Modern Asian Studies,8,3(1974),pp.373-389.Printed in Great Britain. The Arrow'Incident:A Reappraisal J.Y.WONG University of Oxford IN the years 1856-60,Great Britain,France and China were involved in a war,which has been referred to by different names,depending, naturally enough,on the nationality of the historian.Scholars in China, almost without exception,call it the Second Opium War.Historians in England,however,usually prefer to call it the Second Anglo-Chinese War or even the Second China-foreign War.It has been given yet another name,the Arrow War.None of these names is,strictly speaking, entirely appropriate.To begin with,the war was not fought over the question of opium,although in many ways it was a continuation of the Opium War of less than two decades before.In the last analysis,it was a consequence of an ever-expanding Britisheconomy.Secondly,although it is true that Great Britain and China were the chiefcontenders,the title Anglo-Chinese War ignores the part played by France in the campaign. Then the name Second China-foreign War,apart from betraying the English desire to forget that part of their past,is misleading because it focuses attention on China herself rather than on British encroachment on that country.Finally,the Arrow incident was,like the burning of opium by Commissioner Lin,an immediate cause of the quarrel;but once London had decided to resort to arms,little further reference was made to it in British diplomatic documents.The name Arrow War is particularly irrelevant for the period after the scene of confrontation had changed from Canton to Tientsin and then Peking.On balance, however,the names Second Anglo-Chinese War and Arrow War seem preferable because they do not carry overtones of nationalist prejudice. The latter title has the additional merit ofillustrating how,in the age of European expansion,a small diplomatic incident could be magnified to justify the use of force to press home demands unrelated to it.It reflects the fact that the receiving end-in this case China,and in particular This paper began with an invitation by Mr G.R.Storry to speak to the Far East Seminar at St Antony's College,Oxford.It was subsequently read also to the History Seminar at the University of Sheffield,and the Commonwealth Seminar at Oxford. I am grateful to Mr G.F.Hudson,Mr A.J.Nicholls,Miss J.Jacobs,Dr Mark Elvin, Dr Gordon Daniels and Professor R.Robinson for having read and constructively criticized the paper.I wish to thank,above all,Mr Andrew Purkis for his continuous encouragement and valuable suggestions when this article was first drafted. 373 This content downloaded from 202.120.60.150 on Fri,28 Feb 2014 04:35:04 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Modern Asian Studies 8, 3 (I974), pp. 373-389. Printed in Great Britain. Tl1e Arrow' Incident: A Reappraisal J. Y. WONG University ofOxford IN the years I856-60, Great Britainn France and China were involved in a war, which has been referred to by different namesS depending, naturally enough, on the nationality of the historian. Scholars in China, almost without exception, call it the Second Opium War. Historians in England, however, usually prefer to call it the Second Anglo-whinese War or even the Second China-foreign War. It has been given yet another name, the Arrow War. None of these names is, strictly speaking, entirely appropriate. To begin with, the war was not fought over the question of opium, although in many ways it was a continuation of the Opium War of less than two decades before. In the last analysis, it was a consequence of an ever-expanding British economy. Secondly, although it is true that Great Britain and China were the chief contenders, the title Anglo-Chinese War ignores the part played by France in the campaign. Then the name Second China-foreign War, apart from betraying the English desire to forget that part of their past, is misleading because it focuses attention on China herself rather than on British encroachment on that country. Finally, the Arrow incident was, like the burning of opium by Commissioner Lin, an immediate cause of the quarrel; but once London had decided to resort to arms, little further reference was made to it in British diplomatic documents. The name Arrow War is particularly irrelevant for the period after the scene of confrontation had changed from Canton to Tientsin and then Peking. On balance, however, the names Second Anglo-Chinese War and Arrow War seem preferable because they do not carry overtones of nationalist prejudice. The latter title has the additional merit of illustrating how, in the age of European expansion, a small diplomatic incident could be magnified to justify the use of force to press home demands unrelated to it. It reflects the fact that the receiving end-in this case China, and in particular This paper began with an invitatioll by Mr G. R. Storry to speak to the Far East Seminar at St Antony's College, Oxford. It was subsequently read also to the History Seminar at the tJniversity of Sheffield) and the Commonwealth Seminar at Oxford. I am grateful to Mr G. F. Hudson) Mr A. J. Nicholls,Miss J. Jacobs, Dr Mark Elvin) Dr Gordon Daniels and Professor R. Robinson for having read and constructively criticized the paper. I wish to thank, above all, Mr Andrew Purkis for his continuous encouragement and valuable suggestions when this article was first drafted. 373 This content downloaded from 202.120.60.150 on Fri, 28 Feb 2014 04:35:04 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
