Modern Asian Studies 40,3(2006)pp.631-662.2006 Cambridge University Press doi:10.1017/S0026749X06002058 Printed in the United Kingdom Robert Hart and Gustav Detring during the boxer Rebellion HANS VAN DE VEN University of Cambridge This article focuses on Robert Hart during the Boxer Rebellion.My reconstruction of his activities is based on a recently discovered file in the archives of the Chinese Maritime Customs Service held at the Second Historical Archives in Nanjing.While it has long been known that Hart corresponded with Qing officials during the Siege itself and while a few letters have been published,2 the file contains more than one hundred exchanges between Hart and Qing officials written after the end of the Siege of the Legations.I have further relied on a box of documents dealing with the Boxer Rebellion in the Hart Manuscript Collection at the Queen's University of Belfast,including Hart's notes on his meetings with Qing officials.3 These materials provide insight into the way Hart was able to persuade the Qing and foreign countries to begin negotiations and illustrate the critical role he played in fashioning the Boxer Protocol signed on 7 September 1901. Robert Hart was perhaps right that he was in a unique position to mediate.Just after the end of the Siege,he wrote James Duncan Campbell (1833-1907),the Non-Resident Secretary in charge of the London Office of the Customs Service,I am horribly hurt by all that has occurred,but there it is,and we can only try to make the best of it!I hold on to be of use to the Service,to China,and to the general interest.I think I can be of use,and only I in all three directions, I'Qu Han'(Out Letters),Maritime Customs Service Archives,Second Historical Archives of China,679(7)/112.Hereafter Out Letters. 2 Circular 961 (5 October 1goo),in Stanley Wright,ed.,Documents Illustrative of the Origin,Development,and Activities of the Chinese Maritime Customs Service (Shanghai, Statistical Department of the Inspector General of Customs,1938),Vol.II,238-54. This collection includes letters from the Zongli Yamen to Hart. 3 Papers Relating to the Boxer Disturbances',Hart Manuscript Collection, Queen's University Belfast,MS 15/4.Hereafter Boxer Disturbances. 0026-749X/o6/s7-50+$0.10 631
Modern Asian Studies 40, 3 (2006) pp. 631–662. C 2006 Cambridge University Press doi:10.1017/S0026749X06002058 Printed in the United Kingdom Robert Hart and Gustav Detring during the Boxer Rebellion HANS VAN DE VEN University of Cambridge This article focuses on Robert Hart during the Boxer Rebellion. My reconstruction of his activities is based on a recently discovered file in the archives of the Chinese Maritime Customs Service held at the Second Historical Archives in Nanjing.1 While it has long been known that Hart corresponded with Qing officials during the Siege itself and while a few letters have been published,2 the file contains more than one hundred exchanges between Hart and Qing officials written after the end of the Siege of the Legations. I have further relied on a box of documents dealing with the Boxer Rebellion in the Hart Manuscript Collection at the Queen’s University of Belfast, including Hart’s notes on his meetings with Qing officials.3 These materials provide insight into the way Hart was able to persuade the Qing and foreign countries to begin negotiations and illustrate the critical role he played in fashioning the Boxer Protocol signed on 7 September 1901. Robert Hart was perhaps right that he was in a unique position to mediate. Just after the end of the Siege, he wrote James Duncan Campbell (1833–1907), the Non-Resident Secretary in charge of the London Office of the Customs Service, ‘I am horribly hurt by all that has occurred, but there it is, and we can only try to make the best of it! I hold on to be of use to the Service, to China, and to the general interest. I think I can be of use, and only I in all three directions, 1 ‘Qu Han’ (Out Letters), Maritime Customs Service Archives, Second Historical Archives of China, 679(7)/112. Hereafter Out Letters. 2 Circular 961 (5 October 1900), in Stanley Wright, ed., Documents Illustrative of the Origin, Development, and Activities of the Chinese Maritime Customs Service (Shanghai, Statistical Department of the Inspector General of Customs, 1938), Vol. II, 238–54. This collection includes letters from the Zongli Yamen to Hart. 3 ‘Papers Relating to the Boxer Disturbances’, Hart Manuscript Collection, Queen’s University Belfast, MS 15/4. Hereafter Boxer Disturbances. 0026–749X/06/$7.50+$0.10 631
632 HANS VAN DE VEN at this juncture'.It was not at all predictable that the Qing would survive the crisis of the Boxer Rebellion.If Britain favoured concerted international action in support of the Qing,not all other countries thought similarly.Russia was eager to absorb north China as the Siberian railroad is completed',while Japan,which had already seized Korea,was determined to resist Russian influence and extend its own in northern China.France was interested in securing regions in south China neighbouring Tongking,while Germany too sought to acquire a base in China.A collapse of the Qing,the partition of China,or even an Allied imposition of a new monarchical ruler were all real possibilities in the tense weeks that followed the Allied occupation of Beijing and the Qing court's flight first to Taiyuan in Shanxi Province and then to Xi'an in Shaanxi.Hart's determined efforts helped prevent these outcomes. In this examination of Robert Hart's role during the Boxer crisis,I seek to illustrate his significance as a man in the middle.It is limiting, I believe,to portray him as ultimately either a servant of British or general foreign interest in China,or as someone who represented the West at its best.Chinese historians such as Chen Hansheng, Fan Wenlan,and He Jiajun argued in the 195os that the Customs Service was a tool of imperialism that did great harm to China.6 More recently,Chen Shiqi,the author of the most exhaustive history of the Chinese Maritime Customs to date,'as well as Chen Xiafei and Han Rongfang,the editors of the correspondence between Hart and James Duncan Campbell,3 were less one-sided.They expressed admiration for the financial and personnel systems of the Customs Quoted in Stanley Wright,Hart and the Chinese Customs(Belfast:Wm.Mullan and Son,195o),737: 5 The China Problem',National Archives of the United Kingdom (formerly the Public Record Office),Kew,CAB $7/53/65. 6 Zhongguo Jindai Jingjishi Ziliao Congkan Bianji Weiyuanhui (Compilation Committee for Reseources for Modern Economic History of China),Diguozhuyi yu Zhongguo Haiguan(Imperialism and China's Maritime Customs)(Beijing:Zhonghua Shuju,1957-1970). 7 Chen Shiqi,Zhongguo Jindai Haiguan Shi (History of the Maritime Customs Service of Modern China)(Beijing:Renmin Chubanshe,2002). 8 Chen Xiafei and Han Rongfang,eds,The Archives of the China's Imperial Maritime Customs Service:The Confidential Correspondence between Robert Hart and James Duncan Campbell (Beijing:Foreign Languages Press,1990-1993).An earlier edition, providing only Hart's letters to Campbell,was John Fairbank,Katherine Bruner, Elizabeth MacLeod Matheson,eds,The I.G.in Peking:The Letters of Robert Hart,Chinese Maritime Customs of China,1868-1907(Cambridge,Mass,Harvard UP,1975).The Beijing edition also supplies the telegrams that Hart and Campbell exchanged,but
