得分阅卷教师 三、Calculation:(每题20分，共40分) 1.Two major networks are competing for viewer ratings in the 8:00-9:00 P and-10:0PM.slots on a given weeknight. Each has two shows to fill this time period and is juggling its lineup.Each can choose to put its "bigger"show first or to place it second in the 9:00-10:00 P.M.slot.The combination of decisions leads to the following"ratings points"results: First Second First 15.15 30.10 Second 20,30 18,18 a.Find the Nash equilibria for this game,assuming that both networks make their decisions at the same time. b.Ifeach network is risk averse and uses a maximin strategy,what will be the r ng equilibrium? c.What will be the equilibrium if Network 1 can makes its selection first?If Network 2 goes first? d.Suppose the network managers meet to coordinate schedules and Netw rk 1 promises to schedule its big show first.Is this promise credible?What would be the likely outcome?三、Calculation：（每题 20 分，共 40 分） 1. Two major networks are competing for viewer ratings in the 8:00-9:00 P.M. and 9:00-10:00 P.M. slots on a given weeknight. Each has two shows to fill this time period and is juggling its lineup. Each can choose to put its “bigger” show first or to place it second in the 9:00-10:00 P.M. slot. The combination of decisions leads to the following “ratings points” results: Network 2 First Second First 15, 15 30, 10 Network 1 Second 20, 30 18, 18 a. Find the Nash equilibria for this game, assuming that both networks make their decisions at the same time. b. If each network is risk averse and uses a maximin strategy, what will be the resulting equilibrium? c. What will be the equilibrium if Network 1 can makes its selection first? If Network 2 goes first? d. Suppose the network managers meet to coordinate schedules and Network 1 promises to schedule its big show first. Is this promise credible? What would be the likely outcome? 得分 阅卷教师