Journal of Economic Perspectives-Volume 20,Number 2-Spring 2006-Pages 3-22 Why Europe and the West?Why Not China? David S.Landes he world history of technology is the story of a long,protracted inversion. As late as the end of the first millennium of our era,the civilizations of Asia were well ahead of Europe in wealth and knowledge.The Europe of what we call the Middle Ages (say,tenth century)had regressed from the power and pomp of Greece and Rome,had lost much of the science it had once possessed, had seen its economy retreat into generalized autarky.It traded little with other societies,for it had little surplus to sell,and insofar as it wanted goods from outside, it paid for them largely with human beings.Nothing testifies better to deep poverty than the export of slaves or the persistent exodus of job-hungry migrants. Five hundred years later,the tables had turned.I like to summarize the change in one tell-tale event:the Portuguese penetration into the Indian Ocean led by Vasco da Gama in 1498.This was an extraordinary achievement.Some scholars will tell you that it was some kind of accident;that it could just as easily have been Muslim sailors,or Indian,or Chinese to make the connection from the other direction.Did not the Chinese send a series of large fleets sailing west as far as the east African coast in the early fifteenth century-bigger,better and earlier than anything the Portuguese had to show? Don't you believe it.These affirmations of Asian priority are especially prom- inent and urgent nowadays because a new inversion is bringing Asia to the fore.A "multicultural"world history finds it hard to live with a eurocentric story of achievement and transformation.So a new would-be(politically correct)orthodoxy would have us believe that a sequence of contingent events (gains by Portugal and then others in the Indian Ocean,followed by conquests by Spain and then others in the New World)gave Europe what began as a small edge and was then worked up into centuries of dominion and exploitation.A gloss on this myth contends that David S.Landes is Emeritus Professor of Economics,Harvard University,Cambridge, Massachusetts
Why Europe and the West? Why Not China? David S. Landes The world history of technology is the story of a long, protracted inversion. As late as the end of the first millennium of our era, the civilizations of Asia were well ahead of Europe in wealth and knowledge. The Europe of what we call the Middle Ages (say, tenth century) had regressed from the power and pomp of Greece and Rome, had lost much of the science it had once possessed, had seen its economy retreat into generalized autarky. It traded little with other societies, for it had little surplus to sell, and insofar as it wanted goods from outside, it paid for them largely with human beings. Nothing testifies better to deep poverty than the export of slaves or the persistent exodus of job-hungry migrants. Five hundred years later, the tables had turned. I like to summarize the change in one tell-tale event: the Portuguese penetration into the Indian Ocean led by Vasco da Gama in 1498. This was an extraordinary achievement. Some scholars will tell you that it was some kind of accident; that it could just as easily have been Muslim sailors, or Indian, or Chinese to make the connection from the other direction. Did not the Chinese send a series of large fleets sailing west as far as the east African coast in the early fifteenth century— bigger, better and earlier than anything the Portuguese had to show? Don’t you believe it. These affirmations of Asian priority are especially prominent and urgent nowadays because a new inversion is bringing Asia to the fore. A “multicultural” world history finds it hard to live with a eurocentric story of achievement and transformation. So a new would-be (politically correct) orthodoxy would have us believe that a sequence of contingent events (gains by Portugal and then others in the Indian Ocean, followed by conquests by Spain and then others in the New World) gave Europe what began as a small edge and was then worked up into centuries of dominion and exploitation. A gloss on this myth contends that y David S. Landes is Emeritus Professor of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Journal of Economic Perspectives—Volume 20, Number 2—Spring 2006—Pages 3–22
4 Journal of Economic Perspectives a number of non-European societies were themselves on the edge of a technolog- ical and scientific breakthrough;that in effect,European tyranny (to paraphrase Thomas Gray's"Elegy Written in a Country Churchyard"),"froze the genial current of the [Asian]soul." A variant on this history-as-accident (or luck)is the pendulum approach associated with Jack Goody's(1996)book,East in the West.Everything starts on an even keel thanks to the allegedly common heritage of the Bronze Age;but then different parts move ahead,only to be caught up and passed by others,which then lose ground to their predecessors.So Europe was just especially lucky,taking the lead at the crucial turn to the Industrial Revolution.But Asia's turn will now come; indeed is already coming.As Goody (pp.231-232)writes:"[I]t is a pendular movement that continues today,with the East now beginning to dominate the West in matters of the economy."As for efforts to understand this European success- especially explanations based on allegedly deep characteristics that were present in Europe but wanting in China-such efforts are irrelevant,writes Goody(p.238): ..since all these features must have been present [in China]at the earlier period.Those discussions can be seen for what they are,as representing the understandable but distorting tendency of Europeans to inflate their overall contribution to world society and even to 'Western civilisation',a tendency reinforced by their undoubted achievements over the past few centuries.Such inflation of oneself inevitably involves the deflation of others;self-congratulation is a zero-sum game. But of course,Westerners were not alone in noticing some European deep characteristics.Thus Abu Talib,an Indian Muslim visitor to Britain late eighteenth century,commenting on British precocity in mechanization:"The British,"he wrote (cited in Khan,1998,p.303),"were endowed with a natural passion for technical innovation.They possessed inventive skills and preferred to perform even minor routine jobs with the aid of mechanical instruments rather than manually. They had such great passion for the use of technical instruments that they would not perform certain tasks unless the necessary instruments were at their disposal." The French,he went on,were not like that. I shall return later to this revisionist debate.Here,suffice to say:1)The Portuguese success was the result of decades of rational exploration and extension of navigational possibilities in an ocean (the south Atlantic)that was hostile to traditional techniques of navigation,which essentially involved following the coast- line.This technological enhancement rested in turn on a systematic utilization of astronomical observations and calculations,taken from the Muslims and transmit- ted largely by Jewish intermediaries,which allowed the Portuguese to follow winds and currents across the south Atlantic,and then use a knowledge of latitude to swing back around the tip of Africa and into the Indian Ocean.2)The Chinese Khan (1998.p.328.n.122)notes further that the Arabic lacked the vocabulary needed to speak of factory manufacture or machinery.For the latter,Abu Talib used "wheels and tools