632 HANS VAN DE VEN at this juncture’.4 It was not at all predictable that the Qing would survive the crisis of the Boxer Rebellion. If Britain favoured concerted international action in support of the Qing, not all other countries thought similarly. Russia was eager to ‘absorb north China as the Siberian railroad is completed’,5 while Japan, which had already seized Korea, was determined to resist Russian influence and extend its own in northern China. France was interested in securing regions in south China neighbouring Tongking, while Germany too sought to acquire a base in China. A collapse of the Qing, the partition of China, or even an Allied imposition of a new monarchical ruler were all real possibilities in the tense weeks that followed the Allied occupation of Beijing and the Qing court’s flight first to Taiyuan in Shanxi Province and then to Xi’an in Shaanxi. Hart’s determined efforts helped prevent these outcomes. In this examination of Robert Hart’s role during the Boxer crisis, I seek to illustrate his significance as a man in the middle. It is limiting, I believe, to portray him as ultimately either a servant of British or general foreign interest in China, or as someone who represented the West at its best. Chinese historians such as Chen Hansheng, Fan Wenlan, and He Jiajun argued in the 1950s that the Customs Service was a tool of imperialism that did great harm to China.6 More recently, Chen Shiqi, the author of the most exhaustive history of the Chinese Maritime Customs to date,7 as well as Chen Xiafei and Han Rongfang, the editors of the correspondence between Hart and James Duncan Campbell,8 were less one-sided. They expressed admiration for the financial and personnel systems of the Customs 4 Quoted in Stanley Wright, Hart and the Chinese Customs (Belfast: Wm. Mullan and Son, 1950), 737. 5 ‘The China Problem’, National Archives of the United Kingdom (formerly the Public Record Office), Kew, CAB 37/53/65. 6 Zhongguo Jindai Jingjishi Ziliao Congkan Bianji Weiyuanhui (Compilation Committee for Reseources for Modern Economic History of China), Diguozhuyi yu Zhongguo Haiguan (Imperialism and China’s Maritime Customs) (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1957–1970). 7 Chen Shiqi, Zhongguo Jindai Haiguan Shi(History of the Maritime Customs Service of Modern China) (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 2002). 8 Chen Xiafei and Han Rongfang, eds, The Archives of the China’s Imperial Maritime Customs Service: The Confidential Correspondence between Robert Hart and James Duncan Campbell (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1990–1993). An earlier edition, providing only Hart’s letters to Campbell, was John Fairbank, Katherine Bruner, Elizabeth MacLeod Matheson, eds, The I.G. in Peking: The Letters of Robert Hart, Chinese Maritime Customs of China, 1868–1907 (Cambridge, Mass, Harvard UP, 1975). The Beijing edition also supplies the telegrams that Hart and Campbell exchanged, but
ROBERT HART AND GUSTAV DETRING 633 Service.But they nonetheless condemned the Customs Service as an imperialist institution and argued that Hart served British and not Chinese interests. In contrast,Stanley Wright argued that Hart was able to build the Customs Service into a cosmopolitan bureaucracy dedicated to the modernization of China.9 He emphasized that the Service frequently acted on behalf of the Qing,including during diplomatic negotiations, and dampened the effects of imperialism.John Fairbank saw Hart as a paragon of what he called synarchy,that is,the joint rule of Western and Chinese officials of China's Treaty ports with the historical task of bringing modernity to China.10 In his contribution to this collection of essays,Richard O'Leary makes clear that Hart's Irishness makes it difficult to see him as simply British and that Hart held to multiple and overlapping identities. In examining Hart's role as a man in the middle at a time least tolerant of multiple loyalties and compromise,I seek to suggest that Hart occupied a nodal point in a network of transnational elites that emerged during the nineteenth century as commercial exchange intensified and international contacts broadened.This network tied together leading diplomats,merchants,bankers,journalists,and academics.In the West,it had bases in foreign ministries,banks, stock exchanges,periodicals,institutions of learning,and museums. In China,the Zongli Yamen (the Qing bureaucracy in charge of managing Qing relations with most foreign countries),the Customs Service itself,provincial and local governments,and Treaty Port institutions such as municipal councils were significant.But personal relations,sometimes maintained over many years and sometimes of a more ad hoc nature,were also important. What I hope to add to Fairbank's concept of synarchy,which already drew attention,in perhaps too sanguine a way,to the element of cooperation and collaboration in Sino-British relations,is first of all the suggestion that this network had a multinational character and was broadly based,even if Britain and its Foreign Office played a crucial role.Furthermore,divergent financial interests,personal animosities,and connections to home countries following radically still cannot be called definitive as it omits enclosures to the correspondence.A number of letters also appear to be missing. Wright,Hart. John Fairbank,Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast (Cambridge,Mass:Harvard University Press,1964),462-8