374 J.Y.WONG her Imperial Commissioner for Foreign Affairs,Yeh Ming-ch'en-tried throughout to argue the case over the specific casus belli,whereas for the British the whole affair was merely a pretext for wider demands to be made on China.Thus it seems more appropriate to call the conflict the Arrow War;and in order to examine its origins,the first step will be to analyse the documentary evidence related to the Arrow incident.Some papers in the Chinese language have only recently been made available to scholars in the Public Record Office.London,and these provide additional information for a re-investigation of the origins of the war.1 In dealing with historical documents,it is important first of all to study the circumstances in which these documents were written.In the case of the Arrow incident,such a study is still wanting.Consequently,the conclusions accepted in academic circles are,to say the least,biased.It is desirable,therefore,to begin with a brief introduction to the history of the Arrow,and next to examine the conditions in which the Arrow incident was documented,before one can decide how much weight may be attached to each piece of evidence.Then one will be in a better position to assess the realities of an affair that sparked off a second con- flict between Great Britain and China. The Arrow was a lorcha,a kind of western schooner with Chinese rigging.According to one of her sailors,she was built in China in 1854 by a Chinese called Su Ya-ch'eng.2 She was subsequently sold to another Chinese called Fong Ah-ming,3 who had been resident in Hong Kong for about ten years and who conveniently registered her with the colonial government on 27 September 1855.The acting British Consul at Canton,Harry Parkes,maintained that the Arrow,because of her colonial registration,was bona fide a British vessel as much as the brigs; schooners,etc.,that were built or fitted out from Hong Kong.4 This This article aims solely at evaluating the evidence connected with the incident.A full-scale analysis of the origins of the Arrow War is best dealt with in a book,which the author is in the process of writing. 2 F.O.228.213,Parkes-Bowring Desp.158,Incl.,Yeh-Parkes,14 October 1856. The name Su Ya-ch'eng is here romanized according to the Chinese characters given in F.O.682.100.1,Yeh-Seymour,31 October 1856. 3 I have not been able to discover the Chinese characters for Fong Ah-ming. Probably this is the Cantonese version of Fang Ya-ming.Some Chinese local gazet- teers (Nan-hai hsien-chieh 2.60b,P'an-yi hsien-chieh 22.32b and Kuang-chou fu-chich 82.311)recorded that the owner was Hsiao Ch'eng,which probably refers to the same person as Su Ya-ch'eng.If this were the case,then these gazetteers must have mistaken the builder for the owner. 4S.Lane-Poole,The Life of Sir Harry Parkes (London,1894),I.228,quoting one of Parkes'private letters,dated 14 November 1856. This content downloaded from 202.120.60.150 on Fri,28 Feb 2014 04:35:04 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
374 J. Y. WONG her Imperial Commissioner for Foreign AfEairs, Yeh Ming-ch'en- tried throughouto argue the case over the specific casus belli whereas for the British the whole affair was merely a pretext for wider demands to be made on China. Thus it seems more appropriate to call the conflict the Arrow War; and in order to examine its origins, the first step will be to analyse the documentary evidence related to the Arrow incident. Some papers in the Chinese language have only recently been made available to scholars in the Public Record Office. London, and these provide additional information for a re-investigation of the origins of the war.t * * * In dealing with historical documents, it is important first of all to study the circumstances in which these documents were written. In the case of the Arrow incident, such a study is still wanting. Consequently, the conclusions accepted in academic circles are, to say the least, biased. It is desirable, therefore, to begin with a brief introduction to the history of the Arrow, and next to examine the conditions in which the Arrow incident was documented, before one can decide how much weight may be attached to each piece of evidence. Then one will be in a better position to assess the realities of an afEair that sparked off a second conflict between Great Britain and China. The Arrow was a lorcha, a kind of western schooner with Chinese rigging. According to one of her sailors, she was built in China in I854 by a Chinese called Su Ya-ch'eng.2 She was subsequently sold to another Chinese called Fong Ah-ming,3 who had been resident in Hong Kong for about ten years and who conveniently registered her with the colonial government on 27 September I855. The acting British Consul at Canton, Harry Parkes, maintained that the Arrow, because of her colonial registration, was bona Jide a British vessel as much as the brigs, schooners, etc., that were built or fitted out from Hong Kong.4 This 1 This article aims solely at evaluating the evidence connected with the incident. A full-scale analysis of the origins of the Arrow War is best dealt with in a book, which the author is in the process of writing. 