CHAPTER 4 THE MILITARY CHALLENGE: THE NORTH-WEST AND THE COAST CH'ING ARMIES OF THE POST-TAIPING ERA By the end of the Nien War in 1868,a new kind of military force had emerged as the Ch'ing dynasty's chief bulwark of security.Often referred to by historians as regional armies,these forces were generally described at the time as yung-ying (lit.brave battalions').In the late 186os,such forces throughout all the empire totalled more than 3o0,oo0 men.They included the remnants of the old Hunan Army (Hsiang-chuin)founded by Tseng Kuo-fan,the resuscitated Hunan Army(usually called Ch'u-chun)under Tso Tsung-t'ang,and the Anhwei Army (Huai-chun)coordinated by Li Hung-chang.There were also smaller forces of a similar nature in Honan (Yu-chun),Shantung (Tung-chun),Yunnan (Tien-chun)and Szechwan (Ch'uan-chun).1 These forces were distinguished generally by their greater use of Western weapons and they were more costly to maintain.More fundamentally they capitalized for military purposes on the particularistic loyalties of the traditional society.Both the strength and the weakness of the ygying were to be found in the close personal bonds that were formed between higher and lower officers and between officers and men.In this respect they differed from the traditional Ch'ing imperial armies-both the banner forces and the Green Standard Army. The original Ch'ing banners had been composed of companies of 3oo men supported by imperial stipends and grants of land.But to prevent Manchu princes and imperial officials from developing personal military power,the Ch'ing emperors had arranged in the early eighteenth century On the banner and Green Standard forces,see Wei Yuan,Sheng-ws cbi(Chronicle of the sacred dynasty's military campaigns)and Lo Erh-kang,Liying ping-chib(A treatise on the Green Standard Army).The yung-ying figure is from a memorial dated Jan.1866 in Tseng Kuo-fan,Treng Wen-cbeng erng cb'an-cbi (Complete collection of Tseng Kuo-fan's papers; hereafter TCKCC),Trou-ao (Memorials),23.35.On the Shantung Army see Sban-fuong chiin-bring cbi-lueb (Brief record of military campaigns in Shantung),4a.8,and Ting Pao-chen, Ting Wen-cb'eng erng i-cbi(Collected papers of the late Ting Pao-chen),1.4,37b;4.9,16.On the Honan Army,see Yin Keng-yun et al.Yi-cbiin cbi lueh (A concise history of the Honan Army), 1.3.11;5.10.IobI;12.22.5-6.The Yunnan Army originated with Ts'en Yu-ying's cam- paigns against Muslim revolts in that province;see Wang Shu-huai,Hsien-T'ang Yaon-man bui-min sbib-pien (Muslim revolts in Yunnan during the Hsien-feng and T'ung-chih reigns), 224-8. Cambridge Histories Online O Cambridge University Press,2008
CHAPTER 4 THE MILITARY CHALLENGE: THE NORTH-WEST AND THE COAST CH'IN G ARMIES OF THE POST-TAIPING ERA By the end of the Nien War in 1868, a new kind of military force had emerged as the Ch'ing dynasty's chief bulwark of security. Often referred to by historians as regional armies, these forces were generally described at the time n&yung-ying (lit. 'brave battalions'). In the late 1860s, such forces throughout all the empire totalled more than 300,000 men. They included the remnants of the old Hunan Army (Hsiang-chiin) founded by Tseng Kuo-fan, the resuscitated Hunan Army (usually called Ch'u-chiin) under Tso Tsung-t'ang, and the Anhwei Army (Huai-chiin) coordinated by Li Hung-chang. There were also smaller forces of a similar nature in Honan (Yii-chun), Shantung (Tung-chun), Yunnan (Tien-chun) and Szechwan (Ch'uan-chiin). > These forces were distinguished generally by their greater use of Western weapons and they were more costly to maintain. More fundamentally they capitalized for military purposes on the particularistic loyalties of the traditional society. Both the strength and the weakness of thejuftg-ji/jg were to be found in the close personal bonds that were formed between higher and lower officers and between officers and men. In this respect they differed from the traditional Ch'ing imperial armies - both the banner forces and rhe Green Standard Army. The original Ch'ing banners had been composed of companies of 300 men supported by imperial stipends and grants of land. But to prevent Manchu princes and imperial officials from developing personal military power, the Ch'ing emperors had arranged in the early eighteenth century 1 On the banner and Green Standard forces, see Wei Yuan, Sbeng-wu cbi (Chronicle of the sacred dynasty's military campaigns) and Lo Erh-kang, h.u-ying ping-chih (A treatise on the Green Standard Army). The yung-ying figure is from a memorial dated Jan. 1866 in Tseng Kuo-fan, Tseng Wen-cbeng kung cVuan-chi (Complete collection of Tseng Kuo-fan's papers; hereafter TWCKCC), Tsou-kao (Memorials), 25.3$. On the Shantung Army see Sban-tung cbiin-bting ehi-lueb (Brief record of military campaigns in Shantung), 4a. 8, and Ting Pao-chen, Ting U^en-cb'eng Mung i-cbi(Collected papers of the late Ting Pao-chen), 1.4, 37b; 4.9, 16. On the Honan Army, see Yin Keng-yun el al. Yii-cbun chi lueh (A concise history of the Honan Army), I.J.II; j.io.iob-n; 12.22.5-6. The Yunnan Army originated with Ts'en Yii-ying's cam- paigns against Muslim revolts in that province; see Wang Shu-huai, Hsien-T'ung Yun-nan bui-min sbib-pitn (Muslim revolts in Yunnan during the Hsien-feng and T'ung-chih reigns), 224-8. Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
CH'ING ARMIES:POST-TAIPING ERA 203 that the higher commanders of banner forces above the company level were to be rotated from garrison to garrison every three to five years.2 The Green Standard forces,totalling some 6o0,ooo men in the mid-nineteenth century,were positioned in tiny contingents as a constabulary or in the larger 'direct commands'(piao)of the top provincial civil and military officials.But these commands were only relatively large.For example,in the strategic Shensi-Kansu military area the 40,ooo men were divided into thirteen piao,while in Chihli outside Peking 12,ooo men were distributed among seven piao.3 Although the Green Standard troops were hereditary soldiers,even their middle-ranking officers would stay with a given unit of troops usually between three and five years and never in their native province,in accordance with the law of avoidance.This inhibited the growth of long-term relationships between officers and men and especially between commanders and low-ranking officers in the local contingents.A task force pulled together from several Green Standard commands for a specific occasion seldom performed well:the men were not accustomed to their officers,while the officers were at loggerheads with each other'.+ The merit of the yungying had lain in the close personal ties between officers and men.Army commanders('ung-ling)personally chose the com- manders of the various battalions under them.Each battalion commander (ying-kran)responsible for some sso men would personally choose his com- pany officers (shao-ran)who would in turn choose their platoon officers (shib-chang).The to or so common soldiers who formed a platoon were usually chosen by the platoon officer himself.Tseng Kuo-fan in 1868 extolled this system of personal relationships throughout the organization: 'Although rations came from public funds,the yung-ying troops were never- theless grateful to the officers of the battalion for selecting them to be put on the rolls,as if they had received personal favours from the officers. Since in ordinary times there existed [between the officers and the troops] relations of kindness as well as mutual confidence,in battle it could be expected that they would see each other through hardship and adversity.'s As long as the throne's authority over civil and military appointments was not diminished-including the control of high provincial positions and the granting of the coveted Green Standard titles and posts to the yung-ying a Cp.Robert H.G.Lee,The Mancburian frontier in Cb'ing bistory,24-31.Richard J.Smith, 'Chinese military institutions in the mid-nineteenth century,185o-1860',Journal of Arian History,8.2 (1974)136-41.Chang Po-feng,comp.Ch'ing-tai ko-li cbiang-cbiin tu-I'umng ta-cb'en feng nien-piao,1796-19r (Chronological tables of Manchu generals-in-chief,lieutenants- general,imperial agents,etc.,in various areas under the Ch'ing,1796-1911). Lo Eth-kang,Lii-ying ping-cbib,92-100,126-36,162-4,206-7. Ibid.179-81,213-20,237-44.Chiang Chung-yuan,Chiang Chuong-lieb kung i-cbi (The papers ot the late Chiang Chung-yuan),1.2,4. s TWCKCC,Trou-kao,28.18b-19. Cambridge Histories Online O Cambridge University Press,2008
