7 Intervention (1862-64) FEW NOW ARGUE,as most Western writers on the subject once did,that foreign intervention was the decisive factor in the defeat of the Taipings.Nevertheless,it continues to be recog- nized as of considerable importance,and it is often assumed that,being important,it was also quite extensive aid.Thus Lo Erh-kang,after suggesting that the English and French forces which had been retained in China to enforce the new treaties were reinforced by additional troops from India following the defeat of the Mutiny there,states that 'in the Spring of 1862 England began big scale military action against the Taiping state and a new phase in her interference began'.1 It is certainly correct to suggest that a new phase in British policy began at this time,but in so far as Lo's argument infers that the British government was prepared to make a heavy commitment of its forces to the struggle it is quite contrary to the evidence.A primary objective of British policy during these years was to keep the scale of direct foreign involvement as small as possible, to the minimum necessary to ensure a Manchu victory. Bruce in particular urged strictly limited intervention,for he was thinking far beyond the immediate question of the sup- pression of the rebellion,major problem though that was.His grand design,while British minister at Peking,was to win the adherence of the Manchu government to the new treaty settle- ment in spirit as well as letter.His approach,as he defined it to 111
王nterⅤention (1862ˉ 64) 鞲 tha△ Erhˉkang,after suggesting that t【 bCing important,it was a1sO quite extellsiⅤ le EngⅡ 鹦 sh and Frenc11forces 骥 c aid。 Thus Lo 瀚 w⒒ich had been retained in China to enf0rce the new treaties were reinforced by additiona1troops frOln India fo11ovving thc defeat of the Ⅸ赝utiny there,states tl△ at‘in the Spring of1862 Eng1and began big scale lnⅡ itary邑ct至on against the Taiping state and a new phase in her intcrferencc bcgan’ ,廴 It is certainly correct to suggest that a rlew phase in British poⅡcy began at this t虹ne,but in so far as Lo’ s argu11△ cnt in】i￡)rs that the British goⅤernment was prepared to make a heavy comⅡ 1itnlent of its forces to the strugglc it is quitc contrary to the eVidcnce. A primary o妫cCtive of BⅡ tish poIicy during these ycars w皮 s to keep the scale of dircct foreign inⅤ olvement as sma1l as possible, to the Ⅱ1iniFnum necessary to ensure a ⅣIanchu victory。 Bruce in particular urged strict1y1i【nited intervention,for he was t缸 hking far beyond tlle inunediate question of the suppres蕊on of the rebellion,m耐 or problem though that was.H必 grand design,、,孓 `hⅡ e British Ⅱ蛀nister at Peking,讯λs to win the ad⒒ere且 ce oft⒒e卜Ιa血c匕ug。vernment to the new treaty settleˉ me狃tin spirit as we11as Ietter。 FⅡs approach,as he denned itt。 1】 1
Intervention a Foreign Office official shortly before he moved to the Chinese capital,was to convince that government 'that our objects are essentially pacific,that our demands are reasonable and that we are inclined to be moderate and conciliatory if we are met in a corresponding spirit'.2In this way he hoped gradually to create a situation in which the treaties would be fulfilled not under the constant threat of superior Western force,though he recognized that for a long time to come this must remain their ultimate sanction,but under a Chinese government able and willing to co-operate to this end.3 It needed to be a reasonably efficient as well as a reasonably willing government.Bruce certainly did not wish to see preserved in Peking a weak and incapable government which could be easily browbeaten into giving way to every Western demand. Such a government would simply invite rebellion from its own subjects and,ultimately perhaps,partition by ambitious Western powers.China would then become a second Turkey,a field for imperial rivalries of the most dangerous kind rather than a field for peaceful and mutually profitable trade.He told Russell in March 1862 that he was 'fully convinced that we,who neither seek territory nor promote by arms religious conversion, have little to apprehend from any success that may attend our efforts to raise the Chinese Executive out of its present helpless condition.Nor do I consider that it will be a matter of regret or hostile to our interests,that China should be encouraged by a consciousness of her strength,to use bolder language in defence of her just rights.The weakness of China,rather than her strength,is likely to create a fresh Eastern Question in these seas.'4 The basic object of Bruce's policy was simply to provide for the future security of British interests in China with as little trouble and expense to the British home government as possible. He wanted to see Great Britain relieved of the need to maintain large naval forces in Chinese waters,in fact to end the era of gunboat diplomacy.Any aid given the Manchu government against its domestic enemies should therefore contribute to its regeneration,not to its mere survival.It was an enlightened,far- sighted and humane policy,even if inspired by fundamentally self-interested motives.5 As the later history of China sufficiently shows,Bruce failed 112