a number of non-European societies were themselves on the edge of a technological and scientific breakthrough; that in effect, European tyranny (to paraphrase Thomas Gray’s “Elegy Written in a Country Churchyard”), “froze the genial current of the [Asian] soul.” A variant on this history-as-accident (or luck) is the pendulum approach associated with Jack Goody’s (1996) book, East in the West. Everything starts on an even keel thanks to the allegedly common heritage of the Bronze Age; but then different parts move ahead, only to be caught up and passed by others, which then lose ground to their predecessors. So Europe was just especially lucky, taking the lead at the crucial turn to the Industrial Revolution. But Asia’s turn will now come; indeed is already coming. As Goody (pp. 231–232) writes: “[I ]t is a pendular movement that continues today, with the East now beginning to dominate the West in matters of the economy.” As for efforts to understand this European success— especially explanations based on allegedly deep characteristics that were present in Europe but wanting in China—such efforts are irrelevant, writes Goody (p. 238): . . . since all these features must have been present [in China] at the earlier period. Those discussions can be seen for what they are, as representing the understandable but distorting tendency of Europeans to inflate their overall contribution to world society and even to ‘Western civilisation’, a tendency reinforced by their undoubted achievements over the past few centuries. Such inflation of oneself inevitably involves the deflation of others; self-congratulation is a zero-sum game. But of course, Westerners were not alone in noticing some European deep characteristics. Thus Abu Talib, an Indian Muslim visitor to Britain late eighteenth century, commenting on British precocity in mechanization: “The British,” he wrote (cited in Khan, 1998, p. 303), “were endowed with a natural passion for technical innovation. They possessed inventive skills and preferred to perform even minor routine jobs with the aid of mechanical instruments rather than manually. They had such great passion for the use of technical instruments that they would not perform certain tasks unless the necessary instruments were at their disposal.” The French, he went on, were not like that.1 I shall return later to this revisionist debate. Here, suffice to say: 1) The Portuguese success was the result of decades of rational exploration and extension of navigational possibilities in an ocean (the south Atlantic) that was hostile to traditional techniques of navigation, which essentially involved following the coastline. This technological enhancement rested in turn on a systematic utilization of astronomical observations and calculations, taken from the Muslims and transmitted largely by Jewish intermediaries, which allowed the Portuguese to follow winds and currents across the south Atlantic, and then use a knowledge of latitude to swing back around the tip of Africa and into the Indian Ocean. 2) The Chinese 1 Khan (1998, p. 328, n. 122) notes further that the Arabic lacked the vocabulary needed to speak of factory manufacture or machinery. For the latter, Abu Talib used “wheels and tools.” 4 Journal of Economic Perspectives
David S.Landes 5 abandonment of westward exploration was partly the result of contingent political events;but at bottom it reflected the values and structures of Chinese society and civilization.3)European exploitation of the breakthrough rested on a disparity of power technology (better powder and better guns)as well as on navigational superiority. The extension of European power into other parts of the world was the expression of these and other disparities.Why other regions did not keep up with Europe is an important historical question,for one learns almost as much from failure as from success.It is not possible in brief compass,of course,to pose this question for every non-European society or civilization;but three do deserve serious reflection:Islam,China,and India.I shall focus in this essay on China. The First Chance:Science without Development The one civilization that was in a position to match and even anticipate the European achievement was China.China had two chances:first,to generate a continuing,self-sustaining process of scientific and technological advance on the basis of its indigenous traditions and achievements;and second,to learn from European science and technology once the foreign "barbarians"entered the Chi- nese domain in the sixteenth century.China failed both times. The first failure has elicited much scholarly inquiry and analysis.And yet it remains an abiding mystery.The China specialists tell us,for example,that in a number of areas of industrial technique,China long anticipated Europe:in textiles, where the Chinese had a power-driven spinning machine in the thirteenth century, some 500 years before the England of the Industrial Revolution knew water frames and mules;or in iron manufacture,where the Chinese early learned to use coal and probably coke(as against charcoal)in blast furnaces for smelting iron and were turning out perhaps as many as 125,000 tons of pig iron by the later eleventh century-a figure not achieved by Britain until 700 years later(Elvin,1973,p.85).? In general,one can establish a long list of instances of Chinese priority:the wheelbarrow,the stirrup,the rigid horse collar(to prevent choking),the compass, paper,printing,gunpowder,porcelain.(But not the horse-shoe,which implies that the Chinese did not make use of the horse for transport.) The mystery lies in the failure of China to realize the potential of some of the most important of these inventions.One generally assumes that knowledge and know-how are cumulative and that a superior technique,once known,will domi- 2Elvin (1973)gives the figure as"between 35.000 to 40.000 tons and 125,000 tons,"but says he prefers the higher estimate.He relies here on Yoshida Mitsukuni,a Japanese specialist writing in 1967.Work by Hartwell (1966.p.34),also advances the higher figure.In Hall (1985,p.46),this becomes "at least 125,000 tons."In this regard,Elvin (p.285)quotes a description by Yen Ju-yu of iron works on the Hupei/Shensi/Szechwan borders with blast furnaces 18 feet high,using charcoal and hand-operated bellows (more than ten persons relaying one another)and working continuously.The iron was apparently used for castings,and there is no indication of further refining as either wrought iron or steel
abandonment of westward exploration was partly the result of contingent political events; but at bottom it reflected the values and structures of Chinese society and civilization. 3) European exploitation of the breakthrough rested on a disparity of power technology (better powder and better guns) as well as on navigational superiority. The extension of European power into other parts of the world was the expression of these and other disparities. Why other regions did not keep up with Europe is an important historical question, for one learns almost as much from failure as from success. It is not possible in brief compass, of course, to pose this question for every non-European society or civilization; but three do deserve serious reflection: Islam, China, and India. I shall focus in this essay on China. The First Chance: Science without Development The one civilization that was in a position to match and even anticipate the European achievement was China. China had two chances: first, to generate a continuing, self-sustaining process of scientific and technological advance on the basis of its indigenous traditions and achievements; and second, to learn from European science and technology once the foreign “barbarians” entered the Chinese domain in the sixteenth century. China failed both times. The first failure has elicited much scholarly inquiry and analysis. And yet it remains an abiding mystery. The China specialists tell us, for example, that in a number of areas of industrial technique, China long anticipated Europe: in textiles, where the Chinese had a power-driven spinning machine in the thirteenth century, some 500 years before the England of the Industrial Revolution knew water frames and mules; or in iron manufacture, where the Chinese early learned to