The Evolution of Republican Government* Julia C.Strauss The topic of government and administration in the Republican period (1911-49)has attracted periodic bursts of scholarly attention in the first three decades of the post-1950 period.Some of these works focused on the weakness of political institutions in the early Republic,'several were sympathetic to the state-building efforts of the Kuomintang (KMT),2 and the remainder were overtly or covertly negative in their assessment of Republican,particularly KMT,government.3 Whether sympathetic to Republican-era government or not,this scholarship was largely informed by a constellation of three factors:the deep Cold War era divisions between left and right in the United States as to how the spread of Communism in Asia should be accounted for and dealt with,the lack of research access in China itself,and,perhaps most important,what might be called"the prismatic event of 1949,"when the Republican government was militarily defeated in the civil war,driven into exile on a small island,and replaced with a self-consciously revolutionary government which vigorously attempted to recreate and transform state and society.It is little wonder that this abrupt terminus of the Republican period slanted many of the questions implicitly posed in post-1949 scholarship towards explaining the Republic's demise on mainland China.At best,the efforts and strategies of the Kuomintang were considered to have long-term promise until seriously undercut by the Japanese invasion in July 1937; at worst,the entire Republican period was relegated to the status of a transitional period that gave way before the inevitable primacy of "bottom-up"revolution. Insofar as a commonly accepted view of Republican era govern- ment emerged,it was a mostly critical one.The two most influential and *I would like to extend special thanks to William Kirby and R.Bin Wong for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. 1.K.S.Lieuw,Struggle for Democracy:Sung Chiao-ien and the 1911 Revolution (Berkeley:University of California Press,1971),esp.pp.127-201,and Ernest Young,The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor:University of Michigan Press,1977)are the best examples. 2.For a relatively sympathetic view of the KMT's state-building efforts(as well as the role of Western financial and technical knowledge in aiding those efforts),see Arthur Young. China's Nation Building Effort:The Financial and Economic Record.1927-37(Stanford: Hoover Institution Press,1971),Arthur Young,China and the Helping Hand.1937-45, (Cambridge,MA:Harvard University Press,1963).Another somewhat later sympathetic view is expressed in Maria Hsia Chang."'Facism'and Modern China,"The China Quarterly, No.79 (September 1979). 3.For critical views,see Ch'ien Tuan-sheng.The Government and Politics of China (Cambridge,MA:Harvard University Press,1950),Lloyd Eastman,The Abortive Revolution: China Under Nationalist Rule.1927-37(Cambridge,MA:Harvard University Press,1974). and Tien Hung-mao,Government and Politics in Kuomintang China,1927-37 (Stanford: Stanford University Press,1972). The China Quarterly,1997
The Evolution of Republican Government* Julia C. Strauss The topic of government and administration in the Republican period (1911-49) has attracted periodic bursts of scholarly attention in the first three decades of the post-1950 period. Some of these works focused on the weakness of political institutions in the early Republic,l several were sympathetic to the state-building efforts of the Kuomintang (KMT),2 and the remainder were overtly or covertly negative in their assessment of Republican, particularly KMT, government.3 Whether sympathetic to Republican-era government or not, this scholarship was largely informed by a constellation of three factors: the deep Cold War era divisions between left and right in the United States as to how the spread of Communism in Asia should be accounted for and dealt with, the lack of research access in China itself, and, perhaps most important, what might be called "the prismatic event of 1949," when the Republican government was militarily defeated in the civil war, driven into exile on a small island, and replaced with a self-consciously revolutionary government which vigorously attempted to recreate and transform state and society. It is little wonder that this abrupt terminus of the Republican period slanted many of the questions implicitly posed in post-1949 scholarship towards explaining the Republic's demise on mainland China. At best, the efforts and strategies of the Kuomintang were considered to have long-term promise until seriously undercut by the Japanese invasion in July 1937; at worst, the entire Republican period was relegated to the status of a transitional period that gave way before the inevitable primacy of "bottom-up" revolution. Insofar as a commonly accepted view of Republican era government emerged, it was a mostly critical one. The two most influential and *I would like to extend special thanks to William Kirby and R. Bin Wong for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. 1. K. S. Lieuw, Struggle for Democracy: Sung Chiao-jen and the 1911 Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), esp. pp. 127-201, and Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977) are the best examples. 2. For a relatively sympathetic view of the KMT's state-building efforts (as well as the role of Western financial and technical knowledge in aiding those efforts), see Arthur Young, China's Nation Building Effort: The Financial and Economic Record, 1927-37 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971), Arthur Young, China and the Helping Hand, 1937-45, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963). Another somewhat later sympathetic view is expressed in Maria Hsia Chang," 'Facism' and Moder China," The China Quarterly, No. 79 (September 1979). 3. For critical views, see Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, The Government and Politics of China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1950), Lloyd Eastman, The Abortive Revolution: China Under Nationalist Rule, 1927-37 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), and Tien Hung-mao, Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, 1927-37 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972). ? The China Quarterly, 1997 Julia C. Strauss The topic of government and administration in the Republican period (1911-49) has attracted periodic bursts of scholarly attention in the first three decades of the post-1950 period. Some of these works focused on the weakness of political institutions in the early Republic,l several were sympathetic to the state-building efforts of the Kuomintang (KMT),2 and the remainder were overtly or covertly negative in their assessment of Republican, particularly KMT, government.3 Whether sympathetic to Republican-era government or not, this scholarship was largely informed by a constellation of three factors: the deep Cold War era divisions between left and right in the United States as to how the spread of Communism in Asia should be accounted for and dealt with, the lack of research access in China itself, and, perhaps most important, what might be called "the prismatic event of 1949," when the Republican government was militarily defeated in the civil war, driven into exile on a small island, and replaced with a self-consciously revolutionary government which vigorously attempted to recreate and transform state and society. It is little wonder that this abrupt terminus of the Republican period slanted many of the questions implicitly posed in post-1949 scholarship towards explaining the Republic's demise on mainland China. At best, the efforts and strategies of the Kuomintang were considered to have long-term promise until seriously undercut by the Japanese invasion in July 1937; at worst, the entire Republican period was relegated to the status of a transitional period that gave way before the inevitable primacy of "bottom-up" revolution. Insofar as a commonly accepted view of Republican era government emerged, it was a mostly critical one. The two most influential and *I would like to extend special thanks to William Kirby and R. Bin Wong for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. 1. K. S. Lieuw, Struggle for Democracy: Sung Chiao-jen and the 1911 Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), esp. pp. 127-201, and Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977) are the best examples. 2. For a relatively sympathetic view of the KMT's state-building efforts (as well as the role of Western financial and technical knowledge in aiding those efforts), see Arthur Young, China's Nation Building Effort: The Financial and Economic Record, 1927-37 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971), Arthur Young, China and the Helping Hand, 1937-45, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963). Another somewhat later sympathetic view is expressed in Maria Hsia Chang," 'Facism' and Moder China," The China Quarterly, No. 79 (September 1979). 3. For critical views, see Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, The Government and Politics of China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1950), Lloyd Eastman, The Abortive Revolution: China Under Nationalist Rule, 1927-37 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), and Tien Hung-mao, Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, 1927-37 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972). ? The China Quarterly, 1997 Julia C. Strauss The topic of government and administration in the Republican period (1911-49) has attracted periodic bursts of scholarly attention in the first three decades of the post-1950 period. Some of these works focused on the weakness of political institutions in the early Republic,l several were sympathetic to the state-building efforts of the Kuomintang (KMT),2 and the remainder were overtly or covertly negative in their assessment of Republican, particularly KMT, government.3 Whether sympathetic to Republican-era government or not, this scholarship was largely informed by a constellation of three factors: the deep Cold War era divisions between left and right in the United States as to how the spread of Communism in Asia should be accounted for and dealt with, the lack of research access in China itself, and, perhaps most important, what might be called "the prismatic event of 1949," when the Republican government was militarily defeated in the civil war, driven into exile on a small island, and replaced with a self-consciously revolutionary government which vigorously attempted to recreate and transform state and society. It is little wonder that this abrupt terminus of the Republican period slanted many of the questions implicitly posed in post-1949 scholarship towards explaining the Republic's demise on mainland China. At best, the efforts and strategies of the Kuomintang were considered to have long-term promise until seriously undercut by the Japanese invasion in July 1937; at worst, the entire Republican period was relegated to the status of a transitional period that gave way before the inevitable primacy of "bottom-up" revolution. Insofar as a commonly accepted view of Republican era government emerged, it was a mostly critical one. The two most influential and *I would like to extend special thanks to William Kirby and R. Bin Wong for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. 1. K. S. Lieuw, Struggle for Democracy: Sung Chiao-jen and the 1911 Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), esp. pp. 127-201, and Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977) are the best examples. 2. For a relatively sympathetic view of the KMT's state-building efforts (as well as the role of Western financial and technical knowledge in aiding those efforts), see Arthur Young, China's Nation Building Effort: The Financial and Economic Record, 1927-37 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971), Arthur Young, China and the Helping Hand, 1937-45, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963). Another somewhat later sympathetic view is expressed in Maria Hsia Chang," 'Facism' and Moder China," The China Quarterly, No. 79 (September 1979). 3. For critical views, see Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, The Government and Politics of China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1950), Lloyd Eastman, The Abortive Revolution: China Under Nationalist Rule, 1927-37 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), and Tien Hung-mao, Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, 1927-37 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972). ? The China Quarterly, 1997 Julia C. Strauss The topic of government and administration in the Republican period (1911-49) has attracted periodic bursts of scholarly attention in the first three decades of the post-1950 period. Some of these works focused on the weakness of political institutions in the early Republic,l several were sympathetic to the state-building efforts of the Kuomintang (KMT),2 and the remainder were overtly or covertly negative in their assessment of Republican, particularly KMT, government.3 Whether sympathetic to Republican-era government or not, this scholarship was largely informed by a constellation of three factors: the deep Cold War era divisions between left and right in the United States as to how the spread of Communism in Asia should be accounted for and dealt with, the lack of research access in China itself, and, perhaps most important, what might be called "the prismatic event of 1949," when the Republican government was militarily defeated in the civil war, driven into exile on a small island, and replaced with a self-consciously revolutionary government which vigorously attempted to recreate and transform state and society. It is little wonder that this abrupt terminus of the Republican period slanted many of the questions implicitly posed in post-1949 scholarship towards explaining the Republic's demise on mainland China. At best, the efforts and strategies of the Kuomintang were considered to have long-term promise until seriously undercut by the Japanese invasion in July 1937; at worst, the entire Republican period was relegated to the status of a transitional period that gave way before the inevitable primacy of "bottom-up" revolution. Insofar as a commonly accepted view of Republican era government emerged, it was a mostly critical one. The two most influential and *I would like to extend special thanks to William Kirby and R. Bin Wong for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. 1. K. S. Lieuw, Struggle for Democracy: Sung Chiao-jen and the 1911 Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), esp. pp. 127-201, and Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977) are the best examples. 2. For a relatively sympathetic view of the KMT's state-building efforts (as well as the role of Western financial and technical knowledge in aiding those efforts), see Arthur Young, China's Nation Building Effort: The Financial and Economic Record, 1927-37 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971), Arthur Young, China and the Helping Hand, 1937-45, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963). Another somewhat later sympathetic view is expressed in Maria Hsia Chang," 'Facism' and Moder China," The China Quarterly, No. 79 (September 1979). 3. For critical views, see Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, The Government and Politics of China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1950), Lloyd Eastman, The Abortive Revolution: China Under Nationalist Rule, 1927-37 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), and Tien Hung-mao, Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, 1927-37 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972). ? The China Quarterly, 1997 Julia C. Strauss The topic of government and administration in the Republican period (1911-49) has attracted periodic bursts of scholarly attention in the first three decades of the post-1950 period. Some of these works focused on the weakness of political institutions in the early Republic,l several were sympathetic to the state-building efforts of the Kuomintang (KMT),2 and the remainder were overtly or covertly negative in their assessment of Republican, particularly KMT, government.3 Whether sympathetic to Republican-era government or not, this scholarship was largely informed by a constellation of three factors: the deep Cold War era divisions between left and right in the United States as to how the spread of Communism in Asia should be accounted for and dealt with, the lack of research access in China itself, and, perhaps most important, what might be called "the prismatic event of 1949," when the Republican government was militarily defeated in the civil war, driven into exile on a small island, and replaced with a self-consciously revolutionary government which vigorously attempted to recreate and transform state and society. It is little wonder that this abrupt terminus of the Republican period slanted many of the questions implicitly posed in post-1949 scholarship towards explaining the Republic's demise on mainland China. At best, the efforts and strategies of the Kuomintang were considered to have long-term promise until seriously undercut by the Japanese invasion in July 1937; at worst, the entire Republican period was relegated to the status of a transitional period that gave way before the inevitable primacy of "bottom-up" revolution. Insofar as a commonly accepted view of Republican era government emerged, it was a mostly critical one. The two most influential and *I would like to extend special thanks to William Kirby and R. Bin Wong for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. 1. K. S. Lieuw, Struggle for Democracy: Sung Chiao-jen and the 1911 Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), esp. pp. 127-201, and Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977) are the best examples. 2. For a relatively sympathetic view of the KMT's state-building efforts (as well as the role of Western financial and technical knowledge in aiding those efforts), see Arthur Young, China's Nation Building Effort: The Financial and Economic Record, 1927-37 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971), Arthur Young, China and the Helping Hand, 1937-45, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963). Another somewhat later sympathetic view is expressed in Maria Hsia Chang," 'Facism' and Moder China," The China Quarterly, No. 79 (September 1979). 3. For critical views, see Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, The Government and Politics of China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1950), Lloyd Eastman, The Abortive Revolution: China Under Nationalist Rule, 1927-37 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), and Tien Hung-mao, Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, 1927-37 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972). ? The China Quarterly, 1997 Julia C. Strauss The topic of government and administration in the Republican period (1911-49) has attracted periodic bursts of scholarly attention in the first three decades of the post-1950 period. Some of these works focused on the weakness of political institutions in the early Republic,l several were sympathetic to the state-building efforts of the Kuomintang (KMT),2 and the remainder were overtly or covertly negative in their assessment of Republican, particularly KMT, government.3 Whether sympathetic to Republican-era government or not, this scholarship was largely informed by a constellation of three factors: the deep Cold War era divisions between left and right in the United States as to how the spread of Communism in Asia should be accounted for and dealt with, the lack of research access in China itself, and, perhaps most important, what might be called "the prismatic event of 1949," when the Republican government was militarily defeated in the civil war, driven into exile on a small island, and replaced with a self-consciously revolutionary government which vigorously attempted to recreate and transform state and society. It is little wonder that this abrupt terminus of the Republican period slanted many of the questions implicitly posed in post-1949 scholarship towards explaining the Republic's demise on mainland China. At best, the efforts and strategies of the Kuomintang were considered to have long-term promise until seriously undercut by the Japanese invasion in July 1937; at worst, the entire Republican period was relegated to the status of a transitional period that gave way before the inevitable primacy of "bottom-up" revolution. Insofar as a commonly accepted view of Republican era government emerged, it was a mostly critical one. The two most influential and *I would like to extend special thanks to William Kirby and R. Bin Wong for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. 1. K. S. Lieuw, Struggle for Democracy: Sung Chiao-jen and the 1911 Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), esp. pp. 127-201, and Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977) are the best examples. 2. For a relatively sympathetic view of the KMT's state-building efforts (as well as the role of Western financial and technical knowledge in aiding those efforts), see Arthur Young, China's Nation Building Effort: The Financial and Economic Record, 1927-37 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971), Arthur Young, China and the Helping Hand, 1937-45, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963). Another somewhat later sympathetic view is expressed in Maria Hsia Chang," 'Facism' and Moder China," The China Quarterly, No. 79 (September 1979). 3. For critical views, see Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, The Government and Politics of China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1950), Lloyd Eastman, The Abortive Revolution: China Under Nationalist Rule, 1927-37 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), and Tien Hung-mao, Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, 1927-37 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972). ? The China Quarterly, 1997 Julia C. Strauss The topic of government and administration in the Republican period (1911-49) has attracted periodic bursts of scholarly attention in the first three decades of the post-1950 period. Some of these works focused on the weakness of political institutions in the early Republic,l several were sympathetic to the state-building efforts of the Kuomintang (KMT),2 and the remainder were overtly or covertly negative in their assessment of Republican, particularly KMT, government.3 Whether sympathetic to Republican-era government or not, this scholarship was largely informed by a constellation of three factors: the deep Cold War era divisions between left and right in the United States as to how the spread of Communism in Asia should be accounted for and dealt with, the lack of research access in China itself, and, perhaps most important, what might be called "the prismatic event of 1949," when the Republican government was militarily defeated in the civil war, driven into exile on a small island, and replaced with a self-consciously revolutionary government which vigorously attempted to recreate and transform state and society. It is little wonder that this abrupt terminus of the Republican period slanted many of the questions implicitly posed in post-1949 scholarship towards explaining the Republic's demise on mainland China. At best, the efforts and strategies of the Kuomintang were considered to have long-term promise until seriously undercut by the Japanese invasion in July 1937; at worst, the entire Republican period was relegated to the status of a transitional period that gave way before the inevitable primacy of "bottom-up" revolution. Insofar as a commonly accepted view of Republican era government emerged, it was a mostly critical one. The two most influential and *I would like to extend special thanks to William Kirby and R. Bin Wong for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. 1. K. S. Lieuw, Struggle for Democracy: Sung Chiao-jen and the 1911 Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), esp. pp. 127-201, and Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977) are the best examples. 2. For a relatively sympathetic view of the KMT's state-building efforts (as well as the role of Western financial and technical knowledge in aiding those efforts), see Arthur Young, China's Nation Building Effort: The Financial and Economic Record, 1927-37 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971), Arthur Young, China and the Helping Hand, 1937-45, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963). Another somewhat later sympathetic view is expressed in Maria Hsia Chang," 'Facism' and Moder China," The China Quarterly, No. 79 (September 1979). 3. For critical views, see Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, The Government and Politics of China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1950), Lloyd Eastman, The Abortive Revolution: China Under Nationalist Rule, 1927-37 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), and Tien Hung-mao, Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, 1927-37 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972). ? The China Quarterly, 1997 Julia C. Strauss The topic of government and administration in the Republican period (1911-49) has attracted periodic bursts of scholarly attention in the first three decades of the post-1950 period. Some of these works focused on the weakness of political institutions in the early Republic,l several were sympathetic to the state-building efforts of the Kuomintang (KMT),2 and the remainder were overtly or covertly negative in their assessment of Republican, particularly KMT, government.3 Whether sympathetic to Republican-era government or not, this scholarship was largely informed by a constellation of three factors: the deep Cold War era divisions between left and right in the United States as to how the spread of Communism in Asia should be accounted for and dealt with, the lack of research access in China itself, and, perhaps most important, what might be called "the prismatic event of 1949," when the Republican government was militarily defeated in the civil war, driven into exile on a small island, and replaced with a self-consciously revolutionary government which vigorously attempted to recreate and transform state and society. It is little wonder that this abrupt terminus of the Republican period slanted many of the questions implicitly posed in post-1949 scholarship towards explaining the Republic's demise on mainland China. At best, the efforts and strategies of the Kuomintang were considered to have long-term promise until seriously undercut by the Japanese invasion in July 1937; at worst, the entire Republican period was relegated to the status of a transitional period that gave way before the inevitable primacy of "bottom-up" revolution. Insofar as a commonly accepted view of Republican era government emerged, it was a mostly critical one. The two most influential and *I would like to extend special thanks to William Kirby and R. Bin Wong for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. 1. K. S. Lieuw, Struggle for Democracy: Sung Chiao-jen and the 1911 Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), esp. pp. 127-201, and Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977) are the best examples. 2. For a relatively sympathetic view of the KMT's state-building efforts (as well as the role of Western financial and technical knowledge in aiding those efforts), see Arthur Young, China's Nation Building Effort: The Financial and Economic Record, 1927-37 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971), Arthur Young, China and the Helping Hand, 1937-45, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963). Another somewhat later sympathetic view is expressed in Maria Hsia Chang," 'Facism' and Moder China," The China Quarterly, No. 79 (September 1979). 3. For critical views, see Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, The Government and Politics of China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1950), Lloyd Eastman, The Abortive Revolution: China Under Nationalist Rule, 1927-37 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), and Tien Hung-mao, Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, 1927-37 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972). ? The China Quarterly, 1997 Julia C. Strauss The topic of government and administration in the Republican period (1911-49) has attracted periodic bursts of scholarly attention in the first three decades of the post-1950 period. Some of these works focused on the weakness of political institutions in the early Republic,l several were sympathetic to the state-building efforts of the Kuomintang (KMT),2 and the remainder were overtly or covertly negative in their assessment of Republican, particularly KMT, government.3 Whether sympathetic to Republican-era government or not, this scholarship was largely informed by a constellation of three factors: the deep Cold War era divisions between left and right in the United States as to how the spread of Communism in Asia should be accounted for and dealt with, the lack of research access in China itself, and, perhaps most important, what might be called "the prismatic event of 1949," when the Republican government was militarily defeated in the civil war, driven into exile on a small island, and replaced with a self-consciously revolutionary government which vigorously attempted to recreate and transform state and society. It is little wonder that this abrupt terminus of the Republican period slanted many of the questions implicitly posed in post-1949 scholarship towards explaining the Republic's demise on mainland China. At best, the efforts and strategies of the Kuomintang were considered to have long-term promise until seriously undercut by the Japanese invasion in July 1937; at worst, the entire Republican period was relegated to the status of a transitional period that gave way before the inevitable primacy of "bottom-up" revolution. Insofar as a commonly accepted view of Republican era government emerged, it was a mostly critical one. The two most influential and *I would like to extend special thanks to William Kirby and R. Bin Wong for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. 1. K. S. Lieuw, Struggle for Democracy: Sung Chiao-jen and the 1911 Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), esp. pp. 127-201, and Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977) are the best examples. 2. For a relatively sympathetic view of the KMT's state-building efforts (as well as the role of Western financial and technical knowledge in aiding those efforts), see Arthur Young, China's Nation Building Effort: The Financial and Economic Record, 1927-37 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971), Arthur Young, China and the Helping Hand, 1937-45, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963). Another somewhat later sympathetic view is expressed in Maria Hsia Chang," 'Facism' and Moder China," The China Quarterly, No. 79 (September 1979). 3. For critical views, see Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, The Government and Politics of China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1950), Lloyd Eastman, The Abortive Revolution: China Under Nationalist Rule, 1927-37 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), and Tien Hung-mao, Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, 1927-37 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972). ? The China Quarterly, 1997 Julia C. Strauss The topic of government and administration in the Republican period (1911-49) has attracted periodic bursts of scholarly attention in the first three decades of the post-1950 period. Some of these works focused on the weakness of political institutions in the early Republic,l several were sympathetic to the state-building efforts of the Kuomintang (KMT),2 and the remainder were overtly or covertly negative in their assessment of Republican, particularly KMT, government.3 Whether sympathetic to Republican-era government or not, this scholarship was largely informed by a constellation of three factors: the deep Cold War era divisions between left and right in the United States as to how the spread of Communism in Asia should be accounted for and dealt with, the lack of research access in China itself, and, perhaps most important, what might be called "the prismatic event of 1949," when the Republican government was militarily defeated in the civil war, driven into exile on a small island, and replaced with a self-consciously revolutionary government which vigorously attempted to recreate and transform state and society. It is little wonder that this abrupt terminus of the Republican period slanted many of the questions implicitly posed in post-1949 scholarship towards explaining the Republic's demise on mainland China. At best, the efforts and strategies of the Kuomintang were considered to have long-term promise until seriously undercut by the Japanese invasion in July 1937; at worst, the entire Republican period was relegated to the status of a transitional period that gave way before the inevitable primacy of "bottom-up" revolution. Insofar as a commonly accepted view of Republican era government emerged, it was a mostly critical one. The two most influential and *I would like to extend special thanks to William Kirby and R. Bin Wong for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. 1. K. S. Lieuw, Struggle for Democracy: Sung Chiao-jen and the 1911 Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), esp. pp. 127-201, and Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977) are the best examples. 2. For a relatively sympathetic view of the KMT's state-building efforts (as well as the role of Western financial and technical knowledge in aiding those efforts), see Arthur Young, China's Nation Building Effort: The Financial and Economic Record, 1927-37 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971), Arthur Young, China and the Helping Hand, 1937-45, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963). Another somewhat later sympathetic view is expressed in Maria Hsia Chang," 'Facism' and Moder China," The China Quarterly, No. 79 (September 1979). 3. For critical views, see Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, The Government and Politics of China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1950), Lloyd Eastman, The Abortive Revolution: China Under Nationalist Rule, 1927-37 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), and Tien Hung-mao, Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, 1927-37 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972). ? The China Quarterly, 1997 Julia C. Strauss The topic of government and administration in the Republican period (1911-49) has attracted periodic bursts of scholarly attention in the first three decades of the post-1950 period. Some of these works focused on the weakness of political institutions in the early Republic,l several were sympathetic to the state-building efforts of the Kuomintang (KMT),2 and the remainder were overtly or covertly negative in their assessment of Republican, particularly KMT, government.3 Whether sympathetic to Republican-era government or not, this scholarship was largely informed by a constellation of three factors: the deep Cold War era divisions between left and right in the United States as to how the spread of Communism in Asia should be accounted for and dealt with, the lack of research access in China itself, and, perhaps most important, what might be called "the prismatic event of 1949," when the Republican government was militarily defeated in the civil war, driven into exile on a small island, and replaced with a self-consciously revolutionary government which vigorously attempted to recreate and transform state and society. It is little wonder that this abrupt terminus of the Republican period slanted many of the questions implicitly posed in post-1949 scholarship towards explaining the Republic's demise on mainland China. At best, the efforts and strategies of the Kuomintang were considered to have long-term promise until seriously undercut by the Japanese invasion in July 1937; at worst, the entire Republican period was relegated to the status of a transitional period that gave way before the inevitable primacy of "bottom-up" revolution. Insofar as a commonly accepted view of Republican era government emerged, it was a mostly critical one. The two most influential and *I would like to extend special thanks to William Kirby and R. Bin Wong for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. 1. K. S. Lieuw, Struggle for Democracy: Sung Chiao-jen and the 1911 Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), esp. pp. 127-201, and Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977) are the best examples. 2. For a relatively sympathetic view of the KMT's state-building efforts (as well as the role of Western financial and technical knowledge in aiding those efforts), see Arthur Young, China's Nation Building Effort: The Financial and Economic Record, 1927-37 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971), Arthur Young, China and the Helping Hand, 1937-45, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963). Another somewhat later sympathetic view is expressed in Maria Hsia Chang," 'Facism' and Moder China," The China Quarterly, No. 79 (September 1979). 3. For critical views, see Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, The Government and Politics of China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1950), Lloyd Eastman, The Abortive Revolution: China Under Nationalist Rule, 1927-37 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), and Tien Hung-mao, Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, 1927-37 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972). ? The China Quarterly, 1997 Julia C. Strauss The topic of government and administration in the Republican period (1911-49) has attracted periodic bursts of scholarly attention in the first three decades of the post-1950 period. Some of these works focused on the weakness of political institutions in the early Republic,l several were sympathetic to the state-building efforts of the Kuomintang (KMT),2 and the remainder were overtly or covertly negative in their assessment of Republican, particularly KMT, government.3 Whether sympathetic to Republican-era government or not, this scholarship was largely informed by a constellation of three factors: the deep Cold War era divisions between left and right in the United States as to how the spread of Communism in Asia should be accounted for and dealt with, the lack of research access in China itself, and, perhaps most important, what might be called "the prismatic event of 1949," when the Republican government was militarily defeated in the civil war, driven into exile on a small island, and replaced with a self-consciously revolutionary government which vigorously attempted to recreate and transform state and society. It is little wonder that this abrupt terminus of the Republican period slanted many of the questions implicitly posed in post-1949 scholarship towards explaining the Republic's demise on mainland China. At best, the efforts and strategies of the Kuomintang were considered to have long-term promise until seriously undercut by the Japanese invasion in July 1937; at worst, the entire Republican period was relegated to the status of a transitional period that gave way before the inevitable primacy of "bottom-up" revolution. Insofar as a commonly accepted view of Republican era government emerged, it was a mostly critical one. The two most influential and *I would like to extend special thanks to William Kirby and R. Bin Wong for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. 1. K. S. Lieuw, Struggle for Democracy: Sung Chiao-jen and the 1911 Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), esp. pp. 127-201, and Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977) are the best examples. 2. For a relatively sympathetic view of the KMT's state-building efforts (as well as the role of Western financial and technical knowledge in aiding those efforts), see Arthur Young, China's Nation Building Effort: The Financial and Economic Record, 1927-37 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971), Arthur Young, China and the Helping Hand, 1937-45, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963). Another somewhat later sympathetic view is expressed in Maria Hsia Chang," 'Facism' and Moder China," The China Quarterly, No. 79 (September 1979). 3. For critical views, see Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, The Government and Politics of China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1950), Lloyd Eastman, The Abortive Revolution: China Under Nationalist Rule, 1927-37 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), and Tien Hung-mao, Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, 1927-37 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972). ? The China Quarterly, 1997 Julia C. Strauss The topic of government and administration in the Republican period (1911-49) has attracted periodic bursts of scholarly attention in the first three decades of the post-1950 period. Some of these works focused on the weakness of political institutions in the early Republic,l several were sympathetic to the state-building efforts of the Kuomintang (KMT),2 and the remainder were overtly or covertly negative in their assessment of Republican, particularly KMT, government.3 Whether sympathetic to Republican-era government or not, this scholarship was largely informed by a constellation of three factors: the deep Cold War era divisions between left and right in the United States as to how the spread of Communism in Asia should be accounted for and dealt with, the lack of research access in China itself, and, perhaps most important, what might be called "the prismatic event of 1949," when the Republican government was militarily defeated in the civil war, driven into exile on a small island, and replaced with a self-consciously revolutionary government which vigorously attempted to recreate and transform state and society. It is little wonder that this abrupt terminus of the Republican period slanted many of the questions implicitly posed in post-1949 scholarship towards explaining the Republic's demise on mainland China. At best, the efforts and strategies of the Kuomintang were considered to have long-term promise until seriously undercut by the Japanese invasion in July 1937; at worst, the entire Republican period was relegated to the status of a transitional period that gave way before the inevitable primacy of "bottom-up" revolution. Insofar as a commonly accepted view of Republican era government emerged, it was a mostly critical one. The two most influential and *I would like to extend special thanks to William Kirby and R. Bin Wong for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. 1. K. S. Lieuw, Struggle for Democracy: Sung Chiao-jen and the 1911 Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), esp. pp. 127-201, and Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977) are the best examples. 2. For a relatively sympathetic view of the KMT's state-building efforts (as well as the role of Western financial and technical knowledge in aiding those efforts), see Arthur Young, China's Nation Building Effort: The Financial and Economic Record, 1927-37 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971), Arthur Young, China and the Helping Hand, 1937-45, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963). Another somewhat later sympathetic view is expressed in Maria Hsia Chang," 'Facism' and Moder China," The China Quarterly, No. 79 (September 1979). 3. For critical views, see Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, The Government and Politics of China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1950), Lloyd Eastman, The Abortive Revolution: China Under Nationalist Rule, 1927-37 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), and Tien Hung-mao, Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, 1927-37 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972). ? The China Quarterly, 1997 Julia C. Strauss The topic of government and administration in the Republican period (1911-49) has attracted periodic bursts of scholarly attention in the first three decades of the post-1950 period. Some of these works focused on the weakness of political institutions in the early Republic,l several were sympathetic to the state-building efforts of the Kuomintang (KMT),2 and the remainder were overtly or covertly negative in their assessment of Republican, particularly KMT, government.3 Whether sympathetic to Republican-era government or not, this scholarship was largely informed by a constellation of three factors: the deep Cold War era divisions between left and right in the United States as to how the spread of Communism in Asia should be accounted for and dealt with, the lack of research access in China itself, and, perhaps most important, what might be called "the prismatic event of 1949," when the Republican government was militarily defeated in the civil war, driven into exile on a small island, and replaced with a self-consciously revolutionary government which vigorously attempted to recreate and transform state and society. It is little wonder that this abrupt terminus of the Republican period slanted many of the questions implicitly posed in post-1949 scholarship towards explaining the Republic's demise on mainland China. At best, the efforts and strategies of the Kuomintang were considered to have long-term promise until seriously undercut by the Japanese invasion in July 1937; at worst, the entire Republican period was relegated to the status of a transitional period that gave way before the inevitable primacy of "bottom-up" revolution. Insofar as a commonly accepted view of Republican era government emerged, it was a mostly critical one. The two most influential and *I would like to extend special thanks to William Kirby and R. Bin Wong for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. 1. K. S. Lieuw, Struggle for Democracy: Sung Chiao-jen and the 1911 Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), esp. pp. 127-201, and Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977) are the best examples. 2. For a relatively sympathetic view of the KMT's state-building efforts (as well as the role of Western financial and technical knowledge in aiding those efforts), see Arthur Young, China's Nation Building Effort: The Financial and Economic Record, 1927-37 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971), Arthur Young, China and the Helping Hand, 1937-45, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963). Another somewhat later sympathetic view is expressed in Maria Hsia Chang," 'Facism' and Moder China," The China Quarterly, No. 79 (September 1979). 3. For critical views, see Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, The Government and Politics of China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1950), Lloyd Eastman, The Abortive Revolution: China Under Nationalist Rule, 1927-37 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), and Tien Hung-mao, Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, 1927-37 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972). ? The China Quarterly, 1997 Julia C. Strauss The topic of government and administration in the Republican period (1911-49) has attracted periodic bursts of scholarly attention in the first three decades of the post-1950 period. Some of these works focused on the weakness of political institutions in the early Republic,l several were sympathetic to the state-building efforts of the Kuomintang (KMT),2 and the remainder were overtly or covertly negative in their assessment of Republican, particularly KMT, government.3 Whether sympathetic to Republican-era government or not, this scholarship was largely informed by a constellation of three factors: the deep Cold War era divisions between left and right in the United States as to how the spread of Communism in Asia should be accounted for and dealt with, the lack of research access in China itself, and, perhaps most important, what might be called "the prismatic event of 1949," when the Republican government was militarily defeated in the civil war, driven into exile on a small island, and replaced with a self-consciously revolutionary government which vigorously attempted to recreate and transform state and society. It is little wonder that this abrupt terminus of the Republican period slanted many of the questions implicitly posed in post-1949 scholarship towards explaining the Republic's demise on mainland China. At best, the efforts and strategies of the Kuomintang were considered to have long-term promise until seriously undercut by the Japanese invasion in July 1937; at worst, the entire Republican period was relegated to the status of a transitional period that gave way before the inevitable primacy of "bottom-up" revolution. Insofar as a commonly accepted view of Republican era government emerged, it was a mostly critical one. The two most influential and *I would like to extend special thanks to William Kirby and R. Bin Wong for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. 1. K. S. Lieuw, Struggle for Democracy: Sung Chiao-jen and the 1911 Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), esp. pp. 127-201, and Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977) are the best examples. 2. For a relatively sympathetic view of the KMT's state-building efforts (as well as the role of Western financial and technical knowledge in aiding those efforts), see Arthur Young, China's Nation Building Effort: The Financial and Economic Record, 1927-37 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971), Arthur Young, China and the Helping Hand, 1937-45, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963). Another somewhat later sympathetic view is expressed in Maria Hsia Chang," 'Facism' and Moder China," The China Quarterly, No. 79 (September 1979). 3. For critical views, see Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, The Government and Politics of China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1950), Lloyd Eastman, The Abortive Revolution: China Under Nationalist Rule, 1927-37 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), and Tien Hung-mao, Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, 1927-37 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972). ? The China Quarterly, 1997 Julia C. Strauss The topic of government and administration in the Republican period (1911-49) has attracted periodic bursts of scholarly attention in the first three decades of the post-1950 period. Some of these works focused on the weakness of political institutions in the early Republic,l several were sympathetic to the state-building efforts of the Kuomintang (KMT),2 and the remainder were overtly or covertly negative in their assessment of Republican, particularly KMT, government.3 Whether sympathetic to Republican-era government or not, this scholarship was largely informed by a constellation of three factors: the deep Cold War era divisions between left and right in the United States as to how the spread of Communism in Asia should be accounted for and dealt with, the lack of research access in China itself, and, perhaps most important, what might be called "the prismatic event of 1949," when the Republican government was militarily defeated in the civil war, driven into exile on a small island, and replaced with a self-consciously revolutionary government which vigorously attempted to recreate and transform state and society. It is little wonder that this abrupt terminus of the Republican period slanted many of the questions implicitly posed in post-1949 scholarship towards explaining the Republic's demise on mainland China. At best, the efforts and strategies of the Kuomintang were considered to have long-term promise until seriously undercut by the Japanese invasion in July 1937; at worst, the entire Republican period was relegated to the status of a transitional period that gave way before the inevitable primacy of "bottom-up" revolution. Insofar as a commonly accepted view of Republican era government emerged, it was a mostly critical one. The two most influential and *I would like to extend special thanks to William Kirby and R. Bin Wong for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. 1. K. S. Lieuw, Struggle for Democracy: Sung Chiao-jen and the 1911 Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), esp. pp. 127-201, and Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977) are the best examples. 2. For a relatively sympathetic view of the KMT's state-building efforts (as well as the role of Western financial and technical knowledge in aiding those efforts), see Arthur Young, China's Nation Building Effort: The Financial and Economic Record, 1927-37 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971), Arthur Young, China and the Helping Hand, 1937-45, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963). Another somewhat later sympathetic view is expressed in Maria Hsia Chang," 'Facism' and Moder China," The China Quarterly, No. 79 (September 1979). 3. For critical views, see Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, The Government and Politics of China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1950), Lloyd Eastman, The Abortive Revolution: China Under Nationalist Rule, 1927-37 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), and Tien Hung-mao, Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, 1927-37 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972). ? The China Quarterly, 1997 Julia C. Strauss The topic of government and administration in the Republican period (1911-49) has attracted periodic bursts of scholarly attention in the first three decades of the post-1950 period. Some of these works focused on the weakness of political institutions in the early Republic,l several were sympathetic to the state-building efforts of the Kuomintang (KMT),2 and the remainder were overtly or covertly negative in their assessment of Republican, particularly KMT, government.3 Whether sympathetic to Republican-era government or not, this scholarship was largely informed by a constellation of three factors: the deep Cold War era divisions between left and right in the United States as to how the spread of Communism in Asia should be accounted for and dealt with, the lack of research access in China itself, and, perhaps most important, what might be called "the prismatic event of 1949," when the Republican government was militarily defeated in the civil war, driven into exile on a small island, and replaced with a self-consciously revolutionary government which vigorously attempted to recreate and transform state and society. It is little wonder that this abrupt terminus of the Republican period slanted many of the questions implicitly posed in post-1949 scholarship towards explaining the Republic's demise on mainland China. At best, the efforts and strategies of the Kuomintang were considered to have long-term promise until seriously undercut by the Japanese invasion in July 1937; at worst, the entire Republican period was relegated to the status of a transitional period that gave way before the inevitable primacy of "bottom-up" revolution. Insofar as a commonly accepted view of Republican era government emerged, it was a mostly critical one. The two most influential and *I would like to extend special thanks to William Kirby and R. Bin Wong for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. 1. K. S. Lieuw, Struggle for Democracy: Sung Chiao-jen and the 1911 Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), esp. pp. 127-201, and Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977) are the best examples. 2. For a relatively sympathetic view of the KMT's state-building efforts (as well as the role of Western financial and technical knowledge in aiding those efforts), see Arthur Young, China's Nation Building Effort: The Financial and Economic Record, 1927-37 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971), Arthur Young, China and the Helping Hand, 1937-45, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963). Another somewhat later sympathetic view is expressed in Maria Hsia Chang," 'Facism' and Moder China," The China Quarterly, No. 79 (September 1979). 3. For critical views, see Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, The Government and Politics of China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1950), Lloyd Eastman, The Abortive Revolution: China Under Nationalist Rule, 1927-37 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), and Tien Hung-mao, Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, 1927-37 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972). ? The China Quarterly, 1997 Julia C. Strauss The topic of government and administration in the Republican period (1911-49) has attracted periodic bursts of scholarly attention in the first three decades of the post-1950 period. Some of these works focused on the weakness of political institutions in the early Republic,l several were sympathetic to the state-building efforts of the Kuomintang (KMT),2 and the remainder were overtly or covertly negative in their assessment of Republican, particularly KMT, government.3 Whether sympathetic to Republican-era government or not, this scholarship was largely informed by a constellation of three factors: the deep Cold War era divisions between left and right in the United States as to how the spread of Communism in Asia should be accounted for and dealt with, the lack of research access in China itself, and, perhaps most important, what might be called "the prismatic event of 1949," when the Republican government was militarily defeated in the civil war, driven into exile on a small island, and replaced with a self-consciously revolutionary government which vigorously attempted to recreate and transform state and society. It is little wonder that this abrupt terminus of the Republican period slanted many of the questions implicitly posed in post-1949 scholarship towards explaining the Republic's demise on mainland China. At best, the efforts and strategies of the Kuomintang were considered to have long-term promise until seriously undercut by the Japanese invasion in July 1937; at worst, the entire Republican period was relegated to the status of a transitional period that gave way before the inevitable primacy of "bottom-up" revolution. Insofar as a commonly accepted view of Republican era government emerged, it was a mostly critical one. The two most influential and *I would like to extend special thanks to William Kirby and R. Bin Wong for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. 1. K. S. Lieuw, Struggle for Democracy: Sung Chiao-jen and the 1911 Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), esp. pp. 127-201, and Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977) are the best examples. 2. For a relatively sympathetic view of the KMT's state-building efforts (as well as the role of Western financial and technical knowledge in aiding those efforts), see Arthur Young, China's Nation Building Effort: The Financial and Economic Record, 1927-37 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971), Arthur Young, China and the Helping Hand, 1937-45, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963). Another somewhat later sympathetic view is expressed in Maria Hsia Chang," 'Facism' and Moder China," The China Quarterly, No. 79 (September 1979). 3. For critical views, see Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, The Government and Politics of China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1950), Lloyd Eastman, The Abortive Revolution: China Under Nationalist Rule, 1927-37 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), and Tien Hung-mao, Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, 1927-37 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972). ? The China Quarterly, 1997 Julia C. Strauss The topic of government and administration in the Republican period (1911-49) has attracted periodic bursts of scholarly attention in the first three decades of the post-1950 period. Some of these works focused on the weakness of political institutions in the early Republic,l several were sympathetic to the state-building efforts of the Kuomintang (KMT),2 and the remainder were overtly or covertly negative in their assessment of Republican, particularly KMT, government.3 Whether sympathetic to Republican-era government or not, this scholarship was largely informed by a constellation of three factors: the deep Cold War era divisions between left and right in the United States as to how the spread of Communism in Asia should be accounted for and dealt with, the lack of research access in China itself, and, perhaps most important, what might be called "the prismatic event of 1949," when the Republican government was militarily defeated in the civil war, driven into exile on a small island, and replaced with a self-consciously revolutionary government which vigorously attempted to recreate and transform state and society. It is little wonder that this abrupt terminus of the Republican period slanted many of the questions implicitly posed in post-1949 scholarship towards explaining the Republic's demise on mainland China. At best, the efforts and strategies of the Kuomintang were considered to have long-term promise until seriously undercut by the Japanese invasion in July 1937; at worst, the entire Republican period was relegated to the status of a transitional period that gave way before the inevitable primacy of "bottom-up" revolution. Insofar as a commonly accepted view of Republican era government emerged, it was a mostly critical one. The two most influential and *I would like to extend special thanks to William Kirby and R. Bin Wong for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. 1. K. S. Lieuw, Struggle for Democracy: Sung Chiao-jen and the 1911 Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), esp. pp. 127-201, and Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977) are the best examples. 2. For a relatively sympathetic view of the KMT's state-building efforts (as well as the role of Western financial and technical knowledge in aiding those efforts), see Arthur Young, China's Nation Building Effort: The Financial and Economic Record, 1927-37 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971), Arthur Young, China and the Helping Hand, 1937-45, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963). Another somewhat later sympathetic view is expressed in Maria Hsia Chang," 'Facism' and Moder China," The China Quarterly, No. 79 (September 1979). 3. For critical views, see Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, The Government and Politics of China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1950), Lloyd Eastman, The Abortive Revolution: China Under Nationalist Rule, 1927-37 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), and Tien Hung-mao, Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, 1927-37 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972). ? The China Quarterly, 1997 Julia C. Strauss The topic of government and administration in the Republican period (1911-49) has attracted periodic bursts of scholarly attention in the first three decades of the post-1950 period. Some of these works focused on the weakness of political institutions in the early Republic,l several were sympathetic to the state-building efforts of the Kuomintang (KMT),2 and the remainder were overtly or covertly negative in their assessment of Republican, particularly KMT, government.3 Whether sympathetic to Republican-era government or not, this scholarship was largely informed by a constellation of three factors: the deep Cold War era divisions between left and right in the United States as to how the spread of Communism in Asia should be accounted for and dealt with, the lack of research access in China itself, and, perhaps most important, what might be called "the prismatic event of 1949," when the Republican government was militarily defeated in the civil war, driven into exile on a small island, and replaced with a self-consciously revolutionary government which vigorously attempted to recreate and transform state and society. It is little wonder that this abrupt terminus of the Republican period slanted many of the questions implicitly posed in post-1949 scholarship towards explaining the Republic's demise on mainland China. At best, the efforts and strategies of the Kuomintang were considered to have long-term promise until seriously undercut by the Japanese invasion in July 1937; at worst, the entire Republican period was relegated to the status of a transitional period that gave way before the inevitable primacy of "bottom-up" revolution. Insofar as a commonly accepted view of Republican era government emerged, it was a mostly critical one. The two most influential and *I would like to extend special thanks to William Kirby and R. Bin Wong for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. 1. K. S. Lieuw, Struggle for Democracy: Sung Chiao-jen and the 1911 Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), esp. pp. 127-201, and Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977) are the best examples. 2. For a relatively sympathetic view of the KMT's state-building efforts (as well as the role of Western financial and technical knowledge in aiding those efforts), see Arthur Young, China's Nation Building Effort: The Financial and Economic Record, 1927-37 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971), Arthur Young, China and the Helping Hand, 1937-45, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963). Another somewhat later sympathetic view is expressed in Maria Hsia Chang," 'Facism' and Moder China," The China Quarterly, No. 79 (September 1979). 3. For critical views, see Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, The Government and Politics of China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1950), Lloyd Eastman, The Abortive Revolution: China Under Nationalist Rule, 1927-37 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), and Tien Hung-mao, Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, 1927-37 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972). ? The China Quarterly, 1997 Julia C. Strauss The topic of government and administration in the Republican period (1911-49) has attracted periodic bursts of scholarly attention in the first three decades of the post-1950 period. Some of these works focused on the weakness of political institutions in the early Republic,l several were sympathetic to the state-building efforts of the Kuomintang (KMT),2 and the remainder were overtly or covertly negative in their assessment of Republican, particularly KMT, government.3 Whether sympathetic to Republican-era government or not, this scholarship was largely informed by a constellation of three factors: the deep Cold War era divisions between left and right in the United States as to how the spread of Communism in Asia should be accounted for and dealt with, the lack of research access in China itself, and, perhaps most important, what might be called "the prismatic event of 1949," when the Republican government was militarily defeated in the civil war, driven into exile on a small island, and replaced with a self-consciously revolutionary government which vigorously attempted to recreate and transform state and society. It is little wonder that this abrupt terminus of the Republican period slanted many of the questions implicitly posed in post-1949 scholarship towards explaining the Republic's demise on mainland China. At best, the efforts and strategies of the Kuomintang were considered to have long-term promise until seriously undercut by the Japanese invasion in July 1937; at worst, the entire Republican period was relegated to the status of a transitional period that gave way before the inevitable primacy of "bottom-up" revolution. Insofar as a commonly accepted view of Republican era government emerged, it was a mostly critical one. The two most influential and *I would like to extend special thanks to William Kirby and R. Bin Wong for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. 1. K. S. Lieuw, Struggle for Democracy: Sung Chiao-jen and the 1911 Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), esp. pp. 127-201, and Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977) are the best examples. 2. For a relatively sympathetic view of the KMT's state-building efforts (as well as the role of Western financial and technical knowledge in aiding those efforts), see Arthur Young, China's Nation Building Effort: The Financial and Economic Record, 1927-37 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971), Arthur Young, China and the Helping Hand, 1937-45, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963). Another somewhat later sympathetic view is expressed in Maria Hsia Chang," 'Facism' and Moder China," The China Quarterly, No. 79 (September 1979). 3. For critical views, see Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, The Government and Politics of China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1950), Lloyd Eastman, The Abortive Revolution: China Under Nationalist Rule, 1927-37 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), and Tien Hung-mao, Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, 1927-37 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972). ? The China Quarterly, 1997 Julia C. Strauss The topic of government and administration in the Republican period (1911-49) has attracted periodic bursts of scholarly attention in the first three decades of the post-1950 period. Some of these works focused on the weakness of political institutions in the early Republic,l several were sympathetic to the state-building efforts of the Kuomintang (KMT),2 and the remainder were overtly or covertly negative in their assessment of Republican, particularly KMT, government.3 Whether sympathetic to Republican-era government or not, this scholarship was largely informed by a constellation of three factors: the deep Cold War era divisions between left and right in the United States as to how the spread of Communism in Asia should be accounted for and dealt with, the lack of research access in China itself, and, perhaps most important, what might be called "the prismatic event of 1949," when the Republican government was militarily defeated in the civil war, driven into exile on a small island, and replaced with a self-consciously revolutionary government which vigorously attempted to recreate and transform state and society. It is little wonder that this abrupt terminus of the Republican period slanted many of the questions implicitly posed in post-1949 scholarship towards explaining the Republic's demise on mainland China. At best, the efforts and strategies of the Kuomintang were considered to have long-term promise until seriously undercut by the Japanese invasion in July 1937; at worst, the entire Republican period was relegated to the status of a transitional period that gave way before the inevitable primacy of "bottom-up" revolution. Insofar as a commonly accepted view of Republican era government emerged, it was a mostly critical one. The two most influential and *I would like to extend special thanks to William Kirby and R. Bin Wong for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. 1. K. S. Lieuw, Struggle for Democracy: Sung Chiao-jen and the 1911 Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), esp. pp. 127-201, and Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977) are the best examples. 2. For a relatively sympathetic view of the KMT's state-building efforts (as well as the role of Western financial and technical knowledge in aiding those efforts), see Arthur Young, China's Nation Building Effort: The Financial and Economic Record, 1927-37 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971), Arthur Young, China and the Helping Hand, 1937-45, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963). Another somewhat later sympathetic view is expressed in Maria Hsia Chang," 'Facism' and Moder China," The China Quarterly, No. 79 (September 1979). 3. For critical views, see Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, The Government and Politics of China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1950), Lloyd Eastman, The Abortive Revolution: China Under Nationalist Rule, 1927-37 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), and Tien Hung-mao, Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, 1927-37 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972). ? The China Quarterly, 1997 Julia C. Strauss The topic of government and administration in the Republican period (1911-49) has attracted periodic bursts of scholarly attention in the first three decades of the post-1950 period. Some of these works focused on the weakness of political institutions in the early Republic,l several were sympathetic to the state-building efforts of the Kuomintang (KMT),2 and the remainder were overtly or covertly negative in their assessment of Republican, particularly KMT, government.3 Whether sympathetic to Republican-era government or not, this scholarship was largely informed by a constellation of three factors: the deep Cold War era divisions between left and right in the United States as to how the spread of Communism in Asia should be accounted for and dealt with, the lack of research access in China itself, and, perhaps most important, what might be called "the prismatic event of 1949," when the Republican government was militarily defeated in the civil war, driven into exile on a small island, and replaced with a self-consciously revolutionary government which vigorously attempted to recreate and transform state and society. It is little wonder that this abrupt terminus of the Republican period slanted many of the questions implicitly posed in post-1949 scholarship towards explaining the Republic's demise on mainland China. At best, the efforts and strategies of the Kuomintang were considered to have long-term promise until seriously undercut by the Japanese invasion in July 1937; at worst, the entire Republican period was relegated to the status of a transitional period that gave way before the inevitable primacy of "bottom-up" revolution. Insofar as a commonly accepted view of Republican era government emerged, it was a mostly critical one. The two most influential and *I would like to extend special thanks to William Kirby and R. Bin Wong for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. 1. K. S. Lieuw, Struggle for Democracy: Sung Chiao-jen and the 1911 Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), esp. pp. 127-201, and Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977) are the best examples. 2. For a relatively sympathetic view of the KMT's state-building efforts (as well as the role of Western financial and technical knowledge in aiding those efforts), see Arthur Young, China's Nation Building Effort: The Financial and Economic Record, 1927-37 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971), Arthur Young, China and the Helping Hand, 1937-45, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963). Another somewhat later sympathetic view is expressed in Maria Hsia Chang," 'Facism' and Moder China," The China Quarterly, No. 79 (September 1979). 3. For critical views, see Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, The Government and Politics of China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1950), Lloyd Eastman, The Abortive Revolution: China Under Nationalist Rule, 1927-37 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), and Tien Hung-mao, Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, 1927-37 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972). ? The China Quarterly, 1997
330 The China Quarterly widely read works,Lloyd Eastman's The Abortive Revolution and Hung- mao Tien's Government and Politics in Kuomintang China,both dating from the early 1970s,stress the multiple weaknesses of the KMT Party and the government that it set up in 1927-28.Both these books single out phenomena that were widely seen to be prevalent in the 1930s and 1940s: endemic factionalism within the Kuomintang,the lack of an effective examination system or pro-actively functioning bureaucracy,the absence of the means or will to penetrate into the countryside and re-order rural relations,as well as the loss of revolutionary fervour and the increasing militarization of the regime.The conventional analysis of Republican government,as set out by Eastman and Tien,suggests at least implicitly that the seeds of Republican demise were planted long before the events of 1949.In this view,the Republic gave way to the People's Republic because it was institutionally weak,with its weaknesses variously illus- trated by what it failed to accomplish in the 1930s and 1940s,contempor- ary critical opinion in the 1930s and 1940s,and of course,the harsh reality of ultimate defeat and exile in 1949. However,in working backwards from 1949,this conventional view ignores much that is common sense in any kind of comparative perspec- tive.After all,most political systems exhibit fairly large gaps between what politicians say ought to be accomplished and what in fact is accomplished;serious criticism of either individuals or policy in the government is an inevitable feature of any regime with a less than totally controlled press;and all political systems produce informal groups (and the line that differentiates between tightly organized faction and informal groupings is,at best,ill-demarcated).When one turns to the governments of developing countries,many have a strong military component,are invaded with personalistic networks of various sorts,are institutionally weak,and have no particular correlation between civil service examina- tions and political stability.Further,the vast majority,even those who at some point in their political consolidation call themselves revolutionary, have neither the capacity nor the interest in radically restructuring rural relations. Intellectual and political trends in the 1980s,dramatically culminating in the end of the Cold War with the collapse of the Leninist regimes of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union,have prompted a substantial requestioning of basic assumptions about China's 20th-century revol- ution.Scholars have increasingly gained access to archival materials that have made it possible to conduct intensive research on Republican China, and this research has revealed substantial continuities in the pre-and 4.An analysis of the widespread phenomenon of penetration of the state by society in developing countries can be found in Joel Migdal,(Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1988).An impressive example of a state with many parallels to Republican China is Ataturk's Turkey in the 1920s and 1930s:like Chiang Kai-shek,Atatuirk proclaimed himself the head of an anti-imperialist movement of national liberation,and like the KMT in the 1930s,the Republican People's Party attempted to build a strong central state from the top down in urban areas,with little capacity and still less interest in radically restructuring the life of the Anatolian peasantry
330 The China Quarterly widely read works, Lloyd Eastman's The Abortive Revolution and Hungmao Tien's Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, both dating from the early 1970s, stress the multiple weaknesses of the KMT Party and the government that it set up in 1927-28. Both these books single out phenomena that were widely seen to be prevalent in the 1930s and 1940s: endemic factionalism within the Kuomintang, the lack of an effective examination system or pro-actively functioning bureaucracy, the absence of the means or will to penetrate into the countryside and re-order rural relations, as well as the loss of revolutionary fervour and the increasing militarization of the regime. The conventional analysis of Republican government, as set out by Eastman and Tien, suggests at least implicitly that the seeds of Republican demise were planted long before the events of 1949. In this view, the Republic gave way to the People's Republic because it was institutionally weak, with its weaknesses variously illustrated by what it failed to accomplish in the 1930s and 1940s, contemporary critical opinion in the 1930s and 1940s, and of course, the harsh reality of ultimate defeat and exile in 1949. However, in working backwards from 1949, this conventional view ignores much that is common sense in any kind of comparative perspective. After all, most political systems exhibit fairly large gaps between what politicians say ought to be accomplished and what in fact is accomplished; serious criticism of either individuals or policy in the government is an inevitable feature of any regime with a less than totally controlled press; and all political systems produce informal groups (and the line that differentiates between tightly organized faction and informal groupings is, at best, ill-demarcated). When one turns to the governments of developing countries, many have a strong military component, are invaded with personalistic networks of various sorts, are institutionally weak, and have no particular correlation between civil service examinations and political stability. Further, the vast majority, even those who at some point in their political consolidation call themselves revolutionary, have neither the capacity nor the interest in radically restructuring rural relations.4 Intellectual and political trends in the 1980s, dramatically culminating in the end of the Cold War with the collapse of the Leninist regimes of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, have prompted a substantial requestioning of basic assumptions about China's 20th-century revolution. Scholars have increasingly gained access to archival materials that have made it possible to conduct intensive research on Republican China, and this research has revealed substantial continuities in the pre- and 4. An analysis of the widespread phenomenon of penetration of the state by society in developing countries can be found in Joel Migdal, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). An impressive example of a state with many parallels to Republican China is Atatiirk's Turkey in the 1920s and 1930s: like Chiang Kai-shek, Atatirk proclaimed himself the head of an anti-imperialist movement of national liberation, and like the KMT in the 1930s, the Republican People's Party attempted to build a strong central state from the top down in urban areas, with little capacity and still less interest in radically restructuring the life of the Anatolian peasantry. widely read works, Lloyd Eastman's The Abortive Revolution and Hungmao Tien's Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, both dating from the early 1970s, stress the multiple weaknesses of the KMT Party and the government that it set up in 1927-28. Both these books single out phenomena that were widely seen to be prevalent in the 1930s and 1940s: endemic factionalism within the Kuomintang, the lack of an effective examination system or pro-actively functioning bureaucracy, the absence of the means or will to penetrate into the countryside and re-order rural relations, as well as the loss of revolutionary fervour and the increasing militarization of the regime. The conventional analysis of Republican government, as set out by Eastman and Tien, suggests at least implicitly that the seeds of Republican demise were planted long before the events of 1949. In this view, the Republic gave way to the People's Republic because it was institutionally weak, with its weaknesses variously illustrated by what it failed to accomplish in the 1930s and 1940s, contemporary critical opinion in the 1930s and 1940s, and of course, the harsh reality of ultimate defeat and exile in 1949. However, in working backwards from 1949, this conventional view ignores much that is common sense in any kind of comparative perspective. After all, most political systems exhibit fairly large gaps between what politicians say ought to be accomplished and what in fact is accomplished; serious criticism of either individuals or policy in the government is an inevitable feature of any regime with a less than totally controlled press; and all political systems produce informal groups (and the line that differentiates between tightly organized faction and informal groupings is, at best, ill-demarcated). When one turns to the governments of developing countries, many have a strong military component, are invaded with personalistic networks of various sorts, are institutionally weak, and have no particular correlation between civil service examinations and political stability. Further, the vast majority, even those who at some point in their political consolidation call themselves revolutionary, have neither the capacity nor the interest in radically restructuring rural relations.4 Intellectual and political trends in the 1980s, dramatically culminating in the end of the Cold War with the collapse of the Leninist regimes of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, have prompted a substantial requestioning of basic assumptions about China's 20th-century revolution. Scholars have increasingly gained access to archival materials that have made it possible to conduct intensive research on Republican China, and this research has revealed substantial continuities in the pre- and 4. An analysis of the widespread phenomenon of penetration of the state by society in developing countries can be found in Joel Migdal, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). An impressive example of a state with many parallels to Republican China is Atatiirk's Turkey in the 1920s and 1930s: like Chiang Kai-shek, Atatirk proclaimed himself the head of an anti-imperialist movement of national liberation, and like the KMT in the 1930s, the Republican People's Party attempted to build a strong central state from the top down in urban areas, with little capacity and still less interest in radically restructuring the life of the Anatolian peasantry. widely read works, Lloyd Eastman's The Abortive Revolution and Hungmao Tien's Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, both dating from the early 1970s, stress the multiple weaknesses of the KMT Party and the government that it set up in 1927-28. Both these books single out phenomena that were widely seen to be prevalent in the 1930s and 1940s: endemic factionalism within the Kuomintang, the lack of an effective examination system or pro-actively functioning bureaucracy, the absence of the means or will to penetrate into the countryside and re-order rural relations, as well as the loss of revolutionary fervour and the increasing militarization of the regime. The conventional analysis of Republican government, as set out by Eastman and Tien, suggests at least implicitly that the seeds of Republican demise were planted long before the events of 1949. In this view, the Republic gave way to the People's Republic because it was institutionally weak, with its weaknesses variously illustrated by what it failed to accomplish in the 1930s and 1940s, contemporary critical opinion in the 1930s and 1940s, and of course, the harsh reality of ultimate defeat and exile in 1949. However, in working backwards from 1949, this conventional view ignores much that is common sense in any kind of comparative perspective. After all, most political systems exhibit fairly large gaps between what politicians say ought to be accomplished and what in fact is accomplished; serious criticism of either individuals or policy in the government is an inevitable feature of any regime with a less than totally controlled press; and all political systems produce informal groups (and the line that differentiates between tightly organized faction and informal groupings is, at best, ill-demarcated). When one turns to the governments of developing countries, many have a strong military component, are invaded with personalistic networks of various sorts, are institutionally weak, and have no particular correlation between civil service examinations and political stability. Further, the vast majority, even those who at some point in their political consolidation call themselves revolutionary, have neither the capacity nor the interest in radically restructuring rural relations.4 Intellectual and political trends in the 1980s, dramatically culminating in the end of the Cold War with the collapse of the Leninist regimes of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, have prompted a substantial requestioning of basic assumptions about China's 20th-century revolution. Scholars have increasingly gained access to archival materials that have made it possible to conduct intensive research on Republican China, and this research has revealed substantial continuities in the pre- and 4. An analysis of the widespread phenomenon of penetration of the state by society in developing countries can be found in Joel Migdal, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). An impressive example of a state with many parallels to Republican China is Atatiirk's Turkey in the 1920s and 1930s: like Chiang Kai-shek, Atatirk proclaimed himself the head of an anti-imperialist movement of national liberation, and like the KMT in the 1930s, the Republican People's Party attempted to build a strong central state from the top down in urban areas, with little capacity and still less interest in radically restructuring the life of the Anatolian peasantry. widely read works, Lloyd Eastman's The Abortive Revolution and Hungmao Tien's Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, both dating from the early 1970s, stress the multiple weaknesses of the KMT Party and the government that it set up in 1927-28. Both these books single out phenomena that were widely seen to be prevalent in the 1930s and 1940s: endemic factionalism within the Kuomintang, the lack of an effective examination system or pro-actively functioning bureaucracy, the absence of the means or will to penetrate into the countryside and re-order rural relations, as well as the loss of revolutionary fervour and the increasing militarization of the regime. The conventional analysis of Republican government, as set out by Eastman and Tien, suggests at least implicitly that the seeds of Republican demise were planted long before the events of 1949. In this view, the Republic gave way to the People's Republic because it was institutionally weak, with its weaknesses variously illustrated by what it failed to accomplish in the 1930s and 1940s, contemporary critical opinion in the 1930s and 1940s, and of course, the harsh reality of ultimate defeat and exile in 1949. However, in working backwards from 1949, this conventional view ignores much that is common sense in any kind of comparative perspective. After all, most political systems exhibit fairly large gaps between what politicians say ought to be accomplished and what in fact is accomplished; serious criticism of either individuals or policy in the government is an inevitable feature of any regime with a less than totally controlled press; and all political systems produce informal groups (and the line that differentiates between tightly organized faction and informal groupings is, at best, ill-demarcated). When one turns to the governments of developing countries, many have a strong military component, are invaded with personalistic networks of various sorts, are institutionally weak, and have no particular correlation between civil service examinations and political stability. Further, the vast majority, even those who at some point in their political consolidation call themselves revolutionary, have neither the capacity nor the interest in radically restructuring rural relations.4 Intellectual and political trends in the 1980s, dramatically culminating in the end of the Cold War with the collapse of the Leninist regimes of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, have prompted a substantial requestioning of basic assumptions about China's 20th-century revolution. Scholars have increasingly gained access to archival materials that have made it possible to conduct intensive research on Republican China, and this research has revealed substantial continuities in the pre- and 4. An analysis of the widespread phenomenon of penetration of the state by society in developing countries can be found in Joel Migdal, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). An impressive example of a state with many parallels to Republican China is Atatiirk's Turkey in the 1920s and 1930s: like Chiang Kai-shek, Atatirk proclaimed himself the head of an anti-imperialist movement of national liberation, and like the KMT in the 1930s, the Republican People's Party attempted to build a strong central state from the top down in urban areas, with little capacity and still less interest in radically restructuring the life of the Anatolian peasantry. widely read works, Lloyd Eastman's The Abortive Revolution and Hungmao Tien's Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, both dating from the early 1970s, stress the multiple weaknesses of the KMT Party and the government that it set up in 1927-28. Both these books single out phenomena that were widely seen to be prevalent in the 1930s and 1940s: endemic factionalism within the Kuomintang, the lack of an effective examination system or pro-actively functioning bureaucracy, the absence of the means or will to penetrate into the countryside and re-order rural relations, as well as the loss of revolutionary fervour and the increasing militarization of the regime. The conventional analysis of Republican government, as set out by Eastman and Tien, suggests at least implicitly that the seeds of Republican demise were planted long before the events of 1949. In this view, the Republic gave way to the People's Republic because it was institutionally weak, with its weaknesses variously illustrated by what it failed to accomplish in the 1930s and 1940s, contemporary critical opinion in the 1930s and 1940s, and of course, the harsh reality of ultimate defeat and exile in 1949. However, in working backwards from 1949, this conventional view ignores much that is common sense in any kind of comparative perspective. After all, most political systems exhibit fairly large gaps between what politicians say ought to be accomplished and what in fact is accomplished; serious criticism of either individuals or policy in the government is an inevitable feature of any regime with a less than totally controlled press; and all political systems produce informal groups (and the line that differentiates between tightly organized faction and informal groupings is, at best, ill-demarcated). When one turns to the governments of developing countries, many have a strong military component, are invaded with personalistic networks of various sorts, are institutionally weak, and have no particular correlation between civil service examinations and political stability. Further, the vast majority, even those who at some point in their political consolidation call themselves revolutionary, have neither the capacity nor the interest in radically restructuring rural relations.4 Intellectual and political trends in the 1980s, dramatically culminating in the end of the Cold War with the collapse of the Leninist regimes of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, have prompted a substantial requestioning of basic assumptions about China's 20th-century revolution. Scholars have increasingly gained access to archival materials that have made it possible to conduct intensive research on Republican China, and this research has revealed substantial continuities in the pre- and 4. An analysis of the widespread phenomenon of penetration of the state by society in developing countries can be found in Joel Migdal, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). An impressive example of a state with many parallels to Republican China is Atatiirk's Turkey in the 1920s and 1930s: like Chiang Kai-shek, Atatirk proclaimed himself the head of an anti-imperialist movement of national liberation, and like the KMT in the 1930s, the Republican People's Party attempted to build a strong central state from the top down in urban areas, with little capacity and still less interest in radically restructuring the life of the Anatolian peasantry. widely read works, Lloyd Eastman's The Abortive Revolution and Hungmao Tien's Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, both dating from the early 1970s, stress the multiple weaknesses of the KMT Party and the government that it set up in 1927-28. Both these books single out phenomena that were widely seen to be prevalent in the 1930s and 1940s: endemic factionalism within the Kuomintang, the lack of an effective examination system or pro-actively functioning bureaucracy, the absence of the means or will to penetrate into the countryside and re-order rural relations, as well as the loss of revolutionary fervour and the increasing militarization of the regime. The conventional analysis of Republican government, as set out by Eastman and Tien, suggests at least implicitly that the seeds of Republican demise were planted long before the events of 1949. In this view, the Republic gave way to the People's Republic because it was institutionally weak, with its weaknesses variously illustrated by what it failed to accomplish in the 1930s and 1940s, contemporary critical opinion in the 1930s and 1940s, and of course, the harsh reality of ultimate defeat and exile in 1949. However, in working backwards from 1949, this conventional view ignores much that is common sense in any kind of comparative perspective. After all, most political systems exhibit fairly large gaps between what politicians say ought to be accomplished and what in fact is accomplished; serious criticism of either individuals or policy in the government is an inevitable feature of any regime with a less than totally controlled press; and all political systems produce informal groups (and the line that differentiates between tightly organized faction and informal groupings is, at best, ill-demarcated). When one turns to the governments of developing countries, many have a strong military component, are invaded with personalistic networks of various sorts, are institutionally weak, and have no particular correlation between civil service examinations and political stability. Further, the vast majority, even those who at some point in their political consolidation call themselves revolutionary, have neither the capacity nor the interest in radically restructuring rural relations.4 Intellectual and political trends in the 1980s, dramatically culminating in the end of the Cold War with the collapse of the Leninist regimes of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, have prompted a substantial requestioning of basic assumptions about China's 20th-century revolution. Scholars have increasingly gained access to archival materials that have made it possible to conduct intensive research on Republican China, and this research has revealed substantial continuities in the pre- and 4. An analysis of the widespread phenomenon of penetration of the state by society in developing countries can be found in Joel Migdal, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). An impressive example of a state with many parallels to Republican China is Atatiirk's Turkey in the 1920s and 1930s: like Chiang Kai-shek, Atatirk proclaimed himself the head of an anti-imperialist movement of national liberation, and like the KMT in the 1930s, the Republican People's Party attempted to build a strong central state from the top down in urban areas, with little capacity and still less interest in radically restructuring the life of the Anatolian peasantry. widely read works, Lloyd Eastman's The Abortive Revolution and Hungmao Tien's Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, both dating from the early 1970s, stress the multiple weaknesses of the KMT Party and the government that it set up in 1927-28. Both these books single out phenomena that were widely seen to be prevalent in the 1930s and 1940s: endemic factionalism within the Kuomintang, the lack of an effective examination system or pro-actively functioning bureaucracy, the absence of the means or will to penetrate into the countryside and re-order rural relations, as well as the loss of revolutionary fervour and the increasing militarization of the regime. The conventional analysis of Republican government, as set out by Eastman and Tien, suggests at least implicitly that the seeds of Republican demise were planted long before the events of 1949. In this view, the Republic gave way to the People's Republic because it was institutionally weak, with its weaknesses variously illustrated by what it failed to accomplish in the 1930s and 1940s, contemporary critical opinion in the 1930s and 1940s, and of course, the harsh reality of ultimate defeat and exile in 1949. However, in working backwards from 1949, this conventional view ignores much that is common sense in any kind of comparative perspective. After all, most political systems exhibit fairly large gaps between what politicians say ought to be accomplished and what in fact is accomplished; serious criticism of either individuals or policy in the government is an inevitable feature of any regime with a less than totally controlled press; and all political systems produce informal groups (and the line that differentiates between tightly organized faction and informal groupings is, at best, ill-demarcated). When one turns to the governments of developing countries, many have a strong military component, are invaded with personalistic networks of various sorts, are institutionally weak, and have no particular correlation between civil service examinations and political stability. Further, the vast majority, even those who at some point in their political consolidation call themselves revolutionary, have neither the capacity nor the interest in radically restructuring rural relations.4 Intellectual and political trends in the 1980s, dramatically culminating in the end of the Cold War with the collapse of the Leninist regimes of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, have prompted a substantial requestioning of basic assumptions about China's 20th-century revolution. Scholars have increasingly gained access to archival materials that have made it possible to conduct intensive research on Republican China, and this research has revealed substantial continuities in the pre- and 4. An analysis of the widespread phenomenon of penetration of the state by society in developing countries can be found in Joel Migdal, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). An impressive example of a state with many parallels to Republican China is Atatiirk's Turkey in the 1920s and 1930s: like Chiang Kai-shek, Atatirk proclaimed himself the head of an anti-imperialist movement of national liberation, and like the KMT in the 1930s, the Republican People's Party attempted to build a strong central state from the top down in urban areas, with little capacity and still less interest in radically restructuring the life of the Anatolian peasantry. widely read works, Lloyd Eastman's The Abortive Revolution and Hungmao Tien's Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, both dating from the early 1970s, stress the multiple weaknesses of the KMT Party and the government that it set up in 1927-28. Both these books single out phenomena that were widely seen to be prevalent in the 1930s and 1940s: endemic factionalism within the Kuomintang, the lack of an effective examination system or pro-actively functioning bureaucracy, the absence of the means or will to penetrate into the countryside and re-order rural relations, as well as the loss of revolutionary fervour and the increasing militarization of the regime. The conventional analysis of Republican government, as set out by Eastman and Tien, suggests at least implicitly that the seeds of Republican