ROBERT HART AND GUSTAV DETRING 633 Service. But they nonetheless condemned the Customs Service as an imperialist institution and argued that Hart served British and not Chinese interests. In contrast, Stanley Wright argued that Hart was able to build the Customs Service into a cosmopolitan bureaucracy dedicated to the modernization of China.9 He emphasized that the Service frequently acted on behalf of the Qing, including during diplomatic negotiations, and dampened the effects of imperialism. John Fairbank saw Hart as a paragon of what he called synarchy, that is, the joint rule of Western and Chinese officials of China’s Treaty ports with the historical task of bringing modernity to China.10 In his contribution to this collection of essays, Richard O’Leary makes clear that Hart’s Irishness makes it difficult to see him as simply British and that Hart held to multiple and overlapping identities. In examining Hart’s role as a man in the middle at a time least tolerant of multiple loyalties and compromise, I seek to suggest that Hart occupied a nodal point in a network of transnational elites that emerged during the nineteenth century as commercial exchange intensified and international contacts broadened. This network tied together leading diplomats, merchants, bankers, journalists, and academics. In the West, it had bases in foreign ministries, banks, stock exchanges, periodicals, institutions of learning, and museums. In China, the Zongli Yamen (the Qing bureaucracy in charge of managing Qing relations with most foreign countries), the Customs Service itself, provincial and local governments, and Treaty Port institutions such as municipal councils were significant. But personal relations, sometimes maintained over many years and sometimes of a more ad hoc nature, were also important. What I hope to add to Fairbank’s concept of synarchy, which already drew attention, in perhaps too sanguine a way, to the element of cooperation and collaboration in Sino-British relations, is first of all the suggestion that this network had a multinational character and was broadly based, even if Britain and its Foreign Office played a crucial role. Furthermore, divergent financial interests, personal animosities, and connections to home countries following radically still cannot be called definitive as it omits enclosures to the correspondence. A number of letters also appear to be missing. 9 Wright, Hart. 10 John Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1964), 462–8
634 HANS VAN DE VEN different policies generated important divisions and rivalries within this network.It did not divide simply along Sino-Foreign lines.Finally, precisely where power was based,how it was enacted,and what effects it had are perhaps not as clear as the models of imperialism or synarchy suggested. To explore the complexity of the world of transnational elites as it operated in late Qing China,I bring into the analysis Gustav Detring (1842-1913),the German Commissioner of Customs at Tianjin.Detring had helped built the Tianjin Foreign Concession and was close to Li Hongzhang (1823-1901),one of the most powerful officials of the late Qing who followed a pro-Russian policy after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5.Even though nominally a subordinate of Robert Hart,Li Hongzhang's patronage provided Detring a great deal of autonomy.When Hart's stature declined together with the waning of British influence in China after the Sino-Japanese War, Detring attempted to use his connections with Li Hongzhang and the strengthening of German influence to become to China's railroad and mining industries what Hart was to China's sea-borne trade.Li Hongzhang himself used Detring as a counterweight to Hart in the Customs Service and to recover his own influence in China's railroad and mining administrations which he had lost after the Sino-Japanese War.Unlike Hart,whose position improved during the Boxer crisis and who was able to secure the survival of the Customs Service, Detring would lose all.To examine closely the activities of Robert Hart and Gustav Detring during the Boxer Rebellion therefore is useful to illustrate in a concrete way the structures,connections,concerns,and modes of operation characteristic of the world of transnational elites at the turn of the twentieth century in China. I.Robert Hart Hart had deep roots in both Britain and China.He grew up in County Armagh,attended first a preparatory school at Taunton in England and then Wesley College in Dublin,and completed his education at Queen's University Belfast.While maintaining contact with family and boyhood friends throughout his life,as O'Leary makes clear, Hart also developed close connections with leading British diplomats, bankers,journalists,scientists,and entrepreneurs.At the same time, Hart knew Chinese well,lived with a Cantonese partner named Ayaou with whom he had three children,and developed strong relations with
634 HANS VAN DE VEN different policies generated important divisions and rivalries within this network. It did not divide simply along Sino-Foreign lines. Finally, precisely where power was based, how it was enacted, and what effects it had are perhaps not as clear as the models of imperialism or synarchy suggested. To explore the complexity of the world of transnational elites as it operated in late Qing China, I bring into the analysis Gustav Detring (1842–1913), the German Commissioner of Customs at Tianjin. Detring had helped built the Tianjin Foreign Concession and was close to Li Hongzhang (1823–1901), one of the most powerful officials of the late Qing who followed a pro-Russian policy after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–5. Even though nominally a subordinate of Robert Hart, Li Hongzhang’s patronage provided Detring a great deal of autonomy. When Hart’s stature declined together with the waning of British influence in China after the Sino-Japanese War, Detring attempted to use his connections with Li Hongzhang and the strengthening of German influence to become to China’s railroad and mining industries what Hart was to China’s sea-borne trade. Li Hongzhang himself used Detring as a counterweight to Hart in the Customs Service and to recover his own influence in China’s railroad and mining administrations which he had lost after the Sino-Japanese War. Unlike Hart, whose position improved during the Boxer crisis and who was able to secure the survival of the Customs Service, Detring would lose all. To examine closely the activities of Robert Hart and Gustav Detring during the Boxer Rebellion therefore is useful to illustrate in a concrete way the structures, connections, concerns, and modes of operation characteristic of the world of transnational elites at the turn of the twentieth century in China. I. Robert Hart Hart had deep roots in both Britain and China. He grew up in County Armagh, attended first a preparatory school at Taunton in England and then Wesley College in Dublin, and completed his education at Queen’s University Belfast. While maintaining contact with family and boyhood friends throughout his life, as O’Leary makes clear, Hart also developed close connections with leading British diplomats, bankers, journalists, scientists, and entrepreneurs. At the same time, Hart knew Chinese well, lived with a Cantonese partner named Ayaou with whom he had three children, and developed strong relations with
