CH'ING ARMIES:POST-TAIPING ERA 209 one or two secret methods from the Westerners',21 but apart from con- ferring officer status on a few men originally trained by foreign drill- masters in the Ever-Victorious Army (for example,Lo Jung-kuang and Yuan Chiu-kao),Li's method was merely for Western instructors to drill the troops in his 'foreign arms corps'.The few Westerners who remained with the Anhwei Army after 1864,including the Frenchman who became a Ch'ing subject,J.Pennell,were unable to provide widespread and system- atic instruction to either officers or men.Apparently the Chinese had reservations about the applicability and overall utility of Western tactics. Charles G.Gordon noted in 1864 that Ch'ing officers admired the foreign- style infantry square,but thought it unlikely their men would stand'.The Chinese 'allow of our superiority in Artillery,but think they are far in advance in infantry'.Moreover,while yung-ying officers acknowledged the value of Western artillery,they were disinclined to learn artillery drill. Gordon noted that they were reluctant even to learn to 'shout their words of command'.22 Could the Chinese accept Western help and yet remain self-reliant?On the other hand,could the ymg-ying forces do without foreign training and yet acquire the essential discipline and skills demanded by modern warfare? This dilemma is revealed in the history of the training programme at Feng- huang-shan(twenty-five miles from Shanghai),initiated by Gordon him- self in May I864 immediately after the disbandment of the Ever-Victorious Army.*3 Enthusiastically endorsed by the British minister and his consul in Shanghai,the Feng-huang-shan training programme received 'verbal assurances'of support from the Tsungli Yamen and was welcomed by Li Hung-chang initially because of the faith he reposed in Gordon.To Gordon,Li entrusted in June 1864 1,3oo of the Anhwei Army troops under two or three of his best officers. The British interest in this programme was many-faceted.Gordon,who did not regard centralized leadership of the decayed Manchu government as feasible,thought that the British should help to develop a Chinese army 'through the Futais [governors],not through the Peking govt.who are a very helpless lot'.+Minister Bruce,while not entirely in agreement with Gordon on Ch'ing politics,none the less believed in rendering military assistance to the Chinese.But it was the attitude of Harry Parkes,the at Ssu-yu Teng and John K.Fairbank,China'r rerponse to the Wert,69. 2 Gordon Papers(British Museum),Add.MSS.52,389,26 Aug.1864;52,393,'Confidential memo on the imperialist sphere'(1864). For details see Richard J.Smith,'Foreign training and China's self-strengthening:the case of Feng-huang-shan,1864-1873',MAS,10.2 (1976)195-223. 4 Gordon Papers,Add.MSS.52,389,19 June 1864. Cambridge Histories Online O Cambridge University Press,2008CH'IN G ARMIES: POST-TAIPING ERA 209 one or two secret methods from the Westerners',21 but apart from con￾ferring officer status on a few men originally trained by foreign drill￾masters in the Ever-Victorious Army (for example, Lo Jung-kuang and Yuan Chiu-kao), Li's method was merely for Western instructors to drill the troops in his 'foreign arms corps'. The few Westerners who remained with the Anhwei Army after 1864, including the Frenchman who became a Ch'ing subject, J. Pennell, were unable to provide widespread and system￾atic instruction to either officers or men. Apparently the Chinese had reservations about the applicability and overall utility of Western tactics. Charles G. Gordon noted in 1864 that Ch'ing officers admired the foreign￾style infantry square, 'but thought it unlikely their men would stand'. The Chinese 'allow of our superiority in Artillery, but think they are far in advance in infantry'. Moreover, whileyung-ying officers acknowledged the value of Western artillery, they were disinclined to learn artillery drill. Gordon noted that they were reluctant even to learn to 'shout their words of command'." Could the Chinese accept Western help and yet remain self-reliant ? On the other hand, could the yung-ying forces do without foreign training and yet acquire the essential discipline and skills demanded by modern warfare ? This dilemma is revealed in the history of the training programme at Feng￾huang-shan (twenty-five miles from Shanghai), initiated by Gordon him￾self in May 1864 immediately after the disbandment of the Ever-Victorious Army.23 Enthusiastically endorsed by the British minister and his consul in Shanghai, the Feng-huang-shan training programme received 'verbal assurances' of support from the Tsungli Yamen and was welcomed by Li Hung-chang initially because of the faith he reposed in Gordon. To Gordon, Li entrusted in June 1864 1,300 of the Anhwei Army troops under two or three of his best officers. The British interest in this programme was many-faceted. Gordon, who did not regard centralized leadership of the decayed Manchu government as feasible, thought that the British should help to develop a Chinese army 'through the Futais [governors], not through the Peking govt. who are a very helpless lot'.24 Minister Bruce, while not entirely in agreement with Gordon on Ch'ing politics, none the less believed in rendering military assistance to the Chinese. But it was the attitude of Harry Parkes, the 11 Ssu-yu Teng and John K. Fairbank, China's response to the West, 69. 22 Gordon Papers (British Museum), Add. MSS. 52,589, 26 Aug. 1864; 52,593, 'Confidential memo on the imperialist sphere' (1864). 25 For details see Richard J. Smith, 'Foreign training and China's self-strengthening: the case of Feng-huang-shan, 1864-1873', MAS, 10.2(1976) 195-223. 24 Gordon Papers, Add. MSS. 52,389, 19 June 1864. Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008