《近代中国对外关系史 The History of Modern China's Foreign Relations》课程教学资源（阅读材料）Joseph Esherick, The Apologetics of Imperialism.pdf_大学文库

AAAA AAAAAAAA品AA风AAAA风AAAAAAAAA点A点AA 193 Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars INDO-CHINA CALENDAR National Offices INDO CHINA West CASS,c/o Helen Chauncey,Building 600T, In the Year Stanford,CA.94305 Midwest c/o Kenneth Ilazelton,400 Ford Ilall,Univ.of of the Ox... Minnesota,Minneapolis,MN.55455 973 East CCAS,c/o Jean Doyle,86 Elm St.,Somerville, MA.02144 Write the Stanford office for information the bombs continue to fall.In the Year of the Ox,Glad Day Press offers its 2nd calendar-uall hanging to number the days of the struggle.In 28 poster-sized pages,in more than 250 photographs and drawings.in poems,songs, stories and legends,the history of three peoples.Half of the Statement of Purpose proceeds to Medical Aid to Indochina:half to support the anti-war publishing activities of Glad Day Press.In the Year of the Ox. We first came together in opposition to the brutal aggression of the United States in Vietnam and to ● the complicity or silence of our profession with regard to that policy.Those in the field of Asian I enclose for copies of Indochina 1973 at $3.75 (includes 75d for postage and sturdy mailing tube). studics bear responsibility for the consequences of Use additional sheets for gift orders. their rescarch and the political posture of their Name profession.We are concerned about the present unwillingness of specialists to speak out against the Address implications of an Asian policy committed to ensur- City State Zip ing American domination of much of Asia.We reject the legitimacy of this aim,and artempt to change this policy.We recognize that the present HE GLAD D.AY PRESS structure of the profession has often perverted 308 Stewart tvenue scholarship and alienated many people in the ficld Ithace,\ew York 14850 The CCAAS secks to develop a humanc and knowl- edgeable understanding of Asian societies and their efforts to maintain cultural intcgrity and to con- front such problems as poverty,oppression,and imperialism.We realize that to be students of other peoples,we must first understand our relations to them. The CCAS wishes to create alternatives to the BACK ISSUES There are still back issues available of the following Bulletin prevailing trends in scholarship on Asia which too issues:11:3,11:4,11l:3-4,IV:1,and IV:2.Summer-Fall 1971 often spring from a parochial cultural perspective (111:3-4),which includes the CCAS research on Modern China and scrve sclfish interests and expansionism.Our Studies,is in particularly copious supply,and bulk orders will organization is designed to function as a catalyst,a be welcomed from CCAS chapters,bookstores,etc.for that communications nctwork for both Asian and West- issue. ern scholars,a provider of central resources for local chapters.and a community for the development of Other back issues of the Bulletin are now out of print.The anti-imperialist research. Bulletin will pay $1.50 each for copies of issue 1ll:1 (spring 1971). 11ss1.1krb2830,1969./iws1on1

_A~AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA~AAAAAA~ ~ ~ · · ~ 19,0 ~ 3 INDO..CHINA ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ CALENDAR ~ ~ 4 ~ 4 · 4 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ : In the Year E ~ ~ j ~ oftheOx··.E ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4 ~ 4 the bombs continue to fa 11_ In the Year of the Ox, Glad ~ 4 ~ 4 Day Press offers its 2nd calendar-u'all hanging to number ~ ~ the days of the struggle. In 28 poster-sized pages, in more ~ ~ than 250 photographs and drawings, in poems, songs, ~ ~ stories and legends, the history of three peoples. Half of the ~ ~ proceeds to Medical Aid to Indochina; half to support the ~ ~ anti-war publishing activities of Ghld' Day Press, Tn the Year ~ • ~~ili. ~ ~ ~ 4~ • • • t~ 4 ~ : I enclose $ __ for __copie,; of Indochina 1973 at ~ ~ $3.75 (includes 7M for postage and sturdy mailing tube). ~ ~ Use additional sheets for gift orders, ~ · ~ ~ ~ Name ~ ~ Address ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ City Stale ____Zip ___ ~ ~ » ~ ~ ~ ~ ·~ ~ . • ~i- HE GU[) DAr PRE,..,·...,· t ~ f, ~ ~ 308 .\leK'art -l,'('nue ~ : Ilnu,'o. \"H' lilrli /.18:;0 ~ 4 ~ 4 ~ ~WWW't"~w't"""WW""W~":"'t""'"\,,~"W"WW"~WW' BACK ISSUES There are still back issues available of the following Bulletin issues: 11:3,11:4,111:3-4, IV:1, and IV:2. Summer-Fall 1971 (III :3-4), which includes the CCAS research on Modern China Studies, is in particularly copious supply, and bulk orders will be welcomed from CCAS chapters, bookstores, etc. for that issue. Other back issues of the Bulletin are now out of print. The Bul/~tin will pay $1.50 each for copies of issue III: 1 (spring 1971 ). Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars NatiollalOffices: West CASS, c/o Helen Chauncey, Building 600T, Stanford, CA. 94305 Midwest c/o Kenneth Hazelton, 400 Ford Hall, Univ. of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN. 55455 East CCAS, c/o Jean Doyle, 86 Elm Sr., Somerville. MA.02144 Write the Stanford office for information Statement of Purpose We first came together in opposition to the brutal aggression of the United States in Vietnam and to the complicity or silence of our profession with regard to that policy. Those 10 the field of Asian studies bear responsibility for the consequences of their research and the political posture of their profession. We are concerned about the present unwillingness of specialists to speak out against the implications of an Asian policy committed to ensuring American domination of mueh of Asia. We reject the legitimacy of this aim, and attempt to change this policy. We recognize that the present structure of the profession has often pen'erted scholarship :tnti alicnated man\' people in the field. The CC\S seeks to develop a humane and knowledgeable understanding of Asian societies and their efforts to maintain cultural integrity and to confront such problems .is poverty, oppreSSion, and imperialism. We realize that to be students of other peoples. we mllst first understand our relations to tht'lTI, The CC\S \\'ishes to create alternatives to the prevailing trends 111 scholarship on Asia \\'hich too often spring from a parochial eultur,tl perspective and serve selfish interests and eXpanSlOl1lSm. Our organization is designed tn function as a catalyst, a communications network i'or both Asian and Western scholars, a provider of central resources for local chapters, ,1l1d a community for the development of anti-imperia list research. IJ'.lsSL'd .II,/rd) 28-30, 1969. nos/oll/

Editor's Note Some three years ago in this Bulletin,James Peck raised Professors Andrew Nathan and Joseph Esherick,to their a number of crucial issues confronting everyone concerned credit,have seriously confronted these issues in their essays on with serious intellectual discussion of modern China.Only the impact of imperialism in China before 1949.It is clear, Professor John K.Fairbank responded seriously to Peck's after reading these two essays that what is at issue is more than arguments,and since then,the issues raised-as crucial and just a question of choosing "facts"'to support one position or challenging as they were-have,it seems,neatly been another,though this is a significant part of the profound forgotten.This issue of the Bulletin hopes to revive the disagreement between these two essays.The more important intellectual confrontation and debate that began with the Peck-Fairbank exchanges. questions are ones of historical interpretation,questions not only of seeing how isolated events are linked to other Special Section: Imperialism in China From its inception,many people have looked upon the contemporary events,but also of attempting to delineate the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars and its publication trends and being willing to evaluate the inevitable relationships the Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scbolars,as a biased political between groups of human beings that characterize those group whose biases happened to coincide with a morally trends.It is precisely here that the most significant difference acceptable stand -opposition to American aggression in between these two essays lies:in accsrately describing human Vietnam.But whether or not many members and sympathizers