Modern Asian Studies 40,3(2006)pp.549-581.2006 Cambridge University Press doi:10.1017/S0026749X06002113 Printed in the United Kingdom Politics,Power and the Chinese Maritime Customs:the Oing Restoration and the Ascent of Robert Hart RICHARD S.HOROWITZ California State University,Northridge On 6 November 1865,Robert Hart,the 3o-year-old Inspector General (I.G.)of the Imperial Maritime Customs Service,presented to his supervisors in the Zongli Yamen,the Qing Empire's new foreign office, a long memorandum critiquing Chinese administrative practices and offering suggestions for improvement.He criticized corruption and inefficiency at all levels of government,called for tax reform,greater specialization and better technical education of officials,improving contacts with the outside world,and promoting foreign methods and technology.The memorandum,written in Chinese,was entitled the Bystander's View'(juwai pangguan lun).A few months later it was submitted by the Zongli Yamen to the throne,and together with a similar tract by British diplomat Thomas Wade,distributed to senior Qing officials for comment.It had little impact at the time.But forty years later,when the Empress Dowager Cixi reportedly told the author that she wished she had followed his advice,it became a foundation stone of the mythology of Robert Hart,a symbol of the failure of the Qing court to take full advantage of the Portadown native's wisdom. Hart's premise,encapsulated in the title,was that as an outsider to the Qing system he could see problems that insiders could not.The true face of Mount Lu can only be seen in its entirety by one who Juliet Bredon,Sir Robert Hart:The Romance of a Great Career (London:Hutchinson, gog),111.This paper was presented at the Workshop on Sir Robert Hart,Queens University Belfast,September 2003.I am grateful to the organizers and the participants at the workshop for their comments,to my colleagues in the History Department,California State University,Northridge for ideas and encouragement at an early stage,and to Hans van de Ven for many concrete suggestions on how to improve this essay. 0026-749X/o6/S7-50+$o.10 549
Modern Asian Studies 40, 3 (2006) pp. 549–581. C 2006 Cambridge University Press doi:10.1017/S0026749X06002113 Printed in the United Kingdom Politics, Power and the Chinese Maritime Customs: the Qing Restoration and the Ascent of Robert Hart RICHARD S. HOROWITZ California State University, Northridge On 6 November 1865, Robert Hart, the 30-year-old Inspector General (I.G.) of the Imperial Maritime Customs Service, presented to his supervisors in the Zongli Yamen, the Qing Empire’s new foreign office, a long memorandum critiquing Chinese administrative practices and offering suggestions for improvement. He criticized corruption and inefficiency at all levels of government, called for tax reform, greater specialization and better technical education of officials, improving contacts with the outside world, and promoting foreign methods and technology. The memorandum, written in Chinese, was entitled the ‘Bystander’s View’ (juwai pangguan lun). A few months later it was submitted by the Zongli Yamen to the throne, and together with a similar tract by British diplomat Thomas Wade, distributed to senior Qing officials for comment. It had little impact at the time. But forty years later, when the Empress Dowager Cixi reportedly told the author that she wished she had followed his advice, it became a foundation stone of the mythology of Robert Hart, a symbol of the failure of the Qing court to take full advantage of the Portadown native’s wisdom.1 Hart’s premise, encapsulated in the title, was that as an outsider to the Qing system he could see problems that insiders could not. ‘The true face of Mount Lu can only be seen in its entirety by one who 1 Juliet Bredon, Sir Robert Hart: The Romance of a Great Career (London: Hutchinson, 1909), 111. This paper was presented at the Workshop on Sir Robert Hart, Queens University Belfast, September 2003. I am grateful to the organizers and the participants at the workshop for their comments, to my colleagues in the History Department, California State University, Northridge for ideas and encouragement at an early stage, and to Hans van de Ven for many concrete suggestions on how to improve this essay. 0026–749X/06/$7.50+$0.10 549
550 RICHARD S.HOROWITZ stands away from it.2 But the memorandum,for all of its notoriety, was uncharacteristic of Hart.It was too blunt for a man admired for his diplomacy,and too broadly conceived and rhetorical for a man whose successes-at least until the end of the century-were built on quiet actions within the bureaucratic system.Moreover,when Hart identified himself as bystander,he was striking a pose.By the mid 186os he was deeply enmeshed in the politics of the time,and his skill at managing political alliances was a key ingredient to his rise from a minor consular functionary to the figure often described at the turn of the century as the most influential foreigner in China. In what is now close to a century since Robert Hart's death,there has been an impressive amount written about the I.G.But Hart is presented in a limited set of roles.The first was perhaps the most unlikely:Juliet Bredon's paean to her uncle presented him as a romantic figure who had led a life 'as useful as varied,as romantic as successful',a questionable description of a man who spent 47 years running a tax agency-even one as diverse in its activities as the Customs Service.3 H.B.Morse who worked for Hart for 35 years emphasized his role as a wise and discreet advisor to the Qing government and as a diplomatic intermediary settling disputes.4 Stanley Wright wrote Hart's life as expressed in the methodical development of the Customs Service into an efficient modern tax bureaucracy,declaring thatAs an administrative genius Hart stands high in the ranks of the great British administrators'5 In their superbly edited editions of Hart's early journals,John K.Fairbank, Richard Smith and Katherine Bruner opened up Hart's private life to examination,and emphasized Hart's bicultural achievement'in adapting to Chinese cultural and behavioral expectations to win 2 Chouban yiwu shimo,tongzhi chao (Taipei reprint,n.d.)40:13b [hereafter YWSM- TZ]For a more detailed discussion of the memorandum see Richard J.Smith,John K.Fairbank,Katherine F.Bruner,Robert Hart and China's Early Modernization:His Journals,1863-1866 (Cambridge MA:Council on East Asian Studies,Harvard University,1991),284-92,and Mary Clabaugh Wright,Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism:The T'ung-chih Restoration,1862-1874 (Stanford:Stanford University Press,1957),263-8. 3 Bredon,5 and passim. Hosea Ballou Morse,International Relations of the Chinese Empire (London: Longmans,Green&co,1910-1918)2:138-41,190-1,364-7. 5 Stanley F.Wright,Hart and the Chinese Customs (Belfast:Wm.Mullan,1950), 855.See also a similar account by the last foreign Inspector General L.K.Little Introduction'in The I.G.in Peking:Letters of Robert Hart Chinese Maritime Customs, 1868-1907,ed.John King Fairbank,Katherine Frost Bruner,Elizabeth MacLeod Matheson (Cambridge MA:Harvard University Press,1975)Vol.1,1-34
