Moral Sources and Emergent Ethical Theories in Social Work 1797 Rossiter, 2006)and feminists who question the gender neutrality of male dominated ethics(see below). For feminists and postmodernists, the universal or transcendent principles of a reason-based morality are deeply problematic Not only do they not take the differences between men and women into account, but they also disregard the importance of emotions, care, responsibil y, relationships and so on. Feminists wanting to avoid the difference route found the answer in virtue ethics, while those drawn to Gilligans(1982) work gravitated towards an ethics of care approach, as we shall see below Feminist-influenced ethical theories Virtue ethics For feminists. Virtue theory insists that it is misguided to expect reason to be able to estab lish some infallible moral doctrine which is compulsory and often counter to human nature and emotions. Perhaps morality is not about conforming to ales, but more about being trained to see problematic situations in a moral way. Morality may not be the rational control of the emotions but, more appropriately, the cultivation of desirable emotions(Phoca and Wright,1999,p.123) Phoca and Wright(1999)capture here the feminist critique of reason and rationality as the cornerstone of ethical behaviour. Feminists regard this approach as reductive in its presumptions about the overriding importance of duties and obligations, and rules and principles in moral behaviour. This implies that social workers keep clients'confidence, for example, merely because it is their duty to do so. For feminists, there is much more to mor ality than this. We keep confidentiality because we care about our clients There is something intrinsic to our relationships with clients centred on mutuality and trust. We behave in a trustworthy manner because we care 9 There is a give and take in the relationship that has nothing to do with con sciously and rationally applying rules and principles. Levinas(1998)and Bauman(1993) refer to it as the call of the other-a responsibility we feel not out of duty or obligation, but out of compassion and caring deeply. For some feminists, this something intrinsic'arises from a moral disposition, an innate tendency, something inherently human, that gets reinforced in the give and take of our relationships with others. Relation- ships are thus central to feminist thinking about ethics. As an aside, Herman(1993)argues that contrary to feminist ethicists'claims, Kantian moral theory can accommodate relationships. It is precisely the deliberative intersubjective aspects of Kants moral theory that Habermas develops his discourse ethics if one were to see the ethics of care in kantia erms, one would acknowledge that the fulfilment of human needs, includ ing the need for care, is necessary to sustain oneself as a rational being andRossiter, 2006) and feminists who question the gender neutrality of male￾dominated ethics (see below). For feminists and postmodernists, the universal or transcendent principles of a reason-based morality are deeply problematic. Not only do they not take the differences between men and women into account, but they also disregard the importance of emotions, care, responsibil￾ity, relationships and so on. Feminists wanting to avoid the difference route found the answer in virtue ethics, while those drawn to Gilligan’s (1982) work gravitated towards an ethics of care approach, as we shall see below. Feminist-influenced ethical theories Virtue ethics For feminists: Virtue theory insists that it is misguided to expect reason to be able to estab￾lish some infallible moral doctrine which is compulsory and often counter to human nature and emotions. Perhaps morality is not about conforming to rules, but more about being trained to see problematic situations in a moral way. Morality may not be the rational control of the emotions but, more appropriately, the cultivation of desirable emotions (Phoca and Wright, 1999, p. 123). Phoca and Wright (1999) capture here the feminist critique of reason and rationality as the cornerstone of ethical behaviour. Feminists regard this approach as reductive in its presumptions about the overriding importance of duties and obligations, and rules and principles in moral behaviour. This implies that social workers keep clients’ confidence, for example, merely because it is their duty to do so. For feminists, there is much more to mor￾ality than this. We keep confidentiality because we care about our clients. There is something intrinsic to our relationships with clients centred on mutuality and trust. We behave in a trustworthy manner because we care. There is a give and take in the relationship that has nothing to do with con￾sciously and rationally applying rules and principles. Le´vinas (1998) and Bauman (1993) refer to it as the call of the other—a responsibility we feel not out of duty or obligation, but out of compassion and caring deeply. For some feminists, this ‘something intrinsic’ arises from a moral disposition, an innate tendency, something inherently human, that gets reinforced in the give and take of our relationships with others. Relation￾ships are thus central to feminist thinking about ethics. As an aside, Herman (1993) argues that contrary to feminist ethicists’ claims, Kantian moral theory can accommodate relationships. It is precisely the deliberative intersubjective aspects of Kant’s moral theory that Habermas develops in his discourse ethics. If one were to see the ethics of care in Kantian terms, one would acknowledge that the fulfilment of human needs, includ￾ing the need for care, is necessary to sustain oneself as a rational being and Moral Sources and Emergent Ethical Theories in Social Work 1797 at Fudan university on January 6, 2011 bjsw.oxfordjournals.org Downloaded from