reality. realized it,the formation of CCAS was much more than a The editors feel that the joining of this issue in symbol of antipathy to a cruel and immoral war.More intellectual struggle can help to clarify the nature of the world fundamentally,it was a direct challenge to the intellectual and we live in today,for imperialism in the 1970s is in many ways organizational hegemony of a whole group of scholars who,in a more formidable and a more subtle force than it was in the spite of differences in values and personality,had a century or so before the Second World War.Trends 'that can discernibly similar approach to scholarship:"liberal" only be rather tentatively seen in China before 1945 have since scholarship on Asia,most notably the vast outpouring from developed and evolved into a full-blown system of global Ilarvard University which has defined Asian studies since hierarchy and incquality.The other contributions to this issue the 1940s.Jim Peck made an attempt to outline the biases and attempt to explore some of the dimensions of that system in prejudices of this type of scholarship and to offer an Asia,including the future development of Japanese alternative.But somehow nothing happened.Perhaps the imperialism in the 1970s.And to remind the neo-Spencerian psychological comforts and professional advantages of"know apologists of the barbarity implied by their support of it all"eclecticism are too much part of American academia, imperialism's "modernizing"mission,the poetry of the but such an eclecticism succeeds in doing nothing more than Vietnamese is more than enough to make a beginning. avoiding the crucial issues of intellectual debate.Certainly,the The editors of the Bulletin certainly do not envision this differences between Peck and Fairbank were of such a basic special issue on imperialism to conclude the debate.We hope, and important nature that one could have hoped for to the contrary,that there is enough concern,both political wide-ranging argument and first steps in a basic reassessment and intellectual,to examine the issues and discuss the reality of the field. in an ongoing confrontation around these important questions. 2

Editor's Note Some three years ago in this Bulletin, James Peck raised a number of crucial issues confronting everyone concerned with serious intellectual discussion of modern China. Only Professor John K. Fairbank responded seriously to Peck's arguments, and since then, the issues raised - as crucial and challenging as they were - have, it seems, neatly been forgotten. This issue of the Bulletin hopes to revive the intellectual confrontation and debate that began with the Peck-Fairbank exchanges. Special Section: Professors Andrew Nathan and Joseph Esherick, to their credit, have seriously confronted these issues in their essays on the impact of imperialism in China before 1949. It is clear, after reading these two essays that what is at issue is more than just a question of choosing "facts" to support one position or another, though this is a significant part of the profound disagreement between these two essays. The more important questions are ones of historical interpretation, questions not only of seeing how isolated events are linked to other IItlperialisItl • China From its inception, many people have looked upon the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars and its publication, the Bulleti71 of Concerned Asia1l Scbolars, as a biased political group whose biases happencd to coincide with a morally acceptable stand - opposition to American aggression in Vietnam. But whether or not many members and sympathizers realized it, the formation of CCAS was much more than a symbol of antipathy to a cruel and immoral war. More fundamentally, it was a direct challenge to the intellectual and organizational hegemony of a whole group of scholars who, in spite of differences In values and personality, had a discernibly similar approach to scholarship: "liberal" scholarship on Asia, most notably the vast outpouring from lIarvard University which has defined /\sian studies since the 1940s. Jim Peck made an attempt to outline the biascs and prejudices of this type of scholarship and to offer an alternative. But somehow nothing happened. Perhaps the psychological comforts and professional advantages of "know it all" eclecticism are too much part of American academia, but such an eclecticism succeeds in doing nothing more than avoiding the crucial issues of intellectual debate. Certainly, the differences between Peck and Fairbank were of such a basic and important nature that one could have hoped for wide-ranging argument and first steps in a basic reassessment of the field. contemporary events, but also of attempting to delineate the trends and being willing to evaluate the inevitable relationships between groups of human being~ that characterize those trends. It is precisely here that the most significant difference between these two essays lies: in accmltety describing human reality. The editors feel that the joining of this issue in intellectual struggle can help to clarify the nature of the world we live in today, for imperialism in the 1970s is in many ways a more formidable and a more subtle force than It was in the century or so before the Second World War. Trends 'that can only be rather tentatively seen in China before 1945 have since developed and evolved into a full-blown system of global hierarchy and inequality. The other contributions to this issue attempt to explore some of the dimensions of that system in Asia, including the future development of Japanese imperialism in the 1970s. And to remind the neo-Spencerian apologists of the barbarity implied by their support of imperialism's "modernizing" mission, the poetry of the Vietnamese is more than enough to make a beginning. The editors of the Bulletill certainly do not envision this special issue on imperialism to conclude the debate. We hope, to the contrary, that there is enough concern, both political and intellectual, to examine the issues and discuss the reality in an ongoing confrontation around these important questions. 2

Imperialism's Effects on China Andrew J.Nathan Three years ago in this journal,James Peck argued that "the what Peck calls a revolutionary Marxist view of the effects of professional ideology of America's China watchers"has tended imperialism on China.s Issacs provides'a set of concrete to blind them to certain approaches to modern Chinese history propositions about the effects of imperialism on China,which that might be labelled "revolutionary Marxist"interpreta- we can test against the findings of recent research.If,as I hope tions.I As an example,Peck argued that the China watchers to show,they are substantially inconsistent,we shall have have explained China's nineteenth and early twentieth century either to abandon the Isaacs interpretation of imperialism's difficulties (prolonged economic and military weakness,failed effects on China,or to look for some error in the research. reforms and revolutions)by reference to internal factors It might be well to begin by fixing in our minds what (culture,social structure),while a revolutionary Marxist arrangements and foreigners'privileges were involved in perspective would seek explanations in the effects of imperialism in China.The legal bases of the institution called imperialism.2 He provided several examples of the types of imperialism were,of course,the Treaty of Nanking(1842),the effects imperialism may have had on China:"The power of the Treaty of 1858 and the 1860 convention which modified it, metropolitan countries to block the formation of vital the Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895),the treaties and domestic industries in the dependent countries competitive conventions arising out of the "scramble for concessions" with their own operations;the domination of mercantile over (1895-1898).and the Boxer Protocol of 1901.Together,these industrial capital;and the subordination of the economic life set up the following complex of institutions. of a dependent nation to the severe fluctuations of the The Treaty Ports.The ninety or so treaty ports,in the most primary commodities market."3 But he did not have space in important of which foreigners had settlements or concessions, his article,which was primarily concerned with a critique of were the keystone of