Modern Asian Studies,o,2(1976),pp.195-223.Printed in Great Britain. Foreign-Training and China's Self-Strengthening: The Case of Feng-huang-shan,1864-1873 RICHARD J.SMITH Rice University,Houston,Texas ONE of the principal concerns of China's 'self-strengthening movement' in the T'ung-chih period (1862-1874)was the question of military reform.Organizational change was not a central issue,for the Ch'ing dynasty had already found in the innovative armies known as yung-ying (lit.,brave battalions')a comparatively effective military system com- patible with existing economic and administrative institutions.1 But changes in training methods-especially officer training-and weapons came to be viewed as essential to the self-strengthening effort.2 Ex- perience in the huge and devastating Taiping Rebellion(1850-1864), together with the repeated humiliations suffered by China at the hands of foreigners in the two decades following the Opium War of 1839-1842, had brought the Ch'ing government to a greater awareness of the need for introducing Western-style weapons and training in Chinese armies. Particularly convincing was the effective use of foreign troops and foreign-officered contingents (such as the vaunted Ever-Victorious Army)against the Taipings in the area of Shanghai during 1862.3 But in Chinese eyes,the employment of foreign troops and officers could never be anything more than a temporary expedient.Ch'ing policy- makers aimed at eliminating dependence on foreigners as soon as pos- sible,while building China's own military capabilities in order to contend with both internal and external challenges.These twin goals lay at the heart of self-strengthening. 1 On yung-ying,see my article,'Chinese Military Institutions in the Mid-Nineteenth Century,'forthcoming in the Journal of Asian History.Reorganization of Green Standard forces,notably the so-called Retrained Army (lien-chin)and Ting Jih- ch'ang's fu-piao,essentially went no further than 'yung-yingization.'See Wang Erh- min,'Lien-chun ti ch'i-yuan chi ch'i i-i,'(The origin and significance of the Retrained Army),Ta-lu tsa-chih (Mainland Miscellany),34.6-7,esp.221;also Lui Shih-ch'iang, Ting Jih-ch'ang yu tzu-ch'iang yun-tung (Ting Jih-ch'ang and the self-strengthening movement;Taipei,1972),pp.186-90. 2 See,for example,Yang-wu yuin-tung (The foreign matters'movement;Shanghai, 1961),Vol.3,Pp.441,457,459,462-3,466. 3 Richard J.Smith,Barbarian Officers of Imperial China:Ward,Gordon and the Taiping Rebellion'(Ph.D.diss.,University of California,Davis,1972),esp.ch.4. I95
Modern Asian Studies, 10, 2 (1976), pp. I95-223. Printed in Great Britain. Foreign-Training and China's Self-Strengthening: The Case of Feng-huang-shan, 1864--1873 RICHARD J. SMITH Rice University, Houston, Texas O NE of the principal concerns of China's 'self-strengthening movement' in the T'ung-chih period (I862-1874) was the question of military reform. Organizational change was not a central issue, for the Ch'ing dynasty had already found in the innovative armies known asyung-ying (lit., 'brave battalions') a comparatively effective military system compatible with existing economic and administrative institutions.1 But changes in training methods-especially officer training-and weapons came to be viewed as essential to the self-strengthening effort.2 Experience in the huge and devastating Taiping Rebellion (I850-1864), together with the repeated humiliations suffered by China at the hands of foreigners in the two decades following the Opium War of I839-I842, had brought the Ch'ing government to a greater awareness of the need for introducing Western-style weapons and training in Chinese armies. Particularly convincing was the effective use of foreign troops and foreign-officered contingents (such as the vaunted Ever-Victorious Army) against the Taipings in the area of Shanghai during I862.3 But in Chinese eyes, the employment of foreign troops and officers could never be anything more than a temporary expedient. Ch'ing policymakers aimed at eliminating dependence on foreigners as soon as possible, while building China's own military capabilities in order to contend with both internal and external challenges. These twin goals lay at the heart of self-strengthening. 1 Onyung-ying, see my article, 'Chinese Military Institutions in the Mid-Nineteenth Century,' forthcoming in the Journal of Asian History. Reorganization of Green Standard forces, notably the so-called Retrained Army (lien-chiin) and Ting Jihch'ang'sfu-piao, essentially went no further than 'yung-yingization.' See Wang Erhmin, 'Lien-chun ti ch'i-yiian chi ch'i i-i,' (The origin and significance of the 'Retrained Army'), Ta-lu tsa-chih (Mainland Miscellany), 34.6-7, esp. 221; also Lti Shih-ch'iang, Ting Jih-ch'ang yi tzu-ch'iang yiin-tung (Ting Jih-ch'ang and the self-strengthening movement; Taipei, I972), pp. I86-90. 2 See, for example, Yang-wu yin-tung (The 'foreign matters' movement; Shanghai, I961), Vol. 3, pp. 44I, 457, 459, 462-3, 466. 3 Richard J. Smith, 'Barbarian Officers of Imperial China: Ward, Gordon and the Taiping Rebellion' (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Davis, I972), esp. ch. 4. I95
I96 R.J.SMITH The decade from 1864 to 1874 seemed to offer an ideal opportunity for China's self-assertion in military affairs.By 1864 the Taipings had been suppressed,giving the Ch'ing government self-confidence and breathing-room to deal with less formidable but still threatening up- risings such as the Nien Rebellion(1853-1868).At the same time,the 'Cooperative Policy'of the foreign powers following the Peking Con- ventions of 186o gave indications that the West was prepared to assist China in the buildup of its military.4 Following the capture of Nanking in July,1864,the frantic search for a military means to contend with the rebels,which earlier had led to the development of ad hoc foreign- officered Chinese contingents,gave way to what seemed to be a con- certed effort to reform the Chinese military along Western lines through the systematic use of foreign-training.Surprisingly,very little scholarly attention has been given to this important reform effort. The training programs that replaced the Western-officered con- tingents in 1864 varied widely in origins,sponsorship,composition,size, financial resources,and administration.5 As in the Taiping period, Britain and France took the lead in promoting foreign-training,each vying for heightened influence in Chinese military affairs.Some pro- grams were founded with the avowed aim of training Chinese officers for the future;others,with more immediate military needs in mind. Men and officers for training programs were drawn from a variety of sources-Green Standard (usually piao or hsiek),Banner garrisons,or local yung forces-sometimes in combination.Customs revenue often financed foreign-training efforts,but likin,regular provincial funds,and the private resources of individuals might also be used.Head military bureaus(chuin-hsii tsung-chu),established in nearly every province during the Taiping period,frequently played a role in military administration. Most major training programs operated in accordance with specific regulations,but these were devised by local Ch'ing authorities rather than the central government.Moreover,drill procedures,arms,and even the language of instruction varied widely in the various programs.6 4 See Mary C.Wright,The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism:The T'ung-chih Restora- tion,1862-1874 (New York,1967),chas 3 and 9. s There are vast amounts of material on the various foreign-training programs, including diplomatic despatches,first-hand accounts from both Western and Chinese observers,and newspaper reports.Much of this material remains to be used.Yang-wu yin-tung,Vol.3,provides a wealth of information on the training programs at Tient- sin(Pp.443-58,475-7,479,483-4,491,493-44968,501-2),Canton(45966,468- 70,481,5o9-Io,519),Foochow(47i-3,477-8,482,597-6o5)andT'ang-chueh (Wuchang;492,494-6).Additional observations on the problem of foreign-training may be found in ibid.,pp.441-2,452-7,4668,482-7,499,5o1-5. 6 The above discussion is based largely on the rang-wu yun-tung documents cited in