550 RICHARD S. HOROWITZ stands away from it.’2 But the memorandum, for all of its notoriety, was uncharacteristic of Hart. It was too blunt for a man admired for his diplomacy, and too broadly conceived and rhetorical for a man whose successes—at least until the end of the century—were built on quiet actions within the bureaucratic system. Moreover, when Hart identified himself as bystander, he was striking a pose. By the mid 1860s he was deeply enmeshed in the politics of the time, and his skill at managing political alliances was a key ingredient to his rise from a minor consular functionary to the figure often described at the turn of the century as the most influential foreigner in China. In what is now close to a century since Robert Hart’s death, there has been an impressive amount written about the I. G. But Hart is presented in a limited set of roles. The first was perhaps the most unlikely: Juliet Bredon’s paean to her uncle presented him as a romantic figure who had led a life ‘as useful as varied, as romantic as successful’, a questionable description of a man who spent 47 years running a tax agency—even one as diverse in its activities as the Customs Service.3 H. B. Morse who worked for Hart for 35 years emphasized his role as a wise and discreet advisor to the Qing government and as a diplomatic intermediary settling disputes.4 Stanley Wright wrote Hart’s life as expressed in the methodical development of the Customs Service into an efficient modern tax bureaucracy, declaring that ‘As an administrative genius Hart stands high in the ranks of the great British administrators’5 In their superbly edited editions of Hart’s early journals, John K. Fairbank, Richard Smith and Katherine Bruner opened up Hart’s private life to examination, and emphasized Hart’s ‘bicultural achievement’ in adapting to Chinese cultural and behavioral expectations to win 2 Chouban yiwu shimo, tongzhi chao (Taipei reprint, n.d.) 40:13b [hereafter YWSMTZ] For a more detailed discussion of the memorandum see Richard J. Smith, John K. Fairbank, Katherine F. Bruner, Robert Hart and China’s Early Modernization: His Journals, 1863–1866 (Cambridge MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1991), 284–92, and Mary Clabaugh Wright, Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T’ung-chih Restoration, 1862–1874 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957), 263–8. 3 Bredon, 5 and passim. 4 Hosea Ballou Morse, International Relations of the Chinese Empire (London: Longmans, Green & co., 1910–1918) 2:138–41, 190–1, 364–7. 5 Stanley F. Wright, Hart and the Chinese Customs (Belfast: Wm. Mullan, 1950), 855. See also a similar account by the last foreign Inspector General L. K. Little ‘Introduction’ in The I. G. in Peking: Letters of Robert Hart Chinese Maritime Customs, 1868–1907, ed. John King Fairbank, Katherine Frost Bruner, Elizabeth MacLeod Matheson (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1975) Vol. 1, 1–34
CHINESE MARITIME CUSTOMS 551 the confidence of his Chinese overseers.5 These works share a basic assumption that Hart was largely apolitical:he served his Chinese masters by running the Customs with efficiency and providing useful advice,and periodically stepped into international disputes as a trusted honest broker.To do this,Hart remained above the fray of political struggles and the aggressive diplomacy of the day. This paper will present a different angle on Hart's career in the 186os and early 187os.Hart was a political man who leavened his principled arguments for an independent Customs service and administrative honesty with an ample concern for his own selfinterest. While the I.G.avoided taking overtly political positions,he adroitly adapted to the political circumstances and used them to his advantage. Hart aligned himself with a group of Beijing officials lead by Prince Gong (Yixin),a member of the imperial family,and the Manchu statesman Wenxiang who were the leaders of Zongli Yamen.He organized and managed the Customs Service to maximize the Yamen's authority vis-a-vis provincial officials,finance pet projects,and provide confidential advice.Their sponsorship enabled Hart to set up the Customs in a manner that gave him extraordinary and unchecked authority.He would wield this power to the very end,and this would allow for many of the administrative peculiarities of the service. Just as he smoothly adapted to the Qing political situation,Hart took advantage of unusually moderate British diplomacy in China during the 186os.Led by the first Minister to Beijing,Frederick Bruce,British diplomacy demanded from the Qing government strict adherence to the treaties and the establishment of free trade.But Bruce also supported the Qing government's efforts to suppress rebellion,and pursued policies aimed at strengthening the authority of the central government in Beijing.Hart created an organization that served the interests of British free trade policies,and which conspicuously supported authorities in Beijing-a close fit for Bruce's vision.But Hart's Customs also remained sufficiently international in its personnel and free of direct British influence to avoid becoming a target for other powers.In a semi-colonial realm in which the power of the Qing state was precariously balanced against British hegemony 6 Katherine Bruner,John K.Fairbank,Richard J.Smith,Entering China's Service: Robert Hart's Journals,1854-1863 (Cambridge MA:Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University,1986),324-32. Mary Clabaugh Wright,21-42;Britten Dean,China and Great Britain:The Diplomacy of Commercial Relations,1860-1864 (Cambridge,Mass:East Asian Research Center,.1974),128-36