use coal and probably coke (as against charcoal) in blast furnaces for smelting iron and were turning out perhaps as many as 125,000 tons of pig iron by the later eleventh century—a figure not achieved by Britain until 700 years later (Elvin, 1973, p. 85).2 In general, one can establish a long list of instances of Chinese priority: the wheelbarrow, the stirrup, the rigid horse collar (to prevent choking), the compass, paper, printing, gunpowder, porcelain. (But not the horse-shoe, which implies that the Chinese did not make use of the horse for transport.) The mystery lies in the failure of China to realize the potential of some of the most important of these inventions. One generally assumes that knowledge and know-how are cumulative and that a superior technique, once known, will domi- 2 Elvin (1973) gives the figure as “between 35,000 to 40,000 tons and 125,000 tons,” but says he prefers the higher estimate. He relies here on Yoshida Mitsukuni, a Japanese specialist writing in 1967. Work by Hartwell (1966, p. 34), also advances the higher figure. In Hall (1985, p. 46), this becomes “at least 125,000 tons.” In this regard, Elvin (p. 285) quotes a description by Yen Ju-yu of iron works on the Hupei/Shensi/Szechwan borders with blast furnaces 18 feet high, using charcoal and hand-operated bellows (more than ten persons relaying one another) and working continuously. The iron was apparently used for castings, and there is no indication of further refining as either wrought iron or steel. David S. Landes 5
6 Journal of Economic Perspectives nate older methods and remain in use.But Chinese industrial history offers a number of examples of technological regression and oblivion.The machine to spin hemp was never adapted to the manufacture of cotton;cotton spinning was never mechanized;and coal/coke smelting was allowed to fall into disuse,along with the iron industry.Why,asks Elvin (1973,pp.297-298)? It would seem that none of the conventional explanations tells us in convinc- ing fashion why technical progress was absent in the Chinese economy during a period that was,on the whole,one of prosperity and expansion.Almost every element usually regarded by historians as a major contributory cause to the Indus- trial Revolution in north-western Europe was also present in China.There had even been a revolution in the relations between social classes,at least in the countryside; but this had had no important effect on the techniques of production.Only Galilean-Newtonian science was missing;but in the short run this was not impor- tant.Had the Chinese possessed,or developed,the seventeenth-century European mania for tinkering and improving,they could easily have made an efficient spinning machine out of the primitive model described by Wang Chen.A steam engine would have been more difficult;but it should not have posed insuperable difficulties to a people who had been building double-acting piston flame-throwers in the Sung dynasty.The crucial point is that nobody tried.In most fields,agricul- ture being the chief exception,Chinese technology stopped progressing well before the point at which a lack of scientific knowledge had become a serious obstacle. Why indeed?Sinologists have put forward several partial explanations.Those that I find most persuasive are the following. First,China lacked a free market and institutionalized property rights.The Chinese state was always stepping in to interfere with private enterprise-to take over certain activities,to prohibit and inhibit others,to manipulate prices,to exact bribes.At various times the government was motivated by a desire to reserve labor to agriculture or to control important resources(salt and iron,for example);by an appetite for revenue (the story of the goose that laid the golden eggs is a leitmotif of Chinese history);by fear and disapproval of self-enrichment,except by officials, giving rise in turn to abundant corruption and rent-seeking;and by a distaste for maritime trade,which the Heavenly Kingdom saw as a diversion from imperial concerns,as a divisive force and source of income inequality in the ecumenical empire,and worse yet,as an invitation to exit.This state intervention and inter- ference encountered evasion and resistance;indeed,the very needs of state com- pelled a certain tolerance for disobedience.Still,the goal,the aim,the ideal was the ineffable stillness of immobility.When in 1368 the new Chinese emperor inaugu- rated a native (Ming)dynasty to replace the defeated Mongol invaders,he as- cended the throne in Nanjing as the Hongwu("Vast Martial")emperor.Let not the name deceive the reader:Hongwu's goal was anything but war.He wanted rather to immobilize the realm.People were to stay put and move only with the permission of the state-at home and abroad.People who went outside China without per- mission were liable to execution on their return.The Ming code of core laws also sought to block social mobility,with severe penalties for those jumping professional
nate older methods and remain in use. But Chinese industrial history offers a number of examples of technological regression and oblivion. The machine to spin hemp was never adapted to the manufacture of cotton; cotton spinning was never mechanized; and coal/coke smelting was allowed to fall into disuse, along with the iron industry. Why, asks Elvin (1973, pp. 297–298)? It would seem that none of the conventional explanations tells us in convincing fashion why technical progress was absent in the Chinese economy during a period that was, on the whole, one of prosperity and expansion. Almost every element usually regarded by historians as a major contributory cause to the Industrial Revolution in north-western Europe was also present in China. There had even been a revolution in the relations between social classes, at least in the countryside; but this had had no important effect on the techniques of production. Only Galilean-Newtonian science was missing; but in the short run this was not important. Had the Chinese possessed, or developed, the seventeenth-century European mania for tinkering and improving, they could easily have made an efficient spinning machine out of the primitive model described by Wang Chen. A steam engine would have been more difficult; but it should not have posed insuperable difficulties to a people who had been building double-acting piston flame-throwers in the Sung dynasty. The crucial point is that nobody tried. In most fields, agriculture being the chief exception, Chinese technology stopped progressing well before the point at which a lack of scientific knowledge had become a serious obstacle. Why indeed? Sinologists have put forward several partial explanations. Those that I find most persuasive are the following. First, China lacked a free market and institutionalized property rights. The Chinese state was always stepping in to interfere with private enterprise—to take over certain activities, to prohibit and inhibit others, to manipulate prices, to exact bribes. At various times the government was motivated by a desire to reserve labor to agriculture or to control important resources (salt and iron, for example); by an appetite for revenue (the story of the goose that laid the golden eggs is a leitmotif of Chinese history); by fear and disapproval of self-enrichment, except by officials, giving rise in turn to abundant corruption and rent-seeking; and by a distaste for maritime trade, which the Heavenly Kingdom saw as a diversion from imperial concerns, as a divisive force and source of income inequality in the ecumenical empire, and worse yet, as an invitation to exit. This state intervention and interference encountered evasion and resistance; indeed, the very needs of state compelled a certain tolerance for disobedience. Still, the goal, the aim, the ideal was the ineffable stillness of immobility. When in 1368 the new Chinese emperor inaugurated a native (Ming) dynasty to replace the defeated Mongol invaders, he ascended the throne in Nanjing as the Hongwu (“Vast Martial”) emperor. Let not the name deceive the reader: Hongwu’s goal was anything but war. He wanted rather to immobilize the realm. People were to stay put and move only with the permission of the state—at home and abroad. People who went outside China without permission were liable to execution on their return. The Ming code of core laws also sought to block social mobility, with severe penalties for those jumping professional 6 Journal of Economic Perspectives
