CHAPTER 4 POLITICS IN THE AFTERMATH OF REVOLUTION: THE ERA OF YUAN SHIH-K'AI,1912-16 The years immediately following the Revolution of 191,when Yuan Shih-k'ai was president of the first Chinese republic (19I2-16),can be approached in two quite different ways.One emphasizes the beginnings of warlordism:the breakdown of political unity,the emergence of military rule,and the spread of an amoral and treacherous spirit of fauve qui peat among those in authority.In this view,the triumph of the Revolution was rendered meaningless even at the very moment of victory.When the for- mal mandate to govern was passed from the child Manchu emperor and his court to Yuan Shih-k'ai in February 1912,China lost her powerful monarchical symbols of political integration with a history of over two thousand years.In exchange,an unscrupulous and reactionary militarist occupied the central post,with neither programme nor imperial potency; the new republican forms meant little.The result,according to this view, was a rapid slide into warlordism under Yuan Shih-k'ai's aegis. The second approach stresses the continuities with the pre-revolu- tionary years and sees the Revolution of I9II not as another episode in the weakening of China's polity,but as an early climax in a nationalist movement to invigorate politics and society.In this view,the aftermath of the revolution witnessed a testing in practice of the two competing ideas of self-government and administrative centralization,that had been winning adherents during the previous decade.It was a time of energetic political experimentation.Along with experiment went conflict,as the expansion of political participation collided with efforts to centralize authority.But it was only after these competing programmes had each had a period of vigorous life that the attributes of warlordism emerged. The Yuan Shih-k'ai presidency period is best understood,according to this interpretation,as the logical consequence of China's first wave of nationalism,embracing both its virtues and its fatal flaws. Ample data can be marshalled on behalf of either approach.In this account the second approach is favoured,because it seems to make more sense of the leading political tendencies,among which Yuan's presidency was only one.But the first approach is a useful corrective to any inadvert- 2o8 Cambridge Histories Online Cambridge University Press,2008
CHAPTER 4 POLITICS IN THE AFTERMATH OF REVOLUTION: THE ERA OF YUAN SHIH-K'AI, 1912-16 The years immediately following the Revolution of 1911, when Yuan Shih-k'ai was president of the first Chinese republic (1912-16), can be approached in two quite different ways. One emphasizes the beginnings of warlordism: the breakdown of political unity, the emergence of military rule, and the spread of an amoral and treacherous spirit of sauve qui peut among those in authority. In this view, the triumph of the Revolution was rendered meaningless even at the very moment of victory. When the formal mandate to govern was passed from the child Manchu emperor and his court to Yuan Shih-k'ai in February 1912, China lost her powerful monarchical symbols of political integration with a history of over two thousand years. In exchange, an unscrupulous and reactionary militarist occupied the central post, with neither programme nor imperial potency; the new republican forms meant little. The result, according to this view, was a rapid slide into warlordism under Yuan Shih-k'ai's aegis. The second approach stresses the continuities with the pre-revolutionary years and sees the Revolution of 1911 not as another episode in the weakening of China's polity, but as an early climax in a nationalist movement to invigorate politics and society. In this view, the aftermath of the revolution witnessed a testing in practice of the two competing ideas of self-government and administrative centralization, that had been winning adherents during the previous decade. It was a time of energetic political experimentation. Along with experiment went conflict, as the expansion of political participation collided with efforts to centralize authority. But it was only after these competing programmes had each had a period of vigorous life that the attributes of warlordism emerged. The Yuan Shih-k'ai presidency period is best understood, according to this interpretation, as the logical consequence of China's first wave of nationalism, embracing both its virtues and its fatal flaws. Ample data can be marshalled on behalf of either approach. In this account the second approach is favoured, because it seems to make more sense of the leading political tendencies, among which Yuan's presidency was only one. But the first approach is a useful corrective to any inadvert- 208 Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY OF THE REVOLUTION 209 ent glorification of the politicians of the period.This first wave of nation- alism,after all,came nowhere near attaining its essential objective of a strong and independent Chinese state.More thoroughgoing attempts were required before China's sovereignty was recovered.And meanwhile, warlordism and its special oppressions intervened. THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY OF THE REVOLUTION Whichever approach is preferred,the ambiguity of the Revolution of 1911 must be acknowledged,hovering as it did between success and fail- ure,with the unresolved tensions in the polity being passed on to the early republic.Our account of the period begins by noting these am- biguities or tensions and discussing their various sources. The ambiguity of the revolutionary aftermath began with the negotiated settlement of the revolution itself.The first talks between imperial officials and representatives of the revolutionary forces took place in November I911,about one month after the first republican successes. Formal negotiations began in December.The main issues were worked out during January 1912,and the abdication of the Ch'ing monarch was decreed on I2 February.Within three more months the institutions of a new national government were functioning in Peking.Who had won? Judging from the eruption of armed attacks on the government in 1913 and 1916(sometimes called the Second and Third Revolutions),we can conclude that the settlement of I9Iz was an unstable compromise. On the one hand,the settlement consolidated an enormous revolu- tionary victory.The Ch'ing dynasty was overthrown,a feat that had eluded numerous previous attempts,including the massive Taiping Rebellion of the mid nineteenth century.Moreover,the Ch'ing was replaced by a new form of government;the imperial order,which had supported an immeasurable accumulation of attitudes and political habits,was abolished.Both these accomplishments proved to be irrev- ocable,despite attempts to rescind one or both of them in 1915-16 and 1917.The two irreducible aims of the republican revolutionaries had been permanently achieved:the overthrow of the Manchus and the establishment of a republic. On the other hand,the new arrangements were far from ideal for those who had served the revolution the longest.Perhaps the generous set- tlement accorded the abdicating child emperor and his large household, including promise of a substantial stipend,was a harmless concession (though his survival allowed the Japanese to use him in the 193os when establishing a subservient Manchu kingdom in the north-east).Revolu- Cambridge Histories Online Cambridge University Press,2008
THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY OF THE REVOLUTION 209 ent glorification of the politicians of the period. This first wave of nationalism, after all, came nowhere near attaining its essential objective of a strong and independent Chinese state. More thoroughgoing attempts were required before China's sovereignty was recovered. And meanwhile, warlordism and its special oppressions intervened. THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY OF THE REVOLUTION Whichever approach is preferred, the ambiguity of the Revolution of 1911 must be acknowledged, hovering as it did between success and failure, with the unresolved tensions in the polity being passed on to the early republic. Our account of the period begins by noting these ambiguities or tensions and discussing their various sources. The ambiguity of the revolutionary aftermath began with the negotiated settlement of the revolution itself. The first talks between imperial officials and representatives of the revolutionary forces took place in November 1911, about one month after the first republican successes. Formal negotiations began in December. The main issues were worked out during January 1912, and the abdication of the Ch'ing monarch was decreed on 12 February. Within three more months the institutions of a new national government were functioning in Peking. Who had won ? Judging from the eruption of armed attacks on the government in 1913 and 1916 (sometimes called the Second and Third Revolutions), we can conclude that the settlement of 1912 was an unstable compromise. On the one hand, the settlement consolidated an enormous revolutionary victory. The Ch'ing dynasty was overthrown, a feat that had eluded numerous previous attempts, including the massive Taiping Rebellion of the mid nineteenth century. Moreover, the Ch'ing was replaced by a new form of government; the imperial order, which had supported an immeasurable accumulation of attitudes and political habits, was abolished. Both these accomplishments proved to be irrevocable, despite attempts to rescind one or both of them in 1915-16 and 1917. The two irreducible aims of the republican revolutionaries had been permanently achieved: the overthrow of the Manchus and the establishment of a republic. On the other hand, the new arrangements were far from ideal for those who had served the revolution the longest. Perhaps the generous settlement accorded the abdicating child emperor and his large household, including promise of a substantial stipend, was a harmless concession (though his survival allowed the Japanese to use him in the 1930s when establishing a subservient Manchu kingdom in the north-east). RevoluCambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
210 THE ERA OF YUAN SHIH-K'AI,1912-16 tionary expectations were more seriously compromised by the new head of state,Yuan Shih-k'ai,a leading imperial official.The revolutionary spokesmen accepted the sz year-old Yuan to lead the new order as the price for his arranging the Ch'ing abdication and in order to avoid a prolonged civil war.Some were even optimistic about his likely future role.He was capable and could be labelled a 'progressive'among the mandarins.After all his power was to be limited by constitutional ar- rangements,including a cabinet and a national legislature,designed by the revolutionaries themselves.But the resulting compromise of a con- stitutional president with no established revolutionary or republican commitments was to prove a source of great uneasiness.This uneasiness was heightened by Yuan's unwillingess to leave Peking in order to receive his presidential confirmation in Nanking,the centre of revolu- tionary power by early 1912.And it was further augmented by the limited role accorded veteran revolutionaries,who were excluded from the fin- ancial and army posts in the first republican cabinet in Peking.The question of who had won the revolution remained clouded. Another ambiguity lay in the effect of the revolution on national unity. Conceived in nationalism,the revolution demanded the preservation of the territory of the Ch'ing dynasty as a basis for the new nation.Yuan's rise to the presidency stemmed from the urgency of this demand.In practice,however,the revolution severed most administrative ties between the provinces and the central government.In some provinces, ironically,distrust of Yuan as president increased the resistance to reconstituting administrative links between province and centre.Further- more,the outlying areas of Outer Mongolia and Tibet had moved towards complete separation from any Chinese government. In the case of Mongolia and Tibet,the set-back to Han Chinese na- tionalist goals had two aspects.Local non-Han elites took the occasion to escape from Peking's control,thereby shrinking the Ch'ing legacy to the republic.And foreign powers took the opportunity to expand their spheres of influence,thereby tightening the strategic encirclement of China.Begun in reaction to late Ch'ing programmes of intervention in these old dependencies,princely Mongolian and Tibetan movements to throw off Peking's authority succeeded in late 19I and early 1912.But they consolidated their successes only under Russian protection in Outer Mongolia and British protection in Tibet.Peking's subsequent efforts to recover these lost territories had,of necessity,to take the form of nego- tiating with these European powers.Neither Russia nor Great Britain was insisting on full colonial absorption.But all that the early republican gov- ernments could salvage was a tenuous suzerainty in these outlying por- tions of the former Ch'ing empire. Cambridge Histories Online Cambridge University Press,2008