CHINESE MARITIME CUSTOMS 551 the confidence of his Chinese overseers.6 These works share a basic assumption that Hart was largely apolitical: he served his Chinese masters by running the Customs with efficiency and providing useful advice, and periodically stepped into international disputes as a trusted honest broker. To do this, Hart remained above the fray of political struggles and the aggressive diplomacy of the day. This paper will present a different angle on Hart’s career in the 1860s and early 1870s. Hart was a political man who leavened his principled arguments for an independent Customs service and administrative honesty with an ample concern for his own self interest. While the I. G. avoided taking overtly political positions, he adroitly adapted to the political circumstances and used them to his advantage. Hart aligned himself with a group of Beijing officials lead by Prince Gong (Yixin), a member of the imperial family, and the Manchu statesman Wenxiang who were the leaders of Zongli Yamen. He organized and managed the Customs Service to maximize the Yamen’s authority vis-`a-vis provincial officials, finance pet projects, and provide confidential advice. Their sponsorship enabled Hart to set up the Customs in a manner that gave him extraordinary and unchecked authority. He would wield this power to the very end, and this would allow for many of the administrative peculiarities of the service. Just as he smoothly adapted to the Qing political situation, Hart took advantage of unusually moderate British diplomacy in China during the 1860s. Led by the first Minister to Beijing, Frederick Bruce, British diplomacy demanded from the Qing government strict adherence to the treaties and the establishment of free trade. But Bruce also supported the Qing government’s efforts to suppress rebellion, and pursued policies aimed at strengthening the authority of the central government in Beijing.7 Hart created an organization that served the interests of British free trade policies, and which conspicuously supported authorities in Beijing—a close fit for Bruce’s vision. But Hart’s Customs also remained sufficiently international in its personnel and free of direct British influence to avoid becoming a target for other powers. In a semi-colonial realm in which the power of the Qing state was precariously balanced against British hegemony 6 Katherine Bruner, John K. Fairbank, Richard J. Smith, Entering China’s Service: Robert Hart’s Journals, 1854–1863 (Cambridge MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1986), 324–32. 7 Mary Clabaugh Wright, 21–42; Britten Dean, China and Great Britain: The Diplomacy of Commercial Relations, 1860–1864 (Cambridge, Mass: East Asian Research Center, 1974), 128–36
552 RICHARD S.HOROWITZ and threats from other powers,deft political maneuvering maximized Hart's autonomy and authority.8 I In the summer of 1861 Robert Hart made his first important political alliances.He traveled to Beijing in place of his boss,H.N.Lay,who had departed on leave to England.Hart stayed at the new British Legation as the guest of British Minister Frederick Bruce,whose support would later be crucial to Hart's promotion to the position of Inspector General.Even more importantly he had numerous meetings with Wenxiang,a Grand Councilor and the working leader of the new Zongli Yamen,and briefer sessions with Prince Gong,which gave Hart a chance to explain the operations of the Customs Service and discuss plans for its expansion to new treaty ports.9 The evidence available suggests that they hit it off exceptionally well.Although Hart probably did not realize it at the time,he had happened into ideal sponsors:for the pair were a rising force in Qing politics. Less than a year earlier,in the August and September of 1860, the Qing dynasty had been in the midst of its greatest crisis.After four years of off and on fighting,the Arrow War(also known as the second Opium War)was approaching a denouement,as a combined British and French force seized the Dagu fortresses,which protected the seaborne approaches to Tianjin,and in early September marched towards Beijing repeatedly defeating Qing armies on the battlefield. The foreign invasion of the north coincided with a resurgence of the Taiping rebellion in the lower Yangzi region,with major rebellions festering on the north China plain and in the Southwest.For anyone remotely familiar with history,the eerie combination of domestic uprising and foreign invasion,bore all of the characteristics of a dynastic collapse. 8 The concept of semi-colonialism(and its alter ego informal empire)is system- atically developed in Jurgen Osterhammel,Semi-Colonalism and Informal Empire in Twentieth Century China:Towards a Framework of Analysis'in Imperialism and After:Continuities and Discontinuities,ed.Wolfgang Mommsen and Jurgen Osterhammel (London:1986);see also Osterhammel,Britain and China 1842-1914'in The Oxford History ofthe British Empire,Volume III:The Nineteenth Century,ed.Andrew Porter(Oxford: Oxford University Press,1999),146-69. 9 Bruner et al.,240-4;Richard S.Horowitz,Mandarins and Customs Inspectors,' Papers on Chinese History,7 (1998):43-4-
552 RICHARD S. HOROWITZ and threats from other powers, deft political maneuvering maximized Hart’s autonomy and authority.8 I In the summer of 1861 Robert Hart made his first important political alliances. He traveled to Beijing in place of his boss, H. N. Lay, who had departed on leave to England. Hart stayed at the new British Legation as the guest of British Minister Frederick Bruce, whose support would later be crucial to Hart’s promotion to the position of Inspector General. Even more importantly he had numerous meetings with Wenxiang, a Grand Councilor and the working leader of the new Zongli Yamen, and briefer sessions with Prince Gong, which gave Hart a chance to explain the operations of the Customs Service and discuss plans for its expansion to new treaty ports.9 The evidence available suggests that they hit it off exceptionally well. Although Hart probably did not realize it at the time, he had happened into ideal sponsors: for the pair were a rising force in Qing politics. Less than a year earlier, in the August and September of 1860, the Qing dynasty had been in the midst of its greatest crisis. After four years of off and on fighting, the Arrow War (also known as the second Opium War) was approaching a denouement, as a combined British and French force seized the Dagu fortresses, which protected the seaborne approaches to Tianjin, and in early September marched towards Beijing repeatedly defeating Qing armies on the battlefield. The foreign invasion of the north coincided with a resurgence of the Taiping rebellion in the lower Yangzi region, with major rebellions festering on the north China plain and in the Southwest. For anyone remotely familiar with history, the eerie combination of domestic uprising and foreign invasion, bore all of the characteristics of a dynastic collapse. 