米 Frfr召 rvc刀 r莎ε刀 a Foreign OⅢ cc O皿 cial short1y before he rnoved to the Chhese cap⒒ al,was to con诫 nce th乩 governmcnt‘ that our o△ ects are essentiaIly paof△ c,that Our demands are reasonable and伍 at we are inc1ined to be lnoderate and co且 CⅡiatory r we are1met in a corresponding spirit’ 。2In this way he hoped gradua11y tO create a situation in which the treaties wou1d be fulfiⅡed not uⅡder the Constant threat of superior Wcstern forGe,though he recognized that】or a1ong ti【ne to come this must remain their u1timate sanction,but under a Chinese goⅤ er⒑meRlt able a蛋 1d wi1Ⅱ ng to coˉ operate to this end。 3 l口、'ii丨 i!i蘑 {∶l:∶ }∶丨{∶∶1i丨 |∶|}l||∶ ∶∶丨1导 |默黢 搔i百黯 榇 黯 抵 营畚 找 h Pekhg a weak and incapable governme芏 lt which cou1d be easⅡy brOwbeaten into givhg way to every Westerm deInand。 Such a government wou1ds血 ply i11Ⅴ 扭e rebellion from扯 s Own sul∶:jects and, ulthnately perhaps, partition by amb⒒ ious WesterIl powers。 Ch血a would then become a second Turkey,a field for impe蛀 al rivalries of the血 0st dangerous kind ratlaer 伍an a neld f。 r peacefu1and mutual1y prontable grade.He told Russelh蛀 March1862that he was‘ ful1y co殂 诚nced that we,who neither scek territO.ˉ y nor promote by arms reⅡ giOus conversion, haⅤe Ⅱttle to apprehend from any success that Fnay attend our er。rts t。 r缸se the Chhese Execut卜 e out of its present helpless cond⒈ ion.Nor do I consider thatit v汀11be a【 natter ofregret or hostⅡe to our interests,tllat ChiΙ 1a shou1d be encouraged by a Consciousness ofher strength,to use bo1der language in defe狃 Ce of her Just r1ghts. The weakness of China, rather than her stFength,is likely to cmate a fresh Eastern Question in these seas。 ’∠ The bas⒗ ouect of:rucσ s poⅡcy was simply to pro说 de for the future secuⅡty of B五硅sh interests in China w妃 h as Ⅱttle trouble and expense to the British home government as possible. He wanted to see Great Britain re1ievcd of the殂eed to maintain 1arge nava1forces in Chinese waters,in fact to end咖 黟 蚰 咖 迦 蛆 № 珊 迥 r Any缸d ghen the Manchu gover111nent against its domestic eneⅡ Ⅱes shou1d therefOre co纽tⅡbute to its regeneration,not to its rnere surviⅤ al。 It was an e殂 1ightened,farsighted a狃d humane po1icy,even if inspired by fundamentaⅡ y ser~interested motives,5 As the Iater history of China su盅 cienuy sh。 ws,Bruce failed 112
Intervention in his main objective.The Manchu government was neither effectively reformed in itself nor greatly reconciled to the presence of the West.The 'break-up of China'remained a constant possibility throughout the later nineteenth century, and the maintenance of British treaty rights there was always ultimately dependent upon the presence of British gunboats. The difficulties in the way of success for Bruce's plans were indeed formidable,as was the opposition he aroused.British merchants and missionaries who looked for quick returns under the new treaty settlement were critical of a policy which seemed to them more concerned to protect Chinese interests and sen- sibilities than their own.He had also to curb consuls brought up under the old dispensation,who were quick to call upon the nearest gunboat to force satisfaction from the local Chinese authorities when faced with what they considered an infringe- ment of the treaties.If grievances were to be handled in this way,Bruce objected,not only might it lead to general hostilities, as in 1856,but there was little point in having a diplomatic representative to the central government in Peking. There was also little point in having such a representative if the Peking government itself was incapable of enforcing its authority upon its own subordinate officials in the provinces. Bruce wanted to strengthen the hand of the central government and to help make it the sole effective military and political power in the Chinese state.?His attempts to do this ran quite counter to the realities of the political situation in China by 1860,a fact of which he was not completely unaware.The failure of the regular Imperial armies to crush the Taiping rebellion during the eighteen-fifties meant that effective military and political power in central China and,through the new likin tax,s a great measure of independent financial power also was passing into the hands of the great provincial officials.Chief among these were Tseng Kuo-fan and his nominees,Li Hung- chang and Tso Tsung-t'ang,who became governors of Kiangsu and Chekiang respectively in 1862.These were the men who actually created the armies and devised the strategies which defeated the rebellion.Given their growing power and authority,any attempt to bring about changes in the govern- ment of China which did not win their support and co-operation was bound to fail.Indeed,it could be said that it might have GBAT I 113
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Intervention served Bruce's long-term plans better had the final campaign against the rebellion organized by these provincial governors failed,like the earlier campaigns of Hsiang Jung and Chang Kuo-liang,for then the central government might have mounted another and more efficient campaign with Western help,and have emerged from the rebellion militarily and politically stronger,at least in relation to its own provincial officers.Thus late in 1863 he could argue,against all the apparent aims of British intervention,that 'every consideration of sound policy indicates that Nanking is the last place we wish to see taken,as while in the hands of the Taipings it gives us a hold both on them and on this recalcitrant government'.Such statements make no sense at all unless one remembers