2IO THE ERA OF YUAN SHIH-K'AI , I 9 I 2-1 6 tionary expectations were more seriously compromised by the new head of state, Yuan Shih-k'ai, a leading imperial official. The revolutionary spokesmen accepted the 52 year-old Yuan to lead the new order as the price for his arranging the Ch'ing abdication and in order to avoid a prolonged civil war. Some were even optimistic about his likely future role. He was capable and could be labelled a 'progressive' among the mandarins. After all his power was to be limited by constitutional arrangements, including a cabinet and a national legislature, designed by the revolutionaries themselves. But the resulting compromise of a constitutional president with no established revolutionary or republican commitments was to prove a source of great uneasiness. This uneasiness was heightened by Yuan's unwillingess to leave Peking in order to receive his presidential confirmation in Nanking, the centre of revolutionary power by early 1912. And it was further augmented by the limited role accorded veteran revolutionaries, who were excluded from the financial and army posts in the first republican cabinet in Peking. The question of who had won the revolution remained clouded. Another ambiguity lay in the effect of the revolution on national unity. Conceived in nationalism, the revolution demanded the preservation of the territory of the Ch'ing dynasty as a basis for the new nation. Yuan's rise to the presidency stemmed from the urgency of this demand. In practice, however, the revolution severed most administrative ties between the provinces and the central government. In some provinces, ironically, distrust of Yuan as president increased the resistance to reconstituting administrative links between province and centre. Furthermore, the outlying areas of Outer Mongolia and Tibet had moved towards complete separation from any Chinese government. In the case of Mongolia and Tibet, the set-back to Han Chinese nationalist goals had two aspects. Local non-Han elites took the occasion to escape from Peking's control, thereby shrinking the Ch'ing legacy to the republic. And foreign powers took the opportunity to expand their spheres of influence, thereby tightening the strategic encirclement of China. Begun in reaction to late Ch'ing programmes of intervention in these old dependencies, princely Mongolian and Tibetan movements to throw off Peking's authority succeeded in late 1911 and early 1912. But they consolidated their successes only under Russian protection in Outer Mongolia and British protection in Tibet. Peking's subsequent efforts to recover these lost territories had, of necessity, to take the form of negotiating with these European powers. Neither Russia nor Great Britain was insisting on full colonial absorption. But all that the early republican governments could salvage was a tenuous suzerainty in these outlying portions of the former Ch'ing empire. Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY OF THE REVOLUTION 2IT Foreign governments took advantage of revolutionary disruption in a variety of ways.The degree of foreign participation in China's customs collection greatly increased,when foreign commissioners became not just assessors and accountants but also actual collectors of the revenue. Further,the proceeds were,by arrangements struck during the revolu- tion,deposited in foreign banks before disbursement.The measure gave foreign financiers both heightened controls and profits.These and other augmentations of foreign privilege during the Revolution of 1o betrayed Chinese nationalism and sullied the revolutionary banner. A number of circumstances marking the revolution help to explain the ambiguities of the result.The revolutionary movement,whose broadest organization had been the T'ung-meng hui,had failed to pre- serve solidarity in the years preceding the revolution.Its national leaders often had little connection with revolutionary developments in the pro- vinces and were unable to weld into a cohesive whole the forces that burgeoned there during the revolution.Such unified revolutionary de- termination as they were able to muster was blunted by the fear that continued disruption and warfare might lead to full-scale foreign inter- vention,for which they were strategically and psychologically quite un- prepared.Hence,despite a loosely joined accumulation of revolutionary troops that quantitatively far surpassed those at the disposal of the Ch'ing court,compromise seemed necessary.Compromise included accepting the Ch'ing prime minister,Yuan Shih-k'ai,as president.Although 14 provinces established revolutionary governments,in the revolution's aftermath the old revolutionary organization could rely on committed adherents as chief executives in only three provinces(Kwangtung,Kiangsi and Anhwei).Revolutionaries had in fact never been completely in charge of the revolution and were not disposed to press the issue. Another feature of the revolution that contributed to the ambiguity of the result was the social conservatism that accompanied its political ra- dicalism.The revolution replaced a venerable system of government with the latest Western model.The constitution located sovereignty in the people.Sovereignty was to be exercised by a national assembly (or parliament)plus a president,cabinet and judiciary.But it soon became apparent that the new political system would not displace the prevailing social elites from their positions of dominance.On the contrary,the old ruling class emerged both unscathed and invigorated.Although secret societies with their lower class constituencies were active,notably in Szechwan and Shensi,they did not seriously challenge the political pre- eminence of army officers,republican revolutionary politicians,and the leaders of self-government bodies.All three of these dominant groups were socially elite,mainly gentry.Another possible threat to the received Cambridge Histories Online Cambridge University Press,2008
THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY OF THE REVOLUTION 211 Foreign governments took advantage of revolutionary disruption in a variety of ways. The degree of foreign participation in China's customs collection greatly increased, when foreign commissioners became not just assessors and accountants but also actual collectors of the revenue. Further, the proceeds were, by arrangements struck during the revolution, deposited in foreign banks before disbursement. The measure gave foreign financiers both heightened controls and profits. These and other augmentations of foreign privilege during the Revolution of 1911 betrayed Chinese nationalism and sullied the revolutionary banner. A number of circumstances marking the revolution help to explain the ambiguities of the result. The revolutionary movement, whose broadest organization had been the T'ung-meng hui, had failed to preserve solidarity in the years preceding the revolution. Its national leaders often had little connection with revolutionary developments in the provinces and were unable to weld into a cohesive whole the forces that burgeoned there during the revolution. Such unified revolutionary determination as they were able to muster was blunted by the fear that continued disruption and warfare might lead to full-scale foreign intervention, for which they were strategically and psychologically quite unprepared. Hence, despite a loosely joined accumulation of revolutionary troops that quantitatively far surpassed those at the disposal of the Ch'ing court, compromise seemed necessary. Compromise included accepting the Ch'ing prime minister, Yuan Shih-k'ai, as president. Although 14 provinces established revolutionary governments, in the revolution's aftermath the old revolutionary organization could rely on committed adherents as chief executives in only three provinces (Kwangtung, Kiangsi and Anhwei). Revolutionaries had in fact never been completely in charge of the revolution and were not disposed to press the issue. Another feature of the revolution that contributed to the ambiguity of the result was the social conservatism that accompanied its political radicalism. The revolution replaced a venerable system of government with the latest Western model. The constitution located sovereignty in the people. Sovereignty was to be exercised by a national assembly (or parliament) plus a president, cabinet and judiciary. But it soon became apparent that the new political system would not displace the prevailing social elites from their positions of dominance. On the contrary, the old ruling class emerged both unscathed and invigorated. Although secret societies with their lower class constituencies were active, notably in Szechwan and Shensi, they did not seriously challenge the political preeminence of army officers, republican revolutionary politicians, and the leaders of self-government bodies. All three of these dominant groups were socially elite, mainly gentry. Another possible threat to the received Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