ROBERT HART AND GUSTAV DETRING 635 Qing officials,including Prince Gong (1833-1898)and Wenxiang (1818-1876),two officials who dominated Chinese politics in the decades after the Taiping Rebellion(1850-1864)when Hart built up the Customs Service.He possessed a thorough knowledge of Chinese bureaucratic procedures.His understanding of and respect for official etiquette was critical to his success. In the letters that Robert Hart exchanged with the Zongli Yamen during the Siege of the Legations itself,he was concerned about two interconnected issues,the first of which was the Customs Service itself, including his own control over it.When Hart wrote to Campbell that he believed that only he could be of service to the Customs Service,China, and the general interest,this ranking was probably a quite accurate reflection of Hart's priorities.The second issue was the reopening of contact between Qing officials and Allied diplomatic representatives. Hart feared that the longer such contact was postponed,the stronger the likelihood of partition.The departure of the court with Empress Dowager Cixi(1835-1908)and the Guangxu Emperor (1871-1908) from Beijing,and the consequent exodus of officials,placed added obstacles in the way of beginning peace negotiations. On 19June,just before the beginning of the Siege,the Zongli Yamen informed Robert Hart that foreign naval commanders in Tianjin had demanded the surrender of the Dagu Forts and that they regarded this as a declaration of war.They ordered the foreign Legations to leave Beijing within 24 hours for their own safety as Boxer disturbances had spread to Beijing.Hart replied the next day that he found it difficult to believe that the naval commanders had acted without the authorization of the foreign ministers in Beijing and that he believed that peace could have been maintained if the Qing had not ordered the departure of the ministers.He further argued that it was wrong to see the actions of the foreign countries as a threat.They had mobilised forces,he stated,'for self-protection and to assist in pacifying the disturbances;they mean no harm to the court'.12 Hart stressed that as an employee of the Qing he belonged to a different category then the ministers:I have assisted in the collection of revenue for forty years and I should stay in Beijing as I have always Zongli Yamen to Hart'(1June 1go0),Wright,ed.,in Documents Illustrative,II, 241. To Their Excellencies the Senior Secretaries of the Zongli Yamen'(20 June 1goo),Out Letters Number 1.The numbers refer to the number given in the table of contents of the file.Hart began numbering the correspondence in this file only from his second letter,which he numbered New Series Number 1
ROBERT HART AND GUSTAV DETRING 635 Qing officials, including Prince Gong (1833–1898) and Wenxiang (1818–1876), two officials who dominated Chinese politics in the decades after the Taiping Rebellion (1850–1864) when Hart built up the Customs Service. He possessed a thorough knowledge of Chinese bureaucratic procedures. His understanding of and respect for official etiquette was critical to his success. In the letters that Robert Hart exchanged with the Zongli Yamen during the Siege of the Legations itself, he was concerned about two interconnected issues, the first of which was the Customs Service itself, including his own control over it. When Hart wrote to Campbell that he believed that only he could be of service to the Customs Service, China, and the general interest, this ranking was probably a quite accurate reflection of Hart’s priorities. The second issue was the reopening of contact between Qing officials and Allied diplomatic representatives. Hart feared that the longer such contact was postponed, the stronger the likelihood of partition. The departure of the court with Empress Dowager Cixi (1835–1908) and the Guangxu Emperor (1871–1908) from Beijing, and the consequent exodus of officials, placed added obstacles in the way of beginning peace negotiations. On 19 June, just before the beginning of the Siege, the Zongli Yamen informed Robert Hart that foreign naval commanders in Tianjin had demanded the surrender of the Dagu Forts and that they regarded this as a declaration of war. They ordered the foreign Legations to leave Beijing within 24 hours for their own safety as Boxer disturbances had spread to Beijing.11 Hart replied the next day that he found it difficult to believe that the naval commanders had acted without the authorization of the foreign ministers in Beijing and that he believed that peace could have been maintained if the Qing had not ordered the departure of the ministers. He further argued that it was wrong to see the actions of the foreign countries as a threat. They had mobilised forces, he stated, ‘for self-protection and to assist in pacifying the disturbances; they mean no harm to the court’.12 Hart stressed that as an employee of the Qing he belonged to a different category then the ministers: ‘I have assisted in the collection of revenue for forty years and I should stay in Beijing as I have always 11 ‘Zongli Yamen to Hart’ (19 June 1900), Wright, ed., in Documents Illustrative, II, 241. 12 ‘To Their Excellencies the Senior Secretaries of the Zongli Yamen’ (20 June 1900), Out Letters Number 1. The numbers refer to the number given in the table of contents of the file. Hart began numbering the correspondence in this file only from his second letter, which he numbered New Series Number 1