8 The concept of semi-colonialism (and its alter ego informal empire) is systematically developed in Jurgen Osterhammel, ‘Semi-Colonalism and Informal Empire in Twentieth Century China: Towards a Framework of Analysis’ in Imperialism and After: Continuities and Discontinuities, ed. Wolfgang Mommsen and Jurgen Osterhammel (London: 1986); see also Osterhammel, ‘Britain and China 1842–1914’ in The Oxford History of the British Empire, Volume III: The Nineteenth Century, ed. Andrew Porter (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 146–69. 9 Bruner et al., 240–4; Richard S. Horowitz, ‘Mandarins and Customs Inspectors,’ Papers on Chinese History, 7 (1998): 43–4
CHINESE MARITIME CUSTOMS 553 As the situation deteriorated at the end of the summer,a fierce debate broke out at court over whether the emperor should remain in Beijing,or flee to the Imperial hunting retreat at Rehe.Proponents of the retreat,including the leading Grand Councilor Sushun,and the General Senggelinqin,insisted that such an approach would get the emperor out of harm's way and avoid humiliation.Opponents, including Wenxiang,then an obscure Manchu official who had been appointed to the Emperor's chief advisory body,the Grand Council,two years earlier,feared that the emperor's departure would induce panic and government authority might disintegrate-and by implication would induce a dynastic collapse.10 And,as Wenxiang would later recall,with no easily defensible passes between Beijing and Rehe,where we could go,they could go.Our strength was utterly inadequate.'After vacillating briefly,the Xianfeng Emperor decided to flee accompanied by the bulk of his senior officials.A disappointed Wenxiang asked for permission to remain in the capital to keep order. The Emperor assented,placing Wenxiang in charge of the Beijing Gendarmerie,and assigned him,together with Prince Gong (the Emperor's younger brother),and a veteran official Guiliang(Prince Gong's father-in-law)to negotiate a settlement with the invading forces. This was a precarious assignment to say the least.Following the Emperor's departure Wenxiang returned to the city and found that the troops had not received rations for days,and 'I could hear the sound of people seething with insurrection from among the small lanes [of the city],and already there was looting.'Wenxiang opened the granaries and issued rations,and ordered the gendarmes to arrest looters and execute them on the spot.12 Order was gradually restored within the walled city,although banditry persisted outside.Prince Gong, Wenxiang and Guiliang established an ad hoc Peace Commission office,drafting into service middle and lower ranking officials who had remained in Beijing.The Peace Commission negotiated on one hand with the British and French,and on the other with the Russians, who had taken advantage of the situation to press their demands for redefining the northern boundaries.The negotiations went reasonably 10 The documents for this debate are in Chouban yiwu shimo,xianfeng (Chengdu Zhonghua shuju,1980)[hereafter YWSM-XF]7:2269-2301. Wenxiang,Wen wenzhong gong ziding nianpu'in idem.,Wen wenzhong gong shilue (-3ah
CHINESE MARITIME CUSTOMS 553 As the situation deteriorated at the end of the summer, a fierce debate broke out at court over whether the emperor should remain in Beijing, or flee to the Imperial hunting retreat at Rehe. Proponents of the retreat, including the leading Grand Councilor Sushun, and the General Senggelinqin, insisted that such an approach would get the emperor out of harm’s way and avoid humiliation. Opponents, including Wenxiang, then an obscure Manchu official who had been appointed to the Emperor’s chief advisory body, the Grand Council, two years earlier, feared that the emperor’s departure would induce panic and government authority might disintegrate—and by implication would induce a dynastic collapse.10 And, as Wenxiang would later recall, with no easily defensible passes between Beijing and Rehe, ‘where we could go, they could go. Our strength was utterly inadequate.’11 After vacillating briefly, the Xianfeng Emperor decided to flee accompanied by the bulk of his senior officials. A disappointed Wenxiang asked for permission to remain in the capital to keep order. The Emperor assented, placing Wenxiang in charge of the Beijing Gendarmerie, and assigned him, together with Prince Gong (the Emperor’s younger brother), and a veteran official Guiliang (Prince Gong’s father-in-law) to negotiate a settlement with the invading forces. This was a precarious assignment to say the least. Following the Emperor’s departure Wenxiang returned to the city and found that the troops had not received rations for days, and ‘I could hear the sound of people seething with insurrection from among the small lanes [of the city], and already there was looting.’ Wenxiang opened the granaries and issued rations, and ordered the gendarmes to arrest looters and execute them on the spot.12 Order was gradually restored within the walled city, although banditry persisted outside. Prince Gong, Wenxiang and Guiliang established an ad hoc Peace Commission office, drafting into service middle and lower ranking officials who had remained in Beijing. The Peace Commission negotiated on one hand with the British and French, and on the other with the Russians, who had taken advantage of the situation to press their demands for redefining the northern boundaries. The negotiations went reasonably 10 The documents for this debate are in Chouban yiwu shimo, xianfeng (Chengdu Zhonghua shuju, 1980) [hereafter YWSM-XF] 7:2269–2301. 11 Wenxiang, ‘Wen wenzhong gong ziding nianpu’ in idem., Wen wenzhong gong shilue (n.p. 1882), 2:32–32b. 12 Ibid., 2:33