CH'IN G ARMIES: POST-TAIPING ERA 203 that the higher commanders of banner forces above the company level were to be rotated from garrison to garrison every three to five years.2 The Green Standard forces, totalling some 600,000 men in the mid-nineteenth century, were positioned in tiny contingents as a constabulary or in the larger 'direct commands' (piao) of the top provincial civil and military officials. But these commands were only relatively large. For example, in the strategic Shensi-Kansu military area the 40,000 men were divided into thirteen piao, while in Chihli outside Peking 12,000 men were distributed among seven piao.* Although the Green Standard troops were hereditary soldiers, even their middle-ranking officers would stay with a given unit of troops usually between three and five years and never in their native province, in accordance with the law of avoidance. This inhibited the growth of long-term relationships between officers and men and especially between commanders and low-ranking officers in the local contingents. A task force pulled together from several Green Standard commands for a specific occasion seldom performed well: 'the men were not accustomed to their officers, while the officers were at loggerheads with each other'.* The merit of the yung-ying had lain in the close personal ties between officers and men. Army commanders (t'ung-ling) personally chose the commanders of the various battalions under them. Each battalion commander (ying-kuari) responsible for some 550 men would personally choose his company officers (shao-kuan) who would in turn choose their platoon officers {shih-chang). The 10 or so common soldiers who formed a platoon were usually chosen by the platoon officer himself. Tseng Kuo-fan in 1868 extolled this system of personal relationships throughout the organization: 'Although rations came from public funds, theyung-ying troops were nevertheless grateful to the officers of the battalion for selecting them to be put on the rolls, as if they had received personal favours from the officers. Since in ordinary times there existed [between the officers and the troops] relations of kindness as well as mutual confidence, in battle it could be expected that they would see each other through hardship and adversity.'' As long as the throne's authority over civil and military appointments was not diminished - including the control of high provincial positions and the granting of the coveted Green Standard titles and posts to the yung-ying 1 Cp. Robert H. G. Lee, The Manchwian frontier in Ch'ing history, 24-31. Richard J. Smith, 'Chinese military institutions in the mid-nineteenth century, 18 50-1860', Journal of Asian History, 8.2 (1974) 136-41. Chang Po-fcng, comp. Ch'ing-tai ko-ti chiang-cbiin tu-t'ung ta-cb'en teng nien-piao, 1796-1)11 (Chronological tables of Manchu generals-in-chief, lieutenantsgeneral, imperial agents, etc., in various areas under the Ch'ing, 1796-1911). 1 Lo Erh-kang, LM-yingping-cbih, 92-100, 126-36, 162-4, 206-7. 4 Ibid. 179-81, 213-20, 237-44. Chiang Chung-yuan, Chiang Cbtmg-Utb kung i-cbi(The papers ot the late Chiang Chung-yuan), 1.2, 4. ' TWCKCC, Tsou-kao, 28.18D-19. Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
204 THE MILITARY CHALLENGE commanders and officers-the Ch'ing court could make these new armies serve its purposes within China(see volume ro,chapter 9).But in an age of continuous progress in weapons,tactics and auxiliary services,could armed forces that drew their principal strength from particularistic loyal- ties cope with China's new external challenge? During the 186os Peking approved(and eveninitiated)a number of training programmes-usually with the support of European powers,who hoped to see the Ch'ing dynasty become strong enough to defend the treaty ports and trade routes.But only minimal benefits resulted. The dynasty did not intend to abandon the banner and Green Standard forces.Worthless and costly though they were,their maintenance seemed more important than the improvement of the yang-ying.For example,one notable effort was directed towards the banner armies at Peking itself.The Western-armed Peking Field Force(Shen-chi ying),founded in 1862 by Wen-hsiang and others,was drilled by some soo bannermen who had been trained in the use of modern small arms by British officers at Tientsin,as arranged by the commissioner of trade,Ch'ung-hou (see volume 1o, chapter 9).At first only some 3,ooo strong,the Peking Field Force grew considerably in 1865,after Prince Ch'un,the Empress Dowager Tz'u-hsi's brother-in-law,was appointed the prince-ministerin charge.At the throne's order,a total of 3o,ooo men from various banner units at Peking were detached for training with the new force.The power of reviewing the merits of troops and officers had meanwhile been transferred from their original commanders to Prince Ch'un.6 But the Peking Field Force did not grow further.Nor did Prince Ch'un make full use of the opportunity for Western training.In 186-6, he agreed to send two contingents of soo men each from the banner infantry to be drilled in the use of Western weapons at Tientsin,but he resisted the suggestion by Ch'ung-hou,Prince Kung's protege,that mounted bannermen should also receive Western training.Fearful that these individuals might 'neglect the skills they practised in the past',he merely allowed a few of them to undergo a brief period of instruction at Tientsin.In 1869-70,the British training programme,now manned by only three foreign instructors(headed by Major Brown,who had served under Gordon in the Ever Victorious Army)was terminated.The Peking Field Force with its 30,ooo men guarded the Ch'ing capital,7 but in 1870,when 6 Hsi Yu-fu ef al.comp.Huang-cl'ao cheng-fien lei-truan (Classified compendium on the govern- mental documents of the Ch'ing dynasty),331.8-9. 7 Chung-kuo k'o-hsuch yuan ef al.comps.Yang-w#yumn-fuong (The Western affairs movement; hereafter YBYT),3.475-79,484-91,497-8.The total strength of the Peking Field Force's core contingents seems to have been kept at 6,ooo men.As late as 1881-2.Japanese intelli- Cambridge Histories Online O Cambridge University Press,2008