the larger objectives of Bruce's policy while British minister at Peking. There was perhaps little sense in making them in any case,at least at that late stage,for the protraction of the rebellion could equally well have led to the actual partitioning of China by the Western powers as to the effective regeneration of the central Manchu administration.It is difficult to see that there was ever much prospect of success for Bruce's plans,especially since they ignored the deep-seated socialorigins of revolt in nineteenth- century China. But however unsuccessful in the long run,this major objective of reforming and strengthening the government in Peking con- ditioned Bruce's approach to the question of aid against the rebels and made him the chief spokesman in British counsels for limited rather than extensive intervention.The problem,he told Russell in February 1862,was to render assistance 'in a shape which will strengthen and not weaken the authority of the government'.10 To this end the approach he recommended was indirect aid which helped organize the resources available to the Manchus.Thus foreign assistance in the organization of the Imperial customs and the training of Imperial forces by European officers was desirable,but the direct use of Western forces against the rebels was not,at least beyond the defence of the treaty ports themselves.In April 1862 he told Brigadier General Staveley,the commander of British forces at Shanghai, that whatever the risk to our trade it had better be incurred than that we should fight the battles of this Government for it,or afford it more than casual and temporary assistance,which is 114
姒rcrv召 P9莎 :o刀 serVed Bruce’ s1ongˉ term plano better had伍e flna1campaign against the rebe11ion organized by these proⅤ inoa1goⅤernors n吐led,1ike the earlier campaigns of Hsiang Jung and Chang KuoˉⅡang,for then the centra1gover【 ltnent mi￡ 查tRt have motI【 lted another and more e盥 cient campaign Ⅵ砬u1`a`estern he1p, and have emerged from the rebellon mil⒒ arily and po1it妃 aⅡy stronger,at least in re1ation to its own provincial o￡ I1cers。 Thus late in 1863he could argue,against aI1the apparent ahⅡ s of BⅡtish L1tervention,that‘ every consideration of sound po1icy indicates that Nankij〔 1g is the`砑 s莎 place we、〃ish to see taken,as whⅡc in the hands of the Taipings it gives us a hold both on them and on this recalcitrant government’ 。9 Such statements make no sense at a1l uⅡ less one remembers the1arger o砀 eCt加es of Bruce’ s poⅡcy wh⒒e Briush nⅡ nister at Peking. There、Ⅴas perhaps1ittle sense in rnaking the狃 in any case,at 1east at that late stage,for the protraGu。 n。f the rebe11ion could equally weⅡ have led to the actual part止 ionhg of C妯 na by the Western powers as to the efFective regeneration of the central Manchu admirlistration.It is di】 11cu1t to see that there was ever mu0h prospect of success for Bruce’ s p1ans, espeoa11y since theyignored thedeepˉ scatedsocIaloriginsofreⅤ o1tin nineteenthˉ century Cbina。 But howevcr unsucGessfL11h the1ong run,th恕 m苟or o旬ect卜e of refor1r1i11g and strengthening the government in Peking cO【 l~ d⒒ioned Bruce’s approaGh t。 the question of aid agahst the rebe1s and made hi1n the c⒒ ief spokes1nan in British counse1s for liInited rather than extensiⅤ e intervention。 The proble【 n,he to1d Russe11in February 1862,was to render assistance‘ in a shape which Ⅵ泛11strengthen and not weaken the authority of 伍e government’ ,10To this end the approach he recomlnended was indirect aid which heIped organize the resources availabIe to 伍e Manchus。 Thus foreign assista且 Ge in the organizatio【 l of the Imperial customs and the traⅡ 1iⅡ g of Imperial forces by European o扭 cers was desirable,but the direct use of Western forces against the rebe1s llzas no△ at least beyond the defence of the treaty ports themseIves。 In AprⅡ I862hc to1d Brigadier General staveley,the cO1n1nander of B茧 tish forces at Shanghai, that‘whatever the risk to our tradc it had better be incurred than that we should nght the battles of tⅡ s Government for⒒ ,or aford it more than casua1and temporary assistance,which is 114
Intervention all that will be required to enable the Imperialists to triumph,if they can be induced to turn their own resources to proper account...'.1 The aid actually rendered to the Imperialist cause by Britain over the next two years cannot be accurately described as'casual and temporary',but the phrase accurately reflects Bruce's own approach to the question. Such an approach is not altogether what one would expect from Bruce's earlier reports on the rebellion and his scepticism during 1861 as to the possibility of making effective arrange- ments with the rebels.It must be said that Bruce was not remark- able for the steadiness and consistency of his views on the ques- tion of aid,for despite his general objection to British forces fighting the battles of the Manchu government,he showed a recurrent urge to deal the rebels a 'deadly blow'at Nanking, while at other times he became so exasperated with the Manchu government as to threaten to withdraw aid altogether and even, on certain conditions,to hand over Shanghai to the rebels. But basically he did hold to a policy of limited and indirect aid, to be applied through the central government,not the provincial authorities.Bruce found his post at Peking a wearying and frustrating one,1 but he brought to it