2 F.O. 228.2X3, ParkesBowring Desp. I58, Incl., Yeh-Parkes, I4 October t856. The name Su Ya-ch'eng is here romanized according to the Chinese characters given in F.O. 682. I00.I, Yeh-Seymour, 3 I October I 856. 3 I have not been able to discover the Chinese characters for Fong Ah-ming. Probably this is the Cantonese version of Fang Ya-ming. Some Chinese local gazetteers (;J%an-hai hszen-chieh 2.60b, P'an-yu hsien-chieh X.32b and Kuang-chou f-chich 82.3II) recorded that the owner was Hsiao Ch'eng, which probably refers to the same person as Su Ya-ch'eng. If this were the case) then these gazetteers must have mistaken the builder for the owner. 4 S. Lane-Poole, The Life of Sir Harry Parkes (London, I894), t.228, quoting one of Parkes' private letters, dated I4 November I856. This content downloaded from 202.120.60.150 on Fri, 28 Feb 2014 04:35:04 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THE ARROW'INCIDENT:A REAPPRAISAL 375 statement indeed corroborates the evidence that the Arrow was built in China.By her colonial registration,the Arrow was granted permission to fly the British flag and to claim British protection.s Her crew con- sisted entirely of Chinese sailors,with the exception of the captain,who was an Irishman called Thomas Kennedy from Belfast,and who candidly admitted that he had been put on board only as nominal master of the vessel.6 Thus,here is a vessel built in China,owned by a Chinese subject,7 and manned by a Chinese crew sailing in Chinese waters but claiming British protection.This ambiguity,as might be expected,could give rise to misconceptions as to the nationality of the vessel.If such a ship was at sea and flying her British colours,she could be easily identified as a British vessel.But if she sailed into a port in China,lowered her flags in accordance with British nautical practice, dropped anchor,and her British captain went ashore,she would be no different from a Chinese boat. On 3 October 1856,the Arrow entered the harbour of Canton,s having recruited on 27 September 1856 two assistant navigators, Liang Ming-t'ai and Liang Chien-fu.?These two men had belonged to a gang of pirates who had plundered two Chinese cargo ships on 6 September 1856.These cargo ships were the property of a member of the Chinese gentry called Huang Lien-kai.He was with his ships when the pirates began to close in on them.An exchange of fire ensued,which lasted from 7 a.m.to 4 p.m.He and his men were overcome and four of his sailors were killed.He jumped overboard and escaped.On 8 October 1856,he arrived at Canton and immediately detected Liang Ming-t'ai among the crew of the Arrow.He recognized Liang to be the pirate who,during the battle,had worn a red turban and a red girdle, who was without one or two of his front teeth,and had cheered on his 3 In March 1855,the local legislature of Hong Kong passed an ordinance to this effect (Hansard's Parliamentary Debates,Series 3,144.1160). 6 Cf.F.O.228.213,Parkes-Bowring Desp.153,10 October 1856. 7 The fact that her owner was resident in Hong Kong does not mean that she belonged to a British subject.As pointed out by the Attorney General of the colony, hardly any one of the 6o,ooo Chinese inhabitants there could be legally called a British subject(Hansard,op.cit.,116I ff).Indeed,most of these Chinese inhabitants, apart from the peasant minority,went to Hong Kong on a temporary basis,to make a living,like so many of the mobile merchants and labourers in China herself(cf.F.O. 233/185-188 series,which are Chinese documents concerning the administration of Hong Kong between 1845 and 1906). s F.O.228.213,Parkes-Bowring Desp.153,1o October 1856. Ibid.,Desp.154,Incl.,Yeh-Parkes,to October 1856,containing the deposition of Wu Ya-jen.The names Liang Ming-t'ai,Liang Chien-fu and Wu Ya-jen are here romanized according to the Chinese characters found in F.O.682.1oo.Yeh-Seymour, 31 October 1856. This content downloaded from 202.120.60.150 on Fri,28 Feb 2014 04:35:04 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THE ARROW' INCIDENT: A REAPPRAISAL 375 statement indeed corroborates the evidence that the Arrow was built in China. By her colonial r-egistration, the Arrow was granted permission to fly the British flag and to claim British protection.5 Her crew consisted entirely of Chinese sailors, with the exception of the captain, who was an Irishman called Thomas Kennedy from Belfast, and who candidly admitted that he had been put on board only as nominal master of the rressel.6 Thus, here is a vessel built in China, owned by a Chinese subject,7 and manned by a Chinese crew sailing in Chinese waters but claiming British protection. This ambiguity, as might be expected, could give rise to misconceptions as to the nationality of the vessel. If such a ship was at sea and flying her British colours, she could be easily identified as a British rressel. But if she sailed into a port in China, lowered her flags in accordance with British nautical practice, dropped anchor, and her British captain went ashore, she would be no diffierent from a Chinese boat. On 3 October I856, the Arrow entered the harbour of Canton,8 harring recruited on 2 7 September I 856 two assistant navigators, Liang