636 HANS VAN DE VEN been treated with honesty and sincerity'.But he nonetheless had decided to leave with his staff because 'were I to stay while all Ministers left Beijing,I could only cause problems for China'.13 He asked the Yamen to facilitate the departure of himself and other Customs employees because the railroad link with Tianjin had been cut and the roads had become unsafe.Hart's letter was not delivered because his courier abandoned his attempt to deliver it after the murder of Klemens von Ketteler(1853-1900),the German Minister.14 The Siege of the Legations began the next day and would last until 14 August.For four weeks,no messages passed between Hart and the Zongli Yamen.But on 21 July,Hart received a letter stating 'we have been deeply concerned about you but had no way to make enquiries as communications were impossible'.15 It asked whether he and Robert Bredon(1846-1918),Hart's brother-in-law and Deputy Inspector General,were safe and where they resided.Hart's reply informed the Yamen that he and his staff had fled to the British Legation,that the Commissioner for Postal Affairs,who was a member of the Customs Service,was dead,that two other members of his staff had been seriously wounded,that he himself and several others were ill,and that many of the offices of the Customs Service in Beijing and the Translators College (Tongwenguan)had been destroyed.Hart appended a copy of his undelivered 20 June letter to this reply.The Zongli Yamen informed Li Hongzhang,who then served as Governor General of Guangdong and Guangxi in Canton,of these messages, allowing Li to make known that he hadhad reliable news of Hart's safety and thus contradicting an obituary that had appeared in The Times of London on 17July.A memorial service in St Paul's Cathedral was hastily abandoned.16 Several days later,in an obvious attempt to suggest good will,the Zongli Yamen sent several carts with provisions to the Legations to re-establish contact.A special allotment for Hart consisted of a case of vegetables,ten watermelons,two blocks of ice,and 100 pounds of white flour.17 These provisions accompanied a request by the Yamen to the Ministers in the Legations to send open telegrams back to their capitals to inform them that they were safe.This was no doubt a 1s Ibid. 4 Circular 961,in Wright,ed.,Documents Illustrative,II,238. 15 To Their Excellences the Senior Secretaries of the Zongli Yamen',21July 1900, Out Letters,2. 16 Circular 961,in Wright,ed.,Documents Illustrative,II,238.Hart to Campbell', Letter 1173 (1o June 19oo),in Fairbank et al.,eds,The IG in Peking,p.1234,n.5. 7Circular 61,Wright,ed.Documents Illustrative,I,249
636 HANS VAN DE VEN been treated with honesty and sincerity’. But he nonetheless had decided to leave with his staff because ‘were I to stay while all Ministers left Beijing, I could only cause problems for China’.13 He asked the Yamen to facilitate the departure of himself and other Customs employees because the railroad link with Tianjin had been cut and the roads had become unsafe. Hart’s letter was not delivered because his courier abandoned his attempt to deliver it after the murder of Klemens von Ketteler (1853–1900), the German Minister.14 The Siege of the Legations began the next day and would last until 14 August. For four weeks, no messages passed between Hart and the Zongli Yamen. But on 21 July, Hart received a letter stating ‘we have been deeply concerned about you but had no way to make enquiries as communications were impossible’.15 It asked whether he and Robert Bredon (1846–1918), Hart’s brother-in-law and Deputy Inspector General, were safe and where they resided. Hart’s reply informed the Yamen that he and his staff had fled to the British Legation, that the Commissioner for Postal Affairs, who was a member of the Customs Service, was dead, that two other members of his staff had been seriously wounded, that he himself and several others were ill, and that many of the offices of the Customs Service in Beijing and the Translators College (Tongwenguan) had been destroyed. Hart appended a copy of his undelivered 20 June letter to this reply. The Zongli Yamen informed Li Hongzhang, who then served as Governor General of Guangdong and Guangxi in Canton, of these messages, allowing Li to make known that he had had reliable news of Hart’s safety and thus contradicting an obituary that had appeared in The Times of London on 17 July. A memorial service in St Paul’s Cathedral was hastily abandoned.16 Several days later, in an obvious attempt to suggest good will, the Zongli Yamen sent several carts with provisions to the Legations to re-establish contact. A special allotment for Hart consisted of a case of vegetables, ten watermelons, two blocks of ice, and 100 pounds of white flour.17 These provisions accompanied a request by the Yamen to the Ministers in the Legations to send open telegrams back to their capitals to inform them that they were safe. This was no doubt a 13 Ibid. 14 Circular 961, in Wright, ed., Documents Illustrative, II, 238. 15 ‘To Their Excellences the Senior Secretaries of the Zongli Yamen’, 21 July 1900, Out Letters, 2. 16 Circular 961, in Wright, ed., Documents Illustrative, II, 238. ‘Hart to Campbell’, Letter 1173 (10 June 1900), in Fairbank et al., eds, The IG in Peking, p.1234, n.5. 17 Circular 961, Wright, ed., Documents Illustrative, II, 249
ROBERT HART AND GUSTAV DETRING 637 desperate attempt to convince the Allies not to attack Beijing.Allied forces had won the Battle of Tianjin on 15July,following a month of intensive fighting.By late July,they were regrouping in preparation for a march on Beijing.The Ministers refused the Zongli Yamen's request.The Yamen then turned to Robert Hart,but he too declined, stating most diplomatically that 'were I to say the truth in an open telegram,no Minister of Foreign Affairs could believe it'.He added the earlier you agree to send telegrams in code on our behalf,the easier it will be to bring about a decisive change in direction'19 Arrangements for control of the Customs Service were a prominent issue in the messages between Hart and the Zongli Yamen.With the Inspectorate unable to function and Hart himself feared dead,ad hoc measures had been taken.Li Hongzhang had instructed all Customs Houses in Guangdong and Guangxi to report to Paul King,the Canton Commissioner,20 while Russians had taken over Customs Houses in Manchuria.21 The British Foreign Office had asked Campbell whether he would be willing to assume the Inspectorate Generalship in case of Hart's death.Campbell had declined and had suggested that Alfred E. Hippisley (1848-1937),who joined the Customs Service in 1867 and has become famous for inspiring the USA's Open Door notes,would be more suitable.22 In Shanghai,Francis E.Taylor (1848-1939),the Statistical Secretary,had set up a temporary Inspectorate General soon after the beginning of the Siege with the collaboration of Liu Kunyi (1830-1902),the Superintendent of Trade for the Southern Ports.The Zongli Yamen asked Hart on 21 July whether he approved of Liu Kunyi's and Taylor's arrangements.23 Hart had little option but to sanction them,but he noted testily in a Circular of 5 October that 24 June seemed a rather early date to arrange how I was to be replaced'.24 He instructed also that the temporary Inspectorate should be managed conjointly by Taylor and Francis Aglen(1869-1932),the Shanghai Commissioner,rather than Taylor alone,and stressed that they should ask for guidance when in 18Hart to Campbell;Letter 1173 (1o June 1go0),in Fairbank et al.,eds,The IG in Peking,1234,n.4. 