a breadth of vision and a sensitivity of outlook which is worthy of respect,even though it sometimes led him into inconsistencies of attitude and uncer- tainties of policy. The Foreign Office approved Bruce's moderate and con- ciliatory approach to the Manchu government.1s It agreed also that direct British intervention against the rebellion should be strictly limited in extent,though it showed itself readier than Bruce to approve the tendency of service officers to go beyond the limits set.The rational course for Britain to pursue,Russell told Bruce in July 1862,was to avoid any extensive engagements, to protect the treaty ports and to encourage the government to improve its armed forces so that it could itself reduce the rebels to subjection.14 The British government did 'not propose to give to the Chinese government the whole force of the British Empire for their support',he assured the House of Lords,after quoting this despatch.15 The motives which made the home government insist on the limits of the commitment it was prepared to make on this issue were somewhat different from those uppermost in Bruce's 115
r勿 r召 rv纟刀rjo刀 aⅡ that、汛 `i1l be requked to enab1e the Imperia1ists to triumph,r they can be induced 笔0 tum their own resources to proper acoount 。。 '。 1工 :Γhe aid actua11y rendered to the ImperiaⅡ st cause by BⅡtah over the next two years cannot be accurately described as‘ casua1and temporary’ ,but the phrase accurateIy reⅡects Bmcρ ’s Own approach to the question。 Such an approach is not aItogether what one would expect fFOm Bruce’s earⅡer reports on the rebe1Ⅱ on and his scepticism durjhg I861 as to the possibiⅡ ty of1nakhg efFective arrangeˉ ments with the rebeIs。 ItFnust be said that Bruce、vas notren△arkable for thc steadiness and c°nsistency ofhis vie、 vs O11the quesˉ tion of aid,for despite蚯 s gcneral o旬 ecton to British forces fighting the battles of the 卜Ιan0hu govem1△ ent,he showcd a recurrent urge to deal the rebe1sa‘ deadly b1ov'at Nankhg, whⅡe at other tⅡ nes he became so exasperated、 vith the bⅠ anohu government as to threaten to、Ⅳit廴drⅡv aid aItoge伍 er and even, on certain conditions, to hand over Shanghai to the rebels。 But basicaⅡ y he did hold to a poⅡ cy of Ⅱm⒒ed and indirect aid, to be appⅡed through the central governmen△ notthe provinoal authorities, Bruce found his post at Pekji∶I∶】1g a wearyji∶If】 1g and frustrating one,12but he brought to it a breadth of vision and a sensitivity of oudook、Ⅴhich is ll/orthy of respect,even though it somethnes Ied hhn into inconsistenoes of attitude and uncerˉ ta血ties of policy。 The Fore迦羿1 C冫flce approⅤ ed Bruce’s moderate and conˉ cⅡiat。 ry approach to the`Ⅰ anchu goⅤ ernment。 1a It agreed a1so that direct British i11ter、 冫cntion against the rebeIⅡ on shou1d be st蛀ctly Ⅱmited in extent,though it showed itser read始 r than Bruce to approve tlle tendency of service ofF△ cers to go beyond the1iInits set.The rational course for B蛀 tah to pursue,Russe11 told Brucein Ju1y1862,was to aⅤ oid any extensive eRagagements, to protect the treaty ports and to encourage thc government to hmprove its armcd forces so that it couId itser reduce the rebe1s to su凵ec旺on。 1么 The BⅡtish government did‘not propose to giVe to the Chinese governmentthc who1ef° rce ofthe Br⒒ ish Empire for their support’ ,he assured the I-【 ouse of Lords,afCer quoting this despatch,15 The rnotives which made the home government insist on the 1白mits ofthe comm迁 ment it was prepared to make on this issue were somewhat df℃rent ffom those uppermost in Bruce’ s 1I5
Intervention mind.Considerations of economy were very important,16 as were considerations of domestic politics.In 1857 the first Palmerston government had won an election precipitated by the outbreak of the Arrow war in China,and Palmerston's second government launched the campaign of 1859-60 after the Taku repulse.For this government to become embroiled so soon in yet another large-scale war in China was likely to prove too much even for John Bull himself to carry off successfully with parliament and the electorate.The possibility of just such a war developing was a main point in the arguments of the numerous critics in England of the policy of intervention,and the govern- ment was always at some pains to insist that it was only going so far and no further. In any case,the British government was not urged to commit its forces deeply by the government it was supporting.The Manchu authorities maintained a decidedly ambivalent attitude on the question of foreign aid against the rebellion.The need for it,within limits the desirability of it,was recognized,but it was accepted with many misgivings as the lesser of two con- siderable evils.After the rejection of the Russian offer at the beginning of 1861 there was no further discussion of the question among high Manchu officials until the beginning of 1862,al- though plans for acquiring foreign arms and vessels were developed.The initiative in reopening the question of direct foreign aid came from the local gentry and officials at Shanghai. The former were particularly active,one of them,P'an Tseng- wei,even writing to Tseng Kuo-fan and travelling himself to Peking in order to urge the need for hiring foreign troops,not only to protect Shanghai but to help recapture inland cities such as Soochow.17 Leading Manchu officials were,however, chary of these proposals for the extensive use of foreign aid in the interior.Tseng Kuo-fan argued that,whereas at ports such as Shanghai and Ningpo Western and Chinese interests were bound up together and should be defended in common,this was not so in the interior.If foreign troops were hired to help recapture cities such as Soochow,Changchow or Nanking, 'failure would lead to ridicule and success to unpredictable difficulties later'.18 Prince Kung raised practical objections to the use of foreign troops in the interior.They moved much more quickly than did the Chinese,yet would be dependent on them 116