demise were planted long before the events of 1949. In this view, the Republic gave way to the People's Republic because it was institutionally weak, with its weaknesses variously illustrated by what it failed to accomplish in the 1930s and 1940s, contemporary critical opinion in the 1930s and 1940s, and of course, the harsh reality of ultimate defeat and exile in 1949. However, in working backwards from 1949, this conventional view ignores much that is common sense in any kind of comparative perspective. After all, most political systems exhibit fairly large gaps between what politicians say ought to be accomplished and what in fact is accomplished; serious criticism of either individuals or policy in the government is an inevitable feature of any regime with a less than totally controlled press; and all political systems produce informal groups (and the line that differentiates between tightly organized faction and informal groupings is, at best, ill-demarcated). When one turns to the governments of developing countries, many have a strong military component, are invaded with personalistic networks of various sorts, are institutionally weak, and have no particular correlation between civil service examinations and political stability. Further, the vast majority, even those who at some point in their political consolidation call themselves revolutionary, have neither the capacity nor the interest in radically restructuring rural relations.4 Intellectual and political trends in the 1980s, dramatically culminating in the end of the Cold War with the collapse of the Leninist regimes of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, have prompted a substantial requestioning of basic assumptions about China's 20th-century revolution. Scholars have increasingly gained access to archival materials that have made it possible to conduct intensive research on Republican China, and this research has revealed substantial continuities in the pre- and 4. An analysis of the widespread phenomenon of penetration of the state by society in developing countries can be found in Joel Migdal, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). An impressive example of a state with many parallels to Republican China is Atatiirk's Turkey in the 1920s and 1930s: like Chiang Kai-shek, Atatirk proclaimed himself the head of an anti-imperialist movement of national liberation, and like the KMT in the 1930s, the Republican People's Party attempted to build a strong central state from the top down in urban areas, with little capacity and still less interest in radically restructuring the life of the Anatolian peasantry. widely read works, Lloyd Eastman's The Abortive Revolution and Hungmao Tien's Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, both dating from the early 1970s, stress the multiple weaknesses of the KMT Party and the government that it set up in 1927-28. Both these books single out phenomena that were widely seen to be prevalent in the 1930s and 1940s: endemic factionalism within the Kuomintang, the lack of an effective examination system or pro-actively functioning bureaucracy, the absence of the means or will to penetrate into the countryside and re-order rural relations, as well as the loss of revolutionary fervour and the increasing militarization of the regime. The conventional analysis of Republican government, as set out by Eastman and Tien, suggests at least implicitly that the seeds of Republican demise were planted long before the events of 1949. In this view, the Republic gave way to the People's Republic because it was institutionally weak, with its weaknesses variously illustrated by what it failed to accomplish in the 1930s and 1940s, contemporary critical opinion in the 1930s and 1940s, and of course, the harsh reality of ultimate defeat and exile in 1949. However, in working backwards from 1949, this conventional view ignores much that is common sense in any kind of comparative perspective. After all, most political systems exhibit fairly large gaps between what politicians say ought to be accomplished and what in fact is accomplished; serious criticism of either individuals or policy in the government is an inevitable feature of any regime with a less than totally controlled press; and all political systems produce informal groups (and the line that differentiates between tightly organized faction and informal groupings is, at best, ill-demarcated). When one turns to the governments of developing countries, many have a strong military component, are invaded with personalistic networks of various sorts, are institutionally weak, and have no particular correlation between civil service examinations and political stability. Further, the vast majority, even those who at some point in their political consolidation call themselves revolutionary, have neither the capacity nor the interest in radically restructuring rural relations.4 Intellectual and political trends in the 1980s, dramatically culminating in the end of the Cold War with the collapse of the Leninist regimes of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, have prompted a substantial requestioning of basic assumptions about China's 20th-century revolution. Scholars have increasingly gained access to archival materials that have made it possible to conduct intensive research on Republican China, and this research has revealed substantial continuities in the pre- and 4. An analysis of the widespread phenomenon of penetration of the state by society in developing countries can be found in Joel Migdal, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). An impressive example of a state with many parallels to Republican China is Atatiirk's Turkey in the 1920s and 1930s: like Chiang Kai-shek, Atatirk proclaimed himself the head of an anti-imperialist movement of national liberation, and like the KMT in the 1930s, the Republican People's Party attempted to build a strong central state from the top down in urban areas, with little capacity and still less interest in radically restructuring the life of the Anatolian peasantry. widely read works, Lloyd Eastman's The Abortive Revolution and Hungmao Tien's Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, both dating from the early 1970s, stress the multiple weaknesses of the KMT Party and the government that it set up in 1927-28. Both these books single out phenomena that were widely seen to be prevalent in the 1930s and 1940s: endemic factionalism within the Kuomintang, the lack of an effective examination system or pro-actively functioning bureaucracy, the absence of the means or will to penetrate into the countryside and re-order rural relations, as well as the loss of revolutionary fervour and the increasing militarization of the regime. The conventional analysis of Republican government, as set out by Eastman and Tien, suggests at least implicitly that the seeds of Republican demise were planted long before the events of 1949. In this view, the Republic gave way to the People's Republic because it was institutionally weak, with its weaknesses variously illustrated by what it failed to accomplish in the 1930s and 1940s, contemporary critical opinion in the 1930s and 1940s, and of course, the harsh reality of ultimate defeat and exile in 1949. However, in working backwards from 1949, this conventional view ignores much that is common sense in any kind of comparative perspective. After all, most political systems exhibit fairly large gaps between what politicians say ought to be accomplished and what in fact is accomplished; serious criticism of either individuals or policy in the government is an inevitable feature of any regime with a less than totally controlled press; and all political systems produce informal groups (and the line that differentiates between tightly organized faction and informal groupings is, at best, ill-demarcated). When one turns to the governments of developing countries, many have a strong military component, are invaded with personalistic networks of various sorts, are institutionally weak, and have no particular correlation between civil service examinations and political stability. Further, the vast majority, even those who at some point in their political consolidation call themselves revolutionary, have neither the capacity nor the interest in radically restructuring rural relations.4 Intellectual and political trends in the 1980s, dramatically culminating in the end of the Cold War with the collapse of the Leninist regimes of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, have prompted a substantial requestioning of basic assumptions about China's 20th-century revolution. Scholars have increasingly gained access to archival materials that have made it possible to conduct intensive research on Republican China, and this research has revealed substantial continuities in the pre- and 4. An analysis of the widespread phenomenon of penetration of the state by society in developing countries can be found in Joel Migdal, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). An impressive example of a state with many parallels to Republican China is Atatiirk's Turkey in the 1920s and 1930s: like Chiang Kai-shek, Atatirk proclaimed himself the head of an anti-imperialist movement of national liberation, and like the KMT in the 1930s, the Republican People's Party attempted to build a strong central state from the top down in urban areas, with little capacity and still less interest in radically restructuring the life of the Anatolian peasantry. widely read works, Lloyd Eastman's The Abortive Revolution and Hungmao Tien's Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, both dating from the early 1970s, stress the multiple weaknesses of the KMT Party and the government that it set up in 1927-28. Both these books single out phenomena that were widely seen to be prevalent in the 1930s and 1940s: endemic factionalism within the Kuomintang, the lack of an effective examination system or pro-actively functioning bureaucracy, the absence of the means or will to penetrate into the countryside and re-order rural relations, as well as the loss of revolutionary fervour and the increasing militarization of the regime. The conventional analysis of Republican government, as set out by Eastman and Tien, suggests at least implicitly that the seeds of Republican demise were planted long before the events of 1949. In this view, the Republic gave way to the People's Republic because it was institutionally weak, with its weaknesses variously illustrated by what it failed to accomplish in the 1930s and 1940s, contemporary critical opinion in the 1930s and 1940s, and of course, the harsh reality of ultimate defeat and exile in 1949. However, in working backwards from 1949, this conventional view ignores much that is common sense in any kind of comparative perspective. After all, most political systems exhibit fairly large gaps between what politicians say ought to be accomplished and what in fact is accomplished; serious criticism of either individuals or policy in the government is an inevitable feature of any regime with a less than totally controlled press; and all political systems produce informal groups (and the line that differentiates between tightly organized faction and informal groupings is, at best, ill-demarcated). When one turns to the governments of developing countries, many have a strong military component, are invaded with personalistic networks of various sorts, are institutionally weak, and have no particular correlation between civil service examinations and political stability. Further, the vast majority, even those who at some point in their political consolidation call themselves revolutionary, have neither the capacity nor the interest in radically restructuring rural relations.4 Intellectual and political trends in the 1980s, dramatically culminating in the end of the Cold War with the collapse of the Leninist regimes of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, have prompted a substantial requestioning of basic assumptions about China's 20th-century revolution. Scholars have increasingly gained access to archival materials that have made it possible to conduct intensive research on Republican China, and this research has revealed substantial continuities in the pre- and 4. An analysis of the widespread phenomenon of penetration of the state by society in developing countries can be found in Joel Migdal, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). An impressive example of a state with many parallels to Republican China is Atatiirk's Turkey in the 1920s and 1930s: like Chiang Kai-shek, Atatirk proclaimed himself the head of an anti-imperialist movement of national liberation, and like the KMT in the 1930s, the Republican People's Party attempted to build a strong central state from the top down in urban areas, with little capacity and still less interest in radically restructuring the life of the Anatolian peasantry. widely read works, Lloyd Eastman's The Abortive Revolution and Hungmao Tien's Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, both dating from the early 1970s, stress the multiple weaknesses of the KMT Party and the government that it set up in 1927-28. Both these books single out phenomena that were widely seen to be prevalent in the 1930s and 1940s: endemic factionalism within the Kuomintang, the lack of an effective examination system or pro-actively functioning bureaucracy, the absence of the means or will to penetrate into the countryside and re-order rural relations, as well as the loss of revolutionary fervour and the increasing militarization of the regime. The conventional analysis of Republican government, as set out by Eastman and Tien, suggests at least implicitly that the seeds of Republican demise were planted long before the events of 1949. In this view, the Republic gave way to the People's Republic because it was institutionally weak, with its weaknesses variously illustrated by what it failed to accomplish in the 1930s and 1940s, contemporary critical opinion in the 1930s and 1940s, and of course, the harsh reality of ultimate defeat and exile in 1949. However, in working backwards from 1949, this conventional view ignores much that is common sense in any kind of comparative perspective. After all, most political systems exhibit fairly large gaps between what politicians say ought to be accomplished and what in fact is accomplished; serious criticism of either individuals or policy in the government is an inevitable feature of any regime with a less than totally controlled press; and all political systems produce informal groups (and the line that differentiates between tightly organized faction and informal groupings is, at best, ill-demarcated). When one turns to the governments of developing countries, many have a strong military component, are invaded with personalistic networks of various sorts, are institutionally weak, and have no particular correlation between civil service examinations and political stability. Further, the vast majority, even those who at some point in their political consolidation call themselves revolutionary, have neither the capacity nor the interest in radically restructuring rural relations.4 Intellectual and political trends in the 1980s, dramatically culminating in the end of the Cold War with the collapse of the Leninist regimes of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, have prompted a substantial requestioning of basic assumptions about China's 20th-century revolution. Scholars have increasingly gained access to archival materials that have made it possible to conduct intensive research on Republican China, and this research has revealed substantial continuities in the pre- and 4. An analysis of the widespread phenomenon of penetration of the state by society in developing countries can be found in Joel Migdal, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). An impressive example of a state with many parallels to Republican China is Atatiirk's Turkey in the 1920s and 1930s: like Chiang Kai-shek, Atatirk proclaimed himself the head of an anti-imperialist movement of national liberation, and like the KMT in the 1930s, the Republican People's Party attempted to build a strong central state from the top down in urban areas, with little capacity and still less interest in radically restructuring the life of the Anatolian peasantry. widely read works, Lloyd Eastman's The Abortive Revolution and Hungmao Tien's Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, both dating from the early 1970s, stress the multiple weaknesses of the KMT Party and the government that it set up in 1927-28. Both these books single out phenomena that were widely seen to be prevalent in the 1930s and 1940s: endemic factionalism within the Kuomintang, the lack of an effective examination system or pro-actively functioning bureaucracy, the absence of the means or will to penetrate into the countryside and re-order rural relations, as well as the loss of revolutionary fervour and the increasing militarization of the regime. The conventional analysis of Republican government, as set out by Eastman and Tien, suggests at least implicitly that the seeds of Republican demise were planted long before the events of 1949. In this view, the Republic gave way to the People's Republic because it was institutionally weak, with its weaknesses variously illustrated by what it failed to accomplish in the 1930s and 1940s, contemporary critical opinion in the 1930s and 1940s, and of course, the harsh reality of ultimate defeat and exile in 1949. However, in working backwards from 1949, this conventional view ignores much that is common sense in any kind of comparative perspective. After all, most political systems exhibit fairly large gaps between what politicians say ought to be accomplished and what in fact is accomplished; serious criticism of either individuals or policy in the government is an inevitable feature of any regime with a less than totally controlled press; and all political systems produce informal groups (and the line that differentiates between tightly organized faction and informal groupings is, at best, ill-demarcated). When one turns to the governments of developing countries, many have a strong military component, are invaded with personalistic networks of various sorts, are institutionally weak, and have no particular correlation between civil service examinations and political stability. Further, the vast majority, even those who at some point in their political consolidation call themselves revolutionary, have neither the capacity nor the interest in radically restructuring rural relations.4 Intellectual and political trends in the 1980s, dramatically culminating in the end of the Cold War with the collapse of the Leninist regimes of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, have prompted a substantial requestioning of basic assumptions about China's 20th-century revolution. Scholars have increasingly gained access to archival materials that have made it possible to conduct intensive research on Republican China, and this research has revealed substantial continuities in the pre- and 4. An analysis of the widespread phenomenon of penetration of the state by society in developing countries can be found in Joel Migdal, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). An impressive example of a state with many parallels to Republican China is Atatiirk's Turkey in the 1920s and 1930s: like Chiang Kai-shek, Atatirk proclaimed himself the head of an anti-imperialist movement of national liberation, and like the KMT in the 1930s, the Republican People's Party attempted to build a strong central state from the top down in urban areas, with little capacity and still less interest in radically restructuring the life of the Anatolian peasantry. widely read works, Lloyd Eastman's The Abortive Revolution and Hungmao Tien's Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, both dating from the early 1970s, stress the multiple weaknesses of the KMT Party and the government that it set up in 1927-28. Both these books single out phenomena that were widely seen to be prevalent in the 1930s and 1940s: endemic factionalism within the Kuomintang, the lack of an effective examination system or pro-actively functioning bureaucracy, the absence of the means or will to penetrate into the countryside and re-order rural relations, as well as the loss of revolutionary fervour and the increasing militarization of the regime. The conventional analysis of Republican government, as set out by Eastman and Tien, suggests at least implicitly that the seeds of Republican demise were planted long before the events of 1949. In this view, the Republic gave way to the People's Republic because it was institutionally weak, with its weaknesses variously illustrated by what it failed to accomplish in the 1930s and 1940s, contemporary critical opinion in the 1930s and 1940s, and of course, the harsh reality of ultimate defeat and exile in 1949. However, in working backwards from 1949, this conventional view ignores much that is common sense in any kind of comparative perspective. After all, most political systems exhibit fairly large gaps between what politicians say ought to be accomplished and what in fact is accomplished; serious criticism of either individuals or policy in the government is an inevitable feature of any regime with a less than totally controlled press; and all political systems produce informal groups (and the line that differentiates between tightly organized faction and informal groupings is, at best, ill-demarcated). When one turns to the governments of developing countries, many have a strong military component, are invaded with personalistic networks of various sorts, are institutionally weak, and have no particular correlation between civil service examinations and political stability. Further, the vast majority, even those who at some point in their political consolidation call themselves revolutionary, have neither the capacity nor the interest in radically restructuring rural relations.4 Intellectual and political trends in the 1980s, dramatically culminating in the end of the Cold War with the collapse of the Leninist regimes of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, have prompted a substantial requestioning of basic assumptions about China's 20th-century revolution. Scholars have increasingly gained access to archival materials that have made it possible to conduct intensive research on Republican China, and this research has revealed substantial continuities in the pre- and 4. An analysis of the widespread phenomenon of penetration of the state by society in developing countries can be found in Joel Migdal, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). An impressive example of a state with many parallels to Republican China is Atatiirk's Turkey in the 1920s and 1930s: like Chiang Kai-shek, Atatirk proclaimed himself the head of an anti-imperialist movement of national liberation, and like the KMT in the 1930s, the Republican People's Party attempted to build a strong central state from the top down in urban areas, with little capacity and still less interest in radically restructuring the life of the Anatolian peasantry. widely read works, Lloyd Eastman's The Abortive Revolution and Hungmao Tien's Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, both dating from the early 1970s, stress the multiple weaknesses of the KMT Party and the government that it set up in 1927-28. Both these books single out phenomena that were widely seen to be prevalent in the 1930s and 1940s: endemic factionalism within the Kuomintang, the lack of an effective examination system or pro-actively functioning bureaucracy, the absence of the means or will to penetrate into the countryside and re-order rural relations, as well as the loss of revolutionary fervour and the increasing militarization of the regime. The conventional analysis of Republican government, as set out by Eastman and Tien, suggests at least implicitly that the seeds of Republican demise were planted long before the events of 1949. In this view, the Republic gave way to the People's Republic because it was institutionally weak, with its weaknesses variously illustrated by what it failed to accomplish in the 1930s and 1940s, contemporary critical opinion in the 1930s and 1940s, and of course, the harsh reality of ultimate defeat and exile in 1949. However, in working backwards from 1949, this conventional view ignores much that is common sense in any kind of comparative perspective. After all, most political systems exhibit fairly large gaps between what politicians say ought to be accomplished and what in fact is accomplished; serious criticism of either individuals or policy in the government is an inevitable feature of any regime with a less than totally controlled press; and all political systems produce informal groups (and the line that differentiates between tightly organized faction and informal groupings is, at best, ill-demarcated). When one turns to the governments of developing countries, many have a strong military component, are invaded with personalistic networks of various sorts, are institutionally weak, and have no particular correlation between civil service examinations and political stability. Further, the vast majority, even those who at some point in their political consolidation call themselves revolutionary, have neither the capacity nor the interest in radically restructuring rural relations.4 Intellectual and political trends in the 1980s, dramatically culminating in the end of the Cold War with the collapse of the Leninist regimes of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, have prompted a substantial requestioning of basic assumptions about China's 20th-century revolution. Scholars have increasingly gained access to archival materials that have made it possible to conduct intensive research on Republican China, and this research has revealed substantial continuities in the pre- and 4. An analysis of the widespread phenomenon of penetration of the state by society in developing countries can be found in Joel Migdal, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). An impressive example of a state with many parallels to Republican China is Atatiirk's Turkey in the 1920s and 1930s: like Chiang Kai-shek, Atatirk proclaimed himself the head of an anti-imperialist movement of national liberation, and like the KMT in the 1930s, the Republican People's Party attempted to build a strong central state from the top down in urban areas, with little capacity and still less interest in radically restructuring the life of the Anatolian peasantry. widely read works, Lloyd Eastman's The Abortive Revolution and Hungmao Tien's Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, both dating from the early 1970s, stress the multiple weaknesses of the KMT Party and the government that it set up in 1927-28. Both these books single out phenomena that were widely seen to be prevalent in the 1930s and 1940s: endemic factionalism within the Kuomintang, the lack of an effective examination system or pro-actively functioning bureaucracy, the absence of the means or will to penetrate into the countryside and re-order rural relations, as well as the loss of revolutionary fervour and the increasing militarization of the regime. The conventional analysis of Republican government, as set out by Eastman and Tien, suggests at least implicitly that the seeds of Republican demise were planted long before the events of 1949. In this view, the Republic gave way to the People's Republic because it was institutionally weak, with its weaknesses variously illustrated by what it failed to accomplish in the 1930s and 1940s, contemporary critical opinion in the 1930s and 1940s, and of course, the harsh reality of ultimate defeat and exile in 1949. However, in working backwards from 1949, this conventional view ignores much that is common sense in any kind of comparative perspective. After all, most political systems exhibit fairly large gaps between what politicians say ought to be accomplished and what in fact is accomplished; serious criticism of either individuals or policy in the government is an inevitable feature of any regime with a less than totally controlled press; and all political systems produce informal groups (and the line that differentiates between tightly organized faction and informal groupings is, at best, ill-demarcated). When one turns to the governments of developing countries, many have a strong military component, are invaded with personalistic networks of various sorts, are institutionally weak, and have no particular correlation between civil service examinations and political stability. Further, the vast majority, even those who at some point in their political consolidation call themselves revolutionary, have neither the capacity nor the interest in radically restructuring rural relations.4 Intellectual and political trends in the 1980s, dramatically culminating in the end of the Cold War with the collapse of the Leninist regimes of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, have prompted a substantial requestioning of basic assumptions about China's 20th-century revolution. Scholars have increasingly gained access to archival materials that have made it possible to conduct intensive research on Republican China, and this research has revealed substantial continuities in the pre- and 4. An analysis of the widespread phenomenon of penetration of the state by society in developing countries can be found in Joel Migdal, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). An impressive example of a state with many parallels to Republican China is Atatiirk's Turkey in the 1920s and 1930s: like Chiang Kai-shek, Atatirk proclaimed himself the head of an anti-imperialist movement of national liberation, and like the KMT in the 1930s, the Republican People's Party attempted to build a strong central state from the top down in urban areas, with little capacity and still less interest in radically restructuring the life of the Anatolian peasantry. widely read works, Lloyd Eastman's The Abortive Revolution and Hungmao Tien's Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, both dating from the early 1970s, stress the multiple weaknesses of the KMT Party and the government that it set up in 1927-28. Both these books single out phenomena that were widely seen to be prevalent in the 1930s and 1940s: endemic factionalism within the Kuomintang, the lack of an effective examination system or pro-actively functioning bureaucracy, the absence of the means or will to penetrate into the countryside and re-order rural relations, as well as the loss of revolutionary fervour and the increasing militarization of the regime. The conventional analysis of Republican government, as set out by Eastman and Tien, suggests at least implicitly that the seeds of Republican demise were planted long before the events of 1949. In this view, the Republic gave way to the People's Republic because it was institutionally weak, with its weaknesses variously illustrated by what it failed to accomplish in the 1930s and 1940s, contemporary critical opinion in the 1930s and 1940s, and of course, the harsh reality of ultimate defeat and exile in 1949. However, in working backwards from 1949, this conventional view ignores much that is common sense in any kind of comparative perspective. After all, most political systems exhibit fairly large gaps between what politicians say ought to be accomplished and what in fact is accomplished; serious criticism of either individuals or policy in the government is an inevitable feature of any regime with a less than totally controlled press; and all political systems produce informal groups (and the line that differentiates between tightly organized faction and informal groupings is, at best, ill-demarcated). When one turns to the governments of developing countries, many have a strong military component, are invaded with personalistic networks of various sorts, are institutionally weak, and have no particular correlation between civil service examinations and political stability. Further, the vast majority, even those who at some point in their political consolidation call themselves revolutionary, have neither the capacity nor the interest in radically restructuring rural relations.4 Intellectual and political trends in the 1980s, dramatically culminating in the end of the Cold War with the collapse of the Leninist regimes of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, have prompted a substantial requestioning of basic assumptions about China's 20th-century revolution. Scholars have increasingly gained access to archival materials that have made it possible to conduct intensive research on Republican China, and this research has revealed substantial continuities in the pre- and 4. An analysis of the widespread phenomenon of penetration of the state by society in developing countries can be found in Joel Migdal, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). An impressive example of a state with many parallels to Republican China is Atatiirk's Turkey in the 1920s and 1930s: like Chiang Kai-shek, Atatirk proclaimed himself the head of an anti-imperialist movement of national liberation, and like the KMT in the 1930s, the Republican People's Party attempted to build a strong central state from the top down in urban areas, with little capacity and still less interest in radically restructuring the life of the Anatolian peasantry. widely read works, Lloyd Eastman's The Abortive Revolution and Hungmao Tien's Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, both dating from the early 1970s, stress the multiple weaknesses of the KMT Party and the government that it set up in 1927-28. Both these books single out phenomena that were widely seen to be prevalent in the 1930s and 1940s: endemic factionalism within the Kuomintang, the lack of an effective examination system or pro-actively functioning bureaucracy, the absence of the means or will to penetrate into the countryside and re-order rural relations, as well as the loss of revolutionary fervour and the increasing militarization of the regime. The conventional analysis of Republican government, as set out by Eastman and Tien, suggests at least implicitly that the seeds of Republican demise were planted long before the events of 1949. In this view, the Republic gave way to the People's Republic because it was institutionally weak, with its weaknesses variously illustrated by what it failed to accomplish in the 1930s and 1940s, contemporary critical opinion in the 1930s and 1940s, and of course, the harsh reality of ultimate defeat and exile in 1949. However, in working backwards from 1949, this conventional view ignores much that is common sense in any kind of comparative perspective. After all, most political systems exhibit fairly large gaps between what politicians say ought to be accomplished and what in fact is accomplished; serious criticism of either individuals or policy in the government is an inevitable feature of any regime with a less than totally controlled press; and all political systems produce informal groups (and the line that differentiates between tightly organized faction and informal groupings is, at best, ill-demarcated). When one turns to the governments of developing countries, many have a strong military component, are invaded with personalistic networks of various sorts, are institutionally weak, and have no particular correlation between civil service examinations and political stability. Further, the vast majority, even those who at some point in their political consolidation call themselves revolutionary, have neither the capacity nor the interest in radically restructuring rural relations.4 Intellectual and political trends in the 1980s, dramatically culminating in the end of the Cold War with the collapse of the Leninist regimes of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, have prompted a substantial requestioning of basic assumptions about China's 20th-century revolution. Scholars have increasingly gained access to archival materials that have made it possible to conduct intensive research on Republican China, and this research has revealed substantial continuities in the pre- and 4. An analysis of the widespread phenomenon of penetration of the state by society in developing countries can be found in Joel Migdal, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). An impressive example of a state with many parallels to Republican China is Atatiirk's Turkey in the 1920s and 1930s: like Chiang Kai-shek, Atatirk proclaimed himself the head of an anti-imperialist movement of national liberation, and like the KMT in the 1930s, the Republican People's Party attempted to build a strong central state from the top down in urban areas, with little capacity and still less interest in radically restructuring the life of the Anatolian peasantry. widely read works, Lloyd Eastman's The Abortive Revolution and Hungmao Tien's Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, both dating from the early 1970s, stress the multiple weaknesses of the KMT Party and the government that it set up in 1927-28. Both these books single out phenomena that were widely seen to be prevalent in the 1930s and 1940s: endemic factionalism within the Kuomintang, the lack of an effective examination system or pro-actively functioning bureaucracy, the absence of the means or will to penetrate into the countryside and re-order rural relations, as well as the loss of revolutionary fervour and the increasing militarization of the regime. The conventional analysis of Republican government, as set out by Eastman and Tien, suggests at least implicitly that the seeds of Republican demise were planted long before the events of 1949. In this view, the Republic gave way to the People's Republic because it was institutionally weak, with its weaknesses variously illustrated by what it failed to accomplish in the 1930s and 1940s, contemporary critical opinion in the 1930s and 1940s, and of course, the harsh reality of ultimate defeat and exile in 1949. However, in working backwards from 1949, this conventional view ignores much that is common sense in any kind of comparative perspective. After all, most political systems exhibit fairly large gaps between what politicians say ought to be accomplished and what in fact is accomplished; serious criticism of either individuals or policy in the government is an inevitable feature of any regime with a less than totally controlled press; and all political systems produce informal groups (and the line that differentiates between tightly organized faction and informal groupings is, at best, ill-demarcated). When one turns to the governments of developing countries, many have a strong military component, are invaded with personalistic networks of various sorts, are institutionally weak, and have no particular correlation between civil service examinations and political stability. Further, the vast majority, even those who at some point in their political consolidation call themselves revolutionary, have neither the capacity nor the interest in radically restructuring rural relations.4 Intellectual and political trends in the 1980s, dramatically culminating in the end of the Cold War with the collapse of the Leninist regimes of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, have prompted a substantial requestioning of basic assumptions about China's 20th-century revolution. Scholars have increasingly gained access to archival materials that have made it possible to conduct intensive research on Republican China, and this research has revealed substantial continuities in the pre- and 4. An analysis of the widespread phenomenon of penetration of the state by society in developing countries can be found in Joel Migdal, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). An impressive example of a state with many parallels to Republican China is Atatiirk's Turkey in the 1920s and 1930s: like Chiang Kai-shek, Atatirk proclaimed himself the head of an anti-imperialist movement of national liberation, and like the KMT in the 1930s, the Republican People's Party attempted to build a strong central state from the top down in urban areas, with little capacity and still less interest in radically restructuring the life of the Anatolian peasantry. widely read works, Lloyd Eastman's The Abortive Revolution and Hungmao Tien's Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, both dating from the early 1970s, stress the multiple weaknesses of the KMT Party and the government that it set up in 1927-28. Both these books single out phenomena that were widely seen to be prevalent in the 1930s and 1940s: endemic factionalism within the Kuomintang, the lack of an effective examination system or pro-actively functioning bureaucracy, the absence of the means or will to penetrate into the countryside and re-order rural relations, as well as the loss of revolutionary fervour and the increasing militarization of the regime. The conventional analysis of Republican government, as set out by Eastman and Tien, suggests at least implicitly that the seeds of Republican demise were planted long before the events of 1949. In this view, the Republic gave way to the People's Republic because it was institutionally weak, with its weaknesses variously illustrated by what it failed to accomplish in the 1930s and 1940s, contemporary critical opinion in the 1930s and 1940s, and of course, the harsh reality of ultimate defeat and exile in 1949. However, in working backwards from 1949, this conventional view ignores much that is common sense in any kind of comparative perspective. After all, most political systems exhibit fairly large gaps between what politicians say ought to be accomplished and what in fact is accomplished; serious criticism of either individuals or policy in the government is an inevitable feature of any regime with a less than totally controlled press; and all political systems produce informal groups (and the line that differentiates between tightly organized faction and informal groupings is, at best, ill-demarcated). When one turns to the governments of developing countries, many have a strong military component, are invaded with personalistic networks of various sorts, are institutionally weak, and have no particular correlation between civil service examinations and political stability. Further, the vast majority, even those who at some point in their political consolidation call themselves revolutionary, have neither the capacity nor the interest in radically restructuring rural relations.4 Intellectual and political trends in the 1980s, dramatically culminating in the end of the Cold War with the collapse of the Leninist regimes of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, have prompted a substantial requestioning of basic assumptions about China's 20th-century revolution. Scholars have increasingly gained access to archival materials that have made it possible to conduct intensive research on Republican China, and this research has revealed substantial continuities in the pre- and 4. An analysis of the widespread phenomenon of penetration of the state by society in developing countries can be found in Joel Migdal, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). An impressive example of a state with many parallels to Republican China is Atatiirk's Turkey in the 1920s and 1930s: like Chiang Kai-shek, Atatirk proclaimed himself the head of an anti-imperialist movement of national liberation, and like the KMT in the 1930s, the Republican People's Party attempted to build a strong central state from the top down in urban areas, with little capacity and still less interest in radically restructuring the life of the Anatolian peasantry. widely read works, Lloyd Eastman's The Abortive Revolution and Hungmao Tien's Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, both dating from the early 1970s, stress the multiple weaknesses of the KMT Party and the government that it set up in 1927-28. Both these books single out phenomena that were widely seen to be prevalent in the 1930s and 1940s: endemic factionalism within the Kuomintang, the lack of an effective examination system or pro-actively functioning bureaucracy, the absence of the means or will to penetrate into the countryside and re-order rural relations, as well as the loss of revolutionary fervour and the increasing militarization of the regime. The conventional analysis of Republican government, as set out by Eastman and Tien, suggests at least implicitly that the seeds of Republican demise were planted long before the events of 1949. In this view, the Republic gave way to the People's Republic because it was institutionally weak, with its weaknesses variously illustrated by what it failed to accomplish in the 1930s and 1940s, contemporary critical opinion in the 1930s and 1940s, and of course, the harsh reality of ultimate defeat and exile in 1949. However, in working backwards from 1949, this conventional view ignores much that is common sense in any kind of comparative perspective. After all, most political systems exhibit fairly large gaps between what politicians say ought to be accomplished and what in fact is accomplished; serious criticism of either individuals or policy in the government is an inevitable feature of any regime with a less than totally controlled press; and all political systems produce informal groups (and the line that differentiates between tightly organized faction and informal groupings is, at best, ill-demarcated). When one turns to the governments of developing countries, many have a strong military component, are invaded with personalistic networks of various sorts, are institutionally weak, and have no particular correlation between civil service examinations and political stability. Further, the vast majority, even those who at some point in their political consolidation call themselves revolutionary, have neither the capacity nor the interest in radically restructuring rural relations.4 Intellectual and political trends in the 1980s, dramatically culminating in the end of the Cold War with the collapse of the Leninist regimes of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, have prompted a substantial requestioning of basic assumptions about China's 20th-century revolution. Scholars have increasingly gained access to archival materials that have made it possible to conduct intensive research on Republican China, and this research has revealed substantial continuities in the pre- and 4. An analysis of the widespread phenomenon of penetration of the state by society in developing countries can be found in Joel Migdal, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). An impressive example of a state with many parallels to Republican China is Atatiirk's Turkey in the 1920s and 1930s: like Chiang Kai-shek, Atatirk proclaimed himself the head of an anti-imperialist movement of national liberation, and like the KMT in the 1930s, the Republican People's Party attempted to build a strong central state from the top down in urban areas, with little capacity and still less interest in radically restructuring the life of the Anatolian peasantry. widely read works, Lloyd Eastman's The Abortive Revolution and Hungmao Tien's Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, both dating from the early 1970s, stress the multiple weaknesses of the KMT Party and the government that it set up in 1927-28. Both these books single out phenomena that were widely seen to be prevalent in the 1930s and 1940s: endemic factionalism within the Kuomintang, the lack of an effective examination system or pro-actively functioning bureaucracy, the absence of the means or will to penetrate into the countryside and re-order rural relations, as well as the loss of revolutionary fervour and the increasing militarization of the regime. The conventional analysis of Republican government, as set out by Eastman and Tien, suggests at least implicitly that the seeds of Republican demise were planted long before the events of 1949. In this view, the Republic gave way to the People's Republic because it was institutionally weak, with its weaknesses variously illustrated by what it failed to accomplish in the 1930s and 1940s, contemporary critical opinion in the 1930s and 1940s, and of course, the harsh reality of ultimate defeat and exile in 1949. However, in working backwards from 1949, this conventional view ignores much that is common sense in any kind of comparative perspective. After all, most political systems exhibit fairly large gaps between what politicians say ought to be accomplished and what in fact is accomplished; serious criticism of either individuals or policy in the government is an inevitable feature of any regime with a less than totally controlled press; and all political systems produce informal groups (and the line that differentiates between tightly organized faction and informal groupings is, at best, ill-demarcated). When one turns to the governments of developing countries, many have a strong military component, are invaded with personalistic networks of various sorts, are institutionally weak, and have no particular correlation between civil service examinations and political stability. Further, the vast majority, even those who at some point in their political consolidation call themselves revolutionary, have neither the capacity nor the interest in radically restructuring rural relations.4 Intellectual and political trends in the 1980s, dramatically culminating in the end of the Cold War with the collapse of the Leninist regimes of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, have prompted a substantial requestioning of basic assumptions about China's 20th-century revolution. Scholars have increasingly gained access to archival materials that have made it possible to conduct intensive research on Republican China, and this research has revealed substantial continuities in the pre- and 4. An analysis of the widespread phenomenon of penetration of the state by society in developing countries can be found in Joel Migdal, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). An impressive example of a state with many parallels to Republican China is Atatiirk's Turkey in the 1920s and 1930s: like Chiang Kai-shek, Atatirk proclaimed himself the head of an anti-imperialist movement of national liberation, and like the KMT in the 1930s, the Republican People's Party attempted to build a strong central state from the top down in urban areas, with little capacity and still less interest in radically restructuring the life of the Anatolian peasantry. widely read works, Lloyd Eastman's The Abortive Revolution and Hungmao Tien's Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, both dating from the early 1970s, stress the multiple weaknesses of the KMT Party and the government that it set up in 1927-28. Both these books single out phenomena that were widely seen to be prevalent in the 1930s and 1940s: endemic factionalism within the Kuomintang, the lack of an effective examination system or pro-actively functioning bureaucracy, the absence of the means or will to penetrate into the countryside and re-order rural relations, as well as the loss of revolutionary fervour and the increasing militarization of the regime. The conventional analysis of Republican government, as set out by Eastman and Tien, suggests at least implicitly that the seeds of Republican demise were planted long before the events of 1949. In this view, the Republic gave way to the People's Republic because it was institutionally weak, with its weaknesses variously illustrated by what it failed to accomplish in the 1930s and 1940s, contemporary critical opinion in the 1930s and 1940s, and of course, the harsh reality of ultimate defeat and exile in 1949. However, in working backwards from 1949, this conventional view ignores much that is common sense in any kind of comparative perspective. After all, most political systems exhibit fairly large gaps between what politicians say ought to be accomplished and what in fact is accomplished; serious criticism of either individuals or policy in the government is an inevitable feature of any regime with a less than totally controlled press; and all political systems produce informal groups (and the line that differentiates between tightly organized faction and informal groupings is, at best, ill-demarcated). When one turns to the governments of developing countries, many have a strong military component, are invaded with personalistic networks of various sorts, are institutionally weak, and have no particular correlation between civil service examinations and political stability. Further, the vast majority, even those who at some point in their political consolidation call themselves revolutionary, have neither the capacity nor the interest in radically restructuring rural relations.4 Intellectual and political trends in the 1980s, dramatically culminating in the end of the Cold War with the collapse of the Leninist regimes of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, have prompted a substantial requestioning of basic assumptions about China's 20th-century revolution. Scholars have increasingly gained access to archival materials that have made it possible to conduct intensive research on Republican China, and this research has revealed substantial continuities in the pre- and 4. An analysis of the widespread phenomenon of penetration of the state by society in developing countries can be found in Joel Migdal, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). An impressive example of a state with many parallels to Republican China is Atatiirk's Turkey in the 1920s and 1930s: like Chiang Kai-shek, Atatirk proclaimed himself the head of an anti-imperialist movement of national liberation, and like the KMT in the 1930s, the Republican People's Party attempted to build a strong central state from the top down in urban areas, with little capacity and still less interest in radically restructuring the life of the Anatolian peasantry
The Evolution of Republican Government 331 post-1949 periods.As in addition the People's Republic has renounced its earlier radical vision of revolution,and the post-1986 political liberaliza- tion in Taiwan proceeds,the year 1949 increasingly seems to be less of the all-encompassing prism through which all perspectives on the preced- ing Republican period are necessarily and inevitably refracted. Research on Republican-era government and administration is now beginning to shift away from explaining the outcome of the civil war in terms of the KMT regime's undeniable weaknesses,and towards evaluat- ing what Republican governments attempted to do,given the context and constraints of their own times,to overcome those weaknesses.Current work has just begun to scratch the surface,and many basic questions about Republican-era government,particularly those concerning the relations between the different levels of central,provincial and local government,remain unanswered.This article concentrates on central government in the Republican period and develops three preliminary themes:that despite changes in regime,Republican-era governments were characterized by a surprising consistency in terms of basic agenda and constraints on action;that this agenda pushed all Republican-era govern- ments to attempt to build institutional capacity rapidly;and that to this end,Republican-era governments experimented widely and intensively with models drawn from elsewhere,recombined these models with long-standing Chinese norms of statecraft and governance and produced a wide variety of new hybrids-often only partially reconcilable-in different sectors of the central government. Executive Agendas and Institutional Weaknesses Despite obvious and important changes in regime and government organization-from presidential dictatorship in the 1910s,to the Beiyang governments of the 1920s,to the ascendancy of the KMT Party and its National Government in the late 1920s and 1930s -the executives of Republican-era governments were characterized by a quite remarkable consistency in agendas and goals.They were also constrained in achiev- ing those goals by an equally consistent set of structural constraints. Government in the Republican era inherited substantially intact the late Qing xinzheng (New Government)agenda which held that China de- pended on a vigorous central state to lead the way out of international 5.This shift in emphasis began in the early to mid-1980s,with the publication of William Kirby's Germany and Republican China (Stanford:Stanford University Press,1984). Preliminary research on my forthcoming book,Strong Institutions in Weak Polities: Personnel Policies and State Building in China.1927-40(Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1998)was conducted in 1987-89.At present there is a significant cadre of graduate students from programmes in history and political science at Harvard,Berkeley,and Washington University.St.Louis who are in some stage of writing or research on Ph.D.dissertations that address such different aspects of Republican government as constitution-drafting,the KMT's efforts to combat low-level corruption,and water conservancy.Even within the People's Republic,scholars are also beginning to reconsider the Republican period in a more sympathetic light:Nanjing University Press began publication of Minguo yanjiu(Studies on Republican China)with an editorial board of members from China and abroad,in summer 1995
The Evolution of Republican Government post-1949 periods. As in addition the People's Republic has renounced its earlier radical vision of revolution, and the post-1986 political liberalization in Taiwan proceeds, the year 1949 increasingly seems to be less of the all-encompassing prism through which all perspectives on the preceding Republican period are necessarily and inevitably refracted. Research on Republican-era government and administration is now beginning to shift away from explaining the outcome of the civil war in terms of the KMT regime's undeniable weaknesses, and towards evaluating what Republican governments attempted to do, given the context and constraints of their own times, to overcome those weaknesses.5 Current work has just begun to scratch the surface, and many basic questions about Republican-era government, particularly those concerning the relations between the different levels of central, provincial and local government, remain unanswered. This article concentrates on central government in the Republican period and develops three preliminary themes: that despite changes in regime, Republican-era governments were characterized by a surprising consistency in terms of basic agenda and constraints on action; that this agenda pushed all Republican-era governments to attempt to build institutional capacity rapidly; and that to this end, Republican-era governments experimented widely and intensively with models drawn from elsewhere, recombined these models with long-standing Chinese norms of statecraft and governance and produced a wide variety of new hybrids - often only partially reconcilable - in different sectors of the central government. Executive Agendas and Institutional Weaknesses Despite obvious and important changes in regime and government organization - from presidential dictatorship in the 1910s, to the Beiyang governments of the 1920s, to the ascendancy of the KMT Party and its National Government in the late 1920s and 1930s - the executives of Republican-era governments were characterized by a quite remarkable consistency in agendas and goals. They were also constrained in achieving those goals by an equally consistent set of structural constraints. Government in the Republican era inherited substantially intact the late Qing xinzheng (New Government) agenda which held that China depended on a vigorous central state to lead the way out of international 5. This shift in emphasis began in the early to mid-1980s, with the publication of William Kirby's Germany and Republican China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984). Preliminary research on my forthcoming book, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities: Personnel Policies and State Building in China, 1927-40 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) was conducted in 1987-89. At present there is a significant cadre of graduate students from programmes in history and political science at Harvard, Berkeley, and Washington University, St. Louis who are in some stage of writing or research on Ph.D. dissertations that address such different aspects of Republican government as constitution-drafting, the KMT' s efforts to combat low-level corruption, and water conservancy. Even within the People's Republic, scholars are also beginning to reconsider the Republican period in a more sympathetic light: Nanjing University Press began publication of Minguo yanjiu (Studies on Republican China) with an editorial board of members from China and abroad, in summer 1995. post-1949 periods. As in addition the People's Republic has renounced its earlier radical vision of revolution, and the post-1986 political liberalization in Taiwan proceeds, the year 1949 increasingly seems to be less of the all-encompassing prism through which all perspectives on the preceding Republican period are necessarily and inevitably refracted. Research on Republican-era government and administration is now beginning to shift away from explaining the outcome of the civil war in terms of the KMT regime's undeniable weaknesses, and towards evaluating what Republican governments attempted to do, given the context and constraints of their own times, to overcome those weaknesses.5 Current work has just begun to scratch the surface, and many basic questions about Republican-era government, particularly those concerning the relations between the different levels of central, provincial and local government, remain unanswered. This article concentrates on central government in the Republican period and develops three preliminary themes: that despite changes in regime, Republican-era governments were characterized by a surprising consistency in terms of basic agenda and constraints on action; that this agenda pushed all Republican-era governments to attempt to build institutional capacity rapidly; and that to this end, Republican-era governments experimented widely and intensively with models drawn from elsewhere, recombined these models with long-standing Chinese norms of statecraft and governance and produced a wide variety of new hybrids - often only partially reconcilable - in different sectors of the central government. Executive Agendas and Institutional Weaknesses Despite obvious and important changes in regime and government organization - from presidential dictatorship in the 1910s, to the Beiyang governments of the 1920s, to the ascendancy of the KMT Party and its National Government in the late 1920s and 1930s - the executives of Republican-era governments were characterized by a quite remarkable consistency in agendas and goals. They were also constrained in achieving those goals by an equally consistent set of structural constraints. Government in the Republican era inherited substantially intact the late Qing xinzheng (New Government) agenda which held that China depended on a vigorous central state to lead the way out of international 5. This shift in emphasis began in the early to mid-1980s, with the publication of William Kirby's Germany and Republican China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984). Preliminary research on my forthcoming book, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities: Personnel Policies and State Building in China, 1927-40 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) was conducted in 1987-89. At present there is a significant cadre of graduate students from programmes in history and political science at Harvard, Berkeley, and Washington University, St. Louis who are in some stage of writing or research on Ph.D. dissertations that address such different aspects of Republican government as constitution-drafting, the KMT' s efforts to combat low-level corruption, and water conservancy. Even within the People's Republic, scholars are also beginning to reconsider the Republican period in a more sympathetic light: Nanjing University Press began publication of Minguo yanjiu (Studies on Republican China) with an editorial board of members from China and abroad, in summer 1995. post-1949 periods. As in addition the People's Republic has renounced its earlier radical vision of revolution, and the post-1986 political liberalization in Taiwan proceeds, the year 1949 increasingly seems to be less of the all-encompassing prism through which all perspectives on the preceding Republican period are necessarily and inevitably refracted. Research on Republican-era government and administration is now beginning to shift away from explaining the outcome of the civil war in terms of the KMT regime's undeniable weaknesses, and towards evaluating what Republican governments attempted to do, given the context and constraints of their own times, to overcome those weaknesses.5 Current work has just begun to scratch the surface, and many basic questions about Republican-era government, particularly those concerning the relations between the different levels of central, provincial and local government, remain unanswered. This article concentrates on central government in the Republican period and develops three preliminary themes: that despite changes in regime, Republican-era governments were characterized by a surprising consistency in terms of basic agenda and constraints on action; that this agenda pushed all Republican-era governments to attempt to build institutional capacity rapidly; and that to this end, Republican-era governments experimented widely and intensively with models drawn from elsewhere, recombined these models with long-standing Chinese norms of statecraft and governance and produced a wide variety of new hybrids - often only partially reconcilable - in different sectors of the central government. Executive Agendas and Institutional Weaknesses Despite obvious and important changes in regime and government organization - from presidential dictatorship in the 1910s, to the Beiyang governments of the 1920s, to the ascendancy of the KMT Party and its National Government in the late 1920s and 1930s - the executives of Republican-era governments were characterized by a quite remarkable consistency in agendas and goals. They were also constrained in achieving those goals by an equally consistent set of structural constraints. Government in the Republican era inherited substantially intact the late Qing xinzheng (New Government) agenda which held that China depended on a vigorous central state to lead the way out of international 5. This shift in emphasis began in the early to mid-1980s, with the publication of William Kirby's Germany and Republican China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984). Preliminary research on my forthcoming book, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities: Personnel Policies and State Building in China, 1927-40 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) was conducted in 1987-89. At present there is a significant cadre of graduate students from programmes in history and political science at Harvard, Berkeley, and Washington University, St. Louis who are in some stage of writing or research on Ph.D. dissertations that address such different aspects of Republican government as constitution-drafting, the KMT' s efforts to combat low-level corruption, and water conservancy. Even within the People's Republic, scholars are also beginning to reconsider the Republican period in a more sympathetic light: Nanjing University Press began publication of Minguo yanjiu (Studies on Republican China) with an editorial board of members from China and abroad, in summer 1995. post-1949 periods. As in addition the People's Republic has renounced its earlier radical vision of revolution, and the post-1986 political liberalization in Taiwan proceeds, the year 1949 increasingly seems to be less of the all-encompassing prism through which all perspectives on the preceding Republican period are necessarily and inevitably refracted. Research on Republican-era government and administration is now beginning to shift away from explaining the outcome of the civil war in terms of the KMT regime's undeniable weaknesses, and towards evaluating what Republican governments attempted to do, given the context and constraints of their own times, to overcome those weaknesses.5 Current work has just begun to scratch the surface, and many basic questions about Republican-era government, particularly those concerning the relations between the different levels of central, provincial and local government, remain unanswered. This article concentrates on central government in the Republican period and develops three preliminary themes: that despite changes in regime, Republican-era governments were characterized by a surprising consistency in terms of basic agenda and constraints on action; that this agenda pushed all Republican-era governments to attempt to build institutional capacity rapidly; and that to this end, Republican-era governments experimented widely and intensively with models drawn from elsewhere, recombined these models with long-standing Chinese norms of statecraft and governance and produced a wide variety of new hybrids - often only partially reconcilable - in different sectors of the central government. Executive Agendas and Institutional Weaknesses Despite obvious and important changes in regime and government organization - from presidential dictatorship in the 1910s, to the Beiyang governments of the 1920s, to the ascendancy of the KMT Party and its National Government in the late 1920s and 1930s - the executives of Republican-era governments were characterized by a quite remarkable consistency in agendas and goals. They were also constrained in achieving those goals by an equally consistent set of structural constraints. Government in the Republican era inherited substantially intact the late Qing xinzheng (New Government) agenda which held that China depended on a vigorous central state to lead the way out of international 5. This shift in emphasis began in the early to mid-1980s, with the publication of William Kirby's Germany and Republican China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984). Preliminary research on my forthcoming book, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities: Personnel Policies and State Building in China, 1927-40 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) was conducted in 1987-89. At present there is a significant cadre of graduate students from programmes in history and political science at Harvard, Berkeley, and Washington University, St. Louis who are in some stage of writing or research on Ph.D. dissertations that address such different aspects of Republican government as constitution-drafting, the KMT' s efforts to combat low-level corruption, and water conservancy. Even within the People's Republic, scholars are also beginning to reconsider the Republican period in a more sympathetic light: Nanjing University Press began publication of Minguo yanjiu (Studies on Republican China) with an editorial board of members from China and abroad, in summer 1995. post-1949 periods. As in addition the People's Republic has renounced its earlier radical vision of revolution, and the post-1986 political liberalization in Taiwan proceeds, the year 1949 increasingly seems to be less of the all-encompassing prism through which all perspectives on the preceding Republican period are necessarily and inevitably refracted. Research on Republican-era government and administration is now beginning to shift away from explaining the outcome of the civil war in terms of the KMT regime's undeniable weaknesses, and towards evaluating what Republican governments attempted to do, given the context and constraints of their own times, to overcome those weaknesses.5 Current work has just begun to scratch the surface, and many basic questions about Republican-era government, particularly those concerning the relations between the different levels of central, provincial and local government, remain unanswered. This article concentrates on central government in the Republican period and develops three preliminary themes: that despite changes in regime, Republican-era governments were characterized by a surprising consistency in terms of basic agenda and constraints on action; that this agenda pushed all Republican-era governments to attempt to build institutional capacity rapidly; and that to this end, Republican-era governments experimented widely and intensively with models drawn from elsewhere, recombined these models with long-standing Chinese norms of statecraft and governance and produced a wide variety of new hybrids - often only partially reconcilable - in different sectors of the central government. Executive Agendas and Institutional Weaknesses Despite obvious and important changes in regime and government organization - from presidential dictatorship in the 1910s, to the Beiyang governments of the 1920s, to the ascendancy of the KMT Party and its National Government in the late 1920s and 1930s - the executives of Republican-era governments were characterized by a quite remarkable consistency in agendas and goals. They were also constrained in achieving those goals by an equally consistent set of structural constraints. Government in the Republican era inherited substantially intact the late Qing xinzheng (New Government) agenda which held that China depended on a vigorous central state to lead the way out of international 5. This shift in emphasis began in the early to mid-1980s, with the publication of William Kirby's Germany and Republican China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984). Preliminary research on my forthcoming book, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities: Personnel Policies and State Building in China, 1927-40 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) was conducted in 1987-89. At present there is a significant cadre of graduate students from programmes in history and political science at Harvard, Berkeley, and Washington University, St. Louis who are in some stage of writing or research on Ph.D. dissertations that address such different aspects of Republican government as constitution-drafting, the KMT' s efforts to combat low-level corruption, and water conservancy. Even within the People's Republic, scholars are also beginning to reconsider the Republican period in a more sympathetic light: Nanjing University Press began publication of Minguo yanjiu (Studies on Republican China) with an editorial board of members from China and abroad, in summer 1995. post-1949 periods. As in addition the People's Republic has renounced its earlier radical vision of revolution, and the post-1986 political liberalization in Taiwan proceeds, the year 1949 increasingly seems to be less of the all-encompassing prism through which all perspectives on the preceding Republican period are necessarily and inevitably refracted. Research on Republican-era government and administration is now beginning to shift away from explaining the outcome of the civil war in terms of the KMT regime's undeniable weaknesses, and towards evaluating what Republican governments attempted to do, given the context and constraints of their own times, to overcome those weaknesses.5 Current work has just begun to scratch the surface, and many basic questions about Republican-era government, particularly those concerning the relations between the different levels of central, provincial and local government, remain unanswered. This article concentrates on central government in the Republican period and develops three preliminary themes: that despite changes in regime, Republican-era governments were characterized by a surprising consistency in terms of basic agenda and constraints on action; that this agenda pushed all Republican-era governments to attempt to build institutional capacity rapidly; and that to this end, Republican-era governments experimented widely and intensively with models drawn from elsewhere, recombined these models with long-standing Chinese norms of statecraft and governance and produced a wide variety of new hybrids - often only partially reconcilable - in different sectors of the central government. Executive Agendas and Institutional Weaknesses Despite obvious and important changes in regime and government organization - from presidential dictatorship in the 1910s, to the Beiyang governments of the 1920s, to the ascendancy of the KMT Party and its National Government in the late 1920s and 1930s - the executives of Republican-era governments were characterized by a quite remarkable consistency in agendas and goals. They were also constrained in achieving those goals by an equally consistent set of structural constraints. Government in the Republican era inherited substantially intact the late Qing xinzheng (New Government) agenda which held that China depended on a vigorous central state to lead the way out of international 5. This shift in emphasis began in the early to mid-1980s, with the publication of William Kirby's Germany and Republican China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984). Preliminary research on my forthcoming book, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities: Personnel Policies and State Building in China, 1927-40 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) was conducted in 1987-89. At present there is a significant cadre of graduate students from programmes in history and political science at Harvard, Berkeley, and Washington University, St. Louis who are in some stage of writing or research on Ph.D. dissertations that address such different aspects of Republican government as constitution-drafting, the KMT' s efforts to combat low-level corruption, and water conservancy. Even within the People's Republic, scholars are also beginning to reconsider the Republican period in a more sympathetic light: Nanjing University Press began publication of Minguo yanjiu (Studies on Republican China) with an editorial board of members from China and abroad, in summer 1995. post-1949 periods. As in addition the People's Republic has renounced its earlier radical vision of revolution, and the post-1986 political liberalization in Taiwan proceeds, the year 1949 increasingly seems to be less of the all-encompassing prism through which all perspectives on the preceding Republican period are necessarily and inevitably refracted. Research on Republican-era government and administration is now beginning to shift away from explaining the outcome of the civil war in terms of the KMT regime's undeniable weaknesses, and towards evaluating what Republican governments attempted to do, given the context and constraints of their own times, to overcome those weaknesses.5 Current work has just begun to scratch the surface, and many basic questions about Republican-era government, particularly those concerning the relations between the different levels of central, provincial and local government, remain unanswered. This article concentrates on central government in the Republican period and develops three preliminary themes: that despite changes in regime, Republican-era governments were characterized by a surprising consistency in terms of basic agenda and constraints on action; that this agenda pushed all Republican-era governments to attempt to build institutional capacity rapidly; and that to this end, Republican-era governments experimented widely and intensively with models drawn from elsewhere, recombined these models with long-standing Chinese norms of statecraft and governance and produced a wide variety of new hybrids - often only partially reconcilable - in different sectors of the central government. Executive Agendas and Institutional Weaknesses Despite obvious and important changes in regime and government organization - from presidential dictatorship in the 1910s, to the Beiyang governments of the 1920s, to the ascendancy of the KMT Party and its National Government in the late 1920s and 1930s - the executives of Republican-era governments were characterized by a quite remarkable consistency in agendas and goals. They were also constrained in achieving those goals by an equally consistent set of structural constraints. Government in the Republican era inherited substantially intact the late Qing xinzheng (New Government) agenda which held that China depended on a vigorous central state to lead the way out of international 5. This shift in emphasis began in the early to mid-1980s, with the publication of William Kirby's Germany and Republican China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984). Preliminary research on my forthcoming book, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities: Personnel Policies and State Building in China, 1927-40 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) was conducted in 1987-89. At present there is a significant cadre of graduate students from programmes in history and political science at Harvard, Berkeley, and Washington University, St. Louis who are in some stage of writing or research on Ph.D. dissertations that address such different aspects of Republican government as constitution-drafting, the KMT' s efforts to combat low-level corruption, and water conservancy. Even within the People's Republic, scholars are also beginning to reconsider the Republican period in a more sympathetic light: Nanjing University Press began publication of Minguo yanjiu (Studies on Republican China) with an editorial board of members from China and abroad, in summer 1995. post-1949 periods. As in addition the People's Republic has renounced its earlier radical vision of revolution, and the post-1986 political liberalization in Taiwan proceeds, the year 1949 increasingly seems to be less of the all-encompassing prism through which all perspectives on the preceding Republican period are necessarily and inevitably refracted. Research on Republican-era government and administration is now beginning to shift away from explaining the outcome of the civil war in terms of the KMT regime's undeniable weaknesses, and towards evaluating what Republican governments attempted to do, given the context and constraints of their own times, to overcome those weaknesses.5 Current work has just begun to scratch the surface, and many basic questions about Republican-era government, particularly those concerning the relations between the different levels of central, provincial and local government, remain unanswered. This article concentrates on central government in the Republican period and develops three preliminary themes: that despite changes in regime, Republican-era governments were characterized by a surprising consistency in terms of basic agenda and constraints on action; that this agenda pushed all Republican-era governments to attempt to build institutional capacity rapidly; and that to this end, Republican-era governments experimented widely and intensively with models drawn from elsewhere, recombined these models with long-standing Chinese norms of statecraft and governance and produced a wide variety of new hybrids - often only partially reconcilable - in different sectors of the central government. Executive Agendas and Institutional Weaknesses Despite obvious and important changes in regime and government organization - from presidential dictatorship in the 1910s, to the Beiyang governments of the 1920s, to the ascendancy of the KMT Party and its National Government in the late 1920s and 1930s - the executives of Republican-era governments were characterized by a quite remarkable consistency in agendas and goals. They were also constrained in achieving those goals by an equally consistent set of structural constraints. Government in the Republican era inherited substantially intact the late Qing xinzheng (New Government) agenda which held that China depended on a vigorous central state to lead the way out of international 5. This shift in emphasis began in the early to mid-1980s, with the publication of William Kirby's Germany and Republican China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984). Preliminary research on my forthcoming book, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities: Personnel Policies and State Building in China, 1927-40 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) was conducted in 1987-89. At present there is a significant cadre of graduate students from programmes in history and political science at Harvard, Berkeley, and Washington University, St. Louis who are in some stage of writing or research on Ph.D. dissertations that address such different aspects of Republican government as constitution-drafting, the KMT' s efforts to combat low-level corruption, and water conservancy. Even within the People's Republic, scholars are also beginning to reconsider the Republican period in a more sympathetic light: Nanjing University Press began publication of Minguo yanjiu (Studies on Republican China) with an editorial board of members from China and abroad, in summer 1995. post-1949 periods. As in addition the People's Republic has renounced its earlier radical vision of revolution, and the post-1986 political liberalization in Taiwan proceeds, the year 1949 increasingly seems to be less of the all-encompassing prism through which all perspectives on the preceding Republican period are necessarily and inevitably refracted. Research on Republican-era government and administration is now beginning to shift away from explaining the outcome of the civil war in terms of the KMT regime's undeniable weaknesses, and towards evaluating what Republican governments attempted to do, given the context and constraints of their own times, to overcome those weaknesses.5 Current work has just begun to scratch the surface, and many basic questions about Republican-era government, particularly those concerning the relations between the different levels of central, provincial and local government, remain unanswered. This article concentrates on central government in the Republican period and develops three preliminary themes: that despite changes in regime, Republican-era governments were characterized by a surprising consistency in terms of basic agenda and constraints on action; that this agenda pushed all Republican-era governments to attempt to build institutional capacity rapidly; and that to this end, Republican-era governments experimented widely and intensively with models drawn from elsewhere, recombined these models with long-standing Chinese norms of statecraft and governance and produced a wide variety of new hybrids - often only partially reconcilable - in different sectors of the central government. Executive Agendas and Institutional Weaknesses Despite obvious and important changes in regime and government organization - from presidential dictatorship in the 1910s, to the Beiyang governments of the 1920s, to the ascendancy of the KMT Party and its National Government in the late 1920s and 1930s - the executives of Republican-era governments were characterized by a quite remarkable consistency in agendas and goals. They were also constrained in achieving those goals by an equally consistent set of structural constraints. Government in the Republican era inherited substantially intact the late Qing xinzheng (New Government) agenda which held that China depended on a vigorous central state to lead the way out of international 5. This shift in emphasis began in the early to mid-1980s, with the publication of William Kirby's Germany and Republican China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984). Preliminary research on my forthcoming book, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities: Personnel Policies and State Building in China, 1927-40 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) was conducted in 1987-89. At present there is a significant cadre of graduate students from programmes in history and political science at Harvard, Berkeley, and Washington University, St. Louis who are in some stage of writing or research on Ph.D. dissertations that address such different aspects of Republican government as constitution-drafting, the KMT' s efforts to combat low-level corruption, and water conservancy. Even within the People's Republic, scholars are also beginning to reconsider the Republican period in a more sympathetic light: Nanjing University Press began publication of Minguo yanjiu (Studies on Republican China) with an editorial board of members from China and abroad, in summer 1995. post-1949 periods. As in addition the People's Republic has renounced its earlier radical vision of revolution, and the post-1986 political liberalization in Taiwan proceeds, the year 1949 increasingly seems to be less of the all-encompassing prism through which all perspectives on the preceding Republican period are necessarily and inevitably refracted. Research on Republican-era government and administration is now beginning to shift away from explaining the outcome of the civil war in terms of the KMT regime's undeniable weaknesses, and towards evaluating what Republican governments attempted to do, given the context and constraints of their own times, to overcome those weaknesses.5 Current work has just begun to scratch the surface, and many basic questions about Republican-era government, particularly those concerning the relations between the different levels of central, provincial and local government, remain unanswered. This article concentrates on central government in the Republican period and develops three preliminary themes: that despite changes in regime, Republican-era governments were characterized by a surprising consistency in terms of basic agenda and constraints on action; that this agenda pushed all Republican-era governments to attempt to build institutional capacity rapidly; and that to this end, Republican-era governments experimented widely and intensively with models drawn from elsewhere, recombined these models with long-standing Chinese norms of statecraft and governance and produced a wide variety of new hybrids - often only partially reconcilable - in different sectors of the central government. Executive Agendas and Institutional Weaknesses Despite obvious and important changes in regime and government organization - from presidential dictatorship in the 1910s, to the Beiyang governments of the 1920s, to the ascendancy of the KMT Party and its National Government in the late 1920s and 1930s - the executives of Republican-era governments were characterized by a quite remarkable consistency in agendas and goals. They were also constrained in achieving those goals by an equally consistent set of structural constraints. Government in the Republican era inherited substantially intact the late Qing xinzheng (New Government) agenda which held that China depended on a vigorous central state to lead the way out of international 5. This shift in emphasis began in the early to mid-1980s, with the publication of William Kirby's Germany and Republican China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984). Preliminary research on my forthcoming book, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities: Personnel Policies and State Building in China, 1927-40 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) was conducted in 1987-89. At present there is a significant cadre of graduate students from programmes in history and political science at Harvard, Berkeley, and Washington University, St. Louis who are in some stage of writing or research on Ph.D. dissertations that address such different aspects of Republican government as constitution-drafting, the KMT' s efforts to combat low-level corruption, and water conservancy. Even within the People's Republic, scholars are also beginning to reconsider the Republican period in a more sympathetic light: Nanjing University Press began publication of Minguo yanjiu (Studies on Republican China) with an editorial board of members from China and abroad, in summer 1995. post-1949 periods. As in addition the People's Republic has renounced its earlier radical vision of revolution, and the post-1986 political liberalization in Taiwan proceeds, the year 1949 increasingly seems to be less of the all-encompassing prism through which all perspectives on the preceding Republican period are necessarily and inevitably refracted. Research on Republican-era government and administration is now beginning to shift away from explaining the outcome of the civil war in terms of the KMT regime's undeniable weaknesses, and towards evaluating what Republican governments attempted to do, given the context and constraints of their own times, to overcome those weaknesses.5 Current work has just begun to scratch the surface, and many basic questions about Republican-era government, particularly those concerning the relations between the different levels of central, provincial and local government, remain unanswered. This article concentrates on central government in the Republican period and develops three preliminary themes: that despite changes in regime, Republican-era governments were characterized by a surprising consistency in terms of basic agenda and constraints on action; that this agenda pushed all Republican-era governments to attempt to build institutional capacity rapidly; and that to this end, Republican-era governments experimented widely and intensively with models drawn from elsewhere, recombined these models with long-standing Chinese norms of statecraft and governance and produced a wide variety of new hybrids - often only partially reconcilable - in different sectors of the central government. Executive Agendas and Institutional Weaknesses Despite obvious and important changes in regime and government organization - from presidential dictatorship in the 1910s, to the Beiyang governments of the 1920s, to the ascendancy of the KMT Party and its National Government in the late 1920s and 1930s - the executives of Republican-era governments were characterized by a quite remarkable consistency in agendas and goals. They were also constrained in achieving those goals by an equally consistent set of structural constraints. Government in the Republican era inherited substantially intact the late Qing xinzheng (New Government) agenda which held that China depended on a vigorous central state to lead the way out of international 5. This shift in emphasis began in the early to mid-1980s, with the publication of William Kirby's Germany and Republican China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984). Preliminary research on my forthcoming book, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities: Personnel Policies and State Building in China, 1927-40 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) was conducted in 1987-89. At present there is a significant cadre of graduate students from programmes in history and political science at Harvard, Berkeley, and Washington University, St. Louis who are in some stage of writing or research on Ph.D. dissertations that address such different aspects of Republican government as constitution-drafting, the KMT' s efforts to combat low-level corruption, and water conservancy. Even within the People's Republic, scholars are also beginning to reconsider the Republican period in a more sympathetic light: Nanjing University Press began publication of Minguo yanjiu (Studies on Republican China) with an editorial board of members from China and abroad, in summer 1995. post-1949 periods. As in addition the People's Republic has renounced its earlier radical vision of revolution, and the post-1986 political liberalization in Taiwan proceeds, the year 1949 increasingly seems to be less of the all-encompassing prism through which all perspectives on the preceding Republican period are necessarily and inevitably refracted. Research on Republican-era government and administration is now beginning to shift away from explaining the outcome of the civil war in terms of the KMT regime's undeniable weaknesses, and towards evaluating what Republican governments attempted to do, given the context and constraints of their own times, to overcome those weaknesses.5 Current work has just begun to scratch the surface, and many basic questions about Republican-era government, particularly those concerning the relations between the different levels of central, provincial and local government, remain unanswered. This article concentrates on central government in the Republican period and develops three preliminary themes: that despite changes in regime, Republican-era governments were characterized by a surprising consistency in terms of basic agenda and constraints on action; that this agenda pushed all Republican-era governments to attempt to build institutional capacity rapidly; and that to this end, Republican-era governments experimented widely and intensively with models drawn from elsewhere, recombined these models with long-standing Chinese norms of statecraft and governance and produced a wide variety of new hybrids - often only partially reconcilable - in different sectors of the central government. Executive Agendas and Institutional Weaknesses Despite obvious and important changes in regime and government organization - from presidential dictatorship in the 1910s, to the Beiyang governments of the 1920s, to the ascendancy of the KMT Party and its National Government in the late 1920s and 1930s - the executives of Republican-era governments were characterized by a quite remarkable consistency in agendas and goals. They were also constrained in achieving those goals by an equally consistent set of structural constraints. Government in the Republican era inherited substantially intact the late Qing xinzheng (New Government) agenda which held that China depended on a vigorous central state to lead the way out of international 5. This shift in emphasis began in the early to mid-1980s, with the publication of William Kirby's Germany and Republican China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984). Preliminary research on my forthcoming book, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities: Personnel Policies and State Building in China, 1927-40 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) was conducted in 1987-89. At present there is a significant cadre of graduate students from programmes in history and political science at Harvard, Berkeley, and Washington University, St. Louis who are in some stage of writing or research on Ph.D. dissertations that address such different aspects of Republican government as constitution-drafting, the KMT' s efforts to combat low-level corruption, and water conservancy. Even within the People's Republic, scholars are also beginning to reconsider the Republican period in a more sympathetic light: Nanjing University Press began publication of Minguo yanjiu (Studies on Republican China) with an editorial board of members from China and abroad, in summer 1995. post-1949 periods. As in addition the People's Republic has renounced its earlier radical vision of revolution, and the post-1986 political liberalization in Taiwan proceeds, the year 1949 increasingly seems to be less of the all-encompassing prism through which all perspectives on the preceding Republican period are necessarily and inevitably refracted. Research on Republican-era government and administration is now beginning to shift away from explaining the outcome of the civil war in terms of the KMT regime's undeniable weaknesses, and towards evaluating what Republican governments attempted to do, given the context and constraints of their own times, to overcome those weaknesses.5 Current work has just begun to scratch the surface, and many basic questions about Republican-era government, particularly those concerning the relations between the different levels of central, provincial and local government, remain unanswered. This article concentrates on central government in the Republican period and develops three preliminary themes: that despite changes in regime, Republican-era governments were characterized by a surprising consistency in terms of basic agenda and constraints on action; that this agenda pushed all Republican-era governments to attempt to build institutional capacity rapidly; and that to this end, Republican-era governments experimented widely and intensively with models drawn from elsewhere, recombined these models with long-standing Chinese norms of statecraft and governance and produced a wide variety of new hybrids - often only partially reconcilable - in different sectors of the central government. Executive Agendas and Institutional Weaknesses Despite obvious and important changes in regime and government organization - from presidential dictatorship in the 1910s, to the Beiyang governments of the 1920s, to the ascendancy of the KMT Party and its National Government in the late 1920s and 1930s - the executives of Republican-era governments were characterized by a quite remarkable consistency in agendas and goals. They were also constrained in achieving those goals by an equally consistent set of structural constraints. Government in the Republican era inherited substantially intact the late Qing xinzheng (New Government) agenda which held that China depended on a vigorous central state to lead the way out of international 5. This shift in emphasis began in the early to mid-1980s, with the publication of William Kirby's Germany and Republican China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984). Preliminary research on my forthcoming book, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities: Personnel Policies and State Building in China, 1927-40 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) was conducted in 1987-89. At present there is a significant cadre of graduate students from programmes in history and political science at Harvard, Berkeley, and Washington University, St. Louis who are in some stage of writing or research on Ph.D. dissertations that address such different aspects of Republican government as constitution-drafting, the KMT' s efforts to combat low-level corruption, and water conservancy. Even within the People's Republic, scholars are also beginning to reconsider the Republican period in a more sympathetic light: Nanjing University Press began publication of Minguo yanjiu (Studies on Republican China) with an editorial board of members from China and abroad, in summer 1995. post-1949 periods. As in addition the People's Republic has renounced its earlier radical vision of revolution, and the post-1986 political liberalization in Taiwan proceeds, the year 1949 increasingly seems to be less of the all-encompassing prism through which all perspectives on the preceding Republican period are necessarily and inevitably refracted. Research on Republican-era government and administration is now beginning to shift away from explaining the outcome of the civil war in terms of the KMT regime's undeniable weaknesses, and towards evaluating what Republican governments attempted to do, given the context and constraints of their own times, to overcome those weaknesses.5 Current work has just begun to scratch the surface, and many basic questions about Republican-era government, particularly those concerning the relations between the different levels of central, provincial and local government, remain unanswered. This article concentrates on central government in the Republican period and develops three preliminary themes: that despite changes in regime, Republican-era governments were characterized by a surprising consistency in terms of basic agenda and constraints on action; that this agenda pushed all Republican-era governments to attempt to build institutional capacity rapidly; and that to this end, Republican-era governments experimented widely and intensively with models drawn from elsewhere, recombined these models with long-standing Chinese norms of statecraft and governance and produced a wide variety of new hybrids - often only partially reconcilable - in different sectors of the central government. Executive Agendas and Institutional Weaknesses Despite obvious and important changes in regime and government organization - from presidential dictatorship in the 1910s, to the Beiyang governments of the 1920s, to the ascendancy of the KMT Party and its National Government in the late 1920s and 1930s - the executives of Republican-era governments were characterized by a quite