554 RICHARD S.HOROWITZ smoothly,and the Conventions of Beijing were signed on 24 October. While the British and French looted the Yuanming Palace (what foreigners now call the old summer palace)northwest of the city, and the British later burned it as punishment for Qing mistreatment of prisoners,the commissioners skillfully avoided a foreign attack and occupation of Beijing itself.By November foreign troops withdrew to Tianjin.13 At this point,much to the frustration of his officials,the Emperor simply refused to return to Beijing,preventing a return to normal politics,and leaving the Peace Commission to manage the situation in the capital.The commissioners took advantage of the opportunity. In January of 1861,they submitted a series of memorials proposing reforms and advocating a new strategic and foreign policy outlook.In the most famous of these they made the following assessment: The Taiping and Nian bandits multiply and are like an illness of the heart and abdomen.Russia,whose territory adjoins ours is determined to nibble away at our land like a silkworm,and is therefore like a threat to the arm and shoulder.England's purpose is trade but she acts harshly and without regard for human decency,and if we do not act to restrict her,then we will be unable to stand on our own,and thus it is like an affliction of the legs.Therefore, first we should suppress the Taiping and Nian bandits,next put the Russians in order,and then deal with England.14 Wenxiang and Prince Gong were calling for a conciliatory policy toward the Western powers,to give the Qing state space to suppress the internal crises.In other proposals,they began to call for 'self- strengthening,'a term that called to mind the Neo-Confucian ideas of moral self-cultivation,but in this context emphasized the introduction of new techniques,particularly western military technology which had proved far superior to what the Qing armies had to offer.They recognized that while it would take years to match European military capabilities,Western guns could offer tremendous aid in their efforts to defeat internal rebellions.Around this time,provincial leaders like Zeng Guofan and Li Hongzhang fighting the Taipings,were coming to similar conclusions,and in the ensuing fifteen years this would form On the negotiations,see Masataka Banno,China and the West 1858-1861,The Origins of the Tsungli Yamen(Cambridge,Mass.:Harvard University Press,1964),170- 201. 14 YWSM-XF,vol.7,2674
554 RICHARD S. HOROWITZ smoothly, and the Conventions of Beijing were signed on 24 October. While the British and French looted the Yuanming Palace (what foreigners now call the old summer palace) northwest of the city, and the British later burned it as punishment for Qing mistreatment of prisoners, the commissioners skillfully avoided a foreign attack and occupation of Beijing itself. By November foreign troops withdrew to Tianjin.13 At this point, much to the frustration of his officials, the Emperor simply refused to return to Beijing, preventing a return to normal politics, and leaving the Peace Commission to manage the situation in the capital. The commissioners took advantage of the opportunity. In January of 1861, they submitted a series of memorials proposing reforms and advocating a new strategic and foreign policy outlook. In the most famous of these they made the following assessment: The Taiping and Nian bandits multiply and are like an illness of the heart and abdomen. Russia, whose territory adjoins ours is determined to nibble away at our land like a silkworm, and is therefore like a threat to the arm and shoulder. England’s purpose is trade but she acts harshly and without regard for human decency, and if we do not act to restrict her, then we will be unable to stand on our own, and thus it is like an affliction of the legs. Therefore, first we should suppress the Taiping and Nian bandits, next put the Russians in order, and then deal with England.14 Wenxiang and Prince Gong were calling for a conciliatory policy toward the Western powers, to give the Qing state space to suppress the internal crises. In other proposals, they began to call for ‘selfstrengthening,’ a term that called to mind the Neo-Confucian ideas of moral self-cultivation, but in this context emphasized the introduction of new techniques, particularly western military technology which had proved far superior to what the Qing armies had to offer. They recognized that while it would take years to match European military capabilities, Western guns could offer tremendous aid in their efforts to defeat internal rebellions. Around this time, provincial leaders like Zeng Guofan and Li Hongzhang fighting the Taipings, were coming to similar conclusions, and in the ensuing fifteen years this would form 13 On the negotiations, see Masataka Banno, China and the West 1858–1861, The Origins of the Tsungli Yamen (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964), 170– 201. 14 YWSM-XF, vol. 7, 2674
CHINESE MARITIME CUSTOMS 555 the core strategy of what has become known as the Qing or Tongzhi Restoration,and the first stage of the effort for self-strengthening.15 The Peace Commissioners also found a way to institutionalize their position.To better manage foreign relations they proposed the creation of a foreign office,called the Zongli Yamen (short for zongli geguo shiwou yamen 'office for general management of affairs with the various countries),Once approved,Prince Gong,Guiliang (who was aged and would die shortly thereafter),and Wenxang were appointed to run this office,and it quickly became their power base.They brought many of the men who had served the Peace Commission into the new office.Two of these in particular,Baoyun,a Manchu official who later became a Grand Councilor and President of the Board of Finance and Dong Xun a Chinese official and statecraft scholar who would become the Yamen's resident intellectual,would be frequent interlocutors with Robert Hart over the following two decades The new office had a very broadly defined role,dealing not only with diplomatic relations with the foreign legations established in Beijing,but also almost anything to do with yangwu,'foreign matters,'including the Customs Administration.16 The experience of the Peace Commission was the defining moment in the careers of these statesmen,and in subsequent years their memorials calling for reforms or criticizing imperial decisions inevitable recalled the experience,almost as a talisman.Prince Gong had little political experience before 1860.But with a genial