204 THE MILITARY CHALLENGE commanders and officers - the Ch'ing court could make these new armies serve its purposes within China (see volume 10, chapter 9). But in an age of continuous progress in weapons, tactics and auxiliary services, could armed forces that drew their principal strength from particularistic loyalties cope with China's new external challenge ? During the 18 60s Peking approved (and even initiated) a number of training programmes - usually with the support of European powers, who hoped to see the Ch'ing dynasty become strong enough to defend the treaty ports and trade routes. But only minimal benefits resulted. The dynasty did not intend to abandon the banner and Green Standard forces. Worthless and costly though they were, their maintenance seemed more important than the improvement of the jungying. For example, one notable effort was directed towards the banner armies at Peking itself. The Western-armed Peking Field Force (Shen-chi ying), founded in 1862 by Wen-hsiang and others, was drilled by some 500 bannermen who had been trained in the use of modern small arms by British officers at Tientsin, as arranged by the commissioner of trade, Ch'ung-hou (see volume 10, chapter 9). At first only some 3,000 strong, the Peking Field Force grew considerably in 1865, after Prince Ch'un, the Empress Dowager Tz'u-hsi's brother-in-law, was appointed the prince-minister in charge. At the throne's order, a total of 30,000 men from various banner units at Peking were detached for training with the new force. The power of reviewing the merits of troops and officers had meanwhile been transferred from their original commanders to Prince Ch'un.6 But the Peking Field Force did not grow further. Nor did Prince Ch'un make full use of the opportunity for Western training. In 1865-6, he agreed to send two contingents of 500 men each from the banner infantry to be drilled in the use of Western weapons at Tientsin, but he resisted the suggestion by Ch'ung-hou, Prince Kung's protege1 , that mounted bannermen should also receive Western training. Fearful that these individuals might 'neglect the skills they practised in the past', he merely allowed a few of them to undergo a brief period of instruction at Tientsin. In 1869-70, the British training programme, now manned by only three foreign instructors (headed by Major Brown, who had served under Gordon in the Ever Victorious Army) was terminated. The Peking Field Force with its 30,000 men guarded the Ch'ing capital,7 but in 1870, when 6 Hst Yii-fu el a/, comp. Huang-cb'ao tbeng-tien Ui-tsuan (Classified compendium on the govern- mental documents of the Ch'ing dynasty), 331.8-9. 1 Chung-kuo k'o-hsueh yuan et al. comps. Yang-miytm-tung (The Western affairs movement; hereafter YWYT), 3.475-79, 484-91, 497-8. The total strength of the Peking Field Force's core contingents seems to have been kept at 6,000 men. As late as 1881-2, Japanese intelliCambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
CH'ING ARMIES:POST-TAIPING ERA 205 war with France seemed imminent in the wake of the Tientsin Massacre, some 25,ooo men of Li Hung-chang's yung-ying force had to be summoned to bolster Chihli's defences.Li's forces were authorized to be stationed at points half-way between Taku and Peking,up to such towns as Yang-ts'un and Ho-hsi-wu.8 Peking's safety now depended on the loyalty of the Han Chinese. Elsewhere in the empire,banner garrisons that had declined continued to be replenished and financed.But plainly there was no revival of Manchu power.In Canton,Ch'ing officials,conforming with Peking directives, accepted separate British and French offers to drill the Ch'ing troops in the use of modern arms.Beginning in 1863,with equipment purchased by provincial authorities,360 bannermen were trained by the British and 3oo by the French.Coordinated by a Manchu officer,53I local Green Standard troops also underwent drill by the British.The training programmes at Canton were terminated,however,only three years later,when the dis- illusioned foreign consuls wanted the European instructors withdrawn. Meanwhile,Manchu officials were hard put to it to restore the banner garrisons at their statutory locations.In 1867,in Ili and four other centres in Sinkiang,only Iso banner soldiers had survived the Muslim revolts; they had to be transferred to Inner Mongolia for resettlement.In the twelve garrisoned cities of China proper,the bannermen and their families, living in their segregated quarters,were as demoralized as those that re- mained in Manchuria-indigent,addicted to opium,and regularly short- changed by their superiors in their imperial stipends.1o Since banner strength could not easily be revived,the Ch'ing court sought to strengthen the Green Standard Army,over which the boards of War and Revenue still retained control.Ch'ung-hou's British training programme at Tientsin actually drilled more Green Standard troops than bannermen,and out of the former had arisen the Tientsin foreign arms and cannon corps'of soo men,which proved valuable during the Nien War.Meanwhile,Liu Ch'ang-yu,the former Hunan Army commander who became governor-general of Chihli in 1863,had proposed giving new training to some Iso,ooo Chihli Green Standard troops without over- gence found that the force's own command (pen-pw)consisted of only 3,5oo infantry,2,ooo cavalry and soo gunnery troops.See Fukushima Yasumasa,comp.Rimpo beibi ryaks (Military preparedness in neighbouring countries)I.21b-22. Wang Erh-min,Huai-cbin cbib (History of the Anhwei Army),354-5.Li Hung-chang,Li Wen-cbumg kung ch'ian-cbi(Complete papers of Li Hung-chang;hereafter LWCK),Trou-tao (Memorials),17.1ob. YWYT,3.459-70,481.In the mid-1860s,the Ch'ing government employed foreign instruc- tors to train banner and Green Standard forces in two other cities:Foochow (from mid-1865 to 1866);and Wuchang (from early 1866 to mid-1868);sce ibid.471-2,482,492-4. o Huang-cb'ao cbeng-tien lei-truan,333.11.Lee,Mancburian frontier,123-5. Cambridge Histories Online O Cambridge University Press,2008
CH'IN G ARMIES: POST-TAIPING ERA 205 war with France seemed imminent in the wake of the Tientsin Massacre, some 25,000 men of Li Hung-ch&ng'sjung-jing force had to be summoned to bolster Chihli's defences. Li's forces were authorized to be stationed at points half-way between Taku and Peking, up to such towns as Yang-ts'un and Ho-hsi-wu.8 Peking's safety now depended on the loyalty of the Han Chinese. Elsewhere in the empire, banner garrisons that had declined continued to be replenished and financed. But plainly there was no revival of Manchu power. In Canton, Ch'ing officials, conforming with Peking directives, accepted separate British and French offers to drill the Ch'ing troops in the use of modern arms. Beginning in 1863, with equipment purchased by provincial authorities, 360 bannermen were trained by the British and 300 by the French. Coordinated by a Manchu officer, 531 local Green Standard troops also underwent drill by the British. The training programmes at Canton were terminated, however, only three years later, when the disillusioned foreign consuls wanted the European instructors withdrawn.9 Meanwhile, Manchu officials were hard put to it to restore the banner garrisons at their statutory locations. In 1867, in Hi and four other centres in Sinkiang, only 150 banner soldiers had survived the Muslim revolts; they had to be transferred to Inner Mongolia for resettlement. In the twelve garrisoned cities of China proper, the bannermen and their families, living in their segregated quarters, were as demoralized as those that remained in Manchuria - indigent, addicted to opium, and regularly shortchanged by their superiors in their imperial stipends.10 Since banner