Why Europe and the West?Why Not China?7 and occupational barriers.In this regard,Timothy Brook (1998,p.vii)cites in epigraph one of the Hongwu emperor's favorite moral dicta: Let the state be small and the people few; So that the people...fearing death,will be reluctant to move great distances And,even if they have boats and carts,will not use them. So that the people...will find their food sweet and their clothes beautiful, Will be content with where they live and happy in their customs. Though adjoining states be within sight of one another and cocks crow- ing and dogs barking in one be heard in the next, Yet the people of one state will grow old and die without having had any dealings with those of another. These matters reached a wretched climax under the Ming dynasty(1368-1644), when the state attempted to prohibit all trade overseas.Such interdictions led of course to evasion and smuggling,with concomitant corruption (protection money),searches for contraband,confiscations and punishment.All of this neces- sarily acted to strangle initiative,to increase risk and the cost of transactions,and to chase talent from commerce and industry. A second reason why China did not realize the economic potential of its scientific expertise involved the larger values of the society.The great Hungarian- German-French sinologist,Etienne Balazs(1968 [1988];see also Balazs,1964),saw China's abortive technology as part of a larger pattern of totalitarian control.He recognizes the absence of freedom,along with the weight of custom and consensus and what passed for higher wisdom.His analysis (pp.22-23)is worth repeating: ..if one understands by totalitarianism the complete hold of the State and its executive organs and functionaries over all the activities of social life, without exception,Chinese society was highly totalitarian....No private initiative,no expression of public life that can escape official control.There is to begin with a whole array of state monopolies,which comprise the great consumption staples:salt,iron,tea,alcohol,foreign trade.There is a monop- oly of education,jealously guarded.There is practically a monopoly of letters (I was about to say,of the press):anything written unofficially,that escapes the censorship,has little hope of reaching the public.But the reach of the 3 The imperial authorities vacillated in their attitude to foreign trade,now favoring it,now clamping down;and these tergiversations were in themselves a deterrent to stable enterprise and capital accu- mulation.In addition,even when the state relented,it did so in circumstances that pushed the traders into illicit operations.Thus,the early Mongol (Yuan)dynasty (1280-1368)allowed freedom of enter- prise,but then succumbed to the temptation of instituting a licensing system.This enabled officials to play the role of capitalist,financing venturers and dividing profits 70-30:70 for the official,30 for the working trader.That was greedy,compared to the typical European 50-50 split.The traders presumably sought to conceal gains,but in the long run,trade had to suffer
and occupational barriers. In this regard, Timothy Brook (1998, p. vii) cites in epigraph one of the Hongwu emperor’s favorite moral dicta: Let the state be small and the people few; So that the people... fearing death, will be reluctant to move great distances And, even if they have boats and carts, will not use them. So that the people... will find their food sweet and their clothes beautiful, Will be content with where they live and happy in their customs. Though adjoining states be within sight of one another and cocks crowing and dogs barking in one be heard in the next, Yet the people of one state will grow old and die without having had any dealings with those of another. These matters reached a wretched climax under the Ming dynasty (1368 –1644), when the state attempted to prohibit all trade overseas.3 Such interdictions led of course to evasion and smuggling, with concomitant corruption (protection money), searches for contraband, confiscations and punishment. All of this necessarily acted to strangle initiative, to increase risk and the cost of transactions, and to chase talent from commerce and industry. A second reason why China did not realize the economic potential of its scientific expertise involved the larger values of the society. The great HungarianGerman-French sinologist, Etienne Balazs (1968 [1988]; see also Balazs, 1964), saw China’s abortive technology as part of a larger pattern of totalitarian control. He recognizes the absence of freedom, along with the weight of custom and consensus and what passed for higher wisdom. His analysis (pp. 22–23) is worth repeating: . . . if one understands by totalitarianism the complete hold of the State and its executive organs and functionaries over all the activities of social life, without exception, Chinese society was highly totalitarian. . . . No private initiative, no expression of public life that can escape official control. There is to begin with a whole array of state monopolies, which comprise the great consumption staples: salt, iron, tea, alcohol, foreign trade. There is a monopoly of education, jealously guarded. There is practically a monopoly of letters (I was about to say, of the press): anything written unofficially, that escapes the censorship, has little hope of reaching the public. But the reach of the 3 The imperial authorities vacillated in their attitude to foreign trade, now favoring it, now clamping down; and these tergiversations were in themselves a deterrent to stable enterprise and capital accumulation. In addition, even when the state relented, it did so in circumstances that pushed the traders into illicit operations. Thus, the early Mongol (Yuan) dynasty (1280 –1368) allowed freedom of enterprise, but then succumbed to the temptation of instituting a licensing system. This enabled officials to play the role of capitalist, financing venturers and dividing profits 70-30: 70 for the official, 30 for the working trader. That was greedy, compared to the typical European 50-50 split. The traders presumably sought to conceal gains, but in the long run, trade had to suffer. Why Europe and the West? Why Not China? 7