remarkable consistency in agendas and goals. They were also constrained in achieving those goals by an equally consistent set of structural constraints. Government in the Republican era inherited substantially intact the late Qing xinzheng (New Government) agenda which held that China depended on a vigorous central state to lead the way out of international 5. This shift in emphasis began in the early to mid-1980s, with the publication of William Kirby's Germany and Republican China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984). Preliminary research on my forthcoming book, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities: Personnel Policies and State Building in China, 1927-40 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) was conducted in 1987-89. At present there is a significant cadre of graduate students from programmes in history and political science at Harvard, Berkeley, and Washington University, St. Louis who are in some stage of writing or research on Ph.D. dissertations that address such different aspects of Republican government as constitution-drafting, the KMT' s efforts to combat low-level corruption, and water conservancy. Even within the People's Republic, scholars are also beginning to reconsider the Republican period in a more sympathetic light: Nanjing University Press began publication of Minguo yanjiu (Studies on Republican China) with an editorial board of members from China and abroad, in summer 1995. post-1949 periods. As in addition the People's Republic has renounced its earlier radical vision of revolution, and the post-1986 political liberalization in Taiwan proceeds, the year 1949 increasingly seems to be less of the all-encompassing prism through which all perspectives on the preceding Republican period are necessarily and inevitably refracted. Research on Republican-era government and administration is now beginning to shift away from explaining the outcome of the civil war in terms of the KMT regime's undeniable weaknesses, and towards evaluating what Republican governments attempted to do, given the context and constraints of their own times, to overcome those weaknesses.5 Current work has just begun to scratch the surface, and many basic questions about Republican-era government, particularly those concerning the relations between the different levels of central, provincial and local government, remain unanswered. This article concentrates on central government in the Republican period and develops three preliminary themes: that despite changes in regime, Republican-era governments were characterized by a surprising consistency in terms of basic agenda and constraints on action; that this agenda pushed all Republican-era governments to attempt to build institutional capacity rapidly; and that to this end, Republican-era governments experimented widely and intensively with models drawn from elsewhere, recombined these models with long-standing Chinese norms of statecraft and governance and produced a wide variety of new hybrids - often only partially reconcilable - in different sectors of the central government. Executive Agendas and Institutional Weaknesses Despite obvious and important changes in regime and government organization - from presidential dictatorship in the 1910s, to the Beiyang governments of the 1920s, to the ascendancy of the KMT Party and its National Government in the late 1920s and 1930s - the executives of Republican-era governments were characterized by a quite remarkable consistency in agendas and goals. They were also constrained in achieving those goals by an equally consistent set of structural constraints. Government in the Republican era inherited substantially intact the late Qing xinzheng (New Government) agenda which held that China depended on a vigorous central state to lead the way out of international 5. This shift in emphasis began in the early to mid-1980s, with the publication of William Kirby's Germany and Republican China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984). Preliminary research on my forthcoming book, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities: Personnel Policies and State Building in China, 1927-40 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) was conducted in 1987-89. At present there is a significant cadre of graduate students from programmes in history and political science at Harvard, Berkeley, and Washington University, St. Louis who are in some stage of writing or research on Ph.D. dissertations that address such different aspects of Republican government as constitution-drafting, the KMT' s efforts to combat low-level corruption, and water conservancy. Even within the People's Republic, scholars are also beginning to reconsider the Republican period in a more sympathetic light: Nanjing University Press began publication of Minguo yanjiu (Studies on Republican China) with an editorial board of members from China and abroad, in summer 1995. post-1949 periods. As in addition the People's Republic has renounced its earlier radical vision of revolution, and the post-1986 political liberalization in Taiwan proceeds, the year 1949 increasingly seems to be less of the all-encompassing prism through which all perspectives on the preceding Republican period are necessarily and inevitably refracted. Research on Republican-era government and administration is now beginning to shift away from explaining the outcome of the civil war in terms of the KMT regime's undeniable weaknesses, and towards evaluating what Republican governments attempted to do, given the context and constraints of their own times, to overcome those weaknesses.5 Current work has just begun to scratch the surface, and many basic questions about Republican-era government, particularly those concerning the relations between the different levels of central, provincial and local government, remain unanswered. This article concentrates on central government in the Republican period and develops three preliminary themes: that despite changes in regime, Republican-era governments were characterized by a surprising consistency in terms of basic agenda and constraints on action; that this agenda pushed all Republican-era governments to attempt to build institutional capacity rapidly; and that to this end, Republican-era governments experimented widely and intensively with models drawn from elsewhere, recombined these models with long-standing Chinese norms of statecraft and governance and produced a wide variety of new hybrids - often only partially reconcilable - in different sectors of the central government. Executive Agendas and Institutional Weaknesses Despite obvious and important changes in regime and government organization - from presidential dictatorship in the 1910s, to the Beiyang governments of the 1920s, to the ascendancy of the KMT Party and its National Government in the late 1920s and 1930s - the executives of Republican-era governments were characterized by a quite remarkable consistency in agendas and goals. They were also constrained in achieving those goals by an equally consistent set of structural constraints. Government in the Republican era inherited substantially intact the late Qing xinzheng (New Government) agenda which held that China depended on a vigorous central state to lead the way out of international 5. This shift in emphasis began in the early to mid-1980s, with the publication of William Kirby's Germany and Republican China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984). Preliminary research on my forthcoming book, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities: Personnel Policies and State Building in China, 1927-40 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) was conducted in 1987-89. At present there is a significant cadre of graduate students from programmes in history and political science at Harvard, Berkeley, and Washington University, St. Louis who are in some stage of writing or research on Ph.D. dissertations that address such different aspects of Republican government as constitution-drafting, the KMT' s efforts to combat low-level corruption, and water conservancy. Even within the People's Republic, scholars are also beginning to reconsider the Republican period in a more sympathetic light: Nanjing University Press began publication of Minguo yanjiu (Studies on Republican China) with an editorial board of members from China and abroad, in summer 1995. post-1949 periods. As in addition the People's Republic has renounced its earlier radical vision of revolution, and the post-1986 political liberalization in Taiwan proceeds, the year 1949 increasingly seems to be less of the all-encompassing prism through which all perspectives on the preceding Republican period are necessarily and inevitably refracted. Research on Republican-era government and administration is now beginning to shift away from explaining the outcome of the civil war in terms of the KMT regime's undeniable weaknesses, and towards evaluating what Republican governments attempted to do, given the context and constraints of their own times, to overcome those weaknesses.5 Current work has just begun to scratch the surface, and many basic questions about Republican-era government, particularly those concerning the relations between the different levels of central, provincial and local government, remain unanswered. This article concentrates on central government in the Republican period and develops three preliminary themes: that despite changes in regime, Republican-era governments were characterized by a surprising consistency in terms of basic agenda and constraints on action; that this agenda pushed all Republican-era governments to attempt to build institutional capacity rapidly; and that to this end, Republican-era governments experimented widely and intensively with models drawn from elsewhere, recombined these models with long-standing Chinese norms of statecraft and governance and produced a wide variety of new hybrids - often only partially reconcilable - in different sectors of the central government. Executive Agendas and Institutional Weaknesses Despite obvious and important changes in regime and government organization - from presidential dictatorship in the 1910s, to the Beiyang governments of the 1920s, to the ascendancy of the KMT Party and its National Government in the late 1920s and 1930s - the executives of Republican-era governments were characterized by a quite remarkable consistency in agendas and goals. They were also constrained in achieving those goals by an equally consistent set of structural constraints. Government in the Republican era inherited substantially intact the late Qing xinzheng (New Government) agenda which held that China depended on a vigorous central state to lead the way out of international 5. This shift in emphasis began in the early to mid-1980s, with the publication of William Kirby's Germany and Republican China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984). Preliminary research on my forthcoming book, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities: Personnel Policies and State Building in China, 1927-40 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) was conducted in 1987-89. At present there is a significant cadre of graduate students from programmes in history and political science at Harvard, Berkeley, and Washington University, St. Louis who are in some stage of writing or research on Ph.D. dissertations that address such different aspects of Republican government as constitution-drafting, the KMT' s efforts to combat low-level corruption, and water conservancy. Even within the People's Republic, scholars are also beginning to reconsider the Republican period in a more sympathetic light: Nanjing University Press began publication of Minguo yanjiu (Studies on Republican China) with an editorial board of members from China and abroad, in summer 1995. post-1949 periods. As in addition the People's Republic has renounced its earlier radical vision of revolution, and the post-1986 political liberalization in Taiwan proceeds, the year 1949 increasingly seems to be less of the all-encompassing prism through which all perspectives on the preceding Republican period are necessarily and inevitably refracted. Research on Republican-era government and administration is now beginning to shift away from explaining the outcome of the civil war in terms of the KMT regime's undeniable weaknesses, and towards evaluating what Republican governments attempted to do, given the context and constraints of their own times, to overcome those weaknesses.5 Current work has just begun to scratch the surface, and many basic questions about Republican-era government, particularly those concerning the relations between the different levels of central, provincial and local government, remain unanswered. This article concentrates on central government in the Republican period and develops three preliminary themes: that despite changes in regime, Republican-era governments were characterized by a surprising consistency in terms of basic agenda and constraints on action; that this agenda pushed all Republican-era governments to attempt to build institutional capacity rapidly; and that to this end, Republican-era governments experimented widely and intensively with models drawn from elsewhere, recombined these models with long-standing Chinese norms of statecraft and governance and produced a wide variety of new hybrids - often only partially reconcilable - in different sectors of the central government. Executive Agendas and Institutional Weaknesses Despite obvious and important changes in regime and government organization - from presidential dictatorship in the 1910s, to the Beiyang governments of the 1920s, to the ascendancy of the KMT Party and its National Government in the late 1920s and 1930s - the executives of Republican-era governments were characterized by a quite remarkable consistency in agendas and goals. They were also constrained in achieving those goals by an equally consistent set of structural constraints. Government in the Republican era inherited substantially intact the late Qing xinzheng (New Government) agenda which held that China depended on a vigorous central state to lead the way out of international 5. This shift in emphasis began in the early to mid-1980s, with the publication of William Kirby's Germany and Republican China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984). Preliminary research on my forthcoming book, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities: Personnel Policies and State Building in China, 1927-40 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) was conducted in 1987-89. At present there is a significant cadre of graduate students from programmes in history and political science at Harvard, Berkeley, and Washington University, St. Louis who are in some stage of writing or research on Ph.D. dissertations that address such different aspects of Republican government as constitution-drafting, the KMT' s efforts to combat low-level corruption, and water conservancy. Even within the People's Republic, scholars are also beginning to reconsider the Republican period in a more sympathetic light: Nanjing University Press began publication of Minguo yanjiu (Studies on Republican China) with an editorial board of members from China and abroad, in summer 1995. post-1949 periods. As in addition the People's Republic has renounced its earlier radical vision of revolution, and the post-1986 political liberalization in Taiwan proceeds, the year 1949 increasingly seems to be less of the all-encompassing prism through which all perspectives on the preceding Republican period are necessarily and inevitably refracted. Research on Republican-era government and administration is now beginning to shift away from explaining the outcome of the civil war in terms of the KMT regime's undeniable weaknesses, and towards evaluating what Republican governments attempted to do, given the context and constraints of their own times, to overcome those weaknesses.5 Current work has just begun to scratch the surface, and many basic questions about Republican-era government, particularly those concerning the relations between the different levels of central, provincial and local government, remain unanswered. This article concentrates on central government in the Republican period and develops three preliminary themes: that despite changes in regime, Republican-era governments were characterized by a surprising consistency in terms of basic agenda and constraints on action; that this agenda pushed all Republican-era governments to attempt to build institutional capacity rapidly; and that to this end, Republican-era governments experimented widely and intensively with models drawn from elsewhere, recombined these models with long-standing Chinese norms of statecraft and governance and produced a wide variety of new hybrids - often only partially reconcilable - in different sectors of the central government. Executive Agendas and Institutional Weaknesses Despite obvious and important changes in regime and government organization - from presidential dictatorship in the 1910s, to the Beiyang governments of the 1920s, to the ascendancy of the KMT Party and its National Government in the late 1920s and 1930s - the executives of Republican-era governments were characterized by a quite remarkable consistency in agendas and goals. They were also constrained in achieving those goals by an equally consistent set of structural constraints. Government in the Republican era inherited substantially intact the late Qing xinzheng (New Government) agenda which held that China depended on a vigorous central state to lead the way out of international 5. This shift in emphasis began in the early to mid-1980s, with the publication of William Kirby's Germany and Republican China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984). Preliminary research on my forthcoming book, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities: Personnel Policies and State Building in China, 1927-40 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) was conducted in 1987-89. At present there is a significant cadre of graduate students from programmes in history and political science at Harvard, Berkeley, and Washington University, St. Louis who are in some stage of writing or research on Ph.D. dissertations that address such different aspects of Republican government as constitution-drafting, the KMT' s efforts to combat low-level corruption, and water conservancy. Even within the People's Republic, scholars are also beginning to reconsider the Republican period in a more sympathetic light: Nanjing University Press began publication of Minguo yanjiu (Studies on Republican China) with an editorial board of members from China and abroad, in summer 1995. post-1949 periods. As in addition the People's Republic has renounced its earlier radical vision of revolution, and the post-1986 political liberalization in Taiwan proceeds, the year 1949 increasingly seems to be less of the all-encompassing prism through which all perspectives on the preceding Republican period are necessarily and inevitably refracted. Research on Republican-era government and administration is now beginning to shift away from explaining the outcome of the civil war in terms of the KMT regime's undeniable weaknesses, and towards evaluating what Republican governments attempted to do, given the context and constraints of their own times, to overcome those weaknesses.5 Current work has just begun to scratch the surface, and many basic questions about Republican-era government, particularly those concerning the relations between the different levels of central, provincial and local government, remain unanswered. This article concentrates on central government in the Republican period and develops three preliminary themes: that despite changes in regime, Republican-era governments were characterized by a surprising consistency in terms of basic agenda and constraints on action; that this agenda pushed all Republican-era governments to attempt to build institutional capacity rapidly; and that to this end, Republican-era governments experimented widely and intensively with models drawn from elsewhere, recombined these models with long-standing Chinese norms of statecraft and governance and produced a wide variety of new hybrids - often only partially reconcilable - in different sectors of the central government. Executive Agendas and Institutional Weaknesses Despite obvious and important changes in regime and government organization - from presidential dictatorship in the 1910s, to the Beiyang governments of the 1920s, to the ascendancy of the KMT Party and its National Government in the late 1920s and 1930s - the executives of Republican-era governments were characterized by a quite remarkable consistency in agendas and goals. They were also constrained in achieving those goals by an equally consistent set of structural constraints. Government in the Republican era inherited substantially intact the late Qing xinzheng (New Government) agenda which held that China depended on a vigorous central state to lead the way out of international 5. This shift in emphasis began in the early to mid-1980s, with the publication of William Kirby's Germany and Republican China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984). Preliminary research on my forthcoming book, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities: Personnel Policies and State Building in China, 1927-40 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) was conducted in 1987-89. At present there is a significant cadre of graduate students from programmes in history and political science at Harvard, Berkeley, and Washington University, St. Louis who are in some stage of writing or research on Ph.D. dissertations that address such different aspects of Republican government as constitution-drafting, the KMT' s efforts to combat low-level corruption, and water conservancy. Even within the People's Republic, scholars are also beginning to reconsider the Republican period in a more sympathetic light: Nanjing University Press began publication of Minguo yanjiu (Studies on Republican China) with an editorial board of members from China and abroad, in summer 1995. post-1949 periods. As in addition the People's Republic has renounced its earlier radical vision of revolution, and the post-1986 political liberalization in Taiwan proceeds, the year 1949 increasingly seems to be less of the all-encompassing prism through which all perspectives on the preceding Republican period are necessarily and inevitably refracted. Research on Republican-era government and administration is now beginning to shift away from explaining the outcome of the civil war in terms of the KMT regime's undeniable weaknesses, and towards evaluating what Republican governments attempted to do, given the context and constraints of their own times, to overcome those weaknesses.5 Current work has just begun to scratch the surface, and many basic questions about Republican-era government, particularly those concerning the relations between the different levels of central, provincial and local government, remain unanswered. This article concentrates on central government in the Republican period and develops three preliminary themes: that despite changes in regime, Republican-era governments were characterized by a surprising consistency in terms of basic agenda and constraints on action; that this agenda pushed all Republican-era governments to attempt to build institutional capacity rapidly; and that to this end, Republican-era governments experimented widely and intensively with models drawn from elsewhere, recombined these models with long-standing Chinese norms of statecraft and governance and produced a wide variety of new hybrids - often only partially reconcilable - in different sectors of the central government. Executive Agendas and Institutional Weaknesses Despite obvious and important changes in regime and government organization - from presidential dictatorship in the 1910s, to the Beiyang governments of the 1920s, to the ascendancy of the KMT Party and its National Government in the late 1920s and 1930s - the executives of Republican-era governments were characterized by a quite remarkable consistency in agendas and goals. They were also constrained in achieving those goals by an equally consistent set of structural constraints. Government in the Republican era inherited substantially intact the late Qing xinzheng (New Government) agenda which held that China depended on a vigorous central state to lead the way out of international 5. This shift in emphasis began in the early to mid-1980s, with the publication of William Kirby's Germany and Republican China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984). Preliminary research on my forthcoming book, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities: Personnel Policies and State Building in China, 1927-40 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) was conducted in 1987-89. At present there is a significant cadre of graduate students from programmes in history and political science at Harvard, Berkeley, and Washington University, St. Louis who are in some stage of writing or research on Ph.D. dissertations that address such different aspects of Republican government as constitution-drafting, the KMT' s efforts to combat low-level corruption, and water conservancy. Even within the People's Republic, scholars are also beginning to reconsider the Republican period in a more sympathetic light: Nanjing University Press began publication of Minguo yanjiu (Studies on Republican China) with an editorial board of members from China and abroad, in summer 1995. post-1949 periods. As in addition the People's Republic has renounced its earlier radical vision of revolution, and the post-1986 political liberalization in Taiwan proceeds, the year 1949 increasingly seems to be less of the all-encompassing prism through which all perspectives on the preceding Republican period are necessarily and inevitably refracted. Research on Republican-era government and administration is now beginning to shift away from explaining the outcome of the civil war in terms of the KMT regime's undeniable weaknesses, and towards evaluating what Republican governments attempted to do, given the context and constraints of their own times, to overcome those weaknesses.5 Current work has just begun to scratch the surface, and many basic questions about Republican-era government, particularly those concerning the relations between the different levels of central, provincial and local government, remain unanswered. This article concentrates on central government in the Republican period and develops three preliminary themes: that despite changes in regime, Republican-era governments were characterized by a surprising consistency in terms of basic agenda and constraints on action; that this agenda pushed all Republican-era governments to attempt to build institutional capacity rapidly; and that to this end, Republican-era governments experimented widely and intensively with models drawn from elsewhere, recombined these models with long-standing Chinese norms of statecraft and governance and produced a wide variety of new hybrids - often only partially reconcilable - in different sectors of the central government. Executive Agendas and Institutional Weaknesses Despite obvious and important changes in regime and government organization - from presidential dictatorship in the 1910s, to the Beiyang governments of the 1920s, to the ascendancy of the KMT Party and its National Government in the late 1920s and 1930s - the executives of Republican-era governments were characterized by a quite remarkable consistency in agendas and goals. They were also constrained in achieving those goals by an equally consistent set of structural constraints. Government in the Republican era inherited substantially intact the late Qing xinzheng (New Government) agenda which held that China depended on a vigorous central state to lead the way out of international 5. This shift in emphasis began in the early to mid-1980s, with the publication of William Kirby's Germany and Republican China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984). Preliminary research on my forthcoming book, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities: Personnel Policies and State Building in China, 1927-40 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) was conducted in 1987-89. At present there is a significant cadre of graduate students from programmes in history and political science at Harvard, Berkeley, and Washington University, St. Louis who are in some stage of writing or research on Ph.D. dissertations that address such different aspects of Republican government as constitution-drafting, the KMT' s efforts to combat low-level corruption, and water conservancy. Even within the People's Republic, scholars are also beginning to reconsider the Republican period in a more sympathetic light: Nanjing University Press began publication of Minguo yanjiu (Studies on Republican China) with an editorial board of members from China and abroad, in summer 1995. post-1949 periods. As in addition the People's Republic has renounced its earlier radical vision of revolution, and the post-1986 political liberalization in Taiwan proceeds, the year 1949 increasingly seems to be less of the all-encompassing prism through which all perspectives on the preceding Republican period are necessarily and inevitably refracted. Research on Republican-era government and administration is now beginning to shift away from explaining the outcome of the civil war in terms of the KMT regime's undeniable weaknesses, and towards evaluating what Republican governments attempted to do, given the context and constraints of their own times, to overcome those weaknesses.5 Current work has just begun to scratch the surface, and many basic questions about Republican-era government, particularly those concerning the relations between the different levels of central, provincial and local government, remain unanswered. This article concentrates on central government in the Republican period and develops three preliminary themes: that despite changes in regime, Republican-era governments were characterized by a surprising consistency in terms of basic agenda and constraints on action; that this agenda pushed all Republican-era governments to attempt to build institutional capacity rapidly; and that to this end, Republican-era governments experimented widely and intensively with models drawn from elsewhere, recombined these models with long-standing Chinese norms of statecraft and governance and produced a wide variety of new hybrids - often only partially reconcilable - in different sectors of the central government. Executive Agendas and Institutional Weaknesses Despite obvious and important changes in regime and government organization - from presidential dictatorship in the 1910s, to the Beiyang governments of the 1920s, to the ascendancy of the KMT Party and its National Government in the late 1920s and 1930s - the executives of Republican-era governments were characterized by a quite remarkable consistency in agendas and goals. They were also constrained in achieving those goals by an equally consistent set of structural constraints. Government in the Republican era inherited substantially intact the late Qing xinzheng (New Government) agenda which held that China depended on a vigorous central state to lead the way out of international 5. This shift in emphasis began in the early to mid-1980s, with the publication of William Kirby's Germany and Republican China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984). Preliminary research on my forthcoming book, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities: Personnel Policies and State Building in China, 1927-40 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) was conducted in 1987-89. At present there is a significant cadre of graduate students from programmes in history and political science at Harvard, Berkeley, and Washington University, St. Louis who are in some stage of writing or research on Ph.D. dissertations that address such different aspects of Republican government as constitution-drafting, the KMT' s efforts to combat low-level corruption, and water conservancy. Even within the People's Republic, scholars are also beginning to reconsider the Republican period in a more sympathetic light: Nanjing University Press began publication of Minguo yanjiu (Studies on Republican China) with an editorial board of members from China and abroad, in summer 1995. 331
332 The China Quarterly weakness and underdevelopment and into strength and power.The xin- zheng programme set a new template for the evolution of a "modern" Chinese state:first by replacing the imperial Six Boards with modern- style ministries,and secondly by systematically drawing up plans to project central government power much further than ever before into the provinces.6 Although the xinzheng and subsequent Republican-era centralizers claimed to adhere to the principle of mechanisms through which those at local levels could have input into the decision-making process or manage their own affairs,throughout the Republican period,consultative bodies, representative institutions and regularized channels of articulation from below were minor strains in the dominant theme of centrally ordained statism and national unity.'The vast majority of those with executive power were socially conservative military men,and the socializing effects of a career in the military plus the structural predisposition of all executives to want more discretionary power made them even more consistent in their collective distaste for all forms of political participation and expression that they could not directly control. Virtually all executives in the Republican period also conflated their own personal reach with central government power,and in turn central government power with the good of the country as a whole;conversely, any identifiable group or interest that in any way acted as a brake on the executive's policies was excoriated as subversive of the greater good of the nation.Thus in the 1910s Yuan Shikai dissolved the National Assembly and for a time succeeded in abolishing provincial assemblies as well,characterizing them as the preserve of selfish individuals.In the 1920s,a long line of Beiyang warlords periodically packed what re- mained of the National Assembly to draft constitutions that would legitimize their rule while they hurled epithets at each other as being detrimental to national unity.Finally,in the 1930s and 1940s Chiang 6.The xinzheng era,important as it is for the subsequent evolution of the 20th-century Chinese state,remains crucially understudied.Some of the more important works on this period include:Mary C.Wright,China in Revolution:The First Phase,1900-11(New Haven: Yale University Press,1968);Ernest Young,The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,1977),chs.1-2;Esther Morrisson,"The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy,"unpublished dissertation,Radcliffe College,1959;and Paul Hickey, "Fee taking.salary reform and the structure of state power in late Qing China,1909-11," Modern China,Vol.17,No.3,pp.389-417. 7.There was much about the xinzheng reform package that was either ambivalent or unclear,and this lack of clarity particularly stood out in the delicate issue of relative degrees of centralization and decentralization,an issue that continued to reverberate through the remainder of the 20th century.The late Qing xinzheng reforms allowed for the creation of provincial assemblies and even drew up a schedule for the gradual implementation of constitutional monarchy.Yuan Shikai,while hostile to any body that he could not directly control,toward the end of his life seemed quite desperate to make links with any source of popular support and launched a doomed monarchical revival,and the Chiang Kai-shek regime, while no less suspicious,allowed the existence of a Legislative Yuan and National Assembly. and paid at least lip service to the idea of village self-government.On the xinzheng constitutional programme,see Morrisson,"The modernization of the Confucian bureauc- racy."On Yuan Shikai,see Ernest Young."Yuan Shikai as a conservative modernizer,"in Charlotte Furth,The Limits of Change:Essays on Conservatism in Modern China (Cambridge.MA:Harvard University Press,1976),pp.171-190
332 The China Quarterly weakness and underdevelopment and into strength and power. The xinzheng programme set a new template for the evolution of a "modem" Chinese state: first by replacing the imperial Six Boards with modernstyle ministries, and secondly by systematically drawing up plans to project central government power much further than ever before into the provinces.6 Although the xinzheng and subsequent Republican-era centralizers claimed to adhere to the principle of mechanisms through which those at local levels could have input into the decision-making process or manage their own affairs, throughout the Republican period, consultative bodies, representative institutions and regularized channels of articulation from below were minor strains in the dominant theme of centrally ordained statism and national unity.7 The vast majority of those with executive power were socially conservative military men, and the socializing effects of a career in the military plus the structural predisposition of all executives to want more discretionary power made them even more consistent in their collective distaste for all forms of political participation and expression that they could not directly control. Virtually all executives in the Republican period also conflated their own personal reach with central government power, and in turn central government power with the good of the country as a whole; conversely, any identifiable group or interest that in any way acted as a brake on the executive's policies was excoriated as subversive of the greater good of the nation. Thus in the 1910s Yuan Shikai dissolved the National Assembly and for a time succeeded in abolishing provincial assemblies as well, characterizing them as the preserve of selfish individuals. In the 1920s, a long line of Beiyang warlords periodically packed what remained of the National Assembly to draft constitutions that would legitimize their rule while they hurled epithets at each other as being detrimental to national unity. Finally, in the 1930s and 1940s Chiang 6. The xinzheng era, important as it is for the subsequent evolution of the 20th-century Chinese state, remains crucially understudied. Some of the more important works on this period include: Mary C. Wright, China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-11 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977), chs. 1-2; Esther Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy," unpublished dissertation, Radcliffe College, 1959; and Paul Hickey, "Fee taking, salary reform and the structure of state power in late Qing China, 1909-11," Modern China, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 389-417. 7. There was much about the xinzheng reform package that was either ambivalent or unclear, and this lack of clarity particularly stood out in the delicate issue of relative degrees of centralization and decentralization, an issue that continued to reverberate through the remainder of the 20th century. The late Qing xinzheng reforms allowed for the creation of provincial assemblies and even drew up a schedule for the gradual implementation of constitutional monarchy. Yuan Shikai, while hostile to any body that he could not directly control, toward the end of his life seemed quite desperate to make links with any source of popular support and launched a doomed monarchical revival, and the Chiang Kai-shek regime, while no less suspicious, allowed the existence of a Legislative Yuan and National Assembly, and paid at least lip service to the idea of village self-government. On the xinzheng constitutional programme, see Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy." On Yuan Shikai, see Ernest Young, "Yuan Shikai as a conservative modemizer," in Charlotte Furth, The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservatism in Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 171-190. weakness and underdevelopment and into strength and power. The xinzheng programme set a new template for the evolution of a "modem" Chinese state: first by replacing the imperial Six Boards with modernstyle ministries, and secondly by systematically drawing up plans to project central government power much further than ever before into the provinces.6 Although the xinzheng and subsequent Republican-era centralizers claimed to adhere to the principle of mechanisms through which those at local levels could have input into the decision-making process or manage their own affairs, throughout the Republican period, consultative bodies, representative institutions and regularized channels of articulation from below were minor strains in the dominant theme of centrally ordained statism and national unity.7 The vast majority of those with executive power were socially conservative military men, and the socializing effects of a career in the military plus the structural predisposition of all executives to want more discretionary power made them even more consistent in their collective distaste for all forms of political participation and expression that they could not directly control. Virtually all executives in the Republican period also conflated their own personal reach with central government power, and in turn central government power with the good of the country as a whole; conversely, any identifiable group or interest that in any way acted as a brake on the executive's policies was excoriated as subversive of the greater good of the nation. Thus in the 1910s Yuan Shikai dissolved the National Assembly and for a time succeeded in abolishing provincial assemblies as well, characterizing them as the preserve of selfish individuals. In the 1920s, a long line of Beiyang warlords periodically packed what remained of the National Assembly to draft constitutions that would legitimize their rule while they hurled epithets at each other as being detrimental to national unity. Finally, in the 1930s and 1940s Chiang 6. The xinzheng era, important as it is for the subsequent evolution of the 20th-century Chinese state, remains crucially understudied. Some of the more important works on this period include: Mary C. Wright, China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-11 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977), chs. 1-2; Esther Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy," unpublished dissertation, Radcliffe College, 1959; and Paul Hickey, "Fee taking, salary reform and the structure of state power in late Qing China, 1909-11," Modern China, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 389-417. 7. There was much about the xinzheng reform package that was either ambivalent or unclear, and this lack of clarity particularly stood out in the delicate issue of relative degrees of centralization and decentralization, an issue that continued to reverberate through the remainder of the 20th century. The late Qing xinzheng reforms allowed for the creation of provincial assemblies and even drew up a schedule for the gradual implementation of constitutional monarchy. Yuan Shikai, while hostile to any body that he could not directly control, toward the end of his life seemed quite desperate to make links with any source of popular support and launched a doomed monarchical revival, and the Chiang Kai-shek regime, while no less suspicious, allowed the existence of a Legislative Yuan and National Assembly, and paid at least lip service to the idea of village self-government. On the xinzheng constitutional programme, see Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy." On Yuan Shikai, see Ernest Young, "Yuan Shikai as a conservative modemizer," in Charlotte Furth, The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservatism in Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 171-190. weakness and underdevelopment and into strength and power. The xinzheng programme set a new template for the evolution of a "modem" Chinese state: first by replacing the imperial Six Boards with modernstyle ministries, and secondly by systematically drawing up plans to project central government power much further than ever before into the provinces.6 Although the xinzheng and subsequent Republican-era centralizers claimed to adhere to the principle of mechanisms through which those at local levels could have input into the decision-making process or manage their own affairs, throughout the Republican period, consultative bodies, representative institutions and regularized channels of articulation from below were minor strains in the dominant theme of centrally ordained statism and national unity.7 The vast majority of those with executive power were socially conservative military men, and the socializing effects of a career in the military plus the structural predisposition of all executives to want more discretionary power made them even more consistent in their collective distaste for all forms of political participation and expression that they could not directly control. Virtually all executives in the Republican period also conflated their own personal reach with central government power, and in turn central government power with the good of the country as a whole; conversely, any identifiable group or interest that in any way acted as a brake on the executive's policies was excoriated as subversive of the greater good of the nation. Thus in the 1910s Yuan Shikai dissolved the National Assembly and for a time succeeded in abolishing provincial assemblies as well, characterizing them as the preserve of selfish individuals. In the 1920s, a long line of Beiyang warlords periodically packed what remained of the National Assembly to draft constitutions that would legitimize their rule while they hurled epithets at each other as being detrimental to national unity. Finally, in the 1930s and 1940s Chiang 6. The xinzheng era, important as it is for the subsequent evolution of the 20th-century Chinese state, remains crucially understudied. Some of the more important works on this period include: Mary C. Wright, China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-11 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977), chs. 1-2; Esther Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy," unpublished dissertation, Radcliffe College, 1959; and Paul Hickey, "Fee taking, salary reform and the structure of state power in late Qing China, 1909-11," Modern China, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 389-417. 7. There was much about the xinzheng reform package that was either ambivalent or unclear, and this lack of clarity particularly stood out in the delicate issue of relative degrees of centralization and decentralization, an issue that continued to reverberate through the remainder of the 20th century. The late Qing xinzheng reforms allowed for the creation of provincial assemblies and even drew up a schedule for the gradual implementation of constitutional monarchy. Yuan Shikai, while hostile to any body that he could not directly control, toward the end of his life seemed quite desperate to make links with any source of popular support and launched a doomed monarchical revival, and the Chiang Kai-shek regime, while no less suspicious, allowed the existence of a Legislative Yuan and National Assembly, and paid at least lip service to the idea of village self-government. On the xinzheng constitutional programme, see Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy." On Yuan Shikai, see Ernest Young, "Yuan Shikai as a conservative modemizer," in Charlotte Furth, The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservatism in Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 171-190. weakness and underdevelopment and into strength and power. The xinzheng programme set a new template for the evolution of a "modem" Chinese state: first by replacing the imperial Six Boards with modernstyle ministries, and secondly by systematically drawing up plans to project central government power much further than ever before into the provinces.6 Although the xinzheng and subsequent Republican-era centralizers claimed to adhere to the principle of mechanisms through which those at local levels could have input into the decision-making process or manage their own affairs, throughout the Republican period, consultative bodies, representative institutions and regularized channels of articulation from below were minor strains in the dominant theme of centrally ordained statism and national unity.7 The vast majority of those with executive power were socially conservative military men, and the socializing effects of a career in the military plus the structural predisposition of all executives to want more discretionary power made them even more consistent in their collective distaste for all forms of political participation and expression that they could not directly control. Virtually all executives in the Republican period also conflated their own personal reach with central government power, and in turn central government power with the good of the country as a whole; conversely, any identifiable group or interest that in any way acted as a brake on the executive's policies was excoriated as subversive of the greater good of the nation. Thus in the 1910s Yuan Shikai dissolved the National Assembly and for a time succeeded in abolishing provincial assemblies as well, characterizing them as the preserve of selfish individuals. In the 1920s, a long line of Beiyang warlords periodically packed what remained of the National Assembly to draft constitutions that would legitimize their rule while they hurled epithets at each other as being detrimental to national unity. Finally, in the 1930s and 1940s Chiang 6. The xinzheng era, important as it is for the subsequent evolution of the 20th-century Chinese state, remains crucially understudied. Some of the more important works on this period include: Mary C. Wright, China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-11 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977), chs. 1-2; Esther Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy," unpublished dissertation, Radcliffe College, 1959; and Paul Hickey, "Fee taking, salary reform and the structure of state power in late Qing China, 1909-11," Modern China, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 389-417. 7. There was much about the xinzheng reform package that was either ambivalent or unclear, and this lack of clarity particularly stood out in the delicate issue of relative degrees of centralization and decentralization, an issue that continued to reverberate through the remainder of the 20th century. The late Qing xinzheng reforms allowed for the creation of provincial assemblies and even drew up a schedule for the gradual implementation of constitutional monarchy. Yuan Shikai, while hostile to any body that he could not directly control, toward the end of his life seemed quite desperate to make links with any source of popular support and launched a doomed monarchical revival, and the Chiang Kai-shek regime, while no less suspicious, allowed the existence of a Legislative Yuan and National Assembly, and paid at least lip service to the idea of village self-government. On the xinzheng constitutional programme, see Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy." On Yuan Shikai, see Ernest Young, "Yuan Shikai as a conservative modemizer," in Charlotte Furth, The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservatism in Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 171-190. weakness and underdevelopment and into strength and power. The xinzheng programme set a new template for the evolution of a "modem" Chinese state: first by replacing the imperial Six Boards with modernstyle ministries, and secondly by systematically drawing up plans to project central government power much further than ever before into the provinces.6 Although the xinzheng and subsequent Republican-era centralizers claimed to adhere to the principle of mechanisms through which those at local levels could have input into the decision-making process or manage their own affairs, throughout the Republican period, consultative bodies, representative institutions and regularized channels of articulation from below were minor strains in the dominant theme of centrally ordained statism and national unity.7 The vast majority of those with executive power were socially conservative military men, and the socializing effects of a career in the military plus the structural predisposition of all executives to want more discretionary power made them even more consistent in their collective distaste for all forms of political participation and expression that they could not directly control. Virtually all executives in the Republican period also conflated their own personal reach with central government power, and in turn central government power with the good of the country as a whole; conversely, any identifiable group or interest that in any way acted as a brake on the executive's policies was excoriated as subversive of the greater good of the nation. Thus in the 1910s Yuan Shikai dissolved the National Assembly and for a time succeeded in abolishing provincial assemblies as well, characterizing them as the preserve of selfish individuals. In the 1920s, a long line of Beiyang warlords periodically packed what remained of the National Assembly to draft constitutions that would legitimize their rule while they hurled epithets at each other as being detrimental to national unity. Finally, in the 1930s and 1940s Chiang 6. The xinzheng era, important as it is for the subsequent evolution of the 20th-century Chinese state, remains crucially understudied. Some of the more important works on this period include: Mary C. Wright, China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-11 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977), chs. 1-2; Esther Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy," unpublished dissertation, Radcliffe College, 1959; and Paul Hickey, "Fee taking, salary reform and the structure of state power in late Qing China, 1909-11," Modern China, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 389-417. 7. There was much about the xinzheng reform package that was either ambivalent or unclear, and this lack of clarity particularly stood out in the delicate issue of relative degrees of centralization and decentralization, an issue that continued to reverberate through the remainder of the 20th century. The late Qing xinzheng reforms allowed for the creation of provincial assemblies and even drew up a schedule for the gradual implementation of constitutional monarchy. Yuan Shikai, while hostile to any body that he could not directly control, toward the end of his life seemed quite desperate to make links with any source of popular support and launched a doomed monarchical revival, and the Chiang Kai-shek regime, while no less suspicious, allowed the existence of a Legislative Yuan and National Assembly, and paid at least lip service to the idea of village self-government. On the xinzheng constitutional programme, see Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy." On Yuan Shikai, see Ernest Young, "Yuan Shikai as a conservative modemizer," in Charlotte Furth, The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservatism in Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 171-190. weakness and underdevelopment and into strength and power. The xinzheng programme set a new template for the evolution of a "modem" Chinese state: first by replacing the imperial Six Boards with modernstyle ministries, and secondly by systematically drawing up plans to project central government power much further than ever before into the provinces.6 Although the xinzheng and subsequent Republican-era centralizers claimed to adhere to the principle of mechanisms through which those at local levels could have input into the decision-making process or manage their own affairs, throughout the Republican period, consultative bodies, representative institutions and regularized channels of articulation from below were minor strains in the dominant theme of centrally ordained statism and national unity.7 The vast majority of those with executive power were socially conservative military men, and the socializing effects of a career in the military plus the structural predisposition of all executives to want more discretionary power made them even more consistent in their collective distaste for all forms of political participation and expression that they could not directly control. Virtually all executives in the Republican period also conflated their own personal reach with central government power, and in turn central government power with the good of the country as a whole; conversely, any identifiable group or interest that in any way acted as a brake on the executive's policies was excoriated as subversive of the greater good of the nation. Thus in the 1910s Yuan Shikai dissolved the National Assembly and for a time succeeded in abolishing provincial assemblies as well, characterizing them as the preserve of selfish individuals. In the 1920s, a long line of Beiyang warlords periodically packed what remained of the National Assembly to draft constitutions that would legitimize their rule while they hurled epithets at each other as being detrimental to national unity. Finally, in the 1930s and 1940s Chiang 6. The xinzheng era, important as it is for the subsequent evolution of the 20th-century Chinese state, remains crucially understudied. Some of the more important works on this period include: Mary C. Wright, China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-11 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977), chs. 1-2; Esther Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy," unpublished dissertation, Radcliffe College, 1959; and Paul Hickey, "Fee taking, salary reform and the structure of state power in late Qing China, 1909-11," Modern China, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 389-417. 7. There was much about the xinzheng reform package that was either ambivalent or unclear, and this lack of clarity particularly stood out in the delicate issue of relative degrees of centralization and decentralization, an issue that continued to reverberate through the remainder of the 20th century. The late Qing xinzheng reforms allowed for the creation of provincial assemblies and even drew up a schedule for the gradual implementation of constitutional monarchy. Yuan Shikai, while hostile to any body that he could not directly control, toward the end of his life seemed quite desperate to make links with any source of popular support and launched a doomed monarchical revival, and the Chiang Kai-shek regime, while no less suspicious, allowed the existence of a Legislative Yuan and National Assembly, and paid at least lip service to the idea of village self-government. On the xinzheng constitutional programme, see Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy." On Yuan Shikai, see Ernest Young, "Yuan Shikai as a conservative modemizer," in Charlotte Furth, The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservatism in Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 171-190. weakness and underdevelopment and into strength and power. The xinzheng programme set a new template for the evolution of a "modem" Chinese state: first by replacing the imperial Six Boards with modernstyle ministries, and secondly by systematically drawing up plans to project central government power much further than ever before into the provinces.6 Although the xinzheng and subsequent Republican-era centralizers claimed to adhere to the principle of mechanisms through which those at local levels could have input into the decision-making process or manage their own affairs, throughout the Republican period, consultative bodies, representative institutions and regularized channels of articulation from below were minor strains in the dominant theme of centrally ordained statism and national unity.7 The vast majority of those with executive power were socially conservative military men, and the socializing effects of a career in the military plus the structural predisposition of all executives to want more discretionary power made them even more consistent in their collective distaste for all forms of political participation and expression that they could not directly control. Virtually all executives in the Republican period also conflated their own personal reach with central government power, and in turn central government power with the good of the country as a whole; conversely, any identifiable group or interest that in any way acted as a brake on the executive's policies was excoriated as subversive of the greater good of the nation. Thus in the 1910s Yuan Shikai dissolved the National Assembly and for a time succeeded in abolishing provincial assemblies as well, characterizing them as the preserve of selfish individuals. In the 1920s, a long line of Beiyang warlords periodically packed what remained of the National Assembly to draft constitutions that would legitimize their rule while they hurled epithets at each other as being detrimental to national unity. Finally, in the 1930s and 1940s Chiang 6. The xinzheng era, important as it is for the subsequent evolution of the 20th-century Chinese state, remains crucially understudied. Some of the more important works on this period include: Mary C. Wright, China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-11 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977), chs. 1-2; Esther Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy," unpublished dissertation, Radcliffe College, 1959; and Paul Hickey, "Fee taking, salary reform and the structure of state power in late Qing China, 1909-11," Modern China, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 389-417. 7. There was much about the xinzheng reform package that was either ambivalent or unclear, and this lack of clarity particularly stood out in the delicate issue of relative degrees of centralization and decentralization, an issue that continued to reverberate through the remainder of the 20th century. The late Qing xinzheng reforms allowed for the creation of provincial assemblies and even drew up a schedule for the gradual implementation of constitutional monarchy. Yuan Shikai, while hostile to any body that he could not directly control, toward the end of his life seemed quite desperate to make links with any source of popular support and launched a doomed monarchical revival, and the Chiang Kai-shek regime, while no less suspicious, allowed the existence of a Legislative Yuan and National Assembly, and paid at least lip service to the idea of village self-government. On the xinzheng constitutional programme, see Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy." On Yuan Shikai, see Ernest Young, "Yuan Shikai as a conservative modemizer," in Charlotte Furth, The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservatism in Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 171-190. weakness and underdevelopment and into strength and power. The xinzheng programme set a new template for the evolution of a "modem" Chinese state: first by replacing the imperial Six Boards with modernstyle ministries, and secondly by systematically drawing up plans to project central government power much further than ever before into the provinces.6 Although the xinzheng and subsequent Republican-era centralizers claimed to adhere to the principle of mechanisms through which those at local levels could have input into the decision-making process or manage their own affairs, throughout the Republican period, consultative bodies, representative institutions and regularized channels of articulation from below were minor strains in the dominant theme of centrally ordained statism and national unity.7 The vast majority of those with executive power were socially conservative military men, and the socializing effects of a career in the military plus the structural predisposition of all executives to want more discretionary power made them even more consistent in their collective distaste for all forms of political participation and expression that they could not directly control. Virtually all executives in the Republican period also conflated their own personal reach with central government power, and in turn central government power with the good of the country as a whole; conversely, any identifiable group or interest that in any way acted as a brake on the executive's policies was excoriated as subversive of the greater good of the nation. Thus in the 1910s Yuan Shikai dissolved the National Assembly and for a time succeeded in abolishing provincial assemblies as well, characterizing them as the preserve of selfish individuals. In the 1920s, a long line of Beiyang warlords periodically packed what remained of the National Assembly to draft constitutions that would legitimize their rule while they hurled epithets at each other as being detrimental to national unity. Finally, in the 1930s and 1940s Chiang 6. The xinzheng era, important as it is for the subsequent evolution of the 20th-century Chinese state, remains crucially understudied. Some of the more important works on this period include: Mary C. Wright, China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-11 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977), chs. 1-2; Esther Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy," unpublished dissertation, Radcliffe College, 1959; and Paul Hickey, "Fee taking, salary reform and the structure of state power in late Qing China, 1909-11," Modern China, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 389-417. 7. There was much about the xinzheng reform package that was either ambivalent or unclear, and this lack of clarity particularly stood out in the delicate issue of relative degrees of centralization and decentralization, an issue that continued to reverberate through the remainder of the 20th century. The late Qing xinzheng reforms allowed for the creation of provincial assemblies and even drew up a schedule for the gradual implementation of constitutional monarchy. Yuan Shikai, while hostile to any body that he could not directly control, toward the end of his life seemed quite desperate to make links with any source of popular support and launched a doomed monarchical revival, and the Chiang Kai-shek regime, while no less suspicious, allowed the existence of a Legislative Yuan and National Assembly, and paid at least lip service to the idea of village self-government. On the xinzheng constitutional programme, see Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy." On Yuan Shikai, see Ernest Young, "Yuan Shikai as a conservative modemizer," in Charlotte Furth, The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservatism in Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 171-190. weakness and underdevelopment and into strength and power. The xinzheng programme set a new template for the evolution of a "modem" Chinese state: first by replacing the imperial Six Boards with modernstyle ministries, and secondly by systematically drawing up plans to project central government power much further than ever before into the provinces.6 Although the xinzheng and subsequent Republican-era centralizers claimed to adhere to the principle of mechanisms through which those at local levels could have input into the decision-making process or manage their own affairs, throughout the Republican period, consultative bodies, representative institutions and regularized channels of articulation from below were minor strains in the dominant theme of centrally ordained statism and national unity.7 The vast majority of those with executive power were socially conservative military men, and the socializing effects of a career in the military plus the structural predisposition of all executives to want more discretionary power made them even more consistent in their collective distaste for all forms of political participation and expression that they could not directly control. Virtually all executives in the Republican period also conflated their own personal reach with central government power, and in turn central government power with the good of the country as a whole; conversely, any identifiable group or interest that in any way acted as a brake on the executive's policies was excoriated as subversive of the greater good of the nation. Thus in the 1910s Yuan Shikai dissolved the National Assembly and for a time succeeded in abolishing provincial assemblies as well, characterizing them as the preserve of selfish individuals. In the 1920s, a long line of Beiyang warlords periodically packed what remained of the National Assembly to draft constitutions that would legitimize their rule while they hurled epithets at each other as being detrimental to national unity. Finally, in the 1930s and 1940s Chiang 6. The xinzheng era, important as it is for the subsequent evolution of the 20th-century Chinese state, remains crucially understudied. Some of the more important works on this period include: Mary C. Wright, China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-11 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977), chs. 1-2; Esther Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy," unpublished dissertation, Radcliffe College, 1959; and Paul Hickey, "Fee taking, salary reform and the structure of state power in late Qing China, 1909-11," Modern China, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 389-417. 7. There was much about the xinzheng reform package that was either ambivalent or unclear, and this lack of clarity particularly stood out in the delicate issue of relative degrees of centralization and decentralization, an issue that continued to reverberate through the remainder of the 20th century. The late Qing xinzheng reforms allowed for the creation of provincial assemblies and even drew up a schedule for the gradual implementation of constitutional monarchy. Yuan Shikai, while hostile to any body that he could not directly control, toward the end of his life seemed quite desperate to make links with any source of popular support and launched a doomed monarchical revival, and the Chiang Kai-shek regime, while no less suspicious, allowed the existence of a Legislative Yuan and National Assembly, and paid at least lip service to the idea of village self-government. On the xinzheng constitutional programme, see Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy." On Yuan Shikai, see Ernest Young, "Yuan Shikai as a conservative modemizer," in Charlotte Furth, The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservatism in Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 171-190. weakness and underdevelopment and into strength and power. The xinzheng programme set a new template for the evolution of a "modem" Chinese state: first by replacing the imperial Six Boards with modernstyle ministries, and secondly by systematically drawing up plans to project central government power much further than ever before into the provinces.6 Although the xinzheng and subsequent Republican-era centralizers claimed to adhere to the principle of mechanisms through which those at local levels could have input into the decision-making process or manage their own affairs, throughout the Republican period, consultative bodies, representative institutions and regularized channels of articulation from below were minor strains in the dominant theme of centrally ordained statism and national unity.7 The vast majority of those with executive power were socially conservative military men, and the socializing effects of a career in the military plus the structural predisposition of all executives to want more discretionary power made them even more consistent in their collective distaste for all forms of political participation and expression that they could not directly control. Virtually all executives in the Republican period also conflated their own personal reach with central government power, and in turn central government power with the good of the country as a whole; conversely, any identifiable group or interest that in any way acted as a brake on the executive's policies was excoriated as subversive of the greater good of the nation. Thus in the 1910s Yuan Shikai dissolved the National Assembly and for a time succeeded in abolishing provincial assemblies as well, characterizing them as the preserve of selfish individuals. In the 1920s, a long line of Beiyang warlords periodically packed what remained of the National Assembly to draft constitutions that would legitimize their rule while they hurled epithets at each other as being detrimental to national unity. Finally, in the 1930s and 1940s Chiang 6. The xinzheng era, important as it is for the subsequent evolution of the 20th-century Chinese state, remains crucially understudied. Some of the more important works on this period include: Mary C. Wright, China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-11 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977), chs. 1-2; Esther Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy," unpublished dissertation, Radcliffe College, 1959; and Paul Hickey, "Fee taking, salary reform and the structure of state power in late Qing China, 1909-11," Modern China, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 389-417. 7. There was much about the xinzheng reform package that was either ambivalent or unclear, and this lack of clarity particularly stood out in the delicate issue of relative degrees of centralization and decentralization, an issue that continued to reverberate through the remainder of the 20th century. The late Qing xinzheng reforms allowed for the creation of provincial assemblies and even drew up a schedule for the gradual implementation of constitutional monarchy. Yuan Shikai, while hostile to any body that he could not directly control, toward the end of his life seemed quite desperate to make links with any source of popular support and launched a doomed monarchical revival, and the Chiang Kai-shek regime, while no less suspicious, allowed the existence of a Legislative Yuan and National Assembly, and paid at least lip service to the idea of village self-government. On the xinzheng constitutional programme, see Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy." On Yuan Shikai, see Ernest Young, "Yuan Shikai as a conservative modemizer," in Charlotte Furth, The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservatism in Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 171-190. weakness and underdevelopment and into strength and power. The xinzheng programme set a new template for the evolution of a "modem" Chinese state: first by replacing the imperial Six Boards with modernstyle ministries, and secondly by systematically drawing up plans to project central government power much further than ever before into the provinces.6 Although the xinzheng and subsequent Republican-era centralizers claimed to adhere to the principle of mechanisms through which those at local levels could have input into the decision-making process or manage their own affairs, throughout the Republican period, consultative bodies, representative institutions and regularized channels of articulation from below were minor strains in the dominant theme of centrally ordained statism and national unity.7 The vast majority of those with executive power were socially conservative military men, and the socializing effects of a career in the military plus the structural predisposition of all executives to want more discretionary power made them even more consistent in their collective distaste for all forms of political participation and expression that they could not directly control. Virtually all executives in the Republican period also conflated their own personal reach with central government power, and in turn central government power with the good of the country as a whole; conversely, any identifiable group or interest that in any way acted as a brake on the executive's policies was excoriated as subversive of the greater good of the nation. Thus in the 1910s Yuan Shikai dissolved the National Assembly and for a time succeeded in abolishing provincial assemblies as well, characterizing them as the preserve of selfish individuals. In the 1920s, a long line of Beiyang warlords periodically packed what remained of the National Assembly to draft constitutions that would legitimize their rule while they hurled epithets at each other as being detrimental to national unity. Finally, in the 1930s and 1940s Chiang 6. The xinzheng era, important as it is for the subsequent evolution of the 20th-century Chinese state, remains crucially understudied. Some of the more important works on this period include: Mary C. Wright, China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-11 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977), chs. 1-2; Esther Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy," unpublished dissertation, Radcliffe College, 1959; and Paul Hickey, "Fee taking, salary reform and the structure of state power in late Qing China, 1909-11," Modern China, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 389-417. 7. There was much about the xinzheng reform package that was either ambivalent or unclear, and this lack of clarity particularly stood out in the delicate issue of relative degrees of centralization and decentralization, an issue that continued to reverberate through the remainder of the 20th century. The late Qing xinzheng reforms allowed for the creation of provincial assemblies and even drew up a schedule for the gradual implementation of constitutional monarchy. Yuan Shikai, while hostile to any body that he could not directly control, toward the end of his life seemed quite desperate to make links with any source of popular support and launched a doomed monarchical revival, and the Chiang Kai-shek regime, while no less suspicious, allowed the existence of a Legislative Yuan and National Assembly, and paid at least lip service to the idea of village self-government. On the xinzheng constitutional programme, see Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy." On Yuan Shikai, see Ernest Young, "Yuan Shikai as a conservative modemizer," in Charlotte Furth, The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservatism in Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 171-190. weakness and underdevelopment and into strength and power. The xinzheng programme set a new template for the evolution of a "modem" Chinese state: first by replacing the imperial Six Boards with modernstyle ministries, and secondly by systematically drawing up plans to project central government power much further than ever before into the provinces.6 Although the xinzheng and subsequent Republican-era centralizers claimed to adhere to the principle of mechanisms through which those at local levels could have input into the decision-making process or manage their own affairs, throughout the Republican period, consultative bodies, representative institutions and regularized channels of articulation from below were minor strains in the dominant theme of centrally ordained statism and national unity.7 The vast majority of those with executive power were socially conservative military men, and the socializing effects of a career in the military plus the structural predisposition of all executives to want more discretionary power made them even more consistent in their collective distaste for all forms of political participation and expression that they could not directly control. Virtually all executives in the Republican period also conflated their own personal reach with central government power, and in turn central government power with the good of the country as a whole; conversely, any identifiable group or interest that in any way acted as a brake on the executive's policies was excoriated as subversive of the greater good of the nation. Thus in the 1910s Yuan Shikai dissolved the National Assembly and for a time succeeded in abolishing provincial assemblies as well, characterizing them as the preserve of selfish individuals. In the 1920s, a long line of Beiyang warlords periodically packed what remained of the National Assembly to draft constitutions that would legitimize their rule while they hurled epithets at each other as being detrimental to national unity. Finally, in the 1930s and 1940s Chiang 6. The xinzheng era, important as it is for the subsequent evolution of the 20th-century Chinese state, remains crucially understudied. Some of the more important works on this period include: Mary C. Wright, China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-11 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977), chs. 1-2; Esther Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy," unpublished dissertation, Radcliffe College, 1959; and Paul Hickey, "Fee taking, salary reform and the structure of state power in late Qing China, 1909-11," Modern China, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 389-417. 7. There was much about the xinzheng reform package that was either ambivalent or unclear, and this lack of clarity particularly stood out in the delicate issue of relative degrees of centralization and decentralization, an issue that continued to reverberate through the remainder of the 20th century. The late Qing xinzheng reforms allowed for the creation of provincial assemblies and even drew up a schedule for the gradual implementation of constitutional monarchy. Yuan Shikai, while hostile to any body that he could not directly control, toward the end of his life seemed quite desperate to make links with any source of popular support and launched a doomed monarchical revival, and the Chiang Kai-shek regime, while no less suspicious, allowed the existence of a Legislative Yuan and National Assembly, and paid at least lip service to the idea of village self-government. On the xinzheng constitutional programme, see Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy." On Yuan Shikai, see Ernest Young, "Yuan Shikai as a conservative modemizer," in Charlotte Furth, The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservatism in Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 171-190. weakness and underdevelopment and into strength and power. The xinzheng programme set a new template for the evolution of a "modem" Chinese state: first by replacing the imperial Six Boards with modernstyle ministries, and secondly by systematically drawing up plans to project central government power much further than ever before into the provinces.6 Although the xinzheng and subsequent Republican-era centralizers claimed to adhere to the principle of mechanisms through which those at local levels could have input into the decision-making process or manage their own affairs, throughout the Republican period, consultative bodies, representative institutions and regularized channels of articulation from below were minor strains in the dominant theme of centrally ordained statism and national unity.7 The vast majority of those with executive power were socially conservative military men, and the socializing effects of a career in the military plus the structural predisposition of all executives to want more discretionary power made them even more consistent in their collective distaste for all forms of political participation and expression that they could not directly control. Virtually all executives in the Republican period also conflated their own personal reach with central government power, and in turn central government power with the good of the country as a whole; conversely, any identifiable group or interest that in any way acted as a brake on the executive's policies was excoriated as subversive of the greater good of the nation. Thus in the 1910s Yuan Shikai dissolved the National Assembly and for a time succeeded in abolishing provincial assemblies as well, characterizing them as the preserve of selfish individuals. In the 1920s, a long line of Beiyang warlords periodically packed what remained of the National Assembly to draft constitutions that would legitimize their rule while they hurled epithets at each other as being detrimental to national unity. Finally, in the 1930s and 1940s Chiang 6. The xinzheng era, important as it is for the subsequent evolution of the 20th-century Chinese state, remains crucially understudied. Some of the more important works on this period include: Mary C. Wright, China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-11 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977), chs. 1-2; Esther Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy," unpublished dissertation, Radcliffe College, 1959; and Paul Hickey, "Fee taking, salary reform and the structure of state power in late Qing China, 1909-11," Modern China, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 389-417. 7. There was much about the xinzheng reform package that was either ambivalent or unclear, and this lack of clarity particularly stood out in the delicate issue of relative degrees of centralization and decentralization, an issue that continued to reverberate through the remainder of the 20th century. The late Qing xinzheng reforms allowed for the creation of provincial assemblies and even drew up a schedule for the gradual implementation of constitutional monarchy. Yuan Shikai, while hostile to any body that he could not directly control, toward the end of his life seemed quite desperate to make links with any source of popular support and launched a doomed monarchical revival, and the Chiang Kai-shek regime, while no less suspicious, allowed the existence of a Legislative Yuan and National Assembly, and paid at least lip service to the idea of village self-government. On the xinzheng constitutional programme, see Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy." On Yuan Shikai, see Ernest Young, "Yuan Shikai as a conservative modemizer," in Charlotte Furth, The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservatism in Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 171-190. weakness and underdevelopment and into strength and power. The xinzheng programme set a new template for the evolution of a "modem" Chinese state: first by replacing the imperial Six Boards with modernstyle ministries, and secondly by systematically drawing up plans to project central government power much further than ever before into the provinces.6 Although the xinzheng and subsequent Republican-era centralizers claimed to adhere to the principle of mechanisms through which those at local levels could have input into the decision-making process or manage their own affairs, throughout the Republican period, consultative bodies, representative institutions and regularized channels of articulation from below were minor strains in the dominant theme of centrally ordained statism and national unity.7 The vast majority of those with executive power were socially conservative military men, and the socializing effects of a career in the military plus the structural predisposition of all executives to want more discretionary power made them even more consistent in their collective distaste for all forms of political participation and expression that they could not directly control. Virtually all executives in the Republican period also conflated their own personal reach with central government power, and in turn central government power with the good of the country as a whole; conversely, any identifiable group or interest that in any way acted as a brake on the executive's policies was excoriated as subversive of the greater good of the nation. Thus in the 1910s Yuan Shikai dissolved the National Assembly and for a time succeeded in abolishing provincial assemblies as well, characterizing them as the preserve of selfish individuals. In the 1920s, a long line of Beiyang warlords periodically packed what remained of the National Assembly to draft constitutions that would legitimize their rule while they hurled epithets at each other as being detrimental to national unity. Finally, in the 1930s and 1940s Chiang 6. The xinzheng era, important as it is for the subsequent evolution of the 20th-century Chinese state, remains crucially understudied. Some of the more important works on this period include: Mary C. Wright, China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-11 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977), chs. 1-2; Esther Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy," unpublished dissertation, Radcliffe College, 1959; and Paul Hickey, "Fee taking, salary reform and the structure of state power in late Qing China, 1909-11," Modern China, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 389-417. 7. There was much about the xinzheng reform package that was either ambivalent or unclear, and this lack of clarity particularly stood out in the delicate issue of relative degrees of centralization and decentralization, an issue that continued to reverberate through the remainder of the 20th century. The late Qing xinzheng reforms allowed for the creation of provincial assemblies and even drew up a schedule for the gradual implementation of constitutional monarchy. Yuan Shikai, while hostile to any body that he could not directly control, toward the end of his life seemed quite desperate to make links with any source of popular support and launched a doomed monarchical revival, and the Chiang Kai-shek regime, while no less suspicious, allowed the existence of a Legislative Yuan and National Assembly, and paid at least lip service to the idea of village self-government. On the xinzheng constitutional programme, see Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy." On Yuan Shikai, see Ernest Young, "Yuan Shikai as a conservative modemizer," in Charlotte Furth, The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservatism in Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 171-190. weakness and underdevelopment and into strength and power. The xinzheng programme set a new template for the evolution of a "modem" Chinese state: first by replacing the imperial Six Boards with modernstyle ministries, and secondly by systematically drawing up plans to project central government power much further than ever before into the provinces.6 Although the xinzheng and subsequent Republican-era centralizers claimed to adhere to the principle of mechanisms through which those at local levels could have input into the decision-making process or manage their own affairs, throughout the Republican period, consultative bodies, representative institutions and regularized channels of articulation from below were minor strains in the dominant theme of centrally ordained statism and national unity.7 The vast majority of those with executive power were socially conservative military men, and the socializing effects of a career in the military plus the structural predisposition of all executives to want more discretionary power made them even more consistent in their collective distaste for all forms of political participation and expression that they could not directly control. Virtually all executives in the Republican period also conflated their own personal reach with central government power, and in turn central government power with the good of the country as a whole; conversely, any identifiable group or interest that in any way acted as a brake on the executive's policies was excoriated as subversive of the greater good of the nation. Thus in the 1910s Yuan Shikai dissolved the National Assembly and for a time succeeded in abolishing provincial assemblies as well, characterizing them as the preserve of selfish individuals. In the 1920s, a long line of Beiyang warlords periodically packed what remained of the National Assembly to draft constitutions that would legitimize their rule while they hurled epithets at each other as being detrimental to national unity. Finally, in the 1930s and 1940s Chiang 6. The xinzheng era, important as it is for the subsequent evolution of the 20th-century Chinese state, remains crucially understudied. Some of the more important works on this period include: Mary C. Wright, China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-11 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977), chs. 1-2; Esther Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy," unpublished dissertation, Radcliffe College, 1959; and Paul Hickey, "Fee taking, salary reform and the structure of state power in late Qing China, 1909-11," Modern China, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 389-417. 7. There was much about the xinzheng reform package that was either ambivalent or unclear, and this lack of clarity particularly stood out in the delicate issue of relative degrees of centralization and decentralization, an issue that continued to reverberate through the remainder of the 20th century. The late Qing xinzheng reforms allowed for the creation of provincial assemblies and even drew up a schedule for the gradual implementation of constitutional monarchy. Yuan Shikai, while hostile to any body that he could not directly control, toward the end of his life seemed quite desperate to make links with any source of popular support and launched a doomed monarchical revival, and the Chiang Kai-shek regime, while no less suspicious, allowed the existence of a Legislative Yuan and National Assembly, and paid at least lip service to the idea of village self-government. On the xinzheng constitutional programme, see Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy." On Yuan Shikai, see Ernest Young, "Yuan Shikai as a conservative modemizer," in Charlotte Furth, The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservatism in Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 171-190. weakness and underdevelopment and into strength and power. The xinzheng programme set a new template for the evolution of a "modem" Chinese state: first by replacing the imperial Six Boards with modernstyle ministries, and secondly by systematically drawing up plans to project central government power much further than ever before into the provinces.6 Although the xinzheng and subsequent Republican-era centralizers claimed to adhere to the principle of mechanisms through which those at local levels could have input into the decision-making process or manage their own affairs, throughout the Republican period, consultative bodies, representative institutions and regularized channels of articulation from below were minor strains in the dominant theme of centrally ordained statism and national unity.7 The vast majority of those with executive power were socially conservative military men, and the socializing effects of a career in the military plus the structural predisposition of all executives to want more discretionary power made them even more consistent in their collective distaste for all forms of political participation and expression that they could not directly control. Virtually all executives in the Republican period also conflated their own personal reach with central government power, and in turn central government power with the good of the country as a whole; conversely, any identifiable group or interest that in any way acted as a brake on the executive's policies was excoriated as subversive of the greater good of the nation. Thus in the 1910s Yuan Shikai dissolved the National Assembly and for a time succeeded in abolishing provincial assemblies as well, characterizing them as the preserve of selfish individuals. In the 1920s, a long line of Beiyang warlords periodically packed what remained of the National Assembly to draft constitutions that would legitimize their rule while they hurled epithets at each other as being detrimental to national unity. Finally, in the 1930s and 1940s Chiang 6. The xinzheng era, important as it is for the subsequent evolution of the 20th-century Chinese state, remains crucially understudied. Some of the more important works on this period include: Mary C. Wright, China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-11 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977), chs. 1-2; Esther Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy," unpublished dissertation, Radcliffe College, 1959; and Paul Hickey, "Fee taking, salary reform and the structure of state power in late Qing China, 1909-11," Modern China, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 389-417. 7. There was much about the xinzheng reform package that was either ambivalent or unclear, and this lack of clarity particularly stood out in the delicate issue of relative degrees of centralization and decentralization, an issue that continued to reverberate through the remainder of the 20th century. The late Qing xinzheng reforms allowed for the creation of provincial assemblies and even drew up a schedule for the gradual implementation of constitutional monarchy. Yuan Shikai, while hostile to any body that he could not directly control, toward the end of his life seemed quite desperate to make links with any source of popular support and launched a doomed monarchical revival, and the Chiang Kai-shek regime, while no less suspicious, allowed the existence of a Legislative Yuan and National Assembly, and paid at least lip service to the idea of village self-government. On the xinzheng constitutional programme, see Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy." On Yuan Shikai, see Ernest Young, "Yuan Shikai as a conservative modemizer," in Charlotte Furth, The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservatism in Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 171-190. weakness and underdevelopment and into strength and power. The xinzheng programme set a new template for the evolution of a "modem" Chinese state: first by replacing the imperial Six Boards with modernstyle ministries, and secondly by systematically drawing up plans to project central government power much further than ever before into the provinces.6 Although the xinzheng and subsequent Republican-era centralizers claimed to adhere to the principle of mechanisms through which those at local levels could have input into the decision-making process or manage their own affairs, throughout the Republican period, consultative bodies, representative institutions and regularized channels of articulation from below were minor strains in the dominant theme of centrally ordained statism and national unity.7 The vast majority of those with executive power were socially conservative military men, and the socializing effects of a career in the military plus the structural predisposition of all executives to want more discretionary power made them even more consistent in their collective distaste for all forms of political participation and expression that they could not directly control. Virtually all executives in the Republican period also conflated their own personal reach with central government power, and in turn central government power with the good of the country as a whole; conversely, any identifiable group or interest that in any way acted as a brake on the executive's policies was excoriated as subversive of the greater good of the nation. Thus in the 1910s Yuan Shikai dissolved the National Assembly and for a time succeeded in abolishing provincial assemblies as well, characterizing them as the preserve of selfish individuals. In the 1920s, a long line of Beiyang warlords periodically packed what remained of the National Assembly to draft constitutions that would legitimize their rule while they hurled epithets at each other as being detrimental to national unity. Finally, in the 1930s and 1940s Chiang 6. The xinzheng era, important as it is for the subsequent evolution of the 20th-century Chinese state, remains crucially understudied. Some of the more important works on this period include: Mary C. Wright, China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-11 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977), chs. 1-2; Esther Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy," unpublished dissertation, Radcliffe College, 1959; and Paul Hickey, "Fee taking, salary reform and the structure of state power in late Qing China, 1909-11," Modern China, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 389-417. 7. There was much about the xinzheng reform package that was either ambivalent or unclear, and this lack of clarity particularly stood out in the delicate issue of relative degrees of centralization and decentralization, an issue that continued to reverberate through the remainder of the 20th century. The late Qing xinzheng reforms allowed for the creation of provincial assemblies and even drew up a schedule for the gradual implementation of constitutional monarchy. Yuan Shikai, while hostile to any body that he could not directly control, toward the end of his life seemed quite desperate to make links with any source of popular support and launched a doomed monarchical revival, and the Chiang Kai-shek regime, while no less suspicious, allowed the existence of a Legislative Yuan and National Assembly, and paid at least lip service to the idea of village self-government. On the xinzheng constitutional programme, see Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy." On Yuan Shikai, see Ernest Young, "Yuan Shikai as a conservative modemizer," in Charlotte Furth, The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservatism in Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 171-190. weakness and underdevelopment and into strength and power. The xinzheng programme set a new template for the evolution of a "modem" Chinese state: first by replacing the imperial Six Boards with modernstyle ministries, and secondly by systematically drawing up plans to project central government power much further than ever before into the provinces.6 Although the xinzheng and subsequent Republican-era centralizers claimed to adhere to the principle of mechanisms through which those at local levels could have input into the decision-making process or manage their own affairs, throughout the Republican period, consultative bodies, representative institutions and regularized channels of articulation from below were minor strains in the dominant theme of centrally ordained statism and national unity.7 The vast majority of those with executive power were socially conservative military men, and the socializing effects of a career in the military plus the structural predisposition of all executives to want more discretionary power made them even more consistent in their collective distaste for all forms of political participation and expression that they could not directly control. Virtually all executives in the Republican period also conflated their own personal reach with central government power, and in turn central government power with the good of the country as a whole; conversely, any identifiable group or interest that in any way acted as a brake on the executive's policies was excoriated as subversive of the greater good of the nation. Thus in the 1910s Yuan Shikai dissolved the National Assembly and for a time succeeded in abolishing provincial assemblies as well, characterizing them as the preserve of selfish individuals. In the 1920s, a long line of Beiyang warlords periodically packed what remained of the National Assembly to draft constitutions that would legitimize their rule while they hurled epithets at each other as being detrimental to national unity. Finally, in the 1930s and 1940s Chiang 6. The xinzheng era, important as it is for the subsequent evolution of the 20th-century Chinese state, remains crucially understudied. Some of the more important works on this period include: Mary C. Wright, China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-11 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977), chs. 1-2; Esther Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy," unpublished dissertation, Radcliffe College, 1959; and Paul Hickey, "Fee taking, salary reform and the structure of state power in late Qing China, 1909-11," Modern China, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 389-417. 