personality and a moderate approach to diplomacy,he was well liked by foreign diplomats,and the events of 1860 gave him some gravitas and political connections to go with his royal birth.Wenxiang,a Manchu official had risen rapidly (reportedly due to patronage of Grand Councilor Sushun),but his performance in September 1860 won him widespread respect.Foreigners found him intelligent,with 15Self-strengthening'was used by the Peace Commissioners in a memorial in January 1861 referring specifically to military reform though in time it was used much more broadly,see YWSM-XF,vol.8,2700-2702.The self-strengthening movement is a term conventionally used by historians to refer to the efforts to adapt western technology between 1860 and 1894.The term 'restoration'began to be used by officials in the late 186os,as a celebratory description of the revival from during the Tongzhi reign (1862-1874)from the crises of the preceding fifteen years.:See Mary Clabaugh Wright,43-6 for a discussion of the concept of restoration and passim for a magisterial overview. 16 The preceding paragraphs are summarized from Richard S.Horowitz,Central Power and State Making:the Zongli Yamen and Self-Strengthening in China,1860- 1880,'Ph.D.Dissertation,Harvard University,1998,34-60
CHINESE MARITIME CUSTOMS 555 the core strategy of what has become known as the Qing or Tongzhi Restoration, and the first stage of the effort for self-strengthening.15 The Peace Commissioners also found a way to institutionalize their position. To better manage foreign relations they proposed the creation of a foreign office, called the Zongli Yamen (short for zongli geguo shiwu yamen ‘office for general management of affairs with the various countries’), Once approved, Prince Gong, Guiliang (who was aged and would die shortly thereafter), and Wenxang were appointed to run this office, and it quickly became their power base. They brought many of the men who had served the Peace Commission into the new office. Two of these in particular, Baoyun, a Manchu official who later became a Grand Councilor and President of the Board of Finance and Dong Xun a Chinese official and statecraft scholar who would become the Yamen’s resident intellectual, would be frequent interlocutors with Robert Hart over the following two decades The new office had a very broadly defined role, dealing not only with diplomatic relations with the foreign legations established in Beijing, but also almost anything to do with yangwu, ‘foreign matters,’ including the Customs Administration.16 The experience of the Peace Commission was the defining moment in the careers of these statesmen, and in subsequent years their memorials calling for reforms or criticizing imperial decisions inevitable recalled the experience, almost as a talisman. Prince Gong had little political experience before 1860. But with a genial personality and a moderate approach to diplomacy, he was well liked by foreign diplomats, and the events of 1860 gave him some gravitas and political connections to go with his royal birth. Wenxiang, a Manchu official had risen rapidly (reportedly due to patronage of Grand Councilor Sushun), but his performance in September 1860 won him widespread respect. Foreigners found him intelligent, with 15 ‘Self-strengthening’ was used by the Peace Commissioners in a memorial in January 1861 referring specifically to military reform though in time it was used much more broadly, see YWSM-XF, vol. 8, 2700–2702. The self-strengthening movement is a term conventionally used by historians to refer to the efforts to adapt western technology between 1860 and 1894. The term ‘restoration’ began to be used by officials in the late 1860s, as a celebratory description of the revival from during the Tongzhi reign (1862–1874) from the crises of the preceding fifteen years.: See Mary Clabaugh Wright, 43–6 for a discussion of the concept of restoration and passim for a magisterial overview. 16 The preceding paragraphs are summarized from Richard S. Horowitz, ‘Central Power and State Making: the Zongli Yamen and Self-Strengthening in China, 1860– 1880,’ Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1998, 34–60
556 RICHARD S.HOROWITZ a remarkable grasp of detail,and a pragmatic outlook.17 It was Wenxiang,not Prince Gong,who ran the Zongli Yamen on a day- to-day basis,and his long conversations with Hart in June and July of 1861 quickly made him realize the potential of the Customs Service. On 21 August 1861 the Xianfeng Emperor died in Rehe,having never returned to the capital.His only son,a five-year-old boy,was the undisputed heir to the throne.A council of eight,including two princes as well as most of the Grand Councilors,was appointed to aid the boy emperor,while the two empresses dowager Ci'an (the late emperor's chief consort)and Cixi(the mother of the boy emperor, and famous and infamous 'Old Buddha'who would dominate the throne until 1908),wielded the imperial seal for the child.The new reign was to be called gixiang (meaning 'good fortune).The regency quickly broke down.We can imagine that rulership by a committee of eight plus two Empresses-Dowager was clumsy.The Council of Regents was entirely made up of men who had gone with the emperor on his retreat,and left out those who had stayed behind in the capital and picked up the pieces,engendering a split between Rehe and Beijing.Taking advantage of the crisis,the Empresses- Dowager connived with Prince Gong and military leaders in the vicinity of Beijing.When the imperial entourage returned to Beijing at the beginning of November,the Council of eight was arrested. The leading Grand Councilor Sushun was executed,the two princes were generously invited to commit suicide to avoid a similar fate (the privileges of royal birth!),and the remainder were cashiered. It was claimed that Sushun had forged the late emperor's valedictory edict and usurped power.Taking a political 'mulligan,'a new reign name was proclaimed(Tongzhi,which Wenxiang told Thomas Wade meant by way classical allusion something like 'return to order'),the two Empresses-Dowager were made co-regents,and Prince Gong was given the special title of Deliberative Prince,and placed on the Grand Council.A new group of Grand Councilors was appointed,with the exception of Wenxiang who had not been part of the usurpingclique in Rehe.18 17 Mary Clabaugh Wright,70-1. 18 The account of the coup follows Luke S.K.Kwong,Imperial Authority in Crisis: An Interpretation of the Coup D'e'tat of 1861'Modern Asian Studies 17.2(1983):221- 38;see also Mary Clabaugh Wright,16-20.A useful political narrative from standard published primary sources is Xu Liding,Xianfeng tongzhi di(Changchun:Jilin wen shi chubanshe,1993),241-94