imperialism.The treaty ports existed for existing work in the China field,to provide a fuller outline of the convenience of Western businessmen.Western laws of what the imperialism approach to modern China might contract and personal liability were maintained through involve. exterritoriality,which made foreigners in China subject to the The present essay is an effort to clear away some of the laws of thcir own countries,administered by consula:courts. underbrush surrounding the problcm of the effects of lorcigners virtually owned property in treaty ports,since they imperialism in China,in the hope of helping to make held it on 99-year leases,and they were thereforc able to discussion of this important issue as sophisticated and found factories,banks,and trading firms.From their enclaves, empirical as the present state of research allows.It will the foreign communities looked out with contempt upon the become apparent that I do not agree with what Mr.Peck seems native life for which they had little sympathy or to be saying about these effects,and that I give more weight to understanding.The foreign businessman believed that Chinese internal factors than he does in explaining China's modern officials were creating obstacles to the natural expansion of difficulties.However,having declared my standpoint,I would foreign business and that they should be forced,with gunboats like to focus this essay not on the broad question of the overall if necessary,to open the country further.The atmosphere of explanation for modern China's problems,but on the narrower the treaty ports was strongly racist,as symbolized by the question of imperialism's contributions to the shaping of legendary (if apocryphal)Shanghai park sign,"Dogs and modern Chinese history.This is particularly appropriate Chinese not allowed." because recently published research throws new light on the Spberes of luflueuce.There were in addition the railway subject,and because an accurate evaluation of imperialism's and mining concessions and pieces of additional territory effects is essential to a rounded understanding of the broader controlled by certain powers-e.g.,the Germans in Shantung, question of why modern China took the course that she did. the Russians and Japanese in Manchuria,the British at In the absence of an extended discussion by Mr.Peck Weihaiwei and Kowloon.Those powers enjoyed the right to himself of the effects of imperialism,I take as my text Harold station their own police forces in Chinese territory and thus Isaacs'classic Tbe Tragedy of the Cbinese Revolution.4 In the capability to intervene,by threat or act,in Chinese doing so,I do not mean to suggest that Peck's views are politics.They also enjoyed profits from the railways and mines exactly those of Isaacs or vice versa.But it seems most in the concessions. convenient for both author and reader if we focus on this Other Restrictions on Chinese Sovereignty.The Maritime highly developed,widely available,and influential version of Customs Service was officially a Chinese government organ

I I I 1m.perialism.' s Effects on China I , , Andrew J. Nathan J 1 j I Three years ago in this journal, James Peck argued that "the professional ideology of America's China watchers" has tended to blind them to certain approaches to modern Chinese history that might be labelled "revolutionary Marxist" interpretations. 1 As an example, Peck argued that the China watchers have explained China's nineteenth and early twentieth century difficulties (prolonged economic and military weakness. failed reforms and revolutions) by reference to internal factors (culture, social structure), while a revolutionary Marxist perspective would seek explanations in the effects of imperialism. 2 He provided several examples or the types of effects imperialism may have had on China: "The power of the metropolitan countries to block the formation of vital domestic industries in the dependent countries competitive with their own operations; the domination of mercantile over industrial capital; and the subordination of the economic life of a dependent nation to the severe fluctuations of the primary commodities market." 3 But he did not have space in his article, which was primarily concerned with a critique of existing work in the China field, to provide a fuller outline of what the imperialism approach to modern China might involve. The present essay is an effort to clear away some of the underbrush surrounding the problem of the effects of imperialism in China, in the hope of helping to make discussion of this important issue as sophisticated and empirical as the present state of research allows. It \-ViII become apparent that I do not agree with what Mr. Peck seems to be saying about these effects, and that I give more weight to internal factors than he does in explaining China's modern difficulties. However, having declared my standpoint. r would like to focus this essay not on the broad question of the overall explanation for modern China's problems, but on the narrower question of imperialism's contributions to the shaping of modern Chinese history. This is particularly appropriate because recently published research throws new light on the subject, and because an accurate evaluation of imperialism's effects is essential to a rounded understanding of the broader question of why modern China took the course that she did. In the absence of an extended discussion by Mr. Peck himself of the effects of imperialism, r take as my text Harold Isaacs' classic The Tragedy of tbe Cbinese Revo/ution.4 In doing so, I do not mean to suggest that Peck's views are exactly those of Isaacs or vice versa. But it seems most convenient for both author and reader if we focus on this highly developed, widely available, and influential version of I I ! I what Peck calls a revolutionary Marxist vie\\ of the effects of imperialism on China.s Issacs provides' a set of concrete propositions about the effects of imperialism on China, which we can test against the findings of recent research. If, as I hope to show, they are substantially inconsistent, we shall have either to abandon the Isaacs interpretation of imperialism's effects on China, or to look for some error in the research. It might be well to begin by fixing in our minds what arrangements and foreigners' privileges were involved in imperialism in China. (, The legal bases of the institution called imperialism were, of course, the Treaty of Nanking (1842), the Treaty of 1858 and the 1860 convention which modified it. the Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895), the treaties and conventions arising out of the "scramble for concessions" (1895-1898), and the Boxer Protocol of 1901. Together, these set up the following complex of institutions' Tbe Treaty Ports. The ninety or so treaty ports, in the most important of which foreigners had settlements or concessions, were the keystone of imperialism. The treaty ports existed for the convenience of Western businessmen. Western laws of contract and personal liability were maintained through exterritoriality, which made foreigners in China subject to the laws of their own countries, administered by consula, courts. Foreigners virtually owned property in treaty ports, ~ince they held it on 99-year leases, and they were thercfor<. able to found factories, banks, and trading firms. From tbeir enclaves, the foreign communities looked out with contempt upon the native life for which they had little sympathy or understanding. The foreign businessman believed that Chinese officials were creating obstacles to the natural expansion of foreign business and that they should be forced, with gunboats if necessary, to open the country further. The atmnsphere of the treaty ports was strongly racist, as symbolized by the legendary (if apocryphal) Shanghai park sign, "Dogs and Chinese not allowed." Spberes of Ilifluence. There were in addition the railway and mining concessions and pieces of additional territory controlled by certain powers-e.g., the Germans in Shantung, the Russians and Japanese in Manchuria, the British at Weihaiwei and Kowloon. Those powers enjoyed the fight to station their own police forces in Chinese territory and thus the capability to intervene, by threat or act, in Chinese politics. They also enjoyed profits from the railways and mines m the concessions. Otber Restrictiol1s 011 Cbinese Sovereigllty. The Maritime Customs Service was officially a Chinese government organ, 3