strength could not easily be revived, the Ch'jng court sought to strengthen the Green Standard Army, over which the boards of War and Revenue still retained control. Ch'ung-hou's British training programme at Tientsin actually drilled more Green Standard troops than bannermen, and out of the former had arisen the Tientsin 'foreign arms and cannon corps' of 500 men, which proved valuable during the Nien War. Meanwhile, Liu Ch'ang-yu, the former Hunan Army commander who became governor-general of Chihli in 1863, had proposed giving new training to some 150,000 Chihli Green Standard troops without overgence found that the force's own command (pen-pu) consisted of only 3,500 infantry, 2,000 cavalry and 500 gunnery troops. See Fukushima Yasumasa, comp. Rimpo heibi ryaku (Military preparedness in neighbouring countries) I.2ib-Z2. * Wang Erh-min, Huai-chiin Mb (History of the Anhwei Army), 5.54-5. Li Hung-chang, JL; Wen-cbung kung cb'uan-cbi (Complete papers of Li Hung-chang; hereafter L.WCK), Tsou-kao (Memorials), 17.10b. » YWYT, 3.459-70, 481. In the mid-i86os, the Ch'ing government employed foreign instructors to train banner and Green Standard forces in two other cities: Foochow (from mid-1865 to 1866); and Wuchang (from early 1866 to mid-1868); see ibid. 471-2, 482, 492-4. 10 Huang-tb'ao cbeng-ticn lei-ttuan, 333.11. Lee, Mancburianfrontier, 123-5. Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
2o6 THE MILITARY CHALLENGE hauling the traditional command structure.Troops from the tiny brum out- posts were organized into battalions'of soo men each for the purpose of periodic drill in all of the seven centres in the province,but the troops were allowed to return to their posts during the long intervals in between drills. In 1866,Prince Kung secured imperial approval to give governor- general Liu more financial support.Troops from the large piao commands were to be detached to serve in six centres under Liu's coordination.The reorganized force was now designated lien-cbiin,or the 'retrained [Green Standard]forces'.The Board of Revenue at first allocated Ioo,ooo taels from the Tientsin maritime customs for the new training programme's munitions needs.But in January 1867,Lo Tun-yen,president of the board,who belonged to the court faction opposing Prince Kung,memorial- ized to attack the plan-criticism which Tz'u-hsi must have welcomed,for an edict drastically pared down the new programme's revenue.It was not until after the traumatic experience of the Nien cavalry invasion of Chihli in 1868 and the subsequent appointment of Tseng Kuo-fan as Chihli governor-general that further plans were made for the lien-chiin.Arriving at Peking at a time when the Sino-British treaty revision aroused a heated foreign policy debate at court,Tseng found,as he reported to Li Hung- chang,that 'Prince Kung emphasized peace,while Prince Ch'un empha- sized war and defence;the general opinion sided with Prince Ch'un'.Both Manchu factions so trusted Tseng that he was given a free hand to make adjustments in the Green Standard system.Tz'u-hsi herself discussed this with Tseng.13 Tseng adapted his yung-ying formula to the Green Standard Army, although he was inhibited(perhaps by his own conservatism as well as by his political position)from bringing up more basic issues of reform.He recommended in 1869-7o that the newly created battalions should remain intact,their troops and officers to be chosen from the larger Green Standard commands of the provinces.Moreover,the quality and per- formance of the troops and lower-level officers so detached should be reviewed by new battalion officers,each in charge of approximately sso men as in the yung-ying system.In the greatest departure from tradition, t Wang Erh-min,'Lien-chun ti ch'i-yuan chi ch'i i-i'(The origins and significance of the retrained Green Standard contingents),Ta-lu fra-cbib,34.7(April 1967)216,summarizing Liu Ch'ang-yu's memorial. Ch'ing-fai cb'ou-pan i-wu sbib-mo (Complete record of the management of barbarian affairs), Tung-chih (hereafter IWSM-TC),43.10.Liu Ch'ang-yu,Lin Wu-theng erng i-sbu (Papers of the late Liu Ch'ang-yu),12.3,21b,31-7.Ta-Ch'ing li-cb'ao sbib-lu(Veritable records of successive reigns of the Ch'ing dynasty),Tung-chih (hereafter CSL-TC)193.18b-19. 13 TWCKCC,Sbu-cha (Letters),27.2.Tseng Kuo-fan,Treng Wen-cbeng kimng thou-brieb jib-cbi (Tseng Kuo-fan's holograph diary),2.2856,entry of 27 Feb.1869. Cambridge Histories Online O Cambridge University Press,2008
206 THE MILITARY CHALLENGE hauling the traditional command structure. Troops from the tiny hsun outposts were organized into 'battalions' of 500 men each for the purpose of periodic drill in all of the seven centres in the province, but the troops were allowed to return to their posts during the long intervals in between drills. •' In 1866, Prince Kung secured imperial approval to give governorgeneral Liu more financial support. Troops from the large piao commands were to be detached to serve in six centres under Liu's coordination. The reorganized force was now designated lien-chiin, or the 'retrained [Green Standard] forces'. The Board of Revenue at first allocated 100,000 taels from the Tientsin maritime customs for the new training programme's munitions needs. But in January 1867, Lo Tun-yen, president of the board, who belonged to the court faction opposing Prince Kung, memorialized to attack the plan - criticism which Tz'u-hsi must have welcomed, for an edict drastically pared down the new programme's revenue.I2 It was not until after the traumatic experience of the Nien cavalry invasion of Chihli in 1868 and the subsequent appointment of Tseng Kuo-fan as Chihli governor-general that further plans were made for the lien-chun. Arriving at Peking at a time when the Sino-British treaty revision aroused a heated foreign policy debate at court, Tseng found, as he reported to Li Hungchang, that 'Prince Kung emphasized peace, while Prince Ch'un emphasized war and defence; the general opinion sided with Prince Ch'un'. Both Manchu factions so trusted Tseng that he was given a free hand to make adjustments in the Green Standard system. Tz'u-hsi herself discussed this with Tseng.13 Tseng adapted his yung-ying formula to the Green Standard Army, although he was inhibited (perhaps by his own conservatism as well as by his political position) from bringing up more basic issues of reform. He recommended in 1869-70 that the newly created battalions should remain intact, their troops and officers to be chosen from the larger Green Standard commands of the provinces. Moreover, the quality and performance of the troops and lower-level officers so detached should be reviewed by new battalion officers, each in charge of approximately 550 men as in the yung-ying system. In the greatest departure from tradition, 11 Wang Erh-min, 'Lien-chun ti ch'i-yuan chi ch'i i-i' (The origins and significance of the retrained Green Standard contingents), Ta-lu tsa-cbib, 34.7 (April 1967) 216, summarizing Liu Ch'ang-yu's memorial. 11 Ch'ing-tai cb'ou-pan i-mu sbih-mo (Complete record of the management of barbarian affairs), T'ung-chih (hereafter IWSM-TC), 43.10. Liu Ch'ang-yu, Uu Wu-sbtng kung i-shu (Papers of the late Liu Ch'ang-yu), 12.3, 21b, 31-7. Ta-Cb'ing li-cb'ao shib-lu (Veritable records of successive reigns of the Ch'ing dynasty), T'ung-chih (hereafter CSL.-TC) 193.18D-19. " TWCKCC, Shu-cha (Letters), 27.2. Tseng Kuo-fan, Tseng Wen-cbeng kung sbou-bsieb jib-tbi (Tseng Kuo-fan's holograph diary), 2.2856, entry of 27 Feb. 1869. Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
