Separation of powers thus produces less redistribution but also fewer public goods. I Judicial independence reinforces the separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches, on the one hand, and the judiciary, on the other, and we would therefore expect it to increase the cost of redistribution. Compared to Persson et al. 's argument for separation between legislative and executive power, the argument for judicial independence is more complicated and controversial. Landes and Posner(1975)argue that an independent judiciary(that is, one that does not make decisions based on the current desires of the legislature makes interest group deals more secure. The reason is that most legislation is not self-enforcing to be effective, it must be enforced by the judiciary. By enforcing the will of the enacting legislature, the judiciary insulates deals from tampering by future legislatures. The future gislature can, of course, enact a new statute, but this is more costly than simply putting pressure on a judge to rule in favor of the legislature's preferred party. Thus, Landes and Posner conclude judicial independence increases the value of legislative deals by making them more durable Anderson, Shughart and Tollison(1989)argue that the Landes/posner analysis does not adequately explain why a judge would be motivated to enforce the will of the initial legislature. A truly independent judiciary would not feel constrained to follow the legislature's intent. Indeed there is some evidence that independent judges behave independently-that is, they consult their own policy preferences when there is no clear answer from the text of a statute or othe I To anticipate a question that might arise in considering this paper's empirical results, there is not an association between the common law and presidential/congressional regimes; indeed, there is a mild negative correlation. The two forms of separation of powers may be substitutesTo anticipate a question that might arise in considering this paper’s empirical results, 1 there is not an association between the common law and presidential/congressional regimes; indeed, there is a mild negative correlation. The two forms of separation of powers may be substitutes. 7 Separation of powers thus produces less redistribution but also fewer public goods.1 Judicial independence reinforces the separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches, on the one hand, and the judiciary, on the other, and we would therefore expect it to increase the cost of redistribution. Compared to Persson et al.’s argument for separation between legislative and executive power, the argument for judicial independence is more complicated and controversial. Landes and Posner (1975) argue that an independent judiciary (that is, one that does not make decisions based on the current desires of the legislature) makes interest group deals more secure. The reason is that most legislation is not self-enforcing; to be effective, it must be enforced by the judiciary. By enforcing the will of the enacting legislature, the judiciary insulates deals from tampering by future legislatures. The future legislature can, of course, enact a new statute, but this is more costly than simply putting pressure on a judge to rule in favor of the legislature’s preferred party. Thus, Landes and Posner conclude, judicial independence increases the value of legislative deals by making them more durable. Anderson, Shughart and Tollison (1989) argue that the Landes/Posner analysis does not adequately explain why a judge would be motivated to enforce the will of the initial legislature. A truly independent judiciary would not feel constrained to follow the legislature’s intent. Indeed, there is some evidence that independent judges behave independently–that is, they consult their own policy preferences when there is no clear answer from the text of a statute or other