7. There was much about the xinzheng reform package that was either ambivalent or unclear, and this lack of clarity particularly stood out in the delicate issue of relative degrees of centralization and decentralization, an issue that continued to reverberate through the remainder of the 20th century. The late Qing xinzheng reforms allowed for the creation of provincial assemblies and even drew up a schedule for the gradual implementation of constitutional monarchy. Yuan Shikai, while hostile to any body that he could not directly control, toward the end of his life seemed quite desperate to make links with any source of popular support and launched a doomed monarchical revival, and the Chiang Kai-shek regime, while no less suspicious, allowed the existence of a Legislative Yuan and National Assembly, and paid at least lip service to the idea of village self-government. On the xinzheng constitutional programme, see Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy." On Yuan Shikai, see Ernest Young, "Yuan Shikai as a conservative modemizer," in Charlotte Furth, The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservatism in Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 171-190. weakness and underdevelopment and into strength and power. The xinzheng programme set a new template for the evolution of a "modem" Chinese state: first by replacing the imperial Six Boards with modernstyle ministries, and secondly by systematically drawing up plans to project central government power much further than ever before into the provinces.6 Although the xinzheng and subsequent Republican-era centralizers claimed to adhere to the principle of mechanisms through which those at local levels could have input into the decision-making process or manage their own affairs, throughout the Republican period, consultative bodies, representative institutions and regularized channels of articulation from below were minor strains in the dominant theme of centrally ordained statism and national unity.7 The vast majority of those with executive power were socially conservative military men, and the socializing effects of a career in the military plus the structural predisposition of all executives to want more discretionary power made them even more consistent in their collective distaste for all forms of political participation and expression that they could not directly control. Virtually all executives in the Republican period also conflated their own personal reach with central government power, and in turn central government power with the good of the country as a whole; conversely, any identifiable group or interest that in any way acted as a brake on the executive's policies was excoriated as subversive of the greater good of the nation. Thus in the 1910s Yuan Shikai dissolved the National Assembly and for a time succeeded in abolishing provincial assemblies as well, characterizing them as the preserve of selfish individuals. In the 1920s, a long line of Beiyang warlords periodically packed what remained of the National Assembly to draft constitutions that would legitimize their rule while they hurled epithets at each other as being detrimental to national unity. Finally, in the 1930s and 1940s Chiang 6. The xinzheng era, important as it is for the subsequent evolution of the 20th-century Chinese state, remains crucially understudied. Some of the more important works on this period include: Mary C. Wright, China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-11 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977), chs. 1-2; Esther Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy," unpublished dissertation, Radcliffe College, 1959; and Paul Hickey, "Fee taking, salary reform and the structure of state power in late Qing China, 1909-11," Modern China, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 389-417. 7. There was much about the xinzheng reform package that was either ambivalent or unclear, and this lack of clarity particularly stood out in the delicate issue of relative degrees of centralization and decentralization, an issue that continued to reverberate through the remainder of the 20th century. The late Qing xinzheng reforms allowed for the creation of provincial assemblies and even drew up a schedule for the gradual implementation of constitutional monarchy. Yuan Shikai, while hostile to any body that he could not directly control, toward the end of his life seemed quite desperate to make links with any source of popular support and launched a doomed monarchical revival, and the Chiang Kai-shek regime, while no less suspicious, allowed the existence of a Legislative Yuan and National Assembly, and paid at least lip service to the idea of village self-government. On the xinzheng constitutional programme, see Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy." On Yuan Shikai, see Ernest Young, "Yuan Shikai as a conservative modemizer," in Charlotte Furth, The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservatism in Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 171-190. weakness and underdevelopment and into strength and power. The xinzheng programme set a new template for the evolution of a "modem" Chinese state: first by replacing the imperial Six Boards with modernstyle ministries, and secondly by systematically drawing up plans to project central government power much further than ever before into the provinces.6 Although the xinzheng and subsequent Republican-era centralizers claimed to adhere to the principle of mechanisms through which those at local levels could have input into the decision-making process or manage their own affairs, throughout the Republican period, consultative bodies, representative institutions and regularized channels of articulation from below were minor strains in the dominant theme of centrally ordained statism and national unity.7 The vast majority of those with executive power were socially conservative military men, and the socializing effects of a career in the military plus the structural predisposition of all executives to want more discretionary power made them even more consistent in their collective distaste for all forms of political participation and expression that they could not directly control. Virtually all executives in the Republican period also conflated their own personal reach with central government power, and in turn central government power with the good of the country as a whole; conversely, any identifiable group or interest that in any way acted as a brake on the executive's policies was excoriated as subversive of the greater good of the nation. Thus in the 1910s Yuan Shikai dissolved the National Assembly and for a time succeeded in abolishing provincial assemblies as well, characterizing them as the preserve of selfish individuals. In the 1920s, a long line of Beiyang warlords periodically packed what remained of the National Assembly to draft constitutions that would legitimize their rule while they hurled epithets at each other as being detrimental to national unity. Finally, in the 1930s and 1940s Chiang 6. The xinzheng era, important as it is for the subsequent evolution of the 20th-century Chinese state, remains crucially understudied. Some of the more important works on this period include: Mary C. Wright, China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-11 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977), chs. 1-2; Esther Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy," unpublished dissertation, Radcliffe College, 1959; and Paul Hickey, "Fee taking, salary reform and the structure of state power in late Qing China, 1909-11," Modern China, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 389-417. 7. There was much about the xinzheng reform package that was either ambivalent or unclear, and this lack of clarity particularly stood out in the delicate issue of relative degrees of centralization and decentralization, an issue that continued to reverberate through the remainder of the 20th century. The late Qing xinzheng reforms allowed for the creation of provincial assemblies and even drew up a schedule for the gradual implementation of constitutional monarchy. Yuan Shikai, while hostile to any body that he could not directly control, toward the end of his life seemed quite desperate to make links with any source of popular support and launched a doomed monarchical revival, and the Chiang Kai-shek regime, while no less suspicious, allowed the existence of a Legislative Yuan and National Assembly, and paid at least lip service to the idea of village self-government. On the xinzheng constitutional programme, see Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy." On Yuan Shikai, see Ernest Young, "Yuan Shikai as a conservative modemizer," in Charlotte Furth, The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservatism in Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 171-190. weakness and underdevelopment and into strength and power. The xinzheng programme set a new template for the evolution of a "modem" Chinese state: first by replacing the imperial Six Boards with modernstyle ministries, and secondly by systematically drawing up plans to project central government power much further than ever before into the provinces.6 Although the xinzheng and subsequent Republican-era centralizers claimed to adhere to the principle of mechanisms through which those at local levels could have input into the decision-making process or manage their own affairs, throughout the Republican period, consultative bodies, representative institutions and regularized channels of articulation from below were minor strains in the dominant theme of centrally ordained statism and national unity.7 The vast majority of those with executive power were socially conservative military men, and the socializing effects of a career in the military plus the structural predisposition of all executives to want more discretionary power made them even more consistent in their collective distaste for all forms of political participation and expression that they could not directly control. Virtually all executives in the Republican period also conflated their own personal reach with central government power, and in turn central government power with the good of the country as a whole; conversely, any identifiable group or interest that in any way acted as a brake on the executive's policies was excoriated as subversive of the greater good of the nation. Thus in the 1910s Yuan Shikai dissolved the National Assembly and for a time succeeded in abolishing provincial assemblies as well, characterizing them as the preserve of selfish individuals. In the 1920s, a long line of Beiyang warlords periodically packed what remained of the National Assembly to draft constitutions that would legitimize their rule while they hurled epithets at each other as being detrimental to national unity. Finally, in the 1930s and 1940s Chiang 6. The xinzheng era, important as it is for the subsequent evolution of the 20th-century Chinese state, remains crucially understudied. Some of the more important works on this period include: Mary C. Wright, China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-11 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977), chs. 1-2; Esther Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy," unpublished dissertation, Radcliffe College, 1959; and Paul Hickey, "Fee taking, salary reform and the structure of state power in late Qing China, 1909-11," Modern China, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 389-417. 7. There was much about the xinzheng reform package that was either ambivalent or unclear, and this lack of clarity particularly stood out in the delicate issue of relative degrees of centralization and decentralization, an issue that continued to reverberate through the remainder of the 20th century. The late Qing xinzheng reforms allowed for the creation of provincial assemblies and even drew up a schedule for the gradual implementation of constitutional monarchy. Yuan Shikai, while hostile to any body that he could not directly control, toward the end of his life seemed quite desperate to make links with any source of popular support and launched a doomed monarchical revival, and the Chiang Kai-shek regime, while no less suspicious, allowed the existence of a Legislative Yuan and National Assembly, and paid at least lip service to the idea of village self-government. On the xinzheng constitutional programme, see Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy." On Yuan Shikai, see Ernest Young, "Yuan Shikai as a conservative modemizer," in Charlotte Furth, The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservatism in Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 171-190. weakness and underdevelopment and into strength and power. The xinzheng programme set a new template for the evolution of a "modem" Chinese state: first by replacing the imperial Six Boards with modernstyle ministries, and secondly by systematically drawing up plans to project central government power much further than ever before into the provinces.6 Although the xinzheng and subsequent Republican-era centralizers claimed to adhere to the principle of mechanisms through which those at local levels could have input into the decision-making process or manage their own affairs, throughout the Republican period, consultative bodies, representative institutions and regularized channels of articulation from below were minor strains in the dominant theme of centrally ordained statism and national unity.7 The vast majority of those with executive power were socially conservative military men, and the socializing effects of a career in the military plus the structural predisposition of all executives to want more discretionary power made them even more consistent in their collective distaste for all forms of political participation and expression that they could not directly control. Virtually all executives in the Republican period also conflated their own personal reach with central government power, and in turn central government power with the good of the country as a whole; conversely, any identifiable group or interest that in any way acted as a brake on the executive's policies was excoriated as subversive of the greater good of the nation. Thus in the 1910s Yuan Shikai dissolved the National Assembly and for a time succeeded in abolishing provincial assemblies as well, characterizing them as the preserve of selfish individuals. In the 1920s, a long line of Beiyang warlords periodically packed what remained of the National Assembly to draft constitutions that would legitimize their rule while they hurled epithets at each other as being detrimental to national unity. Finally, in the 1930s and 1940s Chiang 6. The xinzheng era, important as it is for the subsequent evolution of the 20th-century Chinese state, remains crucially understudied. Some of the more important works on this period include: Mary C. Wright, China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-11 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977), chs. 1-2; Esther Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy," unpublished dissertation, Radcliffe College, 1959; and Paul Hickey, "Fee taking, salary reform and the structure of state power in late Qing China, 1909-11," Modern China, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 389-417. 7. There was much about the xinzheng reform package that was either ambivalent or unclear, and this lack of clarity particularly stood out in the delicate issue of relative degrees of centralization and decentralization, an issue that continued to reverberate through the remainder of the 20th century. The late Qing xinzheng reforms allowed for the creation of provincial assemblies and even drew up a schedule for the gradual implementation of constitutional monarchy. Yuan Shikai, while hostile to any body that he could not directly control, toward the end of his life seemed quite desperate to make links with any source of popular support and launched a doomed monarchical revival, and the Chiang Kai-shek regime, while no less suspicious, allowed the existence of a Legislative Yuan and National Assembly, and paid at least lip service to the idea of village self-government. On the xinzheng constitutional programme, see Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy." On Yuan Shikai, see Ernest Young, "Yuan Shikai as a conservative modemizer," in Charlotte Furth, The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservatism in Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 171-190. weakness and underdevelopment and into strength and power. The xinzheng programme set a new template for the evolution of a "modem" Chinese state: first by replacing the imperial Six Boards with modernstyle ministries, and secondly by systematically drawing up plans to project central government power much further than ever before into the provinces.6 Although the xinzheng and subsequent Republican-era centralizers claimed to adhere to the principle of mechanisms through which those at local levels could have input into the decision-making process or manage their own affairs, throughout the Republican period, consultative bodies, representative institutions and regularized channels of articulation from below were minor strains in the dominant theme of centrally ordained statism and national unity.7 The vast majority of those with executive power were socially conservative military men, and the socializing effects of a career in the military plus the structural predisposition of all executives to want more discretionary power made them even more consistent in their collective distaste for all forms of political participation and expression that they could not directly control. Virtually all executives in the Republican period also conflated their own personal reach with central government power, and in turn central government power with the good of the country as a whole; conversely, any identifiable group or interest that in any way acted as a brake on the executive's policies was excoriated as subversive of the greater good of the nation. Thus in the 1910s Yuan Shikai dissolved the National Assembly and for a time succeeded in abolishing provincial assemblies as well, characterizing them as the preserve of selfish individuals. In the 1920s, a long line of Beiyang warlords periodically packed what remained of the National Assembly to draft constitutions that would legitimize their rule while they hurled epithets at each other as being detrimental to national unity. Finally, in the 1930s and 1940s Chiang 6. The xinzheng era, important as it is for the subsequent evolution of the 20th-century Chinese state, remains crucially understudied. Some of the more important works on this period include: Mary C. Wright, China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-11 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977), chs. 1-2; Esther Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy," unpublished dissertation, Radcliffe College, 1959; and Paul Hickey, "Fee taking, salary reform and the structure of state power in late Qing China, 1909-11," Modern China, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 389-417. 7. There was much about the xinzheng reform package that was either ambivalent or unclear, and this lack of clarity particularly stood out in the delicate issue of relative degrees of centralization and decentralization, an issue that continued to reverberate through the remainder of the 20th century. The late Qing xinzheng reforms allowed for the creation of provincial assemblies and even drew up a schedule for the gradual implementation of constitutional monarchy. Yuan Shikai, while hostile to any body that he could not directly control, toward the end of his life seemed quite desperate to make links with any source of popular support and launched a doomed monarchical revival, and the Chiang Kai-shek regime, while no less suspicious, allowed the existence of a Legislative Yuan and National Assembly, and paid at least lip service to the idea of village self-government. On the xinzheng constitutional programme, see Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy." On Yuan Shikai, see Ernest Young, "Yuan Shikai as a conservative modemizer," in Charlotte Furth, The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservatism in Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 171-190
The Evolution of Republican Government 333 Kai-shek became near hysterical about the continued existence of Com- munists who not only challenged his government from within the body politic of China but,even more seriously,posed an alternate and highly threatening model of "bottom-up"mobilization. For Republican-era central governments,the primary ordering prin- ciple was rapidly to build and project central state and bureaucratic power in order to create a viable and legitimate form of civil government. Subsidiary components of this larger agenda that remained virtually unchanged throughout the Yuan Shikai,Beiyang and KMT regimes included:promoting administrative and fiscal centralization,rationaliza- tion and standardization;the central state attempting to set the standard in programmes for modern education and industrial development;and civilianizing imperatives to the contrary-militarily crushing open oppo- sition whenever it was feasible to do so and opting for inclusion and co-optation when it was not. Unfortunately for the evolution of post-1911 government in China, while the last years of the Qing bequeathed a largely unaltered agenda for central government action and state-building,it also passed on a complex of very serious structural weaknesses.These were exacerbated by the political volatility of the early Republic,which made the goals doubly difficult to realize in practice.In spite of the standing desire of all central government actors to promote centralization,unity and civil legitimacy, central state capacity was extremely limited with respect to the key issues of taxation and personnel,and the project of building civilian institutions was consistently undercut by the twin phenomena of internal division and external military pressure.Internally weak and fragmented government institutions in turn led to short-term horizons and political expedience, and the continued existence of armed challengers within China and aggressive imperialism from without mandated the continued importance of the military within government decision-making.To a greater rather than to a lesser extent,weak central projective capacity,internal divisions and external military pressure remained constraining and constant fea- tures throughout the Republican period. During the last years of the Qing,the rate of real taxation in many parts of China had increased because of the proliferation of locally imposed surtaxes and sub-bureaucratic offices while the quotas remitted to the central government remained unchanged.This situation worsened after the 1911 Revolution,when provinces refused to remit anything at all to the central government.Although Yuan Shikai briefly got tax receipts coming into the capital in 1914,things so deteriorated after his death that during the Beiyang period,insofar as the central government had any revenues at all,they were provided via the remission of the remainder of salt tax funds collected by customs and Sino-foreign tax collecting 8.Young,The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai,pp.148-155.On warlord actions in the capital,see Chien Tuan-sheng,The Government and Politics of China,pp.65-76,and on the structural systems behind warlord behaviour,see Ch'i Hsi-sheng,Warlord Politics in China, 19/6-28(Stanford:Stanford University Press.1976),pp.185-195
The Evolution of Republican Government Kai-shek became near hysterical about the continued existence of Communists who not only challenged his government from within the body politic of China but, even more seriously, posed an alternate and highly threatening model of "bottom-up" mobilization.8 For Republican-era central governments, the primary ordering principle was rapidly to build and project central state and bureaucratic power in order to create a viable and legitimate form of civil government. Subsidiary components of this larger agenda that remained virtually unchanged throughout the Yuan Shikai, Beiyang and KMT regimes included: promoting administrative and fiscal centralization, rationalization and standardization; the central state attempting to set the standard in programmes for modern education and industrial development; and - civilianizing imperatives to the contrary - militarily crushing open opposition whenever it was feasible to do so and opting for inclusion and co-optation when it was not. Unfortunately for the evolution of post-1911 government in China, while the last years of the Qing bequeathed a largely unaltered agenda for central government action and state-building, it also passed on a complex of very serious structural weaknesses. These were exacerbated by the political volatility of the early Republic, which made the goals doubly difficult to realize in practice. In spite of the standing desire of all central government actors to promote centralization, unity and civil legitimacy, central state capacity was extremely limited with respect to the key issues of taxation and personnel, and the project of building civilian institutions was consistently undercut by the twin phenomena of internal division and external military pressure. Internally weak and fragmented government institutions in turn led to short-term horizons and political expedience, and the continued existence of armed challengers within China and aggressive imperialism from without mandated the continued importance of the military within government decision-making. To a greater rather than to a lesser extent, weak central projective capacity, internal divisions and external military pressure remained constraining and constant features throughout the Republican period. During the last years of the Qing, the rate of real taxation in many parts of China had increased because of the proliferation of locally imposed surtaxes and sub-bureaucratic offices while the quotas remitted to the central government remained unchanged. This situation worsened after the 1911 Revolution, when provinces refused to remit anything at all to the central government. Although Yuan Shikai briefly got tax receipts coming into the capital in 1914, things so deteriorated after his death that during the Beiyang period, insofar as the central government had any revenues at all, they were provided via the remission of the remainder of salt tax funds collected by customs and Sino-foreign tax collecting 8. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 148-155. On warlord actions in the capital, see Chien Tuan-sheng, The Government and Politics of China, pp. 65-76, and on the structural systems behind warlord behaviour, see Ch'i Hsi-sheng, Warlord Politics in China, 1916-28 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), pp. 185-195. Kai-shek became near hysterical about the continued existence of Communists who not only challenged his government from within the body politic of China but, even more seriously, posed an alternate and highly threatening model of "bottom-up" mobilization.8 For Republican-era central governments, the primary ordering principle was rapidly to build and project central state and bureaucratic power in order to create a viable and legitimate form of civil government. Subsidiary components of this larger agenda that remained virtually unchanged throughout the Yuan Shikai, Beiyang and KMT regimes included: promoting administrative and fiscal centralization, rationalization and standardization; the central state attempting to set the standard in programmes for modern education and industrial development; and - civilianizing imperatives to the contrary - militarily crushing open opposition whenever it was feasible to do so and opting for inclusion and co-optation when it was not. Unfortunately for the evolution of post-1911 government in China, while the last years of the Qing bequeathed a largely unaltered agenda for central government action and state-building, it also passed on a complex of very serious structural weaknesses. These were exacerbated by the political volatility of the early Republic, which made the goals doubly difficult to realize in practice. In spite of the standing desire of all central government actors to promote centralization, unity and civil legitimacy, central state capacity was extremely limited with respect to the key issues of taxation and personnel, and the project of building civilian institutions was consistently undercut by the twin phenomena of internal division and external military pressure. Internally weak and fragmented government institutions in turn led to short-term horizons and political expedience, and the continued existence of armed challengers within China and aggressive imperialism from without mandated the continued importance of the military within government decision-making. To a greater rather than to a lesser extent, weak central projective capacity, internal divisions and external military pressure remained constraining and constant features throughout the Republican period. During the last years of the Qing, the rate of real taxation in many parts of China had increased because of the proliferation of locally imposed surtaxes and sub-bureaucratic offices while the quotas remitted to the central government remained unchanged. This situation worsened after the 1911 Revolution, when provinces refused to remit anything at all to the central government. Although Yuan Shikai briefly got tax receipts coming into the capital in 1914, things so deteriorated after his death that during the Beiyang period, insofar as the central government had any revenues at all, they were provided via the remission of the remainder of salt tax funds collected by customs and Sino-foreign tax collecting 8. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 148-155. On warlord actions in the capital, see Chien Tuan-sheng, The Government and Politics of China, pp. 65-76, and on the structural systems behind warlord behaviour, see Ch'i Hsi-sheng, Warlord Politics in China, 1916-28 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), pp. 185-195. Kai-shek became near hysterical about the continued existence of Communists who not only challenged his government from within the body politic of China but, even more seriously, posed an alternate and highly threatening model of "bottom-up" mobilization.8 For Republican-era central governments, the primary ordering principle was rapidly to build and project central state and bureaucratic power in order to create a viable and legitimate form of civil government. Subsidiary components of this larger agenda that remained virtually unchanged throughout the Yuan Shikai, Beiyang and KMT regimes included: promoting administrative and fiscal centralization, rationalization and standardization; the central state attempting to set the standard in programmes for modern education and industrial development; and - civilianizing imperatives to the contrary - militarily crushing open opposition whenever it was feasible to do so and opting for inclusion and co-optation when it was not. Unfortunately for the evolution of post-1911 government in China, while the last years of the Qing bequeathed a largely unaltered agenda for central government action and state-building, it also passed on a complex of very serious structural weaknesses. These were exacerbated by the political volatility of the early Republic, which made the goals doubly difficult to realize in practice. In spite of the standing desire of all central government actors to promote centralization, unity and civil legitimacy, central state capacity was extremely limited with respect to the key issues of taxation and personnel, and the project of building civilian institutions was consistently undercut by the twin phenomena of internal division and external military pressure. Internally weak and fragmented government institutions in turn led to short-term horizons and political expedience, and the continued existence of armed challengers within China and aggressive imperialism from without mandated the continued importance of the military within government decision-making. To a greater rather than to a lesser extent, weak central projective capacity, internal divisions and external military pressure remained constraining and constant features throughout the Republican period. During the last years of the Qing, the rate of real taxation in many parts of China had increased because of the proliferation of locally imposed surtaxes and sub-bureaucratic offices while the quotas remitted to the central government remained unchanged. This situation worsened after the 1911 Revolution, when provinces refused to remit anything at all to the central government. Although Yuan Shikai briefly got tax receipts coming into the capital in 1914, things so deteriorated after his death that during the Beiyang period, insofar as the central government had any revenues at all, they were provided via the remission of the remainder of salt tax funds collected by customs and Sino-foreign tax collecting 8. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 148-155. On warlord actions in the capital, see Chien Tuan-sheng, The Government and Politics of China, pp. 65-76, and on the structural systems behind warlord behaviour, see Ch'i Hsi-sheng, Warlord Politics in China, 1916-28 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), pp. 185-195. Kai-shek became near hysterical about the continued existence of Communists who not only challenged his government from within the body politic of China but, even more seriously, posed an alternate and highly threatening model of "bottom-up" mobilization.8 For Republican-era central governments, the primary ordering principle was rapidly to build and project central state and bureaucratic power in order to create a viable and legitimate form of civil government. Subsidiary components of this larger agenda that remained virtually unchanged throughout the Yuan Shikai, Beiyang and KMT regimes included: promoting administrative and fiscal centralization, rationalization and standardization; the central state attempting to set the standard in programmes for modern education and industrial development; and - civilianizing imperatives to the contrary - militarily crushing open opposition whenever it was feasible to do so and opting for inclusion and co-optation when it was not. Unfortunately for the evolution of post-1911 government in China, while the last years of the Qing bequeathed a largely unaltered agenda for central government action and state-building, it also passed on a complex of very serious structural weaknesses. These were exacerbated by the political volatility of the early Republic, which made the goals doubly difficult to realize in practice. In spite of the standing desire of all central government actors to promote centralization, unity and civil legitimacy, central state capacity was extremely limited with respect to the key issues of taxation and personnel, and the project of building civilian institutions was consistently undercut by the twin phenomena of internal division and external military pressure. Internally weak and fragmented government institutions in turn led to short-term horizons and political expedience, and the continued existence of armed challengers within China and aggressive imperialism from without mandated the continued importance of the military within government decision-making. To a greater rather than to a lesser extent, weak central projective capacity, internal divisions and external military pressure remained constraining and constant features throughout the Republican period. During the last years of the Qing, the rate of real taxation in many parts of China had increased because of the proliferation of locally imposed surtaxes and sub-bureaucratic offices while the quotas remitted to the central government remained unchanged. This situation worsened after the 1911 Revolution, when provinces refused to remit anything at all to the central government. Although Yuan Shikai briefly got tax receipts coming into the capital in 1914, things so deteriorated after his death that during the Beiyang period, insofar as the central government had any revenues at all, they were provided via the remission of the remainder of salt tax funds collected by customs and Sino-foreign tax collecting 8. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 148-155. On warlord actions in the capital, see Chien Tuan-sheng, The Government and Politics of China, pp. 65-76, and on the structural systems behind warlord behaviour, see Ch'i Hsi-sheng, Warlord Politics in China, 1916-28 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), pp. 185-195. Kai-shek became near hysterical about the continued existence of Communists who not only challenged his government from within the body politic of China but, even more seriously, posed an alternate and highly threatening model of "bottom-up" mobilization.8 For Republican-era central governments, the primary ordering principle was rapidly to build and project central state and bureaucratic power in order to create a viable and legitimate form of civil government. Subsidiary components of this larger agenda that remained virtually unchanged throughout the Yuan Shikai, Beiyang and KMT regimes included: promoting administrative and fiscal centralization, rationalization and standardization; the central state attempting to set the standard in programmes for modern education and industrial development; and - civilianizing imperatives to the contrary - militarily crushing open opposition whenever it was feasible to do so and opting for inclusion and co-optation when it was not. Unfortunately for the evolution of post-1911 government in China, while the last years of the Qing bequeathed a largely unaltered agenda for central government action and state-building, it also passed on a complex of very serious structural weaknesses. These were exacerbated by the political volatility of the early Republic, which made the goals doubly difficult to realize in practice. In spite of the standing desire of all central government actors to promote centralization, unity and civil legitimacy, central state capacity was extremely limited with respect to the key issues of taxation and personnel, and the project of building civilian institutions was consistently undercut by the twin phenomena of internal division and external military pressure. Internally weak and fragmented government institutions in turn led to short-term horizons and political expedience, and the continued existence of armed challengers within China and aggressive imperialism from without mandated the continued importance of the military within government decision-making. To a greater rather than to a lesser extent, weak central projective capacity, internal divisions and external military pressure remained constraining and constant features throughout the Republican period. During the last years of the Qing, the rate of real taxation in many parts of China had increased because of the proliferation of locally imposed surtaxes and sub-bureaucratic offices while the quotas remitted to the central government remained unchanged. This situation worsened after the 1911 Revolution, when provinces refused to remit anything at all to the central government. Although Yuan Shikai briefly got tax receipts coming into the capital in 1914, things so deteriorated after his death that during the Beiyang period, insofar as the central government had any revenues at all, they were provided via the remission of the remainder of salt tax funds collected by customs and Sino-foreign tax collecting 8. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 148-155. On warlord actions in the capital, see Chien Tuan-sheng, The Government and Politics of China, pp. 65-76, and on the structural systems behind warlord behaviour, see Ch'i Hsi-sheng, Warlord Politics in China, 1916-28 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), pp. 185-195. Kai-shek became near hysterical about the continued existence of Communists who not only challenged his government from within the body politic of China but, even more seriously, posed an alternate and highly threatening model of "bottom-up" mobilization.8 For Republican-era central governments, the primary ordering principle was rapidly to build and project central state and bureaucratic power in order to create a viable and legitimate form of civil government. Subsidiary components of this larger agenda that remained virtually unchanged throughout the Yuan Shikai, Beiyang and KMT regimes included: promoting administrative and fiscal centralization, rationalization and standardization; the central state attempting to set the standard in programmes for modern education and industrial development; and - civilianizing imperatives to the contrary - militarily crushing open opposition whenever it was feasible to do so and opting for inclusion and co-optation when it was not. Unfortunately for the evolution of post-1911 government in China, while the last years of the Qing bequeathed a largely unaltered agenda for central government action and state-building, it also passed on a complex of very serious structural weaknesses. These were exacerbated by the political volatility of the early Republic, which made the goals doubly difficult to realize in practice. In spite of the standing desire of all central government actors to promote centralization, unity and civil legitimacy, central state capacity was extremely limited with respect to the key issues of taxation and personnel, and the project of building civilian institutions was consistently undercut by the twin phenomena of internal division and external military pressure. Internally weak and fragmented government institutions in turn led to short-term horizons and political expedience, and the continued existence of armed challengers within China and aggressive imperialism from without mandated the continued importance of the military within government decision-making. To a greater rather than to a lesser extent, weak central projective capacity, internal divisions and external military pressure remained constraining and constant features throughout the Republican period. During the last years of the Qing, the rate of real taxation in many parts of China had increased because of the proliferation of locally imposed surtaxes and sub-bureaucratic offices while the quotas remitted to the central government remained unchanged. This situation worsened after the 1911 Revolution, when provinces refused to remit anything at all to the central government. Although Yuan Shikai briefly got tax receipts coming into the capital in 1914, things so deteriorated after his death that during the Beiyang period, insofar as the central government had any revenues at all, they were provided via the remission of the remainder of salt tax funds collected by customs and Sino-foreign tax collecting 8. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 148-155. On warlord actions in the capital, see Chien Tuan-sheng, The Government and Politics of China, pp. 65-76, and on the structural systems behind warlord behaviour, see Ch'i Hsi-sheng, Warlord Politics in China, 1916-28 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), pp. 185-195. Kai-shek became near hysterical about the continued existence of Communists who not only challenged his government from within the body politic of China but, even more seriously, posed an alternate and highly threatening model of "bottom-up" mobilization.8 For Republican-era central governments, the primary ordering principle was rapidly to build and project central state and bureaucratic power in order to create a viable and legitimate form of civil government. Subsidiary components of this larger agenda that remained virtually unchanged throughout the Yuan Shikai, Beiyang and KMT regimes included: promoting administrative and fiscal centralization, rationalization and standardization; the central state attempting to set the standard in programmes for modern education and industrial development; and - civilianizing imperatives to the contrary - militarily crushing open opposition whenever it was feasible to do so and opting for inclusion and co-optation when it was not. Unfortunately for the evolution of post-1911 government in China, while the last years of the Qing bequeathed a largely unaltered agenda for central government action and state-building, it also passed on a complex of very serious structural weaknesses. These were exacerbated by the political volatility of the early Republic, which made the goals doubly difficult to realize in practice. In spite of the standing desire of all central government actors to promote centralization, unity and civil legitimacy, central state capacity was extremely limited with respect to the key issues of taxation and personnel, and the project of building civilian institutions was consistently undercut by the twin phenomena of internal division and external military pressure. Internally weak and fragmented government institutions in turn led to short-term horizons and political expedience, and the continued existence of armed challengers within China and aggressive imperialism from without mandated the continued importance of the military within government decision-making. To a greater rather than to a lesser extent, weak central projective capacity, internal divisions and external military pressure remained constraining and constant features throughout the Republican period. During the last years of the Qing, the rate of real taxation in many parts of China had increased because of the proliferation of locally imposed surtaxes and sub-bureaucratic offices while the quotas remitted to the central government remained unchanged. This situation worsened after the 1911 Revolution, when provinces refused to remit anything at all to the central government. Although Yuan Shikai briefly got tax receipts coming into the capital in 1914, things so deteriorated after his death that during the Beiyang period, insofar as the central government had any revenues at all, they were provided via the remission of the remainder of salt tax funds collected by customs and Sino-foreign tax collecting 8. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 148-155. On warlord actions in the capital, see Chien Tuan-sheng, The Government and Politics of China, pp. 65-76, and on the structural systems behind warlord behaviour, see Ch'i Hsi-sheng, Warlord Politics in China, 1916-28 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), pp. 185-195. Kai-shek became near hysterical about the continued existence of Communists who not only challenged his government from within the body politic of China but, even more seriously, posed an alternate and highly threatening model of "bottom-up" mobilization.8 For Republican-era central governments, the primary ordering principle was rapidly to build and project central state and bureaucratic power in order to create a viable and legitimate form of civil government. Subsidiary components of this larger agenda that remained virtually unchanged throughout the Yuan Shikai, Beiyang and KMT regimes included: promoting administrative and fiscal centralization, rationalization and standardization; the central state attempting to set the standard in programmes for modern education and industrial development; and - civilianizing imperatives to the contrary - militarily crushing open opposition whenever it was feasible to do so and opting for inclusion and co-optation when it was not. Unfortunately for the evolution of post-1911 government in China, while the last years of the Qing bequeathed a largely unaltered agenda for central government action and state-building, it also passed on a complex of very serious structural weaknesses. These were exacerbated by the political volatility of the early Republic, which made the goals doubly difficult to realize in practice. In spite of the standing desire of all central government actors to promote centralization, unity and civil legitimacy, central state capacity was extremely limited with respect to the key issues of taxation and personnel, and the project of building civilian institutions was consistently undercut by the twin phenomena of internal division and external military pressure. Internally weak and fragmented government institutions in turn led to short-term horizons and political expedience, and the continued existence of armed challengers within China and aggressive imperialism from without mandated the continued importance of the military within government decision-making. To a greater rather than to a lesser extent, weak central projective capacity, internal divisions and external military pressure remained constraining and constant features throughout the Republican period. During the last years of the Qing, the rate of real taxation in many parts of China had increased because of the proliferation of locally imposed surtaxes and sub-bureaucratic offices while the quotas remitted to the central government remained unchanged. This situation worsened after the 1911 Revolution, when provinces refused to remit anything at all to the central government. Although Yuan Shikai briefly got tax receipts coming into the capital in 1914, things so deteriorated after his death that during the Beiyang period, insofar as the central government had any revenues at all, they were provided via the remission of the remainder of salt tax funds collected by customs and Sino-foreign tax collecting 8. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 148-155. On warlord actions in the capital, see Chien Tuan-sheng, The Government and Politics of China, pp. 65-76, and on the structural systems behind warlord behaviour, see Ch'i Hsi-sheng, Warlord Politics in China, 1916-28 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), pp. 185-195. Kai-shek became near hysterical about the continued existence of Communists who not only challenged his government from within the body politic of China but, even more seriously, posed an alternate and highly threatening model of "bottom-up" mobilization.8 For Republican-era central governments, the primary ordering principle was rapidly to build and project central state and bureaucratic power in order to create a viable and legitimate form of civil government. Subsidiary components of this larger agenda that remained virtually unchanged throughout the Yuan Shikai, Beiyang and KMT regimes included: promoting administrative and fiscal centralization, rationalization and standardization; the central state attempting to set the standard in programmes for modern education and industrial development; and - civilianizing imperatives to the contrary - militarily crushing open opposition whenever it was feasible to do so and opting for inclusion and co-optation when it was not. Unfortunately for the evolution of post-1911 government in China, while the last years of the Qing bequeathed a largely unaltered agenda for central government action and state-building, it also passed on a complex of very serious structural weaknesses. These were exacerbated by the political volatility of the early Republic, which made the goals doubly difficult to realize in practice. In spite of the standing desire of all central government actors to promote centralization, unity and civil legitimacy, central state capacity was extremely limited with respect to the key issues of taxation and personnel, and the project of building civilian institutions was consistently undercut by the twin phenomena of internal division and external military pressure. Internally weak and fragmented government institutions in turn led to short-term horizons and political expedience, and the continued existence of armed challengers within China and aggressive imperialism from without mandated the continued importance of the military within government decision-making. To a greater rather than to a lesser extent, weak central projective capacity, internal divisions and external military pressure remained constraining and constant features throughout the Republican period. During the last years of the Qing, the rate of real taxation in many parts of China had increased because of the proliferation of locally imposed surtaxes and sub-bureaucratic offices while the quotas remitted to the central government remained unchanged. This situation worsened after the 1911 Revolution, when provinces refused to remit anything at all to the central government. Although Yuan Shikai briefly got tax receipts coming into the capital in 1914, things so deteriorated after his death that during the Beiyang period, insofar as the central government had any revenues at all, they were provided via the remission of the remainder of salt tax funds collected by customs and Sino-foreign tax collecting 8. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 148-155. On warlord actions in the capital, see Chien Tuan-sheng, The Government and Politics of China, pp. 65-76, and on the structural systems behind warlord behaviour, see Ch'i Hsi-sheng, Warlord Politics in China, 1916-28 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), pp. 185-195. Kai-shek became near hysterical about the continued existence of Communists who not only challenged his government from within the body politic of China but, even more seriously, posed an alternate and highly threatening model of "bottom-up" mobilization.8 For Republican-era central governments, the primary ordering principle was rapidly to build and project central state and bureaucratic power in order to create a viable and legitimate form of civil government. Subsidiary components of this larger agenda that remained virtually unchanged throughout the Yuan Shikai, Beiyang and KMT regimes included: promoting administrative and fiscal centralization, rationalization and standardization; the central state attempting to set the standard in programmes for modern education and industrial development; and - civilianizing imperatives to the contrary - militarily crushing open opposition whenever it was feasible to do so and opting for inclusion and co-optation when it was not. Unfortunately for the evolution of post-1911 government in China, while the last years of the Qing bequeathed a largely unaltered agenda for central government action and state-building, it also passed on a complex of very serious structural weaknesses. These were exacerbated by the political volatility of the early Republic, which made the goals doubly difficult to realize in practice. In spite of the standing desire of all central government actors to promote centralization, unity and civil legitimacy, central state capacity was extremely limited with respect to the key issues of taxation and personnel, and the project of building civilian institutions was consistently undercut by the twin phenomena of internal division and external military pressure. Internally weak and fragmented government institutions in turn led to short-term horizons and political expedience, and the continued existence of armed challengers within China and aggressive imperialism from without mandated the continued importance of the military within government decision-making. To a greater rather than to a lesser extent, weak central projective capacity, internal divisions and external military pressure remained constraining and constant features throughout the Republican period. During the last years of the Qing, the rate of real taxation in many parts of China had increased because of the proliferation of locally imposed surtaxes and sub-bureaucratic offices while the quotas remitted to the central government remained unchanged. This situation worsened after the 1911 Revolution, when provinces refused to remit anything at all to the central government. Although Yuan Shikai briefly got tax receipts coming into the capital in 1914, things so deteriorated after his death that during the Beiyang period, insofar as the central government had any revenues at all, they were provided via the remission of the remainder of salt tax funds collected by customs and Sino-foreign tax collecting 8. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 148-155. On warlord actions in the capital, see Chien Tuan-sheng, The Government and Politics of China, pp. 65-76, and on the structural systems behind warlord behaviour, see Ch'i Hsi-sheng, Warlord Politics in China, 1916-28 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), pp. 185-195. Kai-shek became near hysterical about the continued existence of Communists who not only challenged his government from within the body politic of China but, even more seriously, posed an alternate and highly threatening model of "bottom-up" mobilization.8 For Republican-era central governments, the primary ordering principle was rapidly to build and project central state and bureaucratic power in order to create a viable and legitimate form of civil government. Subsidiary components of this larger agenda that remained virtually unchanged throughout the Yuan Shikai, Beiyang and KMT regimes included: promoting administrative and fiscal centralization, rationalization and standardization; the central state attempting to set the standard in programmes for modern education and industrial development; and - civilianizing imperatives to the contrary - militarily crushing open opposition whenever it was feasible to do so and opting for inclusion and co-optation when it was not. Unfortunately for the evolution of post-1911 government in China, while the last years of the Qing bequeathed a largely unaltered agenda for central government action and state-building, it also passed on a complex of very serious structural weaknesses. These were exacerbated by the political volatility of the early Republic, which made the goals doubly difficult to realize in practice. In spite of the standing desire of all central government actors to promote centralization, unity and civil legitimacy, central state capacity was extremely limited with respect to the key issues of taxation and personnel, and the project of building civilian institutions was consistently undercut by the twin phenomena of internal division and external military pressure. Internally weak and fragmented government institutions in turn led to short-term horizons and political expedience, and the continued existence of armed challengers within China and aggressive imperialism from without mandated the continued importance of the military within government decision-making. To a greater rather than to a lesser extent, weak central projective capacity, internal divisions and external military pressure remained constraining and constant features throughout the Republican period. During the last years of the Qing, the rate of real taxation in many parts of China had increased because of the proliferation of locally imposed surtaxes and sub-bureaucratic offices while the quotas remitted to the central government remained unchanged. This situation worsened after the 1911 Revolution, when provinces refused to remit anything at all to the central government. Although Yuan Shikai briefly got tax receipts coming into the capital in 1914, things so deteriorated after his death that during the Beiyang period, insofar as the central government had any revenues at all, they were provided via the remission of the remainder of salt tax funds collected by customs and Sino-foreign tax collecting 8. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 148-155. On warlord actions in the capital, see Chien Tuan-sheng, The Government and Politics of China, pp. 65-76, and on the structural systems behind warlord behaviour, see Ch'i Hsi-sheng, Warlord Politics in China, 1916-28 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), pp. 185-195. Kai-shek became near hysterical about the continued existence of Communists who not only challenged his government from within the body politic of China but, even more seriously, posed an alternate and highly threatening model of "bottom-up" mobilization.8 For Republican-era central governments, the primary ordering principle was rapidly to build and project central state and bureaucratic power in order to create a viable and legitimate form of civil government. Subsidiary components of this larger agenda that remained virtually unchanged throughout the Yuan Shikai, Beiyang and KMT regimes included: promoting administrative and fiscal centralization, rationalization and standardization; the central state attempting to set the standard in programmes for modern education and industrial development; and - civilianizing imperatives to the contrary - militarily crushing open opposition whenever it was feasible to do so and opting for inclusion and co-optation when it was not. Unfortunately for the evolution of post-1911 government in China, while the last years of the Qing bequeathed a largely unaltered agenda for central government action and state-building, it also passed on a complex of very serious structural weaknesses. These were exacerbated by the political volatility of the early Republic, which made the goals doubly difficult to realize in practice. In spite of the standing desire of all central government actors to promote centralization, unity and civil legitimacy, central state capacity was extremely limited with respect to the key issues of taxation and personnel, and the project of building civilian institutions was consistently undercut by the twin phenomena of internal division and external military pressure. Internally weak and fragmented government institutions in turn led to short-term horizons and political expedience, and the continued existence of armed challengers within China and aggressive imperialism from without mandated the continued importance of the military within government decision-making. To a greater rather than to a lesser extent, weak central projective capacity, internal divisions and external military pressure remained constraining and constant features throughout the Republican period. During the last years of the Qing, the rate of real taxation in many parts of China had increased because of the proliferation of locally imposed surtaxes and sub-bureaucratic offices while the quotas remitted to the central government remained unchanged. This situation worsened after the 1911 Revolution, when provinces refused to remit anything at all to the central government. Although Yuan Shikai briefly got tax receipts coming into the capital in 1914, things so deteriorated after his death that during the Beiyang period, insofar as the central government had any revenues at all, they were provided via the remission of the remainder of salt tax funds collected by customs and Sino-foreign tax collecting 8. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 148-155. On warlord actions in the capital, see Chien Tuan-sheng, The Government and Politics of China, pp. 65-76, and on the structural systems behind warlord behaviour, see Ch'i Hsi-sheng, Warlord Politics in China, 1916-28 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), pp. 185-195. Kai-shek became near hysterical about the continued existence of Communists who not only challenged his government from within the body politic of China but, even more seriously, posed an alternate and highly threatening model of "bottom-up" mobilization.8 For Republican-era central governments, the primary ordering principle was rapidly to build and project central state and bureaucratic power in order to create a viable and legitimate form of civil government. Subsidiary components of this larger agenda that remained virtually unchanged throughout the Yuan Shikai, Beiyang and KMT regimes included: promoting administrative and fiscal centralization, rationalization and standardization; the central state attempting to set the standard in programmes for modern education and industrial development; and - civilianizing imperatives to the contrary - militarily crushing open opposition whenever it was feasible to do so and opting for inclusion and co-optation when it was not. Unfortunately for the evolution of post-1911 government in China, while the last years of the Qing bequeathed a largely unaltered agenda for central government action and state-building, it also passed on a complex of very serious structural weaknesses. These were exacerbated by the political volatility of the early Republic, which made the goals doubly difficult to realize in practice. In spite of the standing desire of all central government actors to promote centralization, unity and civil legitimacy, central state capacity was extremely limited with respect to the key issues of taxation and personnel, and the project of building civilian institutions was consistently undercut by the twin phenomena of internal division and external military pressure. Internally weak and fragmented government institutions in turn led to short-term horizons and political expedience, and the continued existence of armed challengers within China and aggressive imperialism from without mandated the continued importance of the military within government decision-making. To a greater rather than to a lesser extent, weak central projective capacity, internal divisions and external military pressure remained constraining and constant features throughout the Republican period. During the last years of the Qing, the rate of real taxation in many parts of China had increased because of the proliferation of locally imposed surtaxes and sub-bureaucratic offices while the quotas remitted to the central government remained unchanged. This situation worsened after the 1911 Revolution, when provinces refused to remit anything at all to the central government. Although Yuan Shikai briefly got tax receipts coming into the capital in 1914, things so deteriorated after his death that during the Beiyang period, insofar as the central government had any revenues at all, they were provided via the remission of the remainder of salt tax funds collected by customs and Sino-foreign tax collecting 8. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 148-155. On warlord actions in the capital, see Chien Tuan-sheng, The Government and Politics of China, pp. 65-76, and on the structural systems behind warlord behaviour, see Ch'i Hsi-sheng, Warlord Politics in China, 1916-28 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), pp. 185-195. Kai-shek became near hysterical about the continued existence of Communists who not only challenged his government from within the body politic of China but, even more seriously, posed an alternate and highly threatening model of "bottom-up" mobilization.8 For Republican-era central governments, the primary ordering principle was rapidly to build and project central state and bureaucratic power in order to create a viable and legitimate form of civil government. Subsidiary components of this larger agenda that remained virtually unchanged throughout the Yuan Shikai, Beiyang and KMT regimes included: promoting administrative and fiscal centralization, rationalization and standardization; the central state attempting to set the standard in programmes for modern education and industrial development; and - civilianizing imperatives to the contrary - militarily crushing open opposition whenever it was feasible to do so and opting for inclusion and co-optation when it was not. Unfortunately for the evolution of post-1911 government in China, while the last years of the Qing bequeathed a largely unaltered agenda for central government action and state-building, it also passed on a complex of very serious structural weaknesses. These were exacerbated by the political volatility of the early Republic, which made the goals doubly difficult to realize in practice. In spite of the standing desire of all central government actors to promote centralization, unity and civil legitimacy, central state capacity was extremely limited with respect to the key issues of taxation and personnel, and the project of building civilian institutions was consistently undercut by the twin phenomena of internal division and external military pressure. Internally weak and fragmented government institutions in turn led to short-term horizons and political expedience, and the continued existence of armed challengers within China and aggressive imperialism from without mandated the continued importance of the military within government decision-making. To a greater rather than to a lesser extent, weak central projective capacity, internal divisions and external military pressure remained constraining and constant features throughout the Republican period. During the last years of the Qing, the rate of real taxation in many parts of China had increased because of the proliferation of locally imposed surtaxes and sub-bureaucratic offices while the quotas remitted to the central government remained unchanged. This situation worsened after the 1911 Revolution, when provinces refused to remit anything at all to the central government. Although Yuan Shikai briefly got tax receipts coming into the capital in 1914, things so deteriorated after his death that during the Beiyang period, insofar as the central government had any revenues at all, they were provided via the remission of the remainder of salt tax funds collected by customs and Sino-foreign tax collecting 8. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 148-155. On warlord actions in the capital, see Chien Tuan-sheng, The Government and Politics of China, pp. 65-76, and on the structural systems behind warlord behaviour, see Ch'i Hsi-sheng, Warlord Politics in China, 1916-28 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), pp. 185-195. Kai-shek became near hysterical about the continued existence of Communists who not only challenged his government from within the body politic of China but, even more seriously, posed an alternate and highly threatening model of "bottom-up" mobilization.8 For Republican-era central governments, the primary ordering principle was rapidly to build and project central state and bureaucratic power in order to create a viable and legitimate form of civil government. Subsidiary components of this larger agenda that remained virtually unchanged throughout the Yuan Shikai, Beiyang and KMT regimes included: promoting administrative and fiscal centralization, rationalization and standardization; the central state attempting to set the standard in programmes for modern education and industrial development; and - civilianizing imperatives to the contrary - militarily crushing open opposition whenever it was feasible to do so and opting for inclusion and co-optation when it was not. Unfortunately for the evolution of post-1911 government in China, while the last years of the Qing bequeathed a largely unaltered agenda for central government action and state-building, it also passed on a complex of very serious structural weaknesses. These were exacerbated by the political volatility of the early Republic, which made the goals doubly difficult to realize in practice. In spite of the standing desire of all central government actors to promote centralization, unity and civil legitimacy, central state capacity was extremely limited with respect to the key issues of taxation and personnel, and the project of building civilian institutions was consistently undercut by the twin phenomena of internal division and external military pressure. Internally weak and fragmented government institutions in turn led to short-term horizons and political expedience, and the continued existence of armed challengers within China and aggressive imperialism from without mandated the continued importance of the military within government decision-making. To a greater rather than to a lesser extent, weak central projective capacity, internal divisions and external military pressure remained constraining and constant features throughout the Republican period. During the last years of the Qing, the rate of real taxation in many parts of China had increased because of the proliferation of locally imposed surtaxes and sub-bureaucratic offices while the quotas remitted to the central government remained unchanged. This situation worsened after the 1911 Revolution, when provinces refused to remit anything at all to the central government. Although Yuan Shikai briefly got tax receipts coming into the capital in 1914, things so deteriorated after his death that during the Beiyang period, insofar as the central government had any revenues at all, they were provided via the remission of the remainder of salt tax funds collected by customs and Sino-foreign tax collecting 8. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 148-155. On warlord actions in the capital, see Chien Tuan-sheng, The Government and Politics of China, pp. 65-76, and on the structural systems behind warlord behaviour, see Ch'i Hsi-sheng, Warlord Politics in China, 1916-28 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), pp. 185-195. Kai-shek became near hysterical about the continued existence of Communists who not only challenged his government from within the body politic of China but, even more seriously, posed an alternate and highly threatening model of "bottom-up" mobilization.8 For Republican-era central governments, the primary ordering principle was rapidly to build and project central state and bureaucratic power in order to create a viable and legitimate form of civil government. Subsidiary components of this larger agenda that remained virtually unchanged throughout the Yuan Shikai, Beiyang and KMT regimes included: promoting administrative and fiscal centralization, rationalization and standardization; the central state attempting to set the standard in programmes for modern education and industrial development; and - civilianizing imperatives to the contrary - militarily crushing open opposition whenever it was feasible to do so and opting for inclusion and co-optation when it was not. Unfortunately for the evolution of post-1911 government in China, while the last years of the Qing bequeathed a largely unaltered agenda for central government action and state-building, it also passed on a complex of very serious structural weaknesses. These were exacerbated by the political volatility of the early Republic, which made the goals doubly difficult to realize in practice. In spite of the standing desire of all central government actors to promote centralization, unity and civil legitimacy, central state capacity was extremely limited with respect to the key issues of taxation and personnel, and the project of building civilian institutions was consistently undercut by the twin phenomena of internal division and external military pressure. Internally weak and fragmented government institutions in turn led to short-term horizons and political expedience, and the continued existence of armed challengers within China and aggressive imperialism from without mandated the continued importance of the military within government decision-making. To a greater rather than to a lesser extent, weak central projective capacity, internal divisions and external military pressure remained constraining and constant features throughout the Republican period. During the last years of the Qing, the rate of real taxation in many parts of China had increased because of the proliferation of locally imposed surtaxes and sub-bureaucratic offices while the quotas remitted to the central government remained unchanged. This situation worsened after the 1911 Revolution, when provinces refused to remit anything at all to the central government. Although Yuan Shikai briefly got tax receipts coming into the capital in 1914, things so deteriorated after his death that during the Beiyang period, insofar as the central government had any revenues at all, they were provided via the remission of the remainder of salt tax funds collected by customs and Sino-foreign tax collecting 8. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 148-155. On warlord actions in the capital, see Chien Tuan-sheng, The Government and Politics of China, pp. 65-76, and on the structural systems behind warlord behaviour, see Ch'i Hsi-sheng, Warlord Politics in China, 1916-28 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), pp. 185-195. Kai-shek became near hysterical about the continued existence of Communists who not only challenged his government from within the body politic of China but, even more seriously, posed an alternate and highly threatening model of "bottom-up" mobilization.8 For Republican-era central governments, the primary ordering principle was rapidly to build and project central state and bureaucratic power in order to create a viable and legitimate form of civil government. Subsidiary components of this larger agenda that remained virtually unchanged throughout the Yuan Shikai, Beiyang and KMT regimes included: promoting administrative and fiscal centralization, rationalization and standardization; the central state attempting to set the standard in programmes for modern education and industrial development; and - civilianizing imperatives to the contrary - militarily crushing open opposition whenever it was feasible to do so and opting for inclusion and co-optation when it was not. Unfortunately for the evolution of post-1911 government in China, while the last years of the Qing bequeathed a largely unaltered agenda for central government action and state-building, it also passed on a complex of very serious structural weaknesses. These were exacerbated by the political volatility of the early Republic, which made the goals doubly difficult to realize in practice. In spite of the standing desire of all central government actors to promote centralization, unity and civil legitimacy, central state capacity was extremely limited with respect to the key issues of taxation and personnel, and the project of building civilian institutions was consistently undercut by the twin phenomena of internal division and external military pressure. Internally weak and fragmented government institutions in turn led to short-term horizons and political expedience, and the continued existence of armed challengers within China and aggressive imperialism from without mandated the continued importance of the military within government decision-making. To a greater rather than to a lesser extent, weak central projective capacity, internal divisions and external military pressure remained constraining and constant features throughout the Republican period. During the last years of the Qing, the rate of real taxation in many parts of China had increased because of the proliferation of locally imposed surtaxes and sub-bureaucratic offices while the quotas remitted to the central government remained unchanged. This situation worsened after the 1911 Revolution, when provinces refused to remit anything at all to the central government. Although Yuan Shikai briefly got tax receipts coming into the capital in 1914, things so deteriorated after his death that during the Beiyang period, insofar as the central government had any revenues at all, they were provided via the remission of the remainder of salt tax funds collected by customs and Sino-foreign tax collecting 8. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 148-155. On warlord actions in the capital, see Chien Tuan-sheng, The Government and Politics of China, pp. 65-76, and on the structural systems behind warlord behaviour, see Ch'i Hsi-sheng, Warlord Politics in China, 1916-28 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), pp. 185-195. Kai-shek became near hysterical about the continued existence of Communists who not only challenged his government from within the body politic of China but, even more seriously, posed an alternate and highly threatening model of "bottom-up" mobilization.8 For Republican-era central governments, the primary ordering principle was rapidly to build and project central state and bureaucratic power in order to create a viable and legitimate form of civil government. Subsidiary components of this larger agenda that remained virtually unchanged throughout the Yuan Shikai, Beiyang and KMT regimes included: promoting administrative and fiscal centralization, rationalization and standardization; the central state attempting to set the standard in programmes for modern education and industrial development; and - civilianizing imperatives to the contrary - militarily crushing open opposition whenever it was feasible to do so and opting for inclusion and co-optation when it was not. Unfortunately for the evolution of post-1911 government in China, while the last years of the Qing bequeathed a largely unaltered agenda for central government action and state-building, it also passed on a complex of very serious structural weaknesses. These were exacerbated by the political volatility of the early Republic, which made the goals doubly difficult to realize in practice. In spite of the standing desire of all central government actors to promote centralization, unity and civil legitimacy, central state capacity was extremely limited with respect to the key issues of taxation and personnel, and the project of building civilian institutions was consistently undercut by the twin phenomena of internal division and external military pressure. Internally weak and fragmented government institutions in turn led to short-term horizons and political expedience, and the continued existence of armed challengers within China and aggressive imperialism from without mandated the continued importance of the military within government decision-making. To a greater rather than to a lesser extent, weak central projective capacity, internal divisions and external military pressure remained constraining and constant features throughout the Republican period. During the last years of the Qing, the rate of real taxation in many parts of China had increased because of the proliferation of locally imposed surtaxes and sub-bureaucratic offices while the quotas remitted to the central government remained unchanged. This situation worsened after the 1911 Revolution, when provinces refused to remit anything at all to the central government. Although Yuan Shikai briefly got tax receipts coming into the capital in 1914, things so deteriorated after his death that during the Beiyang period, insofar as the central government had any revenues at all, they were provided via the remission of the remainder of salt tax funds collected by customs and Sino-foreign tax collecting 8. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 148-155. On warlord actions in the capital, see Chien Tuan-sheng, The Government and Politics of China, pp. 65-76, and on the structural systems behind warlord behaviour, see Ch'i Hsi-sheng, Warlord Politics in China, 1916-28 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), pp. 185-195. Kai-shek became near hysterical about the continued existence of Communists who not only challenged his government from within the body politic of China but, even more seriously, posed an alternate and highly threatening model of "bottom-up" mobilization.8 For Republican-era central governments, the primary ordering principle was rapidly to build and project central state and bureaucratic power in order to create a viable and legitimate form of civil government. Subsidiary components of this larger agenda that remained virtually unchanged throughout the Yuan Shikai, Beiyang and KMT regimes included: promoting administrative and fiscal centralization, rationalization and standardization; the central state attempting to set the standard in programmes for modern education and industrial development; and - civilianizing imperatives to the contrary - militarily crushing open opposition whenever it was feasible to do so and opting for inclusion and co-optation when it was not. Unfortunately for the evolution of post-1911 government in China, while the last years of the Qing bequeathed a largely unaltered agenda for central government action and state-building, it also passed on a complex of very serious structural weaknesses. These were exacerbated by the political volatility of the early Republic, which made the goals doubly difficult to realize in practice. In spite of the standing desire of all central government actors to promote centralization, unity and civil legitimacy, central state capacity was extremely limited with respect to the key issues of taxation and personnel, and the project of building civilian institutions was consistently undercut by the twin phenomena of internal division and external military pressure. Internally weak and fragmented government institutions in turn led to short-term horizons and political expedience, and the continued existence of armed challengers within China and aggressive imperialism from without mandated the continued importance of the military within government decision-making. To a greater rather than to a lesser extent, weak central projective capacity, internal divisions and external military pressure remained constraining and constant features throughout the Republican period. During the last years of the Qing, the rate of real taxation in many parts of China had increased because of the proliferation of locally imposed surtaxes and sub-bureaucratic offices while the quotas remitted to the central government remained unchanged. This situation worsened after the 1911 Revolution, when provinces refused to remit anything at all to the central government. Although Yuan Shikai briefly got tax receipts coming into the capital in 1914, things so deteriorated after his death that during the Beiyang period, insofar as the central government had any revenues at all, they were provided via the remission of the remainder of salt tax funds collected by customs and Sino-foreign tax collecting 8. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 148-155. On warlord actions in the capital, see Chien Tuan-sheng, The Government and Politics of China, pp. 65-76, and on the structural systems behind warlord behaviour, see Ch'i Hsi-sheng, Warlord Politics in China, 1916-28 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), pp. 185-195. Kai-shek became near hysterical about the continued existence of Communists who not only challenged his government from within the body politic of China but, even more seriously, posed an alternate and highly threatening model of "bottom-up" mobilization.8 For Republican-era central governments, the primary ordering principle was rapidly to build and project central state and bureaucratic power in order to create a viable and legitimate form of civil government. Subsidiary components of this larger agenda that remained virtually unchanged throughout the Yuan Shikai, Beiyang and KMT regimes included: promoting administrative and fiscal centralization, rationalization and standardization; the central state attempting to set the standard in programmes for modern education and industrial development; and - civilianizing imperatives to the contrary - militarily crushing open opposition whenever it was feasible to do so and opting for inclusion and co-optation when it was not. Unfortunately for the evolution of post-1911 government in China, while the last years of the Qing bequeathed a largely unaltered agenda for central government action and state-building, it also passed on a complex of very serious structural weaknesses. These were exacerbated by the political volatility of the early Republic, which made the goals doubly difficult to realize in practice. In spite of the standing desire of all central government actors to promote centralization, unity and civil legitimacy, central state capacity was extremely limited with respect to the key issues of taxation and personnel, and the project of building civilian institutions was consistently undercut by the twin phenomena of internal division and external military pressure. Internally weak and fragmented government institutions in turn led to short-term horizons and political expedience, and the continued existence of armed challengers within China and aggressive imperialism from without mandated the continued importance of the military within government decision-making. To a greater rather than to a lesser extent, weak central projective capacity, internal divisions and external military pressure remained constraining and constant features throughout the Republican period. During the last years of the Qing, the rate of real taxation in many parts of China had increased because of the proliferation of locally imposed surtaxes and sub-bureaucratic offices while the quotas remitted to the central government remained unchanged. This situation worsened after the 1911 Revolution, when provinces refused to remit anything at all to the central government. Although Yuan Shikai briefly got tax receipts coming into the capital in 1914, things so deteriorated after his death that during the Beiyang period, insofar as the central government had any revenues at all, they were provided via the remission of the remainder of salt tax funds collected by customs and Sino-foreign tax collecting 8. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 148-155. On warlord actions in the capital, see Chien Tuan-sheng, The Government and Politics of China, pp. 65-76, and on the structural systems behind warlord behaviour, see Ch'i Hsi-sheng, Warlord Politics in China, 1916-28 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), pp. 185-195. Kai-shek became near hysterical about the continued existence of Communists who not only challenged his government from within the body politic of China but, even more seriously, posed an alternate and highly threatening model of "bottom-up" mobilization.8 For Republican-era central governments, the primary ordering principle was rapidly to build and project central state and bureaucratic power in order to create a viable and legitimate form of civil government. Subsidiary components of this larger agenda that remained virtually unchanged throughout the Yuan Shikai, Beiyang and KMT regimes included: promoting administrative and fiscal centralization, rationalization and standardization; the central state attempting to set the standard in programmes for modern education and industrial development; and - civilianizing imperatives to the contrary - militarily crushing open opposition whenever it was feasible to do so and opting for inclusion and co-optation when it was not. Unfortunately for the evolution of post-1911 government in China, while the last years of the Qing bequeathed a largely unaltered agenda for central government action and state-building, it also passed on a complex of very serious structural weaknesses. These were exacerbated by the political volatility of the early Republic, which made the goals doubly difficult to realize in practice. In spite of the standing desire of all central government actors to promote centralization, unity and civil legitimacy, central state capacity was extremely limited with respect to the key issues of taxation and personnel, and the project of building civilian institutions was consistently undercut by the twin phenomena of internal division and external military pressure. Internally weak and fragmented government institutions in turn led to short-term horizons and political expedience, and the continued existence of armed challengers within China and aggressive imperialism from without mandated the continued importance of the military within government decision-making. To a greater rather than to a lesser extent, weak central projective capacity, internal divisions and external military pressure remained constraining and constant features throughout the Republican period. During the last years of the Qing, the rate of real taxation in many parts of China had increased because of the proliferation of locally imposed surtaxes and sub-bureaucratic offices while the quotas remitted to the central government remained unchanged. This situation worsened after the 1911 Revolution, when provinces refused to remit anything at all to the central government. Although Yuan Shikai briefly got tax receipts coming into the capital in 1914, things so deteriorated after his death that during the Beiyang period, insofar as the central government had any revenues at all, they were provided via the remission of the remainder of salt tax funds collected by customs and Sino-foreign tax collecting 8. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 148-155. On warlord actions in the capital, see Chien Tuan-sheng, The Government and Politics of China, pp. 65-76, and on the structural systems behind warlord behaviour, see Ch'i Hsi-sheng, Warlord Politics in China, 1916-28 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), pp. 185-195. Kai-shek became near hysterical about the continued existence of Communists who not only challenged his government from within the body politic of China but, even more seriously, posed an alternate and highly threatening model of "bottom-up" mobilization.8 For Republican-era central governments, the primary ordering principle was rapidly to build and project central state and bureaucratic power in order to create a viable and legitimate form of civil government. Subsidiary components of this larger agenda that remained virtually unchanged throughout the Yuan Shikai, Beiyang and KMT regimes included: promoting administrative and fiscal centralization, rationalization and standardization; the central state attempting to set the standard in programmes for modern education and industrial development; and - civilianizing imperatives to the contrary - militarily crushing open opposition whenever it was feasible to do so and opting for inclusion and co-optation when it was not. Unfortunately for the evolution of post-1911 government in China, while the last years of the Qing bequeathed a largely unaltered agenda for central government action and state-building, it also passed on a complex of very serious structural weaknesses. These were exacerbated by the political volatility of the early Republic, which made the goals doubly difficult to realize in practice. In spite of the standing desire of all central government actors to promote centralization, unity and civil legitimacy, central state capacity was extremely limited with respect to the key issues of taxation and personnel, and the project of building civilian institutions was consistently undercut by the twin phenomena of internal division and external military pressure. Internally weak and fragmented government institutions in turn led to short-term horizons and political expedience, and the continued existence of armed challengers within China and aggressive imperialism from without mandated the continued importance of the military within government decision-making. To a greater rather than to a lesser extent, weak central projective capacity, internal divisions and external military pressure remained constraining and constant features throughout the Republican period. During the last years of the Qing, the rate of real taxation in many parts of China had increased because of the proliferation of locally imposed surtaxes and sub-bureaucratic offices while the quotas remitted to the central government remained unchanged. This situation worsened after the 1911 Revolution, when provinces refused to remit anything at all to the central government. Although Yuan Shikai briefly got tax receipts coming into the capital in 1914, things so deteriorated after his death that during the Beiyang period, insofar as the central government had any revenues at all, they were provided via the remission of the remainder of salt tax funds collected by customs and Sino-foreign tax collecting 8. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 148-155. On warlord actions in the capital, see Chien Tuan-sheng, The Government and Politics of China, pp. 65-76, and on the structural systems behind warlord behaviour, see Ch'i Hsi-sheng, Warlord Politics in China, 1916-28 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), pp. 185-195. Kai-shek became near hysterical about the continued existence of Communists who not only challenged his government from within the body politic of China but, even more seriously, posed an alternate and highly threatening model of "bottom-up" mobilization.8 For Republican-era central governments, the primary ordering principle was rapidly to build and project central state and bureaucratic power in order to create a viable and legitimate form of civil government. Subsidiary components of this larger agenda that remained virtually unchanged throughout the Yuan Shikai, Beiyang and KMT regimes included: promoting administrative and fiscal centralization, rationalization and standardization; the central state attempting to set the standard in programmes for modern education and industrial development; and - civilianizing imperatives to the contrary - militarily crushing open opposition whenever it was feasible to do so and opting for inclusion and co-optation when it was not. Unfortunately for the evolution of post-1911 government in China, while the last years of the Qing bequeathed a largely unaltered agenda for central government action and state-building, it also passed on a complex of very serious structural weaknesses. These were exacerbated by the political volatility of the early Republic, which made the goals doubly difficult to realize in practice. In spite of the standing desire of all central government actors to promote centralization, unity and civil legitimacy, central state capacity was extremely limited with respect to the key issues of taxation and personnel, and the project of building civilian institutions was consistently undercut by the twin phenomena of internal division and external military pressure. Internally weak and fragmented government institutions in turn led to short-term horizons and political expedience, and the continued existence of armed challengers within China and aggressive imperialism from without mandated the continued importance of the military within government decision-making. To a greater rather than to a lesser extent, weak central projective capacity, internal divisions and external military pressure remained constraining and constant features throughout the Republican period. During the last years of the Qing, the rate of real taxation in many parts of China had increased because of the proliferation of locally imposed surtaxes and sub-bureaucratic offices while the quotas remitted to the central government remained unchanged. This situation worsened after the 1911 Revolution, when provinces refused to remit anything at all to the central government. Although Yuan Shikai briefly got tax receipts coming into the capital in 1914, things so deteriorated after his death that during the Beiyang period, insofar as the central government had any revenues at all, they were provided via the remission of the remainder of salt tax funds collected by customs and Sino-foreign tax collecting 8. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 148-155. On warlord actions in the capital, see Chien Tuan-sheng, The Government and Politics of China, pp. 65-76, and on the structural systems behind warlord behaviour, see Ch'i Hsi-sheng, Warlord Politics in China, 1916-28 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), pp. 185-195. 333
334 The China Quarterly agencies that were independent organizations but nominally supervised by the central government in the 1910s and 1920s.3 The issue of government personnel was more subtle,but no less intrac- table.For centuries prior to the establishment of the Republic,those in state service in China had to strike a balance that could accommodate the inherent tensions between two sets of claims:the Confucian bureaucracy's demand that the individual in its employ be responsive to its standardized and impersonal rules and regulations while in office,versus the more enduring claims of the individual's friends and family to provide for them and "be sensitive to human feelings"(gan renging).If left unchecked this latter set of pressures could easily lead to rampant corruption.Although real levels and subjective perceptions of corruption as a problem in the late imperial state certainly varied widely,some combination of "good institutions" through formal and bureaucratic sanctions of deviance,and normative socialization into behaviour as "good men"was the recognized way of keeping the tensions between a depersonalized bureaucracy and the particu- larism of society in some sort of balance.0 In terms of institutions,the existence of Confucian civil service exams as the primary route into the bureaucracy cut off one obvious way of providing patronage.Years of studying the Confucian ethics may have pre-disposed individuals to be "good men,"but clearly "good institutions"were also necessary to maintain an equilibrium between particularist interest and impartial law. By the early Republic,however,neither of these components obtained. The Confucian civil service examinations,viewed by progressives as hopelessly archaic and a brake on progress,had been abolished in 1904-05,but nothing convincing had been instituted as a replace- ment.Although all Republican regimes repeatedly professed their desire to recruit talent through the institution of modern civil service examinations to create a technically competent and pro-active govern- ment,the short-term pressures to provide patronage and buy off re- calcitrant subordinates and would-be allies repeatedly stymied the 9.Young,The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai,pp.164-167.On the creation of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate and the revenues it remitted to the Beiyang governments,see S.A.M.Adshead,The Modemization of the Chinese Salt Administration,1900-1920 (Cambridge,MA:Harvard University Press,1970),pp.61-117.Prasenjit Duara in Culture, Power and the State:Rural North China,1900-42 (Stanford:Stanford University Press. 1988),pp.59-85,also suggests that the very late imperial and Republican proliferation of local tax bureaus and tankuan led to significant increases in the rate of real taxation,virtually none of which was passed up to the central government. 10.The relative weights of the perceived importance of"good institutions"and "good men"in late imperial Chinese statecraft varied substantially,and is a vast topic in its own right. For views in English,see Benjamin Schwartz.The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge,MA:Harvard University Press,1985),pp.102-105 for a discussion of the importance of"good men."For the importance of "good institutions,"see Madeleine Zelin's excellent study of the rationalizing fiscal reforms of the Yongzheng Emperor,The Magistrate's Tael:Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in 18th Century China(Berkeley:University of California Press,1984). 11.Wolfgang Franke,The Reform and Abolition of the Traditional Chinese Examination System(Cambridge,MA:Harvard Monographs,1960)and Benjamin Elman,"Delegitimation and decanonization:the trap of civil service examination reform,1860-1910,"paper prepared for the First International Conference of Ch'ing Intellectual History,National Chung-shan University,Kaohsiung,Taiwan,19-21 November 1993