The decade from I864 to I874 seemed to offer an ideal opportunity for China's self-assertion in military affairs. By 1864 the Taipings had been suppressed, giving the Ch'ing government self-confidence and breathing-room to deal with less formidable but still threatening uprisings such as the Nien Rebellion (1853-1868). At the same time, the 'Cooperative Policy' of the foreign powers following the Peking Conventions of I860 gave indications that the West was prepared to assist China in the buildup of its military.4 Following the capture of Nanking in July, 1864, the frantic search for a military means to contend with the rebels, which earlier had led to the development of ad hoc foreignofficered Chinese contingents, gave way to what seemed to be a concerted effort to reform the Chinese military along Western lines through the systematic use-of foreign-training. Surprisingly, very little scholarly attention has been given to this important reform effort. The training programs that replaced the Western-officered contingents in 1864 varied widely in origins, sponsorship, composition, size, financial resources, and administration.5 As in the Taiping period, Britain and France took the lead in promoting foreign-training, each vying for heightened influence in Chinese military affairs. Some programs were founded with the avowed aim of training Chinese officers for the future; others, with more immediate military needs in mind. Men and officers for training programs were drawn from a variety of sources-Green Standard (usually piao or hsieh), Banner garrisons, or local yung forces-sometimes in combination. Customs revenue often financed foreign-training efforts, but likin, regular provincial funds, and the private resources of individuals might also be used. Head military bureaus (chiin-hsii tsung-chii), established in nearly every province during the Taiping period, frequently played a role in military administration. Most major training programs operated in accordance with specific regulations, but these were devised by local Ch'ing authorities rather than the central government. Moreover, drill procedures, arms, and even the language of instruction varied widely in the various programs.6 4 See Mary C. Wright, The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T'ung-chih Restoration, I862-1874 (New York, I967), chas 3 and 9. 5 There are vast amounts of material on the various foreign-training programs, including diplomatic despatches, first-hand accounts from both Western and Chinese observers, and newspaper reports. Much of this material remains to be used. rang-wu yiin-tung, Vol. 3, provides a wealth of information on the training programs at Tientsin (pp. 443-58, 475-7, 479, 483-4, 49I, 493-4, 496-8, 501-2), Canton (459-66, 468- 70, 48I, 509-10, 519), Foochow (47I-3, 477-8, 482, 597-605) and T'ang-chiieh (Wuchang; 492, 494-6). Additional observations on the problem of foreign-training may be found in ibid., pp. 441-2, 452-7, 466-8, 482-7, 499, 501-5. 6 The above discussion is based largely on the Tang-wuyin-tung documents cited in I96 R. J. SMITH
FOREIGN-TRAINING AND CHINA I97 Of the half-dozen or so major foreign-training programs initiated after the suppression of the Taipings,the training camp begun at Feng- huang-shan,near the thriving treaty port of Shanghai,seemed to offer the greatest chance for success.British officials wholeheartedly endorsed the program and pledged their support,while the Ch'ing government, through the Tsungli Yamen,gave assurances that Feng-huang-shan would be maintained as a bona fide institution.7 One British officer involved in the program wrote that Feng-huang-shan was to be the Aldershot of China.'s But Feng-huang-shan never lived up to his expectations.After nearly a decade of operation,the camp had little to show for an expenditure of perhaps 1.3 million taels.Instead of pro- ducing large numbers of Western-trained Chinese officers for the in- struction of other Chinese troops,the program succumbed to a variety of abuses and fell under heavy criticism from foreigner and Chinese alike.In mid-1873 the program was abruptly terminated,to the satis- faction of some and the displeasure of others.In all,the experiment was a failure.Yet the history of the training program at Feng-huang-shan is instructive,for it provides an illuminating perspective on the role of foreign assistance in China's early self-strengthening movement,and highlights some of the many problems confronting advocates of military reform in the T'ung-chih period.10 The Establishment of Foreign-Training at Feng-huang-shan The rise of Feng-huang-shan may be traced directly to the fall of the Ever-Victorious Army.For two years,from early 1862 to early 1864, the Ever-Victorious Army served Chinese and Western interests as a note 5,although selected Foreign Office documents and Western-language news- papers such as the North-China Herald and Hong Kong Daily Press have also been con- sulted. 7 British Consular and Embassy Archives (hereafter F.O.228),F.O.228/366, Wade to Parkes,December 31,1864. s Story's 'reminiscences'in A.E.Hake,Events in the Taeping Rebellion (London, 18g1),P.5I7. According to the North-China Herald's estimate (which the head drillmaster did not dispute),the camp cost 150,oo0 taels per year to maintain.North-China Herald, June 14,1873 and June 21,1873.Gordon estimated in 1864 that payment for a con- tingent of one thousand officers and men (including foreigners)would exceed ten thousand taels per month.F.O.228/368,Gordon to Brown,September(day missing), 1864.See also Ch'ou-pan i-wou shih-mo (A complete record of the management of barbarian affairs;Peiping,193o;hereafter I.W.S.M.)T'ung-chih 25:26b,which provides a similar estimate. 10 See the general discussion in Wright,The Last Stand,ch.9,esp.pp.200-17. Although I do not agree with all of the late Professor Wright's conclusions,I remain indebted to her stimulating and pioneering work