CH'ING ARMIES:POST-TAIPING ERA 207 Tseng wanted the battalion officers to have authority to replace troops found to be undesirable,with new recruits from among the natives of Chihli,including those who had never been in the register of hereditary Green Standard families.1+The battalion officer himself was to be chosen by a high Green Standard officer-the general-in-chief or brigade general. Under the law of avoidance,the generals and in fact all Green Standard officers down to the second captains had to be natives of other provinces. While the retrained Green Standard troops and officers could not enjoy the native-place ties that characterized most yung-ying units,Tseng hoped that the middle-grade officers of the lien-cbiin could at least serve longer terms and could establish rapport with the brigade generals or generals-in-chief who were given the additional title of t'ug-ling,commanders of the lien- chiin.The regulations drafted by Tseng and approved by the throne in April 187o provided for a pay scale for the lien-cbiin officers and men,which was higher than that of their counterparts in the usual Green Standard units.But Tseng refrained from recommending the overhaul of the entire Green Standard system so as to reduce the number of worthless troops.He hoped that revenue for the lien-cbiin could come from new sources.'s Actually,the throne,during the preceding four years,had approved the proposals of other provincial officials that Green Standard troops in certain provincial commands be reduced so that the funds saved could be applied to the pay and weapons of the remaining Green Standard troops. Tso Tsung-t'ang,governor-general of Fukien and Chekiang until 1867, had begun reorganizing the Fukien Green Standard forces on this basis, and Ting Jih-ch'ang,governor of Kiangsu,with imperial sanction had reduced in 1869 the number of his 'governor's direct command'(fu-piao) from 1,6oo to I,oo0.16(See volume Io,page jo3.)Ting was seriously interested in transforming the I,ooo men under his personal command into a nucleus for the general reform of the Green Standard Army in Kiangsu- a plan left unrealized when Ting himself had to leave in 187o to mourn the death of his mother. Having found in Tseng Kuo-fan's proposals the hope that the Green Standard system could as a whole be saved and improved,the throne in 187I ordered each province to reduce its existing yung-ying forces to less than 8,ooo men,except in such strategic provinces as Kiangsu and Chihli.7 1 TWCKCC,Tsou-kao,28.19b,36. 15bid.28.2ob;2913,6,18b-19. t6 Tso Tsung-t'ang,Tro Wen-isiang eung eb'dan-chi (Complete collection of Tso Tsung-t'ang's papers;hereafter TWHK),14.17;19.16-21.Lu Shih-ch'iang,Ting Jib-ch'ang yf fzu-cb'iang yto-tung (Ting Jih-ch'ang and the self-strengthening movement),186-7.Huang-cb'ao cbeng- tien lei-fruan,325.4b,8-10. 7Liu Chin-tsao,ed.Ch'ing-cb'ao bru wen-brien 'ng-'ao(Encyclopaedia of the historical records of the Ch'ing dynasty,continued),202.9,sos.Kwang-Ching Liu,'The limits of regional power in the late Ch'ing period:a reappraisal',Ch'ing-bua breb-pao,Ns,to.2(July 1974)217. Cambridge Histories OnlineCambridge University Press,2008
CH ING ARMIES: POST-TAIPING ERA 207 Tseng wanted the battalion officers to have authority to replace troops found to be undesirable, with new recruits from among the natives of Chihli, including those who had never been in the register of hereditary Green Standard families.14 The battalion officer himself was to be chosen by a high Green Standard officer - the general-in-chief or brigade general. Under the law of avoidance, the generals and in fact all Green Standard officers down to the second captains had to be natives of other provinces. While the retrained Green Standard troops and officers could not enjoy the native-place ties that characterized mostyung-ying units, Tseng hoped that the middle-grade officers of the lien-chun could at least serve longer terms and could establish rapport with the brigade generals or generals-in-chief who were given the additional title of t'ung-ling, commanders of the lienchun. The regulations drafted by Tseng and approved by the throne in April 1870 provided for a pay scale for the lien-chun officers and men, which was higher than that of their counterparts in the usual Green Standard units. But Tseng refrained from recommending the overhaul of the entire Green Standard system so as to reduce the number of worthless troops. He hoped that revenue for the lien-chun could come from new sources.15 Actually, the throne, during the preceding four years, had approved the proposals of other provincial officials that Green Standard troops in certain provincial commands be reduced so that the funds saved could be applied to the pay and weapons of the remaining Green Standard troops. Tso Tsung-t'ang, governor-general of Fukien and Chekiang until 1867, had begun reorganizing the Fukien Green Standard forces on this basis, and Ting Jih-ch'ang, governor of Kiangsu, with imperial sanction had reduced in 1869 the number of his 'governor's direct command' (fu-piao) from 1,600 to 1,000.l6 (See volume 10, page 503.) Ting was seriously interested in transforming the 1,000 men under his personal command into a nucleus for the general reform of the Green Standard Army in Kiangsu - a plan left unrealized when Ting himself had to leave in 1870 to mourn the death of his mother. Having found in Tseng Kuo-fan's proposals the hope that the Green Standard system could as a whole be saved and improved, the throne in 1871 ordered each province to reduce its existing yung-ying forces to less than 8,000 men, except in such strategic provinces as Kiangsu and Chihli." '• TWCKCC, Tsou-kao, 28.19b, 36. " Ibid. 28.20b; 29.13, 16, 18ID-19. 16 Tso Tsung-t'ang, Tso Wen-bsiang kung cb'iian-chi (Complete collection of Tso Tsung-t'ang's papers; hereafter TH^HK), 14.17; 19.16-21. Lii Shih-ch'iang, Ting Jib-cb'angyS t^u-ch'iang yun-tung (Ting Jih-ch'ang and the self-strengthening movement), 186-7. Huang-ch'ao cbengtitn Iti-tsuan, 325.4b, 8-10. 17 Liu Chin-tsao, ed. Ch'ing-cb'ao bsu wen-bsien t'ung-k'ao (Encyclopaedia of the historical records of the Ch'ing dynasty, continued), 202.9, 505. Kwang-Ching Liu, 'The limits of regional power in the late Ch'ing period: a reappraisal', Cb'ing-bua bsueb-pao, NS, 10.2 (July 1974) 217. Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