334 The China Quarterly agencies that were independent organizations but nominally supervised by the central government in the 1910s and 1920s.9 The issue of government personnel was more subtle, but no less intractable. For centuries prior to the establishment of the Republic, those in state service in China had to strike a balance that could accommodate the inherent tensions between two sets of claims: the Confucian bureaucracy's demand that the individual in its employ be responsive to its standardized and impersonal rules and regulations while in office, versus the more enduring claims of the individual's friends and family to provide for them and "be sensitive to human feelings" (gan renqing). If left unchecked this latter set of pressures could easily lead to rampant corruption. Although real levels and subjective perceptions of corruption as a problem in the late imperial state certainly varied widely, some combination of "good institutions" through formal and bureaucratic sanctions of deviance, and normative socialization into behaviour as "good men" was the recognized way of keeping the tensions between a depersonalized bureaucracy and the particularism of society in some sort of balance.10 In terms of institutions, the existence of Confucian civil service exams as the primary route into the bureaucracy cut off one obvious way of providing patronage. Years of studying the Confucian ethics may have pre-disposed individuals to be "good men," but clearly "good institutions" were also necessary to maintain an equilibrium between particularist interest and impartial law. By the early Republic, however, neither of these components obtained. The Confucian civil service examinations, viewed by progressives as hopelessly archaic and a brake on progress, had been abolished in 1904-05, but nothing convincing had been instituted as a replacement.11 Although all Republican regimes repeatedly professed their desire to recruit talent through the institution of modem civil service examinations to create a technically competent and pro-active government, the short-term pressures to provide patronage and buy off recalcitrant subordinates and would-be allies repeatedly stymied the 9. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 164-167. On the creation of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate and the revenues it remitted to the Beiyang governments, see S. A. M. Adshead, The Modernization of the Chinese Salt Administration, 1900-1920 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 61-117. Prasenjit Duara in Culture, Power and the State: Rural North China, 1900-42 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 59-85, also suggests that the very late imperial and Republican proliferation of local tax bureaus and tankuan led to significant increases in the rate of real taxation, virtually none of which was passed up to the central government. 10. The relative weights of the perceived importance of "good institutions" and "good men" in late imperial Chinese statecraft varied substantially, and is a vast topic in its own right. For views in English, see Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 102-105 for a discussion of the importance of "good men." For the importance of "good institutions," see Madeleine Zelin's excellent study of the rationalizing fiscal reforms of the Yongzheng Emperor, The Magistrate's Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in 18th Century China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). 11. Wolfgang Franke, The Reform and Abolition of the Traditional Chinese Examination System (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Monographs, 1960) and Benjamin Elman, "Delegitimation and decanonization: the trap of civil service examination reform, 1860-1910," paper prepared for the First International Conference of Ch'ing Intellectual History, National Chung-shan University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan, 19-21 November 1993. agencies that were independent organizations but nominally supervised by the central government in the 1910s and 1920s.9 The issue of government personnel was more subtle, but no less intractable. For centuries prior to the establishment of the Republic, those in state service in China had to strike a balance that could accommodate the inherent tensions between two sets of claims: the Confucian bureaucracy's demand that the individual in its employ be responsive to its standardized and impersonal rules and regulations while in office, versus the more enduring claims of the individual's friends and family to provide for them and "be sensitive to human feelings" (gan renqing). If left unchecked this latter set of pressures could easily lead to rampant corruption. Although real levels and subjective perceptions of corruption as a problem in the late imperial state certainly varied widely, some combination of "good institutions" through formal and bureaucratic sanctions of deviance, and normative socialization into behaviour as "good men" was the recognized way of keeping the tensions between a depersonalized bureaucracy and the particularism of society in some sort of balance.10 In terms of institutions, the existence of Confucian civil service exams as the primary route into the bureaucracy cut off one obvious way of providing patronage. Years of studying the Confucian ethics may have pre-disposed individuals to be "good men," but clearly "good institutions" were also necessary to maintain an equilibrium between particularist interest and impartial law. By the early Republic, however, neither of these components obtained. The Confucian civil service examinations, viewed by progressives as hopelessly archaic and a brake on progress, had been abolished in 1904-05, but nothing convincing had been instituted as a replacement.11 Although all Republican regimes repeatedly professed their desire to recruit talent through the institution of modem civil service examinations to create a technically competent and pro-active government, the short-term pressures to provide patronage and buy off recalcitrant subordinates and would-be allies repeatedly stymied the 9. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 164-167. On the creation of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate and the revenues it remitted to the Beiyang governments, see S. A. M. Adshead, The Modernization of the Chinese Salt Administration, 1900-1920 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 61-117. Prasenjit Duara in Culture, Power and the State: Rural North China, 1900-42 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 59-85, also suggests that the very late imperial and Republican proliferation of local tax bureaus and tankuan led to significant increases in the rate of real taxation, virtually none of which was passed up to the central government. 10. The relative weights of the perceived importance of "good institutions" and "good men" in late imperial Chinese statecraft varied substantially, and is a vast topic in its own right. For views in English, see Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 102-105 for a discussion of the importance of "good men." For the importance of "good institutions," see Madeleine Zelin's excellent study of the rationalizing fiscal reforms of the Yongzheng Emperor, The Magistrate's Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in 18th Century China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). 11. Wolfgang Franke, The Reform and Abolition of the Traditional Chinese Examination System (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Monographs, 1960) and Benjamin Elman, "Delegitimation and decanonization: the trap of civil service examination reform, 1860-1910," paper prepared for the First International Conference of Ch'ing Intellectual History, National Chung-shan University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan, 19-21 November 1993. agencies that were independent organizations but nominally supervised by the central government in the 1910s and 1920s.9 The issue of government personnel was more subtle, but no less intractable. For centuries prior to the establishment of the Republic, those in state service in China had to strike a balance that could accommodate the inherent tensions between two sets of claims: the Confucian bureaucracy's demand that the individual in its employ be responsive to its standardized and impersonal rules and regulations while in office, versus the more enduring claims of the individual's friends and family to provide for them and "be sensitive to human feelings" (gan renqing). If left unchecked this latter set of pressures could easily lead to rampant corruption. Although real levels and subjective perceptions of corruption as a problem in the late imperial state certainly varied widely, some combination of "good institutions" through formal and bureaucratic sanctions of deviance, and normative socialization into behaviour as "good men" was the recognized way of keeping the tensions between a depersonalized bureaucracy and the particularism of society in some sort of balance.10 In terms of institutions, the existence of Confucian civil service exams as the primary route into the bureaucracy cut off one obvious way of providing patronage. Years of studying the Confucian ethics may have pre-disposed individuals to be "good men," but clearly "good institutions" were also necessary to maintain an equilibrium between particularist interest and impartial law. By the early Republic, however, neither of these components obtained. The Confucian civil service examinations, viewed by progressives as hopelessly archaic and a brake on progress, had been abolished in 1904-05, but nothing convincing had been instituted as a replacement.11 Although all Republican regimes repeatedly professed their desire to recruit talent through the institution of modem civil service examinations to create a technically competent and pro-active government, the short-term pressures to provide patronage and buy off recalcitrant subordinates and would-be allies repeatedly stymied the 9. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 164-167. On the creation of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate and the revenues it remitted to the Beiyang governments, see S. A. M. Adshead, The Modernization of the Chinese Salt Administration, 1900-1920 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 61-117. Prasenjit Duara in Culture, Power and the State: Rural North China, 1900-42 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 59-85, also suggests that the very late imperial and Republican proliferation of local tax bureaus and tankuan led to significant increases in the rate of real taxation, virtually none of which was passed up to the central government. 10. The relative weights of the perceived importance of "good institutions" and "good men" in late imperial Chinese statecraft varied substantially, and is a vast topic in its own right. For views in English, see Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 102-105 for a discussion of the importance of "good men." For the importance of "good institutions," see Madeleine Zelin's excellent study of the rationalizing fiscal reforms of the Yongzheng Emperor, The Magistrate's Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in 18th Century China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). 11. Wolfgang Franke, The Reform and Abolition of the Traditional Chinese Examination System (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Monographs, 1960) and Benjamin Elman, "Delegitimation and decanonization: the trap of civil service examination reform, 1860-1910," paper prepared for the First International Conference of Ch'ing Intellectual History, National Chung-shan University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan, 19-21 November 1993. agencies that were independent organizations but nominally supervised by the central government in the 1910s and 1920s.9 The issue of government personnel was more subtle, but no less intractable. For centuries prior to the establishment of the Republic, those in state service in China had to strike a balance that could accommodate the inherent tensions between two sets of claims: the Confucian bureaucracy's demand that the individual in its employ be responsive to its standardized and impersonal rules and regulations while in office, versus the more enduring claims of the individual's friends and family to provide for them and "be sensitive to human feelings" (gan renqing). If left unchecked this latter set of pressures could easily lead to rampant corruption. Although real levels and subjective perceptions of corruption as a problem in the late imperial state certainly varied widely, some combination of "good institutions" through formal and bureaucratic sanctions of deviance, and normative socialization into behaviour as "good men" was the recognized way of keeping the tensions between a depersonalized bureaucracy and the particularism of society in some sort of balance.10 In terms of institutions, the existence of Confucian civil service exams as the primary route into the bureaucracy cut off one obvious way of providing patronage. Years of studying the Confucian ethics may have pre-disposed individuals to be "good men," but clearly "good institutions" were also necessary to maintain an equilibrium between particularist interest and impartial law. By the early Republic, however, neither of these components obtained. The Confucian civil service examinations, viewed by progressives as hopelessly archaic and a brake on progress, had been abolished in 1904-05, but nothing convincing had been instituted as a replacement.11 Although all Republican regimes repeatedly professed their desire to recruit talent through the institution of modem civil service examinations to create a technically competent and pro-active government, the short-term pressures to provide patronage and buy off recalcitrant subordinates and would-be allies repeatedly stymied the 9. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 164-167. On the creation of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate and the revenues it remitted to the Beiyang governments, see S. A. M. Adshead, The Modernization of the Chinese Salt Administration, 1900-1920 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 61-117. Prasenjit Duara in Culture, Power and the State: Rural North China, 1900-42 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 59-85, also suggests that the very late imperial and Republican proliferation of local tax bureaus and tankuan led to significant increases in the rate of real taxation, virtually none of which was passed up to the central government. 10. The relative weights of the perceived importance of "good institutions" and "good men" in late imperial Chinese statecraft varied substantially, and is a vast topic in its own right. For views in English, see Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 102-105 for a discussion of the importance of "good men." For the importance of "good institutions," see Madeleine Zelin's excellent study of the rationalizing fiscal reforms of the Yongzheng Emperor, The Magistrate's Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in 18th Century China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). 11. Wolfgang Franke, The Reform and Abolition of the Traditional Chinese Examination System (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Monographs, 1960) and Benjamin Elman, "Delegitimation and decanonization: the trap of civil service examination reform, 1860-1910," paper prepared for the First International Conference of Ch'ing Intellectual History, National Chung-shan University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan, 19-21 November 1993. agencies that were independent organizations but nominally supervised by the central government in the 1910s and 1920s.9 The issue of government personnel was more subtle, but no less intractable. For centuries prior to the establishment of the Republic, those in state service in China had to strike a balance that could accommodate the inherent tensions between two sets of claims: the Confucian bureaucracy's demand that the individual in its employ be responsive to its standardized and impersonal rules and regulations while in office, versus the more enduring claims of the individual's friends and family to provide for them and "be sensitive to human feelings" (gan renqing). If left unchecked this latter set of pressures could easily lead to rampant corruption. Although real levels and subjective perceptions of corruption as a problem in the late imperial state certainly varied widely, some combination of "good institutions" through formal and bureaucratic sanctions of deviance, and normative socialization into behaviour as "good men" was the recognized way of keeping the tensions between a depersonalized bureaucracy and the particularism of society in some sort of balance.10 In terms of institutions, the existence of Confucian civil service exams as the primary route into the bureaucracy cut off one obvious way of providing patronage. Years of studying the Confucian ethics may have pre-disposed individuals to be "good men," but clearly "good institutions" were also necessary to maintain an equilibrium between particularist interest and impartial law. By the early Republic, however, neither of these components obtained. The Confucian civil service examinations, viewed by progressives as hopelessly archaic and a brake on progress, had been abolished in 1904-05, but nothing convincing had been instituted as a replacement.11 Although all Republican regimes repeatedly professed their desire to recruit talent through the institution of modem civil service examinations to create a technically competent and pro-active government, the short-term pressures to provide patronage and buy off recalcitrant subordinates and would-be allies repeatedly stymied the 9. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 164-167. On the creation of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate and the revenues it remitted to the Beiyang governments, see S. A. M. Adshead, The Modernization of the Chinese Salt Administration, 1900-1920 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 61-117. Prasenjit Duara in Culture, Power and the State: Rural North China, 1900-42 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 59-85, also suggests that the very late imperial and Republican proliferation of local tax bureaus and tankuan led to significant increases in the rate of real taxation, virtually none of which was passed up to the central government. 10. The relative weights of the perceived importance of "good institutions" and "good men" in late imperial Chinese statecraft varied substantially, and is a vast topic in its own right. For views in English, see Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 102-105 for a discussion of the importance of "good men." For the importance of "good institutions," see Madeleine Zelin's excellent study of the rationalizing fiscal reforms of the Yongzheng Emperor, The Magistrate's Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in 18th Century China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). 11. Wolfgang Franke, The Reform and Abolition of the Traditional Chinese Examination System (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Monographs, 1960) and Benjamin Elman, "Delegitimation and decanonization: the trap of civil service examination reform, 1860-1910," paper prepared for the First International Conference of Ch'ing Intellectual History, National Chung-shan University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan, 19-21 November 1993. agencies that were independent organizations but nominally supervised by the central government in the 1910s and 1920s.9 The issue of government personnel was more subtle, but no less intractable. For centuries prior to the establishment of the Republic, those in state service in China had to strike a balance that could accommodate the inherent tensions between two sets of claims: the Confucian bureaucracy's demand that the individual in its employ be responsive to its standardized and impersonal rules and regulations while in office, versus the more enduring claims of the individual's friends and family to provide for them and "be sensitive to human feelings" (gan renqing). If left unchecked this latter set of pressures could easily lead to rampant corruption. Although real levels and subjective perceptions of corruption as a problem in the late imperial state certainly varied widely, some combination of "good institutions" through formal and bureaucratic sanctions of deviance, and normative socialization into behaviour as "good men" was the recognized way of keeping the tensions between a depersonalized bureaucracy and the particularism of society in some sort of balance.10 In terms of institutions, the existence of Confucian civil service exams as the primary route into the bureaucracy cut off one obvious way of providing patronage. Years of studying the Confucian ethics may have pre-disposed individuals to be "good men," but clearly "good institutions" were also necessary to maintain an equilibrium between particularist interest and impartial law. By the early Republic, however, neither of these components obtained. The Confucian civil service examinations, viewed by progressives as hopelessly archaic and a brake on progress, had been abolished in 1904-05, but nothing convincing had been instituted as a replacement.11 Although all Republican regimes repeatedly professed their desire to recruit talent through the institution of modem civil service examinations to create a technically competent and pro-active government, the short-term pressures to provide patronage and buy off recalcitrant subordinates and would-be allies repeatedly stymied the 9. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 164-167. On the creation of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate and the revenues it remitted to the Beiyang governments, see S. A. M. Adshead, The Modernization of the Chinese Salt Administration, 1900-1920 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 61-117. Prasenjit Duara in Culture, Power and the State: Rural North China, 1900-42 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 59-85, also suggests that the very late imperial and Republican proliferation of local tax bureaus and tankuan led to significant increases in the rate of real taxation, virtually none of which was passed up to the central government. 10. The relative weights of the perceived importance of "good institutions" and "good men" in late imperial Chinese statecraft varied substantially, and is a vast topic in its own right. For views in English, see Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 102-105 for a discussion of the importance of "good men." For the importance of "good institutions," see Madeleine Zelin's excellent study of the rationalizing fiscal reforms of the Yongzheng Emperor, The Magistrate's Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in 18th Century China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). 11. Wolfgang Franke, The Reform and Abolition of the Traditional Chinese Examination System (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Monographs, 1960) and Benjamin Elman, "Delegitimation and decanonization: the trap of civil service examination reform, 1860-1910," paper prepared for the First International Conference of Ch'ing Intellectual History, National Chung-shan University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan, 19-21 November 1993. agencies that were independent organizations but nominally supervised by the central government in the 1910s and 1920s.9 The issue of government personnel was more subtle, but no less intractable. For centuries prior to the establishment of the Republic, those in state service in China had to strike a balance that could accommodate the inherent tensions between two sets of claims: the Confucian bureaucracy's demand that the individual in its employ be responsive to its standardized and impersonal rules and regulations while in office, versus the more enduring claims of the individual's friends and family to provide for them and "be sensitive to human feelings" (gan renqing). If left unchecked this latter set of pressures could easily lead to rampant corruption. Although real levels and subjective perceptions of corruption as a problem in the late imperial state certainly varied widely, some combination of "good institutions" through formal and bureaucratic sanctions of deviance, and normative socialization into behaviour as "good men" was the recognized way of keeping the tensions between a depersonalized bureaucracy and the particularism of society in some sort of balance.10 In terms of institutions, the existence of Confucian civil service exams as the primary route into the bureaucracy cut off one obvious way of providing patronage. Years of studying the Confucian ethics may have pre-disposed individuals to be "good men," but clearly "good institutions" were also necessary to maintain an equilibrium between particularist interest and impartial law. By the early Republic, however, neither of these components obtained. The Confucian civil service examinations, viewed by progressives as hopelessly archaic and a brake on progress, had been abolished in 1904-05, but nothing convincing had been instituted as a replacement.11 Although all Republican regimes repeatedly professed their desire to recruit talent through the institution of modem civil service examinations to create a technically competent and pro-active government, the short-term pressures to provide patronage and buy off recalcitrant subordinates and would-be allies repeatedly stymied the 9. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 164-167. On the creation of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate and the revenues it remitted to the Beiyang governments, see S. A. M. Adshead, The Modernization of the Chinese Salt Administration, 1900-1920 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 61-117. Prasenjit Duara in Culture, Power and the State: Rural North China, 1900-42 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 59-85, also suggests that the very late imperial and Republican proliferation of local tax bureaus and tankuan led to significant increases in the rate of real taxation, virtually none of which was passed up to the central government. 10. The relative weights of the perceived importance of "good institutions" and "good men" in late imperial Chinese statecraft varied substantially, and is a vast topic in its own right. For views in English, see Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 102-105 for a discussion of the importance of "good men." For the importance of "good institutions," see Madeleine Zelin's excellent study of the rationalizing fiscal reforms of the Yongzheng Emperor, The Magistrate's Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in 18th Century China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). 11. Wolfgang Franke, The Reform and Abolition of the Traditional Chinese Examination System (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Monographs, 1960) and Benjamin Elman, "Delegitimation and decanonization: the trap of civil service examination reform, 1860-1910," paper prepared for the First International Conference of Ch'ing Intellectual History, National Chung-shan University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan, 19-21 November 1993. agencies that were independent organizations but nominally supervised by the central government in the 1910s and 1920s.9 The issue of government personnel was more subtle, but no less intractable. For centuries prior to the establishment of the Republic, those in state service in China had to strike a balance that could accommodate the inherent tensions between two sets of claims: the Confucian bureaucracy's demand that the individual in its employ be responsive to its standardized and impersonal rules and regulations while in office, versus the more enduring claims of the individual's friends and family to provide for them and "be sensitive to human feelings" (gan renqing). If left unchecked this latter set of pressures could easily lead to rampant corruption. Although real levels and subjective perceptions of corruption as a problem in the late imperial state certainly varied widely, some combination of "good institutions" through formal and bureaucratic sanctions of deviance, and normative socialization into behaviour as "good men" was the recognized way of keeping the tensions between a depersonalized bureaucracy and the particularism of society in some sort of balance.10 In terms of institutions, the existence of Confucian civil service exams as the primary route into the bureaucracy cut off one obvious way of providing patronage. Years of studying the Confucian ethics may have pre-disposed individuals to be "good men," but clearly "good institutions" were also necessary to maintain an equilibrium between particularist interest and impartial law. By the early Republic, however, neither of these components obtained. The Confucian civil service examinations, viewed by progressives as hopelessly archaic and a brake on progress, had been abolished in 1904-05, but nothing convincing had been instituted as a replacement.11 Although all Republican regimes repeatedly professed their desire to recruit talent through the institution of modem civil service examinations to create a technically competent and pro-active government, the short-term pressures to provide patronage and buy off recalcitrant subordinates and would-be allies repeatedly stymied the 9. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 164-167. On the creation of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate and the revenues it remitted to the Beiyang governments, see S. A. M. Adshead, The Modernization of the Chinese Salt Administration, 1900-1920 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 61-117. Prasenjit Duara in Culture, Power and the State: Rural North China, 1900-42 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 59-85, also suggests that the very late imperial and Republican proliferation of local tax bureaus and tankuan led to significant increases in the rate of real taxation, virtually none of which was passed up to the central government. 10. The relative weights of the perceived importance of "good institutions" and "good men" in late imperial Chinese statecraft varied substantially, and is a vast topic in its own right. For views in English, see Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 102-105 for a discussion of the importance of "good men." For the importance of "good institutions," see Madeleine Zelin's excellent study of the rationalizing fiscal reforms of the Yongzheng Emperor, The Magistrate's Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in 18th Century China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). 11. Wolfgang Franke, The Reform and Abolition of the Traditional Chinese Examination System (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Monographs, 1960) and Benjamin Elman, "Delegitimation and decanonization: the trap of civil service examination reform, 1860-1910," paper prepared for the First International Conference of Ch'ing Intellectual History, National Chung-shan University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan, 19-21 November 1993. agencies that were independent organizations but nominally supervised by the central government in the 1910s and 1920s.9 The issue of government personnel was more subtle, but no less intractable. For centuries prior to the establishment of the Republic, those in state service in China had to strike a balance that could accommodate the inherent tensions between two sets of claims: the Confucian bureaucracy's demand that the individual in its employ be responsive to its standardized and impersonal rules and regulations while in office, versus the more enduring claims of the individual's friends and family to provide for them and "be sensitive to human feelings" (gan renqing). If left unchecked this latter set of pressures could easily lead to rampant corruption. Although real levels and subjective perceptions of corruption as a problem in the late imperial state certainly varied widely, some combination of "good institutions" through formal and bureaucratic sanctions of deviance, and normative socialization into behaviour as "good men" was the recognized way of keeping the tensions between a depersonalized bureaucracy and the particularism of society in some sort of balance.10 In terms of institutions, the existence of Confucian civil service exams as the primary route into the bureaucracy cut off one obvious way of providing patronage. Years of studying the Confucian ethics may have pre-disposed individuals to be "good men," but clearly "good institutions" were also necessary to maintain an equilibrium between particularist interest and impartial law. By the early Republic, however, neither of these components obtained. The Confucian civil service examinations, viewed by progressives as hopelessly archaic and a brake on progress, had been abolished in 1904-05, but nothing convincing had been instituted as a replacement.11 Although all Republican regimes repeatedly professed their desire to recruit talent through the institution of modem civil service examinations to create a technically competent and pro-active government, the short-term pressures to provide patronage and buy off recalcitrant subordinates and would-be allies repeatedly stymied the 9. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 164-167. On the creation of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate and the revenues it remitted to the Beiyang governments, see S. A. M. Adshead, The Modernization of the Chinese Salt Administration, 1900-1920 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 61-117. Prasenjit Duara in Culture, Power and the State: Rural North China, 1900-42 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 59-85, also suggests that the very late imperial and Republican proliferation of local tax bureaus and tankuan led to significant increases in the rate of real taxation, virtually none of which was passed up to the central government. 10. The relative weights of the perceived importance of "good institutions" and "good men" in late imperial Chinese statecraft varied substantially, and is a vast topic in its own right. For views in English, see Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 102-105 for a discussion of the importance of "good men." For the importance of "good institutions," see Madeleine Zelin's excellent study of the rationalizing fiscal reforms of the Yongzheng Emperor, The Magistrate's Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in 18th Century China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). 11. Wolfgang Franke, The Reform and Abolition of the Traditional Chinese Examination System (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Monographs, 1960) and Benjamin Elman, "Delegitimation and decanonization: the trap of civil service examination reform, 1860-1910," paper prepared for the First International Conference of Ch'ing Intellectual History, National Chung-shan University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan, 19-21 November 1993. agencies that were independent organizations but nominally supervised by the central government in the 1910s and 1920s.9 The issue of government personnel was more subtle, but no less intractable. For centuries prior to the establishment of the Republic, those in state service in China had to strike a balance that could accommodate the inherent tensions between two sets of claims: the Confucian bureaucracy's demand that the individual in its employ be responsive to its standardized and impersonal rules and regulations while in office, versus the more enduring claims of the individual's friends and family to provide for them and "be sensitive to human feelings" (gan renqing). If left unchecked this latter set of pressures could easily lead to rampant corruption. Although real levels and subjective perceptions of corruption as a problem in the late imperial state certainly varied widely, some combination of "good institutions" through formal and bureaucratic sanctions of deviance, and normative socialization into behaviour as "good men" was the recognized way of keeping the tensions between a depersonalized bureaucracy and the particularism of society in some sort of balance.10 In terms of institutions, the existence of Confucian civil service exams as the primary route into the bureaucracy cut off one obvious way of providing patronage. Years of studying the Confucian ethics may have pre-disposed individuals to be "good men," but clearly "good institutions" were also necessary to maintain an equilibrium between particularist interest and impartial law. By the early Republic, however, neither of these components obtained. The Confucian civil service examinations, viewed by progressives as hopelessly archaic and a brake on progress, had been abolished in 1904-05, but nothing convincing had been instituted as a replacement.11 Although all Republican regimes repeatedly professed their desire to recruit talent through the institution of modem civil service examinations to create a technically competent and pro-active government, the short-term pressures to provide patronage and buy off recalcitrant subordinates and would-be allies repeatedly stymied the 9. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 164-167. On the creation of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate and the revenues it remitted to the Beiyang governments, see S. A. M. Adshead, The Modernization of the Chinese Salt Administration, 1900-1920 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 61-117. Prasenjit Duara in Culture, Power and the State: Rural North China, 1900-42 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 59-85, also suggests that the very late imperial and Republican proliferation of local tax bureaus and tankuan led to significant increases in the rate of real taxation, virtually none of which was passed up to the central government. 10. The relative weights of the perceived importance of "good institutions" and "good men" in late imperial Chinese statecraft varied substantially, and is a vast topic in its own right. For views in English, see Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 102-105 for a discussion of the importance of "good men." For the importance of "good institutions," see Madeleine Zelin's excellent study of the rationalizing fiscal reforms of the Yongzheng Emperor, The Magistrate's Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in 18th Century China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). 11. Wolfgang Franke, The Reform and Abolition of the Traditional Chinese Examination System (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Monographs, 1960) and Benjamin Elman, "Delegitimation and decanonization: the trap of civil service examination reform, 1860-1910," paper prepared for the First International Conference of Ch'ing Intellectual History, National Chung-shan University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan, 19-21 November 1993. agencies that were independent organizations but nominally supervised by the central government in the 1910s and 1920s.9 The issue of government personnel was more subtle, but no less intractable. For centuries prior to the establishment of the Republic, those in state service in China had to strike a balance that could accommodate the inherent tensions between two sets of claims: the Confucian bureaucracy's demand that the individual in its employ be responsive to its standardized and impersonal rules and regulations while in office, versus the more enduring claims of the individual's friends and family to provide for them and "be sensitive to human feelings" (gan renqing). If left unchecked this latter set of pressures could easily lead to rampant corruption. Although real levels and subjective perceptions of corruption as a problem in the late imperial state certainly varied widely, some combination of "good institutions" through formal and bureaucratic sanctions of deviance, and normative socialization into behaviour as "good men" was the recognized way of keeping the tensions between a depersonalized bureaucracy and the particularism of society in some sort of balance.10 In terms of institutions, the existence of Confucian civil service exams as the primary route into the bureaucracy cut off one obvious way of providing patronage. Years of studying the Confucian ethics may have pre-disposed individuals to be "good men," but clearly "good institutions" were also necessary to maintain an equilibrium between particularist interest and impartial law. By the early Republic, however, neither of these components obtained. The Confucian civil service examinations, viewed by progressives as hopelessly archaic and a brake on progress, had been abolished in 1904-05, but nothing convincing had been instituted as a replacement.11 Although all Republican regimes repeatedly professed their desire to recruit talent through the institution of modem civil service examinations to create a technically competent and pro-active government, the short-term pressures to provide patronage and buy off recalcitrant subordinates and would-be allies repeatedly stymied the 9. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 164-167. On the creation of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate and the revenues it remitted to the Beiyang governments, see S. A. M. Adshead, The Modernization of the Chinese Salt Administration, 1900-1920 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 61-117. Prasenjit Duara in Culture, Power and the State: Rural North China, 1900-42 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 59-85, also suggests that the very late imperial and Republican proliferation of local tax bureaus and tankuan led to significant increases in the rate of real taxation, virtually none of which was passed up to the central government. 10. The relative weights of the perceived importance of "good institutions" and "good men" in late imperial Chinese statecraft varied substantially, and is a vast topic in its own right. For views in English, see Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 102-105 for a discussion of the importance of "good men." For the importance of "good institutions," see Madeleine Zelin's excellent study of the rationalizing fiscal reforms of the Yongzheng Emperor, The Magistrate's Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in 18th Century China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). 11. Wolfgang Franke, The Reform and Abolition of the Traditional Chinese Examination System (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Monographs, 1960) and Benjamin Elman, "Delegitimation and decanonization: the trap of civil service examination reform, 1860-1910," paper prepared for the First International Conference of Ch'ing Intellectual History, National Chung-shan University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan, 19-21 November 1993. agencies that were independent organizations but nominally supervised by the central government in the 1910s and 1920s.9 The issue of government personnel was more subtle, but no less intractable. For centuries prior to the establishment of the Republic, those in state service in China had to strike a balance that could accommodate the inherent tensions between two sets of claims: the Confucian bureaucracy's demand that the individual in its employ be responsive to its standardized and impersonal rules and regulations while in office, versus the more enduring claims of the individual's friends and family to provide for them and "be sensitive to human feelings" (gan renqing). If left unchecked this latter set of pressures could easily lead to rampant corruption. Although real levels and subjective perceptions of corruption as a problem in the late imperial state certainly varied widely, some combination of "good institutions" through formal and bureaucratic sanctions of deviance, and normative socialization into behaviour as "good men" was the recognized way of keeping the tensions between a depersonalized bureaucracy and the particularism of society in some sort of balance.10 In terms of institutions, the existence of Confucian civil service exams as the primary route into the bureaucracy cut off one obvious way of providing patronage. Years of studying the Confucian ethics may have pre-disposed individuals to be "good men," but clearly "good institutions" were also necessary to maintain an equilibrium between particularist interest and impartial law. By the early Republic, however, neither of these components obtained. The Confucian civil service examinations, viewed by progressives as hopelessly archaic and a brake on progress, had been abolished in 1904-05, but nothing convincing had been instituted as a replacement.11 Although all Republican regimes repeatedly professed their desire to recruit talent through the institution of modem civil service examinations to create a technically competent and pro-active government, the short-term pressures to provide patronage and buy off recalcitrant subordinates and would-be allies repeatedly stymied the 9. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 164-167. On the creation of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate and the revenues it remitted to the Beiyang governments, see S. A. M. Adshead, The Modernization of the Chinese Salt Administration, 1900-1920 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 61-117. Prasenjit Duara in Culture, Power and the State: Rural North China, 1900-42 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 59-85, also suggests that the very late imperial and Republican proliferation of local tax bureaus and tankuan led to significant increases in the rate of real taxation, virtually none of which was passed up to the central government. 10. The relative weights of the perceived importance of "good institutions" and "good men" in late imperial Chinese statecraft varied substantially, and is a vast topic in its own right. For views in English, see Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 102-105 for a discussion of the importance of "good men." For the importance of "good institutions," see Madeleine Zelin's excellent study of the rationalizing fiscal reforms of the Yongzheng Emperor, The Magistrate's Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in 18th Century China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). 11. Wolfgang Franke, The Reform and Abolition of the Traditional Chinese Examination System (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Monographs, 1960) and Benjamin Elman, "Delegitimation and decanonization: the trap of civil service examination reform, 1860-1910," paper prepared for the First International Conference of Ch'ing Intellectual History, National Chung-shan University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan, 19-21 November 1993. agencies that were independent organizations but nominally supervised by the central government in the 1910s and 1920s.9 The issue of government personnel was more subtle, but no less intractable. For centuries prior to the establishment of the Republic, those in state service in China had to strike a balance that could accommodate the inherent tensions between two sets of claims: the Confucian bureaucracy's demand that the individual in its employ be responsive to its standardized and impersonal rules and regulations while in office, versus the more enduring claims of the individual's friends and family to provide for them and "be sensitive to human feelings" (gan renqing). If left unchecked this latter set of pressures could easily lead to rampant corruption. Although real levels and subjective perceptions of corruption as a problem in the late imperial state certainly varied widely, some combination of "good institutions" through formal and bureaucratic sanctions of deviance, and normative socialization into behaviour as "good men" was the recognized way of keeping the tensions between a depersonalized bureaucracy and the particularism of society in some sort of balance.10 In terms of institutions, the existence of Confucian civil service exams as the primary route into the bureaucracy cut off one obvious way of providing patronage. Years of studying the Confucian ethics may have pre-disposed individuals to be "good men," but clearly "good institutions" were also necessary to maintain an equilibrium between particularist interest and impartial law. By the early Republic, however, neither of these components obtained. The Confucian civil service examinations, viewed by progressives as hopelessly archaic and a brake on progress, had been abolished in 1904-05, but nothing convincing had been instituted as a replacement.11 Although all Republican regimes repeatedly professed their desire to recruit talent through the institution of modem civil service examinations to create a technically competent and pro-active government, the short-term pressures to provide patronage and buy off recalcitrant subordinates and would-be allies repeatedly stymied the 9. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 164-167. On the creation of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate and the revenues it remitted to the Beiyang governments, see S. A. M. Adshead, The Modernization of the Chinese Salt Administration, 1900-1920 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 61-117. Prasenjit Duara in Culture, Power and the State: Rural North China, 1900-42 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 59-85, also suggests that the very late imperial and Republican proliferation of local tax bureaus and tankuan led to significant increases in the rate of real taxation, virtually none of which was passed up to the central government. 10. The relative weights of the perceived importance of "good institutions" and "good men" in late imperial Chinese statecraft varied substantially, and is a vast topic in its own right. For views in English, see Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 102-105 for a discussion of the importance of "good men." For the importance of "good institutions," see Madeleine Zelin's excellent study of the rationalizing fiscal reforms of the Yongzheng Emperor, The Magistrate's Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in 18th Century China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). 11. Wolfgang Franke, The Reform and Abolition of the Traditional Chinese Examination System (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Monographs, 1960) and Benjamin Elman, "Delegitimation and decanonization: the trap of civil service examination reform, 1860-1910," paper prepared for the First International Conference of Ch'ing Intellectual History, National Chung-shan University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan, 19-21 November 1993. agencies that were independent organizations but nominally supervised by the central government in the 1910s and 1920s.9 The issue of government personnel was more subtle, but no less intractable. For centuries prior to the establishment of the Republic, those in state service in China had to strike a balance that could accommodate the inherent tensions between two sets of claims: the Confucian bureaucracy's demand that the individual in its employ be responsive to its standardized and impersonal rules and regulations while in office, versus the more enduring claims of the individual's friends and family to provide for them and "be sensitive to human feelings" (gan renqing). If left unchecked this latter set of pressures could easily lead to rampant corruption. Although real levels and subjective perceptions of corruption as a problem in the late imperial state certainly varied widely, some combination of "good institutions" through formal and bureaucratic sanctions of deviance, and normative socialization into behaviour as "good men" was the recognized way of keeping the tensions between a depersonalized bureaucracy and the particularism of society in some sort of balance.10 In terms of institutions, the existence of Confucian civil service exams as the primary route into the bureaucracy cut off one obvious way of providing patronage. Years of studying the Confucian ethics may have pre-disposed individuals to be "good men," but clearly "good institutions" were also necessary to maintain an equilibrium between particularist interest and impartial law. By the early Republic, however, neither of these components obtained. The Confucian civil service examinations, viewed by progressives as hopelessly archaic and a brake on progress, had been abolished in 1904-05, but nothing convincing had been instituted as a replacement.11 Although all Republican regimes repeatedly professed their desire to recruit talent through the institution of modem civil service examinations to create a technically competent and pro-active government, the short-term pressures to provide patronage and buy off recalcitrant subordinates and would-be allies repeatedly stymied the 9. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 164-167. On the creation of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate and the revenues it remitted to the Beiyang governments, see S. A. M. Adshead, The Modernization of the Chinese Salt Administration, 1900-1920 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 61-117. Prasenjit Duara in Culture, Power and the State: Rural North China, 1900-42 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 59-85, also suggests that the very late imperial and Republican proliferation of local tax bureaus and tankuan led to significant increases in the rate of real taxation, virtually none of which was passed up to the central government. 10. The relative weights of the perceived importance of "good institutions" and "good men" in late imperial Chinese statecraft varied substantially, and is a vast topic in its own right. For views in English, see Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 102-105 for a discussion of the importance of "good men." For the importance of "good institutions," see Madeleine Zelin's excellent study of the rationalizing fiscal reforms of the Yongzheng Emperor, The Magistrate's Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in 18th Century China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). 11. Wolfgang Franke, The Reform and Abolition of the Traditional Chinese Examination System (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Monographs, 1960) and Benjamin Elman, "Delegitimation and decanonization: the trap of civil service examination reform, 1860-1910," paper prepared for the First International Conference of Ch'ing Intellectual History, National Chung-shan University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan, 19-21 November 1993. agencies that were independent organizations but nominally supervised by the central government in the 1910s and 1920s.9 The issue of government personnel was more subtle, but no less intractable. For centuries prior to the establishment of the Republic, those in state service in China had to strike a balance that could accommodate the inherent tensions between two sets of claims: the Confucian bureaucracy's demand that the individual in its employ be responsive to its standardized and impersonal rules and regulations while in office, versus the more enduring claims of the individual's friends and family to provide for them and "be sensitive to human feelings" (gan renqing). If left unchecked this latter set of pressures could easily lead to rampant corruption. Although real levels and subjective perceptions of corruption as a problem in the late imperial state certainly varied widely, some combination of "good institutions" through formal and bureaucratic sanctions of deviance, and normative socialization into behaviour as "good men" was the recognized way of keeping the tensions between a depersonalized bureaucracy and the particularism of society in some sort of balance.10 In terms of institutions, the existence of Confucian civil service exams as the primary route into the bureaucracy cut off one obvious way of providing patronage. Years of studying the Confucian ethics may have pre-disposed individuals to be "good men," but clearly "good institutions" were also necessary to maintain an equilibrium between particularist interest and impartial law. By the early Republic, however, neither of these components obtained. The Confucian civil service examinations, viewed by progressives as hopelessly archaic and a brake on progress, had been abolished in 1904-05, but nothing convincing had been instituted as a replacement.11 Although all Republican regimes repeatedly professed their desire to recruit talent through the institution of modem civil service examinations to create a technically competent and pro-active government, the short-term pressures to provide patronage and buy off recalcitrant subordinates and would-be allies repeatedly stymied the 9. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 164-167. On the creation of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate and the revenues it remitted to the Beiyang governments, see S. A. M. Adshead, The Modernization of the Chinese Salt Administration, 1900-1920 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 61-117. Prasenjit Duara in Culture, Power and the State: Rural North China, 1900-42 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 59-85, also suggests that the very late imperial and Republican proliferation of local tax bureaus and tankuan led to significant increases in the rate of real taxation, virtually none of which was passed up to the central government. 10. The relative weights of the perceived importance of "good institutions" and "good men" in late imperial Chinese statecraft varied substantially, and is a vast topic in its own right. For views in English, see Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 102-105 for a discussion of the importance of "good men." For the importance of "good institutions," see Madeleine Zelin's excellent study of the rationalizing fiscal reforms of the Yongzheng Emperor, The Magistrate's Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in 18th Century China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). 11. Wolfgang Franke, The Reform and Abolition of the Traditional Chinese Examination System (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Monographs, 1960) and Benjamin Elman, "Delegitimation and decanonization: the trap of civil service examination reform, 1860-1910," paper prepared for the First International Conference of Ch'ing Intellectual History, National Chung-shan University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan, 19-21 November 1993. agencies that were independent organizations but nominally supervised by the central government in the 1910s and 1920s.9 The issue of government personnel was more subtle, but no less intractable. For centuries prior to the establishment of the Republic, those in state service in China had to strike a balance that could accommodate the inherent tensions between two sets of claims: the Confucian bureaucracy's demand that the individual in its employ be responsive to its standardized and impersonal rules and regulations while in office, versus the more enduring claims of the individual's friends and family to provide for them and "be sensitive to human feelings" (gan renqing). If left unchecked this latter set of pressures could easily lead to rampant corruption. Although real levels and subjective perceptions of corruption as a problem in the late imperial state certainly varied widely, some combination of "good institutions" through formal and bureaucratic sanctions of deviance, and normative socialization into behaviour as "good men" was the recognized way of keeping the tensions between a depersonalized bureaucracy and the particularism of society in some sort of balance.10 In terms of institutions, the existence of Confucian civil service exams as the primary route into the bureaucracy cut off one obvious way of providing patronage. Years of studying the Confucian ethics may have pre-disposed individuals to be "good men," but clearly "good institutions" were also necessary to maintain an equilibrium between particularist interest and impartial law. By the early Republic, however, neither of these components obtained. The Confucian civil service examinations, viewed by progressives as hopelessly archaic and a brake on progress, had been abolished in 1904-05, but nothing convincing had been instituted as a replacement.11 Although all Republican regimes repeatedly professed their desire to recruit talent through the institution of modem civil service examinations to create a technically competent and pro-active government, the short-term pressures to provide patronage and buy off recalcitrant subordinates and would-be allies repeatedly stymied the 9. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 164-167. On the creation of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate and the revenues it remitted to the Beiyang governments, see S. A. M. Adshead, The Modernization of the Chinese Salt Administration, 1900-1920 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 61-117. Prasenjit Duara in Culture, Power and the State: Rural North China, 1900-42 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 59-85, also suggests that the very late imperial and Republican proliferation of local tax bureaus and tankuan led to significant increases in the rate of real taxation, virtually none of which was passed up to the central government. 10. The relative weights of the perceived importance of "good institutions" and "good men" in late imperial Chinese statecraft varied substantially, and is a vast topic in its own right. For views in English, see Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 102-105 for a discussion of the importance of "good men." For the importance of "good institutions," see Madeleine Zelin's excellent study of the rationalizing fiscal reforms of the Yongzheng Emperor, The Magistrate's Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in 18th Century China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). 11. Wolfgang Franke, The Reform and Abolition of the Traditional Chinese Examination System (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Monographs, 1960) and Benjamin Elman, "Delegitimation and decanonization: the trap of civil service examination reform, 1860-1910," paper prepared for the First International Conference of Ch'ing Intellectual History, National Chung-shan University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan, 19-21 November 1993. agencies that were independent organizations but nominally supervised by the central government in the 1910s and 1920s.9 The issue of government personnel was more subtle, but no less intractable. For centuries prior to the establishment of the Republic, those in state service in China had to strike a balance that could accommodate the inherent tensions between two sets of claims: the Confucian bureaucracy's demand that the individual in its employ be responsive to its standardized and impersonal rules and regulations while in office, versus the more enduring claims of the individual's friends and family to provide for them and "be sensitive to human feelings" (gan renqing). If left unchecked this latter set of pressures could easily lead to rampant corruption. Although real levels and subjective perceptions of corruption as a problem in the late imperial state certainly varied widely, some combination of "good institutions" through formal and bureaucratic sanctions of deviance, and normative socialization into behaviour as "good men" was the recognized way of keeping the tensions between a depersonalized bureaucracy and the particularism of society in some sort of balance.10 In terms of institutions, the existence of Confucian civil service exams as the primary route into the bureaucracy cut off one obvious way of providing patronage. Years of studying the Confucian ethics may have pre-disposed individuals to be "good men," but clearly "good institutions" were also necessary to maintain an equilibrium between particularist interest and impartial law. By the early Republic, however, neither of these components obtained. The Confucian civil service examinations, viewed by progressives as hopelessly archaic and a brake on progress, had been abolished in 1904-05, but nothing convincing had been instituted as a replacement.11 Although all Republican regimes repeatedly professed their desire to recruit talent through the institution of modem civil service examinations to create a technically competent and pro-active government, the short-term pressures to provide patronage and buy off recalcitrant subordinates and would-be allies repeatedly stymied the 9. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 164-167. On the creation of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate and the revenues it remitted to the Beiyang governments, see S. A. M. Adshead, The Modernization of the Chinese Salt Administration, 1900-1920 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 61-117. Prasenjit Duara in Culture, Power and the State: Rural North China, 1900-42 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 59-85, also suggests that the very late imperial and Republican proliferation of local tax bureaus and tankuan led to significant increases in the rate of real taxation, virtually none of which was passed up to the central government. 10. The relative weights of the perceived importance of "good institutions" and "good men" in late imperial Chinese statecraft varied substantially, and is a vast topic in its own right. For views in English, see Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 102-105 for a discussion of the importance of "good men." For the importance of "good institutions," see Madeleine Zelin's excellent study of the rationalizing fiscal reforms of the Yongzheng Emperor, The Magistrate's Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in 18th Century China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). 11. Wolfgang Franke, The Reform and Abolition of the Traditional Chinese Examination System (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Monographs, 1960) and Benjamin Elman, "Delegitimation and decanonization: the trap of civil service examination reform, 1860-1910," paper prepared for the First International Conference of Ch'ing Intellectual History, National Chung-shan University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan, 19-21 November 1993. agencies that were independent organizations but nominally supervised by the central government in the 1910s and 1920s.9 The issue of government personnel was more subtle, but no less intractable. For centuries prior to the establishment of the Republic, those in state service in China had to strike a balance that could accommodate the inherent tensions between two sets of claims: the Confucian bureaucracy's demand that the individual in its employ be responsive to its standardized and impersonal rules and regulations while in office, versus the more enduring claims of the individual's friends and family to provide for them and "be sensitive to human feelings" (gan renqing). If left unchecked this latter set of pressures could easily lead to rampant corruption. Although real levels and subjective perceptions of corruption as a problem in the late imperial state certainly varied widely, some combination of "good institutions" through formal and bureaucratic sanctions of deviance, and normative socialization into behaviour as "good men" was the recognized way of keeping the tensions between a depersonalized bureaucracy and the particularism of society in some sort of balance.10 In terms of institutions, the existence of Confucian civil service exams as the primary route into the bureaucracy cut off one obvious way of providing patronage. Years of studying the Confucian ethics may have pre-disposed individuals to be "good men," but clearly "good institutions" were also necessary to maintain an equilibrium between particularist interest and impartial law. By the early Republic, however, neither of these components obtained. The Confucian civil service examinations, viewed by progressives as hopelessly archaic and a brake on progress, had been abolished in 1904-05, but nothing convincing had been instituted as a replacement.11 Although all Republican regimes repeatedly professed their desire to recruit talent through the institution of modem civil service examinations to create a technically competent and pro-active government, the short-term pressures to provide patronage and buy off recalcitrant subordinates and would-be allies repeatedly stymied the 9. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 164-167. On the creation of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate and the revenues it remitted to the Beiyang governments, see S. A. M. Adshead, The Modernization of the Chinese Salt Administration, 1900-1920 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 61-117. Prasenjit Duara in Culture, Power and the State: Rural North China, 1900-42 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 59-85, also suggests that the very late imperial and Republican proliferation of local tax bureaus and tankuan led to significant increases in the rate of real taxation, virtually none of which was passed up to the central government. 10. The relative weights of the perceived importance of "good institutions" and "good men" in late imperial Chinese statecraft varied substantially, and is a vast topic in its own right. For views in English, see Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 102-105 for a discussion of the importance of "good men." For the importance of "good institutions," see Madeleine Zelin's excellent study of the rationalizing fiscal reforms of the Yongzheng Emperor, The Magistrate's Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in 18th Century China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). 11. Wolfgang Franke, The Reform and Abolition of the Traditional Chinese Examination System (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Monographs, 1960) and Benjamin Elman, "Delegitimation and decanonization: the trap of civil service examination reform, 1860-1910," paper prepared for the First International Conference of Ch'ing Intellectual History, National Chung-shan University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan, 19-21 November 1993. agencies that were independent organizations but nominally supervised by the central government in the 1910s and 1920s.9 The issue of government personnel was more subtle, but no less intractable. For centuries prior to the establishment of the Republic, those in state service in China had to strike a balance that could accommodate the inherent tensions between two sets of claims: the Confucian bureaucracy's demand that the individual in its employ be responsive to its standardized and impersonal rules and regulations while in office, versus the more enduring claims of the individual's friends and family to provide for them and "be sensitive to human feelings" (gan renqing). If left unchecked this latter set of pressures could easily lead to rampant corruption. Although real levels and subjective perceptions of corruption as a problem in the late imperial state certainly varied widely, some combination of "good institutions" through formal and bureaucratic sanctions of deviance, and normative socialization into behaviour as "good men" was the recognized way of keeping the tensions between a depersonalized bureaucracy and the particularism of society in some sort of balance.10 In terms of institutions, the existence of Confucian civil service exams as the primary route into the bureaucracy cut off one obvious way of providing patronage. Years of studying the Confucian ethics may have pre-disposed individuals to be "good men," but clearly "good institutions" were also necessary to maintain an equilibrium between particularist interest and impartial law. By the early Republic, however, neither of these components obtained. The Confucian civil service examinations, viewed by progressives as hopelessly archaic and a brake on progress, had been abolished in 1904-05, but nothing convincing had been instituted as a replacement.11 Although all Republican regimes repeatedly professed their desire to recruit talent through the institution of modem civil service examinations to create a technically competent and pro-active government, the short-term pressures to provide patronage and buy off recalcitrant subordinates and would-be allies repeatedly stymied the 9. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 164-167. On the creation of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate and the revenues it remitted to the Beiyang governments, see S. A. M. Adshead, The Modernization of the Chinese Salt Administration, 1900-1920 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 61-117. Prasenjit Duara in Culture, Power and the State: Rural North China, 1900-42 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 59-85, also suggests that the very late imperial and Republican proliferation of local tax bureaus and tankuan led to significant increases in the rate of real taxation, virtually none of which was passed up to the central government. 10. The relative weights of the perceived importance of "good institutions" and "good men" in late imperial Chinese statecraft varied substantially, and is a vast topic in its own right. For views in English, see Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 102-105 for a discussion of the importance of "good men." For the importance of "good institutions," see Madeleine Zelin's excellent study of the rationalizing fiscal reforms of the Yongzheng Emperor, The Magistrate's Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in 18th Century China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). 11. Wolfgang Franke, The Reform and Abolition of the Traditional Chinese Examination System (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Monographs, 1960) and Benjamin Elman, "Delegitimation and decanonization: the trap of civil service examination reform, 1860-1910," paper prepared for the First International Conference of Ch'ing Intellectual History, National Chung-shan University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan, 19-21 November 1993. agencies that were independent organizations but nominally supervised by the central government in the 1910s and 1920s.9 The issue of government personnel was more subtle, but no less intractable. For centuries prior to the establishment of the Republic, those in state service in China had to strike a balance that could accommodate the inherent tensions between two sets of claims: the Confucian bureaucracy's demand that the individual in its employ be responsive to its standardized and impersonal rules and regulations while in office, versus the more enduring claims of the individual's friends and family to provide for them and "be sensitive to human feelings" (gan renqing). If left unchecked this latter set of pressures could easily lead to rampant corruption. Although real levels and subjective perceptions of corruption as a problem in the late imperial state certainly varied widely, some combination of "good institutions" through formal and bureaucratic sanctions of deviance, and normative socialization into behaviour as "good men" was the recognized way of keeping the tensions between a depersonalized bureaucracy and the particularism of society in some sort of balance.10 In terms of institutions, the existence of Confucian civil service exams as the primary route into the bureaucracy cut off one obvious way of providing patronage. Years of studying the Confucian ethics may have pre-disposed individuals to be "good men," but clearly "good institutions" were also necessary to maintain an equilibrium between particularist interest and impartial law. By the early Republic, however, neither of these components obtained. The Confucian civil service examinations, viewed by progressives as hopelessly archaic and a brake on progress, had been abolished in 1904-05, but nothing convincing had been instituted as a replacement.11 Although all Republican regimes repeatedly professed their desire to recruit talent through the institution of modem civil service examinations to create a technically competent and pro-active government, the short-term pressures to provide patronage and buy off recalcitrant subordinates and would-be allies repeatedly stymied the 9. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 164-167. On the creation of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate and the revenues it remitted to the Beiyang governments, see S. A. M. Adshead, The Modernization of the Chinese Salt Administration, 1900-1920 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 61-117. Prasenjit Duara in Culture, Power and the State: Rural North China, 1900-42 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 59-85, also suggests that the very late imperial and Republican proliferation of local tax bureaus and tankuan led to significant increases in the rate of real taxation, virtually none of which was passed up to the central government. 10. The relative weights of the perceived importance of "good institutions" and "good men" in late imperial Chinese statecraft varied substantially, and is a vast topic in its own right. For views in English, see Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 102-105 for a discussion of the importance of "good men." For the importance of "good institutions," see Madeleine Zelin's excellent study of the rationalizing fiscal reforms of the Yongzheng Emperor, The Magistrate's Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in 18th Century China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). 11. Wolfgang Franke, The Reform and Abolition of the Traditional Chinese Examination System (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Monographs, 1960) and Benjamin Elman, "Delegitimation and decanonization: the trap of civil service examination reform, 1860-1910," paper prepared for the First International Conference of Ch'ing Intellectual History, National Chung-shan University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan, 19-21 November 1993. agencies that were independent organizations but nominally supervised by the central government in the 1910s and 1920s.9 The issue of government personnel was more subtle, but no less intractable. For centuries prior to the establishment of the Republic, those in state service in China had to strike a balance that could accommodate the inherent tensions between two sets of claims: the Confucian bureaucracy's demand that the individual in its employ be responsive to its standardized and impersonal rules and regulations while in office, versus the more enduring claims of the individual's friends and family to provide for them and "be sensitive to human feelings" (gan renqing). If left unchecked this latter set of pressures could easily lead to rampant corruption. Although real levels and subjective perceptions of corruption as a problem in the late imperial state certainly varied widely, some combination of "good institutions" through formal and bureaucratic sanctions of deviance, and normative socialization into behaviour as "good men" was the recognized way of keeping the tensions between a depersonalized bureaucracy and the particularism of society in some sort of balance.10 In terms of institutions, the existence of Confucian civil service exams as the primary route into the bureaucracy cut off one obvious way of providing patronage. Years of studying the Confucian ethics may have pre-disposed individuals to be "good men," but clearly "good institutions" were also necessary to maintain an equilibrium between particularist interest and impartial law. By the early Republic, however, neither of these components obtained. The Confucian civil service examinations, viewed by progressives as hopelessly archaic and a brake on progress, had been abolished in 1904-05, but nothing convincing had been instituted as a replacement.11 Although all Republican regimes repeatedly professed their desire to recruit talent through the institution of modem civil service examinations to create a technically competent and pro-active government, the short-term pressures to provide patronage and buy off recalcitrant subordinates and would-be allies repeatedly stymied the 9. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 164-167. On the creation of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate and the revenues it remitted to the Beiyang governments, see S. A. M. Adshead, The Modernization of the Chinese Salt Administration, 1900-1920 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 61-117. Prasenjit Duara in Culture, Power and the State: Rural North China, 1900-42 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 59-85, also suggests that the very late imperial and Republican proliferation of local tax bureaus and tankuan led to significant increases in the rate of real taxation, virtually none of which was passed up to the central government. 10. The relative weights of the perceived importance of "good institutions" and "good men" in late imperial Chinese statecraft varied substantially, and is a vast topic in its own right. For views in English, see Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 102-105 for a discussion of the importance of "good men." For the importance of "good institutions," see Madeleine Zelin's excellent study of the rationalizing fiscal reforms of the Yongzheng Emperor, The Magistrate's Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in 18th Century China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). 11. Wolfgang Franke, The Reform and Abolition of the Traditional Chinese Examination System (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Monographs, 1960) and Benjamin Elman, "Delegitimation and decanonization: the trap of civil service examination reform, 1860-1910," paper prepared for the First International Conference of Ch'ing Intellectual History, National Chung-shan University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan, 19-21 November 1993. agencies that were independent organizations but nominally supervised by the central government in the 1910s and 1920s.9 The issue of government personnel was more subtle, but no less intractable. For centuries prior to the establishment of the Republic, those in state service in China had to strike a balance that could accommodate the inherent tensions between two sets of claims: the Confucian bureaucracy's demand that the individual in its employ be responsive to its standardized and impersonal rules and regulations while in office, versus the more enduring claims of the individual's friends and family to provide for them and "be sensitive to human feelings" (gan renqing). If left unchecked this latter set of pressures could easily lead to rampant corruption. Although real levels and subjective perceptions of corruption as a problem in the late imperial state certainly varied widely, some combination of "good institutions" through formal and bureaucratic sanctions of deviance, and normative socialization into behaviour as "good men" was the recognized way of keeping the tensions between a depersonalized bureaucracy and the particularism of society in some sort of balance.10 In terms of institutions, the existence of Confucian civil service exams as the primary route into the bureaucracy cut off one obvious way of providing patronage. Years of studying the Confucian ethics may have pre-disposed individuals to be "good men," but clearly "good institutions" were also necessary to maintain an equilibrium between particularist interest and impartial law. By the early Republic, however, neither of these components obtained. The Confucian civil service examinations, viewed by progressives as hopelessly archaic and a brake on progress, had been abolished in 1904-05, but nothing convincing had been instituted as a replacement.11 Although all Republican regimes repeatedly professed their desire to recruit talent through the institution of modem civil service examinations to create a technically competent and pro-active government, the short-term pressures to provide patronage and buy off recalcitrant subordinates and would-be allies repeatedly stymied the 9. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 164-167. On the creation of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate and the revenues it remitted to the Beiyang governments, see S. A. M. Adshead, The Modernization of the Chinese Salt Administration, 1900-1920 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 61-117. Prasenjit Duara in Culture, Power and the State: Rural North China, 1900-42 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 59-85, also suggests that the very late imperial and Republican proliferation of local tax bureaus and tankuan led to significant increases in the rate of real taxation, virtually none of which was passed up to the central government. 10. The relative weights of the perceived importance of "good institutions" and "good men" in late imperial Chinese statecraft varied substantially, and is a vast topic in its own right. For views in English, see Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 102-105 for a discussion of the importance of "good men." For the importance of "good institutions," see Madeleine Zelin's excellent study of the rationalizing fiscal reforms of the Yongzheng Emperor, The Magistrate's Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in 18th Century China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). 11. Wolfgang Franke, The Reform and Abolition of the Traditional Chinese Examination System (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Monographs, 1960) and Benjamin Elman, "Delegitimation and decanonization: the trap of civil service examination reform, 1860-1910," paper prepared for the First International Conference of Ch'ing Intellectual History, National Chung-shan University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan, 19-21 November 1993. agencies that were independent organizations but nominally supervised by the central government in the 1910s and 1920s.9 The issue of government personnel was more subtle, but no less intractable. For centuries prior to the establishment of the Republic, those in state service in China had to strike a balance that could accommodate the inherent tensions between two sets of claims: the Confucian bureaucracy's demand that the individual in its employ be responsive to its standardized and impersonal rules and regulations while in office, versus the more enduring claims of the individual's friends and family to provide for them and "be sensitive to human feelings" (gan renqing). If left unchecked this latter set of pressures could easily lead to rampant corruption. Although real levels and subjective perceptions of corruption as a problem in the late imperial state certainly varied widely, some combination of "good institutions" through formal and bureaucratic sanctions of deviance, and normative socialization into behaviour as "good men" was the recognized way of keeping the tensions between a depersonalized bureaucracy and the particularism of society in some sort of balance.10 In terms of institutions, the existence of Confucian civil service exams as the primary route into the bureaucracy cut off one obvious way of providing patronage. Years of studying the Confucian ethics may have pre-disposed individuals to be "good men," but clearly "good institutions" were also necessary to maintain an equilibrium between particularist interest and impartial law. By the early Republic, however, neither of these components obtained. The Confucian civil service examinations, viewed by progressives as hopelessly archaic and a brake on progress, had been abolished in 1904-05, but nothing convincing had been instituted as a replacement.11 Although all Republican regimes repeatedly professed their desire to recruit talent through the institution of modem civil service examinations to create a technically competent and pro-active government, the short-term pressures to provide patronage and buy off recalcitrant subordinates and would-be allies repeatedly stymied the 9. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 164-167. On the creation of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate and the revenues it remitted to the Beiyang governments, see S. A. M. Adshead, The Modernization of the Chinese Salt Administration, 1900-1920 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 61-117. Prasenjit Duara in Culture, Power and the State: Rural North China, 1900-42 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 59-85, also suggests that the very late imperial and Republican proliferation of local tax bureaus and tankuan led to significant increases in the rate of real taxation, virtually none of which was passed up to the central government. 10. The relative weights of the perceived importance of "good institutions" and "good men" in late imperial Chinese statecraft varied substantially, and is a vast topic in its own right. For views in English, see Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 102-105 for a discussion of the importance of "good men." For the importance of "good institutions," see Madeleine Zelin's excellent study of the rationalizing fiscal reforms of the Yongzheng Emperor, The Magistrate's Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in 18th Century China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). 11. Wolfgang Franke, The Reform and Abolition of the Traditional Chinese Examination System (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Monographs, 1960) and Benjamin Elman, "Delegitimation and decanonization: the trap of civil service examination reform, 1860-1910," paper prepared for the First International Conference of Ch'ing Intellectual History, National Chung-shan University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan, 19-21 November 1993
The Evolution of Republican Government 335 re-institutionalization of norms of objectivity and impartiality,however attractive they remained in principle.Fairly consistent foreign pressure, combined with distressing levels of domestic militarization,made the operations and institutions of civil Republican government even more problematic.Clearly,in this highly unfavourable environment of frag- mented organizations,ambiguous loyalties,internal divisions,slender resources and external pressures,what the central governments of Repub- lican China needed was,in effect,an "institutional breakthrough"-some means by which to climb out of this morass of weakness and begin to implement a vision of centrally led institution building and development while standing up to external pressure.2 Over the course of the Republican period,there were two analytically distinct methods or"logics"by which government elites worked to build institutional capacity.The first was to try to create a new set of "good institutions"for government and administration."Good"was now redefined to be impersonal Weberian bureaucracy,characterized by ob- jectively oriented,efficient,rule-based technocracy,with a de facto division of labour between politicians who set policy and bureaucrats who implemented it,and a sharp legal distinction between office and office-holder as the "most rational known means of exercising auth- ority."13 The second"logic,"which arose with the reorganization of the KMT and the expansion of revolutionary sentiment in the mid-1920s, used long-standing beliefs in the importance of "good men."In this conception,"good men"were the raw materials who would effect institu- tional breakthroughs via a controlled mobilization whereby political leadership would arouse the pre-existing values and commitments of those below towards collective ends,and,where "correct"values and norms were lacking,would inculcate those norms. Attempting Institutional Breakthroughs:Pre-1927 Visions and Implemen- tation of Statist Technocracy Although the full-fledged articulation of the vision of"government as statist technocracy responsive to the executive"did not occur until the emergence of a group of Kuomintang administrative reformers in the mid-1930s,there can be little doubt that in embryo very similar principles animated both the Yuan Shikai and Beiyang governments of the 1910s 12.For the idea of an "institutional breakthrough,"I slightly adapt Kenneth Jowitt's concept of a "revolutionary breakthrough"for the early developmental stage of Leninist systems.In contrast to"revolutionary breakthroughs,"which are highly specific to Leninist regimes attempting to consolidate and carry out a "heroic"programme of modernization through collectivization and transformation of the basic units of society,"institutional breakthroughs"are more generic,and can be directed towards any number of different ends (including socially quite conservative ones).However,both revolutionary and institutional breakthroughs are sought after by executive elites wherever institutions are weak and fragmented.See Kenneth Jowitt,Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania (Berkeley:University of California Press,1971),pp.94-95. 13.This list of attributes is drawn from Max Weber,Economy and Sociery (Berkeley: University of California Press,1978),pp.223-26