19 Circular 961,in Wright,ed.,Documents Illustrative,II,249. 20 Hart to Campbell',Letter 1175(12 September 1g00),in Fairbank et al,eds, The IG in Peking,p.1237,n.1. 21 Robert Campbell,Memoir,97. 22 Hart to Campbell,Letter 1178(14 October 1goo),in Fairbank et al,eds,The IG in Peking,1241,n.1. 23 To Their Excellencies the Senior Secretaries of the Zongli Yamen',22July 1900, Out Letters,3. 24Circular 61,Wright,eds.Documents Illustrative,II,238
ROBERT HART AND GUSTAV DETRING 637 desperate attempt to convince the Allies not to attack Beijing. Allied forces had won the Battle of Tianjin on 15 July, following a month of intensive fighting. By late July, they were regrouping in preparation for a march on Beijing. The Ministers refused the Zongli Yamen’s request.18 The Yamen then turned to Robert Hart, but he too declined, stating most diplomatically that ‘were I to say the truth in an open telegram, no Minister of Foreign Affairs could believe it’. He added ‘the earlier you agree to send telegrams in code on our behalf, the easier it will be to bring about a decisive change in direction’.19 Arrangements for control of the Customs Service were a prominent issue in the messages between Hart and the Zongli Yamen. With the Inspectorate unable to function and Hart himself feared dead, ad hoc measures had been taken. Li Hongzhang had instructed all Customs Houses in Guangdong and Guangxi to report to Paul King, the Canton Commissioner,20 while Russians had taken over Customs Houses in Manchuria.21 The British Foreign Office had asked Campbell whether he would be willing to assume the Inspectorate Generalship in case of Hart’s death. Campbell had declined and had suggested that Alfred E. Hippisley (1848–1937), who joined the Customs Service in 1867 and has become famous for inspiring the USA’s Open Door notes, would be more suitable.22 In Shanghai, Francis E. Taylor (1848–1939), the Statistical Secretary, had set up a temporary Inspectorate General soon after the beginning of the Siege with the collaboration of Liu Kunyi (1830–1902), the Superintendent of Trade for the Southern Ports. The Zongli Yamen asked Hart on 21 July whether he approved of Liu Kunyi’s and Taylor’s arrangements.23 Hart had little option but to sanction them, but he noted testily in a Circular of 5 October that ‘24 June seemed a rather early date to arrange how I was to be replaced’.24 He instructed also that the temporary Inspectorate should be managed conjointly by Taylor and Francis Aglen (1869–1932), the Shanghai Commissioner, rather than Taylor alone, and stressed that they should ask for guidance when in 18 ‘Hart to Campbell; Letter 1173 (10 June 1900), in Fairbank et al., eds, The IG in Peking, 1234, n. 4. 19 Circular 961, in Wright, ed., Documents Illustrative, II, 249. 20 ‘Hart to Campbell’, Letter 1175 (12 September 1900), in Fairbank et al., eds, The IG in Peking, p. 1237, n. 1. 21 Robert Campbell, Memoir, 97. 22 ‘Hart to Campbell, Letter 1178 (14 October 1900), in Fairbank et al., eds, The IG in Peking, 1241, n. 1. 23 ‘To Their Excellencies the Senior Secretaries of the Zongli Yamen’, 22 July 1900, Out Letters, 3. 24 Circular 961, Wright, eds., Documents Illustrative, II, 238
638 HANS VAN DE VEN doubt about what to do from the Zongli Yamen in Beijing through Liu Kunyi.25 This restored his ultimate authority.Even before the Siege ended,on 8 August,Hart wrote the Yamen that'since communications between Beijing and Shanghai have been restored,the affairs of the Inspectorate General should of course again be managed by me from my temporary offices at the Gaojingmiao Temple at the Chongwenmen Gate',more famous as Hatamen Street.26 He sent Robert Bredon,his brother-in-law,to take over the management of the temporary Inspectorate in Shanghai.Hart was obviously determined not to let control of the Customs Service slip from his grasp. On the 3oth,a few days after the Allied Expedition had set out from Tianjin,the Yamen turned to Hart asking his 'opinion about the aims of the various countries and the best way to discuss peace'27 Intense worry no doubt gripped the capital as it became clear that foreign forces would once more assault Beijing,as they had in 1860.Many then had feared the fall of the Qing,including Horatio Nelson Lay, the first Inspector General of the Customs Service.The Qing court had fled on that occasion as well.While Lay was out of the country, Prince Gong and Wenxiang had stayed behind,and had turned to Hart for advice.In 1900,when the Qing once more needed someone who could mediate between it and invading countries,they naturally turned to someone they knew could be a reliable and effective broker. Between War and Peace Several tense weeks followed the lifting of the Siege on 14 August, during which the resumption of fighting was a constant possibility. Robert Hart worked tirelessly in this period,which stretched well into October,making the case insistently to Qing officials that immediate peace negotiations were the only way to save the dynasty.With the court on the run and the military in disorder,chaos descended on Beijing and north China generally.The Allied advance to Beijing had been very quick,in part because the forces of different nations raced against each other,but also because the participating units had begun 25To Their Excellencies the Senior Secretaries of the Zongli Yamen',22July 1900, Out Letters,3. 26To Their Excellencies the Senior Secretaries of the Zongli Yamen',8 August 1900,Out Letters,7. 27 The letter is summarised in To Their Excellencies the Senior Secretaries of the Zongli Yamen',8 August 19oo,Out Letters,8