2I2 THE ERA OF YUAN SHIH-K'AI,I912-16 social order was the existence of mass armies,mobilized in support of the revolution in several provinces.But these too were contained and, where necessary,forcibly dispersed(Kwangtung was the most dramatic case). The formal recognition of popular sovereignty was accompanied by the spread of political participation in the society,and this was radical. But at the same time the organized forces of the revolution,no matter how quarrelsome among themselves,were generally united in keeping political control in upper class hands,especially those of the gentry,and this was conservative.When Chiao Ta-feng as revolutionary military governor of Hunan appeared to be basing his power on secret societies in late October 19II,he was assassinated,and a more socially conservative grouping around the provincial assembly leader,Tan Yen-k'ai,took power.When the revolutionary government in Kweichow persisted in an alliance with lower class elements,it was overthrown in March 1912 by military force from a neighbouring revolutionary province (Yunnan). The Chinese social elite had become more variegated in its cultural styles and economic activity since the late nineteenth century.But in the after- math of the 1911 Revolution it still acted with remarkable cohesion and determination in defence of its interests.The few defectors or waverers were easily deposed,without resort to assistance from Yuan Shih-k'ai in Peking. While the gentry were successfully guarding against threats to their social power,they made two demands on the national and provincial leadership.The country should remain unified;and the localities should enjoy self-government.Here was another source of unresolved tension in the revolutionary aftermath.Chinese unity was both a treasured his- torical inheritance and,in the face of foreign designs,an urgent present necessity.There seemed to be no serious dissent from this fundamental proposition.But how was Chinese unity to be organized?In the wake of the revolution some important political leaders and groups urged a cen- tralized administration.They included Yuan Shih-k'ai in Peking and Ts'ai O,military governor in the distant province of Yunnan.A central- ized administration was a plank in some party platforms.But in the early months after the revolution,these voices were drowned out (and voted down in the national assembly)by the advocates of local self-government, who often espoused an extreme form of provincial autonomy. The idea that autonomous provinces would better serve Chinese na- tionalism than would a centralized state had gained considerable currency in the last years of the Ch'ing.After most provinces emerged from the revolution fully autonomous,there was little disposition to surrender Cambridge Histories Online Cambridge University Press,2008
212 THE ERA OF YUAN SHIH-K'AI, I 9 I 2-1 6 social order was the existence of mass armies, mobilized in support of the revolution in several provinces. But these too were contained and, where necessary, forcibly dispersed (Kwangtung was the most dramatic case). The formal recognition of popular sovereignty was accompanied by the spread of political participation in the society, and this was radical. But at the same time the organized forces of the revolution, no matter how quarrelsome among themselves, were generally united in keeping political control in upper class hands, especially those of the gentry, and this was conservative. When Chiao Ta-feng as revolutionary military governor of Hunan appeared to be basing his power on secret societies in late October 1911, he was assassinated, and a more socially conservative grouping around the provincial assembly leader, T'an Yen-k'ai, took power. When the revolutionary government in Kweichow persisted in an alliance with lower class elements, it was overthrown in March 1912 by military force from a neighbouring' revolutionary province (Yunnan). The Chinese social elite had become more variegated in its cultural styles and economic activity since the late nineteenth century. But in the aftermath of the 1911 Revolution it still acted with remarkable cohesion and determination in defence of its interests. The few defectors or waverers were easily deposed, without resort to assistance from Yuan Shih-k'ai in Peking. While the gentry were successfully guarding against threats to their social power, they made two demands on the national and provincial leadership. The country should remain unified; and the localities should enjoy self-government. Here was another source of unresolved tension in the revolutionary aftermath. Chinese unity was both a treasured historical inheritance and, in the face of foreign designs, an urgent present necessity. There seemed to be no serious dissent from this fundamental proposition. But how was Chinese unity to be organized ? In the wake of the revolution some important political leaders and groups urged a centralized administration. They included Yuan Shih-k'ai in Peking and Ts'ai O, military governor in the distant province of Yunnan. A centralized administration was a plank in some party platforms. But in the early months after the revolution, these voices were drowned out (and voted down in the national assembly) by the advocates of local self-government, who often espoused an extreme form of provincial autonomy. The idea that autonomous provinces would better serve Chinese nationalism than would a centralized state had gained considerable currency in the last years of the Ch'ing. After most provinces emerged from the revolution fully autonomous, there was little disposition to surrender Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