The Evolution of Republican Government re-institutionalization of norms of objectivity and impartiality, however attractive they remained in principle. Fairly consistent foreign pressure, combined with distressing levels of domestic militarization, made the operations and institutions of civil Republican government even more problematic. Clearly, in this highly unfavourable environment of fragmented organizations, ambiguous loyalties, internal divisions, slender resources and external pressures, what the central governments of Republican China needed was, in effect, an "institutional breakthrough" - some means by which to climb out of this morass of weakness and begin to implement a vision of centrally led institution building and development while standing up to external pressure.2 Over the course of the Republican period, there were two analytically distinct methods or "logics" by which government elites worked to build institutional capacity. The first was to try to create a new set of "good institutions" for government and administration. "Good" was now redefined to be impersonal Weberian bureaucracy, characterized by objectively oriented, efficient, rule-based technocracy, with a de facto division of labour between politicians who set policy and bureaucrats who implemented it, and a sharp legal distinction between office and office-holder as the "most rational known means of exercising authority."'3 The second "logic," which arose with the reorganization of the KMT and the expansion of revolutionary sentiment in the mid-1920s, used long-standing beliefs in the importance of "good men." In this conception, "good men" were the raw materials who would effect institutional breakthroughs via a controlled mobilization whereby political leadership would arouse the pre-existing values and commitments of those below towards collective ends, and, where "correct" values and norms were lacking, would inculcate those norms. Attempting Institutional Breakthroughs: Pre-1927 Visions and Implementation of Statist Technocracy Although the full-fledged articulation of the vision of "government as statist technocracy responsive to the executive" did not occur until the emergence of a group of Kuomintang administrative reformers in the mid-1930s, there can be little doubt that in embryo very similar principles animated both the Yuan Shikai and Beiyang governments of the 1910s 12. For the idea of an "institutional breakthrough," I slightly adapt Kenneth Jowitt's concept of a "revolutionary breakthrough" for the early developmental stage of Leninist systems. In contrast to "revolutionary breakthroughs," which are highly specific to Leninist regimes attempting to consolidate and carry out a "heroic" programme of modernization through collectivization and transformation of the basic units of society, "institutional breakthroughs" are more generic, and can be directed towards any number of different ends (including socially quite conservative ones). However, both revolutionary and institutional breakthroughs are sought after by executive elites wherever institutions are weak and fragmented. See Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 94-95. 13. This list of attributes is drawn from Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 223-26. re-institutionalization of norms of objectivity and impartiality, however attractive they remained in principle. Fairly consistent foreign pressure, combined with distressing levels of domestic militarization, made the operations and institutions of civil Republican government even more problematic. Clearly, in this highly unfavourable environment of fragmented organizations, ambiguous loyalties, internal divisions, slender resources and external pressures, what the central governments of Republican China needed was, in effect, an "institutional breakthrough" - some means by which to climb out of this morass of weakness and begin to implement a vision of centrally led institution building and development while standing up to external pressure.2 Over the course of the Republican period, there were two analytically distinct methods or "logics" by which government elites worked to build institutional capacity. The first was to try to create a new set of "good institutions" for government and administration. "Good" was now redefined to be impersonal Weberian bureaucracy, characterized by objectively oriented, efficient, rule-based technocracy, with a de facto division of labour between politicians who set policy and bureaucrats who implemented it, and a sharp legal distinction between office and office-holder as the "most rational known means of exercising authority."'3 The second "logic," which arose with the reorganization of the KMT and the expansion of revolutionary sentiment in the mid-1920s, used long-standing beliefs in the importance of "good men." In this conception, "good men" were the raw materials who would effect institutional breakthroughs via a controlled mobilization whereby political leadership would arouse the pre-existing values and commitments of those below towards collective ends, and, where "correct" values and norms were lacking, would inculcate those norms. Attempting Institutional Breakthroughs: Pre-1927 Visions and Implementation of Statist Technocracy Although the full-fledged articulation of the vision of "government as statist technocracy responsive to the executive" did not occur until the emergence of a group of Kuomintang administrative reformers in the mid-1930s, there can be little doubt that in embryo very similar principles animated both the Yuan Shikai and Beiyang governments of the 1910s 12. For the idea of an "institutional breakthrough," I slightly adapt Kenneth Jowitt's concept of a "revolutionary breakthrough" for the early developmental stage of Leninist systems. In contrast to "revolutionary breakthroughs," which are highly specific to Leninist regimes attempting to consolidate and carry out a "heroic" programme of modernization through collectivization and transformation of the basic units of society, "institutional breakthroughs" are more generic, and can be directed towards any number of different ends (including socially quite conservative ones). However, both revolutionary and institutional breakthroughs are sought after by executive elites wherever institutions are weak and fragmented. See Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 94-95. 13. This list of attributes is drawn from Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 223-26. re-institutionalization of norms of objectivity and impartiality, however attractive they remained in principle. Fairly consistent foreign pressure, combined with distressing levels of domestic militarization, made the operations and institutions of civil Republican government even more problematic. Clearly, in this highly unfavourable environment of fragmented organizations, ambiguous loyalties, internal divisions, slender resources and external pressures, what the central governments of Republican China needed was, in effect, an "institutional breakthrough" - some means by which to climb out of this morass of weakness and begin to implement a vision of centrally led institution building and development while standing up to external pressure.2 Over the course of the Republican period, there were two analytically distinct methods or "logics" by which government elites worked to build institutional capacity. The first was to try to create a new set of "good institutions" for government and administration. "Good" was now redefined to be impersonal Weberian bureaucracy, characterized by objectively oriented, efficient, rule-based technocracy, with a de facto division of labour between politicians who set policy and bureaucrats who implemented it, and a sharp legal distinction between office and office-holder as the "most rational known means of exercising authority."'3 The second "logic," which arose with the reorganization of the KMT and the expansion of revolutionary sentiment in the mid-1920s, used long-standing beliefs in the importance of "good men." In this conception, "good men" were the raw materials who would effect institutional breakthroughs via a controlled mobilization whereby political leadership would arouse the pre-existing values and commitments of those below towards collective ends, and, where "correct" values and norms were lacking, would inculcate those norms. Attempting Institutional Breakthroughs: Pre-1927 Visions and Implementation of Statist Technocracy Although the full-fledged articulation of the vision of "government as statist technocracy responsive to the executive" did not occur until the emergence of a group of Kuomintang administrative reformers in the mid-1930s, there can be little doubt that in embryo very similar principles animated both the Yuan Shikai and Beiyang governments of the 1910s 12. For the idea of an "institutional breakthrough," I slightly adapt Kenneth Jowitt's concept of a "revolutionary breakthrough" for the early developmental stage of Leninist systems. In contrast to "revolutionary breakthroughs," which are highly specific to Leninist regimes attempting to consolidate and carry out a "heroic" programme of modernization through collectivization and transformation of the basic units of society, "institutional breakthroughs" are more generic, and can be directed towards any number of different ends (including socially quite conservative ones). However, both revolutionary and institutional breakthroughs are sought after by executive elites wherever institutions are weak and fragmented. See Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 94-95. 13. This list of attributes is drawn from Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 223-26. re-institutionalization of norms of objectivity and impartiality, however attractive they remained in principle. Fairly consistent foreign pressure, combined with distressing levels of domestic militarization, made the operations and institutions of civil Republican government even more problematic. Clearly, in this highly unfavourable environment of fragmented organizations, ambiguous loyalties, internal divisions, slender resources and external pressures, what the central governments of Republican China needed was, in effect, an "institutional breakthrough" - some means by which to climb out of this morass of weakness and begin to implement a vision of centrally led institution building and development while standing up to external pressure.2 Over the course of the Republican period, there were two analytically distinct methods or "logics" by which government elites worked to build institutional capacity. The first was to try to create a new set of "good institutions" for government and administration. "Good" was now redefined to be impersonal Weberian bureaucracy, characterized by objectively oriented, efficient, rule-based technocracy, with a de facto division of labour between politicians who set policy and bureaucrats who implemented it, and a sharp legal distinction between office and office-holder as the "most rational known means of exercising authority."'3 The second "logic," which arose with the reorganization of the KMT and the expansion of revolutionary sentiment in the mid-1920s, used long-standing beliefs in the importance of "good men." In this conception, "good men" were the raw materials who would effect institutional breakthroughs via a controlled mobilization whereby political leadership would arouse the pre-existing values and commitments of those below towards collective ends, and, where "correct" values and norms were lacking, would inculcate those norms. Attempting Institutional Breakthroughs: Pre-1927 Visions and Implementation of Statist Technocracy Although the full-fledged articulation of the vision of "government as statist technocracy responsive to the executive" did not occur until the emergence of a group of Kuomintang administrative reformers in the mid-1930s, there can be little doubt that in embryo very similar principles animated both the Yuan Shikai and Beiyang governments of the 1910s 12. For the idea of an "institutional breakthrough," I slightly adapt Kenneth Jowitt's concept of a "revolutionary breakthrough" for the early developmental stage of Leninist systems. In contrast to "revolutionary breakthroughs," which are highly specific to Leninist regimes attempting to consolidate and carry out a "heroic" programme of modernization through collectivization and transformation of the basic units of society, "institutional breakthroughs" are more generic, and can be directed towards any number of different ends (including socially quite conservative ones). However, both revolutionary and institutional breakthroughs are sought after by executive elites wherever institutions are weak and fragmented. See Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 94-95. 13. This list of attributes is drawn from Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 223-26. re-institutionalization of norms of objectivity and impartiality, however attractive they remained in principle. Fairly consistent foreign pressure, combined with distressing levels of domestic militarization, made the operations and institutions of civil Republican government even more problematic. Clearly, in this highly unfavourable environment of fragmented organizations, ambiguous loyalties, internal divisions, slender resources and external pressures, what the central governments of Republican China needed was, in effect, an "institutional breakthrough" - some means by which to climb out of this morass of weakness and begin to implement a vision of centrally led institution building and development while standing up to external pressure.2 Over the course of the Republican period, there were two analytically distinct methods or "logics" by which government elites worked to build institutional capacity. The first was to try to create a new set of "good institutions" for government and administration. "Good" was now redefined to be impersonal Weberian bureaucracy, characterized by objectively oriented, efficient, rule-based technocracy, with a de facto division of labour between politicians who set policy and bureaucrats who implemented it, and a sharp legal distinction between office and office-holder as the "most rational known means of exercising authority."'3 The second "logic," which arose with the reorganization of the KMT and the expansion of revolutionary sentiment in the mid-1920s, used long-standing beliefs in the importance of "good men." In this conception, "good men" were the raw materials who would effect institutional breakthroughs via a controlled mobilization whereby political leadership would arouse the pre-existing values and commitments of those below towards collective ends, and, where "correct" values and norms were lacking, would inculcate those norms. Attempting Institutional Breakthroughs: Pre-1927 Visions and Implementation of Statist Technocracy Although the full-fledged articulation of the vision of "government as statist technocracy responsive to the executive" did not occur until the emergence of a group of Kuomintang administrative reformers in the mid-1930s, there can be little doubt that in embryo very similar principles animated both the Yuan Shikai and Beiyang governments of the 1910s 12. For the idea of an "institutional breakthrough," I slightly adapt Kenneth Jowitt's concept of a "revolutionary breakthrough" for the early developmental stage of Leninist systems. In contrast to "revolutionary breakthroughs," which are highly specific to Leninist regimes attempting to consolidate and carry out a "heroic" programme of modernization through collectivization and transformation of the basic units of society, "institutional breakthroughs" are more generic, and can be directed towards any number of different ends (including socially quite conservative ones). However, both revolutionary and institutional breakthroughs are sought after by executive elites wherever institutions are weak and fragmented. See Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 94-95. 13. This list of attributes is drawn from Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 223-26. re-institutionalization of norms of objectivity and impartiality, however attractive they remained in principle. Fairly consistent foreign pressure, combined with distressing levels of domestic militarization, made the operations and institutions of civil Republican government even more problematic. Clearly, in this highly unfavourable environment of fragmented organizations, ambiguous loyalties, internal divisions, slender resources and external pressures, what the central governments of Republican China needed was, in effect, an "institutional breakthrough" - some means by which to climb out of this morass of weakness and begin to implement a vision of centrally led institution building and development while standing up to external pressure.2 Over the course of the Republican period, there were two analytically distinct methods or "logics" by which government elites worked to build institutional capacity. The first was to try to create a new set of "good institutions" for government and administration. "Good" was now redefined to be impersonal Weberian bureaucracy, characterized by objectively oriented, efficient, rule-based technocracy, with a de facto division of labour between politicians who set policy and bureaucrats who implemented it, and a sharp legal distinction between office and office-holder as the "most rational known means of exercising authority."'3 The second "logic," which arose with the reorganization of the KMT and the expansion of revolutionary sentiment in the mid-1920s, used long-standing beliefs in the importance of "good men." In this conception, "good men" were the raw materials who would effect institutional breakthroughs via a controlled mobilization whereby political leadership would arouse the pre-existing values and commitments of those below towards collective ends, and, where "correct" values and norms were lacking, would inculcate those norms. Attempting Institutional Breakthroughs: Pre-1927 Visions and Implementation of Statist Technocracy Although the full-fledged articulation of the vision of "government as statist technocracy responsive to the executive" did not occur until the emergence of a group of Kuomintang administrative reformers in the mid-1930s, there can be little doubt that in embryo very similar principles animated both the Yuan Shikai and Beiyang governments of the 1910s 12. For the idea of an "institutional breakthrough," I slightly adapt Kenneth Jowitt's concept of a "revolutionary breakthrough" for the early developmental stage of Leninist systems. In contrast to "revolutionary breakthroughs," which are highly specific to Leninist regimes attempting to consolidate and carry out a "heroic" programme of modernization through collectivization and transformation of the basic units of society, "institutional breakthroughs" are more generic, and can be directed towards any number of different ends (including socially quite conservative ones). However, both revolutionary and institutional breakthroughs are sought after by executive elites wherever institutions are weak and fragmented. See Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 94-95. 13. This list of attributes is drawn from Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 223-26. re-institutionalization of norms of objectivity and impartiality, however attractive they remained in principle. Fairly consistent foreign pressure, combined with distressing levels of domestic militarization, made the operations and institutions of civil Republican government even more problematic. Clearly, in this highly unfavourable environment of fragmented organizations, ambiguous loyalties, internal divisions, slender resources and external pressures, what the central governments of Republican China needed was, in effect, an "institutional breakthrough" - some means by which to climb out of this morass of weakness and begin to implement a vision of centrally led institution building and development while standing up to external pressure.2 Over the course of the Republican period, there were two analytically distinct methods or "logics" by which government elites worked to build institutional capacity. The first was to try to create a new set of "good institutions" for government and administration. "Good" was now redefined to be impersonal Weberian bureaucracy, characterized by objectively oriented, efficient, rule-based technocracy, with a de facto division of labour between politicians who set policy and bureaucrats who implemented it, and a sharp legal distinction between office and office-holder as the "most rational known means of exercising authority."'3 The second "logic," which arose with the reorganization of the KMT and the expansion of revolutionary sentiment in the mid-1920s, used long-standing beliefs in the importance of "good men." In this conception, "good men" were the raw materials who would effect institutional breakthroughs via a controlled mobilization whereby political leadership would arouse the pre-existing values and commitments of those below towards collective ends, and, where "correct" values and norms were lacking, would inculcate those norms. Attempting Institutional Breakthroughs: Pre-1927 Visions and Implementation of Statist Technocracy Although the full-fledged articulation of the vision of "government as statist technocracy responsive to the executive" did not occur until the emergence of a group of Kuomintang administrative reformers in the mid-1930s, there can be little doubt that in embryo very similar principles animated both the Yuan Shikai and Beiyang governments of the 1910s 12. For the idea of an "institutional breakthrough," I slightly adapt Kenneth Jowitt's concept of a "revolutionary breakthrough" for the early developmental stage of Leninist systems. In contrast to "revolutionary breakthroughs," which are highly specific to Leninist regimes attempting to consolidate and carry out a "heroic" programme of modernization through collectivization and transformation of the basic units of society, "institutional breakthroughs" are more generic, and can be directed towards any number of different ends (including socially quite conservative ones). However, both revolutionary and institutional breakthroughs are sought after by executive elites wherever institutions are weak and fragmented. See Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 94-95. 13. This list of attributes is drawn from Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 223-26. re-institutionalization of norms of objectivity and impartiality, however attractive they remained in principle. Fairly consistent foreign pressure, combined with distressing levels of domestic militarization, made the operations and institutions of civil Republican government even more problematic. Clearly, in this highly unfavourable environment of fragmented organizations, ambiguous loyalties, internal divisions, slender resources and external pressures, what the central governments of Republican China needed was, in effect, an "institutional breakthrough" - some means by which to climb out of this morass of weakness and begin to implement a vision of centrally led institution building and development while standing up to external pressure.2 Over the course of the Republican period, there were two analytically distinct methods or "logics" by which government elites worked to build institutional capacity. The first was to try to create a new set of "good institutions" for government and administration. "Good" was now redefined to be impersonal Weberian bureaucracy, characterized by objectively oriented, efficient, rule-based technocracy, with a de facto division of labour between politicians who set policy and bureaucrats who implemented it, and a sharp legal distinction between office and office-holder as the "most rational known means of exercising authority."'3 The second "logic," which arose with the reorganization of the KMT and the expansion of revolutionary sentiment in the mid-1920s, used long-standing beliefs in the importance of "good men." In this conception, "good men" were the raw materials who would effect institutional breakthroughs via a controlled mobilization whereby political leadership would arouse the pre-existing values and commitments of those below towards collective ends, and, where "correct" values and norms were lacking, would inculcate those norms. Attempting Institutional Breakthroughs: Pre-1927 Visions and Implementation of Statist Technocracy Although the full-fledged articulation of the vision of "government as statist technocracy responsive to the executive" did not occur until the emergence of a group of Kuomintang administrative reformers in the mid-1930s, there can be little doubt that in embryo very similar principles animated both the Yuan Shikai and Beiyang governments of the 1910s 12. For the idea of an "institutional breakthrough," I slightly adapt Kenneth Jowitt's concept of a "revolutionary breakthrough" for the early developmental stage of Leninist systems. In contrast to "revolutionary breakthroughs," which are highly specific to Leninist regimes attempting to consolidate and carry out a "heroic" programme of modernization through collectivization and transformation of the basic units of society, "institutional breakthroughs" are more generic, and can be directed towards any number of different ends (including socially quite conservative ones). However, both revolutionary and institutional breakthroughs are sought after by executive elites wherever institutions are weak and fragmented. See Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 94-95. 13. This list of attributes is drawn from Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 223-26. re-institutionalization of norms of objectivity and impartiality, however attractive they remained in principle. Fairly consistent foreign pressure, combined with distressing levels of domestic militarization, made the operations and institutions of civil Republican government even more problematic. Clearly, in this highly unfavourable environment of fragmented organizations, ambiguous loyalties, internal divisions, slender resources and external pressures, what the central governments of Republican China needed was, in effect, an "institutional breakthrough" - some means by which to climb out of this morass of weakness and begin to implement a vision of centrally led institution building and development while standing up to external pressure.2 Over the course of the Republican period, there were two analytically distinct methods or "logics" by which government elites worked to build institutional capacity. The first was to try to create a new set of "good institutions" for government and administration. "Good" was now redefined to be impersonal Weberian bureaucracy, characterized by objectively oriented, efficient, rule-based technocracy, with a de facto division of labour between politicians who set policy and bureaucrats who implemented it, and a sharp legal distinction between office and office-holder as the "most rational known means of exercising authority."'3 The second "logic," which arose with the reorganization of the KMT and the expansion of revolutionary sentiment in the mid-1920s, used long-standing beliefs in the importance of "good men." In this conception, "good men" were the raw materials who would effect institutional breakthroughs via a controlled mobilization whereby political leadership would arouse the pre-existing values and commitments of those below towards collective ends, and, where "correct" values and norms were lacking, would inculcate those norms. Attempting Institutional Breakthroughs: Pre-1927 Visions and Implementation of Statist Technocracy Although the full-fledged articulation of the vision of "government as statist technocracy responsive to the executive" did not occur until the emergence of a group of Kuomintang administrative reformers in the mid-1930s, there can be little doubt that in embryo very similar principles animated both the Yuan Shikai and Beiyang governments of the 1910s 12. For the idea of an "institutional breakthrough," I slightly adapt Kenneth Jowitt's concept of a "revolutionary breakthrough" for the early developmental stage of Leninist systems. In contrast to "revolutionary breakthroughs," which are highly specific to Leninist regimes attempting to consolidate and carry out a "heroic" programme of modernization through collectivization and transformation of the basic units of society, "institutional breakthroughs" are more generic, and can be directed towards any number of different ends (including socially quite conservative ones). However, both revolutionary and institutional breakthroughs are sought after by executive elites wherever institutions are weak and fragmented. See Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 94-95. 13. This list of attributes is drawn from Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 223-26. re-institutionalization of norms of objectivity and impartiality, however attractive they remained in principle. Fairly consistent foreign pressure, combined with distressing levels of domestic militarization, made the operations and institutions of civil Republican government even more problematic. Clearly, in this highly unfavourable environment of fragmented organizations, ambiguous loyalties, internal divisions, slender resources and external pressures, what the central governments of Republican China needed was, in effect, an "institutional breakthrough" - some means by which to climb out of this morass of weakness and begin to implement a vision of centrally led institution building and development while standing up to external pressure.2 Over the course of the Republican period, there were two analytically distinct methods or "logics" by which government elites worked to build institutional capacity. The first was to try to create a new set of "good institutions" for government and administration. "Good" was now redefined to be impersonal Weberian bureaucracy, characterized by objectively oriented, efficient, rule-based technocracy, with a de facto division of labour between politicians who set policy and bureaucrats who implemented it, and a sharp legal distinction between office and office-holder as the "most rational known means of exercising authority."'3 The second "logic," which arose with the reorganization of the KMT and the expansion of revolutionary sentiment in the mid-1920s, used long-standing beliefs in the importance of "good men." In this conception, "good men" were the raw materials who would effect institutional breakthroughs via a controlled mobilization whereby political leadership would arouse the pre-existing values and commitments of those below towards collective ends, and, where "correct" values and norms were lacking, would inculcate those norms. Attempting Institutional Breakthroughs: Pre-1927 Visions and Implementation of Statist Technocracy Although the full-fledged articulation of the vision of "government as statist technocracy responsive to the executive" did not occur until the emergence of a group of Kuomintang administrative reformers in the mid-1930s, there can be little doubt that in embryo very similar principles animated both the Yuan Shikai and Beiyang governments of the 1910s 12. For the idea of an "institutional breakthrough," I slightly adapt Kenneth Jowitt's concept of a "revolutionary breakthrough" for the early developmental stage of Leninist systems. In contrast to "revolutionary breakthroughs," which are highly specific to Leninist regimes attempting to consolidate and carry out a "heroic" programme of modernization through collectivization and transformation of the basic units of society, "institutional breakthroughs" are more generic, and can be directed towards any number of different ends (including socially quite conservative ones). However, both revolutionary and institutional breakthroughs are sought after by executive elites wherever institutions are weak and fragmented. See Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 94-95. 13. This list of attributes is drawn from Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 223-26. re-institutionalization of norms of objectivity and impartiality, however attractive they remained in principle. Fairly consistent foreign pressure, combined with distressing levels of domestic militarization, made the operations and institutions of civil Republican government even more problematic. Clearly, in this highly unfavourable environment of fragmented organizations, ambiguous loyalties, internal divisions, slender resources and external pressures, what the central governments of Republican China needed was, in effect, an "institutional breakthrough" - some means by which to climb out of this morass of weakness and begin to implement a vision of centrally led institution building and development while standing up to external pressure.2 Over the course of the Republican period, there were two analytically distinct methods or "logics" by which government elites worked to build institutional capacity. The first was to try to create a new set of "good institutions" for government and administration. "Good" was now redefined to be impersonal Weberian bureaucracy, characterized by objectively oriented, efficient, rule-based technocracy, with a de facto division of labour between politicians who set policy and bureaucrats who implemented it, and a sharp legal distinction between office and office-holder as the "most rational known means of exercising authority."'3 The second "logic," which arose with the reorganization of the KMT and the expansion of revolutionary sentiment in the mid-1920s, used long-standing beliefs in the importance of "good men." In this conception, "good men" were the raw materials who would effect institutional breakthroughs via a controlled mobilization whereby political leadership would arouse the pre-existing values and commitments of those below towards collective ends, and, where "correct" values and norms were lacking, would inculcate those norms. Attempting Institutional Breakthroughs: Pre-1927 Visions and Implementation of Statist Technocracy Although the full-fledged articulation of the vision of "government as statist technocracy responsive to the executive" did not occur until the emergence of a group of Kuomintang administrative reformers in the mid-1930s, there can be little doubt that in embryo very similar principles animated both the Yuan Shikai and Beiyang governments of the 1910s 12. For the idea of an "institutional breakthrough," I slightly adapt Kenneth Jowitt's concept of a "revolutionary breakthrough" for the early developmental stage of Leninist systems. In contrast to "revolutionary breakthroughs," which are highly specific to Leninist regimes attempting to consolidate and carry out a "heroic" programme of modernization through collectivization and transformation of the basic units of society, "institutional breakthroughs" are more generic, and can be directed towards any number of different ends (including socially quite conservative ones). However, both revolutionary and institutional breakthroughs are sought after by executive elites wherever institutions are weak and fragmented. See Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 94-95. 13. This list of attributes is drawn from Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 223-26. re-institutionalization of norms of objectivity and impartiality, however attractive they remained in principle. Fairly consistent foreign pressure, combined with distressing levels of domestic militarization, made the operations and institutions of civil Republican government even more problematic. Clearly, in this highly unfavourable environment of fragmented organizations, ambiguous loyalties, internal divisions, slender resources and external pressures, what the central governments of Republican China needed was, in effect, an "institutional breakthrough" - some means by which to climb out of this morass of weakness and begin to implement a vision of centrally led institution building and development while standing up to external pressure.2 Over the course of the Republican period, there were two analytically distinct methods or "logics" by which government elites worked to build institutional capacity. The first was to try to create a new set of "good institutions" for government and administration. "Good" was now redefined to be impersonal Weberian bureaucracy, characterized by objectively oriented, efficient, rule-based technocracy, with a de facto division of labour between politicians who set policy and bureaucrats who implemented it, and a sharp legal distinction between office and office-holder as the "most rational known means of exercising authority."'3 The second "logic," which arose with the reorganization of the KMT and the expansion of revolutionary sentiment in the mid-1920s, used long-standing beliefs in the importance of "good men." In this conception, "good men" were the raw materials who would effect institutional breakthroughs via a controlled mobilization whereby political leadership would arouse the pre-existing values and commitments of those below towards collective ends, and, where "correct" values and norms were lacking, would inculcate those norms. Attempting Institutional Breakthroughs: Pre-1927 Visions and Implementation of Statist Technocracy Although the full-fledged articulation of the vision of "government as statist technocracy responsive to the executive" did not occur until the emergence of a group of Kuomintang administrative reformers in the mid-1930s, there can be little doubt that in embryo very similar principles animated both the Yuan Shikai and Beiyang governments of the 1910s 12. For the idea of an "institutional breakthrough," I slightly adapt Kenneth Jowitt's concept of a "revolutionary breakthrough" for the early developmental stage of Leninist systems. In contrast to "revolutionary breakthroughs," which are highly specific to Leninist regimes attempting to consolidate and carry out a "heroic" programme of modernization through collectivization and transformation of the basic units of society, "institutional breakthroughs" are more generic, and can be directed towards any number of different ends (including socially quite conservative ones). However, both revolutionary and institutional breakthroughs are sought after by executive elites wherever institutions are weak and fragmented. See Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 94-95. 13. This list of attributes is drawn from Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 223-26. re-institutionalization of norms of objectivity and impartiality, however attractive they remained in principle. Fairly consistent foreign pressure, combined with distressing levels of domestic militarization, made the operations and institutions of civil Republican government even more problematic. Clearly, in this highly unfavourable environment of fragmented organizations, ambiguous loyalties, internal divisions, slender resources and external pressures, what the central governments of Republican China needed was, in effect, an "institutional breakthrough" - some means by which to climb out of this morass of weakness and begin to implement a vision of centrally led institution building and development while standing up to external pressure.2 Over the course of the Republican period, there were two analytically distinct methods or "logics" by which government elites worked to build institutional capacity. The first was to try to create a new set of "good institutions" for government and administration. "Good" was now redefined to be impersonal Weberian bureaucracy, characterized by objectively oriented, efficient, rule-based technocracy, with a de facto division of labour between politicians who set policy and bureaucrats who implemented it, and a sharp legal distinction between office and office-holder as the "most rational known means of exercising authority."'3 The second "logic," which arose with the reorganization of the KMT and the expansion of revolutionary sentiment in the mid-1920s, used long-standing beliefs in the importance of "good men." In this conception, "good men" were the raw materials who would effect institutional breakthroughs via a controlled mobilization whereby political leadership would arouse the pre-existing values and commitments of those below towards collective ends, and, where "correct" values and norms were lacking, would inculcate those norms. Attempting Institutional Breakthroughs: Pre-1927 Visions and Implementation of Statist Technocracy Although the full-fledged articulation of the vision of "government as statist technocracy responsive to the executive" did not occur until the emergence of a group of Kuomintang administrative reformers in the mid-1930s, there can be little doubt that in embryo very similar principles animated both the Yuan Shikai and Beiyang governments of the 1910s 12. For the idea of an "institutional breakthrough," I slightly adapt Kenneth Jowitt's concept of a "revolutionary breakthrough" for the early developmental stage of Leninist systems. In contrast to "revolutionary breakthroughs," which are highly specific to Leninist regimes attempting to consolidate and carry out a "heroic" programme of modernization through collectivization and transformation of the basic units of society, "institutional breakthroughs" are more generic, and can be directed towards any number of different ends (including socially quite conservative ones). However, both revolutionary and institutional breakthroughs are sought after by executive elites wherever institutions are weak and fragmented. See Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 94-95. 13. This list of attributes is drawn from Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 223-26. re-institutionalization of norms of objectivity and impartiality, however attractive they remained in principle. Fairly consistent foreign pressure, combined with distressing levels of domestic militarization, made the operations and institutions of civil Republican government even more problematic. Clearly, in this highly unfavourable environment of fragmented organizations, ambiguous loyalties, internal divisions, slender resources and external pressures, what the central governments of Republican China needed was, in effect, an "institutional breakthrough" - some means by which to climb out of this morass of weakness and begin to implement a vision of centrally led institution building and development while standing up to external pressure.2 Over the course of the Republican period, there were two analytically distinct methods or "logics" by which government elites worked to build institutional capacity. The first was to try to create a new set of "good institutions" for government and administration. "Good" was now redefined to be impersonal Weberian bureaucracy, characterized by objectively oriented, efficient, rule-based technocracy, with a de facto division of labour between politicians who set policy and bureaucrats who implemented it, and a sharp legal distinction between office and office-holder as the "most rational known means of exercising authority."'3 The second "logic," which arose with the reorganization of the KMT and the expansion of revolutionary sentiment in the mid-1920s, used long-standing beliefs in the importance of "good men." In this conception, "good men" were the raw materials who would effect institutional breakthroughs via a controlled mobilization whereby political leadership would arouse the pre-existing values and commitments of those below towards collective ends, and, where "correct" values and norms were lacking, would inculcate those norms. Attempting Institutional Breakthroughs: Pre-1927 Visions and Implementation of Statist Technocracy Although the full-fledged articulation of the vision of "government as statist technocracy responsive to the executive" did not occur until the emergence of a group of Kuomintang administrative reformers in the mid-1930s, there can be little doubt that in embryo very similar principles animated both the Yuan Shikai and Beiyang governments of the 1910s 12. For the idea of an "institutional breakthrough," I slightly adapt Kenneth Jowitt's concept of a "revolutionary breakthrough" for the early developmental stage of Leninist systems. In contrast to "revolutionary breakthroughs," which are highly specific to Leninist regimes attempting to consolidate and carry out a "heroic" programme of modernization through collectivization and transformation of the basic units of society, "institutional breakthroughs" are more generic, and can be directed towards any number of different ends (including socially quite conservative ones). However, both revolutionary and institutional breakthroughs are sought after by executive elites wherever institutions are weak and fragmented. See Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 94-95. 13. This list of attributes is drawn from Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 223-26. re-institutionalization of norms of objectivity and impartiality, however attractive they remained in principle. Fairly consistent foreign pressure, combined with distressing levels of domestic militarization, made the operations and institutions of civil Republican government even more problematic. Clearly, in this highly unfavourable environment of fragmented organizations, ambiguous loyalties, internal divisions, slender resources and external pressures, what the central governments of Republican China needed was, in effect, an "institutional breakthrough" - some means by which to climb out of this morass of weakness and begin to implement a vision of centrally led institution building and development while standing up to external pressure.2 Over the course of the Republican period, there were two analytically distinct methods or "logics" by which government elites worked to build institutional capacity. The first was to try to create a new set of "good institutions" for government and administration. "Good" was now redefined to be impersonal Weberian bureaucracy, characterized by objectively oriented, efficient, rule-based technocracy, with a de facto division of labour between politicians who set policy and bureaucrats who implemented it, and a sharp legal distinction between office and office-holder as the "most rational known means of exercising authority."'3 The second "logic," which arose with the reorganization of the KMT and the expansion of revolutionary sentiment in the mid-1920s, used long-standing beliefs in the importance of "good men." In this conception, "good men" were the raw materials who would effect institutional breakthroughs via a controlled mobilization whereby political leadership would arouse the pre-existing values and commitments of those below towards collective ends, and, where "correct" values and norms were lacking, would inculcate those norms. Attempting Institutional Breakthroughs: Pre-1927 Visions and Implementation of Statist Technocracy Although the full-fledged articulation of the vision of "government as statist technocracy responsive to the executive" did not occur until the emergence of a group of Kuomintang administrative reformers in the mid-1930s, there can be little doubt that in embryo very similar principles animated both the Yuan Shikai and Beiyang governments of the 1910s 12. For the idea of an "institutional breakthrough," I slightly adapt Kenneth Jowitt's concept of a "revolutionary breakthrough" for the early developmental stage of Leninist systems. In contrast to "revolutionary breakthroughs," which are highly specific to Leninist regimes attempting to consolidate and carry out a "heroic" programme of modernization through collectivization and transformation of the basic units of society, "institutional breakthroughs" are more generic, and can be directed towards any number of different ends (including socially quite conservative ones). However, both revolutionary and institutional breakthroughs are sought after by executive elites wherever institutions are weak and fragmented. See Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 94-95. 13. This list of attributes is drawn from Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 223-26. re-institutionalization of norms of objectivity and impartiality, however attractive they remained in principle. Fairly consistent foreign pressure, combined with distressing levels of domestic militarization, made the operations and institutions of civil Republican government even more problematic. Clearly, in this highly unfavourable environment of fragmented organizations, ambiguous loyalties, internal divisions, slender resources and external pressures, what the central governments of Republican China needed was, in effect, an "institutional breakthrough" - some means by which to climb out of this morass of weakness and begin to implement a vision of centrally led institution building and development while standing up to external pressure.2 Over the course of the Republican period, there were two analytically distinct methods or "logics" by which government elites worked to build institutional capacity. The first was to try to create a new set of "good institutions" for government and administration. "Good" was now redefined to be impersonal Weberian bureaucracy, characterized by objectively oriented, efficient, rule-based technocracy, with a de facto division of labour between politicians who set policy and bureaucrats who implemented it, and a sharp legal distinction between office and office-holder as the "most rational known means of exercising authority."'3 The second "logic," which arose with the reorganization of the KMT and the expansion of revolutionary sentiment in the mid-1920s, used long-standing beliefs in the importance of "good men." In this conception, "good men" were the raw materials who would effect institutional breakthroughs via a controlled mobilization whereby political leadership would arouse the pre-existing values and commitments of those below towards collective ends, and, where "correct" values and norms were lacking, would inculcate those norms. Attempting Institutional Breakthroughs: Pre-1927 Visions and Implementation of Statist Technocracy Although the full-fledged articulation of the vision of "government as statist technocracy responsive to the executive" did not occur until the emergence of a group of Kuomintang administrative reformers in the mid-1930s, there can be little doubt that in embryo very similar principles animated both the Yuan Shikai and Beiyang governments of the 1910s 12. For the idea of an "institutional breakthrough," I slightly adapt Kenneth Jowitt's concept of a "revolutionary breakthrough" for the early developmental stage of Leninist systems. In contrast to "revolutionary breakthroughs," which are highly specific to Leninist regimes attempting to consolidate and carry out a "heroic" programme of modernization through collectivization and transformation of the basic units of society, "institutional breakthroughs" are more generic, and can be directed towards any number of different ends (including socially quite conservative ones). However, both revolutionary and institutional breakthroughs are sought after by executive elites wherever institutions are weak and fragmented. See Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 94-95. 13. This list of attributes is drawn from Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 223-26. re-institutionalization of norms of objectivity and impartiality, however attractive they remained in principle. Fairly consistent foreign pressure, combined with distressing levels of domestic militarization, made the operations and institutions of civil Republican government even more problematic. Clearly, in this highly unfavourable environment of fragmented organizations, ambiguous loyalties, internal divisions, slender resources and external pressures, what the central governments of Republican China needed was, in effect, an "institutional breakthrough" - some means by which to climb out of this morass of weakness and begin to implement a vision of centrally led institution building and development while standing up to external pressure.2 Over the course of the Republican period, there were two analytically distinct methods or "logics" by which government elites worked to build institutional capacity. The first was to try to create a new set of "good institutions" for government and administration. "Good" was now redefined to be impersonal Weberian bureaucracy, characterized by objectively oriented, efficient, rule-based technocracy, with a de facto division of labour between politicians who set policy and bureaucrats who implemented it, and a sharp legal distinction between office and office-holder as the "most rational known means of exercising authority."'3 The second "logic," which arose with the reorganization of the KMT and the expansion of revolutionary sentiment in the mid-1920s, used long-standing beliefs in the importance of "good men." In this conception, "good men" were the raw materials who would effect institutional breakthroughs via a controlled mobilization whereby political leadership would arouse the pre-existing values and commitments of those below towards collective ends, and, where "correct" values and norms were lacking, would inculcate those norms. Attempting Institutional Breakthroughs: Pre-1927 Visions and Implementation of Statist Technocracy Although the full-fledged articulation of the vision of "government as statist technocracy responsive to the executive" did not occur until the emergence of a group of Kuomintang administrative reformers in the mid-1930s, there can be little doubt that in embryo very similar principles animated both the Yuan Shikai and Beiyang governments of the 1910s 12. For the idea of an "institutional breakthrough," I slightly adapt Kenneth Jowitt's concept of a "revolutionary breakthrough" for the early developmental stage of Leninist systems. In contrast to "revolutionary breakthroughs," which are highly specific to Leninist regimes attempting to consolidate and carry out a "heroic" programme of modernization through collectivization and transformation of the basic units of society, "institutional breakthroughs" are more generic, and can be directed towards any number of different ends (including socially quite conservative ones). However, both revolutionary and institutional breakthroughs are sought after by executive elites wherever institutions are weak and fragmented. See Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 94-95. 13. This list of attributes is drawn from Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 223-26. re-institutionalization of norms of objectivity and impartiality, however attractive they remained in principle. Fairly consistent foreign pressure, combined with distressing levels of domestic militarization, made the operations and institutions of civil Republican government even more problematic. Clearly, in this highly unfavourable environment of fragmented organizations, ambiguous loyalties, internal divisions, slender resources and external pressures, what the central governments of Republican China needed was, in effect, an "institutional breakthrough" - some means by which to climb out of this morass of weakness and begin to implement a vision of centrally led institution building and development while standing up to external pressure.2 Over the course of the Republican period, there were two analytically distinct methods or "logics" by which government elites worked to build institutional capacity. The first was to try to create a new set of "good institutions" for government and administration. "Good" was now redefined to be impersonal Weberian bureaucracy, characterized by objectively oriented, efficient, rule-based technocracy, with a de facto division of labour between politicians who set policy and bureaucrats who implemented it, and a sharp legal distinction between office and office-holder as the "most rational known means of exercising authority."'3 The second "logic," which arose with the reorganization of the KMT and the expansion of revolutionary sentiment in the mid-1920s, used long-standing beliefs in the importance of "good men." In this conception, "good men" were the raw materials who would effect institutional breakthroughs via a controlled mobilization whereby political leadership would arouse the pre-existing values and commitments of those below towards collective ends, and, where "correct" values and norms were lacking, would inculcate those norms. Attempting Institutional Breakthroughs: Pre-1927 Visions and Implementation of Statist Technocracy Although the full-fledged articulation of the vision of "government as statist technocracy responsive to the executive" did not occur until the emergence of a group of Kuomintang administrative reformers in the mid-1930s, there can be little doubt that in embryo very similar principles animated both the Yuan Shikai and Beiyang governments of the 1910s 12. For the idea of an "institutional breakthrough," I slightly adapt Kenneth Jowitt's concept of a "revolutionary breakthrough" for the early developmental stage of Leninist systems. In contrast to "revolutionary breakthroughs," which are highly specific to Leninist regimes attempting to consolidate and carry out a "heroic" programme of modernization through collectivization and transformation of the basic units of society, "institutional breakthroughs" are more generic, and can be directed towards any number of different ends (including socially quite conservative ones). However, both revolutionary and institutional breakthroughs are sought after by executive elites wherever institutions are weak and fragmented. See Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 94-95. 13. This list of attributes is drawn from Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 223-26. re-institutionalization of norms of objectivity and impartiality, however attractive they remained in principle. Fairly consistent foreign pressure, combined with distressing levels of domestic militarization, made the operations and institutions of civil Republican government even more problematic. Clearly, in this highly unfavourable environment of fragmented organizations, ambiguous loyalties, internal divisions, slender resources and external pressures, what the central governments of Republican China needed was, in effect, an "institutional breakthrough" - some means by which to climb out of this morass of weakness and begin to implement a vision of centrally led institution building and development while standing up to external pressure.2 Over the course of the Republican period, there were two analytically distinct methods or "logics" by which government elites worked to build institutional capacity. The first was to try to create a new set of "good institutions" for government and administration. "Good" was now redefined to be impersonal Weberian bureaucracy, characterized by objectively oriented, efficient, rule-based technocracy, with a de facto division of labour between politicians who set policy and bureaucrats who implemented it, and a sharp legal distinction between office and office-holder as the "most rational known means of exercising authority."'3 The second "logic," which arose with the reorganization of the KMT and the expansion of revolutionary sentiment in the mid-1920s, used long-standing beliefs in the importance of "good men." In this conception, "good men" were the raw materials who would effect institutional breakthroughs via a controlled mobilization whereby political leadership would arouse the pre-existing values and commitments of those below towards collective ends, and, where "correct" values and norms were lacking, would inculcate those norms. Attempting Institutional Breakthroughs: Pre-1927 Visions and Implementation of Statist Technocracy Although the full-fledged articulation of the vision of "government as statist technocracy responsive to the executive" did not occur until the emergence of a group of Kuomintang administrative reformers in the mid-1930s, there can be little doubt that in embryo very similar principles animated both the Yuan Shikai and Beiyang governments of the 1910s 12. For the idea of an "institutional breakthrough," I slightly adapt Kenneth Jowitt's concept of a "revolutionary breakthrough" for the early developmental stage of Leninist systems. In contrast to "revolutionary breakthroughs," which are highly specific to Leninist regimes attempting to consolidate and carry out a "heroic" programme of modernization through collectivization and transformation of the basic units of society, "institutional breakthroughs" are more generic, and can be directed towards any number of different ends (including socially quite conservative ones). However, both revolutionary and institutional breakthroughs are sought after by executive elites wherever institutions are weak and fragmented. See Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 94-95. 13. This list of attributes is drawn from Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 223-26. re-institutionalization of norms of objectivity and impartiality, however attractive they remained in principle. Fairly consistent foreign pressure, combined with distressing levels of domestic militarization, made the operations and institutions of civil Republican government even more problematic. Clearly, in this highly unfavourable environment of fragmented organizations, ambiguous loyalties, internal divisions, slender resources and external pressures, what the central governments of Republican China needed was, in effect, an "institutional breakthrough" - some means by which to climb out of this morass of weakness and begin to implement a vision of centrally led institution building and development while standing up to external pressure.2 Over the course of the Republican period, there were two analytically distinct methods or "logics" by which government elites worked to build institutional capacity. The first was to try to create a new set of "good institutions" for government and administration. "Good" was now redefined to be impersonal Weberian bureaucracy, characterized by objectively oriented, efficient, rule-based technocracy, with a de facto division of labour between politicians who set policy and bureaucrats who implemented it, and a sharp legal distinction between office and office-holder as the "most rational known means of exercising authority."'3 The second "logic," which arose with the reorganization of the KMT and the expansion of revolutionary sentiment in the mid-1920s, used long-standing beliefs in the importance of "good men." In this conception, "good men" were the raw materials who would effect institutional breakthroughs via a controlled mobilization whereby political leadership would arouse the pre-existing values and commitments of those below towards collective ends, and, where "correct" values and norms were lacking, would inculcate those norms. Attempting Institutional Breakthroughs: Pre-1927 Visions and Implementation of Statist Technocracy Although the full-fledged articulation of the vision of "government as statist technocracy responsive to the executive" did not occur until the emergence of a group of Kuomintang administrative reformers in the mid-1930s, there can be little doubt that in embryo very similar principles animated both the Yuan Shikai and Beiyang governments of the 1910s 12. For the idea of an "institutional breakthrough," I slightly adapt Kenneth Jowitt's concept of a "revolutionary breakthrough" for the early developmental stage of Leninist systems. In contrast to "revolutionary breakthroughs," which are highly specific to Leninist regimes attempting to consolidate and carry out a "heroic" programme of modernization through collectivization and transformation of the basic units of society, "institutional breakthroughs" are more generic, and can be directed towards any number of different ends (including socially quite conservative ones). However, both revolutionary and institutional breakthroughs are sought after by executive elites wherever institutions are weak and fragmented. See Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 94-95. 13. This list of attributes is drawn from Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 223-26. re-institutionalization of norms of objectivity and impartiality, however attractive they remained in principle. Fairly consistent foreign pressure, combined with distressing levels of domestic militarization, made the operations and institutions of civil Republican government even more problematic. Clearly, in this highly unfavourable environment of fragmented organizations, ambiguous loyalties, internal divisions, slender resources and external pressures, what the central governments of Republican China needed was, in effect, an "institutional breakthrough" - some means by which to climb out of this morass of weakness and begin to implement a vision of centrally led institution building and development while standing up to external pressure.2 Over the course of the Republican period, there were two analytically distinct methods or "logics" by which government elites worked to build institutional capacity. The first was to try to create a new set of "good institutions" for government and administration. "Good" was now redefined to be impersonal Weberian bureaucracy, characterized by objectively oriented, efficient, rule-based technocracy, with a de facto division of labour between politicians who set policy and bureaucrats who implemented it, and a sharp legal distinction between office and office-holder as the "most rational known means of exercising authority."'3 The second "logic," which arose with the reorganization of the KMT and the expansion of revolutionary sentiment in the mid-1920s, used long-standing beliefs in the importance of "good men." In this conception, "good men" were the raw materials who would effect institutional breakthroughs via a controlled mobilization whereby political leadership would arouse the pre-existing values and commitments of those below towards collective ends, and, where "correct" values and norms were lacking, would inculcate those norms. Attempting Institutional Breakthroughs: Pre-1927 Visions and Implementation of Statist Technocracy Although the full-fledged articulation of the vision of "government as statist technocracy responsive to the executive" did not occur until the emergence of a group of Kuomintang administrative reformers in the mid-1930s, there can be little doubt that in embryo very similar principles animated both the Yuan Shikai and Beiyang governments of the 1910s 12. For the idea of an "institutional breakthrough," I slightly adapt Kenneth Jowitt's concept of a "revolutionary breakthrough" for the early developmental stage of Leninist systems. In contrast to "revolutionary breakthroughs," which are highly specific to Leninist regimes attempting to consolidate and carry out a "heroic" programme of modernization through collectivization and transformation of the basic units of society, "institutional breakthroughs" are more generic, and can be directed towards any number of different ends (including socially quite conservative ones). However, both revolutionary and institutional breakthroughs are sought after by executive elites wherever institutions are weak and fragmented. See Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 94-95. 13. This list of attributes is drawn from Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 223-26. re-institutionalization of norms of objectivity and impartiality, however attractive they remained in principle. Fairly consistent foreign pressure, combined with distressing levels of domestic militarization, made the operations and institutions of civil Republican government even more problematic. Clearly, in this highly unfavourable environment of fragmented organizations, ambiguous loyalties, internal divisions, slender resources and external pressures, what the central governments of Republican China needed was, in effect, an "institutional breakthrough" - some means by which to climb out of this morass of weakness and begin to implement a vision of centrally led institution building and development while standing up to external pressure.2 Over the course of the Republican period, there were two analytically distinct methods or "logics" by which government elites worked to build institutional capacity. The first was to try to create a new set of "good institutions" for government and administration. "Good" was now redefined to be impersonal Weberian bureaucracy, characterized by objectively oriented, efficient, rule-based technocracy, with a de facto division of labour between politicians who set policy and bureaucrats who implemented it, and a sharp legal distinction between office and office-holder as the "most rational known means of exercising authority."'3 The second "logic," which arose with the reorganization of the KMT and the expansion of revolutionary sentiment in the mid-1920s, used long-standing beliefs in the importance of "good men." In this conception, "good men" were the raw materials who would effect institutional breakthroughs via a controlled mobilization whereby political leadership would arouse the pre-existing values and commitments of those below towards collective ends, and, where "correct" values and norms were lacking, would inculcate those norms. Attempting Institutional Breakthroughs: Pre-1927 Visions and Implementation of Statist Technocracy Although the full-fledged articulation of the vision of "government as statist technocracy responsive to the executive" did not occur until the emergence of a group of Kuomintang administrative reformers in the mid-1930s, there can be little doubt that in embryo very similar principles animated both the Yuan Shikai and Beiyang governments of the 1910s 12. For the idea of an "institutional breakthrough," I slightly adapt Kenneth Jowitt's concept of a "revolutionary breakthrough" for the early developmental stage of Leninist systems. In contrast to "revolutionary breakthroughs," which are highly specific to Leninist regimes attempting to consolidate and carry out a "heroic" programme of modernization through collectivization and transformation of the basic units of society, "institutional breakthroughs" are more generic, and can be directed towards any number of different ends (including socially quite conservative ones). However, both revolutionary and institutional breakthroughs are sought after by executive elites wherever institutions are weak and fragmented. See Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 94-95. 13. This list of attributes is drawn from Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 223-26. re-institutionalization of norms of objectivity and impartiality, however attractive they remained in principle. Fairly consistent foreign pressure, combined with distressing levels of domestic militarization, made the operations and institutions of civil Republican government even more problematic. Clearly, in this highly unfavourable environment of fragmented organizations, ambiguous loyalties, internal divisions, slender resources and external pressures, what the central governments of Republican China needed was, in effect, an "institutional breakthrough" - some means by which to climb out of this morass of weakness and begin to implement a vision of centrally led institution building and development while standing up to external pressure.2 Over the course of the Republican period, there were two analytically distinct methods or "logics" by which government elites worked to build institutional capacity. The first was to try to create a new set of "good institutions" for government and administration. "Good" was now redefined to be impersonal Weberian bureaucracy, characterized by objectively oriented, efficient, rule-based technocracy, with a de facto division of labour between politicians who set policy and bureaucrats who implemented it, and a sharp legal distinction between office and office-holder as the "most rational known means of exercising authority."'3 The second "logic," which arose with the reorganization of the KMT and the expansion of revolutionary sentiment in the mid-1920s, used long-standing beliefs in the importance of "good men." In this conception, "good men" were the raw materials who would effect institutional breakthroughs via a controlled mobilization whereby political leadership would arouse the pre-existing values and commitments of those below towards collective ends, and, where "correct" values and norms were lacking, would inculcate those norms. Attempting Institutional Breakthroughs: Pre-1927 Visions and Implementation of Statist Technocracy Although the full-fledged articulation of the vision of "government as statist technocracy responsive to the executive" did not occur until the emergence of a group of Kuomintang administrative reformers in the mid-1930s, there can be little doubt that in embryo very similar principles animated both the Yuan Shikai and Beiyang governments of the 1910s 12. For the idea of an "institutional breakthrough," I slightly adapt Kenneth Jowitt's concept of a "revolutionary breakthrough" for the early developmental stage of Leninist systems. In contrast to "revolutionary breakthroughs," which are highly specific to Leninist regimes attempting to consolidate and carry out a "heroic" programme of modernization through collectivization and transformation of the basic units of society, "institutional breakthroughs" are more generic, and can be directed towards any number of different ends (including socially quite conservative ones). However, both revolutionary and institutional breakthroughs are sought after by executive elites wherever institutions are weak and fragmented. See Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 94-95. 13. This list of attributes is drawn from Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 223-26. 335
336 The China Quarterly and 1920s.In his short tenure between 1912 and 1916,Yuan Shikai devoted a considerable amount of attention to attempting to create "good institutions"by regularizing,standardizing and establishing executive control over the government bureaucracy while pushing it in the direction of "objective"technocracy.Yuan established a new system of rank classifications and procedures for promotion in the civil bureaucracy as a whole.He drew up draft regulations to re-institute nation-wide open civil service examinations that assessed a combination of literacy in Chinese and knowledge of technical subjects as the preferred "regular path"into the bureaucracy,which was then followed by a provisional assignment to a ministry and two-year probationary period of intensive training.And Yuan consistently wooed to his administration "men of talent"who had been educated either abroad or domestically in modern subjects.4 There is some evidence to suggest substantial continuity of these policies in the central Beiyang governments into the early 1920s.The first nation-wide post-imperial civil service examinations were held in 1916, shortly after Yuan Shikai's death,and were identical in form to those he proposed the year before.The Beiyang Ministry of Finance,at least in its earliest years,seems to have continued in the way outlined by Yuan Shikai:in 1917 it assigned some 35 examinees who had passed the national civil service exams to a two-year probationary appointment. Until the early 1920s,when large numbers of staff began to be regularly replaced with those from outside,the Ministry of Finance probably retained many of the Yuan Shikai regime"men of talent"who had some mix of credentials in the "modern"subjects of government,economics and law,and practical experience in local,provincial or central govern- ment financial administration.5 Although the Yuan Shikai and early Beiyang government push towards central government technocracy,standardization,rationalization,examin- ation and training systems provided a powerful model that continued to influence parts of the National Government once the KMT came to power in the late 1920s,it did not in its own time effect an institutional breakthrough,as it had no means by which to project its authority much beyond Beijing into highly unstable and militarized provincial and local environments.Taxes from the provinces simply did not come in and government regulations had little meaning.During the Beiyang period the central government of China operated as a head without a body,fiscally kept alive (as noted above)by regular transfusions of the surpluses remitted by quasi-government tax collection agencies that it did not control,and loans from Western banks.16 14.This discussion draws on my article,"Symbol and reflection of the reconstituting state: the Examination Yuan in the 1930s,"Moder China,Vol.20,No.2 (April 1994).Many of the original details can be found in Qian Shipu (ed.),Beiyang zhengfu shigide zhengzhi zhidu (The Political System of the Beiyang Government Period)(Beijing:Zhonghua shuju,1984). 15.This segment is based on details in ch.5 of Strauss,Strong Institutions in Weak Polities, with the original documentation from the No.2 Historical Archives,files 1027/176(2), 1027/179,1027/181,and1027/188(1). 16.The fact that the Beiyang government in Beijing was the officially recognized central government of China meant that control of it provided automatic access to a range of financial
336 The China Quarterly and 1920s. In his short tenure between 1912 and 1916, Yuan Shikai devoted a considerable amount of attention to attempting to create "good institutions" by regularizing, standardizing and establishing executive control over the government bureaucracy while pushing it in the direction of "objective" technocracy. Yuan established a new system of rank classifications and procedures for promotion in the civil bureaucracy as a whole. He drew up draft regulations to re-institute nation-wide open civil service examinations that assessed a combination of literacy in Chinese and knowledge of technical subjects as the preferred "regular path" into the bureaucracy, which was then followed by a provisional assignment to a ministry and two-year probationary period of intensive training. And Yuan consistently wooed to his administration "men of talent" who had been educated either abroad or domestically in moder subjects.14 There is some evidence to suggest substantial continuity of these policies in the central Beiyang governments into the early 1920s. The first nation-wide post-imperial civil service examinations were held in 1916, shortly after Yuan Shikai's death, and were identical in form to those he proposed the year before. The Beiyang Ministry of Finance, at least in its earliest years, seems to have continued in the way outlined by Yuan Shikai: in 1917 it assigned some 35 examinees who had passed the national civil service exams to a two-year probationary appointment. Until the early 1920s, when large numbers of staff began to be regularly replaced with those from outside, the Ministry of Finance probably retained many of the Yuan Shikai regime "men of talent" who had some mix of credentials in the "moder" subjects of government, economics and law, and practical experience in local, provincial or central government financial administration.15 Although the Yuan Shikai and early Beiyang government push towards central government technocracy, standardization, rationalization, examination and training systems provided a powerful model that continued to influence parts of the National Government once the KMT came to power in the late 1920s, it did not in its own time effect an institutional breakthrough, as it had no means by which to project its authority much beyond Beijing into highly unstable and militarized provincial and local environments. Taxes from the provinces simply did not come in and government regulations had little meaning. During the Beiyang period the central government of China operated as a head without a body, fiscally kept alive (as noted above) by regular transfusions of the surpluses remitted by quasi-government tax collection agencies that it did not control, and loans from Western banks.16 14. This discussion draws on my article, "Symbol and reflection of the reconstituting state: the Examination Yuan in the 1930s," Moder China, Vol. 20, No. 2 (April 1994). Many of the original details can be found in Qian Shipu (ed.), Beiyang zhengfu shiqide zhengzhi zhidu (The Political System of the Beiyang Government Period) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1984). 15. This segment is based on details in ch. 5 of Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities, with the original documentation from the No. 2 Historical Archives, files 1027/176 (2), 1027/179, 1027/181, and 1027/188 (1). 16. The fact that the Beiyang government in Beijing was the officially recognized central government of China meant that control of it provided automatic access to a range of financial and 1920s. In his short tenure between 1912 and 1916, Yuan Shikai devoted a considerable amount of attention to attempting to create "good institutions" by regularizing, standardizing and establishing executive control over the government bureaucracy while pushing it in the direction of "objective" technocracy. Yuan established a new system of rank classifications and procedures for promotion in the civil bureaucracy as a whole. He drew up draft regulations to re-institute nation-wide open civil service examinations that assessed a combination of literacy in Chinese and knowledge of technical subjects as the preferred "regular path" into the bureaucracy, which was then followed by a provisional assignment to a ministry and two-year probationary period of intensive training. And Yuan consistently wooed to his administration "men of talent" who had been educated either abroad or domestically in moder subjects.14 There is some evidence to suggest substantial continuity of these policies in the central Beiyang governments into the early 1920s. The first nation-wide post-imperial civil service examinations were held in 1916, shortly after Yuan Shikai's death, and were identical in form to those he proposed the year before. The Beiyang Ministry of Finance, at least in its earliest years, seems to have continued in the way outlined by Yuan Shikai: in 1917 it assigned some 35 examinees who had passed the national civil service exams to a two-year probationary appointment. Until the early 1920s, when large numbers of staff began to be regularly replaced with those from outside, the Ministry of Finance probably retained many of the Yuan Shikai regime "men of talent" who had some mix of credentials in the "moder" subjects of government, economics and law, and practical experience in local, provincial or central government financial administration.15 Although the Yuan Shikai and early Beiyang government push towards central government technocracy, standardization, rationalization, examination and training systems provided a powerful model that continued to influence parts of the National Government once the KMT came to power in the late 1920s, it did not in its own time effect an institutional breakthrough, as it had no means by which to project its authority much beyond Beijing into highly unstable and militarized provincial and local environments. Taxes from the provinces simply did not come in and government regulations had little meaning. During the Beiyang period the central government of China operated as a head without a body, fiscally kept alive (as noted above) by regular transfusions of the surpluses remitted by quasi-government tax collection agencies that it did not control, and loans from Western banks.16 14. This discussion draws on my article, "Symbol and reflection of the reconstituting state: the Examination Yuan in the 1930s," Moder China, Vol. 20, No. 2 (April 1994). Many of the original details can be found in Qian Shipu (ed.), Beiyang zhengfu shiqide zhengzhi zhidu (The Political System of the Beiyang Government Period) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1984). 15. This segment is based on details in ch. 5 of Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities, with the original documentation from the No. 2 Historical Archives, files 1027/176 (2), 1027/179, 1027/181, and 1027/188 (1). 16. The fact that the Beiyang government in Beijing was the officially recognized central government of China meant that control of it provided automatic access to a range of financial and 1920s. In his short tenure between 1912 and 1916, Yuan Shikai devoted a considerable amount of attention to attempting to create "good institutions" by regularizing, standardizing and establishing executive control over the government bureaucracy while pushing it in the direction of "objective" technocracy. Yuan established a new system of rank classifications and procedures for promotion in the civil bureaucracy as a whole. He drew up draft regulations to re-institute nation-wide open civil service examinations that assessed a combination of literacy in Chinese and knowledge of technical subjects as the preferred "regular path" into the bureaucracy, which was then followed by a provisional assignment to a ministry and two-year probationary period of intensive training. And Yuan consistently wooed to his administration "men of talent" who had been educated either abroad or domestically in moder subjects.14 There is some evidence to suggest substantial continuity of these policies in the central Beiyang governments into the early 1920s. The first nation-wide post-imperial civil service examinations were held in 1916, shortly after Yuan Shikai's death, and were identical in form to those he proposed the year before. The Beiyang Ministry of Finance, at least in its earliest years, seems to have continued in the way outlined by Yuan Shikai: in 1917 it assigned some 35 examinees who had passed the national civil service exams to a two-year probationary appointment. Until the early 1920s, when large numbers of staff began to be regularly replaced with those from outside, the Ministry of Finance probably retained many of the Yuan Shikai regime "men of talent" who had some mix of credentials in the "moder" subjects of government, economics and law, and practical experience in local, provincial or central government financial administration.15 Although the Yuan Shikai and early Beiyang government push towards central government technocracy, standardization, rationalization, examination and training systems provided a powerful model that continued to influence parts of the National Government once the KMT came to power in the late 1920s, it did not in its own time effect an institutional breakthrough, as it had no means by which to project its authority much beyond Beijing into highly unstable and militarized provincial and local environments. Taxes from the provinces simply did not come in and government regulations had little meaning. During the Beiyang period the central government of China operated as a head without a body, fiscally kept alive (as noted above) by regular transfusions of the surpluses remitted by quasi-government tax collection agencies that it did not control, and loans from Western banks.16 14. This discussion draws on my article, "Symbol and reflection of the reconstituting state: the Examination Yuan in the 1930s," Moder China, Vol. 20, No. 2 (April 1994). Many of the original details can be found in Qian Shipu (ed.), Beiyang zhengfu shiqide zhengzhi zhidu (The Political System of the Beiyang Government Period) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1984). 15. This segment is based on details in ch. 5 of Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities, with the original documentation from the No. 2 Historical Archives, files 1027/176 (2), 1027/179, 1027/181, and 1027/188 (1). 16. The fact that the Beiyang government in Beijing was the officially recognized central government of China meant that control of it provided automatic access to a range of financial and 1920s. In his short tenure between 1912 and 1916, Yuan Shikai devoted a considerable amount of attention to attempting to create "good institutions" by regularizing, standardizing and establishing executive control over the government bureaucracy while pushing it in the direction of "objective" technocracy. Yuan established a new system of rank classifications and procedures for promotion in the civil bureaucracy as a whole. He drew up draft regulations to re-institute nation-wide open civil service examinations that assessed a combination of literacy in Chinese and knowledge of technical subjects as the preferred "regular path" into the bureaucracy, which was then followed by a provisional assignment to a ministry and two-year probationary period of intensive training. And Yuan consistently wooed to his administration "men of talent" who had been educated either abroad or domestically in moder subjects.14 There is some evidence to suggest substantial continuity of these policies in the central Beiyang governments into the early 1920s. The first nation-wide post-imperial civil service examinations were held in 1916, shortly after Yuan Shikai's death, and were identical in form to those he proposed the year before. The Beiyang Ministry of Finance, at least in its earliest years, seems to have continued in the way outlined by Yuan Shikai: in 1917 it assigned some 35 examinees who had passed the national civil service exams to a two-year probationary appointment. Until the early 1920s, when large numbers of staff began to be regularly replaced with those from outside, the Ministry of Finance probably retained many of the Yuan Shikai regime "men of talent" who had some mix of credentials in the "moder" subjects of government, economics and law, and practical experience in local, provincial or central government financial administration.15 Although the Yuan Shikai and early Beiyang government push towards central government technocracy, standardization, rationalization, examination and training systems provided a powerful model that continued to influence parts of the National Government once the KMT came to power in the late 1920s, it did not in its own time effect an institutional breakthrough, as it had no means by which to project its authority much beyond Beijing into highly unstable and militarized provincial and local environments. Taxes from the provinces simply did not come in and government regulations had little meaning. During the Beiyang period the central government of China operated as a head without a body, fiscally kept alive (as noted above) by regular transfusions of the surpluses remitted by quasi-government tax collection agencies that it did not control, and loans from Western banks.16 14. This discussion draws on my article, "Symbol and reflection of the reconstituting state: the Examination Yuan in the 1930s," Moder China, Vol. 20, No. 2 (April 1994). Many of the original details can be found in Qian Shipu (ed.), Beiyang zhengfu shiqide zhengzhi zhidu (The Political System of the Beiyang Government Period) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1984). 15. This segment is based on details in ch. 5 of Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities, with the original documentation from the No. 2 Historical Archives, files 1027/176 (2), 1027/179, 1027/181, and 1027/188 (1). 16. The fact that the Beiyang government in Beijing was the officially recognized central government of China meant that control of it provided automatic access to a range of financial and 1920s. In his short tenure between 1912 and 1916, Yuan Shikai devoted a considerable amount of attention to attempting to create "good institutions" by regularizing, standardizing and establishing executive control over the government bureaucracy while pushing it in the direction of "objective" technocracy. Yuan established a new system of rank classifications and procedures for promotion in the civil bureaucracy as a whole. He drew up draft regulations to re-institute nation-wide open civil service examinations that assessed a combination of literacy in Chinese and knowledge of technical subjects as the preferred "regular path" into the bureaucracy, which was then followed by a provisional assignment to a ministry and two-year probationary period of intensive training. And Yuan consistently wooed to his administration "men of talent" who had been educated either abroad or domestically in moder subjects.14 There is some evidence to suggest substantial continuity of these policies in the central Beiyang governments into the early 1920s. The first nation-wide post-imperial civil service examinations were held in 1916, shortly after Yuan Shikai's death, and were identical in form to those he proposed the year before. The Beiyang Ministry of Finance, at least in its earliest years, seems to have continued in the way outlined by Yuan Shikai: in 1917 it assigned some 35 examinees who had passed the national civil service exams to a two-year probationary appointment. Until the early 1920s, when large numbers of staff began to be regularly replaced with those from outside, the Ministry of Finance probably retained many of the Yuan Shikai regime "men of talent" who had some mix of credentials in the "moder" subjects of government, economics and law, and practical experience in local, provincial or central government financial administration.15 Although the Yuan Shikai and early Beiyang government push towards central government technocracy, standardization, rationalization, examination and training systems provided a powerful model that continued to influence parts of the National Government once the KMT came to power in the late 1920s, it did not in its own time effect an institutional breakthrough, as it had no means by which to project its authority much beyond Beijing into highly unstable and militarized provincial and local environments. Taxes from the provinces simply did not come in and government regulations had little meaning. During the Beiyang period the central government of China operated as a head without a body, fiscally kept alive (as noted above) by regular transfusions of the surpluses remitted by quasi-government tax collection agencies that it did not control, and loans from Western banks.16 14. This discussion draws on my article, "Symbol and reflection of the reconstituting state: the Examination Yuan in the 1930s," Moder China, Vol. 20, No. 2 (April 1994). Many of the original details can be found in Qian Shipu (ed.), Beiyang zhengfu shiqide zhengzhi zhidu (The Political System of the Beiyang Government Period) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1984). 15. This segment is based on details in ch. 5 of Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities, with the original documentation from the No. 2 Historical Archives, files 1027/176 (2), 1027/179, 1027/181, and 1027/188 (1). 16. The fact that the Beiyang government in Beijing was the officially recognized central government of China meant that control of it provided automatic access to a range of financial and 1920s. In his short tenure between 1912 and 1916, Yuan Shikai devoted a considerable amount of attention to attempting to create "good institutions" by regularizing, standardizing and establishing executive control over the government bureaucracy while pushing it in the direction of "objective" technocracy. Yuan established a new system of rank classifications and procedures for promotion in the civil bureaucracy as a whole. He drew up draft regulations to re-institute nation-wide open civil service examinations that assessed a combination of literacy in Chinese and knowledge of technical subjects as the preferred "regular path" into the bureaucracy, which was then followed by a provisional assignment to a ministry and two-year probationary period of intensive training. And Yuan consistently wooed to his administration "men of talent" who had been educated either abroad or domestically in moder subjects.14 There is some evidence to suggest substantial continuity of these policies in the central Beiyang governments into the early 1920s. The first nation-wide post-imperial civil service examinations were held in 1916, shortly after Yuan Shikai's death, and were identical in form to those he proposed the year before. The Beiyang Ministry of Finance, at least in its earliest years, seems to have continued in the way outlined by Yuan Shikai: in 1917 it assigned some 35 examinees who had passed the national civil service exams to a two-year probationary appointment. Until the early 1920s, when large numbers of staff began to be regularly replaced with those from outside, the Ministry of Finance probably retained many of the Yuan Shikai regime "men of talent" who had some mix of credentials in the "moder" subjects of government, economics and law, and practical experience in local, provincial or central government financial administration.15 Although the Yuan Shikai and early Beiyang government push towards central government technocracy, standardization, rationalization, examination and training systems provided a powerful model that continued to influence parts of the National Government once the KMT came to power in the late 1920s, it did not in its own time effect an institutional breakthrough, as it had no means by which to project its authority much beyond Beijing into highly unstable and militarized provincial and local environments. Taxes from the provinces simply did not come in and government regulations had little meaning. During the Beiyang period the central government of China operated as a head without a body, fiscally kept alive (as noted above) by regular transfusions of the surpluses remitted by quasi-government tax collection agencies that it did not control, and loans from Western banks.16 14. This discussion draws on my article, "Symbol and reflection of the reconstituting state: the Examination Yuan in the 1930s," Moder China, Vol. 20, No. 2 (April 1994). Many of the original details can be found in Qian Shipu (ed.), Beiyang zhengfu shiqide zhengzhi zhidu (The Political System of the Beiyang Government Period) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1984). 15. This segment is based on details in ch. 5 of Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities, with the original documentation from the No. 2 Historical Archives, files 1027/176 (2), 1027/179, 1027/181, and 1027/188 (1). 16. The fact that the Beiyang government in Beijing was the officially recognized central government of China meant that control of it provided automatic access to a range of financial and 1920s. In his short tenure between 1912 and 1916, Yuan Shikai devoted a considerable amount of attention to attempting to create "good institutions" by regularizing, standardizing and establishing executive control over the government bureaucracy while pushing it in the direction of "objective" technocracy. Yuan established a new system of rank classifications and procedures for promotion in the civil bureaucracy as a whole. He drew up draft regulations to re-institute nation-wide open civil service examinations that assessed a combination of literacy in Chinese and knowledge of technical subjects as the preferred "regular path" into the bureaucracy, which was then followed by a provisional assignment to a ministry and two-year probationary period of intensive training. And Yuan consistently wooed to his administration "men of talent" who had been educated either abroad or domestically in moder subjects.14 There is some evidence to suggest substantial continuity of these policies in the central Beiyang governments into the early 1920s. The first nation-wide post-imperial civil service examinations were held in 1916, shortly after Yuan Shikai's death, and were identical in form to those he proposed the year before. The Beiyang Ministry of Finance, at least in its earliest years, seems to have continued in the way outlined by Yuan Shikai: in 1917 it assigned some 35 examinees who had passed the national civil service exams to a two-year probationary appointment. Until the early 1920s, when large numbers of staff began to be regularly replaced with those from outside, the Ministry of Finance probably retained many of the Yuan Shikai regime "men of talent" who had some mix of credentials in the "moder" subjects of government, economics and law, and practical experience in local, provincial or central government financial administration.15 Although the Yuan Shikai and early Beiyang government push towards central government technocracy, standardization, rationalization, examination and training systems provided a powerful model that continued to influence parts of the National Government once the KMT came to power in the late 1920s, it did not in its own time effect an institutional breakthrough, as it had no means by which to project its authority much beyond Beijing into highly unstable and militarized provincial and local environments. Taxes from the provinces simply did not come in and government regulations had little meaning. During the Beiyang period the central government of China operated as a head without a body, fiscally kept alive (as noted above) by regular transfusions of the surpluses remitted by quasi-government tax collection agencies that it did not control, and loans from Western banks.16 14. This discussion draws on my article, "Symbol and reflection of the reconstituting state: the Examination Yuan in the 1930s," Moder China, Vol. 20, No. 2 (April 1994). Many of the original details can be found in Qian Shipu (ed.), Beiyang zhengfu shiqide zhengzhi zhidu (The Political System of the Beiyang Government Period) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1984). 15. This segment is based on details in ch. 5 of Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities, with the original documentation from the No. 2 Historical Archives, files 1027/176 (2), 1027/179, 1027/181, and 1027/188 (1). 16. The fact that the Beiyang government in Beijing was the officially recognized central government of China meant that control of it provided automatic access to a range of financial and 1920s. In his short tenure between 1912 and 1916, Yuan Shikai devoted a considerable amount of attention to attempting to create "good institutions" by regularizing, standardizing and establishing executive control over the government bureaucracy while pushing it in the direction of "objective" technocracy. Yuan established a new system of rank classifications and procedures for promotion in the civil bureaucracy as a whole. He drew up draft regulations to re-institute nation-wide open civil service examinations that assessed a combination of literacy in Chinese and knowledge of technical subjects as the preferred "regular path" into the bureaucracy, which was then followed by a provisional assignment to a ministry and two-year probationary period of intensive training. And Yuan consistently wooed to his administration "men of talent" who had been educated either abroad or domestically in moder subjects.14 There is some evidence to suggest substantial continuity of these policies in the central Beiyang governments into the early 1920s. The first nation-wide post-imperial civil service examinations were held in 1916, shortly after Yuan Shikai's death, and were identical in form to those he proposed the year before. The Beiyang Ministry of Finance, at least in its earliest years, seems to have continued in the way outlined by Yuan Shikai: in 1917 it assigned some 35 examinees who had passed the national civil service exams to a two-year probationary appointment. Until the early 1920s, when large numbers of staff began to be regularly replaced with those from outside, the Ministry of Finance probably retained many of the Yuan Shikai regime "men of talent" who had some mix of credentials in the "moder" subjects of government, economics and law, and practical experience in local, provincial or central government financial administration.15 Although the Yuan Shikai and early Beiyang government push towards central government technocracy, standardization, rationalization, examination and training systems provided a powerful model that continued to influence parts of the National Government once the KMT came to power in the late 1920s, it did not in its own time effect an institutional breakthrough, as it had no means by which to project its authority much beyond Beijing into highly unstable and militarized provincial and local environments. Taxes from the provinces simply did not come in and government regulations had little meaning. During the Beiyang period the central government of China operated as a head without a body, fiscally kept alive (as noted above) by regular transfusions of the surpluses remitted by quasi-government tax collection agencies that it did not control, and loans from Western banks.16 14. This discussion draws on my article, "Symbol and reflection of the reconstituting state: the Examination Yuan in the 1930s," Moder China, Vol. 20, No. 2 (April 1994). Many of the original details can be found in Qian Shipu (ed.), Beiyang zhengfu shiqide zhengzhi zhidu (The Political System of the Beiyang Government Period) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1984). 15. This segment is based on details in ch. 5 of Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities, with the original documentation from the No. 2 Historical Archives, files 1027/176 (2), 1027/179, 1027/181, and 1027/188 (1). 16. The fact that the Beiyang government in Beijing was the officially recognized central government of China meant that control of it provided automatic access to a range of financial and 1920s. In his short tenure between 1912 and 1916, Yuan Shikai devoted a considerable amount of attention to attempting to create "good institutions" by regularizing, standardizing and establishing executive control over the government bureaucracy while pushing it in the direction of "objective" technocracy. Yuan established a new system of rank classifications and procedures for promotion in the civil bureaucracy as a whole. He drew up draft regulations to re-institute nation-wide open civil service examinations that assessed a combination of literacy in Chinese and knowledge of technical subjects as the preferred "regular path" into the bureaucracy, which was then followed by a provisional assignment to a ministry and two-year probationary period of intensive training. And Yuan consistently wooed to his administration "men of talent" who had been educated either abroad or domestically in moder subjects.14 There is some evidence to suggest substantial continuity of these policies in the central Beiyang governments into the early 1920s. The first nation-wide post-imperial civil service examinations were held in 1916, shortly after Yuan Shikai's death, and were identical in form to those he proposed the year before. The Beiyang Ministry of Finance, at least in its earliest years, seems to have continued in the way outlined by Yuan Shikai: in 1917 it assigned some 35 examinees who had passed the national civil service exams to a two-year probationary appointment. Until the early 1920s, when large numbers of staff began to be regularly replaced with those from outside, the Ministry of Finance probably retained many of the Yuan Shikai regime "men of talent" who had some mix of credentials in the "moder" subjects of government, economics and law, and practical experience in local, provincial or central government financial administration.15 Although the Yuan Shikai and early Beiyang government push towards central government technocracy, standardization, rationalization, examination and training systems provided a powerful model that continued to influence parts of the National Government once the KMT came to power in the late 1920s, it did not in its own time effect an institutional breakthrough, as it had no means by which to project its authority much beyond Beijing into highly unstable and militarized provincial and local environments. Taxes from the provinces simply did not come in and government regulations had little meaning. During the Beiyang period the central government of China operated as a head without a body, fiscally kept alive (as noted above) by regular transfusions of the surpluses remitted by quasi-government tax collection agencies that it did not control, and loans from Western banks.16 14. This discussion draws on my article, "Symbol and reflection of the reconstituting state: the Examination Yuan in the 1930s," Moder China, Vol. 20, No. 2 (April 1994). Many of the original details can be found in Qian Shipu (ed.), Beiyang zhengfu shiqide zhengzhi zhidu (The Political System of the Beiyang Government Period) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1984). 15. This segment is based on details in ch. 5 of Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities, with the original documentation from the No. 2 Historical Archives, files 1027/176 (2), 1027/179, 1027/181, and 1027/188 (1). 16. The fact that the Beiyang government in Beijing was the officially recognized central government of China meant that control of it provided automatic access to a range of financial and 1920s. In his short tenure between 1912 and 1916, Yuan Shikai devoted a considerable amount of attention to attempting to create "good institutions" by regularizing, standardizing and establishing executive control over the government bureaucracy while pushing it in the direction of "objective" technocracy. Yuan established a new system of rank classifications and procedures for promotion in the civil bureaucracy as a whole. He drew up draft regulations to re-institute nation-wide open civil service examinations that assessed a combination of literacy in Chinese and knowledge of technical subjects as the preferred "regular path" into the bureaucracy, which was then followed by a provisional assignment to a ministry and two-year probationary period of intensive training. And Yuan consistently wooed to his administration "men of talent" who had been educated either abroad or domestically in moder subjects.14 There is some evidence to suggest substantial continuity of these policies in the central Beiyang governments into the early 1920s. The first nation-wide post-imperial civil service examinations were held in 1916, shortly after Yuan Shikai's death, and were identical in form to those he proposed the year before. The Beiyang Ministry of Finance, at least in its earliest years, seems to have continued in the way outlined by Yuan Shikai: in 1917 it assigned some 35 examinees who had passed the national civil service exams to a two-year probationary appointment. Until the early 1920s, when large numbers of staff began to be regularly replaced with those from outside, the Ministry of Finance probably retained many of the Yuan Shikai regime "men of talent" who had some mix of credentials in the "moder" subjects of government, economics and law, and practical experience in local, provincial or central government financial administration.15 Although the Yuan Shikai and early Beiyang government push towards central government technocracy, standardization, rationalization, examination and training systems provided a powerful model that continued to influence parts of the National Government once the KMT came to power in the late 1920s, it did not in its own time effect an institutional breakthrough, as it had no means by which to project its authority much beyond Beijing into highly unstable and militarized provincial and local environments. Taxes from the provinces simply did not come in and government regulations had little meaning. During the Beiyang period the central government of China operated as a head without a body, fiscally kept alive (as noted above) by regular transfusions of the surpluses remitted by quasi-government tax collection agencies that it did not control, and loans from Western banks.16 14. This discussion draws on my article, "Symbol and reflection of the reconstituting state: the Examination Yuan in the 1930s," Moder China, Vol. 20, No. 2 (April 1994). Many of the original details can be found in Qian Shipu (ed.), Beiyang zhengfu shiqide zhengzhi zhidu (The Political System of the Beiyang Government Period) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1984). 15. This segment is based on details in ch. 5 of Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities, with the original documentation from the No. 2 Historical Archives, files 1027/176 (2), 1027/179, 1027/181, and 1027/188 (1). 16. The fact that the Beiyang government in Beijing was the officially recognized central government of China meant that control of it provided automatic access to a range of financial and 1920s. In his short tenure between 1912 and 1916, Yuan Shikai devoted a considerable amount of attention to attempting to create "good institutions" by regularizing, standardizing and establishing executive control over the government bureaucracy while pushing it in the direction of "objective" technocracy. Yuan established a new system of rank classifications and procedures for promotion in the civil bureaucracy as a whole. He drew up draft regulations to re-institute nation-wide open civil service examinations that assessed a combination of literacy in Chinese and knowledge of technical subjects as the preferred "regular path" into the bureaucracy, which was then followed by a provisional assignment to a ministry and two-year probationary period of intensive training. And Yuan consistently wooed to his administration "men of talent" who had been educated either abroad or domestically in moder subjects.14 There is some evidence to suggest substantial continuity of these policies in the central Beiyang governments into the early 1920s. The first nation-wide post-imperial civil service examinations were held in 1916, shortly after Yuan Shikai's death, and were identical in form to those he proposed the year before. The Beiyang Ministry of Finance, at least in its earliest years, seems to have continued in the way outlined by Yuan Shikai: in 1917 it assigned some 35 examinees who had passed the national civil service exams to a two-year probationary appointment. Until the early 1920s, when large numbers of staff began to be regularly replaced with those from outside, the Ministry of Finance probably retained many of the Yuan Shikai regime "men of talent" who had some mix of credentials in the "moder" subjects of government, economics and law, and practical experience in local, provincial or central government financial administration.15 Although the Yuan Shikai and early Beiyang government push towards central government technocracy, standardization, rationalization, examination and training systems provided a powerful model that continued to influence parts of the National Government once the KMT came to power in the late 1920s, it did not in its own time effect an institutional breakthrough, as it had no means by which to project its authority much beyond Beijing into highly unstable and militarized provincial and local environments. Taxes from the provinces simply did not come in and government regulations had little meaning. During the Beiyang period the central government of China operated as a head without a body, fiscally kept alive (as noted above) by regular transfusions of the surpluses remitted by quasi-government tax collection agencies that it did not control, and loans from Western banks.16 14. This discussion draws on my article, "Symbol and reflection of the reconstituting state: the Examination Yuan in the 1930s," Moder China, Vol. 20, No. 2 (April 1994). Many of the original details can be found in Qian Shipu (ed.), Beiyang zhengfu shiqide zhengzhi zhidu (The Political System of the Beiyang Government Period) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1984). 15. This segment is based on details in ch. 5 of Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities, with the original documentation from the No. 2 Historical Archives, files 1027/176 (2), 1027/179, 1027/181, and 1027/188 (1). 