FOREIGN-TRAINING AND CHINA Of the half-dozen or so major foreign-training programs initiated after the suppression of the Taipings, the training camp begun at Fenghuang-shan, near the thriving treaty port of Shanghai, seemed to offer the greatest chance for success. British officials wholeheartedly endorsed the program and pledged their support, while the Ch'ing government, through the Tsungli Yamen, gave assurances that Feng-huang-shan would be maintained as a bona fide institution.7 One British officer involved in the program wrote that Feng-huang-shan was to be 'the Aldershot of China.'8 But Feng-huang-shan never lived up to his expectations. After nearly a decade of operation, the camp had little to show for an expenditure of perhaps I.3 million taels.9 Instead of producing large numbers of Western-trained Chinese officers for the instruction of other Chinese troops, the program succumbed to a variety of abuses and fell under heavy criticism from foreigner and Chinese alike. In mid-I873 the program was abruptly terminated, to the satisfaction of some and the displeasure of others. In all, the experiment was a failure. Yet the history of the training program at Feng-huang-shan is instructive, for it provides an illuminating perspective on the role of foreign assistance in China's early self-strengthening movement, and highlights some of the many problems confronting advocates of military reform in the T'ung-chih period.10 The Establishment of Foreign- Training at Feng-huang-shan The rise of Feng-huang-shan may be traced directly to the fall of the Ever-Victorious Army. For two years, from early I862 to early I864, the Ever-Victorious Army served Chinese and Western interests as a note 5, although selected Foreign Office documents and Western-language newspapers such as the North-China Herald and Hong Kong Daily Press have also been consulted. 7British Consular and Embassy Archives (hereafter F.O. 228), F.O. 228/366, Wade to Parkes, December 31, I864. 8 Story's 'reminiscences' in A. E. Hake, Events in the Taeping Rebellion (London, 1891), p. 517. 9 According to the North-China Herald's estimate (which the head drillmaster did not dispute), the camp cost 50o,o000 taels per year to maintain. North-China Herald, June 14, 1873 and June 21, I873. Gordon estimated in I864 that payment for a contingent of one thousand officers and men (including foreigners) would exceed ten thousand taels per month. F.O. 228/368, Gordon to Brown, September (day missing), I864. See also Ch'ou-pan i-wu shih-mo (A complete record of the management of barbarian affairs; Peiping, 1930; hereafter I.W.S.M.) T'ung-chih 25: 26b, which provides a similar estimate. 10 See the general discussion in Wright, The Last Stand, ch. 9, esp. pp. 200-I7. Although I do not agree with all of the late Professor Wright's conclusions, I remain indebted to her stimulating and pioneering work. I97
198 R.J.SMITH defense force for the treaty port of Shanghai and a modernizing agent for the Ch'ing military.But by the spring of 1864 the contingent had clearly outlived its usefulness.According to reports by the commander of the force,Charles G.Gordon,and his superior as governor of Kiangsu,Li Hung-chang,the Ever-Victorious Army had become un- ruly,unpredictable,ineffective and even dangerous.12 It had failed to produce significant numbers of Western-trained Chinese officers,and had been a source of constant friction between Chinese and Western officials.13 In view of the contingent's obvious deficiencies,Gordon and Li hastened to disband the force in May,1864;but British officials at Shanghai-notably the strong-willed consul,Harry Parkes,and the British commander-in-chief,General W.G.Brown-vigorously op- posed the move on grounds that Shanghai would be left virtually un- protected in the event of a Taiping resurgence.14 Their opposition was largely unjustified in view of the imminent fall of Nanking and the presence of Li Hung-chang's Anhwei Army in the area.Nonetheless,Li was forced to strike a bargain with Parkes:Disbandment would take place,but portions of the Ever-Victorious Army were to be retained as the nucleus of a foreign-training program(and defense force)supervised by British drillmasters but now no longer under the direct control of British officers.15 Certain foreign observers perceived that the retention of a force 'officered by Englishmen-whether you style them Military instructors or commanding officers'would promote rivalry among the other Western powers,but local British officials at Shanghai considered the move justifiable in the light of growing French influence in foreign- training programs.16 1 Smith,Barbarian Officers,'currently being revised for publication. 12 Gordon Papers (British Museum),Additional Manuscripts (Add.MSS.) 52,389,Gordon to Mother,June 2,1864:The Force is now completely disbanded, and I think a great danger removed both for Shanghai the Chinese.'See also Li Hung-chang's memorial in I.W.S.M.Tung-chih,25:23b-27b. 13 Smith,Barbarian Officers,'esp.chs 5,6,8,and 9. 14 Stanley Lane-Poole,The Life of Sir Harry Parkes(2 vols,London,1894),I,497-505. 1s Documentation on the negotiations leading to the compromise is voluminous in both Chinese and Western languages.See the correspondence in F.O.228/367 between Parkes and various Ch'ing and British officials;also I.W.S.M.T'ung-chih, 25:24b-26;Li Wen-chung-kung ch'iian-chi (The complete papers of Li Hung-chang; Nanking,1908),Letters,5:16;Fu-Wu kung-tu (Official letters of the governor of Kiangsu [Ting Jih-ch'ang];Canton,1877),50:6b.I am grateful to Professor K.C. Liu,of the University of California,Davis,for making Ting's papers available to me. 16 Gordon Papers,Add.MSS.,52,387,Hart to Gordon,May 17,1864;Hong Kong Daily Press,July 29,1864.Anglo-French rivalry in the establishment of foreign- training programs emerged in 1862 and continued to be a prominent theme in the post-Taiping period.See,for example,Wang,'Lien-chiin,'34.7:222,note I1; Yang-wu yun-tung,Vol.3,p.464;Tong Ling Tch'ouang,'La politique francaise en
defense force for the treaty port of Shanghai and a modernizing agent for the Ch'ing military.11 But by the spring of I864 the contingent had clearly outlived its usefulness. According to reports by the commander of the force, Charles G. Gordon, and his superior as governor of Kiangsu, Li Hung-chang, the Ever-Victorious Army had become unruly, unpredictable, ineffective and even dangerous.12 It had failed to produce significant numbers of Western-trained Chinese officers, and had been a source of constant friction between Chinese and Western officials.13 In view of the contingent's obvious deficiencies, Gordon and Li hastened to disband the force in May, I864; but British officials at Shanghai-notably the strong-willed consul, Harry Parkes, and the British commander-in-chief, General W. G. Brown-vigorously opposed the move on grounds that Shanghai would be left virtually unprotected in the event of a Taiping resurgence.14 Their opposition was largely unjustified in view of the imminent fall of Nanking and the presence of Li Hung-chang's Anhwei Army in the area. Nonetheless, Li was forced to strike a bargain with Parkes: Disbandment would take place, but portions of the Ever-Victorious Army were to be retained as the nucleus of a foreign-training program (and defense force) supervised by British drillmasters but now no longer under the direct control of British officers.15 Certain foreign observers perceived that the retention of a force 'officered by Englishmen-whether you style them Military instructors or commanding officers' would promote rivalry among the other Western powers, but local British officials at Shanghai considered the move justifiable in the light of growing French influence in foreigntraining programs.16 11 Smith, 'Barbarian Officers,' currently being revised for publication. 