but was run by foreigners with close diplomatic contacts with caused by the drain resulted in a 20 to 30%depreciation of foreign powers.The proceeds collected by Customs were the copper currency in common use and a sbarp rise in the directly turned over to the service of foreign debts;when in cost of living.Debased coinage came into use.Foreign 1917 a surplus appeared,the Powers took over the right of cotton goods and other commodities drove Chinese approving its release and restricting its use.Furthermore,the bandicrafts to the wall,especially in the soutbern treaties gave the Powers the right to set the Chinese tariff;they provinces.... kept it at a low 5%of value in order to encourage the opening The accumulative result of all these agencies of of the China market to foreign trade.This not only kept China dissolution was mass pauperization and the creation of a from protecting her industry but deprived her of income. large floating population.... Tbe Financial Drain.The treaties involved China in fiancial Tbe imperialists,on tbeir part,baving battered the obligations to foreigners that were crippling to government Mancbu court into submission and adapted tbe upper strata finance in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.To pay the of cbinese society to their own uses,became the protectors 1895 indemnity of about 30 million pounds,the Chinese took of tbe Cbinese rulers against the wratb of the people.... loans which it took approximately 100 million pounds to [Later]the rivalries of the different Western powers fed on repay.For the $333 million Boxer indemnity,the Chinese had separatist conflicts whicb undermined the central autbority to make installment payments at a rate that absorbed almost and encouraged provincial and regional satrapies wbich all the central government's income and would have reached, corresponded rougbly to tbe "spberes of influence. with interest,about $739 million.(Since part of the debt was By adapting to its own uses the mercbants,landlords, cancelled after the first world war,the payments ultimately officials,and militarists,imperialism belped perpetuate the amounted to only $250 million.) precapitalist forms of Cbinese social organization....The Tbe Missionary Invasion.The treaties required the Chinese Cbinese ruling class could not liberate the peasantry to permit missionaries in the interior.Missionaries reached because,as a result of the peculiar conditions and about half of China's bsien,?and must have been seen or heard belatedness of its growtb,it was too organically tied to the by a substantial portion of the population.Driven by an exploitation of tbe peasantry. evangelizing fervor ("Shall not the low wail of helpless, hopeless misery,arising from one-half of the heathen world, With violence to the eloguence,but not,I hope,to the pierce our sluggish ear,"8 etc.)the missionaries did not content of this argunent,we might reduce it to two sets of hesitate to intervene in Chinese politics and lawsuits to propositions about imperialism's effects. strengthen their local position.They were generally quite A.Economic effects. willing to share information on local conditions with their 1.Foreign economic activity "drove Chinese handicrafts to the wall'and thus contributed to the immiseration of the consuls,for whom they therefore acted as virtual spies.The racism and contempt implicit in the concept of China as a peasants. "Niagara of souls"falling to perdition was only enhanced for 2.Foreign dominance of the treaty port economy stifled most missionaries by the physical deprivation of life in China the growth of native industry and commerce. and the frustration of trying to reach the largely unresponsive 3.Unfavorable terms of trade (plus indemnities)drained "heathen." China's wealth,increasing the misery of the people and the We now recognize the moral ugliness of nineteenth and weakness of native enterprise. early twentieth century imperialism in China.But what were B.Political effects. its concrete effects?Isaacs argues as follows: 1.The Powers gave direct support to reactionary forces(the dynasty,the warlords)and thus helped to postpone Tbe Chinese economic and social structure,already in revolution. crisis,reacted swiftly at top and at bottom to tbe corrosive 2.Imperialism distorted normal political evolution-the influence of the foreign invasion.Economically,Cbina was growth of a bourgeoisie to lead the revolution against laid prostrate.With the belp of opium,the foreign traders feudalism-and fostered instead the growth of a treaty port established a balance of trade permanently in their compradore class which was a non-revolutionary outgrowth of favor....Tbrough the breacb made by the drug and the feudal landlord class. widened by Britisb and lrench cannon in the Opium Wars How well do these propositions stand up to the evidence? of 1842 and 1858,manufactured commodities made their First,did foreign imports drive Chinese handicrafts to the wall, way.As Britisb cotton goods came in,the export of leading to mass pauperization of the peasantry?Recent Cbinese woven clotb (nankeens)began to fall off and research tends to suggest that this did not occur. disappeared almost entirely by 1833....The flow of First of all,it is questionable whether there was any secular commodities was soon followed by capital investment and trend toward mass pauperization in modern China.The loans.Foreign sbipping companies,cotton mills,railways, existence of severe economic distress in the countryside from and telegrapb lines occupied by the end of tbe century all the 1920s onwards was observed by all who visited the Chinese the commanding positions in Cbinese economic life.... village,but it may be a mistake to project this back much The spread of opium,tbe drain of silver,and the influx before 1910,or to argue that it was a result of structural of macbine-made commodities greatly aggravated the crisis features of the Chinese-economy-plus-imperialism.Rhoads in the countryside,wbich arose primarily from the rapid Murphey has shown that European observers of the 19th growth of population and the sbortage of cultivable land. century and before tended to describe China as equally or Tbe widespread use of opium caused a flow of wealtb from more prosperous than Europe except for areas that were tbe countryside to the towns and led to an alarming temporarily suffering from the devastations of war,flood or contraction of the internal market.Tbe silver sbortage drought.0 If,as Dwight Perkins has argued, food

but was run by foreigners with close diplomatic contacts with foreign powers. The proceeds collected by Customs were directly turned over to the service of foreign debts; when in 1917 a surplus appeared, the Powers took over the right of approving its release and restricting its use. Furthermore, the treaties gave the Powers the right to set the Chinese tariff; they kept it at a low 5 % of value in order to encourage the opening of the China market to foreign trade. This not only kept China from protecting her industry but deprived her of income. The Financial Drain. The treaties involved China in fiancial obligations to foreigners that were crippling to government finance in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. To pay the 1895 indemnity of about 30 million pounds, the Chinese took loans which it took approximately 100 million pounds to repay. For the $333 million Boxer indemnity, the Chinese had to make installment payments at a rate that absorbed almost all the central government's income and would have reached, with interest, about $739 million. (Since part of the debt was cancelled after the first world war, the payments ultimately amounted to only $250 million.) The Missionary Invasion. The treaties required the Chinese to permit missionaries in the interior. Missionaries reached about half of China's hsien, 7 and must have been seen or heard by a substantial portion of the population. Driven by an evangelizing fervor ("Shall not the low wail of helpless, hopeless misery, arising from one-half of the heathen world, pierce our sluggish ear,"s etc.) the missionaries did not hesitate to intervene in Chinese politics and lawsuits to strengthen their local position. They were generally quite willing to share information on local