J9饣 矽召rV召 刀艹 'ε 刀 lIlind。 Considerations of economy were Ⅴery llIlportant,工 6 as were considcrations of domestic poⅡ住cs。 In 1857 the nrst 贽跏 :∶ ∶};;∶;∶∶}甯J觜:虔 1:∶ goverIllrlent1aun0hed the campaign of1859~60after the Taku :l}∶f冫B显瑟摁解盅孺 repuIse。 For tlt]1jis goverIllnent to become embroⅡ ed so soon h yet another hrgeˉ scaIe war Ⅱ1 Chha was like1y to prove too 黜 fl呈l￡:∶ I:∶∶l嚣:捃 嘛 ℃恳 簖 滞 撼 骢 a钅蛰 develop血g was a Inain pointin the arguInents ofthe numerous critics in Eng1and ofthe poⅡcy ofintervention,and the governˉ 茗 毖 $絮 苜 挠 氵叩 ep血 sω h⒍晚 that⒒ was∞圩 g血g 掖 on the question of fore珏 ￡犭f1盅咒奖逮喘 虏器鞯罗默。酝J⒊泔号嚣拇t属娆 买1aid against the rebeⅡion。 The need for it,Ⅵ泛伽 n1i1nits the desirabⅡity of it,was recogn弦ed,but it was accepted Ⅵ`ith many Ⅱ蛀sg⒈没ngs as the1esser of two con- 蕊derable evils。 After the r(:∶ iec砬 on ofthe Rus蛀 an ofFer at the 黜 i蹴 though plans for acquir至 溉捃耦 ng foreign arms and vesse1s were 嚣璐帮犭滗芒蹴扌拶宁 deve1oped。 The kⅡtiatiⅤe 血 reopenhg the question of dkect 苫 舞 苕 强 蓊 邈 瑟 瑙 磷 蘑 邋 :鞲 Pekhg in order to urge the need for hiring foreign troops,not on1y to protect shanghai but to heIp recapture in1and G沈 ies suoh as soochow。 工?Leading ⅣIanchu oflcia1s were,however, chary ofthese proposaIs for the extensiⅤe use of foreign aid h the inteⅡ or.Tseng Kuoˉ fan argued that,whereas at ports such as shanghai and卜 ⅡngpO Western and Chinese interests were bound up together and shou1d be defended in cOIll1110n,this 禚 d皿cu1t⒗ 弼 s1ateΓ 黯、鞴 ,18Prince Kmg rahed practiGtal ouections t。 、f∶i嵌潸琚懈 糨 摧 the use offoreign troops in the interior。 They王noVed Fnuch1nore quickly than did the Chinese,yet wou1d be dependent on them 116
Intervention for supplies;they were impatient and always anxious to advance, but China would have to supply the garrisons for the places they recaptured.Altogether,the value of using foreign troops beyond the treaty ports was questionable,he argued.19 In addition,although this was no doubt partly a face-saving formula,such aid as was accepted was to be on a temporary basis,necessary only in a period of acute crisis.'The English ambassador says it is possible to send troops to help suppress the rebels,but only temporarily,not permanently',an Edict of February 25,1862,read.'He should be informed that after the alarm was sounded at Shanghai,troops were despatched from every quarter.But since this relief has not yet arrived it is necessary to borrow the help of foreign countries;but once our strength has been concentrated there,and put under competent command,naturally there will be no need of help.'20 There was no anxiety to see large numbers of foreign troops brought to China to help suppress the rebels.In the middle of 1862,after the failure of the first combined attempt to clear a thirty-mile radius around Shanghai,there were reports that the British proposed to get more troops from India to assist in a later campaign.Both Tseng Kuo-fan and Tso Tsung-t'ang,who was leading the Chinese forces in Kiangsu and Chekiang,expressed their opposition to this,Tso being sceptical of their value on the ground that recent reverses near Shanghai showed that the barbarians were as much afraid of the rebels as China's own forces,and Tseng arguing that China's own resources were adequate to the task in hand.Many cities had been recaptured, Tseng wrote,the means for subduing Kiangsu and Chekiang exist,and if our policies do not succeed and the rebel conflagra- tion die out,China should bear the burden herself....How can we lightly hire foreign forces and so become an object of scorn to later generations?'China,in suppressing the rebels,should not plant the seeds of future complications,he concluded.21 When criticized for being too accommodating towards the foreign powers in the interpretation of the treaties,a situation in which Bruce could sympathize with him,Prince Kung vehemently defended the policies of the Tsungli Yamen and indicated another aspect of the official Manchu attitude towards foreign aid.'As for the opinion that foreign help in putting down the rebels is not trustworthy,I am very far from saying 117