12 Gordon Papers (British Museum), Additional Manuscripts (Add. MSS.) 52,389, Gordon to Mother, June 2, I864: 'The Force is now completely disbanded, and I think a great danger removed both for Shanghai & the Chinese.' See also Li Hung-chang's memorial in I.W.S.M. T'ung-chih, 25: 23b-27b. 13 Smith, 'Barbarian Officers,' esp. chs 5, 6, 8, and 9. 14 Stanley Lane-Poole, The Life of Sir Harry Parkes (2 vols, London, 1894), 1,497-505. 15 Documentation on the negotiations leading to the compromise is voluminous in both Chinese and Western languages. See the correspondence in F.O. 228/367 between Parkes and various Ch'ing and British officials; also L.W.S.M. T'ung-chih, 25: 24b-26; Li Wen-chung-kung ch'iian-chi (The complete papers of Li Hung-chang; Nanking, I908), Letters, 5: I6; Fu-Wu kung-tu (Official letters of the governor of Kiangsu [Ting Jih-ch'ang]; Canton, I877), 50: 6b. I am grateful to Professor K. C. Liu, of the University of California, Davis, for making Ting's papers available to me. 16 Gordon Papers, Add. MSS., 52,387, Hart to Gordon, May I7, I864; Hong Kong Daily Press, July 29, I864. Anglo-French rivalry in the establishment of foreigntraining programs emerged in I862 and continued to be a prominent theme in the post-Taiping period. See, for example, Wang, 'Lien-chiin,' 34.7: 222, note I I; Tang-wuyiin-tung, Vol. 3, p. 464; Tong Ling Tch'ouang, 'La politique francaise en I98 R. J. SMITH
FOREIGN-TRAINING AND CHINA I99 The compromise proposal agreed to by Li and Parkes reflected a mixture of motives.Local British officials at Shanghai,aggressive, chauvinistic,and,in the main,imbued with a strong sense of personal and national self-interest,evinced a clear desire to maintain competi- tive presence'with the French in foreign-training.Moreover,they- like virtually all of their countrymen-were vitally concerned with the security of Shanghai and felt that the Chinese should assume total responsibility for the protection of the treaty port.17 Other individuals, such as Gordon and the British minister at Peking,Frederick Bruce, were no less anxious to protect Britain's reputation and interests,but they also believed that foreign-training was essential to the moderniza- tion of China's military,and should be continued even after the danger to Shanghai had subsided.18 To be certain,these men saw the creation of a strong and self-sufficient China as beneficial to British as well as Chinese interests,but one senses that their reform proposals contained at least a measure of altruism.19 Chinese policymakers,for their part,were naturally anxious to assure the security of strategic areas,and to build up China's military capabilities.But their immediate concern was to eliminate the need for foreign assistance and minimize foreign interference in Chinese affairs. Li Hung-chang,from his experience with the Ever-Victorious Army, had come to appreciate the value of Western arms and training,and had even begun to introduce these innovations into his own Anhwei Army.20 But he did not wholeheartedly endorse the idea of a foreign- training program under British sponsorship.Li greatly resented the Chine pendant les guerres des Taipings'(Ph.D.diss.,University of Paris,1950),p. 305;F.O.228/376,Robertson to Hammond,January 29,1862;P.R.O.(Public Record Office)30/22/49,Bruce to Russell,August 14,1862. 17F.O.228/367,Parkes to Gordon,May 19,1864;Lane-Poole,Parkes,I,498;Fu-Wu kung-tu,50:6b.F.O.228/367 Parkes to Wade,July 29,1864,highlights the concern of British officials over French foreign-training activity at the time. 18 F.O.228/366,Bruce to Parkes,June 7,1864;ibid.,Wade to Parkes,November 28,1864;see also note 24.Bruce had long been an advocate of Chinese military improvement. 19 See Jack Gerson,'Letter by Frederick Bruce',Ch'ing-shih wen-t'i,1.5 (April, 1967),13.Unfortunately,even such comparatively sympathetic individuals as Wade could be rather heavy-handed in pursuing what they believed to be China's best interests.Wade believed,for example,that Li Hung-chang should be made to adhere to 'the project of military organization'at Feng-huang-shan in return for Great Britain's willingness to allow British officers to serve in Li's Anhwei Army as gunners.Wade did acknowledge,however,that Li already seemed 'seriously dis- posed'to support the plan.F.O.228/366,Wade to Parkes,n.d.(July 6-July 27, 1864). 20 Wang Erh-min,Huai-chan chih (Treatise on the Anhwei Army;Taipei,1967), Pp.193-200
FOREIGN-TRAINING AND CHINA The compromise proposal agreed to by Li and Parkes reflected a mixture of motives. Local British officials at Shanghai, aggressive, chauvinistic, and, in the main, imbued with a strong sense of personal and national self-interest, evinced a clear desire to maintain 'competitive presence' with the French in foreign-training. Moreover, theylike virtually all of their countrymen--were vitally concerned with the security of Shanghai and felt that the Chinese should assume total responsibility for the protection of the treaty port.17 Other individuals, such as Gordon and the British minister at Peking, Frederick Bruce, were no less anxious to protect Britain's reputation and interests, but they also believed that foreign-training was essential to the modernization of China's military, and should be continued even after the danger to Shanghai had subsided.18 To be certain, these men saw the creation of a strong and self-sufficient China as beneficial to British as well as Chinese interests, but one senses that their reform proposals contained at least a measure of altruism.19 Chinese policymakers, for their part, were naturally anxious to assure the security of strategic areas, and to build up China's military capabilities. But their immediate concern was to eliminate the need for foreign assistance and minimize foreign interference in Chinese affairs. Li Hung-chang, from his experience with the Ever-Victorious Army, had come to appreciate the value of Western arms and training, and had even begun to introduce these innovations into his own Anhwei Army.20 But he did not wholeheartedly endorse the idea of a foreigntraining program under British sponsorship. Li greatly resented the Chine pendant les guerres des Taipings' (Ph.D. diss., University of Paris, I950), p. 305; F.O. 228/376, Robertson to Hammond, January 29, I862; P.R.O. (Public Record Office) 30/22/49, Bruce to Russell, August 14, 1862. 17 F.O. 228/367, Parkes to Gordon, May I9, i864; Lane-Poole, Parkes, I, 498;Fu-Wu kung-tu, 50: 6b. F.O. 228/367 Parkes to Wade, July 29, I864, highlights the concern of British officials over French foreign-training activity at the time. 18 F.O. 228/366, Bruce to Parkes, June 7, I864; ibid., Wade to Parkes, November 28, I864; see also note 24. Bruce had long been an advocate of Chinese military improvement. 19 See Jack Gerson, 'Letter by Frederick Bruce', Ch'ing-shih wen-t'i, 1.5 (April, 1967), 13. Unfortunately, even such comparatively sympathetic individuals as Wade could be rather heavy-handed in pursuing what they believed to be China's best interests. Wade believed, for example, that Li Hung-chang should be made to adhere to 'the project of military organization' at Feng-huang-shan in return for Great Britain's willingness to allow British officers to serve in Li's Anhwei Army as gunners. Wade did acknowledge, however, that Li already seemed 'seriously disposed' to support the plan. F.O. 228/366, Wade to Parkes, n.d. (July 6-July 27, I864). 20 Wang Erh-min, Huai-chiin chih (Treatise on the Anhwei Army; Taipei, I967), pp. I93-200. I99