conditions with their consuls, for whom they therefore acted as virtual spies. The racism and contempt in:t.plicit in the concept of China as a "Niagara of souls" falling to perdition was only enhanced for most missionaries by the physical deprivation of life in China and the frustration of trying to reach the largely unresponsive "heathen. " We now recognize the moral ugliness of nineteenth and early twentieth century imperialism in China. But what were its concrete effects? Isaacs argues as follows: The Chinese economic and social structure, already in crisis, reacted swiftly at top and at bottom to the corrosive influence of the foreign invasion. Economically, China was laid prostrate. With the help of opium, the foreign traders established a balance of trade permanently in their favor. . .. Through the breach made by the drug and widened by British and French cannon in the Opium Wars of 1842 and 1858, manufactured commodities made their way. As British cotton goods came in, the export of Chinese woven cloth (nankeens) began to fall off and disappeared almost entirely by 1833.... The flow of commodities was soon followed by capital investment and loans. Foreign shipping companies, cotton mills, railways, and telegraph lines occupied by the end of the century all the commanding positions in Chinese economic life . ... The spread of opium, the drain of silver, and the influx of machine-made commodities greatly aggravated the crisis in the countryside, which arose primarily from the rapid growth of population and the shortage of cultivable land. The widespread use of opium caused a flow ofwealth from the countryside to the towns and led to an alarming contraction of the internal market. The silver shortage caused by the drain resulted in a 20 to 30% depreciation of the copper currency in common use and a sharp rise in the cost of living. Debased coinage came into use. Foreign cotton goods and other commodities drove Chinese handicrafts to the wall, especially in the southern provinces . ... Tile accumulative result of all these agencies of dissolution was mass pauperization and the creation of a large floating population . ... The imperialists, on their part, having battered the Manchu court into submission and adapted the upper strata of chinese society to their own uses, became the protectors of the Chinese rulers against the wrath of the people . ... [Later] the rivalries of the different Western powers fed on separatist conflicts which undermined the central authority and encouraged provincial and regional satrapies which corresponded roughly to the "spheres ofinfluence. ".... By adapting to its own uses the merchants, landlords, officials, and militarists, imperialism helped perpetuate the pre capitalist forms of Chinese social organization . ... The Chinese ruling class could not liberate the peasantry because, as a result of the peculiar conditions and belatedness of its growth, it was too organically tied to the exploitation of the peasantry. 9 With violence to the elo<;uence, but not, I hope, to the content of this argument, we might reduce it to two sets of propositions about imperialism's effects. A. Economic effects. 1. Foreign economic activity "drove Chinese handicrafts to the wall" and thus contributed to the immiseration of the peasants. 2. Foreign dominance of the treaty port economy stifled the growth of native industry and commerce. 3. Unfavorable terms of trade (plus indemnities) drained China's wealth, increasing the misery of the people and the weakness of native enterprise. B. Political effects. 1. The Powers gave direct support to reactionary forces (the dynasty, the warlords) and thus helped to postpone revolution. 2. Imperialism distorted normal political evolution-the growth of a bourgeoisie to lead the revolution against feudalism-and fostered instead the growth of a treaty port compradore class which was a non-revolutionary outgrowth of the feudal landlord class. How well do these propositions stand up to the evidence? First, did foreign imports drive Chinese handicrafts to the wall, leading to mass pauperization of the peasantry? Recent research tends to suggest that this did not occur. First of all, it is questionable whether there was any secular trend toward mass pauperization in modern China. The existence of severe economic distress in the countryside from the 1920s onwards was observed by all who visited the Chinese village, but it may be a mistake to project this back much before 1910, or to argue that it was a result of structural features of the Chinese-economy-plus-imperialism. Rhoads Murphey has shown that European observers of the 19th century and before tended to describe China as equally or more prosperous than Europe except for areas that were temporarily suffering from the devastations of war, flood or drought. 1O If, as Dwight Perkins has argued, 11 food

production kept up with population growth in China until the (with their banking facilities,railways,order,and concepts of middle of the twentieth century,it must have been not China's contract)and foreign enterprises (serving as technical and decreasing prosperity but Europe's increasing wealth,the entrepreneurial models and pioneering the demand for new revolution of rising expectations among Chinese intellectuals, products)were essential catalysts to the development of and a tendency to overgeneralize from specific cases of Chinese industry.Hou,in short,shows that it is difficult to worsening conditions,that created the impression of a secular establish a negative relationship between the foreign presence trend towards pauperization in the countryside.This,indeed, and the success of Chinese enterprise. is the argument made by Ramon Myers,12 whose rescarch Even if one rejects Hou's arguments,it may be a mistake to shows that at least in some North China villages,conditions see imperialism as the cause of the weakness of Chinese tended if anything to improve,except for the intermittent modern enterprise.As Albert Feuerwerker has pointed out,far damage(which tended to be repaired in a few years)done by more important than the relative shares of Chinese and foreign the passage of warlord armies or by drought or flood.13 In enterprise in the modern sector of the economy was the failure short,in the areas where rural poverty got worse during the of that sector as a whole to develop.Modern industry and twentieth century,the cause cannot be laid to a structural commerce never became more than a miniscule component of feature of the whole cconomy,and the impact of foreign the whole Chinese economy.The problem is really the classic imports on handicrafts would have been such a structural one of the failure of industrialization to occur(under foreign feature. or Chinese auspices),and this can hardly be explained by the In any case,research suggests that over the nineteenth and depressing effect of foreign treaty port enterprise on Chinese twentieth centuries as a whole there was not only no decline, treaty port enterprise.The probable reason,according to but growth commensurate with population growth,in the Feuerwerker,for the weakness of the treaty port sector of the total domestic market enjoyed by native handicraft-produced cconomy was the failure of demand for modern-style goods.14 The basic reason for this was that handicraft goods manufactured goods to develop within the economy;this were cheaper and more suited to peasant needs than foreign failure was in turn due to lack of transport,peasant poverty, factory-produced equivalents.Foreign goods in general were the expense of manufactured goods,and the continued unable seriously to dent the Chinese market,which consisted viability of traditional handicrafts and commercial channels.20 of tens of thousands of small markets dealing primarily in The continuing backwardness of the Chinese economy,then, locally produced goods.15 Certain exceptions to this was if anything partially due to the weakness of the effects of statement must immediately be specified:factory-spun yarn imperialism rather than to the strength of these effects. did make large inroads in the Chinese markets,with serious What about Issacs'third point,that imperialism caused dislocation in those bsien where spinning was a major China to be drained of wealth?There is no question that the handicraft industry;16 cigarettes and kerosene were two combination of