THE STRUCTURE OF THE NEW ORDER 2I3 their accrued privileges,including command over provincial armies,the retention of tax revenues,and the selection of local and provincial officials. At the same time,local assemblies below the provincial level swelled greatly in incidence and assertiveness.To the minds of the provincial- ists,the two demands of unity and self-government could be wedded in federal structures.The early republic was at first a de facto confederation of provinces.But the continuing foreign pressure on Chinese sovereignty put a great strain on such a loose arrangement. THE STRUCTURE OF THE NEW ORDER The new political order had the task of establishing itself amidst these unresolved tensions.A brief description of its structure in the spring of I9Iz is a necessary preliminary to tracing the main events. As agreed in the negotiations concluding the revolution,Yuan Shih- k'ai was president.He swore to a republican oath composed,like the Provisional Constitution(Lin-shih yueh-fa)of 1912,by the revolutionary leadership.But the president was endowed by the new constitution with considerable executive power.Impeachment was not made easy;he was theoretically commander-in-chief of all China's army and navy;and, again theoretically,he possessed broad powers of appointment.He was to share responsibilities with a prime minister and cabinet,whom he appointed with the concurrence of the parliament or national assembly. The first prime minister was Tang Shao-i,an old associate of Yuan's, whose sympathy for the revolutionary side unexpectedly persisted after the revolution. The first provisional parliament of the republic consisted of represen- tatives from the provinces,five delegates each.The parliament lacked any significant royalist group,but adherents of the main revolutionary party,the T'ung-meng hui,held less than one-third of the seats.This reflected the Tung-meng hui's failure to dominate more than a minority of the governments even of those provinces that had joined the revolu- tion.The other major parties represented either factions that had pre- viously split from the T'ung-meng hui,or the reformist constitutional movement of officials and gentry that had adopted republicanism only during-and in some cases,after-the revolution.One principal achieve- ment of this parliament was the legislation guiding the election of a more permanent,bicameral parliament and of new provincial assemblies. (The new assemblies actually were constituted in the first half of 1913.) Another achievement was the rejection of Yuan's efforts to establish administrative machinery for subordinating the provinces. Cambridge Histories Online Cambridge University Press,2008
THE STRUCTURE OF THE NEW ORDER 213 their accrued privileges, including command over provincial armies, the retention of tax revenues, and the selection of local and provincial officials. At the same time, local assemblies below the provincial level swelled greatly in incidence and assertiveness. To the minds of the provincialists, the two demands of unity and self-government could be wedded in federal structures. The early republic was at first a de facto confederation of provinces. But the continuing foreign pressure on Chinese sovereignty put a great strain on such a loose arrangement. THE STRUCTURE OF THE NEW ORDER The new political order had the task of establishing itself amidst these unresolved tensions. A brief description of its structure in the spring of 1912 is a necessary preliminary to tracing the main events. As agreed in the negotiations concluding the revolution, Yuan Shihk'ai was president. He swore to a republican oath composed, like the Provisional Constitution (Lin-shih yueh-fa) of 1912, by the revolutionary leadership. But the president was endowed by the new constitution with considerable executive power. Impeachment was not made easy; he was theoretically commander-in-chief of all China's army and navy; and, again theoretically, he possessed broad powers of appointment. He was to share responsibilities with a prime minister and cabinet, whom he appointed with the concurrence of the parliament or national assembly. The first prime minister was T'ang Shao-i, an old associate of Yuan's, whose sympathy for the revolutionary side unexpectedly persisted after the revolution. The first provisional parliament of the republic consisted of representatives from the provinces, five delegates each. The parliament lacked any significant royalist group, but adherents of the main revolutionary party, the T'ung-meng hui, held less than one-third of the seats. This reflected the T'ung-meng hui's failure to dominate more than a minority of the governments even of those provinces that had joined the revolution. The other major parties represented either factions that had previously split from the T'ung-meng hui, or the reformist constitutional movement of officials and gentry that had adopted republicanism only during - and in some cases, after - the revolution. One principal achievement of this parliament was the legislation guiding the election of a more permanent, bicameral parliament and of new provincial assemblies. (The new assemblies actually were constituted in the first half of 1913.) Another achievement was the rejection of Yuan's efforts to establish administrative machinery for subordinating the provinces. Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
214 THE ERA OF YUAN SHIH-K'AI,1912-16 In most provinces,political leadership was drawn from two institutions: the army,especially the leaders of the modern New Army units formed around the country in the late Ch'ing,and the provincial assemblies. Although the precipitation of the revolution had often begun at lower levels,it was people from these two groups who had consolidated power as Ch'ing authority collapsed.The top executive was in every province the military governor (-)If we exclude the Manchurian provinces and Kansu,where conditions differed and comparison is difficult,then I2 of the remaining 17'home'provinces had soldiers as military governors in the mid summer of 1912.(Of these 12,six were Chinese graduates of the Japanese Army Officers Academy.)There were five men without mili- tary backgrounds in this post,two of them in provinces that had not joined the revolution before the Ch'ing abdication.The balance between army and provincial assembly varied considerably from province to province.In Yunnan the New Army officers maintained rigid control over the provincial government.In Hunan they gave way to leaders out of the provincial assembly.In a few provinces the revolutionary party and its adherents were a third force and might even,as in Kwangtung, dominate the provincial government.In some cases,important sections of the army,not necessarily including the military governor,were ad- herents of the revolutionary party or shared its relative radicalism,as in Hupei and Kiangsu.The resulting politics was often quite confusing. Remarkably,sufficient cohesion was achieved in most of the formerly revolutionary provinces to prevent Peking from injecting its power locally.Only in the three northern provinces of Chihli,Honan and Shantung and,somewhat less confidently,in Manchuria could Yuan unilaterally appoint important officials. Most provincial governments were not only immune to Peking's control;they were also able to muster sufficient energy to prevent lesser administrative units from splitting off.The consolidation of provincial authority was in several cases a difficult process.One pattern by which the revolution had spread was the establishment of sub-provincial re- volutionary governments,often at the prefectural level.Their subor- dination to the provincial government was not always accomplished either swiftly or completely.But in comparison with Peking's authority in the formerly revolutionary provinces,the fiscal and appointive powers of provincial governments in their own domain were extensive by the end of 1912.This was due partly to the circumstances of the revolution-its primary act having been the destruction of central authority and its form being internally decentralized.It also owed much to the assertion that provinces could best serve China's interests by insisting on their autonomy Cambridge Histories Online Cambridge University Press,2008