16. The fact that the Beiyang government in Beijing was the officially recognized central government of China meant that control of it provided automatic access to a range of financial and 1920s. In his short tenure between 1912 and 1916, Yuan Shikai devoted a considerable amount of attention to attempting to create "good institutions" by regularizing, standardizing and establishing executive control over the government bureaucracy while pushing it in the direction of "objective" technocracy. Yuan established a new system of rank classifications and procedures for promotion in the civil bureaucracy as a whole. He drew up draft regulations to re-institute nation-wide open civil service examinations that assessed a combination of literacy in Chinese and knowledge of technical subjects as the preferred "regular path" into the bureaucracy, which was then followed by a provisional assignment to a ministry and two-year probationary period of intensive training. And Yuan consistently wooed to his administration "men of talent" who had been educated either abroad or domestically in moder subjects.14 There is some evidence to suggest substantial continuity of these policies in the central Beiyang governments into the early 1920s. The first nation-wide post-imperial civil service examinations were held in 1916, shortly after Yuan Shikai's death, and were identical in form to those he proposed the year before. The Beiyang Ministry of Finance, at least in its earliest years, seems to have continued in the way outlined by Yuan Shikai: in 1917 it assigned some 35 examinees who had passed the national civil service exams to a two-year probationary appointment. Until the early 1920s, when large numbers of staff began to be regularly replaced with those from outside, the Ministry of Finance probably retained many of the Yuan Shikai regime "men of talent" who had some mix of credentials in the "moder" subjects of government, economics and law, and practical experience in local, provincial or central government financial administration.15 Although the Yuan Shikai and early Beiyang government push towards central government technocracy, standardization, rationalization, examination and training systems provided a powerful model that continued to influence parts of the National Government once the KMT came to power in the late 1920s, it did not in its own time effect an institutional breakthrough, as it had no means by which to project its authority much beyond Beijing into highly unstable and militarized provincial and local environments. Taxes from the provinces simply did not come in and government regulations had little meaning. During the Beiyang period the central government of China operated as a head without a body, fiscally kept alive (as noted above) by regular transfusions of the surpluses remitted by quasi-government tax collection agencies that it did not control, and loans from Western banks.16 14. This discussion draws on my article, "Symbol and reflection of the reconstituting state: the Examination Yuan in the 1930s," Moder China, Vol. 20, No. 2 (April 1994). Many of the original details can be found in Qian Shipu (ed.), Beiyang zhengfu shiqide zhengzhi zhidu (The Political System of the Beiyang Government Period) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1984). 15. This segment is based on details in ch. 5 of Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities, with the original documentation from the No. 2 Historical Archives, files 1027/176 (2), 1027/179, 1027/181, and 1027/188 (1). 16. The fact that the Beiyang government in Beijing was the officially recognized central government of China meant that control of it provided automatic access to a range of financial and 1920s. In his short tenure between 1912 and 1916, Yuan Shikai devoted a considerable amount of attention to attempting to create "good institutions" by regularizing, standardizing and establishing executive control over the government bureaucracy while pushing it in the direction of "objective" technocracy. Yuan established a new system of rank classifications and procedures for promotion in the civil bureaucracy as a whole. He drew up draft regulations to re-institute nation-wide open civil service examinations that assessed a combination of literacy in Chinese and knowledge of technical subjects as the preferred "regular path" into the bureaucracy, which was then followed by a provisional assignment to a ministry and two-year probationary period of intensive training. And Yuan consistently wooed to his administration "men of talent" who had been educated either abroad or domestically in moder subjects.14 There is some evidence to suggest substantial continuity of these policies in the central Beiyang governments into the early 1920s. The first nation-wide post-imperial civil service examinations were held in 1916, shortly after Yuan Shikai's death, and were identical in form to those he proposed the year before. The Beiyang Ministry of Finance, at least in its earliest years, seems to have continued in the way outlined by Yuan Shikai: in 1917 it assigned some 35 examinees who had passed the national civil service exams to a two-year probationary appointment. Until the early 1920s, when large numbers of staff began to be regularly replaced with those from outside, the Ministry of Finance probably retained many of the Yuan Shikai regime "men of talent" who had some mix of credentials in the "moder" subjects of government, economics and law, and practical experience in local, provincial or central government financial administration.15 Although the Yuan Shikai and early Beiyang government push towards central government technocracy, standardization, rationalization, examination and training systems provided a powerful model that continued to influence parts of the National Government once the KMT came to power in the late 1920s, it did not in its own time effect an institutional breakthrough, as it had no means by which to project its authority much beyond Beijing into highly unstable and militarized provincial and local environments. Taxes from the provinces simply did not come in and government regulations had little meaning. During the Beiyang period the central government of China operated as a head without a body, fiscally kept alive (as noted above) by regular transfusions of the surpluses remitted by quasi-government tax collection agencies that it did not control, and loans from Western banks.16 14. This discussion draws on my article, "Symbol and reflection of the reconstituting state: the Examination Yuan in the 1930s," Moder China, Vol. 20, No. 2 (April 1994). Many of the original details can be found in Qian Shipu (ed.), Beiyang zhengfu shiqide zhengzhi zhidu (The Political System of the Beiyang Government Period) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1984). 15. This segment is based on details in ch. 5 of Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities, with the original documentation from the No. 2 Historical Archives, files 1027/176 (2), 1027/179, 1027/181, and 1027/188 (1). 16. The fact that the Beiyang government in Beijing was the officially recognized central government of China meant that control of it provided automatic access to a range of financial and 1920s. In his short tenure between 1912 and 1916, Yuan Shikai devoted a considerable amount of attention to attempting to create "good institutions" by regularizing, standardizing and establishing executive control over the government bureaucracy while pushing it in the direction of "objective" technocracy. Yuan established a new system of rank classifications and procedures for promotion in the civil bureaucracy as a whole. He drew up draft regulations to re-institute nation-wide open civil service examinations that assessed a combination of literacy in Chinese and knowledge of technical subjects as the preferred "regular path" into the bureaucracy, which was then followed by a provisional assignment to a ministry and two-year probationary period of intensive training. And Yuan consistently wooed to his administration "men of talent" who had been educated either abroad or domestically in moder subjects.14 There is some evidence to suggest substantial continuity of these policies in the central Beiyang governments into the early 1920s. The first nation-wide post-imperial civil service examinations were held in 1916, shortly after Yuan Shikai's death, and were identical in form to those he proposed the year before. The Beiyang Ministry of Finance, at least in its earliest years, seems to have continued in the way outlined by Yuan Shikai: in 1917 it assigned some 35 examinees who had passed the national civil service exams to a two-year probationary appointment. Until the early 1920s, when large numbers of staff began to be regularly replaced with those from outside, the Ministry of Finance probably retained many of the Yuan Shikai regime "men of talent" who had some mix of credentials in the "moder" subjects of government, economics and law, and practical experience in local, provincial or central government financial administration.15 Although the Yuan Shikai and early Beiyang government push towards central government technocracy, standardization, rationalization, examination and training systems provided a powerful model that continued to influence parts of the National Government once the KMT came to power in the late 1920s, it did not in its own time effect an institutional breakthrough, as it had no means by which to project its authority much beyond Beijing into highly unstable and militarized provincial and local environments. Taxes from the provinces simply did not come in and government regulations had little meaning. During the Beiyang period the central government of China operated as a head without a body, fiscally kept alive (as noted above) by regular transfusions of the surpluses remitted by quasi-government tax collection agencies that it did not control, and loans from Western banks.16 14. This discussion draws on my article, "Symbol and reflection of the reconstituting state: the Examination Yuan in the 1930s," Moder China, Vol. 20, No. 2 (April 1994). Many of the original details can be found in Qian Shipu (ed.), Beiyang zhengfu shiqide zhengzhi zhidu (The Political System of the Beiyang Government Period) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1984). 15. This segment is based on details in ch. 5 of Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities, with the original documentation from the No. 2 Historical Archives, files 1027/176 (2), 1027/179, 1027/181, and 1027/188 (1). 16. The fact that the Beiyang government in Beijing was the officially recognized central government of China meant that control of it provided automatic access to a range of financial and 1920s. In his short tenure between 1912 and 1916, Yuan Shikai devoted a considerable amount of attention to attempting to create "good institutions" by regularizing, standardizing and establishing executive control over the government bureaucracy while pushing it in the direction of "objective" technocracy. Yuan established a new system of rank classifications and procedures for promotion in the civil bureaucracy as a whole. He drew up draft regulations to re-institute nation-wide open civil service examinations that assessed a combination of literacy in Chinese and knowledge of technical subjects as the preferred "regular path" into the bureaucracy, which was then followed by a provisional assignment to a ministry and two-year probationary period of intensive training. And Yuan consistently wooed to his administration "men of talent" who had been educated either abroad or domestically in moder subjects.14 There is some evidence to suggest substantial continuity of these policies in the central Beiyang governments into the early 1920s. The first nation-wide post-imperial civil service examinations were held in 1916, shortly after Yuan Shikai's death, and were identical in form to those he proposed the year before. The Beiyang Ministry of Finance, at least in its earliest years, seems to have continued in the way outlined by Yuan Shikai: in 1917 it assigned some 35 examinees who had passed the national civil service exams to a two-year probationary appointment. Until the early 1920s, when large numbers of staff began to be regularly replaced with those from outside, the Ministry of Finance probably retained many of the Yuan Shikai regime "men of talent" who had some mix of credentials in the "moder" subjects of government, economics and law, and practical experience in local, provincial or central government financial administration.15 Although the Yuan Shikai and early Beiyang government push towards central government technocracy, standardization, rationalization, examination and training systems provided a powerful model that continued to influence parts of the National Government once the KMT came to power in the late 1920s, it did not in its own time effect an institutional breakthrough, as it had no means by which to project its authority much beyond Beijing into highly unstable and militarized provincial and local environments. Taxes from the provinces simply did not come in and government regulations had little meaning. During the Beiyang period the central government of China operated as a head without a body, fiscally kept alive (as noted above) by regular transfusions of the surpluses remitted by quasi-government tax collection agencies that it did not control, and loans from Western banks.16 14. This discussion draws on my article, "Symbol and reflection of the reconstituting state: the Examination Yuan in the 1930s," Moder China, Vol. 20, No. 2 (April 1994). Many of the original details can be found in Qian Shipu (ed.), Beiyang zhengfu shiqide zhengzhi zhidu (The Political System of the Beiyang Government Period) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1984). 15. This segment is based on details in ch. 5 of Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities, with the original documentation from the No. 2 Historical Archives, files 1027/176 (2), 1027/179, 1027/181, and 1027/188 (1). 16. The fact that the Beiyang government in Beijing was the officially recognized central government of China meant that control of it provided automatic access to a range of financial and 1920s. In his short tenure between 1912 and 1916, Yuan Shikai devoted a considerable amount of attention to attempting to create "good institutions" by regularizing, standardizing and establishing executive control over the government bureaucracy while pushing it in the direction of "objective" technocracy. Yuan established a new system of rank classifications and procedures for promotion in the civil bureaucracy as a whole. He drew up draft regulations to re-institute nation-wide open civil service examinations that assessed a combination of literacy in Chinese and knowledge of technical subjects as the preferred "regular path" into the bureaucracy, which was then followed by a provisional assignment to a ministry and two-year probationary period of intensive training. And Yuan consistently wooed to his administration "men of talent" who had been educated either abroad or domestically in moder subjects.14 There is some evidence to suggest substantial continuity of these policies in the central Beiyang governments into the early 1920s. The first nation-wide post-imperial civil service examinations were held in 1916, shortly after Yuan Shikai's death, and were identical in form to those he proposed the year before. The Beiyang Ministry of Finance, at least in its earliest years, seems to have continued in the way outlined by Yuan Shikai: in 1917 it assigned some 35 examinees who had passed the national civil service exams to a two-year probationary appointment. Until the early 1920s, when large numbers of staff began to be regularly replaced with those from outside, the Ministry of Finance probably retained many of the Yuan Shikai regime "men of talent" who had some mix of credentials in the "moder" subjects of government, economics and law, and practical experience in local, provincial or central government financial administration.15 Although the Yuan Shikai and early Beiyang government push towards central government technocracy, standardization, rationalization, examination and training systems provided a powerful model that continued to influence parts of the National Government once the KMT came to power in the late 1920s, it did not in its own time effect an institutional breakthrough, as it had no means by which to project its authority much beyond Beijing into highly unstable and militarized provincial and local environments. Taxes from the provinces simply did not come in and government regulations had little meaning. During the Beiyang period the central government of China operated as a head without a body, fiscally kept alive (as noted above) by regular transfusions of the surpluses remitted by quasi-government tax collection agencies that it did not control, and loans from Western banks.16 14. This discussion draws on my article, "Symbol and reflection of the reconstituting state: the Examination Yuan in the 1930s," Moder China, Vol. 20, No. 2 (April 1994). Many of the original details can be found in Qian Shipu (ed.), Beiyang zhengfu shiqide zhengzhi zhidu (The Political System of the Beiyang Government Period) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1984). 15. This segment is based on details in ch. 5 of Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities, with the original documentation from the No. 2 Historical Archives, files 1027/176 (2), 1027/179, 1027/181, and 1027/188 (1). 16. The fact that the Beiyang government in Beijing was the officially recognized central government of China meant that control of it provided automatic access to a range of financial and 1920s. In his short tenure between 1912 and 1916, Yuan Shikai devoted a considerable amount of attention to attempting to create "good institutions" by regularizing, standardizing and establishing executive control over the government bureaucracy while pushing it in the direction of "objective" technocracy. Yuan established a new system of rank classifications and procedures for promotion in the civil bureaucracy as a whole. He drew up draft regulations to re-institute nation-wide open civil service examinations that assessed a combination of literacy in Chinese and knowledge of technical subjects as the preferred "regular path" into the bureaucracy, which was then followed by a provisional assignment to a ministry and two-year probationary period of intensive training. And Yuan consistently wooed to his administration "men of talent" who had been educated either abroad or domestically in moder subjects.14 There is some evidence to suggest substantial continuity of these policies in the central Beiyang governments into the early 1920s. The first nation-wide post-imperial civil service examinations were held in 1916, shortly after Yuan Shikai's death, and were identical in form to those he proposed the year before. The Beiyang Ministry of Finance, at least in its earliest years, seems to have continued in the way outlined by Yuan Shikai: in 1917 it assigned some 35 examinees who had passed the national civil service exams to a two-year probationary appointment. Until the early 1920s, when large numbers of staff began to be regularly replaced with those from outside, the Ministry of Finance probably retained many of the Yuan Shikai regime "men of talent" who had some mix of credentials in the "moder" subjects of government, economics and law, and practical experience in local, provincial or central government financial administration.15 Although the Yuan Shikai and early Beiyang government push towards central government technocracy, standardization, rationalization, examination and training systems provided a powerful model that continued to influence parts of the National Government once the KMT came to power in the late 1920s, it did not in its own time effect an institutional breakthrough, as it had no means by which to project its authority much beyond Beijing into highly unstable and militarized provincial and local environments. Taxes from the provinces simply did not come in and government regulations had little meaning. During the Beiyang period the central government of China operated as a head without a body, fiscally kept alive (as noted above) by regular transfusions of the surpluses remitted by quasi-government tax collection agencies that it did not control, and loans from Western banks.16 14. This discussion draws on my article, "Symbol and reflection of the reconstituting state: the Examination Yuan in the 1930s," Moder China, Vol. 20, No. 2 (April 1994). Many of the original details can be found in Qian Shipu (ed.), Beiyang zhengfu shiqide zhengzhi zhidu (The Political System of the Beiyang Government Period) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1984). 15. This segment is based on details in ch. 5 of Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities, with the original documentation from the No. 2 Historical Archives, files 1027/176 (2), 1027/179, 1027/181, and 1027/188 (1). 16. The fact that the Beiyang government in Beijing was the officially recognized central government of China meant that control of it provided automatic access to a range of financial and 1920s. In his short tenure between 1912 and 1916, Yuan Shikai devoted a considerable amount of attention to attempting to create "good institutions" by regularizing, standardizing and establishing executive control over the government bureaucracy while pushing it in the direction of "objective" technocracy. Yuan established a new system of rank classifications and procedures for promotion in the civil bureaucracy as a whole. He drew up draft regulations to re-institute nation-wide open civil service examinations that assessed a combination of literacy in Chinese and knowledge of technical subjects as the preferred "regular path" into the bureaucracy, which was then followed by a provisional assignment to a ministry and two-year probationary period of intensive training. And Yuan consistently wooed to his administration "men of talent" who had been educated either abroad or domestically in moder subjects.14 There is some evidence to suggest substantial continuity of these policies in the central Beiyang governments into the early 1920s. The first nation-wide post-imperial civil service examinations were held in 1916, shortly after Yuan Shikai's death, and were identical in form to those he proposed the year before. The Beiyang Ministry of Finance, at least in its earliest years, seems to have continued in the way outlined by Yuan Shikai: in 1917 it assigned some 35 examinees who had passed the national civil service exams to a two-year probationary appointment. Until the early 1920s, when large numbers of staff began to be regularly replaced with those from outside, the Ministry of Finance probably retained many of the Yuan Shikai regime "men of talent" who had some mix of credentials in the "moder" subjects of government, economics and law, and practical experience in local, provincial or central government financial administration.15 Although the Yuan Shikai and early Beiyang government push towards central government technocracy, standardization, rationalization, examination and training systems provided a powerful model that continued to influence parts of the National Government once the KMT came to power in the late 1920s, it did not in its own time effect an institutional breakthrough, as it had no means by which to project its authority much beyond Beijing into highly unstable and militarized provincial and local environments. Taxes from the provinces simply did not come in and government regulations had little meaning. During the Beiyang period the central government of China operated as a head without a body, fiscally kept alive (as noted above) by regular transfusions of the surpluses remitted by quasi-government tax collection agencies that it did not control, and loans from Western banks.16 14. This discussion draws on my article, "Symbol and reflection of the reconstituting state: the Examination Yuan in the 1930s," Moder China, Vol. 20, No. 2 (April 1994). Many of the original details can be found in Qian Shipu (ed.), Beiyang zhengfu shiqide zhengzhi zhidu (The Political System of the Beiyang Government Period) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1984). 15. This segment is based on details in ch. 5 of Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities, with the original documentation from the No. 2 Historical Archives, files 1027/176 (2), 1027/179, 1027/181, and 1027/188 (1). 16. The fact that the Beiyang government in Beijing was the officially recognized central government of China meant that control of it provided automatic access to a range of financial and 1920s. In his short tenure between 1912 and 1916, Yuan Shikai devoted a considerable amount of attention to attempting to create "good institutions" by regularizing, standardizing and establishing executive control over the government bureaucracy while pushing it in the direction of "objective" technocracy. Yuan established a new system of rank classifications and procedures for promotion in the civil bureaucracy as a whole. He drew up draft regulations to re-institute nation-wide open civil service examinations that assessed a combination of literacy in Chinese and knowledge of technical subjects as the preferred "regular path" into the bureaucracy, which was then followed by a provisional assignment to a ministry and two-year probationary period of intensive training. And Yuan consistently wooed to his administration "men of talent" who had been educated either abroad or domestically in moder subjects.14 There is some evidence to suggest substantial continuity of these policies in the central Beiyang governments into the early 1920s. The first nation-wide post-imperial civil service examinations were held in 1916, shortly after Yuan Shikai's death, and were identical in form to those he proposed the year before. The Beiyang Ministry of Finance, at least in its earliest years, seems to have continued in the way outlined by Yuan Shikai: in 1917 it assigned some 35 examinees who had passed the national civil service exams to a two-year probationary appointment. Until the early 1920s, when large numbers of staff began to be regularly replaced with those from outside, the Ministry of Finance probably retained many of the Yuan Shikai regime "men of talent" who had some mix of credentials in the "moder" subjects of government, economics and law, and practical experience in local, provincial or central government financial administration.15 Although the Yuan Shikai and early Beiyang government push towards central government technocracy, standardization, rationalization, examination and training systems provided a powerful model that continued to influence parts of the National Government once the KMT came to power in the late 1920s, it did not in its own time effect an institutional breakthrough, as it had no means by which to project its authority much beyond Beijing into highly unstable and militarized provincial and local environments. Taxes from the provinces simply did not come in and government regulations had little meaning. During the Beiyang period the central government of China operated as a head without a body, fiscally kept alive (as noted above) by regular transfusions of the surpluses remitted by quasi-government tax collection agencies that it did not control, and loans from Western banks.16 14. This discussion draws on my article, "Symbol and reflection of the reconstituting state: the Examination Yuan in the 1930s," Moder China, Vol. 20, No. 2 (April 1994). Many of the original details can be found in Qian Shipu (ed.), Beiyang zhengfu shiqide zhengzhi zhidu (The Political System of the Beiyang Government Period) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1984). 15. This segment is based on details in ch. 5 of Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities, with the original documentation from the No. 2 Historical Archives, files 1027/176 (2), 1027/179, 1027/181, and 1027/188 (1). 16. The fact that the Beiyang government in Beijing was the officially recognized central government of China meant that control of it provided automatic access to a range of financial and 1920s. In his short tenure between 1912 and 1916, Yuan Shikai devoted a considerable amount of attention to attempting to create "good institutions" by regularizing, standardizing and establishing executive control over the government bureaucracy while pushing it in the direction of "objective" technocracy. Yuan established a new system of rank classifications and procedures for promotion in the civil bureaucracy as a whole. He drew up draft regulations to re-institute nation-wide open civil service examinations that assessed a combination of literacy in Chinese and knowledge of technical subjects as the preferred "regular path" into the bureaucracy, which was then followed by a provisional assignment to a ministry and two-year probationary period of intensive training. And Yuan consistently wooed to his administration "men of talent" who had been educated either abroad or domestically in moder subjects.14 There is some evidence to suggest substantial continuity of these policies in the central Beiyang governments into the early 1920s. The first nation-wide post-imperial civil service examinations were held in 1916, shortly after Yuan Shikai's death, and were identical in form to those he proposed the year before. The Beiyang Ministry of Finance, at least in its earliest years, seems to have continued in the way outlined by Yuan Shikai: in 1917 it assigned some 35 examinees who had passed the national civil service exams to a two-year probationary appointment. Until the early 1920s, when large numbers of staff began to be regularly replaced with those from outside, the Ministry of Finance probably retained many of the Yuan Shikai regime "men of talent" who had some mix of credentials in the "moder" subjects of government, economics and law, and practical experience in local, provincial or central government financial administration.15 Although the Yuan Shikai and early Beiyang government push towards central government technocracy, standardization, rationalization, examination and training systems provided a powerful model that continued to influence parts of the National Government once the KMT came to power in the late 1920s, it did not in its own time effect an institutional breakthrough, as it had no means by which to project its authority much beyond Beijing into highly unstable and militarized provincial and local environments. Taxes from the provinces simply did not come in and government regulations had little meaning. During the Beiyang period the central government of China operated as a head without a body, fiscally kept alive (as noted above) by regular transfusions of the surpluses remitted by quasi-government tax collection agencies that it did not control, and loans from Western banks.16 14. This discussion draws on my article, "Symbol and reflection of the reconstituting state: the Examination Yuan in the 1930s," Moder China, Vol. 20, No. 2 (April 1994). Many of the original details can be found in Qian Shipu (ed.), Beiyang zhengfu shiqide zhengzhi zhidu (The Political System of the Beiyang Government Period) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1984). 15. This segment is based on details in ch. 5 of Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities, with the original documentation from the No. 2 Historical Archives, files 1027/176 (2), 1027/179, 1027/181, and 1027/188 (1). 16. The fact that the Beiyang government in Beijing was the officially recognized central government of China meant that control of it provided automatic access to a range of financial and 1920s. In his short tenure between 1912 and 1916, Yuan Shikai devoted a considerable amount of attention to attempting to create "good institutions" by regularizing, standardizing and establishing executive control over the government bureaucracy while pushing it in the direction of "objective" technocracy. Yuan established a new system of rank classifications and procedures for promotion in the civil bureaucracy as a whole. He drew up draft regulations to re-institute nation-wide open civil service examinations that assessed a combination of literacy in Chinese and knowledge of technical subjects as the preferred "regular path" into the bureaucracy, which was then followed by a provisional assignment to a ministry and two-year probationary period of intensive training. And Yuan consistently wooed to his administration "men of talent" who had been educated either abroad or domestically in moder subjects.14 There is some evidence to suggest substantial continuity of these policies in the central Beiyang governments into the early 1920s. The first nation-wide post-imperial civil service examinations were held in 1916, shortly after Yuan Shikai's death, and were identical in form to those he proposed the year before. The Beiyang Ministry of Finance, at least in its earliest years, seems to have continued in the way outlined by Yuan Shikai: in 1917 it assigned some 35 examinees who had passed the national civil service exams to a two-year probationary appointment. Until the early 1920s, when large numbers of staff began to be regularly replaced with those from outside, the Ministry of Finance probably retained many of the Yuan Shikai regime "men of talent" who had some mix of credentials in the "moder" subjects of government, economics and law, and practical experience in local, provincial or central government financial administration.15 Although the Yuan Shikai and early Beiyang government push towards central government technocracy, standardization, rationalization, examination and training systems provided a powerful model that continued to influence parts of the National Government once the KMT came to power in the late 1920s, it did not in its own time effect an institutional breakthrough, as it had no means by which to project its authority much beyond Beijing into highly unstable and militarized provincial and local environments. Taxes from the provinces simply did not come in and government regulations had little meaning. During the Beiyang period the central government of China operated as a head without a body, fiscally kept alive (as noted above) by regular transfusions of the surpluses remitted by quasi-government tax collection agencies that it did not control, and loans from Western banks.16 14. This discussion draws on my article, "Symbol and reflection of the reconstituting state: the Examination Yuan in the 1930s," Moder China, Vol. 20, No. 2 (April 1994). Many of the original details can be found in Qian Shipu (ed.), Beiyang zhengfu shiqide zhengzhi zhidu (The Political System of the Beiyang Government Period) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1984). 15. This segment is based on details in ch. 5 of Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities, with the original documentation from the No. 2 Historical Archives, files 1027/176 (2), 1027/179, 1027/181, and 1027/188 (1). 16. The fact that the Beiyang government in Beijing was the officially recognized central government of China meant that control of it provided automatic access to a range of financial and 1920s. In his short tenure between 1912 and 1916, Yuan Shikai devoted a considerable amount of attention to attempting to create "good institutions" by regularizing, standardizing and establishing executive control over the government bureaucracy while pushing it in the direction of "objective" technocracy. Yuan established a new system of rank classifications and procedures for promotion in the civil bureaucracy as a whole. He drew up draft regulations to re-institute nation-wide open civil service examinations that assessed a combination of literacy in Chinese and knowledge of technical subjects as the preferred "regular path" into the bureaucracy, which was then followed by a provisional assignment to a ministry and two-year probationary period of intensive training. And Yuan consistently wooed to his administration "men of talent" who had been educated either abroad or domestically in moder subjects.14 There is some evidence to suggest substantial continuity of these policies in the central Beiyang governments into the early 1920s. The first nation-wide post-imperial civil service examinations were held in 1916, shortly after Yuan Shikai's death, and were identical in form to those he proposed the year before. The Beiyang Ministry of Finance, at least in its earliest years, seems to have continued in the way outlined by Yuan Shikai: in 1917 it assigned some 35 examinees who had passed the national civil service exams to a two-year probationary appointment. Until the early 1920s, when large numbers of staff began to be regularly replaced with those from outside, the Ministry of Finance probably retained many of the Yuan Shikai regime "men of talent" who had some mix of credentials in the "moder" subjects of government, economics and law, and practical experience in local, provincial or central government financial administration.15 Although the Yuan Shikai and early Beiyang government push towards central government technocracy, standardization, rationalization, examination and training systems provided a powerful model that continued to influence parts of the National Government once the KMT came to power in the late 1920s, it did not in its own time effect an institutional breakthrough, as it had no means by which to project its authority much beyond Beijing into highly unstable and militarized provincial and local environments. Taxes from the provinces simply did not come in and government regulations had little meaning. During the Beiyang period the central government of China operated as a head without a body, fiscally kept alive (as noted above) by regular transfusions of the surpluses remitted by quasi-government tax collection agencies that it did not control, and loans from Western banks.16 14. This discussion draws on my article, "Symbol and reflection of the reconstituting state: the Examination Yuan in the 1930s," Moder China, Vol. 20, No. 2 (April 1994). Many of the original details can be found in Qian Shipu (ed.), Beiyang zhengfu shiqide zhengzhi zhidu (The Political System of the Beiyang Government Period) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1984). 15. This segment is based on details in ch. 5 of Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities, with the original documentation from the No. 2 Historical Archives, files 1027/176 (2), 1027/179, 1027/181, and 1027/188 (1). 16. The fact that the Beiyang government in Beijing was the officially recognized central government of China meant that control of it provided automatic access to a range of financial and 1920s. In his short tenure between 1912 and 1916, Yuan Shikai devoted a considerable amount of attention to attempting to create "good institutions" by regularizing, standardizing and establishing executive control over the government bureaucracy while pushing it in the direction of "objective" technocracy. Yuan established a new system of rank classifications and procedures for promotion in the civil bureaucracy as a whole. He drew up draft regulations to re-institute nation-wide open civil service examinations that assessed a combination of literacy in Chinese and knowledge of technical subjects as the preferred "regular path" into the bureaucracy, which was then followed by a provisional assignment to a ministry and two-year probationary period of intensive training. And Yuan consistently wooed to his administration "men of talent" who had been educated either abroad or domestically in moder subjects.14 There is some evidence to suggest substantial continuity of these policies in the central Beiyang governments into the early 1920s. The first nation-wide post-imperial civil service examinations were held in 1916, shortly after Yuan Shikai's death, and were identical in form to those he proposed the year before. The Beiyang Ministry of Finance, at least in its earliest years, seems to have continued in the way outlined by Yuan Shikai: in 1917 it assigned some 35 examinees who had passed the national civil service exams to a two-year probationary appointment. Until the early 1920s, when large numbers of staff began to be regularly replaced with those from outside, the Ministry of Finance probably retained many of the Yuan Shikai regime "men of talent" who had some mix of credentials in the "moder" subjects of government, economics and law, and practical experience in local, provincial or central government financial administration.15 Although the Yuan Shikai and early Beiyang government push towards central government technocracy, standardization, rationalization, examination and training systems provided a powerful model that continued to influence parts of the National Government once the KMT came to power in the late 1920s, it did not in its own time effect an institutional breakthrough, as it had no means by which to project its authority much beyond Beijing into highly unstable and militarized provincial and local environments. Taxes from the provinces simply did not come in and government regulations had little meaning. During the Beiyang period the central government of China operated as a head without a body, fiscally kept alive (as noted above) by regular transfusions of the surpluses remitted by quasi-government tax collection agencies that it did not control, and loans from Western banks.16 14. This discussion draws on my article, "Symbol and reflection of the reconstituting state: the Examination Yuan in the 1930s," Moder China, Vol. 20, No. 2 (April 1994). Many of the original details can be found in Qian Shipu (ed.), Beiyang zhengfu shiqide zhengzhi zhidu (The Political System of the Beiyang Government Period) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1984). 15. This segment is based on details in ch. 5 of Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities, with the original documentation from the No. 2 Historical Archives, files 1027/176 (2), 1027/179, 1027/181, and 1027/188 (1). 16. The fact that the Beiyang government in Beijing was the officially recognized central government of China meant that control of it provided automatic access to a range of financial
The Evolution of Republican Government 337 Generating Institutional Breakthroughs:The Sino-Foreign Salt Inspec- torate“Model'”and After Ironically,the very weakness of the early Republican government brought about the creation of a quasi-government organization that became one of the more powerful models of a statist technocracy and,in the critical sphere of tax collection,did generate an institutional break- through.When the Yuan Shikai government went to the Western banking establishment to conclude a large Reorganization Loan to refinance outstanding debts and consolidate the regime in 1913,the price demanded was that the salt gabelle be reorganized administratively so that an efficiently collected salt tax could service the debt on the loan.The result was a new tax-collecting agency nominally under the supervision of the Republican central government,the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate (Yanwu jihe zongsuo).The Inspectorate was explicitly modelled on the customs administration and,by extension,on other British colonial bureaucracies:it was a hybrid,prefectural tax-collecting agency,jointly staffed by foreign and Chinese personnel,in which all orders and documents were co-signed by foreign and Chinese staff of equal rank However the preponderant influence in establishing the core values and methods of operation of the Inspectorate for its turbulent history was that of its first foreign Chief Inspector,Sir Richard Dane.7 The programme of the Salt Inspectorate was to standardize,simplify, bureaucratize and establish direct control over China's far-flung and heterogenous salt works and taxation arrangements by replacing a centuries-old patchwork of indirect control via official monopolies with the principle of "tax directly levied at source"(jiuchang zhengshui) Obviously,such reforms would engender the resistance of everyone who stood to lose by them:salt merchants,local-level governments who had long added surtaxes to the salt gabelle,local smugglers,and corrupt salt tax officials from pre-existing administrations.Yet in spite of resistance and a quite hostile environment in which to carry out these reforms,the Salt Inspectorate was astonishingly successful by almost any measure:in the first full year of its operations,net salt tax receipts nearly quintupled from $11,471,000 in 1913 to $60,410,000 in 1914,and gradually in- creased thereafter to a pre-KMT era high of $85,789,000 in 1922.18 Much to the surprise of everyone,the Salt Inspectorate not only produced enough each year to service the Reorganization Loan debt to the foreign footnote continued resources not available elsewhere (primarily customs and salt surpluses as well as the possibility of foreign loans).This ironically increased the attractiveness of the city and rump central government administration as a target for warlord depradations during the 1920s 17.The analysis in this and the following section of the Salt Inspectorate presents an overview of ch.3."Effective institution building:the case of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate,"in Strauss,Strong Institutions in Weak Polities.See also S.A.M Adshead.The Modernization of the Salt Administration,1900-20(Cambridge,MA:Harvard University Press,1970),especially ch.4. 18.These figures are taken from Kwei Chungshu (ed.),The Chinese Year Book,1935-36 (Shanghai:Commercial Press,1936),p.1298.The currency in which these figures were calculated was the standard silver dollar
The Evolution of Republican Government Generating Institutional Breakthroughs: The Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate "Model" and After Ironically, the very weakness of the early Republican government brought about the creation of a quasi-goverment organization that became one of the more powerful models of a statist technocracy and, in the critical sphere of tax collection, did generate an institutional breakthrough. When the Yuan Shikai government went to the Western banking establishment to conclude a large Reorganization Loan to refinance outstanding debts and consolidate the regime in 1913, the price demanded was that the salt gabelle be reorganized administratively so that an efficiently collected salt tax could service the debt on the loan. The result was a new tax-collecting agency nominally under the supervision of the Republican central government, the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate (Yanwu jihe zongsuo). The Inspectorate was explicitly modelled on the customs administration and, by extension, on other British colonial bureaucracies: it was a hybrid, prefectural tax-collecting agency, jointly staffed by foreign and Chinese personnel, in which all orders and documents were co-signed by foreign and Chinese staff of equal rank. However the preponderant influence in establishing the core values and methods of operation of the Inspectorate for its turbulent history was that of its first foreign Chief Inspector, Sir Richard Dane.'7 The programme of the Salt Inspectorate was to standardize, simplify, bureaucratize and establish direct control over China's far-flung and heterogenous salt works and taxation arrangements by replacing a centuries-old patchwork of indirect control via official monopolies with the principle of "tax directly levied at source" (jiuchang zhengshui). Obviously, such reforms would engender the resistance of everyone who stood to lose by them: salt merchants, local-level governments who had long added surtaxes to the salt gabelle, local smugglers, and corrupt salt tax officials from pre-existing administrations. Yet in spite of resistance and a quite hostile environment in which to carry out these reforms, the Salt Inspectorate was astonishingly successful by almost any measure: in the first full year of its operations, net salt tax receipts nearly quintupled from $11,471,000 in 1913 to $60,410,000 in 1914, and gradually increased thereafter to a pre-KMT era high of $85,789,000 in 1922.18 Much to the surprise of everyone, the Salt Inspectorate not only produced enough each year to service the Reorganization Loan debt to the foreign footnote continued resources not available elsewhere (primarily customs and salt surpluses as well as the possibility of foreign loans). This ironically increased the attractiveness of the city and rump central government administration as a target for warlord depradations during the 1920s. 17. The analysis in this and the following section of the Salt Inspectorate presents an overview of ch. 3, "Effective institution building: the case of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate," in Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities. See also S. A. M Adshead, The Modernization of the Salt Administration, 1900-20 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), especially ch. 4. 18. These figures are taken from Kwei Chungshu (ed.), The Chinese Year Book, 1935-36 (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1936), p. 1298. The currency in which these figures were calculated was the standard silver dollar. Generating Institutional Breakthroughs: The Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate "Model" and After Ironically, the very weakness of the early Republican government brought about the creation of a quasi-goverment organization that became one of the more powerful models of a statist technocracy and, in the critical sphere of tax collection, did generate an institutional breakthrough. When the Yuan Shikai government went to the Western banking establishment to conclude a large Reorganization Loan to refinance outstanding debts and consolidate the regime in 1913, the price demanded was that the salt gabelle be reorganized administratively so that an efficiently collected salt tax could service the debt on the loan. The result was a new tax-collecting agency nominally under the supervision of the Republican central government, the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate (Yanwu jihe zongsuo). The Inspectorate was explicitly modelled on the customs administration and, by extension, on other British colonial bureaucracies: it was a hybrid, prefectural tax-collecting agency, jointly staffed by foreign and Chinese personnel, in which all orders and documents were co-signed by foreign and Chinese staff of equal rank. However the preponderant influence in establishing the core values and methods of operation of the Inspectorate for its turbulent history was that of its first foreign Chief Inspector, Sir Richard Dane.'7 The programme of the Salt Inspectorate was to standardize, simplify, bureaucratize and establish direct control over China's far-flung and heterogenous salt works and taxation arrangements by replacing a centuries-old patchwork of indirect control via official monopolies with the principle of "tax directly levied at source" (jiuchang zhengshui). Obviously, such reforms would engender the resistance of everyone who stood to lose by them: salt merchants, local-level governments who had long added surtaxes to the salt gabelle, local smugglers, and corrupt salt tax officials from pre-existing administrations. Yet in spite of resistance and a quite hostile environment in which to carry out these reforms, the Salt Inspectorate was astonishingly successful by almost any measure: in the first full year of its operations, net salt tax receipts nearly quintupled from $11,471,000 in 1913 to $60,410,000 in 1914, and gradually increased thereafter to a pre-KMT era high of $85,789,000 in 1922.18 Much to the surprise of everyone, the Salt Inspectorate not only produced enough each year to service the Reorganization Loan debt to the foreign footnote continued resources not available elsewhere (primarily customs and salt surpluses as well as the possibility of foreign loans). This ironically increased the attractiveness of the city and rump central government administration as a target for warlord depradations during the 1920s. 17. The analysis in this and the following section of the Salt Inspectorate presents an overview of ch. 3, "Effective institution building: the case of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate," in Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities. See also S. A. M Adshead, The Modernization of the Salt Administration, 1900-20 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), especially ch. 4. 18. These figures are taken from Kwei Chungshu (ed.), The Chinese Year Book, 1935-36 (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1936), p. 1298. The currency in which these figures were calculated was the standard silver dollar. Generating Institutional Breakthroughs: The Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate "Model" and After Ironically, the very weakness of the early Republican government brought about the creation of a quasi-goverment organization that became one of the more powerful models of a statist technocracy and, in the critical sphere of tax collection, did generate an institutional breakthrough. When the Yuan Shikai government went to the Western banking establishment to conclude a large Reorganization Loan to refinance outstanding debts and consolidate the regime in 1913, the price demanded was that the salt gabelle be reorganized administratively so that an efficiently collected salt tax could service the debt on the loan. The result was a new tax-collecting agency nominally under the supervision of the Republican central government, the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate (Yanwu jihe zongsuo). The Inspectorate was explicitly modelled on the customs administration and, by extension, on other British colonial bureaucracies: it was a hybrid, prefectural tax-collecting agency, jointly staffed by foreign and Chinese personnel, in which all orders and documents were co-signed by foreign and Chinese staff of equal rank. However the preponderant influence in establishing the core values and methods of operation of the Inspectorate for its turbulent history was that of its first foreign Chief Inspector, Sir Richard Dane.'7 The programme of the Salt Inspectorate was to standardize, simplify, bureaucratize and establish direct control over China's far-flung and heterogenous salt works and taxation arrangements by replacing a centuries-old patchwork of indirect control via official monopolies with the principle of "tax directly levied at source" (jiuchang zhengshui). Obviously, such reforms would engender the resistance of everyone who stood to lose by them: salt merchants, local-level governments who had long added surtaxes to the salt gabelle, local smugglers, and corrupt salt tax officials from pre-existing administrations. Yet in spite of resistance and a quite hostile environment in which to carry out these reforms, the Salt Inspectorate was astonishingly successful by almost any measure: in the first full year of its operations, net salt tax receipts nearly quintupled from $11,471,000 in 1913 to $60,410,000 in 1914, and gradually increased thereafter to a pre-KMT era high of $85,789,000 in 1922.18 Much to the surprise of everyone, the Salt Inspectorate not only produced enough each year to service the Reorganization Loan debt to the foreign footnote continued resources not available elsewhere (primarily customs and salt surpluses as well as the possibility of foreign loans). This ironically increased the attractiveness of the city and rump central government administration as a target for warlord depradations during the 1920s. 17. The analysis in this and the following section of the Salt Inspectorate presents an overview of ch. 3, "Effective institution building: the case of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate," in Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities. See also S. A. M Adshead, The Modernization of the Salt Administration, 1900-20 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), especially ch. 4. 18. These figures are taken from Kwei Chungshu (ed.), The Chinese Year Book, 1935-36 (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1936), p. 1298. The currency in which these figures were calculated was the standard silver dollar. Generating Institutional Breakthroughs: The Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate "Model" and After Ironically, the very weakness of the early Republican government brought about the creation of a quasi-goverment organization that became one of the more powerful models of a statist technocracy and, in the critical sphere of tax collection, did generate an institutional breakthrough. When the Yuan Shikai government went to the Western banking establishment to conclude a large Reorganization Loan to refinance outstanding debts and consolidate the regime in 1913, the price demanded was that the salt gabelle be reorganized administratively so that an efficiently collected salt tax could service the debt on the loan. The result was a new tax-collecting agency nominally under the supervision of the Republican central government, the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate (Yanwu jihe zongsuo). The Inspectorate was explicitly modelled on the customs administration and, by extension, on other British colonial bureaucracies: it was a hybrid, prefectural tax-collecting agency, jointly staffed by foreign and Chinese personnel, in which all orders and documents were co-signed by foreign and Chinese staff of equal rank. However the preponderant influence in establishing the core values and methods of operation of the Inspectorate for its turbulent history was that of its first foreign Chief Inspector, Sir Richard Dane.'7 The programme of the Salt Inspectorate was to standardize, simplify, bureaucratize and establish direct control over China's far-flung and heterogenous salt works and taxation arrangements by replacing a centuries-old patchwork of indirect control via official monopolies with the principle of "tax directly levied at source" (jiuchang zhengshui). Obviously, such reforms would engender the resistance of everyone who stood to lose by them: salt merchants, local-level governments who had long added surtaxes to the salt gabelle, local smugglers, and corrupt salt tax officials from pre-existing administrations. Yet in spite of resistance and a quite hostile environment in which to carry out these reforms, the Salt Inspectorate was astonishingly successful by almost any measure: in the first full year of its operations, net salt tax receipts nearly quintupled from $11,471,000 in 1913 to $60,410,000 in 1914, and gradually increased thereafter to a pre-KMT era high of $85,789,000 in 1922.18 Much to the surprise of everyone, the Salt Inspectorate not only produced enough each year to service the Reorganization Loan debt to the foreign footnote continued resources not available elsewhere (primarily customs and salt surpluses as well as the possibility of foreign loans). This ironically increased the attractiveness of the city and rump central government administration as a target for warlord depradations during the 1920s. 17. The analysis in this and the following section of the Salt Inspectorate presents an overview of ch. 3, "Effective institution building: the case of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate," in Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities. See also S. A. M Adshead, The Modernization of the Salt Administration, 1900-20 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), especially ch. 4. 18. These figures are taken from Kwei Chungshu (ed.), The Chinese Year Book, 1935-36 (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1936), p. 1298. The currency in which these figures were calculated was the standard silver dollar. Generating Institutional Breakthroughs: The Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate "Model" and After Ironically, the very weakness of the early Republican government brought about the creation of a quasi-goverment organization that became one of the more powerful models of a statist technocracy and, in the critical sphere of tax collection, did generate an institutional breakthrough. When the Yuan Shikai government went to the Western banking establishment to conclude a large Reorganization Loan to refinance outstanding debts and consolidate the regime in 1913, the price demanded was that the salt gabelle be reorganized administratively so that an efficiently collected salt tax could service the debt on the loan. The result was a new tax-collecting agency nominally under the supervision of the Republican central government, the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate (Yanwu jihe zongsuo). The Inspectorate was explicitly modelled on the customs administration and, by extension, on other British colonial bureaucracies: it was a hybrid, prefectural tax-collecting agency, jointly staffed by foreign and Chinese personnel, in which all orders and documents were co-signed by foreign and Chinese staff of equal rank. However the preponderant influence in establishing the core values and methods of operation of the Inspectorate for its turbulent history was that of its first foreign Chief Inspector, Sir Richard Dane.'7 The programme of the Salt Inspectorate was to standardize, simplify, bureaucratize and establish direct control over China's far-flung and heterogenous salt works and taxation arrangements by replacing a centuries-old patchwork of indirect control via official monopolies with the principle of "tax directly levied at source" (jiuchang zhengshui). Obviously, such reforms would engender the resistance of everyone who stood to lose by them: salt merchants, local-level governments who had long added surtaxes to the salt gabelle, local smugglers, and corrupt salt tax officials from pre-existing administrations. Yet in spite of resistance and a quite hostile environment in which to carry out these reforms, the Salt Inspectorate was astonishingly successful by almost any measure: in the first full year of its operations, net salt tax receipts nearly quintupled from $11,471,000 in 1913 to $60,410,000 in 1914, and gradually increased thereafter to a pre-KMT era high of $85,789,000 in 1922.18 Much to the surprise of everyone, the Salt Inspectorate not only produced enough each year to service the Reorganization Loan debt to the foreign footnote continued resources not available elsewhere (primarily customs and salt surpluses as well as the possibility of foreign loans). This ironically increased the attractiveness of the city and rump central government administration as a target for warlord depradations during the 1920s. 17. The analysis in this and the following section of the Salt Inspectorate presents an overview of ch. 3, "Effective institution building: the case of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate," in Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities. See also S. A. M Adshead, The Modernization of the Salt Administration, 1900-20 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), especially ch. 4. 18. These figures are taken from Kwei Chungshu (ed.), The Chinese Year Book, 1935-36 (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1936), p. 1298. The currency in which these figures were calculated was the standard silver dollar. Generating Institutional Breakthroughs: The Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate "Model" and After Ironically, the very weakness of the early Republican government brought about the creation of a quasi-goverment organization that became one of the more powerful models of a statist technocracy and, in the critical sphere of tax collection, did generate an institutional breakthrough. When the Yuan Shikai government went to the Western banking establishment to conclude a large Reorganization Loan to refinance outstanding debts and consolidate the regime in 1913, the price demanded was that the salt gabelle be reorganized administratively so that an efficiently collected salt tax could service the debt on the loan. The result was a new tax-collecting agency nominally under the supervision of the Republican central government, the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate (Yanwu jihe zongsuo). The Inspectorate was explicitly modelled on the customs administration and, by extension, on other British colonial bureaucracies: it was a hybrid, prefectural tax-collecting agency, jointly staffed by foreign and Chinese personnel, in which all orders and documents were co-signed by foreign and Chinese staff of equal rank. However the preponderant influence in establishing the core values and methods of operation of the Inspectorate for its turbulent history was that of its first foreign Chief Inspector, Sir Richard Dane.'7 The programme of the Salt Inspectorate was to standardize, simplify, bureaucratize and establish direct control over China's far-flung and heterogenous salt works and taxation arrangements by replacing a centuries-old patchwork of indirect control via official monopolies with the principle of "tax directly levied at source" (jiuchang zhengshui). Obviously, such reforms would engender the resistance of everyone who stood to lose by them: salt merchants, local-level governments who had long added surtaxes to the salt gabelle, local smugglers, and corrupt salt tax officials from pre-existing administrations. Yet in spite of resistance and a quite hostile environment in which to carry out these reforms, the Salt Inspectorate was astonishingly successful by almost any measure: in the first full year of its operations, net salt tax receipts nearly quintupled from $11,471,000 in 1913 to $60,410,000 in 1914, and gradually increased thereafter to a pre-KMT era high of $85,789,000 in 1922.18 Much to the surprise of everyone, the Salt Inspectorate not only produced enough each year to service the Reorganization Loan debt to the foreign footnote continued resources not available elsewhere (primarily customs and salt surpluses as well as the possibility of foreign loans). This ironically increased the attractiveness of the city and rump central government administration as a target for warlord depradations during the 1920s. 17. The analysis in this and the following section of the Salt Inspectorate presents an overview of ch. 3, "Effective institution building: the case of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate," in Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities. See also S. A. M Adshead, The Modernization of the Salt Administration, 1900-20 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), especially ch. 4. 18. These figures are taken from Kwei Chungshu (ed.), The Chinese Year Book, 1935-36 (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1936), p. 1298. The currency in which these figures were calculated was the standard silver dollar. Generating Institutional Breakthroughs: The Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate "Model" and After Ironically, the very weakness of the early Republican government brought about the creation of a quasi-goverment organization that became one of the more powerful models of a statist technocracy and, in the critical sphere of tax collection, did generate an institutional breakthrough. When the Yuan Shikai government went to the Western banking establishment to conclude a large Reorganization Loan to refinance outstanding debts and consolidate the regime in 1913, the price demanded was that the salt gabelle be reorganized administratively so that an efficiently collected salt tax could service the debt on the loan. The result was a new tax-collecting agency nominally under the supervision of the Republican central government, the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate (Yanwu jihe zongsuo). The Inspectorate was explicitly modelled on the customs administration and, by extension, on other British colonial bureaucracies: it was a hybrid, prefectural tax-collecting agency, jointly staffed by foreign and Chinese personnel, in which all orders and documents were co-signed by foreign and Chinese staff of equal rank. However the preponderant influence in establishing the core values and methods of operation of the Inspectorate for its turbulent history was that of its first foreign Chief Inspector, Sir Richard Dane.'7 The programme of the Salt Inspectorate was to standardize, simplify, bureaucratize and establish direct control over China's far-flung and heterogenous salt works and taxation arrangements by replacing a centuries-old patchwork of indirect control via official monopolies with the principle of "tax directly levied at source" (jiuchang zhengshui). Obviously, such reforms would engender the resistance of everyone who stood to lose by them: salt merchants, local-level governments who had long added surtaxes to the salt gabelle, local smugglers, and corrupt salt tax officials from pre-existing administrations. Yet in spite of resistance and a quite hostile environment in which to carry out these reforms, the Salt Inspectorate was astonishingly successful by almost any measure: in the first full year of its operations, net salt tax receipts nearly quintupled from $11,471,000 in 1913 to $60,410,000 in 1914, and gradually increased thereafter to a pre-KMT era high of $85,789,000 in 1922.18 Much to the surprise of everyone, the Salt Inspectorate not only produced enough each year to service the Reorganization Loan debt to the foreign footnote continued resources not available elsewhere (primarily customs and salt surpluses as well as the possibility of foreign loans). This ironically increased the attractiveness of the city and rump central government administration as a target for warlord depradations during the 1920s. 17. The analysis in this and the following section of the Salt Inspectorate presents an overview of ch. 3, "Effective institution building: the case of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate," in Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities. See also S. A. M Adshead, The Modernization of the Salt Administration, 1900-20 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), especially ch. 4. 18. These figures are taken from Kwei Chungshu (ed.), The Chinese Year Book, 1935-36 (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1936), p. 1298. The currency in which these figures were calculated was the standard silver dollar. Generating Institutional Breakthroughs: The Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate "Model" and After Ironically, the very weakness of the early Republican government brought about the creation of a quasi-goverment organization that became one of the more powerful models of a statist technocracy and, in the critical sphere of tax collection, did generate an institutional breakthrough. When the Yuan Shikai government went to the Western banking establishment to conclude a large Reorganization Loan to refinance outstanding debts and consolidate the regime in 1913, the price demanded was that the salt gabelle be reorganized administratively so that an efficiently collected salt tax could service the debt on the loan. The result was a new tax-collecting agency nominally under the supervision of the Republican central government, the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate (Yanwu jihe zongsuo). The Inspectorate was explicitly modelled on the customs administration and, by extension, on other British colonial bureaucracies: it was a hybrid, prefectural tax-collecting agency, jointly staffed by foreign and Chinese personnel, in which all orders and documents were co-signed by foreign and Chinese staff of equal rank. However the preponderant influence in establishing the core values and methods of operation of the Inspectorate for its turbulent history was that of its first foreign Chief Inspector, Sir Richard Dane.'7 The programme of the Salt Inspectorate was to standardize, simplify, bureaucratize and establish direct control over China's far-flung and heterogenous salt works and taxation arrangements by replacing a centuries-old patchwork of indirect control via official monopolies with the principle of "tax directly levied at source" (jiuchang zhengshui). Obviously, such reforms would engender the resistance of everyone who stood to lose by them: salt merchants, local-level governments who had long added surtaxes to the salt gabelle, local smugglers, and corrupt salt tax officials from pre-existing administrations. Yet in spite of resistance and a quite hostile environment in which to carry out these reforms, the Salt Inspectorate was astonishingly successful by almost any measure: in the first full year of its operations, net salt tax receipts nearly quintupled from $11,471,000 in 1913 to $60,410,000 in 1914, and gradually increased thereafter to a pre-KMT era high of $85,789,000 in 1922.18 Much to the surprise of everyone, the Salt Inspectorate not only produced enough each year to service the Reorganization Loan debt to the foreign footnote continued resources not available elsewhere (primarily customs and salt surpluses as well as the possibility of foreign loans). This ironically increased the attractiveness of the city and rump central government administration as a target for warlord depradations during the 1920s. 17. The analysis in this and the following section of the Salt Inspectorate presents an overview of ch. 3, "Effective institution building: the case of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate," in Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities. See also S. A. M Adshead, The Modernization of the Salt Administration, 1900-20 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), especially ch. 4. 18. These figures are taken from Kwei Chungshu (ed.), The Chinese Year Book, 1935-36 (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1936), p. 1298. The currency in which these figures were calculated was the standard silver dollar. Generating Institutional Breakthroughs: The Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate "Model" and After Ironically, the very weakness of the early Republican government brought about the creation of a quasi-goverment organization that became one of the more powerful models of a statist technocracy and, in the critical sphere of tax collection, did generate an institutional breakthrough. When the Yuan Shikai government went to the Western banking establishment to conclude a large Reorganization Loan to refinance outstanding debts and consolidate the regime in 1913, the price demanded was that the salt gabelle be reorganized administratively so that an efficiently collected salt tax could service the debt on the loan. The result was a new tax-collecting agency nominally under the supervision of the Republican central government, the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate (Yanwu jihe zongsuo). The Inspectorate was explicitly modelled on the customs administration and, by extension, on other British colonial bureaucracies: it was a hybrid, prefectural tax-collecting agency, jointly staffed by foreign and Chinese personnel, in which all orders and documents were co-signed by foreign and Chinese staff of equal rank. However the preponderant influence in establishing the core values and methods of operation of the Inspectorate for its turbulent history was that of its first foreign Chief Inspector, Sir Richard Dane.'7 The programme of the Salt Inspectorate was to standardize, simplify, bureaucratize and establish direct control over China's far-flung and heterogenous salt works and taxation arrangements by replacing a centuries-old patchwork of indirect control via official monopolies with the principle of "tax directly levied at source" (jiuchang zhengshui). Obviously, such reforms would engender the resistance of everyone who stood to lose by them: salt merchants, local-level governments who had long added surtaxes to the salt gabelle, local smugglers, and corrupt salt tax officials from pre-existing administrations. Yet in spite of resistance and a quite hostile environment in which to carry out these reforms, the Salt Inspectorate was astonishingly successful by almost any measure: in the first full year of its operations, net salt tax receipts nearly quintupled from $11,471,000 in 1913 to $60,410,000 in 1914, and gradually increased thereafter to a pre-KMT era high of $85,789,000 in 1922.18 Much to the surprise of everyone, the Salt Inspectorate not only produced enough each year to service the Reorganization Loan debt to the foreign footnote continued resources not available elsewhere (primarily customs and salt surpluses as well as the possibility of foreign loans). This ironically increased the attractiveness of the city and rump central government administration as a target for warlord depradations during the 1920s. 17. The analysis in this and the following section of the Salt Inspectorate presents an overview of ch. 3, "Effective institution building: the case of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate," in Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities. See also S. A. M Adshead, The Modernization of the Salt Administration, 1900-20 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), especially ch. 4. 18. These figures are taken from Kwei Chungshu (ed.), The Chinese Year Book, 1935-36 (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1936), p. 1298. The currency in which these figures were calculated was the standard silver dollar. Generating Institutional Breakthroughs: The Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate "Model" and After Ironically, the very weakness of the early Republican government brought about the creation of a quasi-goverment organization that became one of the more powerful models of a statist technocracy and, in the critical sphere of tax collection, did generate an institutional breakthrough. When the Yuan Shikai government went to the Western banking establishment to conclude a large Reorganization Loan to refinance outstanding debts and consolidate the regime in 1913, the price demanded was that the salt gabelle be reorganized administratively so that an efficiently collected salt tax could service the debt on the loan. The result was a new tax-collecting agency nominally under the supervision of the Republican central government, the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate (Yanwu jihe zongsuo). The Inspectorate was explicitly modelled on the customs administration and, by extension, on other British colonial bureaucracies: it was a hybrid, prefectural tax-collecting agency, jointly staffed by foreign and Chinese personnel, in which all orders and documents were co-signed by foreign and Chinese staff of equal rank. However the preponderant influence in establishing the core values and methods of operation of the Inspectorate for its turbulent history was that of its first foreign Chief Inspector, Sir Richard Dane.'7 The programme of the Salt Inspectorate was to standardize, simplify, bureaucratize and establish direct control over China's far-flung and heterogenous salt works and taxation arrangements by replacing a centuries-old patchwork of indirect control via official monopolies with the principle of "tax directly levied at source" (jiuchang zhengshui). Obviously, such reforms would engender the resistance of everyone who stood to lose by them: salt merchants, local-level governments who had long added surtaxes to the salt gabelle, local smugglers, and corrupt salt tax officials from pre-existing administrations. Yet in spite of resistance and a quite hostile environment in which to carry out these reforms, the Salt Inspectorate was astonishingly successful by almost any measure: in the first full year of its operations, net salt tax receipts nearly quintupled from $11,471,000 in 1913 to $60,410,000 in 1914, and gradually increased thereafter to a pre-KMT era high of $85,789,000 in 1922.18 Much to the surprise of everyone, the Salt Inspectorate not only produced enough each year to service the Reorganization Loan debt to the foreign footnote continued resources not available elsewhere (primarily customs and salt surpluses as well as the possibility of foreign loans). This ironically increased the attractiveness of the city and rump central government administration as a target for warlord depradations during the 1920s. 17. The analysis in this and the following section of the Salt Inspectorate presents an overview of ch. 3, "Effective institution building: the case of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate," in Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities. See also S. A. M Adshead, The Modernization of the Salt Administration, 1900-20 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), especially ch. 4. 18. These figures are taken from Kwei Chungshu (ed.), The Chinese Year Book, 1935-36 (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1936), p. 1298. The currency in which these figures were calculated was the standard silver dollar. Generating Institutional Breakthroughs: The Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate "Model" and After Ironically, the very weakness of the early Republican government brought about the creation of a quasi-goverment organization that became one of the more powerful models of a statist technocracy and, in the critical sphere of tax collection, did generate an institutional breakthrough. When the Yuan Shikai government went to the Western banking establishment to conclude a large Reorganization Loan to refinance outstanding debts and consolidate the regime in 1913, the price demanded was that the salt gabelle be reorganized administratively so that an efficiently collected salt tax could service the debt on the loan. The result was a new tax-collecting agency nominally under the supervision of the Republican central government, the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate (Yanwu jihe zongsuo). The Inspectorate was explicitly modelled on the customs administration and, by extension, on other British colonial bureaucracies: it was a hybrid, prefectural tax-collecting agency, jointly staffed by foreign and Chinese personnel, in which all orders and documents were co-signed by foreign and Chinese staff of equal rank. However the preponderant influence in establishing the core values and methods of operation of the Inspectorate for its turbulent history was that of its first foreign Chief Inspector, Sir Richard Dane.'7 The programme of the Salt Inspectorate was to standardize, simplify, bureaucratize and establish direct control over China's far-flung and heterogenous salt works and taxation arrangements by replacing a centuries-old patchwork of indirect control via official monopolies with the principle of "tax directly levied at source" (jiuchang zhengshui). Obviously, such reforms would engender the resistance of everyone who stood to lose by them: salt merchants, local-level governments who had long added surtaxes to the salt gabelle, local smugglers, and corrupt salt tax officials from pre-existing administrations. Yet in spite of resistance and a quite hostile environment in which to carry out these reforms, the Salt Inspectorate was astonishingly successful by almost any measure: in the first full year of its operations, net salt tax receipts nearly quintupled from $11,471,000 in 1913 to $60,410,000 in 1914, and gradually increased thereafter to a pre-KMT era high of $85,789,000 in 1922.18 Much to the surprise of everyone, the Salt Inspectorate not only produced enough each year to service the Reorganization Loan debt to the foreign footnote continued resources not available elsewhere (primarily customs and salt surpluses as well as the possibility of foreign loans). This ironically increased the attractiveness of the city and rump central government administration as a target for warlord depradations during the 1920s. 17. The analysis in this and the following section of the Salt Inspectorate presents an overview of ch. 3, "Effective institution building: the case of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate," in Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities. See also S. A. M Adshead, The Modernization of the Salt Administration, 1900-20 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), especially ch. 4. 18. These figures are taken from Kwei Chungshu (ed.), The Chinese Year Book, 1935-36 (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1936), p. 1298. The currency in which these figures were calculated was the standard silver dollar. Generating Institutional Breakthroughs: The Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate "Model" and After Ironically, the very weakness of the early Republican government brought about the creation of a quasi-goverment organization that became one of the more powerful models of a statist technocracy and, in the critical sphere of tax collection, did generate an institutional breakthrough. When the Yuan Shikai government went to the Western banking establishment to conclude a large Reorganization Loan to refinance outstanding debts and consolidate the regime in 1913, the price demanded was that the salt gabelle be reorganized administratively so that an efficiently collected salt tax could service the debt on the loan. The result was a new tax-collecting agency nominally under the supervision of the Republican central government, the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate (Yanwu jihe zongsuo). The Inspectorate was explicitly modelled on the customs administration and, by extension, on other British colonial bureaucracies: it was a hybrid, prefectural tax-collecting agency, jointly staffed by foreign and Chinese personnel, in which all orders and documents were co-signed by foreign and Chinese staff of equal rank. However the preponderant influence in establishing the core values and methods of operation of the Inspectorate for its turbulent history was that of its first foreign Chief Inspector, Sir Richard Dane.'7 The programme of the Salt Inspectorate was to standardize, simplify, bureaucratize and establish direct control over China's far-flung and heterogenous salt works and taxation arrangements by replacing a centuries-old patchwork of indirect control via official monopolies with the principle of "tax directly levied at source" (jiuchang zhengshui). Obviously, such reforms would engender the resistance of everyone who stood to lose by them: salt merchants, local-level governments who had long added surtaxes to the salt gabelle, local smugglers, and corrupt salt tax officials from pre-existing administrations. Yet in spite of resistance and a quite hostile environment in which to carry out these reforms, the Salt Inspectorate was astonishingly successful by almost any measure: in the first full year of its operations, net salt tax receipts nearly quintupled from $11,471,000 in 1913 to $60,410,000 in 1914, and gradually increased thereafter to a pre-KMT era high of $85,789,000 in 1922.18 Much to the surprise of everyone, the Salt Inspectorate not only produced enough each year to service the Reorganization Loan debt to the foreign footnote continued resources not available elsewhere (primarily customs and salt surpluses as well as the possibility of foreign loans). This ironically increased the attractiveness of the city and rump central government administration as a target for warlord depradations during the 1920s. 17. The analysis in this and the following section of the Salt Inspectorate presents an overview of ch. 3, "Effective institution building: the case of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate," in Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities. See also S. A. M Adshead, The Modernization of the Salt Administration, 1900-20 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), especially ch. 4. 18. These figures are taken from Kwei Chungshu (ed.), The Chinese Year Book, 1935-36 (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1936), p. 1298. The currency in which these figures were calculated was the standard silver dollar. Generating Institutional Breakthroughs: The Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate "Model" and After Ironically, the very weakness of the early Republican government brought about the creation of a quasi-goverment organization that became one of the more powerful models of a statist technocracy and, in the critical sphere of tax collection, did generate an institutional breakthrough. When the Yuan Shikai government went to the Western banking establishment to conclude a large Reorganization Loan to refinance outstanding debts and consolidate the regime in 1913, the price demanded was that the salt gabelle be reorganized administratively so that an efficiently collected salt tax could service the debt on the loan. The result was a new tax-collecting agency nominally under the supervision of the Republican central government, the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate (Yanwu jihe zongsuo). The Inspectorate was explicitly modelled on the customs administration and, by extension, on other British colonial bureaucracies: it was a hybrid, prefectural tax-collecting agency, jointly staffed by foreign and Chinese personnel, in which all orders and documents were co-signed by foreign and Chinese staff of equal rank. However the preponderant influence in establishing the core values and methods of operation of the Inspectorate for its turbulent history was that of its first foreign Chief Inspector, Sir Richard Dane.'7 The programme of the Salt Inspectorate was to standardize, simplify, bureaucratize and establish direct control over China's far-flung and heterogenous salt works and taxation arrangements by replacing a centuries-old patchwork of indirect control via official monopolies with the principle of "tax directly levied at source" (jiuchang zhengshui). Obviously, such reforms would engender the resistance of everyone who stood to lose by them: salt merchants, local-level governments who had long added surtaxes to the salt gabelle, local smugglers, and corrupt salt tax officials from pre-existing administrations. Yet in spite of resistance and a quite hostile environment in which to carry out these reforms, the Salt Inspectorate was astonishingly successful by almost any measure: in the first full year of its operations, net salt tax receipts nearly quintupled from $11,471,000 in 1913 to $60,410,000 in 1914, and gradually increased thereafter to a pre-KMT era high of $85,789,000 in 1922.18 Much to the surprise of everyone, the Salt Inspectorate not only produced enough each year to service the Reorganization Loan debt to the foreign footnote continued resources not available elsewhere (primarily customs and salt surpluses as well as the possibility of foreign loans). This ironically increased the attractiveness of the city and rump central government administration as a target for warlord depradations during the 1920s. 17. The analysis in this and the following section of the Salt Inspectorate presents an overview of ch. 3, "Effective institution building: the case of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate," in Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities. See also S. A. M Adshead, The Modernization of the Salt Administration, 1900-20 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), especially ch. 4. 18. These figures are taken from Kwei Chungshu (ed.), The Chinese Year Book, 1935-36 (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1936), p. 1298. The currency in which these figures were calculated was the standard silver dollar. Generating Institutional Breakthroughs: The Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate "Model" and After Ironically, the very weakness of the early Republican government brought about the creation of a quasi-goverment organization that became one of the more powerful models of a statist technocracy and, in the critical sphere of tax collection, did generate an institutional breakthrough. When the Yuan Shikai government went to the Western banking establishment to conclude a large Reorganization Loan to refinance outstanding debts and consolidate the regime in 1913, the price demanded was that the salt gabelle be reorganized administratively so that an efficiently collected salt tax could service the debt on the loan. The result was a new tax-collecting agency nominally under the supervision of the Republican central government, the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate (Yanwu jihe zongsuo). The Inspectorate was explicitly modelled on the customs administration and, by extension, on other British colonial bureaucracies: it was a hybrid, prefectural tax-collecting agency, jointly staffed by foreign and Chinese personnel, in which all orders and documents were co-signed by foreign and Chinese staff of equal rank. However the preponderant influence in establishing the core values and methods of operation of the Inspectorate for its turbulent history was that of its first foreign Chief Inspector, Sir Richard Dane.'7 The programme of the Salt Inspectorate was to standardize, simplify, bureaucratize and establish direct control over China's far-flung and heterogenous salt works and taxation arrangements by replacing a centuries-old patchwork of indirect control via official monopolies with the principle of "tax directly levied at source" (jiuchang zhengshui). Obviously, such reforms would engender the resistance of everyone who stood to lose by them: salt merchants, local-level governments who had long added surtaxes to the salt gabelle, local smugglers, and corrupt salt tax officials from pre-existing administrations. Yet in spite of resistance and a quite hostile environment in which to carry out these reforms, the Salt Inspectorate was astonishingly successful by almost any measure: in the first full year of its operations, net salt tax receipts nearly quintupled from $11,471,000 in 1913 to $60,410,000 in 1914, and gradually increased thereafter to a pre-KMT era high of $85,789,000 in 1922.18 Much to the surprise of everyone, the Salt Inspectorate not only produced enough each year to service the Reorganization Loan debt to the foreign footnote continued resources not available elsewhere (primarily customs and salt surpluses as well as the possibility of foreign loans). This ironically increased the attractiveness of the city and rump central government administration as a target for warlord depradations during the 1920s. 17. The analysis in this and the following section of the Salt Inspectorate presents an overview of ch. 3, "Effective institution building: the case of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate," in Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities. See also S. A. M Adshead, The Modernization of the Salt Administration, 1900-20 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), especially ch. 4. 18. These figures are taken from Kwei Chungshu (ed.), The Chinese Year Book, 1935-36 (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1936), p. 1298. The currency in which these figures were calculated was the standard silver dollar. Generating Institutional Breakthroughs: The Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate "Model" and After Ironically, the very weakness of the early Republican government brought about the creation of a quasi-goverment organization that became one of the more powerful models of a statist technocracy and, in the critical sphere of tax collection, did generate an institutional breakthrough. When the Yuan Shikai government went to the Western banking establishment to conclude a large Reorganization Loan to refinance outstanding debts and consolidate the regime in 1913, the price demanded was that the salt gabelle be reorganized administratively so that an efficiently collected salt tax could service the debt on the loan. The result was a new tax-collecting agency nominally under the supervision of the Republican central government, the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate (Yanwu jihe zongsuo). The Inspectorate was explicitly modelled on the customs administration and, by extension, on other British colonial bureaucracies: it was a hybrid, prefectural tax-collecting agency, jointly staffed by foreign and Chinese personnel, in which all orders and documents were co-signed by foreign and Chinese staff of equal rank. However the preponderant influence in establishing the core values and methods of operation of the Inspectorate for its turbulent history was that of its first foreign Chief Inspector, Sir Richard Dane.'7 The programme of the Salt Inspectorate was to standardize, simplify, bureaucratize and establish direct control over China's far-flung and heterogenous salt works and taxation arrangements by replacing a centuries-old patchwork of indirect control via official monopolies with the principle of "tax directly levied at source" (jiuchang zhengshui). Obviously, such reforms would engender the resistance of everyone who stood to lose by them: salt merchants, local-level governments who had long added surtaxes to the salt gabelle, local smugglers, and corrupt salt tax officials from pre-existing administrations. Yet in spite of resistance and a quite hostile environment in which to carry out these reforms, the Salt Inspectorate was astonishingly successful by almost any measure: in the first full year of its operations, net salt tax receipts nearly quintupled from $11,471,000 in 1913 to $60,410,000 in 1914, and gradually increased thereafter to a pre-KMT era high of $85,789,000 in 1922.18 Much to the surprise of everyone, the Salt Inspectorate not only produced enough each year to service the Reorganization Loan debt to the foreign footnote continued resources not available elsewhere (primarily customs and salt surpluses as well as the possibility of foreign loans). This ironically increased the attractiveness of the city and rump central government administration as a target for warlord depradations during the 1920s. 17. The analysis in this and the following section of the Salt Inspectorate presents an overview of ch. 3, "Effective institution building: the case of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate," in Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities. See also S. A. M Adshead, The Modernization of the Salt Administration, 1900-20 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), especially ch. 4. 18. These figures are taken from Kwei Chungshu (ed.), The Chinese Year Book, 1935-36 (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1936), p. 1298. The currency in which these figures were calculated was the standard silver dollar. Generating Institutional Breakthroughs: The Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate "Model" and After Ironically, the very weakness of the early Republican government brought about the creation of a quasi-goverment organization that became one of the more powerful models of a statist technocracy and, in the critical sphere of tax collection, did generate an institutional breakthrough. When the Yuan Shikai government went to the Western banking establishment to conclude a large Reorganization Loan to refinance outstanding debts and consolidate the regime in 1913, the price demanded was that the salt gabelle be reorganized administratively so that an efficiently collected salt tax could service the debt on the loan. The result was a new tax-collecting agency nominally under the supervision of the Republican central government, the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate (Yanwu jihe zongsuo). The Inspectorate was explicitly modelled on the customs administration and, by extension, on other British colonial bureaucracies: it was a hybrid, prefectural tax-collecting agency, jointly staffed by foreign and Chinese personnel, in which all orders and documents were co-signed by foreign and Chinese staff of equal rank. However the preponderant influence in establishing the core values and methods of operation of the Inspectorate for its turbulent history was that of its first foreign Chief Inspector, Sir Richard Dane.'7 The programme of the Salt Inspectorate was to standardize, simplify, bureaucratize and establish direct control over China's far-flung and heterogenous salt works and taxation arrangements by replacing a centuries-old patchwork of indirect control via official monopolies with the principle of "tax directly levied at source" (jiuchang zhengshui). Obviously, such reforms would engender the resistance of everyone who stood to lose by them: salt merchants, local-level governments who had long added surtaxes to the salt gabelle, local smugglers, and corrupt salt tax officials from pre-existing administrations. Yet in spite of resistance and a quite hostile environment in which to carry out these reforms, the Salt Inspectorate was astonishingly successful by almost any measure: in the first full year of its operations, net salt tax receipts nearly quintupled from $11,471,000 in 1913 to $60,410,000 in 1914, and gradually increased thereafter to a pre-KMT era high of $85,789,000 in 1922.18 Much to the surprise of everyone, the Salt Inspectorate not only produced enough each year to service the Reorganization Loan debt to the foreign footnote continued resources not available elsewhere (primarily customs and salt surpluses as well as the possibility of foreign loans). This ironically increased the attractiveness of the city and rump central government administration as a target for warlord depradations during the 1920s. 17. The analysis in this and the following section of the Salt Inspectorate presents an overview of ch. 3, "Effective institution building: the case of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate," in Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities. See also S. A. M Adshead, The Modernization of the Salt Administration, 1900-20 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), especially ch. 4. 18. These figures are taken from Kwei Chungshu (ed.), The Chinese Year Book, 1935-36 (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1936), p. 1298. The currency in which these figures were calculated was the standard silver dollar. Generating Institutional Breakthroughs: The Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate "Model" and After Ironically, the very weakness of the early Republican government brought about the creation of a quasi-goverment organization that became one of the more powerful models of a statist technocracy and, in the critical sphere of tax collection, did generate an institutional breakthrough. When the Yuan Shikai government went to the Western banking establishment to conclude a large Reorganization Loan to refinance outstanding debts and consolidate the regime in 1913, the price demanded was that the salt gabelle be reorganized administratively so that an efficiently collected salt tax could service the debt on the loan. The result was a new tax-collecting agency nominally under the supervision of the Republican central government, the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate (Yanwu jihe zongsuo). The Inspectorate was explicitly modelled on the customs administration and, by extension, on other British colonial bureaucracies: it was a hybrid, prefectural tax-collecting agency, jointly staffed by foreign and Chinese personnel, in which all orders and documents were co-signed by foreign and Chinese staff of equal rank. However the preponderant influence in establishing the core values and methods of operation of the Inspectorate for its turbulent history was that of its first foreign Chief Inspector, Sir Richard Dane.'7 The programme of the Salt Inspectorate was to standardize, simplify, bureaucratize and establish direct control over China's far-flung and heterogenous salt works and taxation arrangements by replacing a centuries-old patchwork of indirect control via official monopolies with the principle of "tax directly levied at source" (jiuchang zhengshui). Obviously, such reforms would engender the resistance of everyone who stood to lose by them: salt merchants, local-level governments who had long added surtaxes to the salt gabelle, local smugglers, and corrupt salt tax officials from pre-existing administrations. Yet in spite of resistance and a quite hostile environment in which to carry out these reforms, the Salt Inspectorate was astonishingly successful by almost any measure: in the first full year of its operations, net salt tax receipts nearly quintupled from $11,471,000 in 1913 to $60,410,000 in 1914, and gradually increased thereafter to a pre-KMT era high of $85,789,000 in 1922.18 Much to the surprise of everyone, the Salt Inspectorate not only produced enough each year to service the Reorganization Loan debt to the foreign footnote continued resources not available elsewhere (primarily customs and salt surpluses as well as the possibility of foreign loans). This ironically increased the attractiveness of the city and rump central government administration as a target for warlord depradations during the 1920s. 17. The analysis in this and the following section of the Salt Inspectorate presents an overview of ch. 3, "Effective institution building: the case of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate," in Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities. See also S. A. M Adshead, The Modernization of the Salt Administration, 1900-20 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), especially ch. 4. 