TIMOTHY HILDEBRANDT quite different in Shanghai,Henan,and even Beijing.Local factors lead to different interpretations of issues and sometimes changes in organization structure,part of local 'policy learning'.s8 LGBT activists'work is dependent upon the cultivation and continued preservation of good relations-and the requisite good will-of local governments.It is these ties that ultimately shape domestic organizations'relation- ships with international actors.This becomes even more important when considering the role local governments play in disbursing foreign funds.With governments holding purse strings,organizations have a strong disincentive to link up to the international community if it is against officials'interests.As in other countries,the success and failure of transnational civil society in China is highly dependent on a number of geopolitical-and local-forces. Just as domestic NGOs and local activists need to adapt to government interests and avoid activities counter to state interests,so too do international actors.Not all explanatory power for failed TANs rests with the domestic actors;international actors are bound by similarly restrictive structures.Because of strong state controls on their presence in China,international donors and INGOs interested in engaging in HIV/AIDS-related activities must work within the narrow legal framework;they also need to continually massage ties with central and local government authorities.For foundations with relationships to multinational corporations (e.g.the Gates Foundation),activities that conflict with government interests could put business ventures at risk.Like domestic activists,these actors are,in essence,somewhat embedded within the state.The power of international organizations (IOs)and other states is also limited in China.In making this point,an important clarification to common understandings of the boomerang model should be made:not all states (and IOs)are similarly sized.In the China case,there are clear power asymmetries that make putting pressing on Beijing difficult;states are unlikely to have the same effect on China as they might on Chile. China is not as vulnerable to TANs as those countries from which these theories were initially developed.As evidence of this,an attempt to begin this boomerang played out at a meeting of the Global Fund in Kunming on 11 November 2007.The leader of an HIV/AIDS NGO argued that despite receiving some resources,'true grassroots organizations'are unable to play the role intended by the Global Fund.60 He implored the Global Fund to pressure Beijing to include truly independent NGOs. The Chair of the Global Fund promptly replied that while he was sympathetic, because the Global Fund is 'country-led'and relies on a strong partnership with the governments in the countries it operates,it 'will not impose or pressure governments 58.Betsill and Bulkeley,"Transnational networks and global environmental governance',p.487. 59.K.Anderson and D.Reigg."Global civil society":a skeptical view',in H.Anheier,M.Kaldor and M.Glasius,eds.Global Civil Sociery Yearbook (Oxford:Oxford University Press.2005):N.Chandhoke,'The limits of global civil society',in H.Anheier,M.Kaldor and M.Glasius,eds.Global Civil Sociery Yearbook (Oxford:Oxford University Press,2002).In 1998 a Zambian activist and local human rights organization joined Dutch and American gay organizations to remove penal codes forbidding homosexuality and promote gay rights.After encountering blockage'from the Zambian government-the activists'NGO was denied the right to legally register-another state actor(the Norwegian ambassador)advocated on its behalf.This intervention failed.The group remained unregistered and the Zambian government deemed homosexuality a 'Norwegian conspiracy';see Neville Hoad,'Between the white man's burden and the white man's disease:tracking lesbian and gay human rights in southern Africa'.GLO: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies 5.(1999).p.572. 60.Participant observation.Kunming,11 November 2007. 856quite different in Shanghai, Henan, and even Beijing. Local factors lead to different interpretations of issues and sometimes changes in organization structure, part of local ‘policy learning’.58 LGBT activists’ work is dependent upon the cultivation and continued preservation of good relations—and the requisite good will—of local governments. It is these ties that ultimately shape domestic organizations’ relation￾ships with international actors. This becomes even more important when considering the role local governments play in disbursing foreign funds.With governments holding purse strings, organizations have a strong disincentive to link up to the international community if it is against officials’ interests. As in other countries, the success and failure of transnational civil society in China is highly dependent on a number of geopolitical—and local—forces.59 Just as domestic NGOs and local activists need to adapt to government interests and avoid activities counter to state interests, so too do international actors. Not all explanatory power for failed TANs rests with the domestic actors; international actors are bound by similarly restrictive structures. Because of strong state controls on their presence in China, international donors and INGOs interested in engaging in HIV/AIDS-related activities must work within the narrow legal framework; they also need to continually massage ties with central and local government authorities. For foundations with relationships to multinational corporations (e.g. the Gates Foundation), activities that conflict with government interests could put business ventures at risk. Like domestic activists, these actors are, in essence, somewhat embedded within the state. The power of international organizations (IOs) and other states is also limited in China. In making this point, an important clarification to common understandings of the boomerang model should be made: not all states (and IOs) are similarly sized. In the China case, there are clear power asymmetries that make putting pressing on Beijing difficult; states are unlikely to have the same effect on China as they might on Chile. China is not as vulnerable to TANs as those countries from which these theories were initially developed. As evidence of this, an attempt to begin this boomerang played out at a meeting of the Global Fund in Kunming on 11 November 2007. The leader of an HIV/AIDS NGO argued that despite receiving some resources, ‘true grassroots organizations’ are unable to play the role intended by the Global Fund.60 He implored the Global Fund to pressure Beijing to include truly independent NGOs. The Chair of the Global Fund promptly replied that while he was sympathetic, because the Global Fund is ‘country-led’ and relies on a strong partnership with the governments in the countries it operates, it ‘will not impose or pressure governments 58. Betsill and Bulkeley, ‘Transnational networks and global environmental governance’, p. 487. 59. K. Anderson and D. Reigg, ‘“Global civil society”: a skeptical view’, in H. Anheier, M. Kaldor and M. Glasius, eds, Global Civil Society Yearbook (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); N. Chandhoke, ‘The limits of global civil society’, in H. Anheier, M. Kaldor and M. Glasius, eds, Global Civil Society Yearbook (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). In 1998 a Zambian activist and local human rights organization joined Dutch and American gay organizations to remove penal codes forbidding homosexuality and promote gay rights. After encountering ‘blockage’ from the Zambian government—the activists’ NGO was denied the right to legally register—another state actor (the Norwegian ambassador) advocated on its behalf. This intervention failed. The group remained unregistered and the Zambian government deemed homosexuality a ‘Norwegian conspiracy’; see Neville Hoad, ‘Between the white man’s burden and the white man’s disease: tracking lesbian and gay human rights in southern Africa’, GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies 5, (1999), p. 572. 60. Participant observation, Kunming, 11 November 2007. TIMOTHY HILDEBRANDT 856