214 TH E ER A O F YUAN SHIH-K'AI, I 9 I 2-1 6 In most provinces, political leadership was drawn from two institutions: the army, especially the leaders of the modern New Army units formed around the country in the late Ch'ing, and the provincial assemblies. Although the precipitation of the revolution had often begun at lower levels, it was people from these two groups who had consolidated power as Ch'ing authority collapsed. The top executive was in every province the military governor (tu-tu). If we exclude the Manchurian provinces and Kansu, where conditions differed and comparison is difficult, then 12 of the remaining 17 'home' provinces had soldiers as military governors in the mid summer of 1912. (Of these 12, six were Chinese graduates of the Japanese Army Officers Academy.) There were five men without military backgrounds in this post, two of them in provinces that had not joined the revolution before the Ch'ing abdication. The balance between army and provincial assembly varied considerably from province to province. In Yunnan the New Army officers maintained rigid control over the provincial government. In Hunan they gave way to leaders out of the provincial assembly. In a few provinces the revolutionary party and its adherents were a third force and might even, as in Kwangtung, dominate the provincial government. In some cases, important sections of the army, not necessarily including the military governor, were adherents of the revolutionary party or shared its relative radicalism, as in Hupei and Kiangsu. The resulting politics was often quite confusing. Remarkably, sufficient cohesion was achieved in most of the formerly revolutionary provinces to prevent Peking from injecting its power locally. Only in the three northern provinces of Chihli, Honan and Shantung and, somewhat less confidently, in Manchuria could Yuan unilaterally appoint important officials. Most provincial governments were not only immune to Peking's control; they were also able to muster sufficient energy to prevent lesser administrative units from splitting off. The consolidation of provincial authority was in several cases a difficult process. One pattern by which the revolution had spread was the establishment of sub-provincial revolutionary governments, often at the prefectural level. Their subordination to the provincial government was not always accomplished either swiftly or completely. But in comparison with Peking's authority in the formerly revolutionary provinces, the fiscal and appointive powers of provincial governments in their own domain were extensive by the end of 1912. This was due partly to the circumstances of the revolution - its primary act having been the destruction of central authority and its form being internally decentralized. It also owed much to the assertion that provinces could best serve China's interests by insisting on their autonomy Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
THE STRUCTURE OF THE NEW ORDER 2I5 in the face of the stifling centralization that was believed to have marked Ch'ing rule,especially in its final years. Among the many presentations of the case for provincial autonomy was that written in 1912 by Tai Chi-t'ao,a young journalist in Shanghai. 'With respect to the localities,the role of the province is that of the highest administrative district.With respect to the centre,it is the largest sphere of self-government.To attain the goals of republicanism,one must seek to develop people's rights (minch'tian],and in seeking to develop people's rights,the scope of self-government must be enlarged.'Tai noted that advocates of centralization 'argue that the reason for China's not prospering is that localism is too ingrained,so that province is set off from province,and prefecture from prefecture...'.But Tai would reverse the argument.China was too large and its people too numerous to be ruled through centralized institutions,which had often caused decay and collapse under the empire.'Seen in this light,the reason China has not prospered is that the ideas of centralization are too ingrained and the concept of self-government too weak.'Provincial autonomy and the popular election of provincial chiefs,Tai felt,were keys to national political progress and tranquillity. These sentiments were squarely opposed to those of Peking's bureau- crats,including the country's president.Tai's analysis also implied the need to check the attempt of sub-provincial districts to escape provincial power. The actual success of provincial governments in extending their power throughout their provinces varied widely.The Ch'ing in its last few years had begun establishing self-government councils and assemblies at the hsien and lesser levels.After the revolution,the incidence of such bodies mounted rapidly.In the Ch'ing plan,these local representative organs were supposed to manage and finance a range of local reforms, particularly in education,under the guidance of centrally appointed of- ficials.With the revolution,some local assemblies became politically ag- gressive and presumed to select their own executive authorities,including county magistrates.Such assertiveness harmonized with one persistent school of political thought over the centuries that urged a closer,more organic connection between local elites and their administrators.As a practical matter in I9rz and 1913,it not only violated the conceptions entertained for the Chinese polity by the centralizers in Peking;it also defied provincial authority.Generally speaking,provincial authority prevailed.But judging from provincial budgets in these years,the success 1 Tai Chi-t'ao,Tai T'ien-ch'ou wen-chi(Collected essays of Tai Chi-t'ao)(Taipei reprint edn, 1962),187-95. Cambridge Histories Online Cambridge University Press,2008
