authoritative text(Revesz, 1997). In that event, judicial independence should function similarly to the separation of legislative and executive power. Independence introduces another actor with policy preferences that are potentially different from those of the legislature and makes coordination among those actors difficult. Independence thereby increases the risk that an interest group will expend resources attempting to obtain favorable policies but come up empty-handed Indeed, administrative agencies seem much more likely than courts to play the role Landes and Posner describe. Many regulatory statutes entrust an administrative agency with the administration and enforcement of the regulatory program. Civil service laws and statutes creating these agencies may protect their personnel against termination by the executive based on olicy disagreements. Moreover, those personnel may desire jobs with the regulated industr fter their government service, making them a potent force for protecting the rents created by regulatory statutes. Here again an independent judiciary, unless it can be counted on to uphold the agency's decisions, will decrease the predictabil ity of enforcement and the value of favorable The degree of formal separation between the judiciary and the other branch or branches is ordinarily greater in common law than civil law countries. In the common law tradition,the judiciary is a formally separate branch of government and any ordinary judgeship is a prestigious, well-compensated post. A judge is appointed, typically as the culmination of a successful career Ashenfelter, Eisenberg and Schwab(1995), by contrast, find that a judge's ideology (proxied by the party of the President who appointed him or her) do not affect the outcomes of cases at the trial court level in a sample of civil rights cases. They note that in a substantial number of the cases in the sample, the applicable legal rule was reasonably clear. Thus there is no necessary conflict between their findings and those of Revesz, who focused on appellate cases that are more likely to involve the interpretation of facially ambiguous statutesAshenfelter, Eisenberg and Schwab (1995), by contrast, find that a judge’s ideology 2 (proxied by the party of the President who appointed him or her) do not affect the outcomes of cases at the trial court level in a sample of civil rights cases. They note that in a substantial number of the cases in the sample, the applicable legal rule was reasonably clear. Thus there is no necessary conflict between their findings and those of Revesz, who focused on appellate cases that are more likely to involve the interpretation of facially ambiguous statutes. 8 authoritative text (Revesz, 1997). In that event, judicial independence should function similarly 2 to the separation of legislative and executive power. Independence introduces another actor with policy preferences that are potentially different from those of the legislature and makes coordination among those actors difficult. Independence thereby increases the risk that an interest group will expend resources attempting to obtain favorable policies but come up empty-handed. Indeed, administrative agencies seem much more likely than courts to play the role Landes and Posner describe. Many regulatory statutes entrust an administrative agency with the administration and enforcement of the regulatory program. Civil service laws and statutes creating these agencies may protect their personnel against termination by the executive based on policy disagreements. Moreover, those personnel may desire jobs with the regulated industry after their government service, making them a potent force for protecting the rents created by regulatory statutes. Here again an independent judiciary, unless it can be counted on to uphold the agency’s decisions, will decrease the predictability of enforcement and the value of favorable legislation. The degree of formal separation between the judiciary and the other branch or branches is ordinarily greater in common law than civil law countries. In the common law tradition, the judiciary is a formally separate branch of government and any ordinary judgeship is a prestigious, well-compensated post. A judge is appointed, typically as the culmination of a successful career