rr,矽纟rv召 rF矽 jo刀 for suppⅡes;they werei1npauent and a1ways anxiousto advance, but China wouId have to supp1y伍 e garrisons for the places they recaptured.Altogether,the value of using foreign troops beyond the treaty ports、 vas ques伍 onab1e,he argued,|9 In addition,altllough this was no doubt partly a face冖 savmg formula,such aid as was accepted was to be on a temporary bas厶,necessary only in a peⅡ od of acute αi“s.‘ The Engloh ambassador says it is possible to scnd troops to help suppress the rebels,but0n1y temporaⅡ ly,not permanently’ ,an Edict of Februa,ry25,1862,read.‘ IΙe should be informed that after the alar1m was sounded at shanghai,troops、 氵、`ere despatched from eVery quarter。 But since this reⅡ ef has not yet arrived it is necessary to borrow the heIp offoreign countⅡ es;but once our strength has been cOncentrated there,and put under competent CoⅡ1Inand,naturaⅡ y there wi11be no need of help'20There Was no anxiety to see large numbers of f° reign troops brought to CⅡna to help suppress the rebcIs。 I殂 the middle of1862,after 伍e faⅡurc of the nrst c。mbined attempt to clear a thirtyˉmile radius around shanghai, there were reports that the British proposed to get more troops frO1n India to assist in a later campaign。 Both Tseng Kuoˉ fan and Tso Tsungˉ t’ ang,who lvas leading the Chinese forces in Xjangsu and Chekiang,expressed their opposition to this,Tso being sc。 ptical oftheir value on the ground that recent reVerses near Shanghai sh° wed that the barbarians were as much afraid of the rebels as China’ s Own forces, and Tseng arguhg that China’ s own resources were adequate to the task in hand,】 Ⅰˇ‘[any cities had been recaptured, Tseng wrote, ‘the Ineans for subduing XⅡ angsu and Chekiang exist,and if our poⅡ cies do not succeed and the rebe1con丑 agration die out,ChiI1a should bear the burden herse1【 、。。.1Iow can we ligl△ dy Ⅱre fore璁 n forces and so become an o刂 ect of scom to later generati° ns?’ C血a,in suppressing the rebels,should not phnt the seeds of future complications,he concluded。 ⒓1 When criticizcd for being too accommodathg to、vards the fore廴 了1powers in the interpretation of the treaties,a situation 瑰h婆茹l祧赢甜皙嬲骢飞紫责靶F慨e阝甘:号 indioated another aspeot ofthe o伍 cial⒒汀anchu attitude tOwards foreign aid。 ‘As for the opⅡ1ion that foreign help in putung down the rebels h not trustwOrthy,I am very far f1· om saying 1I7
Intervention that it is',he insisted.'It is just that there is a danger that if we do not make them our allies,they may be used by the rebels. The harm in that would be immeasurable.'2 Aid accepted in this spirit was,needless to say,readily abandoned when the need for it was felt to have passed.Foreign-officered forces,such as the Ever Victorious Army,were a constant source of appre- hension to the Manchu government,for it was difficult to keep control over them or to be sure of their later loyalties.There were no regrets among Chinese officials when the Ever Victorious Army was disbanded in May 1864,before the final capture of Nanking,for it had long been regarded as a trouble- some encumbrance.28 Altogether,the official Manchu view on the extent to which foreign aid against the rebels should go paralleled,on the obverse side of the coin,the official British view.Limited assist- ance,at the ports rather than in the interior,given indirectly by provision of arms and equipment rather than directly with foreign troops-all these points were common both to Bruce and the high Manchu officials in their approaches to the ques- tion.This is not to say that the aid actually given was exactly on this pattern.The local pressure at Shanghai in favour of more extended intervention was strong on both sides,while the Foreign Office was less insistent on the precise limits to be observed than was Bruce.But although there were differences in detail,there was agreement on fundamentals.In the circum- stances foreign intervention was necessary,but it should be limited and it was better given indirectly. Limited intervention was,in any case,all that was possible with the military forces Britain had available in China by 1862. Although her naval forces in the station were increased by about a third on what they had been in March 1861,her military establishment in China remained around the five-thousand mark and was not increased in the last years of the rebellion. There was,however,a very considerable relative increase in the British force stationed at Shanghai.In January 1862 this was between six and seven hundred men,to whom should be added four or five hundred French,two hundred and fifty volunteers and perhaps the same number of marines,a total European force of about fifteen hundred.During March and April the number of British and Indian troops at Shanghai was consider- 118
E汤招Fvε刀饣扔刀 曲atit h’ ,he hsisted.‘ It hmstthat伍 ∝eo ada血ger伍at r we do not1nake the1n our a1Ⅱes,they1nay be used by the rebe1s. The harn1in that wou1d be immeasurable。 ’22Aid accepted in this spirit was, need1ess to say, readⅡ y abandoned when the need forit was feltto have passed,ForeignˉofIicered forces,such as the Ever`△ ctorious Army,were a constant source of appreˉ hension to the Ⅸ冱anchu goⅤ ernment,for it、vas dⅡⅡcult to keep contro1over the血 0r to be sure of their Iatcr loyalties。 There were no regrets among Ch血 ese o珥 oals When the Ever `△ ctorious Army、 Ⅳas disbanded in卜汪ay1864,before the nna1 capture of NaⅡ king,for it had1ong been regarded as a troub1eˉ some encumbrance.23 Altogether,the of【 1cia1卜Ⅰanchu vicⅥ /on the extent tO which foreign aid against the rebcls shou1d go para11e1ed, on the obverse side of the coin,the o盅 ciaI British view.Lilnitcd assistance,at the ports rather than in the interior,given indirectly by provision of arms and equipment rather than direcuy w止 h foreign troops一 ˉal1these points were cOItl【 non both to Bruce and the high bΙ anchu o壬】icia1s in their approaches to the quesˉ tion。 This is not to say that the aid actuaⅡ y given was exact1y on this pattern。 The1ocal pressure at Sha【1ghai in favour of more extended intervention Was strong on both sides, whⅡ e the Foreign Omce was less insiste迎 t on the precise1i1nits to be observed than was Bruce。 