200 R.J.SMITH cajolery of Parkes and others,and perceived in Western demands for the expansion of foreign-training an attempt to 'seize our military authority and squander our financial resources.'21 His aim,therefore,was to gain full control of the situation as soon as possible.Fortunately,Li had valuable allies in the energetic Shanghai taotai,Ting Jih-ch'ang,and Gordon,now Li's close personal friend.22 After disbanding the Ever-Victorious Army,Gordon had planned to return to England,but pressure from both British officials and the Chinese induced him to stay and initiate the foreign-training project. Although not inclined to devote any longer time than is necessary for the starting of scheme,'Gordon believed that a training program of the sort proposed was a most important move.'23 Gordon hoped that China would be able to develop a foreign-trained national army 'under native leaders and subject to native laws,'but he felt that the change should be made 'gradually on a small scale at first,through the Futais,not through the Peking govt.who are a very helpless lot.'24 Following the disbandment of the Ever-Victorious Army in late May,1864,Li Hung-chang retained some six hundred artillerymen and about three hundred infantrymen from the force.Initially,Li planned to send the artillerymen to Nanking,but before he could do so the Taiping capital fell to Tseng Kuo-ch'tian.Li then arranged for the retained troops to be transferred to Feng-huang-shan(about twenty-five miles southwest of Shanghai)as part of a foreign-training program under colonels Yu Tsai-pang and Yuian Chiu-kao of the Anhwei Army.25 Most of the foreign drillmasters associated with the newly- formed camp had served in the Ever-Victorious Army or the British a I.W.S.M.T'ung-chih,25:27a-b;see also ibid.,32:35b-37;Li Hung-chang chih P'an Ting-hsin shu-cha (Li Hung-chang's letters to P'an Ting-hsin;Peking,1960; hereafter Li-P'an Letters),p.22;Chou Shih-ch'eng,Huai-chiin p'ing-Nien chi (Record of the Anhwei Army's suppression of the Nien;Shanghai,1877),I:6b 22 On Ting,consult Lu,Ting Jih-ch'ang;on Gordon's relationship with Li,see Gordon Papers,Add.MSS.52,393,confidential memorandum on the 'Imperialist Sphere'(n.d.),ibid.,'Account of Wushufu'(n.d.),and ibid.,Add.MSS.52,389, Gordon to Henry Gordon,June 19,1864.See also Li's letters to Gordon in T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo shih-liao (Historical materials on the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom;Peking, 1950),esp.pp.369,374,and Li Wen-chung-kung ch'ian-chi (Letters),5:15b. 2 Gordon Papers,Add.MSS.52,389,Gordon to Henry Gordon,July 3,1864. 24 Ibid.,June 19,1864. as The troops eventually sent to Feng-huang-shan included remnants of the Ever- Victorious Army,men from the British training camp at Fa-hua,and some new recruits.See I.W.S.M.T'ung-chih,25:26a-27b;Tai-p'ing t'ien-kuo shih-liao,pp.371- 3,416-17,427-8;Lu,Ting Jih-ch'ang,pp.41-2;F.O.228/367,Gordon to Parkes, May 17,1864 (two communications and one memorandum);ibid.,Parkes to Bruce, May 21,1864;ibid.,Parkes to Bruce,June 6,1864;ibid.,Parkes to Russell,June 21, 1864;ibid.,Parkes to Bruce,June 27,1864
cajolery of Parkes and others, and perceived in Western demands for the expansion of foreign-training an attempt to 'seize our military authority and squander our financial resources.'21 His aim, therefore, was to gain full control of the situation as soon as possible. Fortunately, Li had valuable allies in the energetic Shanghai taotai, Ting Jih-ch'ang, and Gordon, now Li's close personal friend.22 After disbanding the Ever-Victorious Army, Gordon had planned to return to England, but pressure from both British officials and the Chinese induced him to stay and initiate the foreign-training project. Although 'not inclined to devote any longer time than is necessary for the starting of scheme,' Gordon believed that a training program of the sort proposed was a 'most important move.'23 Gordon hoped that China would be able to develop a foreign-trained national army 'under native leaders and subject to native laws,' but he felt that the change should be made 'gradually & on a small scale at first, & through the Futais, not through the Peking govt. who are a very helpless lot.,24 Following the disbandment of the Ever-Victorious Army in late May, 1864, Li Hung-chang retained some six hundred artillerymen and about three hundred infantrymen from the force. Initially, Li planned to send the artillerymen to Nanking, but before he could do so the Taiping capital fell to Tseng Kuo-ch'tian. Li then arranged for the retained troops to be transferred to Feng-huang-shan (about twenty-five miles southwest of Shanghai) as part of a foreign-training program under colonels Yii Tsai-pang and Yuan Chiu-kao of the Anhwei Army.25 Most of the foreign drillmasters associated with the newlyformed camp had served in the Ever-Victorious Army or the British 21 I.W.S.M. T'ung-chih, 25: 27a-b; see also ibid., 32: 35b-37; Li Hung-chang chih P'an Ting-hsin shu-cha (Li Hung-chang's letters to P'an Ting-hsin; Peking, 1960; hereafter Li-P'an Letters), p. 22; Chou Shih-ch'eng, Huai-chin p'ing-Nien chi (Record of the Anhwei Army's suppression of the Nien; Shanghai, I877), i: 6b. 22 On Ting, consult Lii, Ting Jih-ch'ang; on Gordon's relationship with Li, see Gordon Papers, Add. MSS. 52,393, confidential memorandum on the 'Imperialist Sphere' (n.d.), ibid., 'Account of Wushufu' (n.d.), and ibid., Add. MSS. 52,389, Gordon to Henry Gordon, June I9, I864. See also Li's letters to Gordon in T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo shih-liao (Historical materials on the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom; Peking, I950), esp. pp. 369, 374, and Li Wen-chung-kung ch'iian-chi (Letters), 5: I5b. 23 Gordon Papers, Add. MSS. 52,389, Gordon to Henry Gordon, July 3, 1864. 24 Ibid., June I9, I864. 25 The troops eventually sent to Feng-huang-shan included remnants of the EverVictorious Army, men from the British training camp at Fa-hua, and some new recruits. See . W.S.M. T'ung-chih, 25: 26a-27b; T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo shih-liao, pp. 371- 3, 4i6-I7, 427-8; Lii, Ting Jih-ch'ang, pp. 41-2; F.O. 228/367, Gordon to Parkes, May 17, I864 (two communications and one memorandum); ibid., Parkes to Bruce, May 21, I864; ibid., Parkes to Bruce, June 6, I864; ibid., Parkes to Russell, June 21, I864; ibid., Parkes to Bruce, June 27, I864. 200 R. J. SMITH