638 HANS VAN DE VEN doubt about what to do from the Zongli Yamen in Beijing through Liu Kunyi.25 This restored his ultimate authority. Even before the Siege ended, on 8August, Hart wrote the Yamen that ‘since communications between Beijing and Shanghai have been restored, the affairs of the Inspectorate General should of course again be managed by me from my temporary offices at the Gaojingmiao Temple at the Chongwenmen Gate’, more famous as Hatamen Street.26 He sent Robert Bredon, his brother-in-law, to take over the management of the temporary Inspectorate in Shanghai. Hart was obviously determined not to let control of the Customs Service slip from his grasp. On the 30th, a few days after the Allied Expedition had set out from Tianjin, the Yamen turned to Hart asking his ‘opinion about the aims of the various countries and the best way to discuss peace’.27 Intense worry no doubt gripped the capital as it became clear that foreign forces would once more assault Beijing, as they had in 1860. Many then had feared the fall of the Qing, including Horatio Nelson Lay, the first Inspector General of the Customs Service. The Qing court had fled on that occasion as well. While Lay was out of the country, Prince Gong and Wenxiang had stayed behind, and had turned to Hart for advice. In 1900, when the Qing once more needed someone who could mediate between it and invading countries, they naturally turned to someone they knew could be a reliable and effective broker. Between War and Peace Several tense weeks followed the lifting of the Siege on 14 August, during which the resumption of fighting was a constant possibility. Robert Hart worked tirelessly in this period, which stretched well into October, making the case insistently to Qing officials that immediate peace negotiations were the only way to save the dynasty. With the court on the run and the military in disorder, chaos descended on Beijing and north China generally. The Allied advance to Beijing had been very quick, in part because the forces of different nations raced against each other, but also because the participating units had begun 25 ‘To Their Excellencies the Senior Secretaries of the Zongli Yamen’, 22 July 1900, Out Letters, 3. 26 ‘To Their Excellencies the Senior Secretaries of the Zongli Yamen’, 8 August 1900, Out Letters, 7. 27 The letter is summarised in ‘To Their Excellencies the Senior Secretaries of the Zongli Yamen’, 8 August 1900, Out Letters, 8
ROBERT HART AND GUSTAV DETRING 639 to run out of supplies.Expectations of bad weather,which would make the roads impassable,had driven the relief forces forward.In Beijing, these forces lost their discipline.On 8 September,Robert Hart wrote to James Campbell:'such a mixture of soldiers makes life difficult: their policy ought to be to restore order and confidence and induce people to bring in supplies for sale,but instead of this terrorism(except in the Japanese quarter)seems the order of the day and looting and commandeering are the only methods the soldiers think fit of resorting t02.28 Panic and disorder too reigned outside Beijing.The drought,disease, and famine of 1goo meant that granaries and storehouses were empty and any improvement would have to wait at least until the harvest of the following year.A British Military Attache noted in a report of 4 October that 'the natives will hardly venture to harvest the crops,and it seems probable that the homeless and starving population together with the unruly elements that have been driven out of Peking [Beijing] will form themselves in the winter into bands of brigands'.29 By mid September,Hart feared that the siege might be renewed.He wrote to Campbell Boxers are beginning to swarm all round Peking,and have been seen even in the city-they tried to carry off a Frenchman yesterday!-and a second siege,or isolation,but on a larger scale is quite possible'30 Punitive raids on Chinese towns and villages suspected of harbouring Boxers added to the chaos and hardened opposition to peace discussions.Although the Allies claimed they had invaded China in the defence of civilization,looting and the torching of villages undermined that presentation.Field Marshall Count Alfred von Waldersee(1832- 1904)had been appointed the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Expedition in recognition of the fact that the most significant death had been that of von Ketteler.But he arrived on 27 September in Tianjin,too late to participate in the lifting of the Siege.He remained keen to give substance to Kaiser Wilhelm's statement 'just as the Huns a thousand years ago...may the name of Germany become known in such a manner in China that no Chinese will ever again dare to look 2Hart to Campbell',Letter 1147(8 September 1go0),Fairbank et al,eds,The IG in Peking,1235. 29 The Military Attache was A.Churchill.The report can be found in 'China Expedition,1goo:Reports on Operations to Relieve Tientsin and Peking,UK National Archives,WOg2/6145. 30Hart to Campbeli,Letter 1175(12 September 1go0),in Fairbank et al.,eds, The IG in Peking,1237-
ROBERT HART AND GUSTAV DETRING 639 to run out of supplies. Expectations of bad weather, which would make the roads impassable, had driven the relief forces forward. In Beijing, these forces lost their discipline. On 8 September, Robert Hart wrote to James Campbell: ‘such a mixture of soldiers makes life difficult: their policy ought to be to restore order and confidence and induce people to bring in supplies for sale, but instead of this terrorism (except in the Japanese quarter) seems the order of the day and looting and commandeering are the only methods the soldiers think fit of resorting to’.28 Panic and disorder too reigned outside Beijing. The drought, disease, and famine of 1900 meant that granaries and storehouses were empty and any improvement would have to wait at least until the harvest of the following year. A British Military Attach´e noted in a report of 4 October that ‘the natives will hardly venture to harvest the crops, and it seems probable that the homeless and starving population together with the unruly elements that have been driven out of Peking [Beijing] will form themselves in the winter into bands of brigands’.29 By mid September, Hart feared that the siege might be renewed. He wrote to Campbell ‘Boxers are beginning to swarm all round Peking, and have been seen even in the city—they tried to carry off a Frenchman yesterday!