THE STRUCTURE OF THE NEW ORDER 215 in the face of the stifling centralization that was believed to have marked Ch'ing rule, especially in its final years. Among the many presentations of the case for provincial autonomy was that written in 1912 by Tai Chi-t'ao, a young journalist in Shanghai. 'With respect to the localities, the role of the province is that of the highest administrative district. With respect to the centre, it is the largest sphere of self-government. To attain the goals of republicanism, one must seek to develop people's rights [min-ch'iian], and in seeking to develop people's rights, the scope of self-government must be enlarged.' Tai noted that advocates of centralization 'argue that the reason for China's not prospering is that localism is too ingrained, so that province is set off from province, and prefecture from prefecture. . .'. But Tai would reverse the argument. China was too large and its people too numerous to be ruled through centralized institutions, which had often caused decay and collapse under the empire. 'Seen in this light, the reason China has not prospered is that the ideas of centralization are too ingrained and the concept of self-government too weak.' Provincial autonomy and the popular election of provincial chiefs, Tai felt, were keys to national political progress and tranquillity.' These sentiments were squarely opposed to those of Peking's bureaucrats, including the country's president. Tai's analysis also implied the need to check the attempt of sub-provincial districts to escape provincial power. The actual success of provincial governments in extending their power throughout their provinces varied widely. The Ch'ing in its last few years had begun establishing self-government councils and assemblies at the hsien and lesser levels. After the revolution, the incidence of such bodies mounted rapidly. In the Ch'ing plan, these local representative organs were supposed to manage and finance a range of local reforms, particularly in education, under the guidance of centrally appointed officials. With the revolution, some local assemblies became politically aggressive and presumed to select their own executive authorities, including county magistrates. Such assertiveness harmonized with one persistent school of political thought over the centuries that urged a closer, more organic connection between local elites and their administrators. As a practical matter in 1912 and 1913, it not only violated the conceptions entertained for the Chinese polity by the centralizers in Peking; it also defied provincial authority. Generally speaking, provincial authority prevailed. But judging from provincial budgets in these years, the success 1 Tai Chi-t'ao, Tai T'ien-ch'ou wen-chi (Collected essays of Tai Chi-t'ao) (Taipei reprint edn, 1962), 187-95. Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
216 THE ERA OF YUAN SHIH-K'AI,1912-16 was often only partial,as more revenue seems to have been retained in the counties than had been the case in most provinces under the Ch'ing. Meanwhile,the charge on provincial revenues was greatly increased by the expanded armies of the revolutionary aftermath.Despite some demobilization even before the Ch'ing abdication,the provinces that had joined the revolution were in most cases left with a large assortment of troops,some inherited from the Ch'ing and some conscripted during the revolution.The soldiers could not easily be dismissed without payment of the arrears that had commonly accumulated;but the longer they were retained,the greater was the amount owed and the more likely were they to take to rioting and looting.In Kiangsu,for example,a Japanese consul estimated that the province had 44,ooo soldiers at the end of the Ch'ing rule there,that the numbers grew to 180,ooo during the revolution, and that after strenuous efforts at disbandment,there were still over 1o0,ooo in various military units in August 1912.The precise numbers nationally were a matter of speculation.For purposes of negotiating loans with foreign banks,in part to pay for demobilization,the Peking govern- ment used a figure of over 8o0,ooo men under arms throughout the coun- try.As long as such locally financed troops remained,they both strength- ened and weakened the provinces.They provided a potential defence against Peking authority;but they drained funds from provincial budgets that might otherwise have financed reforms and given vitality to pro- vincial autonomy.Demobilization continued in I9Iz and 1913,so that by the spring of 1913 there were perhaps half a million troops in fairly modernized or formal units.But financing and command remained pro- vincial responsibilities in most of the formerly revolutionary provinces, until Yuan's armed assault on provincial autonomy in the summer of 1913. Despite numerous mutinies,which were characteristically directed against the actuality or threat of short wages,the armies did not turn against the social order or challenge the dominance of the existing elite groups.Nor did the countryside stay long in a turbulent state.Reports of banditry were common,and occasionally villages would rise up against extortionate taxes or malfeasant officials.But suppression was regularly applied and rural disturbances did not reach proportions worthy of na- tional attention before the Second Revolution.The threat from below 2 Funatsu Shinichiro,consul in Nanking,to Uchida Yasuchika,foreign minister,secret despatch No.38(23 Aug.1912),microfilms of the Japanese Foreign Ministry,MT 5.1.10.5- 1. 3 Japanese General Staff,'Kakumei-go ni okeru Shina kakusho zogen ichi-ranbyo'(Table of changes in military strength of the various Chinese provinces after the revolution),Io March 1913,microfilms of the Japanese Foreign Ministry,MT 5.1.1o.5-1,reel 463,pp. 420-1. Cambridge Histories Online Cambridge University Press,2008
2l6 THE ERA OF YUAN SHIH-K'AI, I 9 I 2-1 6 was often only partial, as more revenue seems to have been retained in the counties than had been the case in most provinces under the Ch'ing. Meanwhile, the charge on provincial revenues was greatly increased by the expanded armies of the revolutionary aftermath. Despite some demobilization even before the Ch'ing abdication, the provinces that had joined the revolution were in most cases left with a large assortment of troops, some inherited from the Ch'ing and some conscripted during the revolution. The soldiers could not easily be dismissed without payment of the arrears that had commonly accumulated; but the longer they were retained, the greater was the amount owed and the more likely were they to take to rioting and looting. In Kiangsu, for example, a Japanese consul estimated that the province had 44,000 soldiers at the end of the Ch'ing rule there, that the numbers grew to 180,000 during the revolution, and that after strenuous efforts at disbandment, there were still over 100,000 in various military units in August 1912.2 The precise numbers nationally were a matter of speculation. For purposes of negotiating loans with foreign banks, in part to pay for demobilization, the Peking government used a figure of over 800,000 men under arms throughout the country. As long as such locally financed troops remained, they both strengthened and weakened the provinces. They provided a potential defence against Peking authority; but they drained funds from provincial budgets that might otherwise have financed reforms and given vitality to provincial autonomy. Demobilization continued in 1912 and 1913, so that by the spring of 1913 there were perhaps half a million troops in fairly modernized or formal units.3 But financing and command remained provincial responsibilities in most of the formerly revolutionary provinces, until Yuan's armed assault on provincial autonomy in the summer of 1913. Despite numerous mutinies, which were characteristically directed against the actuality or threat of short wages, the armies did not turn against the social order or challenge the dominance of the existing elite groups. Nor did the countryside stay long in a turbulent state. Reports of banditry were common, and occasionally villages would rise up against extortionate taxes or malfeasant officials. But suppression was regularly applied and rural disturbances did not reach proportions worthy of national attention before the Second Revolution. The threat from below 2 Funatsu Shinichiro, consul in Nanking, to Uchida Yasuchika, foreign minister, secret despatch No. 38 (23 Aug. 1912), microfilms of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, MT 5.1.10.5- 1 . 