2o8 THE MILITARY CHALLENGE While this guideline concerning the yung-ying was only loosely followed, the loyal provincial administrators now found convenient formulas to accommodate the vested interests of the Green Standard Army in each province.Some provinces(Kiangsu,Chekiang,Fukien and Kwangtung) followed the precedents set by Tso Tsung-t'ang and Ting Jih-ch'ang,and reduced the troops of certain commands which,at least in theory,raised the pay of the remaining Green Standard troops.Other provinces (Shantung,Honan,Shansi and Hunan)adopted in toto Tseng's regulations for Chihli and organized lien-chiin battalions out of the Green Standard personnel-a method for which the Board of War indicated its preference in 1873.18 The court did not object to the infiltration of the Green Standard system by yung-ying officers.As part of the dynasty's system of conferring recognition,many yung-ying officers since the 18sos had been given the brevet status of Green Standard officer.More of them were now allowed to fill actual Green Standard vacancies from second captain up to pro- vincial general-in-chief,posts still controlled by the Board of War and,in the case of high commanders,by the throne itself. While Tseng's lien-chiin formula infused some new elements into the Green Standard Army at all levels,large amounts of deadwood un- doubtedly remained.In the late seventies and eighties the number of Green Standard troops was still around 400,oo0,costing annually more than 6 million taels to maintain.From the dynasty's standpoint,this large expenditure was not a total waste,for the retrained Green Standard forces, equipped with comparatively modern arms and deployed in revolt-prone areas of the provinces,maintained general internal tranquillity in the remaining years of the century.But for large-scale campaigns such as the Muslim wars in Shensi,Kansu and Sinkiang,to say nothing of conflicts with European powers or Japan,the yang-ying continued to be the only instrument that could possibly be effective. Yet the organizational principle of the yung ying remained incompatible with modern military practice.For all the interpersonal rapport between its troops and officers,the yung-ying hierarchy gave the middle-and upper- level officers a status which could place them above direct participation in combat.It was extremely difficult to get the battalion or even company officers to participate in rigorous training,especially in Western-style drill. Ever since 1862-3,Li Hung-chang had hoped that his officers'would learn Huang-cb'ao cbeng-tien lei-truan,326.6b-8. Memorial dated Jan.1884 of Prince Kung and other Tsungli Yamen ministers,YWYT,526. See also Chang P'ei-lun,Chian-yi cbi(Memorials of Chang P'ei-lun),6.10. ao See Lo Erh-kang,Lfi-ying ping-cbib,72-3(nn.70-3).The uses of lien-cbiin in suppressing local revolts are now more fully documented in Kung-cbung-fang Kuang-bru ch'ao trou-cbe (Secret palace memorials of the Kuang-hsu period,1875-1908),e.g,2.02.664,667;3.172,318, 323,399,445,5I8,753 Cambridge Histories Online O Cambridge University Press,2008
2O8 THE MILITARY CHALLENGE While this guideline concerning the yung-ying was only loosely followed, the loyal provincial administrators now found convenient formulas to accommodate the vested interests of the Green Standard Army in each province. Some provinces (Kiangsu, Chekiang, Fukien and Kwangtung) followed the precedents set by Tso Tsung-t'ang and Ting Jih-ch'ang, and reduced the troops of certain commands which, at least in theory, raised the pay of the remaining Green Standard troops. Other provinces (Shantung, Honan, Shansi and Hunan) adopted in toto Tseng's regulations for Chihli and organized lien-chun battalions out of the Green Standard personnel - a method for which the Board of War indicated its preference in 1873.'8 The court did not object to the infiltration of the Green Standard system ty yung-ying officers. As part of the dynasty's system of conferring recognition, many yung-ying officers since the 1850s had been given the brevet status of Green Standard officer. More of them were now allowed to fill actual Green Standard vacancies from second captain up to provincial general-in-chief, posts still controlled by the Board of War and, in the case of high commanders, by the throne itself. While Tseng's lien-chun formula infused some new elements into the Green Standard Army at all levels, large amounts of deadwood undoubtedly remained. In the late seventies and eighties the number of Green Standard troops was still around 400,000, costing annually more than 6 million taels to maintain.1 ' From the dynasty's standpoint, this large expenditure was not a total waste, for the retrained Green Standard forces, equipped with comparatively modern arms and deployed in revolt-prone areas of the provinces, maintained general internal tranquillity in the remaining years of the century.20 But for large-scale campaigns such as the Muslim wars in Shensi, Kansu and Sinkiang, to say nothing of conflicts with European powers or Japan, the yung-ying continued to be the only instrument that could possibly be effective. Yet the organizational principle of the yung-ying remained incompatible with modern military practice. For all the interpersonal rapport between its troops and officers, theyung-jing hierarchy gave the middle- and upperlevel officers a status which could place them above direct participation in combat. It was extremely difficult to get the battalion or even company officers to participate in rigorous training, especially in Western-style drill. Ever since 1862-3, Li Hung-chang had hoped that his officers 'would learn 18 Huang-ch'ao cbcng-tien Ui-ttuan, 326.6D-8. '• Memorial dated Jan. 1884 of Prince Kung and other Tsungli Yamen ministers, YWYT, 526. See also Chang P'ei-lun, Cbien-yu cbi (Memorials of Chang P'ei-lun), 6.10. 20 See Lo Erh-kang, Ui-yingping-cbib, 72-3 (nn. 70-}). The uses ollien-cbun in suppressing local revolts are now more fully documented in Kung-cbung-tang Kuang-btu cb'ao tsou-cbe (Secret palace memorials of the Kuang-hsu period, 1875-1908), e.g., 2.302, 664, 667; 3.172, 318, 3*3. 399. 445. 5»8. 753- Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
CH'ING ARMIES:POST-TAIPING ERA 209 one or two secret methods from the Westerners',21 but apart from con- ferring officer status on a few men originally trained by foreign drill- masters in the Ever-Victorious Army (for example,Lo Jung-kuang and Yuan Chiu-kao),Li's method was merely for Western instructors to drill the troops in his 'foreign arms corps'.The few Westerners who remained with the Anhwei Army after 1864,including the Frenchman who became a Ch'ing subject,J.Pennell,were unable to provide widespread and system- atic instruction to either officers or men.Apparently the Chinese had reservations about the applicability and overall utility of Western tactics. Charles G.Gordon noted in 1864 that Ch'ing officers admired the foreign- style infantry square,but thought it unlikely their men would stand'.The Chinese 'allow of our superiority in Artillery,but think they are far in advance in infantry'.Moreover,while yung-ying officers acknowledged the value of Western artillery,they were disinclined to learn artillery drill. Gordon noted that they were reluctant even to learn to 'shout their words of command'.22 Could the Chinese accept Western help and yet remain self-reliant?On the other hand,could the ymg-ying forces do without foreign training and yet acquire the essential discipline and skills demanded by modern warfare? This dilemma is revealed in the history of the training programme at Feng- huang-shan(twenty-five miles from Shanghai),initiated by Gordon him- self in May I864 immediately after the disbandment of the Ever-Victorious Army.*3 Enthusiastically endorsed by the British minister and his consul in Shanghai,the Feng-huang-shan training programme received 'verbal assurances'of support from the Tsungli Yamen and was welcomed by Li Hung-chang initially because of the faith he reposed in Gordon.To Gordon,Li entrusted in June 1864 1,3oo of the Anhwei Army troops under two or three of his best officers. The British interest in this programme was many-faceted.Gordon,who did not regard centralized leadership of the decayed Manchu government as feasible,thought that the British should help to develop a Chinese army 'through the Futais [governors],not through the Peking govt.who are a very helpless lot'.+Minister Bruce,while not entirely in agreement with Gordon on Ch'ing politics,none the less believed in rendering military assistance to the Chinese.But it was the attitude of Harry Parkes,the at Ssu-yu Teng and John K.Fairbank,China'r rerponse to the Wert,69. 2 Gordon Papers(British Museum),Add.MSS.52,389,26 Aug.1864;52,393,'Confidential memo on the imperialist sphere'(1864). For details see Richard J.Smith,'Foreign training and China's self-strengthening:the case of Feng-huang-shan,1864-1873',MAS,10.2 (1976)195-223. 4 Gordon Papers,Add.MSS.52,389,19 June 1864. Cambridge Histories Online O Cambridge University Press,2008