But although there、vere diferences i⒒ detaⅡ , there、 vas agreement on fundamentals. In the circumstances fore廴罗1 intervention was necessary, but it should be Ⅱmited and⒈ was better g加en h扯rectly。 LiⅡⅡted intervention、 vas,in any case,a11that was possibIe w⒒h the n1iⅡ tary forces Britain had available i盘 China by1862. A1though her nava1forcesin the station were increased by about a third on what they had been in Ⅳ￡arch 1861,her1nilitary estabⅡshmeI△t in ChiIla remai正 1ed around the flⅤe-thousand mark and was not increascd in the1ast years of the rebeⅡ ion. There was,however,a very considerab1e relatiⅤ e increase in the British force stationed at Shangha⒈ In January 1862this llzas betlⅣeen six and seven hundred1nen,to、 vhom s缸 ou1d be added four or nve hundred French,two hundred and f【 ft,z vo1unteers and perhaps the same number of marines, a tota1European force of about￡ fteen humdred,During ⅣΙarch and AprⅡ the number of British and Indian troops at Shanghai Was considerˉ 118
Intervention ably increased from the garrison then being withdrawn from Tientsin,and by the middle of the year the regular British force there numbered about two thousand five hundred.With other additions the total force available was probably in the region of four thousand.24 In the circumstances this was cer- tainly a formidable force,especially when the great superiority of its arms and training are taken into account.But it was not of a size,nor was it ever intended,to be used much beyond the defence of Shanghai and its immediate vicinity.In fact one of the arguments used by Rear-Admiral Hope in favour of defending a radius around Shanghai rather than simply the city itself was that it would take fewer troops,using them in flying columns to support Chinese garrisons,than to man walls four and a half miles in extent.The object was to keep the size of the force needed at Shanghai as small as possible.25 The British military commander in China during most of 1862,Brig.-Gen.Staveley,was authorized to send for additional troops from India if he felt it absolutely necessary,but he was certainly not encouraged to do so.When he did call for them, upon what the War Office regarded as the inadequate ground that Indian troops stood the Shanghai climate better than British,he was reprimanded and told that it was the opinion of the government that 'the British military forces at Shanghae may safely be reduced'.26 In March 1863,over twelve months before the capture of Nanking,Bruce also urged upon him the desirability of making arrangements with the Chinese authorities for the defence of the port 'which would gradually enable us to reduce the number of troops at Shanghae,and consequently the expenses of the occupation;for I look with dread at the conse- quences of the financial difficulties that must result from the present state of expenditure'.27 In the middle of 1863,by which time the threat to Shanghai was safely past,the British force there was reduced to about fifteen hundred.The British forces maintained at Shanghai during 1862-63 were never capable of an extensive campaign against the rebellion. The occasions on which regular British naval and military forces were engaged in direct action against the rebels were confined to the year 1862.The manner in which these engage- ments were first undertaken illustrates the quite unplanned nature of the change in British policy in the first part of that 119
r汔 莎纟rV召 't莎 氵o″ ably horeased from t缸 e garrison then bong withdrawn from Tientsin, and by the ⅡⅡddle of the ycar the regu1ar British force there numbered about two thousand flve hundred, With other additons thc total force avallable was probab1y in the region of four thousand。 2‘ Ill the circumstances t⒕ is was cerˉ tahIy a form姒 able force,鸲 peo斑ly whe且 the great supero⒒ ty of its arms and trai丑hg are1ti【 l1ke⒚ i狃to account.Butit was not of a size,⒑ or was it ever intended,to bc used1nuch beyOnd the defc殂ce of shan窿⒙i and扭s immedate vicinity.In fact one of the aFguments used by RearˉAdlniral Hope iI1 favour of defcndhg a radus arOL【nd Shallgh碰 rather than simply the G“y⒒self was that⒒ would take fewer troops,us血g them in Ⅱ】 w馘`1ing columns to support Chhese garroons,than to man ls four and a har miles in cxtent。 The o凵ect Was to keep the size ofthe force needed at shanghai as sma11as possibIe.25 The British Ⅱ1ilitary co【 n1nander in China during most of 1862,Brig.Gen.Staveley,、 vas authorized to send for additiona1 troops from Indh if he felt it absolutely necessary,but he was certaⅡⅡy not encouraged to do so。 When he did ca1l for them, upo众 lvhat the War0丘ce regarded as the iⅡ adequate ground that Indian troops stood the shanghai climate better than Br扭ish,he lvas repr血nanded and told thatit was the opinion of the goverxlment钅Ⅱat ‘the British mⅡ ⒒ary forces at Shanghae may safely be roduced’ 。26In March I863,over twe1Ⅴe months before t缸 e capture of Nankhg,Bruce aIso urged upon hhn the desirabⅡ妣y ofmaking arrangements v注th the Chhese authorities for the defence ofthe port‘ which、Ⅳould gradua11y enab1e us to reducc the number oftroops at shanghae,and consequently the expe⒑ses of the Occupation;for I look、Ⅳith dread at the cOnseˉ quences of the盘 nancia1dⅡ ncu⒒ies t⒖at must resu1t froⅡ 1the presemt state of expenditure’ ,27In the Iniddle of1863,by wboch thne the threat to shanghai was safely past,the British force there xvas reduced to about fifteen hundrcd,The Br⒒ ish forces mahtaiⅡed at shanghai duri且 g1862-63、vere never capab1e of an extensive campaign agahst the rebe1Ⅱ on. Thc OccasiO⒑ s on which regular Br如 ish naval and mⅡ ⒒ary forces were e⒔gaged h direct action agahst the rebels were comfmed to the year1862,The manner in which thesc cngageˉ ments Were nrst undertake且 illustrates the qu⒒ e unplanned nature of the change in Br“ ish po⒒cy im伍e且rst part of that 119