3 Japanese General Staff, 'Kakumei-go ni okeru Shina kakusho zogen ichi-ranbyo' (Table of changes in military strength of the various Chinese provinces after the revolution), 10 March 1913, microfilms of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, MT 5.1.10.5-1, reel 463, pp. 420-1. Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
POLITICAL PARTIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT 2I7 preoccupied the local social and political leadership,even though it was diffuse and unorganized.It was successfully contained,while the national leadership experimented with liberal politics. POLITICAL PARTIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT The question of whether groups might properly band together outside the government in order to effect political ends has been a lively one in the course of Chinese history.The weight of orthodox opinion under the empire had been that such parties,cliques or factions were injurious to the proper working of government and were evil in themselves.Much of this critical view focused on the word fang or party.When the Ch'ing dynasty fell and the sanctions against parties vanished,it was as if the centuries of denial had produced an almost unquenchable thirst for polit- ical parties and associations.Within the first few months of the new republic,some dozen political groups emerged that were at least nominally in competition for political power through the representative system. This proliferation of political organization was an important expres- sion of the climate of the revolutionary aftermath,but it was also built upon pre-revolutionary experience.The leaders in party formation had more often than not spent time in Japan,where political parties had been developing for over three decades and were at the time of the i9tI Revolu- tion entering a new stage of importance in Japanese politics.Chinese political parties had been appearing in clandestine and conspiratorial forms since Sun Yat-sen established branches of the Hsing-Chung hui in Honolulu and Hong Kong in 1894 and 1895.The establishment of pro- vincial assemblies and the national consultative assembly in the last years of the Ch'ing stimulated the formation of open political groupings that hardly pretended to avoid the appearance of being tang.Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, prominent political writer and veteran activist,encouraged these devel- opments,both in his widely-read essays and as practical adviser from his exile in Japan.When the revolution came,China's educated elite,par- ticularly that portion which had absorbed Western notions of political organization,entered the political game with brash enthusiasm. Interest first focuses naturally on the leading revolutionary group,of whom the most famous were Sun Yat-sen,Huang Hsing and Sung Chiao- jen.These national leaders had no disciplined organization at their dis- posal that effectively reached the local scene.Therefore they did not typically control the behaviour of even the most committed of local revolutionary activists.Recent scholarship has emphasized the autonomy of provincial politics after the I9It Revolution.But national unity Cambridge Histories Online Cambridge University Press,2008
POLITICAL PARTIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT ZIJ preoccupied the local social and political leadership, even though it was diffuse and unorganized. It was successfully contained, while the national leadership experimented with liberal politics. POLITICAL PARTIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT The question of whether groups might properly band together outside the government in order to effect political ends has been a lively one in the course of Chinese history. The weight of orthodox opinion under the empire had been that such parties, cliques or factions were injurious to the proper working of government and were evil in themselves. Much of this critical view focused on the word tang or party. When the Ch'ing dynasty fell and the sanctions against parties vanished, it was as if the centuries of denial had produced an almost unquenchable thirst for political parties and associations. Within the first few months of the new republic, some dozen political groups emerged that were at least nominally in competition for political power through the representative system. This proliferation of political organization was an important expression of the climate of the revolutionary aftermath, but it was also built upon pre-revolutionary experience. The leaders in party formation had more often than not spent time in Japan, where political parties had been developing for over three decades and were at the time of the 1911 Revolution entering a new stage of importance in Japanese politics. Chinese political parties had been appearing in clandestine and conspiratorial forms since Sun Yat-sen established branches of the Hsing-Chung hui in Honolulu and Hong Kong in 1894 and 1895. The establishment of provincial assemblies and the national consultative assembly in the last years of the Ch'ing stimulated the formation of open political groupings that hardly pretended to avoid the appearance of being tang. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, prominent political writer and veteran activist, encouraged these developments, both in his widely-read essays and as practical adviser from his exile in Japan. When the revolution came, China's educated elite, particularly that portion which had absorbed Western notions of political organization, entered the political game with brash enthusiasm. Interest first focuses naturally on the leading revolutionary group, of whom the most famous were Sun Yat-sen, Huang Hsing and Sung Chiaojen. These national leaders had no disciplined organization at their disposal that effectively reached the local scene. Therefore they did not typically control the behaviour of even the most committed of local revolutionary activists. Recent scholarship has emphasized the autonomy of provincial politics after the 1911 Revolution. But national unity Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008