18. These figures are taken from Kwei Chungshu (ed.), The Chinese Year Book, 1935-36 (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1936), p. 1298. The currency in which these figures were calculated was the standard silver dollar. Generating Institutional Breakthroughs: The Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate "Model" and After Ironically, the very weakness of the early Republican government brought about the creation of a quasi-goverment organization that became one of the more powerful models of a statist technocracy and, in the critical sphere of tax collection, did generate an institutional breakthrough. When the Yuan Shikai government went to the Western banking establishment to conclude a large Reorganization Loan to refinance outstanding debts and consolidate the regime in 1913, the price demanded was that the salt gabelle be reorganized administratively so that an efficiently collected salt tax could service the debt on the loan. The result was a new tax-collecting agency nominally under the supervision of the Republican central government, the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate (Yanwu jihe zongsuo). The Inspectorate was explicitly modelled on the customs administration and, by extension, on other British colonial bureaucracies: it was a hybrid, prefectural tax-collecting agency, jointly staffed by foreign and Chinese personnel, in which all orders and documents were co-signed by foreign and Chinese staff of equal rank. However the preponderant influence in establishing the core values and methods of operation of the Inspectorate for its turbulent history was that of its first foreign Chief Inspector, Sir Richard Dane.'7 The programme of the Salt Inspectorate was to standardize, simplify, bureaucratize and establish direct control over China's far-flung and heterogenous salt works and taxation arrangements by replacing a centuries-old patchwork of indirect control via official monopolies with the principle of "tax directly levied at source" (jiuchang zhengshui). Obviously, such reforms would engender the resistance of everyone who stood to lose by them: salt merchants, local-level governments who had long added surtaxes to the salt gabelle, local smugglers, and corrupt salt tax officials from pre-existing administrations. Yet in spite of resistance and a quite hostile environment in which to carry out these reforms, the Salt Inspectorate was astonishingly successful by almost any measure: in the first full year of its operations, net salt tax receipts nearly quintupled from $11,471,000 in 1913 to $60,410,000 in 1914, and gradually increased thereafter to a pre-KMT era high of $85,789,000 in 1922.18 Much to the surprise of everyone, the Salt Inspectorate not only produced enough each year to service the Reorganization Loan debt to the foreign footnote continued resources not available elsewhere (primarily customs and salt surpluses as well as the possibility of foreign loans). This ironically increased the attractiveness of the city and rump central government administration as a target for warlord depradations during the 1920s. 17. The analysis in this and the following section of the Salt Inspectorate presents an overview of ch. 3, "Effective institution building: the case of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate," in Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities. See also S. A. M Adshead, The Modernization of the Salt Administration, 1900-20 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), especially ch. 4. 18. These figures are taken from Kwei Chungshu (ed.), The Chinese Year Book, 1935-36 (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1936), p. 1298. The currency in which these figures were calculated was the standard silver dollar. Generating Institutional Breakthroughs: The Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate "Model" and After Ironically, the very weakness of the early Republican government brought about the creation of a quasi-goverment organization that became one of the more powerful models of a statist technocracy and, in the critical sphere of tax collection, did generate an institutional breakthrough. When the Yuan Shikai government went to the Western banking establishment to conclude a large Reorganization Loan to refinance outstanding debts and consolidate the regime in 1913, the price demanded was that the salt gabelle be reorganized administratively so that an efficiently collected salt tax could service the debt on the loan. The result was a new tax-collecting agency nominally under the supervision of the Republican central government, the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate (Yanwu jihe zongsuo). The Inspectorate was explicitly modelled on the customs administration and, by extension, on other British colonial bureaucracies: it was a hybrid, prefectural tax-collecting agency, jointly staffed by foreign and Chinese personnel, in which all orders and documents were co-signed by foreign and Chinese staff of equal rank. However the preponderant influence in establishing the core values and methods of operation of the Inspectorate for its turbulent history was that of its first foreign Chief Inspector, Sir Richard Dane.'7 The programme of the Salt Inspectorate was to standardize, simplify, bureaucratize and establish direct control over China's far-flung and heterogenous salt works and taxation arrangements by replacing a centuries-old patchwork of indirect control via official monopolies with the principle of "tax directly levied at source" (jiuchang zhengshui). Obviously, such reforms would engender the resistance of everyone who stood to lose by them: salt merchants, local-level governments who had long added surtaxes to the salt gabelle, local smugglers, and corrupt salt tax officials from pre-existing administrations. Yet in spite of resistance and a quite hostile environment in which to carry out these reforms, the Salt Inspectorate was astonishingly successful by almost any measure: in the first full year of its operations, net salt tax receipts nearly quintupled from $11,471,000 in 1913 to $60,410,000 in 1914, and gradually increased thereafter to a pre-KMT era high of $85,789,000 in 1922.18 Much to the surprise of everyone, the Salt Inspectorate not only produced enough each year to service the Reorganization Loan debt to the foreign footnote continued resources not available elsewhere (primarily customs and salt surpluses as well as the possibility of foreign loans). This ironically increased the attractiveness of the city and rump central government administration as a target for warlord depradations during the 1920s. 17. The analysis in this and the following section of the Salt Inspectorate presents an overview of ch. 3, "Effective institution building: the case of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate," in Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities. See also S. A. M Adshead, The Modernization of the Salt Administration, 1900-20 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), especially ch. 4. 18. These figures are taken from Kwei Chungshu (ed.), The Chinese Year Book, 1935-36 (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1936), p. 1298. The currency in which these figures were calculated was the standard silver dollar. Generating Institutional Breakthroughs: The Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate "Model" and After Ironically, the very weakness of the early Republican government brought about the creation of a quasi-goverment organization that became one of the more powerful models of a statist technocracy and, in the critical sphere of tax collection, did generate an institutional breakthrough. When the Yuan Shikai government went to the Western banking establishment to conclude a large Reorganization Loan to refinance outstanding debts and consolidate the regime in 1913, the price demanded was that the salt gabelle be reorganized administratively so that an efficiently collected salt tax could service the debt on the loan. The result was a new tax-collecting agency nominally under the supervision of the Republican central government, the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate (Yanwu jihe zongsuo). The Inspectorate was explicitly modelled on the customs administration and, by extension, on other British colonial bureaucracies: it was a hybrid, prefectural tax-collecting agency, jointly staffed by foreign and Chinese personnel, in which all orders and documents were co-signed by foreign and Chinese staff of equal rank. However the preponderant influence in establishing the core values and methods of operation of the Inspectorate for its turbulent history was that of its first foreign Chief Inspector, Sir Richard Dane.'7 The programme of the Salt Inspectorate was to standardize, simplify, bureaucratize and establish direct control over China's far-flung and heterogenous salt works and taxation arrangements by replacing a centuries-old patchwork of indirect control via official monopolies with the principle of "tax directly levied at source" (jiuchang zhengshui). Obviously, such reforms would engender the resistance of everyone who stood to lose by them: salt merchants, local-level governments who had long added surtaxes to the salt gabelle, local smugglers, and corrupt salt tax officials from pre-existing administrations. Yet in spite of resistance and a quite hostile environment in which to carry out these reforms, the Salt Inspectorate was astonishingly successful by almost any measure: in the first full year of its operations, net salt tax receipts nearly quintupled from $11,471,000 in 1913 to $60,410,000 in 1914, and gradually increased thereafter to a pre-KMT era high of $85,789,000 in 1922.18 Much to the surprise of everyone, the Salt Inspectorate not only produced enough each year to service the Reorganization Loan debt to the foreign footnote continued resources not available elsewhere (primarily customs and salt surpluses as well as the possibility of foreign loans). This ironically increased the attractiveness of the city and rump central government administration as a target for warlord depradations during the 1920s. 17. The analysis in this and the following section of the Salt Inspectorate presents an overview of ch. 3, "Effective institution building: the case of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate," in Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities. See also S. A. M Adshead, The Modernization of the Salt Administration, 1900-20 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), especially ch. 4. 18. These figures are taken from Kwei Chungshu (ed.), The Chinese Year Book, 1935-36 (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1936), p. 1298. The currency in which these figures were calculated was the standard silver dollar. Generating Institutional Breakthroughs: The Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate "Model" and After Ironically, the very weakness of the early Republican government brought about the creation of a quasi-goverment organization that became one of the more powerful models of a statist technocracy and, in the critical sphere of tax collection, did generate an institutional breakthrough. When the Yuan Shikai government went to the Western banking establishment to conclude a large Reorganization Loan to refinance outstanding debts and consolidate the regime in 1913, the price demanded was that the salt gabelle be reorganized administratively so that an efficiently collected salt tax could service the debt on the loan. The result was a new tax-collecting agency nominally under the supervision of the Republican central government, the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate (Yanwu jihe zongsuo). The Inspectorate was explicitly modelled on the customs administration and, by extension, on other British colonial bureaucracies: it was a hybrid, prefectural tax-collecting agency, jointly staffed by foreign and Chinese personnel, in which all orders and documents were co-signed by foreign and Chinese staff of equal rank. However the preponderant influence in establishing the core values and methods of operation of the Inspectorate for its turbulent history was that of its first foreign Chief Inspector, Sir Richard Dane.'7 The programme of the Salt Inspectorate was to standardize, simplify, bureaucratize and establish direct control over China's far-flung and heterogenous salt works and taxation arrangements by replacing a centuries-old patchwork of indirect control via official monopolies with the principle of "tax directly levied at source" (jiuchang zhengshui). Obviously, such reforms would engender the resistance of everyone who stood to lose by them: salt merchants, local-level governments who had long added surtaxes to the salt gabelle, local smugglers, and corrupt salt tax officials from pre-existing administrations. Yet in spite of resistance and a quite hostile environment in which to carry out these reforms, the Salt Inspectorate was astonishingly successful by almost any measure: in the first full year of its operations, net salt tax receipts nearly quintupled from $11,471,000 in 1913 to $60,410,000 in 1914, and gradually increased thereafter to a pre-KMT era high of $85,789,000 in 1922.18 Much to the surprise of everyone, the Salt Inspectorate not only produced enough each year to service the Reorganization Loan debt to the foreign footnote continued resources not available elsewhere (primarily customs and salt surpluses as well as the possibility of foreign loans). This ironically increased the attractiveness of the city and rump central government administration as a target for warlord depradations during the 1920s. 17. The analysis in this and the following section of the Salt Inspectorate presents an overview of ch. 3, "Effective institution building: the case of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate," in Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities. See also S. A. M Adshead, The Modernization of the Salt Administration, 1900-20 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), especially ch. 4. 18. These figures are taken from Kwei Chungshu (ed.), The Chinese Year Book, 1935-36 (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1936), p. 1298. The currency in which these figures were calculated was the standard silver dollar. Generating Institutional Breakthroughs: The Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate "Model" and After Ironically, the very weakness of the early Republican government brought about the creation of a quasi-goverment organization that became one of the more powerful models of a statist technocracy and, in the critical sphere of tax collection, did generate an institutional breakthrough. When the Yuan Shikai government went to the Western banking establishment to conclude a large Reorganization Loan to refinance outstanding debts and consolidate the regime in 1913, the price demanded was that the salt gabelle be reorganized administratively so that an efficiently collected salt tax could service the debt on the loan. The result was a new tax-collecting agency nominally under the supervision of the Republican central government, the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate (Yanwu jihe zongsuo). The Inspectorate was explicitly modelled on the customs administration and, by extension, on other British colonial bureaucracies: it was a hybrid, prefectural tax-collecting agency, jointly staffed by foreign and Chinese personnel, in which all orders and documents were co-signed by foreign and Chinese staff of equal rank. However the preponderant influence in establishing the core values and methods of operation of the Inspectorate for its turbulent history was that of its first foreign Chief Inspector, Sir Richard Dane.'7 The programme of the Salt Inspectorate was to standardize, simplify, bureaucratize and establish direct control over China's far-flung and heterogenous salt works and taxation arrangements by replacing a centuries-old patchwork of indirect control via official monopolies with the principle of "tax directly levied at source" (jiuchang zhengshui). Obviously, such reforms would engender the resistance of everyone who stood to lose by them: salt merchants, local-level governments who had long added surtaxes to the salt gabelle, local smugglers, and corrupt salt tax officials from pre-existing administrations. Yet in spite of resistance and a quite hostile environment in which to carry out these reforms, the Salt Inspectorate was astonishingly successful by almost any measure: in the first full year of its operations, net salt tax receipts nearly quintupled from $11,471,000 in 1913 to $60,410,000 in 1914, and gradually increased thereafter to a pre-KMT era high of $85,789,000 in 1922.18 Much to the surprise of everyone, the Salt Inspectorate not only produced enough each year to service the Reorganization Loan debt to the foreign footnote continued resources not available elsewhere (primarily customs and salt surpluses as well as the possibility of foreign loans). This ironically increased the attractiveness of the city and rump central government administration as a target for warlord depradations during the 1920s. 17. The analysis in this and the following section of the Salt Inspectorate presents an overview of ch. 3, "Effective institution building: the case of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate," in Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities. See also S. A. M Adshead, The Modernization of the Salt Administration, 1900-20 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), especially ch. 4. 18. These figures are taken from Kwei Chungshu (ed.), The Chinese Year Book, 1935-36 (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1936), p. 1298. The currency in which these figures were calculated was the standard silver dollar. Generating Institutional Breakthroughs: The Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate "Model" and After Ironically, the very weakness of the early Republican government brought about the creation of a quasi-goverment organization that became one of the more powerful models of a statist technocracy and, in the critical sphere of tax collection, did generate an institutional breakthrough. When the Yuan Shikai government went to the Western banking establishment to conclude a large Reorganization Loan to refinance outstanding debts and consolidate the regime in 1913, the price demanded was that the salt gabelle be reorganized administratively so that an efficiently collected salt tax could service the debt on the loan. The result was a new tax-collecting agency nominally under the supervision of the Republican central government, the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate (Yanwu jihe zongsuo). The Inspectorate was explicitly modelled on the customs administration and, by extension, on other British colonial bureaucracies: it was a hybrid, prefectural tax-collecting agency, jointly staffed by foreign and Chinese personnel, in which all orders and documents were co-signed by foreign and Chinese staff of equal rank. However the preponderant influence in establishing the core values and methods of operation of the Inspectorate for its turbulent history was that of its first foreign Chief Inspector, Sir Richard Dane.'7 The programme of the Salt Inspectorate was to standardize, simplify, bureaucratize and establish direct control over China's far-flung and heterogenous salt works and taxation arrangements by replacing a centuries-old patchwork of indirect control via official monopolies with the principle of "tax directly levied at source" (jiuchang zhengshui). Obviously, such reforms would engender the resistance of everyone who stood to lose by them: salt merchants, local-level governments who had long added surtaxes to the salt gabelle, local smugglers, and corrupt salt tax officials from pre-existing administrations. Yet in spite of resistance and a quite hostile environment in which to carry out these reforms, the Salt Inspectorate was astonishingly successful by almost any measure: in the first full year of its operations, net salt tax receipts nearly quintupled from $11,471,000 in 1913 to $60,410,000 in 1914, and gradually increased thereafter to a pre-KMT era high of $85,789,000 in 1922.18 Much to the surprise of everyone, the Salt Inspectorate not only produced enough each year to service the Reorganization Loan debt to the foreign footnote continued resources not available elsewhere (primarily customs and salt surpluses as well as the possibility of foreign loans). This ironically increased the attractiveness of the city and rump central government administration as a target for warlord depradations during the 1920s. 17. The analysis in this and the following section of the Salt Inspectorate presents an overview of ch. 3, "Effective institution building: the case of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate," in Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities. See also S. A. M Adshead, The Modernization of the Salt Administration, 1900-20 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), especially ch. 4. 18. These figures are taken from Kwei Chungshu (ed.), The Chinese Year Book, 1935-36 (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1936), p. 1298. The currency in which these figures were calculated was the standard silver dollar. 337
338 The China Quarterly banks:it even produced enough to remit a substantial annual remainder to the central government. It was able to do so by effective pursuit of a two-pronged strategy of internal and external bureaucratization.It generated the capacity to im- plement its programmes in part because of non-replicable factors of serendipity,astute leadership and the extreme weakness of the Chinese central government at the time when it came into existence:a few months into his tenure,Dane managed to expand the authority of the Inspectorate to include not only collecting the tax but also authorizing the transfer of revenues to the banks and the Chinese government,and taking over the power of audit in the district offices.This extraordinary amount of auth- ority was then translated into organizational capital in terms of institutional bureaucratization:the funds it collected gave the Inspectorate the financial means by which to insulate itself from the highly hostile surrounding atmosphere,whereby it promptly established a civil service system entirely separate from that of the rest of the Chinese government.The system had different classification grades,substantially higher salaries,rigorous en- forcement of the principle of entry exclusively by examination into the lowest three grades,promotion based largely on seniority and to a lesser degree on performance,frequent internal audit and review,and absolutely regular tours of rotation between districts for all regular staff.19 Both the foreigners and the Chinese who worked for the Inspectorate believed that its separate civil service system was at the heart of its success. All the available evidence indicates that once thus buffered from the claims of friends and family,socialized into the bureaucratic and performance- oriented norms of the organization,and given a stable source of income with every prospect of long-term employment,staff did commit themselves and their careers to the Inspectorate.For those who worked for it,the Inspectorate stood out as an unusually impartial and fair organization.20 Such internal insulation,combined with the Inspectorate's external implementation of rationalizing reforms and its success (relative to all other organizations of the time),was mutually reinforcing,and on more than one occasion enabled district offices of the Inspectorate literally to buy their continued existence through ad hoc negotiations with warlords during the turbulent 1920s.The ultimate example of this came in 1927-28.After the National Revolutionary Army forcibly closed down all the district offices in its path and the KMT regime abolished the Inspectorate as an unsavoury vestige of imperialist domination,the Salt Inspectorate was able to negotiate its revival by styling itself as an impersonal,efficient organization of Weberian bureaucrats that could serve any political master,including the KMT.By accepting its incorpo- ration into the National Government under the Ministry of Finance,the Salt Inspectorate was revived as a still semi-autonomous administration 19.Yanwu renshi guize(Regulations on Salt Affairs Personnel),Ministry of Finance.n.d. (c.1948).Interviews with:Zhong Liangzhe,Taipei,Taiwan,20 January 1989;Lin Jiyong, Tainan,Taiwan,24 January 1989;Chen Guisheng,Taipei,Taiwan,16 January 1989. 20.Interviews,Chen Guisheng,Taipei,Taiwan,16 January 1989;and Zhou Weiliang, Tainan,Taiwan,24 January 1989
338 The China Quarterly banks: it even produced enough to remit a substantial annual remainder to the central government. It was able to do so by effective pursuit of a two-pronged strategy of internal and external bureaucratization. It generated the capacity to implement its programmes in part because of non-replicable factors of serendipity, astute leadership and the extreme weakness of the Chinese central government at the time when it came into existence: a few months into his tenure, Dane managed to expand the authority of the Inspectorate to include not only collecting the tax but also authorizing the transfer of revenues to the banks and the Chinese government, and taking over the power of audit in the district offices. This extraordinary amount of authority was then translated into organizational capital in terms of institutional bureaucratization: the funds it collected gave the Inspectorate the financial means by which to insulate itself from the highly hostile surrounding atmosphere, whereby it promptly established a civil service system entirely separate from that of the rest of the Chinese government. The system had different classification grades, substantially higher salaries, rigorous enforcement of the principle of entry exclusively by examination into the lowest three grades, promotion based largely on seniority and to a lesser degree on performance, frequent internal audit and review, and absolutely regular tours of rotation between districts for all regular staff.19 Both the foreigners and the Chinese who worked for the Inspectorate believed that its separate civil service system was at the heart of its success. All the available evidence indicates that once thus buffered from the claims of friends and family, socialized into the bureaucratic and performanceoriented norms of the organization, and given a stable source of income with every prospect of long-term employment, staff did commit themselves and their careers to the Inspectorate. For those who worked for it, the Inspectorate stood out as an unusually impartial and fair organization.20 Such internal insulation, combined with the Inspectorate's external implementation of rationalizing reforms and its success (relative to all other organizations of the time), was mutually reinforcing, and on more than one occasion enabled district offices of the Inspectorate literally to buy their continued existence through ad hoc negotiations with warlords during the turbulent 1920s. The ultimate example of this came in 1927-28. After the National Revolutionary Army forcibly closed down all the district offices in its path and the KMT regime abolished the Inspectorate as an unsavoury vestige of imperialist domination, the Salt Inspectorate was able to negotiate its revival by styling itself as an impersonal, efficient organization of Weberian bureaucrats that could serve any political master, including the KMT. By accepting its incorporation into the National Government under the Ministry of Finance, the Salt Inspectorate was revived as a still semi-autonomous administration 19. Yanwu renshi guize (Regulations on Salt Affairs Personnel), Ministry of Finance, n.d. (c. 1948). Interviews with: Zhong Liangzhe, Taipei, Taiwan, 20 January 1989; Lin Jiyong, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989; Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989. 20. Interviews, Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989; and Zhou Weiliang, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989. banks: it even produced enough to remit a substantial annual remainder to the central government. It was able to do so by effective pursuit of a two-pronged strategy of internal and external bureaucratization. It generated the capacity to implement its programmes in part because of non-replicable factors of serendipity, astute leadership and the extreme weakness of the Chinese central government at the time when it came into existence: a few months into his tenure, Dane managed to expand the authority of the Inspectorate to include not only collecting the tax but also authorizing the transfer of revenues to the banks and the Chinese government, and taking over the power of audit in the district offices. This extraordinary amount of authority was then translated into organizational capital in terms of institutional bureaucratization: the funds it collected gave the Inspectorate the financial means by which to insulate itself from the highly hostile surrounding atmosphere, whereby it promptly established a civil service system entirely separate from that of the rest of the Chinese government. The system had different classification grades, substantially higher salaries, rigorous enforcement of the principle of entry exclusively by examination into the lowest three grades, promotion based largely on seniority and to a lesser degree on performance, frequent internal audit and review, and absolutely regular tours of rotation between districts for all regular staff.19 Both the foreigners and the Chinese who worked for the Inspectorate believed that its separate civil service system was at the heart of its success. All the available evidence indicates that once thus buffered from the claims of friends and family, socialized into the bureaucratic and performanceoriented norms of the organization, and given a stable source of income with every prospect of long-term employment, staff did commit themselves and their careers to the Inspectorate. For those who worked for it, the Inspectorate stood out as an unusually impartial and fair organization.20 Such internal insulation, combined with the Inspectorate's external implementation of rationalizing reforms and its success (relative to all other organizations of the time), was mutually reinforcing, and on more than one occasion enabled district offices of the Inspectorate literally to buy their continued existence through ad hoc negotiations with warlords during the turbulent 1920s. The ultimate example of this came in 1927-28. After the National Revolutionary Army forcibly closed down all the district offices in its path and the KMT regime abolished the Inspectorate as an unsavoury vestige of imperialist domination, the Salt Inspectorate was able to negotiate its revival by styling itself as an impersonal, efficient organization of Weberian bureaucrats that could serve any political master, including the KMT. By accepting its incorporation into the National Government under the Ministry of Finance, the Salt Inspectorate was revived as a still semi-autonomous administration 19. Yanwu renshi guize (Regulations on Salt Affairs Personnel), Ministry of Finance, n.d. (c. 1948). Interviews with: Zhong Liangzhe, Taipei, Taiwan, 20 January 1989; Lin Jiyong, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989; Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989. 20. Interviews, Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989; and Zhou Weiliang, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989. banks: it even produced enough to remit a substantial annual remainder to the central government. It was able to do so by effective pursuit of a two-pronged strategy of internal and external bureaucratization. It generated the capacity to implement its programmes in part because of non-replicable factors of serendipity, astute leadership and the extreme weakness of the Chinese central government at the time when it came into existence: a few months into his tenure, Dane managed to expand the authority of the Inspectorate to include not only collecting the tax but also authorizing the transfer of revenues to the banks and the Chinese government, and taking over the power of audit in the district offices. This extraordinary amount of authority was then translated into organizational capital in terms of institutional bureaucratization: the funds it collected gave the Inspectorate the financial means by which to insulate itself from the highly hostile surrounding atmosphere, whereby it promptly established a civil service system entirely separate from that of the rest of the Chinese government. The system had different classification grades, substantially higher salaries, rigorous enforcement of the principle of entry exclusively by examination into the lowest three grades, promotion based largely on seniority and to a lesser degree on performance, frequent internal audit and review, and absolutely regular tours of rotation between districts for all regular staff.19 Both the foreigners and the Chinese who worked for the Inspectorate believed that its separate civil service system was at the heart of its success. All the available evidence indicates that once thus buffered from the claims of friends and family, socialized into the bureaucratic and performanceoriented norms of the organization, and given a stable source of income with every prospect of long-term employment, staff did commit themselves and their careers to the Inspectorate. For those who worked for it, the Inspectorate stood out as an unusually impartial and fair organization.20 Such internal insulation, combined with the Inspectorate's external implementation of rationalizing reforms and its success (relative to all other organizations of the time), was mutually reinforcing, and on more than one occasion enabled district offices of the Inspectorate literally to buy their continued existence through ad hoc negotiations with warlords during the turbulent 1920s. The ultimate example of this came in 1927-28. After the National Revolutionary Army forcibly closed down all the district offices in its path and the KMT regime abolished the Inspectorate as an unsavoury vestige of imperialist domination, the Salt Inspectorate was able to negotiate its revival by styling itself as an impersonal, efficient organization of Weberian bureaucrats that could serve any political master, including the KMT. By accepting its incorporation into the National Government under the Ministry of Finance, the Salt Inspectorate was revived as a still semi-autonomous administration 19. Yanwu renshi guize (Regulations on Salt Affairs Personnel), Ministry of Finance, n.d. (c. 1948). Interviews with: Zhong Liangzhe, Taipei, Taiwan, 20 January 1989; Lin Jiyong, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989; Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989. 20. Interviews, Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989; and Zhou Weiliang, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989. banks: it even produced enough to remit a substantial annual remainder to the central government. It was able to do so by effective pursuit of a two-pronged strategy of internal and external bureaucratization. It generated the capacity to implement its programmes in part because of non-replicable factors of serendipity, astute leadership and the extreme weakness of the Chinese central government at the time when it came into existence: a few months into his tenure, Dane managed to expand the authority of the Inspectorate to include not only collecting the tax but also authorizing the transfer of revenues to the banks and the Chinese government, and taking over the power of audit in the district offices. This extraordinary amount of authority was then translated into organizational capital in terms of institutional bureaucratization: the funds it collected gave the Inspectorate the financial means by which to insulate itself from the highly hostile surrounding atmosphere, whereby it promptly established a civil service system entirely separate from that of the rest of the Chinese government. The system had different classification grades, substantially higher salaries, rigorous enforcement of the principle of entry exclusively by examination into the lowest three grades, promotion based largely on seniority and to a lesser degree on performance, frequent internal audit and review, and absolutely regular tours of rotation between districts for all regular staff.19 Both the foreigners and the Chinese who worked for the Inspectorate believed that its separate civil service system was at the heart of its success. All the available evidence indicates that once thus buffered from the claims of friends and family, socialized into the bureaucratic and performanceoriented norms of the organization, and given a stable source of income with every prospect of long-term employment, staff did commit themselves and their careers to the Inspectorate. For those who worked for it, the Inspectorate stood out as an unusually impartial and fair organization.20 Such internal insulation, combined with the Inspectorate's external implementation of rationalizing reforms and its success (relative to all other organizations of the time), was mutually reinforcing, and on more than one occasion enabled district offices of the Inspectorate literally to buy their continued existence through ad hoc negotiations with warlords during the turbulent 1920s. The ultimate example of this came in 1927-28. After the National Revolutionary Army forcibly closed down all the district offices in its path and the KMT regime abolished the Inspectorate as an unsavoury vestige of imperialist domination, the Salt Inspectorate was able to negotiate its revival by styling itself as an impersonal, efficient organization of Weberian bureaucrats that could serve any political master, including the KMT. By accepting its incorporation into the National Government under the Ministry of Finance, the Salt Inspectorate was revived as a still semi-autonomous administration 19. Yanwu renshi guize (Regulations on Salt Affairs Personnel), Ministry of Finance, n.d. (c. 1948). Interviews with: Zhong Liangzhe, Taipei, Taiwan, 20 January 1989; Lin Jiyong, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989; Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989. 20. Interviews, Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989; and Zhou Weiliang, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989. banks: it even produced enough to remit a substantial annual remainder to the central government. It was able to do so by effective pursuit of a two-pronged strategy of internal and external bureaucratization. It generated the capacity to implement its programmes in part because of non-replicable factors of serendipity, astute leadership and the extreme weakness of the Chinese central government at the time when it came into existence: a few months into his tenure, Dane managed to expand the authority of the Inspectorate to include not only collecting the tax but also authorizing the transfer of revenues to the banks and the Chinese government, and taking over the power of audit in the district offices. This extraordinary amount of authority was then translated into organizational capital in terms of institutional bureaucratization: the funds it collected gave the Inspectorate the financial means by which to insulate itself from the highly hostile surrounding atmosphere, whereby it promptly established a civil service system entirely separate from that of the rest of the Chinese government. The system had different classification grades, substantially higher salaries, rigorous enforcement of the principle of entry exclusively by examination into the lowest three grades, promotion based largely on seniority and to a lesser degree on performance, frequent internal audit and review, and absolutely regular tours of rotation between districts for all regular staff.19 Both the foreigners and the Chinese who worked for the Inspectorate believed that its separate civil service system was at the heart of its success. All the available evidence indicates that once thus buffered from the claims of friends and family, socialized into the bureaucratic and performanceoriented norms of the organization, and given a stable source of income with every prospect of long-term employment, staff did commit themselves and their careers to the Inspectorate. For those who worked for it, the Inspectorate stood out as an unusually impartial and fair organization.20 Such internal insulation, combined with the Inspectorate's external implementation of rationalizing reforms and its success (relative to all other organizations of the time), was mutually reinforcing, and on more than one occasion enabled district offices of the Inspectorate literally to buy their continued existence through ad hoc negotiations with warlords during the turbulent 1920s. The ultimate example of this came in 1927-28. After the National Revolutionary Army forcibly closed down all the district offices in its path and the KMT regime abolished the Inspectorate as an unsavoury vestige of imperialist domination, the Salt Inspectorate was able to negotiate its revival by styling itself as an impersonal, efficient organization of Weberian bureaucrats that could serve any political master, including the KMT. By accepting its incorporation into the National Government under the Ministry of Finance, the Salt Inspectorate was revived as a still semi-autonomous administration 19. Yanwu renshi guize (Regulations on Salt Affairs Personnel), Ministry of Finance, n.d. (c. 1948). Interviews with: Zhong Liangzhe, Taipei, Taiwan, 20 January 1989; Lin Jiyong, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989; Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989. 20. Interviews, Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989; and Zhou Weiliang, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989. banks: it even produced enough to remit a substantial annual remainder to the central government. It was able to do so by effective pursuit of a two-pronged strategy of internal and external bureaucratization. It generated the capacity to implement its programmes in part because of non-replicable factors of serendipity, astute leadership and the extreme weakness of the Chinese central government at the time when it came into existence: a few months into his tenure, Dane managed to expand the authority of the Inspectorate to include not only collecting the tax but also authorizing the transfer of revenues to the banks and the Chinese government, and taking over the power of audit in the district offices. This extraordinary amount of authority was then translated into organizational capital in terms of institutional bureaucratization: the funds it collected gave the Inspectorate the financial means by which to insulate itself from the highly hostile surrounding atmosphere, whereby it promptly established a civil service system entirely separate from that of the rest of the Chinese government. The system had different classification grades, substantially higher salaries, rigorous enforcement of the principle of entry exclusively by examination into the lowest three grades, promotion based largely on seniority and to a lesser degree on performance, frequent internal audit and review, and absolutely regular tours of rotation between districts for all regular staff.19 Both the foreigners and the Chinese who worked for the Inspectorate believed that its separate civil service system was at the heart of its success. All the available evidence indicates that once thus buffered from the claims of friends and family, socialized into the bureaucratic and performanceoriented norms of the organization, and given a stable source of income with every prospect of long-term employment, staff did commit themselves and their careers to the Inspectorate. For those who worked for it, the Inspectorate stood out as an unusually impartial and fair organization.20 Such internal insulation, combined with the Inspectorate's external implementation of rationalizing reforms and its success (relative to all other organizations of the time), was mutually reinforcing, and on more than one occasion enabled district offices of the Inspectorate literally to buy their continued existence through ad hoc negotiations with warlords during the turbulent 1920s. The ultimate example of this came in 1927-28. After the National Revolutionary Army forcibly closed down all the district offices in its path and the KMT regime abolished the Inspectorate as an unsavoury vestige of imperialist domination, the Salt Inspectorate was able to negotiate its revival by styling itself as an impersonal, efficient organization of Weberian bureaucrats that could serve any political master, including the KMT. By accepting its incorporation into the National Government under the Ministry of Finance, the Salt Inspectorate was revived as a still semi-autonomous administration 19. Yanwu renshi guize (Regulations on Salt Affairs Personnel), Ministry of Finance, n.d. (c. 1948). Interviews with: Zhong Liangzhe, Taipei, Taiwan, 20 January 1989; Lin Jiyong, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989; Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989. 20. Interviews, Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989; and Zhou Weiliang, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989. banks: it even produced enough to remit a substantial annual remainder to the central government. It was able to do so by effective pursuit of a two-pronged strategy of internal and external bureaucratization. It generated the capacity to implement its programmes in part because of non-replicable factors of serendipity, astute leadership and the extreme weakness of the Chinese central government at the time when it came into existence: a few months into his tenure, Dane managed to expand the authority of the Inspectorate to include not only collecting the tax but also authorizing the transfer of revenues to the banks and the Chinese government, and taking over the power of audit in the district offices. This extraordinary amount of authority was then translated into organizational capital in terms of institutional bureaucratization: the funds it collected gave the Inspectorate the financial means by which to insulate itself from the highly hostile surrounding atmosphere, whereby it promptly established a civil service system entirely separate from that of the rest of the Chinese government. The system had different classification grades, substantially higher salaries, rigorous enforcement of the principle of entry exclusively by examination into the lowest three grades, promotion based largely on seniority and to a lesser degree on performance, frequent internal audit and review, and absolutely regular tours of rotation between districts for all regular staff.19 Both the foreigners and the Chinese who worked for the Inspectorate believed that its separate civil service system was at the heart of its success. All the available evidence indicates that once thus buffered from the claims of friends and family, socialized into the bureaucratic and performanceoriented norms of the organization, and given a stable source of income with every prospect of long-term employment, staff did commit themselves and their careers to the Inspectorate. For those who worked for it, the Inspectorate stood out as an unusually impartial and fair organization.20 Such internal insulation, combined with the Inspectorate's external implementation of rationalizing reforms and its success (relative to all other organizations of the time), was mutually reinforcing, and on more than one occasion enabled district offices of the Inspectorate literally to buy their continued existence through ad hoc negotiations with warlords during the turbulent 1920s. The ultimate example of this came in 1927-28. After the National Revolutionary Army forcibly closed down all the district offices in its path and the KMT regime abolished the Inspectorate as an unsavoury vestige of imperialist domination, the Salt Inspectorate was able to negotiate its revival by styling itself as an impersonal, efficient organization of Weberian bureaucrats that could serve any political master, including the KMT. By accepting its incorporation into the National Government under the Ministry of Finance, the Salt Inspectorate was revived as a still semi-autonomous administration 19. Yanwu renshi guize (Regulations on Salt Affairs Personnel), Ministry of Finance, n.d. (c. 1948). Interviews with: Zhong Liangzhe, Taipei, Taiwan, 20 January 1989; Lin Jiyong, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989; Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989. 20. Interviews, Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989; and Zhou Weiliang, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989. banks: it even produced enough to remit a substantial annual remainder to the central government. It was able to do so by effective pursuit of a two-pronged strategy of internal and external bureaucratization. It generated the capacity to implement its programmes in part because of non-replicable factors of serendipity, astute leadership and the extreme weakness of the Chinese central government at the time when it came into existence: a few months into his tenure, Dane managed to expand the authority of the Inspectorate to include not only collecting the tax but also authorizing the transfer of revenues to the banks and the Chinese government, and taking over the power of audit in the district offices. This extraordinary amount of authority was then translated into organizational capital in terms of institutional bureaucratization: the funds it collected gave the Inspectorate the financial means by which to insulate itself from the highly hostile surrounding atmosphere, whereby it promptly established a civil service system entirely separate from that of the rest of the Chinese government. The system had different classification grades, substantially higher salaries, rigorous enforcement of the principle of entry exclusively by examination into the lowest three grades, promotion based largely on seniority and to a lesser degree on performance, frequent internal audit and review, and absolutely regular tours of rotation between districts for all regular staff.19 Both the foreigners and the Chinese who worked for the Inspectorate believed that its separate civil service system was at the heart of its success. All the available evidence indicates that once thus buffered from the claims of friends and family, socialized into the bureaucratic and performanceoriented norms of the organization, and given a stable source of income with every prospect of long-term employment, staff did commit themselves and their careers to the Inspectorate. For those who worked for it, the Inspectorate stood out as an unusually impartial and fair organization.20 Such internal insulation, combined with the Inspectorate's external implementation of rationalizing reforms and its success (relative to all other organizations of the time), was mutually reinforcing, and on more than one occasion enabled district offices of the Inspectorate literally to buy their continued existence through ad hoc negotiations with warlords during the turbulent 1920s. The ultimate example of this came in 1927-28. After the National Revolutionary Army forcibly closed down all the district offices in its path and the KMT regime abolished the Inspectorate as an unsavoury vestige of imperialist domination, the Salt Inspectorate was able to negotiate its revival by styling itself as an impersonal, efficient organization of Weberian bureaucrats that could serve any political master, including the KMT. By accepting its incorporation into the National Government under the Ministry of Finance, the Salt Inspectorate was revived as a still semi-autonomous administration 19. Yanwu renshi guize (Regulations on Salt Affairs Personnel), Ministry of Finance, n.d. (c. 1948). Interviews with: Zhong Liangzhe, Taipei, Taiwan, 20 January 1989; Lin Jiyong, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989; Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989. 20. Interviews, Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989; and Zhou Weiliang, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989. banks: it even produced enough to remit a substantial annual remainder to the central government. It was able to do so by effective pursuit of a two-pronged strategy of internal and external bureaucratization. It generated the capacity to implement its programmes in part because of non-replicable factors of serendipity, astute leadership and the extreme weakness of the Chinese central government at the time when it came into existence: a few months into his tenure, Dane managed to expand the authority of the Inspectorate to include not only collecting the tax but also authorizing the transfer of revenues to the banks and the Chinese government, and taking over the power of audit in the district offices. This extraordinary amount of authority was then translated into organizational capital in terms of institutional bureaucratization: the funds it collected gave the Inspectorate the financial means by which to insulate itself from the highly hostile surrounding atmosphere, whereby it promptly established a civil service system entirely separate from that of the rest of the Chinese government. The system had different classification grades, substantially higher salaries, rigorous enforcement of the principle of entry exclusively by examination into the lowest three grades, promotion based largely on seniority and to a lesser degree on performance, frequent internal audit and review, and absolutely regular tours of rotation between districts for all regular staff.19 Both the foreigners and the Chinese who worked for the Inspectorate believed that its separate civil service system was at the heart of its success. All the available evidence indicates that once thus buffered from the claims of friends and family, socialized into the bureaucratic and performanceoriented norms of the organization, and given a stable source of income with every prospect of long-term employment, staff did commit themselves and their careers to the Inspectorate. For those who worked for it, the Inspectorate stood out as an unusually impartial and fair organization.20 Such internal insulation, combined with the Inspectorate's external implementation of rationalizing reforms and its success (relative to all other organizations of the time), was mutually reinforcing, and on more than one occasion enabled district offices of the Inspectorate literally to buy their continued existence through ad hoc negotiations with warlords during the turbulent 1920s. The ultimate example of this came in 1927-28. After the National Revolutionary Army forcibly closed down all the district offices in its path and the KMT regime abolished the Inspectorate as an unsavoury vestige of imperialist domination, the Salt Inspectorate was able to negotiate its revival by styling itself as an impersonal, efficient organization of Weberian bureaucrats that could serve any political master, including the KMT. By accepting its incorporation into the National Government under the Ministry of Finance, the Salt Inspectorate was revived as a still semi-autonomous administration 19. Yanwu renshi guize (Regulations on Salt Affairs Personnel), Ministry of Finance, n.d. (c. 1948). Interviews with: Zhong Liangzhe, Taipei, Taiwan, 20 January 1989; Lin Jiyong, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989; Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989. 20. Interviews, Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989; and Zhou Weiliang, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989. banks: it even produced enough to remit a substantial annual remainder to the central government. It was able to do so by effective pursuit of a two-pronged strategy of internal and external bureaucratization. It generated the capacity to implement its programmes in part because of non-replicable factors of serendipity, astute leadership and the extreme weakness of the Chinese central government at the time when it came into existence: a few months into his tenure, Dane managed to expand the authority of the Inspectorate to include not only collecting the tax but also authorizing the transfer of revenues to the banks and the Chinese government, and taking over the power of audit in the district offices. This extraordinary amount of authority was then translated into organizational capital in terms of institutional bureaucratization: the funds it collected gave the Inspectorate the financial means by which to insulate itself from the highly hostile surrounding atmosphere, whereby it promptly established a civil service system entirely separate from that of the rest of the Chinese government. The system had different classification grades, substantially higher salaries, rigorous enforcement of the principle of entry exclusively by examination into the lowest three grades, promotion based largely on seniority and to a lesser degree on performance, frequent internal audit and review, and absolutely regular tours of rotation between districts for all regular staff.19 Both the foreigners and the Chinese who worked for the Inspectorate believed that its separate civil service system was at the heart of its success. All the available evidence indicates that once thus buffered from the claims of friends and family, socialized into the bureaucratic and performanceoriented norms of the organization, and given a stable source of income with every prospect of long-term employment, staff did commit themselves and their careers to the Inspectorate. For those who worked for it, the Inspectorate stood out as an unusually impartial and fair organization.20 Such internal insulation, combined with the Inspectorate's external implementation of rationalizing reforms and its success (relative to all other organizations of the time), was mutually reinforcing, and on more than one occasion enabled district offices of the Inspectorate literally to buy their continued existence through ad hoc negotiations with warlords during the turbulent 1920s. The ultimate example of this came in 1927-28. After the National Revolutionary Army forcibly closed down all the district offices in its path and the KMT regime abolished the Inspectorate as an unsavoury vestige of imperialist domination, the Salt Inspectorate was able to negotiate its revival by styling itself as an impersonal, efficient organization of Weberian bureaucrats that could serve any political master, including the KMT. By accepting its incorporation into the National Government under the Ministry of Finance, the Salt Inspectorate was revived as a still semi-autonomous administration 19. Yanwu renshi guize (Regulations on Salt Affairs Personnel), Ministry of Finance, n.d. (c. 1948). Interviews with: Zhong Liangzhe, Taipei, Taiwan, 20 January 1989; Lin Jiyong, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989; Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989. 20. Interviews, Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989; and Zhou Weiliang, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989. banks: it even produced enough to remit a substantial annual remainder to the central government. It was able to do so by effective pursuit of a two-pronged strategy of internal and external bureaucratization. It generated the capacity to implement its programmes in part because of non-replicable factors of serendipity, astute leadership and the extreme weakness of the Chinese central government at the time when it came into existence: a few months into his tenure, Dane managed to expand the authority of the Inspectorate to include not only collecting the tax but also authorizing the transfer of revenues to the banks and the Chinese government, and taking over the power of audit in the district offices. This extraordinary amount of authority was then translated into organizational capital in terms of institutional bureaucratization: the funds it collected gave the Inspectorate the financial means by which to insulate itself from the highly hostile surrounding atmosphere, whereby it promptly established a civil service system entirely separate from that of the rest of the Chinese government. The system had different classification grades, substantially higher salaries, rigorous enforcement of the principle of entry exclusively by examination into the lowest three grades, promotion based largely on seniority and to a lesser degree on performance, frequent internal audit and review, and absolutely regular tours of rotation between districts for all regular staff.19 Both the foreigners and the Chinese who worked for the Inspectorate believed that its separate civil service system was at the heart of its success. All the available evidence indicates that once thus buffered from the claims of friends and family, socialized into the bureaucratic and performanceoriented norms of the organization, and given a stable source of income with every prospect of long-term employment, staff did commit themselves and their careers to the Inspectorate. For those who worked for it, the Inspectorate stood out as an unusually impartial and fair organization.20 Such internal insulation, combined with the Inspectorate's external implementation of rationalizing reforms and its success (relative to all other organizations of the time), was mutually reinforcing, and on more than one occasion enabled district offices of the Inspectorate literally to buy their continued existence through ad hoc negotiations with warlords during the turbulent 1920s. The ultimate example of this came in 1927-28. After the National Revolutionary Army forcibly closed down all the district offices in its path and the KMT regime abolished the Inspectorate as an unsavoury vestige of imperialist domination, the Salt Inspectorate was able to negotiate its revival by styling itself as an impersonal, efficient organization of Weberian bureaucrats that could serve any political master, including the KMT. By accepting its incorporation into the National Government under the Ministry of Finance, the Salt Inspectorate was revived as a still semi-autonomous administration 19. Yanwu renshi guize (Regulations on Salt Affairs Personnel), Ministry of Finance, n.d. (c. 1948). Interviews with: Zhong Liangzhe, Taipei, Taiwan, 20 January 1989; Lin Jiyong, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989; Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989. 20. Interviews, Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989; and Zhou Weiliang, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989. banks: it even produced enough to remit a substantial annual remainder to the central government. It was able to do so by effective pursuit of a two-pronged strategy of internal and external bureaucratization. It generated the capacity to implement its programmes in part because of non-replicable factors of serendipity, astute leadership and the extreme weakness of the Chinese central government at the time when it came into existence: a few months into his tenure, Dane managed to expand the authority of the Inspectorate to include not only collecting the tax but also authorizing the transfer of revenues to the banks and the Chinese government, and taking over the power of audit in the district offices. This extraordinary amount of authority was then translated into organizational capital in terms of institutional bureaucratization: the funds it collected gave the Inspectorate the financial means by which to insulate itself from the highly hostile surrounding atmosphere, whereby it promptly established a civil service system entirely separate from that of the rest of the Chinese government. The system had different classification grades, substantially higher salaries, rigorous enforcement of the principle of entry exclusively by examination into the lowest three grades, promotion based largely on seniority and to a lesser degree on performance, frequent internal audit and review, and absolutely regular tours of rotation between districts for all regular staff.19 Both the foreigners and the Chinese who worked for the Inspectorate believed that its separate civil service system was at the heart of its success. All the available evidence indicates that once thus buffered from the claims of friends and family, socialized into the bureaucratic and performanceoriented norms of the organization, and given a stable source of income with every prospect of long-term employment, staff did commit themselves and their careers to the Inspectorate. For those who worked for it, the Inspectorate stood out as an unusually impartial and fair organization.20 Such internal insulation, combined with the Inspectorate's external implementation of rationalizing reforms and its success (relative to all other organizations of the time), was mutually reinforcing, and on more than one occasion enabled district offices of the Inspectorate literally to buy their continued existence through ad hoc negotiations with warlords during the turbulent 1920s. The ultimate example of this came in 1927-28. After the National Revolutionary Army forcibly closed down all the district offices in its path and the KMT regime abolished the Inspectorate as an unsavoury vestige of imperialist domination, the Salt Inspectorate was able to negotiate its revival by styling itself as an impersonal, efficient organization of Weberian bureaucrats that could serve any political master, including the KMT. By accepting its incorporation into the National Government under the Ministry of Finance, the Salt Inspectorate was revived as a still semi-autonomous administration 19. Yanwu renshi guize (Regulations on Salt Affairs Personnel), Ministry of Finance, n.d. (c. 1948). Interviews with: Zhong Liangzhe, Taipei, Taiwan, 20 January 1989; Lin Jiyong, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989; Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989. 20. Interviews, Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989; and Zhou Weiliang, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989. banks: it even produced enough to remit a substantial annual remainder to the central government. It was able to do so by effective pursuit of a two-pronged strategy of internal and external bureaucratization. It generated the capacity to implement its programmes in part because of non-replicable factors of serendipity, astute leadership and the extreme weakness of the Chinese central government at the time when it came into existence: a few months into his tenure, Dane managed to expand the authority of the Inspectorate to include not only collecting the tax but also authorizing the transfer of revenues to the banks and the Chinese government, and taking over the power of audit in the district offices. This extraordinary amount of authority was then translated into organizational capital in terms of institutional bureaucratization: the funds it collected gave the Inspectorate the financial means by which to insulate itself from the highly hostile surrounding atmosphere, whereby it promptly established a civil service system entirely separate from that of the rest of the Chinese government. The system had different classification grades, substantially higher salaries, rigorous enforcement of the principle of entry exclusively by examination into the lowest three grades, promotion based largely on seniority and to a lesser degree on performance, frequent internal audit and review, and absolutely regular tours of rotation between districts for all regular staff.19 Both the foreigners and the Chinese who worked for the Inspectorate believed that its separate civil service system was at the heart of its success. All the available evidence indicates that once thus buffered from the claims of friends and family, socialized into the bureaucratic and performanceoriented norms of the organization, and given a stable source of income with every prospect of long-term employment, staff did commit themselves and their careers to the Inspectorate. For those who worked for it, the Inspectorate stood out as an unusually impartial and fair organization.20 Such internal insulation, combined with the Inspectorate's external implementation of rationalizing reforms and its success (relative to all other organizations of the time), was mutually reinforcing, and on more than one occasion enabled district offices of the Inspectorate literally to buy their continued existence through ad hoc negotiations with warlords during the turbulent 1920s. The ultimate example of this came in 1927-28. After the National Revolutionary Army forcibly closed down all the district offices in its path and the KMT regime abolished the Inspectorate as an unsavoury vestige of imperialist domination, the Salt Inspectorate was able to negotiate its revival by styling itself as an impersonal, efficient organization of Weberian bureaucrats that could serve any political master, including the KMT. By accepting its incorporation into the National Government under the Ministry of Finance, the Salt Inspectorate was revived as a still semi-autonomous administration 19. Yanwu renshi guize (Regulations on Salt Affairs Personnel), Ministry of Finance, n.d. (c. 1948). Interviews with: Zhong Liangzhe, Taipei, Taiwan, 20 January 1989; Lin Jiyong, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989; Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989. 20. Interviews, Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989; and Zhou Weiliang, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989. banks: it even produced enough to remit a substantial annual remainder to the central government. It was able to do so by effective pursuit of a two-pronged strategy of internal and external bureaucratization. It generated the capacity to implement its programmes in part because of non-replicable factors of serendipity, astute leadership and the extreme weakness of the Chinese central government at the time when it came into existence: a few months into his tenure, Dane managed to expand the authority of the Inspectorate to include not only collecting the tax but also authorizing the transfer of revenues to the banks and the Chinese government, and taking over the power of audit in the district offices. This extraordinary amount of authority was then translated into organizational capital in terms of institutional bureaucratization: the funds it collected gave the Inspectorate the financial means by which to insulate itself from the highly hostile surrounding atmosphere, whereby it promptly established a civil service system entirely separate from that of the rest of the Chinese government. The system had different classification grades, substantially higher salaries, rigorous enforcement of the principle of entry exclusively by examination into the lowest three grades, promotion based largely on seniority and to a lesser degree on performance, frequent internal audit and review, and absolutely regular tours of rotation between districts for all regular staff.19 Both the foreigners and the Chinese who worked for the Inspectorate believed that its separate civil service system was at the heart of its success. All the available evidence indicates that once thus buffered from the claims of friends and family, socialized into the bureaucratic and performanceoriented norms of the organization, and given a stable source of income with every prospect of long-term employment, staff did commit themselves and their careers to the Inspectorate. For those who worked for it, the Inspectorate stood out as an unusually impartial and fair organization.20 Such internal insulation, combined with the Inspectorate's external implementation of rationalizing reforms and its success (relative to all other organizations of the time), was mutually reinforcing, and on more than one occasion enabled district offices of the Inspectorate literally to buy their continued existence through ad hoc negotiations with warlords during the turbulent 1920s. The ultimate example of this came in 1927-28. After the National Revolutionary Army forcibly closed down all the district offices in its path and the KMT regime abolished the Inspectorate as an unsavoury vestige of imperialist domination, the Salt Inspectorate was able to negotiate its revival by styling itself as an impersonal, efficient organization of Weberian bureaucrats that could serve any political master, including the KMT. By accepting its incorporation into the National Government under the Ministry of Finance, the Salt Inspectorate was revived as a still semi-autonomous administration 19. Yanwu renshi guize (Regulations on Salt Affairs Personnel), Ministry of Finance, n.d. (c. 1948). Interviews with: Zhong Liangzhe, Taipei, Taiwan, 20 January 1989; Lin Jiyong, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989; Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989. 20. Interviews, Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989; and Zhou Weiliang, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989. banks: it even produced enough to remit a substantial annual remainder to the central government. It was able to do so by effective pursuit of a two-pronged strategy of internal and external bureaucratization. It generated the capacity to implement its programmes in part because of non-replicable factors of serendipity, astute leadership and the extreme weakness of the Chinese central government at the time when it came into existence: a few months into his tenure, Dane managed to expand the authority of the Inspectorate to include not only collecting the tax but also authorizing the transfer of revenues to the banks and the Chinese government, and taking over the power of audit in the district offices. This extraordinary amount of authority was then translated into organizational capital in terms of institutional bureaucratization: the funds it collected gave the Inspectorate the financial means by which to insulate itself from the highly hostile surrounding atmosphere, whereby it promptly established a civil service system entirely separate from that of the rest of the Chinese government. The system had different classification grades, substantially higher salaries, rigorous enforcement of the principle of entry exclusively by examination into the lowest three grades, promotion based largely on seniority and to a lesser degree on performance, frequent internal audit and review, and absolutely regular tours of rotation between districts for all regular staff.19 Both the foreigners and the Chinese who worked for the Inspectorate believed that its separate civil service system was at the heart of its success. All the available evidence indicates that once thus buffered from the claims of friends and family, socialized into the bureaucratic and performanceoriented norms of the organization, and given a stable source of income with every prospect of long-term employment, staff did commit themselves and their careers to the Inspectorate. For those who worked for it, the Inspectorate stood out as an unusually impartial and fair organization.20 Such internal insulation, combined with the Inspectorate's external implementation of rationalizing reforms and its success (relative to all other organizations of the time), was mutually reinforcing, and on more than one occasion enabled district offices of the Inspectorate literally to buy their continued existence through ad hoc negotiations with warlords during the turbulent 1920s. The ultimate example of this came in 1927-28. After the National Revolutionary Army forcibly closed down all the district offices in its path and the KMT regime abolished the Inspectorate as an unsavoury vestige of imperialist domination, the Salt Inspectorate was able to negotiate its revival by styling itself as an impersonal, efficient organization of Weberian bureaucrats that could serve any political master, including the KMT. By accepting its incorporation into the National Government under the Ministry of Finance, the Salt Inspectorate was revived as a still semi-autonomous administration 19. Yanwu renshi guize (Regulations on Salt Affairs Personnel), Ministry of Finance, n.d. (c. 1948). Interviews with: Zhong Liangzhe, Taipei, Taiwan, 20 January 1989; Lin Jiyong, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989; Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989. 20. Interviews, Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989; and Zhou Weiliang, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989. banks: it even produced enough to remit a substantial annual remainder to the central government. It was able to do so by effective pursuit of a two-pronged strategy of internal and external bureaucratization. It generated the capacity to implement its programmes in part because of non-replicable factors of serendipity, astute leadership and the extreme weakness of the Chinese central government at the time when it came into existence: a few months into his tenure, Dane managed to expand the authority of the Inspectorate to include not only collecting the tax but also authorizing the transfer of revenues to the banks and the Chinese government, and taking over the power of audit in the district offices. This extraordinary amount of authority was then translated into organizational capital in terms of institutional bureaucratization: the funds it collected gave the Inspectorate the financial means by which to insulate itself from the highly hostile surrounding atmosphere, whereby it promptly established a civil service system entirely separate from that of the rest of the Chinese government. The system had different classification grades, substantially higher salaries, rigorous enforcement of the principle of entry exclusively by examination into the lowest three grades, promotion based largely on seniority and to a lesser degree on performance, frequent internal audit and review, and absolutely regular tours of rotation between districts for all regular staff.19 Both the foreigners and the Chinese who worked for the Inspectorate believed that its separate civil service system was at the heart of its success. All the available evidence indicates that once thus buffered from the claims of friends and family, socialized into the bureaucratic and performanceoriented norms of the organization, and given a stable source of income with every prospect of long-term employment, staff did commit themselves and their careers to the Inspectorate. For those who worked for it, the Inspectorate stood out as an unusually impartial and fair organization.20 Such internal insulation, combined with the Inspectorate's external implementation of rationalizing reforms and its success (relative to all other organizations of the time), was mutually reinforcing, and on more than one occasion enabled district offices of the Inspectorate literally to buy their continued existence through ad hoc negotiations with warlords during the turbulent 1920s. The ultimate example of this came in 1927-28. After the National Revolutionary Army forcibly closed down all the district offices in its path and the KMT regime abolished the Inspectorate as an unsavoury vestige of imperialist domination, the Salt Inspectorate was able to negotiate its revival by styling itself as an impersonal, efficient organization of Weberian bureaucrats that could serve any political master, including the KMT. By accepting its incorporation into the National Government under the Ministry of Finance, the Salt Inspectorate was revived as a still semi-autonomous administration 19. Yanwu renshi guize (Regulations on Salt Affairs Personnel), Ministry of Finance, n.d. (c. 1948). Interviews with: Zhong Liangzhe, Taipei, Taiwan, 20 January 1989; Lin Jiyong, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989; Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989. 20. Interviews, Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989; and Zhou Weiliang, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989. banks: it even produced enough to remit a substantial annual remainder to the central government. It was able to do so by effective pursuit of a two-pronged strategy of internal and external bureaucratization. It generated the capacity to implement its programmes in part because of non-replicable factors of serendipity, astute leadership and the extreme weakness of the Chinese central government at the time when it came into existence: a few months into his tenure, Dane managed to expand the authority of the Inspectorate to include not only collecting the tax but also authorizing the transfer of revenues to the banks and the Chinese government, and taking over the power of audit in the district offices. This extraordinary amount of authority was then translated into organizational capital in terms of institutional bureaucratization: the funds it collected gave the Inspectorate the financial means by which to insulate itself from the highly hostile surrounding atmosphere, whereby it promptly established a civil service system entirely separate from that of the rest of the Chinese government. The system had different classification grades, substantially higher salaries, rigorous enforcement of the principle of entry exclusively by examination into the lowest three grades, promotion based largely on seniority and to a lesser degree on performance, frequent internal audit and review, and absolutely regular tours of rotation between districts for all regular staff.19 Both the foreigners and the Chinese who worked for the Inspectorate believed that its separate civil service system was at the heart of its success. All the available evidence indicates that once thus buffered from the claims of friends and family, socialized into the bureaucratic and performanceoriented norms of the organization, and given a stable source of income with every prospect of long-term employment, staff did commit themselves and their careers to the Inspectorate. For those who worked for it, the Inspectorate stood out as an unusually impartial and fair organization.20 Such internal insulation, combined with the Inspectorate's external implementation of rationalizing reforms and its success (relative to all other organizations of the time), was mutually reinforcing, and on more than one occasion enabled district offices of the Inspectorate literally to buy their continued existence through ad hoc negotiations with warlords during the turbulent 1920s. The ultimate example of this came in 1927-28. After the National Revolutionary Army forcibly closed down all the district offices in its path and the KMT regime abolished the Inspectorate as an unsavoury vestige of imperialist domination, the Salt Inspectorate was able to negotiate its revival by styling itself as an impersonal, efficient organization of Weberian bureaucrats that could serve any political master, including the KMT. By accepting its incorporation into the National Government under the Ministry of Finance, the Salt Inspectorate was revived as a still semi-autonomous administration 19. Yanwu renshi guize (Regulations on Salt Affairs Personnel), Ministry of Finance, n.d. (c. 1948). Interviews with: Zhong Liangzhe, Taipei, Taiwan, 20 January 1989; Lin Jiyong, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989; Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989. 20. Interviews, Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989; and Zhou Weiliang, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989. banks: it even produced enough to remit a substantial annual remainder to the central government. It was able to do so by effective pursuit of a two-pronged strategy of internal and external bureaucratization. It generated the capacity to implement its programmes in part because of non-replicable factors of serendipity, astute leadership and the extreme weakness of the Chinese central government at the time when it came into existence: a few months into his tenure, Dane managed to expand the authority of the Inspectorate to include not only collecting the tax but also authorizing the transfer of revenues to the banks and the Chinese government, and taking over the power of audit in the district offices. This extraordinary amount of authority was then translated into organizational capital in terms of institutional bureaucratization: the funds it collected gave the Inspectorate the financial means by which to insulate itself from the highly hostile surrounding atmosphere, whereby it promptly established a civil service system entirely separate from that of the rest of the Chinese government. The system had different classification grades, substantially higher salaries, rigorous enforcement of the principle of entry exclusively by examination into the lowest three grades, promotion based largely on seniority and to a lesser degree on performance, frequent internal audit and review, and absolutely regular tours of rotation between districts for all regular staff.19 Both the foreigners and the Chinese who worked for the Inspectorate believed that its separate civil service system was at the heart of its success. All the available evidence indicates that once thus buffered from the claims of friends and family, socialized into the bureaucratic and performanceoriented norms of the organization, and given a stable source of income with every prospect of long-term employment, staff did commit themselves and their careers to the Inspectorate. For those who worked for it, the Inspectorate stood out as an unusually impartial and fair organization.20 Such internal insulation, combined with the Inspectorate's external implementation of rationalizing reforms and its success (relative to all other organizations of the time), was mutually reinforcing, and on more than one occasion enabled district offices of the Inspectorate literally to buy their continued existence through ad hoc negotiations with warlords during the turbulent 1920s. The ultimate example of this came in 1927-28. After the National Revolutionary Army forcibly closed down all the district offices in its path and the KMT regime abolished the Inspectorate as an unsavoury vestige of imperialist domination, the Salt Inspectorate was able to negotiate its revival by styling itself as an impersonal, efficient organization of Weberian bureaucrats that could serve any political master, including the KMT. By accepting its incorporation into the National Government under the Ministry of Finance, the Salt Inspectorate was revived as a still semi-autonomous administration 19. Yanwu renshi guize (Regulations on Salt Affairs Personnel), Ministry of Finance, n.d. (c. 1948). Interviews with: Zhong Liangzhe, Taipei, Taiwan, 20 January 1989; Lin Jiyong, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989; Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989. 20. Interviews, Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989; and Zhou Weiliang, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989. banks: it even produced enough to remit a substantial annual remainder to the central government. It was able to do so by effective pursuit of a two-pronged strategy of internal and external bureaucratization. It generated the capacity to implement its programmes in part because of non-replicable factors of serendipity, astute leadership and the extreme weakness of the Chinese central government at the time when it came into existence: a few months into his tenure, Dane managed to expand the authority of the Inspectorate to include not only collecting the tax but also authorizing the transfer of revenues to the banks and the Chinese government, and taking over the power of audit in the district offices. This extraordinary amount of authority was then translated into organizational capital in terms of institutional bureaucratization: the funds it collected gave the Inspectorate the financial means by which to insulate itself from the highly hostile surrounding atmosphere, whereby it promptly established a civil service system entirely separate from that of the rest of the Chinese government. The system had different classification grades, substantially higher salaries, rigorous enforcement of the principle of entry exclusively by examination into the lowest three grades, promotion based largely on seniority and to a lesser degree on performance, frequent internal audit and review, and absolutely regular tours of rotation between districts for all regular staff.19 Both the foreigners and the Chinese who worked for the Inspectorate believed that its separate civil service system was at the heart of its success. All the available evidence indicates that once thus buffered from the claims of friends and family, socialized into the bureaucratic and performanceoriented norms of the organization, and given a stable source of income with every prospect of long-term employment, staff did commit themselves and their careers to the Inspectorate. For those who worked for it, the Inspectorate stood out as an unusually impartial and fair organization.20 Such internal insulation, combined with the Inspectorate's external implementation of rationalizing reforms and its success (relative to all other organizations of the time), was mutually reinforcing, and on more than one occasion enabled district offices of the Inspectorate literally to buy their continued existence through ad hoc negotiations with warlords during the turbulent 1920s. The ultimate example of this came in 1927-28. After the National Revolutionary Army forcibly closed down all the district offices in its path and the KMT regime abolished the Inspectorate as an unsavoury vestige of imperialist domination, the Salt Inspectorate was able to negotiate its revival by styling itself as an impersonal, efficient organization of Weberian bureaucrats that could serve any political master, including the KMT. By accepting its incorporation into the National Government under the Ministry of Finance, the Salt Inspectorate was revived as a still semi-autonomous administration 19. Yanwu renshi guize (Regulations on Salt Affairs Personnel), Ministry of Finance, n.d. (c. 1948). Interviews with: Zhong Liangzhe, Taipei, Taiwan, 20 January 1989; Lin Jiyong, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989; Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989. 20. Interviews, Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989; and Zhou Weiliang, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989. banks: it even produced enough to remit a substantial annual remainder to the central government. It was able to do so by effective pursuit of a two-pronged strategy of internal and external bureaucratization. It generated the capacity to implement its programmes in part because of non-replicable factors of serendipity, astute leadership and the extreme weakness of the Chinese central government at the time when it came into existence: a few months into his tenure, Dane managed to expand the authority of the Inspectorate to include not only collecting the tax but also authorizing the transfer of revenues to the banks and the Chinese government, and taking over the power of audit in the district offices. This extraordinary amount of authority was then translated into organizational capital in terms of institutional bureaucratization: the funds it collected gave the Inspectorate the financial means by which to insulate itself from the highly hostile surrounding atmosphere, whereby it promptly established a civil service system entirely separate from that of the rest of the Chinese government. The system had different classification grades, substantially higher salaries, rigorous enforcement of the principle of entry exclusively by examination into the lowest three grades, promotion based largely on seniority and to a lesser degree on performance, frequent internal audit and review, and absolutely regular tours of rotation between districts for all regular staff.19 Both the foreigners and the Chinese who worked for the Inspectorate believed that its separate civil service system was at the heart of its success. All the available evidence indicates that once thus buffered from the claims of friends and family, socialized into the bureaucratic and performanceoriented norms of the organization, and given a stable source of income with every prospect of long-term employment, staff did commit themselves and their careers to the Inspectorate. For those who worked for it, the Inspectorate stood out as an unusually impartial and fair organization.20 Such internal insulation, combined with the Inspectorate's external implementation of rationalizing reforms and its success (relative to all other organizations of the time), was mutually reinforcing, and on more than one occasion enabled district offices of the Inspectorate literally to buy their continued existence through ad hoc negotiations with warlords during the turbulent 1920s. The ultimate example of this came in 1927-28. After the National Revolutionary Army forcibly closed down all the district offices in its path and the KMT regime abolished the Inspectorate as an unsavoury vestige of imperialist domination, the Salt Inspectorate was able to negotiate its revival by styling itself as an impersonal, efficient organization of Weberian bureaucrats that could serve any political master, including the KMT. By accepting its incorporation into the National Government under the Ministry of Finance, the Salt Inspectorate was revived as a still semi-autonomous administration 19. Yanwu renshi guize (Regulations on Salt Affairs Personnel), Ministry of Finance, n.d. (c. 1948). Interviews with: Zhong Liangzhe, Taipei, Taiwan, 20 January 1989; Lin Jiyong, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989; Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989. 20. Interviews, Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989; and Zhou Weiliang, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989. banks: it even produced enough to remit a substantial annual remainder to the central government. It was able to do so by effective pursuit of a two-pronged strategy of internal and external bureaucratization. It generated the capacity to implement its programmes in part because of non-replicable factors of serendipity, astute leadership and the extreme weakness of the Chinese central government at the time when it came into existence: a few months into his tenure, Dane managed to expand the authority of the Inspectorate to include not only collecting the tax but also authorizing the transfer of revenues to the banks and the Chinese government, and taking over the power of audit in the district offices. This extraordinary amount of authority was then translated into organizational capital in terms of institutional bureaucratization: the funds it collected gave the Inspectorate the financial means by which to insulate itself from the highly hostile surrounding atmosphere, whereby it promptly established a civil service system entirely separate from that of the rest of the Chinese government. The system had different classification grades, substantially higher salaries, rigorous enforcement of the principle of entry exclusively by examination into the lowest three grades, promotion based largely on seniority and to a lesser degree on performance, frequent internal audit and review, and absolutely regular tours of rotation between districts for all regular staff.19 Both the foreigners and the Chinese who worked for the Inspectorate believed that its separate civil service system was at the heart of its success. All the available evidence indicates that once thus buffered from the claims of friends and family, socialized into the bureaucratic and performanceoriented norms of the organization, and given a stable source of income with every prospect of long-term employment, staff did commit themselves and their careers to the Inspectorate. For those who worked for it, the Inspectorate stood out as an unusually impartial and fair organization.20 Such internal insulation, combined with the Inspectorate's external implementation of rationalizing reforms and its success (relative to all other organizations of the time), was mutually reinforcing, and on more than one occasion enabled district offices of the Inspectorate literally to buy their continued existence through ad hoc negotiations with warlords during the turbulent 1920s. The ultimate example of this came in 1927-28. After the National Revolutionary Army forcibly closed down all the district offices in its path and the KMT regime abolished the Inspectorate as an unsavoury vestige of imperialist domination, the Salt Inspectorate was able to negotiate its revival by styling itself as an impersonal, efficient organization of Weberian bureaucrats that could serve any political master, including the KMT. By accepting its incorporation into the National Government under the Ministry of Finance, the Salt Inspectorate was revived as a still semi-autonomous administration 19. Yanwu renshi guize (Regulations on Salt Affairs Personnel), Ministry of Finance, n.d. (c. 1948). Interviews with: Zhong Liangzhe, Taipei, Taiwan, 20 January 1989; Lin Jiyong, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989; Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989. 20. Interviews, Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989; and Zhou Weiliang, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989. banks: it even produced enough to remit a substantial annual remainder to the central government. It was able to do so by effective pursuit of a two-pronged strategy of internal and external bureaucratization. It generated the capacity to implement its programmes in part because of non-replicable factors of serendipity, astute leadership and the extreme weakness of the Chinese central government at the time when it came into existence: a few months into his tenure, Dane managed to expand the authority of the Inspectorate to include not only collecting the tax but also authorizing the transfer of revenues to the banks and the Chinese government, and taking over the power of audit in the district offices. This extraordinary amount of authority was then translated into organizational capital in terms of institutional bureaucratization: the funds it collected gave the Inspectorate the financial means by which to insulate itself from the highly hostile surrounding atmosphere, whereby it promptly established a civil service system entirely separate from that of the rest of the Chinese government. The system had different classification grades, substantially higher salaries, rigorous enforcement of the principle of entry exclusively by examination into the lowest three grades, promotion based largely on seniority and to a lesser degree on performance, frequent internal audit and review, and absolutely regular tours of rotation between districts for all regular staff.19 Both the foreigners and the Chinese who worked for the Inspectorate believed that its separate civil service system was at the heart of its success. All the available evidence indicates that once thus buffered from the claims of friends and family, socialized into the bureaucratic and performanceoriented norms of the organization, and given a stable source of income with every prospect of long-term employment, staff did commit themselves and their careers to the Inspectorate. For those who worked for it, the Inspectorate stood out as an unusually impartial and fair organization.20 Such internal insulation, combined with the Inspectorate's external implementation of rationalizing reforms and its success (relative to all other organizations of the time), was mutually reinforcing, and on more than one occasion enabled district offices of the Inspectorate literally to buy their continued existence through ad hoc negotiations with warlords during the turbulent 1920s. The ultimate example of this came in 1927-28. After the National Revolutionary Army forcibly closed down all the district offices in its path and the KMT regime abolished the Inspectorate as an unsavoury vestige of imperialist domination, the Salt Inspectorate was able to negotiate its revival by styling itself as an impersonal, efficient organization of Weberian bureaucrats that could serve any political master, including the KMT. By accepting its incorporation into the National Government under the Ministry of Finance, the Salt Inspectorate was revived as a still semi-autonomous administration 19. Yanwu renshi guize (Regulations on Salt Affairs Personnel), Ministry of Finance, n.d. (c. 1948). Interviews with: Zhong Liangzhe, Taipei, Taiwan, 20 January 1989; Lin Jiyong, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989; Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989. 20. Interviews, Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989; and Zhou Weiliang, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989. banks: it even produced enough to remit a substantial annual remainder to the central government. It was able to do so by effective pursuit of a two-pronged strategy of internal and external bureaucratization. It generated the capacity to implement its programmes in part because of non-replicable factors of serendipity, astute leadership and the extreme weakness of the Chinese central government at the time when it came into existence: a few months into his tenure, Dane managed to expand the authority of the Inspectorate to include not only collecting the tax but also authorizing the transfer of revenues to the banks and the Chinese government, and taking over the power of audit in the district offices. This extraordinary amount of authority was then translated into organizational capital in terms of institutional bureaucratization: the funds it collected gave the Inspectorate the financial means by which to insulate itself from the highly hostile surrounding atmosphere, whereby it promptly established a civil service system entirely separate from that of the rest of the Chinese government. The system had different classification grades, substantially higher salaries, rigorous enforcement of the principle of entry exclusively by examination into the lowest three grades, promotion based largely on seniority and to a lesser degree on performance, frequent internal audit and review, and absolutely regular tours of rotation between districts for all regular staff.19 Both the foreigners and the Chinese who worked for the Inspectorate believed that its separate civil service system was at the heart of its success. All the available evidence indicates that once thus buffered from the claims of friends and family, socialized into the bureaucratic and performanceoriented norms of the organization, and given a stable source of income with every prospect of long-term employment, staff did commit themselves and their careers to the Inspectorate. For those who worked for it, the Inspectorate stood out as an unusually impartial and fair organization.20 Such internal insulation, combined with the Inspectorate's external implementation of rationalizing reforms and its success (relative to all other organizations of the time), was mutually reinforcing, and on more than one occasion enabled district offices of the Inspectorate literally to buy their continued existence through ad hoc negotiations with warlords during the turbulent 1920s. The ultimate example of this came in 1927-28. After the National Revolutionary Army forcibly closed down all the district offices in its path and the KMT regime abolished the Inspectorate as an unsavoury vestige of imperialist domination, the Salt Inspectorate was able to negotiate its revival by styling itself as an impersonal, efficient organization of Weberian bureaucrats that could serve any political master, including the KMT. By accepting its incorporation into the National Government under the Ministry of Finance, the Salt Inspectorate was revived as a still semi-autonomous administration 19. Yanwu renshi guize (Regulations on Salt Affairs Personnel), Ministry of Finance, n.d. (c. 1948). Interviews with: Zhong Liangzhe, Taipei, Taiwan, 20 January 1989; Lin Jiyong, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989; Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989. 20. Interviews, Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989; and Zhou Weiliang, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989