556 RICHARD S. HOROWITZ a remarkable grasp of detail, and a pragmatic outlook.17 It was Wenxiang, not Prince Gong, who ran the Zongli Yamen on a dayto-day basis, and his long conversations with Hart in June and July of 1861 quickly made him realize the potential of the Customs Service. On 21 August 1861 the Xianfeng Emperor died in Rehe, having never returned to the capital. His only son, a five-year-old boy, was the undisputed heir to the throne. A council of eight, including two princes as well as most of the Grand Councilors, was appointed to aid the boy emperor, while the two empresses dowager Ci’an (the late emperor’s chief consort) and Cixi (the mother of the boy emperor, and famous and infamous ‘Old Buddha’ who would dominate the throne until 1908), wielded the imperial seal for the child. The new reign was to be called qixiang (meaning ‘good fortune’). The regency quickly broke down. We can imagine that rulership by a committee of eight plus two Empresses-Dowager was clumsy. The Council of Regents was entirely made up of men who had gone with the emperor on his retreat, and left out those who had stayed behind in the capital and picked up the pieces, engendering a split between Rehe and Beijing. Taking advantage of the crisis, the EmpressesDowager connived with Prince Gong and military leaders in the vicinity of Beijing. When the imperial entourage returned to Beijing at the beginning of November, the Council of eight was arrested. The leading Grand Councilor Sushun was executed, the two princes were generously invited to commit suicide to avoid a similar fate (the privileges of royal birth!), and the remainder were cashiered. It was claimed that Sushun had forged the late emperor’s valedictory edict and usurped power. Taking a political ‘mulligan,’ a new reign name was proclaimed (Tongzhi, which Wenxiang told Thomas Wade meant by way classical allusion something like ‘return to order’), the two Empresses-Dowager were made co-regents, and Prince Gong was given the special title of Deliberative Prince, and placed on the Grand Council. A new group of Grand Councilors was appointed, with the exception of Wenxiang who had not been part of the ‘usurping’ clique in Rehe.18 17 Mary Clabaugh Wright, 70–1. 18 The account of the coup follows Luke S. K. Kwong, ‘Imperial Authority in Crisis: An Interpretation of the Coup D’e tat of 1861’ Modern Asian Studies 17.2 (1983): 221– 38; see also Mary Clabaugh Wright, 16–20. A useful political narrative from standard published primary sources is Xu Liding, Xianfeng tongzhi di (Changchun: Jilin wen shi chubanshe, 1993), 241–94.
CHINESE MARITIME CUSTOMS 557 The coup d'etat placed the Peace Commission group in a much stronger political position.The Zongli Yamen was gradually expanded, and Prince Gong and Wenxiang continued to work with foreign representatives to forge a cooperative policy:foreigners supported Qing efforts to suppress rebellion as benefitting their trading interests, and the Yamen,together with provincial officials enforced the treaty agreements.Prince Gong's ascendancy was brief:in 1865,accused of corruption,he was briefly stripped of his posts,as the Empresses- Dowager solidified their control of the regency.Quickly restored to all but the title of deliberative prince,he was weakened but remained an influential figure.Wenxiang,a cautious but persistent advocate of reform,would remain a key figure until his premature death in 1876. Where most other foreigners who did substantive work helping the Qing government in the Tongzhi era were associated with progressive provincial leaders-Charles Chinese'Gordon and Halliday Macartney with Li Hongzhang,Prosper Giquel with Zuo Zongtang-Hart made his most important connections in Beijing. The Customs Service became an agent of the central government, and subordinate to the Zongli Yamen.The alliance between the Peace Commission group and Hart would bring benefits flowing both ways. I Robert Hart handled his early relations with the Peace Commission group in Beijing with great cultural sensitivity.John Fairbank, Katherine Bruner and Richard Smith make a convincing case for Hart's bicultural achievement'in dealing so effectively with his Manchu and Chinese overseers.19 But curiously missing from their characterization is the notion of cultivating personal relationships.In Chinese culture,at least in recent centuries, the cultivation of personal relationships has been of exceptional importance.Relationships bring with them expectations of mutual assistance,and are understood to imply strong sense of reciprocity. While direct evidence of the political implications of personal connections is hard to come by,Chinese generally assume that they form an important underlying structure to political activity.20 19 Bruner,et al,324-32. 20 For example see Lien-sheng Yang,The Concept of Pao as a Basis for Social Relations in China'in Chinese Thought and Institutions,ed.John K.Fairbank(Chicago:
CHINESE MARITIME CUSTOMS 557 The coup d’´etat placed the Peace Commission group in a much stronger political position. The Zongli Yamen was gradually expanded, and Prince Gong and Wenxiang continued to work with foreign representatives to forge a cooperative policy: foreigners supported Qing efforts to suppress rebellion as benefitting their trading interests, and the Yamen, together with provincial officials enforced the treaty agreements. Prince Gong’s ascendancy was brief: in 1865, accused of corruption, he was briefly stripped of his posts, as the EmpressesDowager solidified their control of the regency. Quickly restored to all but the title of deliberative prince, he was weakened but remained an influential figure. Wenxiang, a cautious but persistent advocate of reform, would remain a key figure until his premature death in 1876. Where most other foreigners who did substantive work helping the Qing government in the Tongzhi era were associated with progressive provincial leaders—Charles ‘Chinese’ Gordon and Halliday Macartney with Li Hongzhang, Prosper Giquel with Zuo Zongtang—Hart made his most important connections in Beijing. The Customs Service became an agent of the central