8 Journal of Economic Perspectives Moloch-State,the omnipotence of the bureaucracy,goes much farther.There are clothing regulations,a regulation of public and private construction (dimensions of houses);the colors one wears,the music one hears,the festivals-all are regulated.There are rules for birth and rules for death;the providential State watches minutely over every step of its subjects,from cradle to grave.It is a regime of paper work and harassment,endless paper work and endless harassment. The ingenuity and inventiveness of the Chinese,which have given so much to mankind-silk,tea,porcelain,paper,printing,and more-would no doubt have enriched China further and probably brought it to the threshold of modern industry,had it not been for this stifling state control.It is the State that kills technological progress in China.Not only in the sense that it nips in the bud anything that goes against or seems to go against its interests,but also by the customs implanted inexorably by the raison d'Etat.The atmosphere of routine,of traditionalism,and of immobility,which makes any innovation suspect,any initiative that is not commanded and sanctioned in advance,is unfavorable to the spirit of free inquiry. In short,to go back to Elvin (1973),the reason the Chinese did not develop based on their scientific knowledge is that no one was trying.Why try?Especially since the Chinese were not without their own quiet resources to thwart bureaucratic interferences and frustrations-reliance on personal and familial collaboration,for example,in place of arbitrary or institutional practice in business.In such matters, personal trust could yield more dependable performance than legal rules. In all this,the contrast with Europe was marked.Where fragmentation and national rivalries compelled European rulers to pay heed to their subjects,to recognize their rights and cultivate the sources of wealth,the rulers of China had a free hand.Again Elvin (1973,pp.224-225)captures some of this: ..it was the great size of the Chinese Empire which made the adoption of the policies of the Ming emperors possible.In a Chinese subcontinent made up of smaller independent states,like those of the Five Dynasties [907-960 C.E.]or the Ten Kingdoms,no government could have afforded to close itself off.International economic interdependence (as that between regions would have become)would have removed this option;and the need for diplomatic and military alliances,and revenue from foreign trade,would have made isolationism undesirable.With smaller states,there might also have been,as there was in north-western Europe in early modern times,a closer conscious identification of the governed with their countries and rulers.Prior to mod- ern communications,the immensity of the empire precluded nationalism Whatever the mix of factors,the result seems to have been a curious pattern of isolated initiatives and sisyphean discontinuities-up,up,up and then down again-almost as though the society were constrained by a homeostatic braking mechanism or held down by a silk ceiling.The result,if not the aim,was a kind of
Moloch-State, the omnipotence of the bureaucracy, goes much farther. There are clothing regulations, a regulation of public and private construction (dimensions of houses); the colors one wears, the music one hears, the festivals—all are regulated. There are rules for birth and rules for death; the providential State watches minutely over every step of its subjects, from cradle to grave. It is a regime of paper work and harassment, endless paper work and endless harassment. The ingenuity and inventiveness of the Chinese, which have given so much to mankind—silk, tea, porcelain, paper, printing, and more—would no doubt have enriched China further and probably brought it to the threshold of modern industry, had it not been for this stifling state control. It is the State that kills technological progress in China. Not only in the sense that it nips in the bud anything that goes against or seems to go against its interests, but also by the customs implanted inexorably by the raison d’Etat. The atmosphere of routine, of traditionalism, and of immobility, which makes any innovation suspect, any initiative that is not commanded and sanctioned in advance, is unfavorable to the spirit of free inquiry. In short, to go back to Elvin (1973), the reason the Chinese did not develop based on their scientific knowledge is that no one was trying. Why try? Especially since the Chinese were not without their own quiet resources to thwart bureaucratic interferences and frustrations—reliance on personal and familial collaboration, for example, in place of arbitrary or institutional practice in business. In such matters, personal trust could yield more dependable performance than legal rules. In all this, the contrast with Europe was marked. Where fragmentation and national rivalries compelled European rulers to pay heed to their subjects, to recognize their rights and cultivate the sources of wealth, the rulers of China had a free hand. Again Elvin (1973, pp. 224 –225) captures some of this: . . . it was the great size of the Chinese Empire which made the adoption of the policies of the Ming emperors possible. In a Chinese subcontinent made up of smaller independent states, like those of the Five Dynasties [907-960 C.E.] or the Ten Kingdoms, no government could have afforded to close itself off. International economic interdependence (as that between regions would have become) would have removed this option; and the need for diplomatic and military alliances, and revenue from foreign trade, would have made isolationism undesirable. With smaller states, there might also have been, as there was in north-western Europe in early modern times, a closer conscious identification of the governed with their countries and rulers. Prior to modern communications, the immensity of the empire precluded nationalism. Whatever the mix of factors, the result seems to have been a curious pattern of isolated initiatives and sisyphean discontinuities— up, up, up and then down again—almost as though the society were constrained by a homeostatic braking mechanism or held down by a silk ceiling. The result, if not the aim, was a kind of 8 Journal of Economic Perspectives
David S.Landes 9 change-in-immobility;or maybe immobility-in-change.Innovation was allowed to go (was able to go)so far and no farther.4 The Europeans knew much less of these interferences.Instead,they entered during these centuries into an exciting world of innovation and emulation that challenged and tempted vested interests and kept the forces of conservatism scrambling.Changes were cumulative,news of novelty spread fast and a new sense of progress and achievement replaced an older,effete reverence for authority.This intoxicating sense of freedom touched (infected)all domains.These were years of heresies in the church,of popular initiatives that,we can see now,anticipated the rupture of the Reformation;of new forms of expression and collective action that challenged the older organization of society and posed a threat to other polities;of new ways of doing and making things that made newness a virtue and a source of delight. Important in all this was the role of the Christian church in Europe as custodian of knowledge and school for technicians.One might have expected otherwise:that organized spirituality,with its emphasis on prayer and contempla- tion,would have had little interest in technology;and that with its view of labor as penalty for original sin,it would have had no concern to save labor.And yet everything seems to have worked in the opposite direction:The desire to free clerics from time-consuming earthly tasks led to the introduction and diffusion of power machinery and,beginning with the Cistercians in the twelfth century,to the hiring of lay brothers (conversi)to do the dirty work,which led in turn to an awareness of and attention to time and productivity.All of this gave rise on monastic estates to remarkable assemblages of powered machinery-complex se- quences designed to make the most of the water power available and distribute it through a series of industrial operations.A description of the abbey of Clairvaux in the mid-twelfth century (cited in White,1978,p.245-246)exults in this versatility: "coquendis,cribrandis,vertendis,terendis,rigandis,lavandis,molendis,molliendis,suum sine contradictione praestans obsequium."The author,clearly proud of these achieve- ments,further tells his readers that he will take the liberty of joking(the medieval clerical equivalent of,"if you'll pardon the expression"):the fulling hammers,he says,seem to have dispensed the fullers of the penalty for their sins;and he thanks God that such devices can mitigate the oppressive labor of men and spare the backs of their horses. Why this peculiarly European joy in discovery?This pleasure in the new and better?This cultivation of invention-or what some have called "the invention of invention"?Different scholars have suggested a variety of reasons,typically related to religious values.One possible reason grows from the Judaeo-Christian respect for manual labor,summed up in a number of biblical injunctions.One example will suffice:when God warns Noah of the coming flood and tells him he will be saved, it is not God who saves him."Build thee an ark of gopher wood,"says the Lord,and For example,Max Weber (1922 [1951].as cited in Hall,1985,p.41)argued that the administrative bureaucracy was undermanned,so that government came to know and respond to changes only after they had gotten under way.Hence a pattern of "intermittent and jerky"homeostatic interventions
