1796 Me/ Gray rule requires. The object of the action is to keep the client's confidence: her motive-reason-to maintain confidentiality accords with the rule that requires her to do so. Hence, this form of ethics is primarily concerned with finding objective moral rules and principles that apply to all people everywhere. Kant's principle of respect for persons, as an end in itself, tied to his view of individuals as rational beings with autonomy and the capacity to exercise choice(Gray and Stofberg, 2000). It is this condition of human agency that sets the object of moral requirement in place and places limitations on our actions. It is precisely this view of the individual that social work adopts. It leads to attention being paid to responsibility as the flipside of duty or obligation and to ethical decision making as a rational activity. Much attention is then focused on devising codes of ethics and ethical decision-making frameworks to guide ethical practice (e.g. Congress, 1999: Mattison, 2000; Robinson and Reeser, 2000; McAu- liffe and Chenoweth, 2008; Dolgoff et aL., 2009). Importantly, however what lies behind this is what Goldstein(1987) was at pains to emphasise and that is social workers' commitment to and seriousness about morality Once they understand the moral motivation behind what they do, they will appreciate the importance of following the rules and ethical codes of their ofession and exercise their freedom or autonomy to do s Deontological approaches create a logic whereby professionals are dut bound to follow their ethical code and where ethical practice without uiding principles is inconceivable. This allows for rational deliberation that comes into play when our routine moral judgements fail us, such as in cases of conflict or uncertainty. While there is no denying the importance of prin- ciples when difficult ethical decisions have to be made, the possibility exists that other factors are equally important. Hence, a new literature is emerging that offers more diverse approaches and appeals for social workers to have a deep understanding of morality and the ethical implications of their work(e.g Clark, 2000, 2006: Houston, 2003: Meagher and Parton, 2004: Hugman, 2005: 5望9 Banks, 2006, 2008: Bowles et al, 2006; Gray and Lovat, 2006, 2007: Lovat and Gray, 2008: Gray and Webb, 2008, 2009). In the harsh, risk-aversive, manage- rial environments of contemporary practice, it becomes increasingly difficult to maintain an ethical perspective. There is an'anti-ethical tendency in the translation of principles into codes used to regulate practitioner behaviour, since they force practitioners into a narrowly prescriptive approach with little space for professional autonomy(Meagher and Parton, 2004; Orme and Rennie, 2006). In such an environment, the practice of value,, as Webb 2006)calls it, is much more difficult than social workers realise. This lowever, should not undermine the importance of principles and codes. It is mportant in the teaching of ethics to emphasise their usefulness despite the difficulties involved and challenges from several quarters: from researchers ith evidence that social workers do not use ethical codes in practice(McAu- fe, 1999; Rossiter et aL., 2000: Banks, 2008), postmodernists who point to ethical ambiguity and uncertainty(Dean and Rhodes, 1998; Parton, 2003;rule requires. The object of the action is to keep the client’s confidence: her motive—reason—to maintain confidentiality accords with the rule that requires her to do so. Hence, this form of ethics is primarily concerned with finding objective moral rules and principles that apply to all people everywhere. Kant’s principle of respect for persons, as an end in itself, is tied to his view of individuals as rational beings with autonomy and the capacity to exercise choice (Gray and Stofberg, 2000). It is this condition of human agency that sets the object of moral requirement in place and places limitations on our actions. It is precisely this view of the individual that social work adopts. It leads to attention being paid to responsibility as the flipside of duty or obligation and to ethical decision making as a rational activity. Much attention is then focused on devising codes of ethics and ethical decision-making frameworks to guide ethical practice (e.g. Congress, 1999; Mattison, 2000; Robinson and Reeser, 2000; McAu￾liffe and Chenoweth, 2008; Dolgoff et al., 20091 ). Importantly, however, what lies behind this is what Goldstein (1987) was at pains to emphasise and that is social workers’ commitment to and seriousness about morality. Once they understand the moral motivation behind what they do, they will appreciate the importance of following the rules and ethical codes of their profession and exercise their freedom or autonomy to do so. Deontological approaches create a logic whereby professionals are duty￾bound to follow their ethical code and where ethical practice without guiding principles is inconceivable. This allows for rational deliberation that comes into play when our routine moral judgements fail us, such as in cases of conflict or uncertainty. While there is no denying the importance of prin￾ciples when difficult ethical decisions have to be made, the possibility exists that other factors are equally important. Hence, a new literature is emerging that offers more diverse approaches and appeals for social workers to have a deep understanding of morality and the ethical implications of their work (e.g. Clark, 2000, 2006; Houston, 2003; Meagher and Parton, 2004; Hugman, 2005; Banks, 2006, 2008; Bowles et al., 2006; Gray and Lovat, 2006, 2007; Lovat and Gray, 2008; Gray and Webb, 2008, 2009). In the harsh, risk-aversive, manage￾rial environments of contemporary practice, it becomes increasingly difficult to maintain an ethical perspective. There is an ‘anti-ethical’ tendency in the translation of principles into codes used to regulate practitioner behaviour, since they force practitioners into a narrowly prescriptive approach with little space for professional autonomy (Meagher and Parton, 2004; Orme and Rennie, 2006). In such an environment, the ‘practice of value’, as Webb (2006) calls it, is much more difficult than social workers realise. This, however, should not undermine the importance of principles and codes. It is important in the teaching of ethics to emphasise their usefulness despite the difficulties involved and challenges from several quarters: from researchers with evidence that social workers do not use ethical codes in practice (McAu￾liffe, 1999; Rossiter et al., 2000; Banks, 2008), postmodernists who point to ethical ambiguity and uncertainty (Dean and Rhodes, 1998; Parton, 2003; 1796 Mel Gray at Fudan university on January 6, 2011 bjsw.oxfordjournals.org Downloaded from