CH'IN G ARMIES: POST-TAIPING ERA 209 one or two secret methods from the Westerners',21 but apart from conferring officer status on a few men originally trained by foreign drillmasters in the Ever-Victorious Army (for example, Lo Jung-kuang and Yuan Chiu-kao), Li's method was merely for Western instructors to drill the troops in his 'foreign arms corps'. The few Westerners who remained with the Anhwei Army after 1864, including the Frenchman who became a Ch'ing subject, J. Pennell, were unable to provide widespread and systematic instruction to either officers or men. Apparently the Chinese had reservations about the applicability and overall utility of Western tactics. Charles G. Gordon noted in 1864 that Ch'ing officers admired the foreignstyle infantry square, 'but thought it unlikely their men would stand'. The Chinese 'allow of our superiority in Artillery, but think they are far in advance in infantry'. Moreover, whileyung-ying officers acknowledged the value of Western artillery, they were disinclined to learn artillery drill. Gordon noted that they were reluctant even to learn to 'shout their words of command'." Could the Chinese accept Western help and yet remain self-reliant ? On the other hand, could the yung-ying forces do without foreign training and yet acquire the essential discipline and skills demanded by modern warfare ? This dilemma is revealed in the history of the training programme at Fenghuang-shan (twenty-five miles from Shanghai), initiated by Gordon himself in May 1864 immediately after the disbandment of the Ever-Victorious Army.23 Enthusiastically endorsed by the British minister and his consul in Shanghai, the Feng-huang-shan training programme received 'verbal assurances' of support from the Tsungli Yamen and was welcomed by Li Hung-chang initially because of the faith he reposed in Gordon. To Gordon, Li entrusted in June 1864 1,300 of the Anhwei Army troops under two or three of his best officers. The British interest in this programme was many-faceted. Gordon, who did not regard centralized leadership of the decayed Manchu government as feasible, thought that the British should help to develop a Chinese army 'through the Futais [governors], not through the Peking govt. who are a very helpless lot'.24 Minister Bruce, while not entirely in agreement with Gordon on Ch'ing politics, none the less believed in rendering military assistance to the Chinese. But it was the attitude of Harry Parkes, the 11 Ssu-yu Teng and John K. Fairbank, China's response to the West, 69. 22 Gordon Papers (British Museum), Add. MSS. 52,589, 26 Aug. 1864; 52,593, 'Confidential memo on the imperialist sphere' (1864). 25 For details see Richard J. Smith, 'Foreign training and China's self-strengthening: the case of Feng-huang-shan, 1864-1873', MAS, 10.2(1976) 195-223. 24 Gordon Papers, Add. MSS. 52,389, 19 June 1864. Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
2I0 THE MILITARY CHALLENGE British consul at Shanghai,that put Li Hung-chang on his guard.Parkes wanted primarily to train Chinese troops who could defend Shanghai against possible further unrest in that area.He was also jealous of the French,who still maintained a small camp for training Chinese troops near Shanghai(troops who were not returned to the Chinese authorities until mid-1865).Li imputed to Parkes the intent of taking over our military authority and squandering our financial resources'.2s In late 1864,however,Gordon abandoned the training programme to return to England.Li had to accept Parkes'nominee as Feng-huang-shan's new drillmaster-Lieutenant Jebb of the British Army.In an agreement dated November 1864,Parkes accepted Li's guid pro guo that a commander of the Anhwei Army,P'an Ting-hsin,should have complete control over promotion and demotion of Chinese officers and troops,as well as their pay and equipment.The programme was to be financed from the maritime customs revenue.Jebb's duties were confined to drill and instruction, including the supervision of fifteen foreign staff members,also paid by the Chinese.Jebb proved,however,to be a bad choice,frequently absent from the camp and,when on duty,rigidly insistent on adherence to 'the Queen's Regulations and the Drill Book'.*6 When,in June 1865,Li was ordered by the throne to send troops and artillery to Chihli to guard its border against the Niens,he had no hesitation in pulling an entire battalion out from Feng-huang-shan,together with a 3oo-man artillery corps under training there,to be dispatched to the north under P'an Ting-hsin.Consul Parkes protested vehemently.Although Li agreed to replace the 8so men taken from Feng-huang-shan with other Anhwei Army troops,he no longer had, by this time,any faith in the Feng-huang-shan programme and repeatedly rejected requests for its expansion. The camp's subsequent history was marked by Sino-Western friction as well as the exposure of the weaknesses of both the foreign instructors and the Anhwei Army itself.In July 1865 Lieutenant Jebb was transferred back to England,and Ting Jih-ch'ang,the Shanghai faotai,quickly manoeuvred to get W.Winstanley,a former subordinate of Gordon's,to replace him. The British consul's insistence on appointing a regular British officer was overruled by the legation in Peking.Winstanley was apparently reasonable and conscientious but he lacked sufficient authority,and his mediocre foreign instructors did little to inspire confidence among the troops.The yung-ying officers,for their part,behaved scandalously.Although the com- s ISM-TC,25.27.Li none the less believed,in July 1864,that with Gordon in charge of the training programme,'there will be no great trouble in the future';LW CK,P'eng-liao ban-kao (Letters),5.21. as Ting Jih-ch'ang,'Ting Chung-ch'eng cheng-shu'(Political papers of Governor Ting), 7.1ob-11.Alfted E.Hakc,Events in the Taiping Rebellion,526-7. Cambridge Histories Online O Cambridge University Press,2008