change-in-immobility; or maybe immobility-in-change. Innovation was allowed to go (was able to go) so far and no farther.4 The Europeans knew much less of these interferences. Instead, they entered during these centuries into an exciting world of innovation and emulation that challenged and tempted vested interests and kept the forces of conservatism scrambling. Changes were cumulative, news of novelty spread fast and a new sense of progress and achievement replaced an older, effete reverence for authority. This intoxicating sense of freedom touched (infected) all domains. These were years of heresies in the church, of popular initiatives that, we can see now, anticipated the rupture of the Reformation; of new forms of expression and collective action that challenged the older organization of society and posed a threat to other polities; of new ways of doing and making things that made newness a virtue and a source of delight. Important in all this was the role of the Christian church in Europe as custodian of knowledge and school for technicians. One might have expected otherwise: that organized spirituality, with its emphasis on prayer and contemplation, would have had little interest in technology; and that with its view of labor as penalty for original sin, it would have had no concern to save labor. And yet everything seems to have worked in the opposite direction: The desire to free clerics from time-consuming earthly tasks led to the introduction and diffusion of power machinery and, beginning with the Cistercians in the twelfth century, to the hiring of lay brothers (conversi) to do the dirty work, which led in turn to an awareness of and attention to time and productivity. All of this gave rise on monastic estates to remarkable assemblages of powered machinery— complex sequences designed to make the most of the water power available and distribute it through a series of industrial operations. A description of the abbey of Clairvaux in the mid-twelfth century (cited in White, 1978, p. 245–246) exults in this versatility: “coquendis, cribrandis, vertendis, terendis, rigandis, lavandis, molendis, molliendis, suum sine contradictione praestans obsequium.” The author, clearly proud of these achievements, further tells his readers that he will take the liberty of joking (the medieval clerical equivalent of, “if you’ll pardon the expression”): the fulling hammers, he says, seem to have dispensed the fullers of the penalty for their sins; and he thanks God that such devices can mitigate the oppressive labor of men and spare the backs of their horses. Why this peculiarly European joy in discovery? This pleasure in the new and better? This cultivation of invention— or what some have called “the invention of invention”? Different scholars have suggested a variety of reasons, typically related to religious values. One possible reason grows from the Judaeo-Christian respect for manual labor, summed up in a number of biblical injunctions. One example will suffice: when God warns Noah of the coming flood and tells him he will be saved, it is not God who saves him. “Build thee an ark of gopher wood,” says the Lord, and 4 For example, Max Weber (1922 [1951], as cited in Hall, 1985, p. 41) argued that the administrative bureaucracy was undermanned, so that government came to know and respond to changes only after they had gotten under way. Hence a pattern of “intermittent and jerky” homeostatic interventions. David S. Landes 9
10 Journal of Economic Perspectives Noah builds an ark to divine specifications.A second and related reason is the Judaeo-Christian subordination of nature to man.This belief is a sharp departure from widespread animistic beliefs and practices that saw something of the divine in every tree and stream (hence the naiads and dryads).Ecologists today might say these animistic beliefs were preferable to what was put in their place,but no one was listening to pagan nature-worshipers in Christian Europe.A third reason stems from the Judaeo-Christian sense of linear time.Other societies thought of time as cyclical,returning to earlier stages and starting over again.Linear time can be thought of as progressive or regressive,as moving on to better things or declining from some earlier,happier state.For Europeans in our period,the progressive view prevailed. In the last analysis,however,I would stress the role of the market:the fact that enterprise was free in Europe,that innovation worked and paid,that rulers and vested interests were narrowly constrained in what they could do to prevent or discourage innovation.Success bred imitation and emulation;also a sense of power that would in the long run raise men almost to the level of gods.The old legends remained-the expulsion from the Garden,Icarus who flew too high,Prometheus in chains-to warn against hubris.The very notion of hubris-cosmic insolence-is testimony to some men's pretensions and the efforts of others to curb them.But the doers were not paying attention. The Second Chance:Learning from the Barbarians At the time the first Europeans arrived in the Indian Ocean and made their way to China,the Celestial Empire as it was called was,at least in its own eyes,the premier political entity in the world-first in size and population,first in age and experience,untouchable in its cultural achievement,apparently imperturbable in its sense of moral and spiritual superiority.5 The Chinese lived,as they thought,at the center of the universe;around them,lesser breeds basked in their glow, reached out to them for light,gained stature by doing obeisance and offering tribute.Their emperor was the "Son of Heaven,"the unique,godlike representative of celestial power.Those few who entered his presence showed their awe by kowtowing-kneeling and touching their head nine times to the ground;others kowtowed to anything emanating from him-a letter,a single handwritten ideo- graph.The paper he wrote on,the clothes he wore,everything he touched partook of his divine essence.Western diplomats allowed the Chinese to compel them to these gestures,which they "considered an essential part of a tributary system of foreign relations"(Spence,1998,p.42).By doing this,"the Westerners were 5 These Portuguese sailors of the sixteenth century were of course not the first Europeans to make their way to China.The best known of the earlier visitors is Marco Polo,who came in the thirteenth century from Venice,then the richest city in Europe,yet thought it a small town by comparison with what he saw in Cathay