FOREIGN-TRAINING AND CHINA 20I training program at Fa-hua known as Kingsley's contingent.26 Although a recent (March I,1864)Order-in-Council explicitly prohibited British subjects from serving the Chinese in a military capacity,British policymakers in China did not anticipate London's disapproval of the Feng-huang-shan project,and events proved them correct.Despite some opposition in Parliament,Lord Russell eventually decided to 'deprecate the withdrawal of these instructors.'27 In any case,well before official instructions from London reached Shanghai,Gordon had already begun drilling troops at Feng-huang-shan.28 The training program began auspiciously.By mid-August,Gordon could already write of the great progress'he had made with the troops in manual,platoon and gun drill.'It is,'he wrote,'much easier than I supposed it would be.'2 About a week later,he complained that The instruction of the Chinese here is very tedious,and requires a great deal more patience than I have';but he added:'On the whole the men are picking up Artillery.The fact is that the whole system...is new to them the Mandarins.they [sic]do not see how it should be necessary for them to shout their words of command,when they are used to give [sic]the same by tap of drum or tom tom.'By the end of August, Gordon had his manual,platoon,company and part of his battalion drill programs 'in full swing,'and could state with some satisfaction that one or two of his men knew battery drill 'very fairly.'30 But after training troops for over a month,Gordon could no longer contain the urge to return home.His announced departure,in turn, provided impetus for negotiations between the British and Chinese over the future of Feng-huang-shan.Gordon himself expressed satisfaction with the program,feeling that it should continue 'to assimilate the men as much as possible to the Imperialists with respect to...dress,pay 26 Hong Kong Daily Press,July 26,1864;T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo shih-liao,p.372. 27 F.O.228/380 Layard to Under-Secretary of State,War Department,July 25, 1865.See also Chinese and Japanese Repository,Vol.3 (June,1865),pp.300-2. a On July 26,1864,about the time Gordon began drilling troops at Feng-huang- shan,the Hong Kong Daily Press opined:The information about Gordon's rejoining the Chinese sounds strangely [sic].It is clearly a move to thwart the French.'At the time,the French operated a small training program at Kao-ch'ang-miao,near Shanghai.See Lu,Ting Jih-ch'ang,pp.22-3,44-5.Most probably,the comment by the Hong Kong Daily Press was prompted by Anglo-French competition in areas other than Shanghai,however-notably Canton.See Hong Kong Daily Press,July 27,1864. For Anglo-French rivalry in foreign-training at Foochow,consult F.O.228/366, Parkes to Bruce,June 8,1864 and F.O.228/408,Hewlett to Alcock,April 21,1866; for problems at Ningpo,see Hong Kong Daily Press,July 29,1864,and November 1, 14andI5,I864. Gordon Papers,Add.MSS.52,389,Gordon to Henry Gordon,August 17,1864. 30 Ibid.,August 26,1864;ibid.,August 30,1864
FOREIGN-TRAINING AND CHINA training program at Fa-hua known as Kingsley's contingent.26 Although a recent (March I, 1864) Order-in-Council explicitly prohibited British subjects from serving the Chinese in a military capacity, British policymakers in China did not anticipate London's disapproval of the Feng-huang-shan project, and events proved them correct. Despite some opposition in Parliament, Lord Russell eventually decided to 'deprecate the withdrawal of these instructors.'27 In any case, well before official instructions from London reached Shanghai, Gordon had already begun drilling troops at Feng-huang-shan.28 The training program began auspiciously. By mid-August, Gordon could already write of the 'great progress' he had made with the troops in manual, platoon and gun drill. 'It is,' he wrote, 'much easier than I supposed it would be.'29 About a week later, he complained that 'The instruction of the Chinese here is very tedious, and requires a great deal more patience than I have'; but he added: 'On the whole the men are picking up Artillery. The fact is that the whole system ... is new to them & the Mandarins. they [sic] do not see how it should be necessary for them to shout their words of command, when they are used to give [sic] the same by tap of drum or tom tom.' By the end of August, Gordon had his manual, platoon, company and part of his battalion drill programs 'in full swing,' and could state with some satisfaction that one or two of his men knew battery drill 'very fairly.'30 But after training troops for over a month, Gordon could no longer contain the urge to return home. His announced departure, in turn, provided impetus for negotiations between the British and Chinese over the future of Feng-huang-shan. Gordon himself expressed satisfaction with the program, feeling that it should continue 'to assimilate the men as much as possible to the Imperialists with respect to ... dress, pay & 26 Hong Kong Daily Press, July 26, I864; T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo shih-liao, p. 372. 27 F.O. 228/380 Layard to Under-Secretary of State, War Department, July 25, 1865. See also Chinese and Japanese Repository, Vol. 3 (June, i865), pp. 300-2. 28 On July 26, I864, about the time Gordon began drilling troops at Feng-huangshan, the Hong Kong Daily Press opined: 'The information about Gordon's rejoining the Chinese sounds strangely [sic]. It is clearly a move to thwart the French.' At the time, the French operated a small training program at Kao-ch'ang-miao, near Shanghai. See Lti, Ting Jih-ch'ang, pp. 22-3, 44-5. Most probably, the comment by the Hong Kong Daily Press was prompted by Anglo-French competition in areas other than Shanghai, however-notably Canton. See Hong Kong Daily Press, July 27, 1864. For Anglo-French rivalry in foreign-training at Foochow, consult F.O. 228/366, Parkes to Bruce, June 8, 1864 and F.O. 228/408, Hewlett to Alcock, April 21, i866; for problems at Ningpo, see Hong Kong Daily Press, July 29, I864, and November I, I4 and 15, I864. 29 Gordon Papers, Add. MSS. 52,389, Gordon to Henry Gordon, August I7, I864. 30 Ibid., August 26, I864; ibid., August 30, I864. 20I
202 R.J.SMITH discipline.'The foreigners connected with the camp,he believed,should only be 'Instructors and guarantees that the Force...[would be]duly kept up and paid.'31 This view coincided with that of the Chinese,who sought to restrict the British role solely to instruction.32 Gordon ack- nowledged that Li Hung-chang had given no cause for complaint re- garding the program at Feng-huang-shan,but he believed that an understanding should be reached with the Chinese authorities which would place the camp on a more permanent footing in the event of Li's transfer.33 Based on guidelines provided by Gordon,Parkes pro- posed in November certain conditions'for the camp,to be amended' by Li Hung-chang's representatives after consultation.The upshot was a thirteen-point agreement between the British and the Chinese which satisfied both parties.Although Li Hung-chang was forced to accept Lieutenant Jebb of the 67th Regiment as head drillmaster replacing Gordon,34 he succeeded in making Feng-huang-shan a Chinese institu- tion in fact as well as name.According to the terms of the agreement, a Chinese commander (t'ung-ling)would assume responsibility for all matters of promotion and dismissal,camp discipline,payment,rations and other major aspects of military administration.35 Jebb and his foreign drillmasters were responsible only for instruction and drill. With P'an Ting-hsin,a local Anhwei Army officer as t'ung-ling,and Ting Jih-ch'ang as taotai (later financial commissioner of Kiangsu and finally governor),Li could be reasonably confident that he had achieved his goal of assuring Chinese control over affairs at Feng-huang-shan.36 Meanwhile,at Peking,Chinese and British officials had also come to an agreement concerning Feng-huang-shan.According to Bruce,before the camp had actually been established,officials of the Tsungli Yamen, Wen-hsiang in particular,had expressed reservations about the plan to train Chinese troops in the use of Western arms and tactics.Bruce per- ceived that the Ch'ing government was anxious to keep Western- 31 F.O.228/368,Gordon to Brown,September (no day),1864. 2 See,for example,T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo shih-liao,p.372. 3 Undoubtedly Gordon was influenced by a letter from Robert Hart,who in- formed him of Li Hung-chang's comment that if the men of the Anhwei Army 'were placed under any other chief than himself,or left in the province under another Footae [governor]he could not answer for them,and was of the opinion that they would be impossible to be controlled.'Gordon Papers,Add.MSS.52,387,Hart to Gordon,May 17, 1864.Italics in the original. 34 Jebb,who had trained British troops at Fa-hua in 1862,was the British com- mander-in-chief's choice.F.O.228/368,Brown to Parkes,October 3,1864.See also, Lane-Poole,Parkes,I,501-4. ss The agreement,and correspondence leading up to the agreement,are enclosed in F.O.228/368,Parkes to Wade,November 23,1864. 36 Li Wen-chung-kung ch'tian-chi (Memorials),7:5oa-b