government, and subordinate to the Zongli Yamen. The alliance between the Peace Commission group and Hart would bring benefits flowing both ways. II Robert Hart handled his early relations with the Peace Commission group in Beijing with great cultural sensitivity. John Fairbank, Katherine Bruner and Richard Smith make a convincing case for Hart’s ‘bicultural achievement’ in dealing so effectively with his Manchu and Chinese overseers.19 But curiously missing from their characterization is the notion of cultivating personal relationships. In Chinese culture, at least in recent centuries, the cultivation of personal relationships has been of exceptional importance. Relationships bring with them expectations of mutual assistance, and are understood to imply strong sense of reciprocity. While direct evidence of the political implications of personal connections is hard to come by, Chinese generally assume that they form an important underlying structure to political activity.20 19 Bruner, et al., 324–32. 20 For example see Lien-sheng Yang, ‘The Concept of Pao as a Basis for Social Relations in China’ in Chinese Thought and Institutions, ed. John K. Fairbank (Chicago:
558 RICHARD S.HOROWITZ Hart (never reluctant to use personal connections in his dealings with non-Chinese in the Customs)would surely have been aware of this.Hart does not speak explicitly of the benefits of cultivating relationships with the Zongli Yamen,and nor is this obvious in Chinese materials I have read.But the record of Hart's involvement with the Zongli Yamen leadership in the 186os points to the development of a strong and mutually beneficial relationship. From the beginning,Hart brought more than good manners and an amiable persona,he had tangible benefits to offer.There is little evidence that before 1861 Qing central government officials had much understanding of the revenue potential of the foreign Customs Service.In the pre-Opium war era,Canton maritime customs revenues that made it to Beijing disappeared into the coffers of the Imperial Household Department,which through its appointed Hoppo'the Customs Superintendent maintained a primary role in overseeing foreign trade.Indeed,in 1858 Guiliang offered to eliminate all customs duties if the British and French would withdraw their demand to establish legations in Beijing.21 Hart not only made clear that these revenues were substantial, but was able to place effective control over them into the hands of Qing central administration.For other kinds of taxes (like land and grain taxes)provincial officials fulfilled preset quotas and could retain whatever surplus they could extract (as long as they were not so excessive as to induce impeachment by another official or open rebellion).In 1861 Hart informed Wenxiang that the Customs Service would provide quarterly revenue returns to the Zongli Yamen.22 This was particularly valuable,for while the foreign Customs Service assessed taxes,it did not actually collect them.Merchants received an invoice and they paid taxes owed into a Chinese Customs Bank, which then transferred the funds as ordered by the Qing government. Given this separation of assessment and collection of the import and export taxes,the quarterly reports provided the central authorities with a picture of actual customs revenues;and local officials could be compelled to transfer funds as needed.Thus the central government University of Chicago Press,1957),291-309;and Ambrose Yeo-chi King,Kuan-hsi and Network Building:a Sociological Interpretation,'Daedalus 120.2(1991):63-84. 21 See Preston Torbert,The Ch'ing Imperial Household Department:a Study of its Organization and Principal Functions,1662-1796(Cambridge Mass.:Harvard University Press,1977),ch.4.;Banno,27-8. 22YSM-XF,vol.8,2918-2924
558 RICHARD S. HOROWITZ Hart (never reluctant to use personal connections in his dealings with non-Chinese in the Customs) would surely have been aware of this. Hart does not speak explicitly of the benefits of cultivating relationships with the Zongli Yamen, and nor is this obvious in Chinese materials I have read. But the record of Hart’s involvement with the Zongli Yamen leadership in the 1860s points to the development of a strong and mutually beneficial relationship. From the beginning, Hart brought more than good manners and an amiable persona, he had tangible benefits to offer. There is little evidence that before 1861 Qing central government officials had much understanding of the revenue potential of the foreign Customs Service. In the pre-Opium war era, Canton maritime customs revenues that made it to Beijing disappeared into the coffers of the Imperial Household Department, which through its appointed ‘Hoppo’ the Customs Superintendent maintained a primary role in overseeing foreign trade. Indeed, in 1858 Guiliang offered to eliminate all customs duties if the British and French would withdraw their demand to establish legations in Beijing.21 Hart not only made clear that these revenues were substantial, but was able to place effective control over them into the hands of Qing central administration. For other kinds of taxes (like land and grain taxes) provincial officials fulfilled preset quotas and could retain whatever surplus they could extract (as long as they were not so excessive as to induce impeachment by another official or open rebellion). In 1861 Hart informed Wenxiang that the Customs Service would provide quarterly revenue returns to the Zongli Yamen.22 This was particularly valuable, for while the foreign Customs Service assessed taxes, it did not actually collect them. Merchants received an invoice and they paid taxes owed into a Chinese Customs Bank, which then transferred the funds as ordered by the Qing government. Given this separation of assessment and collection of the import and export taxes, the quarterly reports provided the central authorities with a picture of actual customs revenues; and local officials could be compelled to transfer funds as needed. Thus the central government University of Chicago Press, 1957), 291–309; and Ambrose Yeo-chi King, ‘Kuan-hsi and Network Building: a Sociological Interpretation,’ Daedalus 120.2 (1991): 63–84. 21 See Preston Torbert, The Ch’ing Imperial Household Department: a Study of its Organization and Principal Functions, 1662–1796 (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977), ch. 4.; Banno, 27–8. 22 YWSM-XF, vol. 8, 2918–2924