Noah builds an ark to divine specifications. A second and related reason is the Judaeo-Christian subordination of nature to man. This belief is a sharp departure from widespread animistic beliefs and practices that saw something of the divine in every tree and stream (hence the naiads and dryads). Ecologists today might say these animistic beliefs were preferable to what was put in their place, but no one was listening to pagan nature-worshipers in Christian Europe. A third reason stems from the Judaeo-Christian sense of linear time. Other societies thought of time as cyclical, returning to earlier stages and starting over again. Linear time can be thought of as progressive or regressive, as moving on to better things or declining from some earlier, happier state. For Europeans in our period, the progressive view prevailed. In the last analysis, however, I would stress the role of the market: the fact that enterprise was free in Europe, that innovation worked and paid, that rulers and vested interests were narrowly constrained in what they could do to prevent or discourage innovation. Success bred imitation and emulation; also a sense of power that would in the long run raise men almost to the level of gods. The old legends remained—the expulsion from the Garden, Icarus who flew too high, Prometheus in chains—to warn against hubris. The very notion of hubris— cosmic insolence—is testimony to some men’s pretensions and the efforts of others to curb them. But the doers were not paying attention. The Second Chance: Learning from the Barbarians At the time the first Europeans arrived in the Indian Ocean and made their way to China, the Celestial Empire as it was called was, at least in its own eyes, the premier political entity in the world—first in size and population, first in age and experience, untouchable in its cultural achievement, apparently imperturbable in its sense of moral and spiritual superiority.5 The Chinese lived, as they thought, at the center of the universe; around them, lesser breeds basked in their glow, reached out to them for light, gained stature by doing obeisance and offering tribute. Their emperor was the “Son of Heaven,” the unique, godlike representative of celestial power. Those few who entered his presence showed their awe by kowtowing— kneeling and touching their head nine times to the ground; others kowtowed to anything emanating from him—a letter, a single handwritten ideograph. The paper he wrote on, the clothes he wore, everything he touched partook of his divine essence. Western diplomats allowed the Chinese to compel them to these gestures, which they “considered an essential part of a tributary system of foreign relations” (Spence, 1998, p. 42). By doing this, “the Westerners were 5 These Portuguese sailors of the sixteenth century were of course not the first Europeans to make their way to China. The best known of the earlier visitors is Marco Polo, who came in the thirteenth century from Venice, then the richest city in Europe, yet thought it a small town by comparison with what he saw in Cathay. 10 Journal of Economic Perspectives
Why Europe and the West？Why Not China？I1 unwittingly shoring up the Qing court's views of China's superiority"(Spence citing Wils,1984). Those who represented the emperor and administered for him were chosen on the basis of competitive examinations in Confucian letters and morals.These mandarin officials were in effect the embodiment of the higher Chinese culture, invested with its prestige,imbued with its wholeness and sublime superiority.Their self-esteem and haughtiness had ample room for expression and exercise on their inferiors and were matched only by their "stunned submissiveness"and self abasement to superiors (Welsh,1993,p.16,who in this case quotes without reference).Nothing conveyed so well their rivalry in humility than the morning audience,when hundreds of courtiers gathered from midnight on and stood about in the open air,in rain and cold and fair,to wait for the emperor's arrival and perform their obeisance.They were not wasting time;their time was the emperor's. They could not afford to be late,and punctuality was not enough:unpunctual earliness was proof of zeal (Landes,1983;see also Huang,1981). Such cultural triumphalism combined with petty downward tyranny made China a singularly bad learner.What was there to learn?This rejection of the strange and foreign was the more anxious for the very force of the arrogance that justified it.For that is the paradox of the superiority complex:it is an expression of insecurity.It is intrinsically brittle;those who nourish it,need it,and depend on it are also those who fear nothing so much as contradiction.The French today are so persuaded of the superiority of their language that they dither and tremble at the prospect of a borrowed word,especially if it comes from English.The same holds for Ming China:they were so convinced of their ascendancy that they quaked before the challenge of Western technology,which was there for the learning. The irony is that those first Portuguese visitors and Catholic missionaries used the wonders of western technology to charm their way into China.The mechanical clock was the key that unlocked the gates.The mechanical clock was a European mega-invention of the late thirteenth century,crucial not only for its contribution to temporal discipline and productivity,but its susceptibility of improvement and its role at the frontier of instrumentation and mechanical technique.The water clock is a dunce by comparison.For the Chinese in the sixteenth century,the mechanical clock came as a wondrous machine capable not only of keeping time but of amusing and entertaining.Some clocks played music;others were automata with figurines that moved rhythmically at intervals.Clocks,then,were the sort of thing that the emperor would want to see,that had to be shown him if only to earn his favor,that a zealous courtier had to show him before someone else did.But that was not so easy.This magical device had to be accompanied.Where all Chinese instincts and practice dictated that foreigners should be kept at a distance,confined to some peripheral point like Macao and allowed to proceed to the center only by exception,the clock,in its sixteenth-century avatar,needed its attendant clock- maker and keepers. The Chinese loved clocks and watches.They were less happy,though,with their European attendants.The problem here was the Chinese sense of the whole- ness of culture,the link between things,people and the divine.The Catholic priests
unwittingly shoring up the Qing court’s views of China’s superiority” (Spence citing Wills, 1984). Those who represented the emperor and administered for him were chosen on the basis of competitive examinations in Confucian letters and morals. These mandarin officials were in effect the embodiment of the higher Chinese culture, invested with its prestige, imbued with its wholeness and sublime superiority. Their self-esteem and haughtiness had ample room for expression and exercise on their inferiors and were matched only by their “stunned submissiveness” and selfabasement to superiors (Welsh, 1993, p. 16, who in this case quotes without reference). Nothing conveyed so well their rivalry in humility than the morning audience, when hundreds of courtiers gathered from midnight on and stood about in the open air, in rain and cold and fair, to wait for the emperor’s arrival and perform their obeisance. They were not wasting time; their time was the emperor’s. They could not afford to be late, and punctuality was not enough: unpunctual earliness was proof of zeal (Landes, 1983; see also Huang, 1981). Such cultural triumphalism combined with petty downward tyranny made China a singularly bad learner. What was there to learn? This rejection of the strange and foreign was the more anxious for the very force of the arrogance that justified it. For that is the paradox of the superiority complex: it is an expression of insecurity. It is intrinsically brittle; those who nourish it, need it, and depend on it are also those who fear nothing so much as contradiction. The French today are so persuaded of the superiority of their language that they dither and tremble at the prospect of a borrowed word, especially if it comes from English. The same holds for Ming China: they were so convinced of their ascendancy that they quaked before the challenge of Western technology, which was there for the learning. The irony is that those first Portuguese visitors and Catholic missionaries used the wonders of western technology to charm their way into China. The mechanical clock was the key that unlocked the gates. The mechanical clock