discipline.' The foreigners connected with the camp, he believed, should only be 'Instructors and guarantees that the Force .. . [would be] duly kept up and paid.'31 This view coincided with that of the Chinese, who sought to restrict the British role solely to instruction.32 Gordon acknowledged that Li Hung-chang had given no cause for complaint regarding the program at Feng-huang-shan, but he believed that an understanding should be reached with the Chinese authorities which would place the camp on a more permanent footing in the event of Li's transfer.33 Based on guidelines provided by Gordon, Parkes proposed in November certain 'conditions' for the camp, to be 'amended' by Li Hung-chang's representatives after consultation. The upshot was a thirteen-point agreement between the British and the Chinese which satisfied both parties. Although Li Hung-chang was forced to accept Lieutenant Jebb of the 67th Regiment as head drillmaster replacing Gordon,34 he succeeded in making Feng-huang-shan a Chinese institution in fact as well as name. According to the terms of the agreement, a Chinese commander (t'ung-ling) would assume responsibility for all matters of promotion and dismissal, camp discipline, payment, rations and other major aspects of military administration.35 Jebb and his foreign drillmasters were responsible only for instruction and drill. With P'an Ting-hsin, a local Anhwei Army officer as t'ung-ling, and Ting Jih-ch'ang as taotai (later financial commissioner of Kiangsu and finally governor), Li could be reasonably confident that he had achieved his goal of assuring Chinese control over affairs at Feng-huang-shan.36 Meanwhile, at Peking, Chinese and British officials had also come to an agreement concerning Feng-huang-shan. According to Bruce, before the camp had actually been established, officials of the Tsungli Yamen, Wen-hsiang in particular, had expressed reservations about the plan to train Chinese troops in the use of Western arms and tactics. Bruce perceived that the Ch'ing government was anxious to keep Western- 31 F.O. 228/368, Gordon to Brown, September (no day), I864. 32 See, for example, T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo shih-liao, p. 372. 33 Undoubtedly Gordon was influenced by a letter from Robert Hart, who informed him of Li Hung-chang's comment that if the men of the Anhwei Army 'were placed under any other chief than himself, or left in the province under another Footae [governor] he could not answer for them, and was of the opinion that they would be impossible to be controlled.' Gordon Papers, Add. MSS. 52,387, Hart to Gordon, May 17, I864. Italics in the original. 34Jebb, who had trained British troops at Fa-hua in I862, was the British commander-in-chief's choice. F.O. 228/368, Brown to Parkes, October 3, I864. See also, Lane-Poole, Parkes, I, 50I-4. 35 The agreement, and correspondence leading up to the agreement, are enclosed in F.O. 228/368, Parkes to Wade, November 23, I864. 36 Li Wen-chung-kung ch'iian-chi (Memorials), 7: 5oa-b. 202 R. J. SMITH
FOREIGN-TRAINING AND CHINA 203 trained Chinese troops out of Li Hung-chang's complete control,and that Wen-hsiang,at least,was desirous to hold...[strategic]places with Manchoos [sic]and that he did not wish to see the Chinese population initiated in foreign discipline and the use of foreign arms.'37 Yet despite the apprehensions of Ch'ing officials at the capital,by late December,1864,Thomas Wade could report that he had received 'verbal assurances'that Feng-huang-shan would be maintained as a regular camp of instruction.38 Unlike Parkes and other local British officials at Shanghai,Wade did not insist that British officers head the training program,recognizing that the exclusive employment of British officers on a grand scale would awaken the jealousy of the other Treaty Powers.'He did,however,tell Parkes that he should impress upon Li Hung-chang(now governor-general of Liangkiang)the fright- ful danger incurred to the independence of China by the continued postponement of the question of military reform.'He also encouraged Parkes to point out to Li the dangers of foreign interference and the possibility of further interference 'both in the administration and finance of the country.'39 Such warnings did not fall upon deaf ears,although they were not always interpreted correctly.40 Although the Feng-huang-shan project enjoyed the avowed support of Chinese and British officials at all levels,matters did not remain in a satisfactory state at the camp.Apparently,Jebb's performance as head drillmaster did little to inspire confidence:Ting Jih-ch'ang complained of Jebb's recurrent absence from camp and other misdeeds,while Westerners found him laughably inflexible in his adherence to the Queen's Regulations and the Drill Book.'41 There were few regrets, therefore,when Jebb received his transfer back to England in 1865.On the other hand,his departure had a unsettling effect,for it raised the issue of who would succeed him.Local British officials were convinced that the new commander-in-chief,General Guy,should name a succes- sor to Jebb;but Ting Jih-ch'ang in desperation bypassed regular chan- nels to secure the appointment of William Winstanley,a former British officer who had served in the Ever-Victorious Army and who had 37 F.O.17/410,Bruce to Russell,June 12,1864. 38 F.O.228/366,Wade to Parkes,December 31,1864.See also F.O.228/387, Wade to Parkes,March 24,1865 and Li-P'an Letters,p.21. 3F.O.228/366,Wade to Parkes,November 28,1864. 40 For an example of Wade's warnings in the Taiping period and the Chinese response,consult John S.Gregory,Great Britain and the Taipings (New York and Washington,1969),pp.93-4. 41 Hsun-Hu kung-tu (Official letters of the Shanghai taotai [Ting Jih-ch'ang]),7 (Ting-cheng 32):1ob-11;Fu-Wu kung-tu,50:8;Hake,Events,pp.526-7