indemnities and unfavorable terms of trade did foreign items that deeply penetrated the Chinese countryside, cause a net drain of wealth from China (although this was and although cigarettes did not replace any Chinese handicraft balanced to an undetermined extent by overseas Chinese item,kerosene replaced vegetable oil for burning.There was remittances).21 And unquestionably,this drain came out of also some dislocation when,in the twentieth century,export the pockets of the people,making some incremental demand for silk and tea declined;17 but domestic demand for contribution to their poverty.But Hou's data suggest that the these two items continued strong,so that total demand was total amount of the outflow,when measured against the not greatly affected.In general,the China market spelled massive body of the Chinese economy,was not very frustration for foreign merchants.Foreign goods made but a significant.China's national debt per capita and her foreign superficial mark in Chinese markets.Where exports of trade per capita must have been among the lowest in the handicraft items fell off,domestic demand took up most of world.It is hard to see how the impact of this aspect of the slack.Dislocation was confined to a few areas imperialism could be regarded as doing more than giving a Turning to Isaacs'second proposition,did foreign slight additional impetus to economic trends already under dominance of the treaty port economy stifle the growth of way,22 and the discussion of the two preceding points has native industry and commerce?It is hard to make this already shown that,whatever their nature,these trends were argument stick,for two reasons. not due to imperialism. First,we have the well-known findings of Chi-ming Hou.18 It is interesting to note in connection with this discussion Granted that foreign firms were dominant in banking,foreign of foreign trade that one phenomenon of modern trade,coal mining,cotton weaving,cigarettes and electricity,it neo-colonialism to which Peck draws attention23 emphatically remains the fact that the majority of treaty port enterprises did not occur in the Chinese case:the restructuring of the were small,consumer-goods factories.Taking these into native economy towards heavy reliance on the export of account,Chinese-owned plants accounted for 78%of factory mineral or agricultural primary products to the mother output in China proper in 1922.19 Furthermore,Chinese country for processing.Foreign trade was entirely too small a owned substantial amounts of stock in the so-called proportion of the huge locally-oriented Chinese economy to "foreign-owned"companies.The foreign and Chinese shares of create large-scale restructuring in any direction (including,as the industrial sector remained roughly stable over the years we have shown,the direction of industrialization).24 1895 to 1937.Even though some aspects of the treaty port The economic effects of imperialism,then,seem to have scene (low tariffs,competition)were harmful to Chinese been relatively slight in the Chinese economy as a whole.To industry,there is no evidence that Chinese firms were more say this is not to suggest that people did not suffer from these adversely affected by these conditions than foreign firms.So effects or that these sufferings are not valid subjects for far from Western treaty port enterprise being harmful to research or concern.But on the economic side,at least,the Chinese enterprises.Hou even argues that the treaty ports effects of imperialism seem to have been too limited to serve 5

production kept up with population growth in China until the middle of the twentieth century, it must have been not China's decreasing prosperity but Europe's increa~ing wealth, the revolution of rising expectations among Chinese intellectuals, and a tendency to overgeneralize from specific cases of worsening conditions, that created the impression of a secular trend towards pauperization in the countryside. This, indeed, is the argument made by Ramon Myers,12 whose research shows that at least in some North China villages, conditions tended if anything to improve, except for the intermittent damage (which tended to be repaired in a few years) done by the passage of warlord armies or by drought or flood. 13 In short, in the areas where rural poverty got worse during the twentieth century, the cause cannot be laid to a structural feature of the whole economy, and the impact of foreign imports on handicrafts would have been such a structural feature. In any case, research suggests that over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as a whole there was not only no decline. but growth commensurate with population growth, in the total domestic market enjoyed by native handicraft-produced goodS. 14 The basic reason for this was that handicraft goods were cheaper and more suited to peasant needs than foreign factory-produced equivalents. Foreign goods in general were unable seriously to dent the Chinese market, which consisted of tens of thousands of small markets dealing primarily in locally produced goods. IS Certain exceptions to this statement must immediately be specified: factory-spun yarn did make large inroads in the Chinese markets, with serious dislocation in those bsien where spinning was a major handicraft industry; 16 cigarettes and kerosene were two foreign items that deeply penetrated the Chinese countryside, and although cigarettes did not replace any Chinese handicraft item, kerosene replaced vegetable oil for burning. There was also some dislocation when, in the twentieth century, export demand for silk and tea declined; 17 but domestic demand for these two items continued strong, so that total demand was not greatly affected. In general, the China market spelled frustration for foreign merchants. For~ign goods made but a superficial mark in Chinese markets. Where exports of handicraft items fell off, domestic demand took up most of the slack. Dislocation was confined to a few areas. Turning to Isaacs' second propositIOn, did foreign dominance of the treaty port econo'my stifle the growth of native industry and commerce? It is hard to make this argument stick, for two reasons. First, we have the well-known findings of Chi-ming Hou. 18 Granted that foreign firms were dominant in banking, foreign trade, coal mining, cotton weaving, cigarettes and electricity, it remains the fact that the majority of treaty port enterprises were small, consumer-goods factories. Taking these into account, Chinese-owned plants accounted for 78% of factory output in China proper in 1922. 19 Furthermore, Chinese owned substantial amounts of stock in the so-called "foreign-owned" companies. The foreign and Chinese shares of the industrial sector remained roughly stable over the years 1895 to 1937. Even though some aspects of the treaty port scene (low tariffs, competition) were harmful to Chinese industry, there is no evidence that Chinese firms were more adversely affected by these conditions than foreign firms. So far from Western treaty port enterprise being harmful to Chinese enterprises, Hou even argues that the treaty ports (with their banking facilities, railways, order, and concepts of contract) and foreign enterprises (serving as technical and entrepreneurial models and pioneering the demand for new products) were essential catalysts to the development of Chinese industry. Hou, in short, shows that it is difficult to establish a negative relationship between the foreign presence and the success of Chinese enterprise. Even if one rejects Hou's arguments, it may be a mistake to see imperialism as the cause of the weakness of Chinese modern enterprise. As Albert Feuern'erker has pointed out, far f more important than the relative shares of Chinese and foreign t enterprise in the modern sector of the economy was the failure of that sector as a whole to develop. Modern industry and t commerce never became more than a miniscule component of i the whole Chinese economy. The problem is really the classic f one of the failure of industrialization to occur (under foreign I or Chinese auspices), and this can hardly be explained by the depressing effect of foreign treaty port enterprise on Chinese treaty port enterprise. The probable reason, according to Feuerwerker, for the weakness of the treaty port sector of the economy was the failure of demand for modern-style manufactured goods to develop within the economy; this failure was in turn due to lack of transport, peasant poverty, the expense of manufactured goods, and the continued viability of traditional handicrafts and commercial channels. 