Intervention year,for they were begun well in advance of any Foreign Office approval or instruction.At the beginning of 1862 British policy,as understood by the Foreign Office,did not go beyond the defence of the foreign settlement areas save at Shanghai,while negotiation with the rebels where necessary was still an accepted part of it.'It is true that the accounts we receive on all sides show the Taepings to be little better than Banditti organized on a large scale and bent on free quarters and plunder',a Foreign Office memorandum of February 22 read,'and we have abundant evidence of the destructive nature of the insurrection and of the blasphemous and immoral character of the superstition on which it is based;but our efforts in the various interviews which our agents have held with the Rebel leaders have been directed chiefly to securing the persons and Property of British subjects,and maintaining our rights to trade as secured for us by Treaty.'28 A few days after this was written Rear-Admiral Hope's report telling of the refusal of the rebels to extend the agreement not to approach the treaty ports was received,and early in March his instructions were extended to provide for the defence of all the ports not already in rebel hands by the naval forces under his command. There was no instruction about the use of military forces,and any need for action beyond the ports was not yet envisaged by the Foreign Office.29 At Shanghai,however,action beyond the walls of the city had already been taken and more was being planned even before these instructions were sent.Early in February consul Medhurst had urged the need for action by British forces beyond the walls on the ground that it was necessary to clear a belt of country around the city in order to maintain supplies for its population, now swollen by refugees.He saw such action as essentially defensive,and quite consistent with a policy of strict neutrality.30 On February 21 Hope used naval forces to co-operate with Chinese troops under Ward in clearing the rebels from the immediate vicinity of Shanghai and to recapture the towns of Woosung and Kaokiao(which commanded the river approaches to the port).He also urged upon Bruce the need for more extensive action,and suggested clearing the country within a line running through towns approximately thirty miles out. Bruce thought this project'within the scope of the intentions of 120
JPc莎 纟rV召刀莎Forr year, for they were begun we11 i殂 adVance of any Foreign Om。e appr。val or instruction. At the beghnhg of 1862 Bri伍sh po⒒cy,as understood by the Foreign omce,did not go beyond the defence of thc forcign settlement areas save at shanghai, whi1e negot至 ation Ⅵ泅th the rebels where necessary was stⅡ l an accepted part of it.‘It is true that the accOunts we receive on a11sides show t受1e Taepi【1gs to be litt1e better than Band⒒ti organized on a large scale and bent on free quarters and pIunder’ ,a Forcign omce1mem。randum of Fcbruary22 read,‘and we have abundant evide且 Ce of the destructive nature of the insurrection alld of the blasphemous and 虹nmoral character of the superstition on which it is based; but our efForts in the various interviews which our agents have held Ⅵ砬th the Rebe11caders have been directed ohieny t。 securing the persons and Propcr1;∶ ,厂 of BⅡ tisb sul[)1iects,and m狨 ntajl111j[111g our rights to trade as secured for us by Trc敲 y。 ’28A few days after this was writtcn Rearˉ AdRlliral Hope’ s rcport te11hg of the refusa1of the rebe1s to exteェ 1d the agreement not to approach the treaty ports was received,and carly in R淫 arch his klstructions were extended to provide for the defencc of a11the ports not a1ready in rebe1hands by the nava1forces under his command。 There was no instruction about the use of【 nⅡ⒒ary forces,and any need for action beyond the ports llzas not yet eIlvisaged by the Fore迦” OmcC.29 At Shangha廴 howCⅤer,ac伍on beyond the waⅡ s ofthe city had already been take】 △and moFe was behg planned even before these instructions were sent.Early in February consu1bΙ edhurst had urged thc need for action by British forces beyond the wal1s on the ground that it、 Vas necessary to clear a be1t of country around the city i血 0rder to rnaintah supplics for its population, noⅥ⒎sWo11cn by refugees, 【Ie saⅥ/such action as essentiaⅡ y defensivc,and quite cOnsistent v吐 th a policy ofstrict neutrality。 80 On February 21 Hope used nava1forccs to c。 ˉoperate Ⅵ注th Chhese troops under Ward i【 l clearing the rebels frO1n the Ⅱnmediate vicinity of Shanghai a珏 d to recapture the tOwns of Woosung and Kaokiao(、 Ⅴhich coln1nanded the riⅤ er approaches to the port,。 ]He also urged upon Bruce the need for more extensiⅤe action,and suggestcd c1earing thc country withh a line runnil111g through towIls approx妞nately tllirty lnⅡ es out。 Bruoe thought this pr° jcct‘Ⅵ泅tkin the scope of the intentions of 120