FOREIGN-TRAINING AND CHINA trained Chinese troops out of Li Hung-chang's complete control, and that Wen-hsiang, at least, 'was desirous to hold ... [strategic] places with\ Manchoos [sic] and that he did not wish to see the Chinese population initiated in foreign discipline and the use of foreign arms.'37 Yet despite the apprehensions of Ch'ing officials at the capital, by late December, I864, Thomas Wade could report that he had received 'verbal assurances' that Feng-huang-shan would be maintained as a regular camp of instruction.38 Unlike Parkes and other local British officials at Shanghai, Wade did not insist that British officers head the training program, recognizing that 'the exclusive employment of British officers on a grand scale would awaken the jealousy of the other Treaty Powers.' He did, however, tell Parkes that he should impress upon Li Hung-chang (now governor-general of Liangkiang) 'the frightful danger incurred to the independence of China by the continued postponement of the question of military reform.' He also encouraged Parkes to point out to Li the dangers of foreign interference and the possibility of further interference 'both in the administration and finance of the country.'39 Such warnings did not fall upon deaf ears, although they were not always interpreted correctly.40 Although the Feng-huang-shan project enjoyed the avowed support of Chinese and British officials at all levels, matters did not remain in a satisfactory state at the camp. Apparently, Jebb's performance as head drillmaster did little to inspire confidence: Ting Jih-ch'ang complained of Jebb's recurrent absence from camp and other misdeeds, while Westerners found him laughably inflexible in his adherence to 'the Queen's Regulations and the Drill Book.'41 There were few regrets, therefore, whenJebb received his transfer back to England in 1865. On the other hand, his departure had a unsettling effect, for it raised the issue of who would succeed him. Local British officials were convinced that the new commander-in-chief, General Guy, should name a successor to Jebb; but Ting Jih-ch'ang in desperation bypassed regular channels to secure the appointment of William Winstanley, a former British officer who had served in the Ever-Victorious Army and who had 37 F.O. 17/4I0, Bruce to Russell, June 12, 1864. 38 F.O. 228/366, Wade to Parkes, December 31, I864. See also F.O. 228/387, Wade to Parkes, March 24, 1865 and Li-P'an Letters, p. 21. 39F.O. 228/366, Wade to Parkes, November 28, I864. 40 For an example of Wade's warnings in the Taiping period and the Chinese response, consult John S. Gregory, Great Britain and the Taipings (New York and Washington, I969), pp. 93-4. 41 Hsiin-Hu kung-tu (Official letters of the Shanghai taotai [TingJih-ch'ang]), 7 (Ting-cheng 32): Iob-I i; Fu-Wu kung-tu, 50: 8; Hake, Events, pp. 526-7. 203
204 R.J.SMITH helped to initiate the Feng-huang-shan project.42 In justifying the move to his superiors,Ting emphasized that Gordon had recommended Winstanley in a letter from home,and he took pains to point out that Winstanley's lack of official connections with the British government would prove to be an advantage.43 British officials at Shanghai pro- tested Ting's coup vociferously,but to no avail.At Peking the British minister affirmed China's right to appoint a successor to Jebb,asking only that the Chinese inform him of their final selection.44 The issue of Jebb's successor brought into focus the tension between local British officials at Shanghai,who continually attempted to expand British influence in Chinese military affairs,and their superiors at Peking-Bruce,Wade and Rutherford Alcock-who sought to limit direct British interference.To be certain,each of the three ministers cherished the hope that China would modernize her military along Western lines.But they felt that military reform under Western leader- ship should be aimed at preventing rather than facilitating foreign interference in Chinese military affairs.45 In Bruce's words:'Our office is that of the schoolmaster who educates,not of the tyrant who im- poses.'46 Such attitudes contrast markedly with those of local British officials,W.H.Medhurst in particular.47 Organization and Administration at Feng-huang-shan By the time Winstanley assumed the position of head drillmaster at Feng-huang-shan in mid-1865,the basic features of the program had been set.Although daily roll call,parade and Western drill introduced elements of a foreign military lifestyle to the common soldier at Feng- huang-shan,the milieu was basically Chinese.Camp administration and discipline followed traditional lines,as did the uniform of men and officers.The organization of a 'stockade'(i.e.,battalion,ying)roughly approximated that of its counterpart in yung-ying armies,and there were no Western-style mess or barracks arrangements:"The native officers lived in quarters in the village close by,while the commandant 42 Winstanley obviously sought the position.See Demetrius Boulger,The Life of Sir Halliday Macartney (London and New York,1908),p.147. 43 Hstin-Hu kung-tu,7 (Ting-cheng 32):I1-12b. 4F.O.228/387,Wade to Parkes,August 1,1865;see also F.O.228/524,Wade to Medhurst,February I3,1873. s For Alcock's views,consult Wright,The Last Stand,p.216. 46 Gerson,'Letter,'p.I3. 47 On Medhurst's aggressiveness,see Martin Wolfson,'The English and the Ever- Victorious Army'(M.A.thesis,Columbia University,1962),pp.136-55
helped to initiate the Feng-huang-shan project.42 In justifying the move to his superiors, Ting emphasized that Gordon had recommended Winstanley in a letter from home, and he took pains to point out that Winstanley's lack of official connections with the British government would prove to be an advantage.43 British officials at Shanghai protested Ting's coup vociferously, but to no avail. At Peking the British minister affirmed China's right to appoint a successor to Jebb, asking only that the Chinese inform him of their final selection.44 The issue ofJebb's successor brought into focus the tension between local British officials at Shanghai, who continually attempted to expand British influence in Chinese military affairs, and their superiors at Peking-Bruce, Wade and Rutherford Alcock-who sought to limit direct British interference. To be certain, each of the three ministers cherished the hope that China would modernize her military along Western lines. But they felt that military reform under Western leadership should be aimed at preventing rather than facilitating foreign interference in Chinese military affairs.45 In Bruce's words: 'Our office is that of the schoolmaster who educates, not of the tyrant who imposes.'46 Such attitudes contrast markedly with those of local British officials, W. H. Medhurst in particular.47 Organization and Administration atFeng-huang-shan By the time Winstanley assumed the position of head drillmaster at Feng-huang-shan in mid-I865, the basic features of the program had been set. Although daily roll call, parade and Western drill introduced elements of a foreign military lifestyle to the common soldier at Fenghuang-shan, the milieu was basically Chinese. Camp administration and discipline followed traditional lines, as did the uniform of men and officers. The organization of a 'stockade' (i.e., battalion, ying) roughly approximated that of its counterpart in yung-ying armies, and there were no Western-style mess or barracks arrangements: 'The native officers lived in quarters in the village close by, while the commandant 42 Winstanley obviously sought the position. See Demetrius Boulger, The Life of Sir Halliday Macartney (London and New York, 1908), p. I47. 43 Hsin-Hu kung-tu, 7 (Ting-cheng 32): i I-I2b. 44 F.O. 228/387, Wade to Parkes, August i, 1865; see also F.O. 228/524, Wade to Medhurst, February I3, 1873. 45 For Alcock's views, consult Wright, The Last Stand, p. 2 6. 46 Gerson, 'Letter,' p. I3. 47 On Medhurst's aggressiveness, see Martin Wolfson, 'The English and the EverVictorious Army' (M.A. thesis, Columbia University, I962), pp. I36-55. 20o4 R. J. SMITH