20 The continuing backwardness of the Chinese economy, then, was if anything partially due to the weakness of the effects of imperialism rather than to the strength of these effects. What about Issacs' third point, that imperialism caused China to be drained of wealth? There is no question that the combination of indemnities and unfavorable terms of trade did cause a net drain of wealth from China (although this was balanced to an undetermined extent by overseas Chinese remittances). 21 And unquestionably, this drain came out of the pockets of the people, making some incremental contribution to their poverty. But Hou's data suggest that the total amount of the outflow, when measured against the massive body of the Chinese economy, was not very significant. China's national debt per capita and her foreign trade per capita must have been among the lowest in the world. It is hard to see how the impact of this aspect of imperialism could be regarded as doing more than giving a slight additional impetus to economic trends already under way, 22 and the discussion of the two preceding points ha~ already shown that, whatever their nature, these trends were not due to imperialism. It is interesting to note in connection with this discussion of foreign trade that one phenomenon of modern neo-colonialism to which Peck draws attention 23 emphatically did not occur in the Chinese case: the restructuring of the native economy towards heavy reliance on the export of mineral or agricultural primary products to the mother country for processing. Foreign trade was entirely too small a proportion of the huge locally-oriented Chinese economy to create large-scale restructuring in any direction (including, as we have shown, the direction of industrialization). 24 The economic effects of imperialism, then, seem to have been relatively slight in the Chinese economy as a whole. To say this is not to suggest that people did not suffer from these effects or that these sufferings are not valid subjects for research or concern. But on the economic side, at least, the effects of imperialism seem to have been too limited to serve 5

as a basic explanation for China's problems. have to contend with the preceding 80 or 90 years of But what about the political impact of imperialism?Here imperialism's effects.At the most,it would seem,the we have to deal with Isaacs'two points about direct foreign compradore class was able to delay the revolution by ten of support for reactionary forces on the Chinese scene and the the one hundred or so years it required to come to fruition. distortion of normal political evolution by the fostering of a To the extent,then,that the Isaacs book can represent compradore class. what Mr.Peck means by a "revolutionary Marxist" With respect to the first point,research turns up a familiar interpretation of the effect of imperialism on China,the mixed picture.It is true that the Powers in the 1860s initiated results of this brief survey of the relevant literature suggest a "cooperative policy"toward the dynasty,which they that Peck is directing us into a blind alley when he calls for thought would reform itself and thus establish the peace analysis of modern Chinese history to be carried out in this necessary to the full development of the China trade which vein.If the debate over the basic causes of China's modern was the Powers'main goal;that the Powers provided technical difficulties is to have two sides,the external-causation side of assistance to the self-strengtheners,who used their new the argument will be ill served by adopting the five Isaacs arsenals and weapons to suppress domestic rebellions;and that propositions as the basis of its position.With no disrespect to some foreign mercenaries participated in the campaign against Mr.Isaacs'superb book,it appears that in the light of more the Taipings.25 But it is clear that these factors were far from recent research his interpretation of imperialism's effects is decisive for the survival of the dynasty to 1911.The forces of simplistic and misdirected. rebellion must have been weak indeed if the essentially A more tenable-although not revolutionary Marxist-view peripheral foreign role was sufficient to tip the balance toward of the effects of imperialism on China,it seems to me,is that their suppression.In any case,the dynasty did fall and was it wrought a profound change in the Chinese national psyche. succeeded by Yuan Shih-k'ai and then the warlords.Here In this view,the primary result of imperialism was the rise of again,despite the fact of some foreign loans and some foreign Chinese nationalism and the consequent revolution which was meddling,and despite the inviting coincidence between certain carried out as a succession of transformations aimed at ridding spheres of influence and certain warlords,the foreign role was China of foreign encroachment.What was important, essentially peripheral.All the evidence so far on this still according to this interpretation,was not the actual social and ill-researched period is that the Powers deplored rather than economic impact of imperialism,which was relatively slight, favored warlordism because of its harmful impact on trade; but the fact that the Chinese themselves believed in the that after the Nishihara Loans they gave no substantial severity of this impact,9 and the further fact that the Chinese financial support to the Peking government or individual were deeply humiliated by the unequal treaties and the racism warlords;and that they were wary of backing any specific of the citizens of the Powers.In the nineteenth century, warlord for fear that he might soon fall out of power.26 In Chinese diplomats believed they were manipulating the short,although the Powers did little to end warlordism,it foreigners by granting privileges that would make the would be entirely too superficial to regard their presence as its foreigners grateful to the Empire.But as imperialism grew cause.In conclusion,then,however high-handed and more extensive,it created in China a new concept of illegitimate the direct political interventions of imperialism in sovereignty and a ncw emotion of nationalism, which China before the 1930s,on a balanced view their effects would stressed the extirpation of foreign privilege and the have to be judged inessential to the outcome or even to the preservation of the integrity of the Chinese body politic.China timing of revolution in China.27 must strengthen herself to win back sovereignty:such was the Issacs'final point-the distorting impact of imperialism on view of successive waves of reformers and revolutionaries from China's political evolution-is harder to evaluate.For one the self-strengtheners through the communists.31 If the thing,it requires us to assume that China would have taken the necessary national strength could only be earned at the "normal"(European)course of bourgeois revolution against expense of the traditional social and political order,the price feudalism,an assumption which is hard to accept in view of had ultimately to be paid.In this way,China's national the fact that the Chinese bourgeoisie,weak as it was,seems to conservatism was shaken by the excesses of imperialism,and have developed to the extent that it did largly because of the revolution replaced restoration as the goal of the political elite. foreign impact.Furthermore,a proper evaluation of the It was a process that could only be understood as a response to general issue of the class nature of successive regimes and the impact of imperialism,but to imperialism's psychological, political forces in modern China would require more cultural and intellectual impact rather than to its social and knowledge than we yet have about,for example,which social economic impact. classes supported the Nanking government and how important This view of imperialism's effects has ambiguous this support was to its strength.But in the absence of this sort implications for the larger issue of the reasons for China's and of knowledge there are at least shreds of evidence that caution Japan's different experiences in the last century.There skepticism towards the argument that reactionary regimes remains the possibility,suggested by Peck,32 that the (Manchus,warlords and the KMT)were founded on the psychological,cultural and intellectual impact of imperialism support of a compradore class created by imperialism.If the on China was heavier that it was on Japan.But if we ask why treaty port economy was as small a proportion of the total it was heavier,we are likely to assign considerable importance economy as we have argued above,it is hard to see how any in our answer to the different Chinese and Japanese treaty port class-compradore,boureoisie or proletariat-could perceptions of imperialism,and to their different readiness to have had a controlling impact on the outcome or timing of the adopt the idea of nationalism and to transform themselves Chinese revolution.28 Even if we concede the dubious point politically and technologically.We are,in short,likely to be that the strength of the Nationalist Government of 1927-1937 led back to that stress on internal causes which Mr.Peck was based primarily or largely on compradore support,we still wishes to avoid,despite the fact that we assign no less 6