was a European mega-invention of the late thirteenth century, crucial not only for its contribution to temporal discipline and productivity, but its susceptibility of improvement and its role at the frontier of instrumentation and mechanical technique. The water clock is a dunce by comparison. For the Chinese in the sixteenth century, the mechanical clock came as a wondrous machine capable not only of keeping time but of amusing and entertaining. Some clocks played music; others were automata with figurines that moved rhythmically at intervals. Clocks, then, were the sort of thing that the emperor would want to see, that had to be shown him if only to earn his favor, that a zealous courtier had to show him before someone else did. But that was not so easy. This magical device had to be accompanied. Where all Chinese instincts and practice dictated that foreigners should be kept at a distance, confined to some peripheral point like Macao and allowed to proceed to the center only by exception, the clock, in its sixteenth-century avatar, needed its attendant clockmaker and keepers. The Chinese loved clocks and watches. They were less happy, though, with their European attendants. The problem here was the Chinese sense of the wholeness of culture, the link between things, people and the divine. The Catholic priests Why Europe and the West? Why Not China? 11
12 Journal of Economic Perspectives who first brought them these wonderful machines were salesmen of a special kind. They sought to convert the Chinese to the one true God,the trinitarian God of the Roman church,and the clocks were not only an entry ticket but an argument for the superiority of the Christian religion.Were not those who could make these things,who possessed all kinds of special astronomical and geographical knowledge to the bargain,were they not superior in the largest moral sense?Was not their faith truer,wiser?The Jesuits were prepared to make such an argument,stretching the while the rules and rites of the Church to fit the premises and win the sympathy of an understandably skeptical Chinese elite.(The Chinese ideographs for ancestor worship,for example,became the signifiers for the Christian mass.)But European laymen made the argument as well.Here is Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz(1646- 1716),mathematician (coinventor of the calculus)and philosopher (as quoted in Landes,1983,p.45,from a letter written circa 1675): What will these peoples say [the Persians,the Chinese],when they see this marvelous machine that you have made,which represents the true state of the heavens at any given time?I believe that they will recognize that the mind of man has something of the divine,and that this divinity communicates itself especially to Christians.The secret of the heavens,the greatness of the earth, and time measurement are the sort of thing I mean. This argument,whether explicit or implicit,did carry occasionally.The Cath- olic missionaries had some small success,although they had trouble persuading their open-minded"converts"to be good exclusivists(no other faith but the"true" faith)in the European tradition.But most Chinese saw these pretensions for what they were:an attack on Chinese claims to moral superiority,an assault on China's self-esteem. The response,then,had to be a repudiation or depreciation of Western science and technology (Cipolla,1967;Landes,1983,chapter 2).Here is the K'ang Hsi emperor,the most open-minded and curious of men in his pursuit of Western ways,the most zealous in teaching them (as translated by Spence,1974,p.74): "[E]ven though some of the Western methods are different from our own,and may even be an improvement,there is little about them that is new.The principles of mathematics all derive from the Book of Changes,and the Western methods are Chinese in origin..." That was the heart-warming myth.So the Chinese,who were not prepared to give up clocks,who wanted clocks,who recognized their Western origin-these same Chinese trivialized clocks as toys (which for many they were)or as nonfunc- tional symbols of status,unaffordable by or inaccessible to most.Premodern imperial China did not think of time knowledge as a personal right.The hour was sounded by the authorities,and the right to own a timepiece was a rare privilege. As a result,although the imperial court set up workshops to make clocks and got their Jesuit clockmakers to train some native talent,these Chinese makers never arrived at the level of Western horologists-for want of the best teachers and lack of commercial competition and emulation.Nor did imperial China ever develop a
who first brought them these wonderful machines were salesmen of a special kind. They sought to convert the Chinese to the one true God, the trinitarian God of the Roman church, and the clocks were not only an entry ticket but an argument for the superiority of the Christian religion. Were not those who could make these things, who possessed all kinds of special astronomical and geographical knowledge to the bargain, were they not superior in the largest moral sense? Was not their faith truer, wiser? The Jesuits were prepared to make such an argument, stretching the while the rules and rites of the Church to fit the premises and win the sympathy of an understandably skeptical Chinese elite. (The Chinese ideographs for ancestor worship, for example, became the signifiers for the Christian mass.) But European laymen made the argument as well. Here is Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz (1646 – 1716), mathematician (coinventor of the calculus) and philosopher (as quoted in Landes, 1983, p. 45, from a letter written circa 1675): What will these peoples say [the Persians, the Chinese], when they see this marvelous machine that you have made, which represents the true state of the heavens at any given time? I believe that they will recognize that the mind of man has something of the divine, and that this divinity communicates itself especially to Christians. The secret of the heavens, the greatness of the earth, and time measurement are the sort of thing I mean. This argument, whether explicit or implicit, did carry occasionally. The Catholic missionaries had some small success, although they had trouble persuading their open-minded “converts” to be good exclusivists (no other faith but the “true” faith) in the European tradition. But most Chinese saw these pretensions for what they were: an attack on Chinese claims to moral superiority, an assault on China’s self-esteem. The response, then, had to be a repudiation or depreciation of Western science and technology (Cipolla, 1967; Landes, 1983, chapter 2). Here is the K’ang Hsi emperor, the most open-minded and curious of men in his pursuit of Western ways, the most zealous in teaching them (as translated by Spence, 1974, p. 74): “[E]ven though some of the Western methods are different from our own, and may even be an improvement, there is little about them that is new. The principles of mathematics all derive from the Book of Changes, and the Western methods are Chinese in origin . . .” That was the heart-warming myth. So the Chinese, who were not prepared to give up clocks, who wanted clocks, who recognized their Western origin—these same Chinese trivialized clocks as toys (which for many they were) or as nonfunctional symbols of status, unaffordable by or inaccessible to most. Premodern imperial China did not think of time knowledge as a personal right. The hour was sounded by the authorities, and the right to own a timepiece was a rare privilege. As a result, although the imperial court set up workshops to make clocks and got their Jesuit clockmakers to train some native talent, these Chinese makers never arrived at the level of Western horologists—for want of the best teachers and lack of commercial competition and emulation. Nor did imperial China ever develop a 12 Journal of Economic Perspectives