2IO THE MILITARY CHALLENGE British consul at Shanghai, that put Li Hung-chang on his guard. Parkes wanted primarily to train Chinese troops who could defend Shanghai against possible further unrest in that area. He was also jealous of the French, who still maintained a small camp for training Chinese troops near Shanghai (troops who were not returned to the Chinese authorities until mid-1865). Li imputed to Parkes the intent of 'taking over our military authority and squandering our financial resources'.25 In late 1864, however, Gordon abandoned the training programme to return to England. Li had to accept Parkes' nominee as Feng-huang-shan's new drillmaster - Lieutenant Jebb of the British Army. In an agreement dated November 1864, Parkes accepted Li's quid pro quo that a commander of the Anhwei Army, P'an Ting-hsin, should have complete control over promotion and demotion of Chinese officers and troops, as well as their pay and equipment. The programme was to be financed from the maritime customs revenue. Jebb's duties were confined to drill and instruction, including the supervision of fifteen foreign staff members, also paid by the Chinese. Jebb proved, however, to be a bad choice, frequently absent from the camp and, when on duty, rigidly insistent on adherence to 'the Queen's Regulations and the Drill Book'.26 When, in June 1865, Li was ordered by the throne to send troops and artillery to Chihli to guard its border against the Niens, he had no hesitation in pulling an entire battalion out from Feng-huang-shan, together with a 300-man artillery corps under training there, to be dispatched to the north under P'an Ting-hsin. Consul Parkes protested vehemently. Although Li agreed to replace the 850 men taken from Feng-huang-shan with other Anhwei Army troops, he no longer had, by this time, any faith in the Feng-huang-shan programme and repeatedly rejected requests for its expansion. The camp's subsequent history was marked by Sino-Western friction as well as the exposure of the weaknesses of both the foreign instructors and the Anhwei Army itself. In July 1865 Lieutenant Jebb was transferred back to England, and Ting Jih-ch'ang, the Shanghai taotai, quickly manoeuvred to get W. Winstanley, a former subordinate of Gordon's, to replace him. The British consul's insistence on appointing a regular British officer was overruled by the legation in Peking. Winstanley was apparently reasonable and conscientious but he lacked sufficient authority, and his mediocre foreign instructors did little to inspire confidence among the troops. The yung-jing officers, for their part, behaved scandalously. Although the com- *» 1WSM-TC, 25.27. Li none the less believed, in July 1864, that with Gordon in charge of the training programme, 'there will be no great trouble in the future'; L.WCK, P'eng-liao ban-kao (Letters), 5.21. 26 Ting Jih-ch'ang, 'Ting Chung-ch'eng cheng-shu' (Political papers of Governor Ting), 7>iob-i 1. Alfred E. Hake, Events in the Taiping Rebellion, 526-7. Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
CH'ING ARMIES:POST-TAIPING ERA 2II pany officers always appeared in parades and displays,they seldom parti- cipated in the actual training.Moreover,they and their superiors profited by withholding fifty Mexican dollars per company from the stipends of the men and lower officers on each pay day.Winstanley praised the adeptness of the troops in infantry,howitzer and rocket drills.But as in the banner and the Green Standard establishments,many yung-ying troops and officers at Feng-huang-shan were habitual opium-smokers.The troops were also unruly tiouble-makers.27 On occasion they showed resentment against foreigners:training had to be suspended in the aftermath of the Tientsin Massacre(June I87o).But after the routine was resumed,the wrath of the men turned against their corrupt yimg-ying superiors,indicating the limita- tions of the system's rapport between troops and officers.Mutiny broke out twice in 1872,provoked by the officers'abuses of power including unjust punishment ordered by a battalion commander.In May 1873, after having spent nearly 1.5 million taels over a nine-year period,the programme was abruptly terminated despite vigorous protest from the British consul.Once envisaged by a British officer as the 'Aldershot of China',Feng-huang-shan was never actually designed to train officers,but it did teach a considerable number of Anhwei Army troops to use modern weapons. By the early 187os,the Ch'ing forces undoubtedly had acquired the capacity to suppress rebellion in most areas of China proper.But it remained questionable as to whether they could stand up to foreign invaders on the coast or even deal with rebels in the difficult terrain of the North-West or Central Asia. THE MUSLIM REVOLTS AND THEIR INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS The great Muslim revolts in the Ch'ing empire during the third quarter of the nineteenth century are particularly difficult to study because of the paucity of firm documentation on the Muslim side.The several Islamic revolts varied in the intensity of their ethno-religious consciousness,as well as in their circumstances and geographic location.In China proper,the rebellions in Yunnan(1856-73,also known as the Panthay Rebellion)and in Shensi and Kansu (1862-73,also known as the Tungan Rebellion) shared a background of community feuds.These resulted from the Muslim minority leading a distinctive life in their separate villages or urban 7 Ting Jih-ch'ang,Fa-Wu kung-tu (Official papers of the governor of Kiangsu),5o.8.FO 228:453 and 49z,Winstanley's reports,zo Nov.1868 and 13 Jan.1870. a FO 228:524,Winstanley's memo,6 Jan.1873. Cambridge Histories Online Cambridge University Press,2008
CH'iNG ARMIES: POST-TAIPING ERA 211 pany officers always appeared in parades and displays, they seldom participated in the actual training. Moreover, they and their superiors profited by withholding fifty Mexican dollars per company from the stipends of the men and lower officers on each pay day. Winstanley praised the adeptness of the troops in infantry, howitzer and rocket drills. But as in the banner and the Green Standard establishments, many yung-ying troops and officers at Feng-huang-shan were habitual opium-smokers. The troops were also unruly trouble-makers.27 On occasion they showed resentment against foreigners: training had to be suspended in the aftermath of the Tientsin Massacre (June 1870). But after the routine was resumed, the wrath of the men turned against their corruptyung-ying superiors, indicating the limitations of the system's rapport between troops and officers. Mutiny broke out twice in 1872, provoked by the officers' abuses of power including unjust punishment ordered by a battalion commander.28 In May 1873, after having spent nearly 1.5 million taels over a nine-year period, the programme was abruptly terminated despite vigorous protest from the British consul. Once envisaged by a British officer as the 'Aldershot of China', Feng-huang-shan was never actually designed to train officers, but it did teach a considerable number of Anhwei Army troops to use modern weapons. By the early 1870s, the Ch'ing forces undoubtedly had acquired the capacity to suppress rebellion in most areas of China proper. But it remained questionable as to whether they could stand up to foreign invaders on the coast or even deal with rebels in the difficult terrain of the North-West or Central Asia. THE MUSLIM REVOLTS AND THEIR INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS The great Muslim revolts in the Ch'ing empire during the third quarter of the nineteenth century are particularly difficult to study because of the paucity of firm documentation on the Muslim side. The several Islamic revolts varied in the intensity of their ethno-religious consciousness, as well as in their circumstances and geographic location. In China proper, the rebellions in Yunnan (1856-73, also known as the Panthay Rebellion) and in Shensi and Kansu (1862-73, also known as the Tungan Rebellion) shared a background of community feuds. These resulted from the Muslim minority leading a distinctive life in their separate villages or urban 17 Ting Jih-ch'ang, Fu-Wu kung-fu (Official papers of the governor of Kiangsu), 50.8. FO 228: 455 and 492, Winstanley's reports, 20 Nov. 1868 and IJ Jan. 1870. " FO 228: 524, Winstanley's memo, 6 Jan. 1873. Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008