as a basic explanation for China's problems. Hut what about the political impact of imperialism? Here we have to deal with Isaacs' two points about direct foreign support for reactionary forces on the Chinese scene and the distortion of normal political evolution by the fostering of a compradore class. With respect to the first point, research turns up a familiar mixed picture. It is true that the Powers in the 1860s initiated a "cooperative policy" toward the dynasty, which they thought would reform itself and thus establish the peace necessary to the full development of the China trade which was the Powers' main goal; that the Powers provided technical assistance to the self-strengtheners, who used their new arsenals and weapons to suppress domestic rebellions; and that some foreign mercenaries participated in the campaign against the Taipings.25 But it is clear that these factors were far from decisive for the survival of the dynasty to 1911. The forces of rebellion must have been weak indeed if the essentially peripheral foreign role was sufficient to tip the balance toward their suppression. In any case, the dynasty did fall and was succeeded by Yuan Shih-k'ai and then the warlords. Here again, despite the fact of some foreign loans and some foreign meddling, and despite the inviting coincidence between certain spheres of influence and certain warlords, the foreign role was essentially peripheral. All the evidence so far on this still ill-researched period is that the Powers deplored rather than favored warlord ism because of its harmful impact on trade; that after the Nishihara Loans they gave no substantial financial support to the Peking government or individual warlords; and that they were wary of backing any specific warlord for fear that he might soon fdl out of power. 26 In short, although the Powers did little "" end warlord ism, it would be entirely too superficial to regard their presence as its cause. In conclusion, then, however high-handed and illegitimate the direct political interventions of imperialism in China before the 1930s, on a balanced view their effects would have to be judged inessential to the outcome or even to the timing of revolution in China. 27 Issacs' final point-the distorting impact of imperialism on China's political evolution-is harder to evaluate. For one thing, it requires us to assume that China would have taken the "normal" (European) course of bourgeois revolution against feudalism, an assumption which is hard to accept in view of the fact that the Chinese bourgeoisie, weak as it was, seems to have developed to the extent that it did largly because of the foreign impact. Furthermore, a proper evaluation of the general issue of the class nature of successive regimes and political forces in modern China would require more knowledge than we yet have about, for example, which social classes supported the Nanking government and how important this support was to its strength. But in the absence of this sort of knowledge there are at least shreds of evidence that caution skepticism towards the argument that reactionary regimes (Manchus, warlords and the KMT) were founded on the support of a compradore class created by imperialism. If the treaty port economy was as small a proportion of the total economy as we have argued above, it is hard to see how any treaty port c1ass-compradore, boureoisie or proletariat-could have had a controlling impact on the outcome or timing of the Chinese revolution. 28 Even if we concede the dubious point that the strength of the Nationalist Government of 1927-1937 was based primarily or largely on compradore support, we still have to contend with the preceding 80 or 90 years of imperialism's effects. At the most, it would seem, the compradore class was able to delay the revolution by ten of the one hundred or so years it required to come to fruition. To the extent, then, that the Isaacs book can represent what Mr. Peck means by a "revolutionary Marxist" interpretation of the effect of imperialism on China, the results of this brief survey of the relevant literature suggest that Peck is directing us into a blind alley when he calls for analysis of modern Chinese history to be carried out in this vein. If the debate over the basic causes of China's modern difficulties is to have two sides, the external-causation side of the argume nt will be ill served by adopting the five Isaacs propositions as the basis of its position. With no disrespect to Mr. Isaacs' superb book, it appears that in the light of more recent research his interpretation of imperialism's effects is simplistic and misdirected. A more tenable-although not revolutionary Marxist-view of the effects of imperialism on China, it seems to me, is that it wrought a profound change in the Chinese national psyche. In this view, the primary result of imperialism was the rise of Chinese nationalism and the consequent revolution which was carried out as a succession of transformations aimed at ridding China of foreign encroachment. What was important, according to this interpretation, was not the actual social and economic impact of imperialism, which was relatively slight, but the fact that the Chinese themselves believed in the severity of this impact,29 and the further fact that the Chinese were deeply humiliated by the unequal treaties and the racism of the citizens of the Powers. In the nineteenth century, Chinese diplomats believed they were manipulating the foreigners by granting privileges that would make the foreigners grateful to the Empire. But as imperialism grew more extensive, it created in China a new concept of sovereignty and a new emotion of nationalism,3O which stressed the extirpation of foreign privilege and the preservation of the integrity of the Chinese body politic. China must strengthen herself to win back sovereignty: such was the view of successive waves of reformers and revolutionaries from the self-strengtheners through the communists. 31 If the necessary national strength could only be earned .at the expense of the traditional social and political order, the price had ultimately to be paid. In this way, China's national conservatism was shaken by the excesses of imperialism, and revolution replaced restoration as the goal of the political elite. It was a process that could only be understood as a response to the impact of imperialism, but to imperialism's psychological, cultural and intellectual impact rather than to its social and economic impact. This view of imperialism's effects has ambiguous implications for the larger issue of the reasons for China's and Japan's different experiences in the last century. There remains the possibility, suggested by Peck, 32 that the psychological, cultural and intellectual impact of imperialism on China was heavier that it was on Japan. But if we ask why it was heavier, we are likely to assign considerable importance in our answer to the different Chinese and Japanese perceptions of imperialism, and to their different readiness to adopt the idea of nationalism and to transform themselves politically and technologically. We are, in short, likely to be led back to that stress on internal causes which Mr. Peck wishes to avoid, despite the fact that we assign no less 6