—and a second siege, or isolation, but on a larger scale is quite possible’.30 Punitive raids on Chinese towns and villages suspected of harbouring Boxers added to the chaos and hardened opposition to peace discussions. Although the Allies claimed they had invaded China in the defence of civilization, looting and the torching of villages undermined that presentation. Field Marshall Count Alfred von Waldersee (1832– 1904) had been appointed the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Expedition in recognition of the fact that the most significant death had been that of von Ketteler. But he arrived on 27 September in Tianjin, too late to participate in the lifting of the Siege. He remained keen to give substance to Kaiser Wilhelm’s statement ‘just as the Huns a thousand years ago ... may the name of Germany become known in such a manner in China that no Chinese will ever again dare to look 28 ‘Hart to Campbell’, Letter 1147 (8 September 1900), Fairbank et al., eds, The IG in Peking, 1235. 29 The Military Attach´e was A. Churchill. The report can be found in ‘China Expedition, 1900: Reports on Operations to Relieve Tientsin and Peking’, UK National Archives, WO32/6145. 30 ‘Hart to Campbell’, Letter 1175 (12 September 1900), in Fairbank et al., eds, The IG in Peking, 1237
640 HANS VAN DE VEN askance at a German'.31 He argued that one can only command the respect of the Asian through force and its ruthless application'and declared that 'no outdated clemency'would be shown toward 'this ridiculous and childish people'32 A series of actions across the north China plain,including the punitive expedition to the provincial capital Baoding in Zhili Province in October,gave substance to these words. Unilateral action increased tensions.In the last week of September, Russia seized Niuzhuang,Anshan,and Liaoyang in Manchuria,while the British took Shanhaiguan to forestall Russian penetration south of the Great Wall.But,the Russians did occupy the railroad from Shanhaiguan to Tianjin and claimed a concession area that included the railroad station.33 German naval vessels sailed up the Yangtze River into an area that the British regarded as their sphere of influence.Japanese and French forces too remained ready to act if it did come to a general land grab. Given Allied actions and attitudes,it is not strange that some Qing officials began to advocate a resumption of war.In a memorandum of early November,Hart wrote to the Zongli Yamen that strong rumours existed that one leading pro-Boxer official,Prince Duan,whose son had failed to become heir apparent because of foreign opposition,had written to all provincial governors to prepare for the renewal of combat during the winter months when the Tianjin harbour would be frozen over and foreign naval vessels would be unable to sail up the Yangtze River as its water levels would be low.Hart further stated that the story was in circulation that another pro-Boxer official,Gangyi,who died as a result of his support for the Boxers,had gone to south China to issue instructions to governors there.34 He politely stated that he himself doubted the veracity of these reports,but stressed that the resumption of battle could only lead to the collapse of the Qing.Because Allied forces were able to go where they pleased,he noted,the court should not have any false ideas about its safety,no matter how far it withdrew inland. 31 Quoted in Roger Thompson,Military Dimensions of the Boxer Uprising in Shanxi',in Hans van de Ven,ed.,Warfare in Chinese History (Leiden,Brill,2000),311. 32 Sabine Dabringhaus,An Army on Vacation?'in F.C.Boemecke,Anticipating Total War(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1999),470. 33 Wright,Hart,739-40. 3 Memorandum on the Attack on the Ministers,Number Six',Out Letters,44. No date,but listed between documents dated g1 October and 13 November in the index
640 HANS VAN DE VEN askance at a German’.31 He argued that ‘one can only command the respect of the Asian through force and its ruthless application’ and declared that ‘no outdated clemency’ would be shown toward ‘this ridiculous and childish people’.32 A series of actions across the north China plain, including the punitive expedition to the provincial capital Baoding in Zhili Province in October, gave substance to these words. Unilateral action increased tensions. In the last week of September, Russia seized Niuzhuang, Anshan, and Liaoyang in Manchuria, while the British took Shanhaiguan to forestall Russian penetration south of the Great Wall. But, the Russians did occupy the railroad from Shanhaiguan to Tianjin and claimed a concession area that included the railroad station.33 German naval vessels sailed up the Yangtze River into an area that the British regarded as their sphere of influence. Japanese and French forces too remained ready to act if it did come to a general land grab. Given Allied actions and attitudes, it is not strange that some Qing officials began to advocate a resumption of war. In a memorandum of early November, Hart wrote to the Zongli Yamen that strong rumours existed that one leading pro-Boxer official, Prince Duan, whose son had failed to become heir apparent because of foreign opposition, had written to all provincial governors to prepare for the renewal of combat during the winter months when the Tianjin harbour would be frozen over and foreign naval vessels would be unable to sail up the Yangtze River as its water levels would be low. Hart further stated that the story was in circulation that another pro-Boxer official, Gangyi, who died as a result of his support for the Boxers, had gone to south China to issue instructions to governors there.34 He politely stated that he himself doubted the veracity of these reports, but stressed that the resumption of battle could only lead to the collapse of the Qing. Because Allied forces were able to go where they pleased, he noted, the court should not have any false ideas about its safety, no matter how far it withdrew inland. 31 Quoted in Roger Thompson, ‘Military Dimensions of the Boxer Uprising in Shanxi’, in Hans van de Ven, ed., Warfare in Chinese History (Leiden, Brill, 2000), 311. 32 Sabine Dabringhaus, ‘An Army on Vacation?’ in F. C. Boemecke, Anticipating Total War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 470. 33 Wright, Hart, 739–40. 34 ‘Memorandum on the Attack on the Ministers, Number Six’, Out Letters, 44. No date, but listed between documents dated 31 October and 13 November in the index