Ming-t'ai and Liang Chien-fu.s These two men had belonged to a gang of pirates who had plundered two Chinese cargo ships on 6 September I856. These cargo ships were the property of a member of the Chinese gentry called Huang Lien-kai. He was with his ships when the pirates began to close in on them. An exchange of fire ensued, which lasted from 7 a.m. to 4 p.m. He and his men were overcome and four of his sailors were killed. He jumped overboard and escaped. On 8 October I856, he arrived at Canton and immediately detected Liang Ming-t'ai among the crew of the Arrow. He recognized Liang to be the pirate who, during the battle, had worn a red turban and a red girdle, who was without one or two of his front teeth, and had cheered on his 5 In March I855, the local legislature of Hong Kong passed an ordinance to this effect (Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Series 3, I44. I I60) 6 Cf. F.O. 228.2I3, Parkes-Bowring Desp. I53, I0 October I856. 7 The fact that her owner was resident in Hong Kong does not mean that she belonged to a British subject. As pointed out by the Attorney General of the colony, hardly any one of the 60,ooo Chinese inhabitants there could be legally called a British subject (Hansard, op. Cit., I I6I f5). Indeed, most of these Chinese inhabitants, apart from the peasant minority, went to Hong Kong on a temporary basis, to make a living, like so many of the mobile merchants and labourers in China herself (cf. F.O. 233/I85-I88 series, which are Chinese documents concerning the administration of Hong Kong between I845 and I906). 8 F.O. 228.2I3n Parkes-Bowring Desp. I53 I0 October I856. 9 Ibid., Desp. I54, Incl., Yeh-Parkes, I0 October I856, containing the deposition of Wu Yajen. The names Liang Ming-t'ai, Liang Chien-fu and Wu Yajen are here romanized according to the Chinese characters found in F.O. 682. I00. Yeh-Seyrnour, 3 I October I 856. This content downloaded from 202.120.60.150 on Fri, 28 Feb 2014 04:35:04 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
376 J.Y.WONG fellow pirates to keep up their fire.Immediately he reported to the harbour authorities at Canton.10 A squad of marines was despatched to the Arrow.The officers commanding these marines claimed that when they arrived at the ship,they did not see any flag on the masts,or any foreigner on board,but only Chinese sailors,whereupon they proceeded to take the entire crew into custody as they would have done with the sailors of any suspect Chinese vessel.11 The above is a brief history of the Arrow,and the background of the Chinese evidence.At this stage,it may be useful to verify the claims of the Chinese officers.Even English documents support their assertion that no foreigner was on board the Arrow when they reached the vessel. The captain,Thomas Kennedy,admitted that he was at the time breakfasting in another vessel called the Dart.12 His friends,namely,the captain of the Dart,John Leach,and the captain of the Chusan,Charles Earl,who were eating with him,also testified to the same effect.13 The other claim of the Chinese officers,that no flags were flying,was chal- lenged by Kennedy and his breakfasting friends,who professed to have watched the incident from a distance.14 The testimonies of these three men were supported by those of the two Chinese sailors whom Kennedy, hurrying to the scene from his breakfast table,requested the Chinese officers to leave behind to guard the Arrow while they took the rest of the crew away.This discrepancy between the evidence of the two sides leads to another aspect of the study of the Arrowe incident,namely,an examination of the circumstances in which the depositions on the British side were made. After twelve members of his crew of fourteen were led away by the Chinese,Kennedy lost no time in reporting his version of the incident to the acting British Consul,Harry Parkes.His story consisted of two main points:the Chinese had arrested the sailors of a British vessel under his charge,and had hauled down the Union Jack,which he claimed had been flying on the mizen-mast.Parkes'immediate reaction, as he told the British Plenipotentiary,Sir John Bowring,15 and Com- missioner Yeh afterwards,was hesitation 'to rely solely on the master's account of so gross an outrage'.He at once despatched people'to make inquiries,the result of which led him,so he implied,to conclude 10 Ibid.,Deposition of Huang Lien-kai. 11 Ibid.,Desp.158,Incl.,Yeh-Parkes,14 October 1856. 12 Ibid.,Desp.155,Incl.,Kennedy's deposition,9 October 1856. 13 Ibid.,Desp.155,Incl.,Leach's deposition,9 October 1856;ibid..Desp.160, Incl.,Earl's deposition,16 October 1856. 14 Ibid.The distance was estimated by Kennedy to be between 50 and Ioo yards. 1s He was also Governor of Hong Kong and Superintendent of Trade. This content downloaded from 202.120.60.150 on Fri,28 Feb 2014 04:35:04 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
376 J. Y. WONG fellow pirates to keep up their fire. Immediately he reported to the harbour authorities at Canton.l° A'squad of marines was despatched to the Arrow. The officers commanding these marines claimed that when they arrived at the ship, they did not see any flag on the masts, or any foreigner on board, but only Chinese sailors, whereupon they proceeded to take the entire crew into custody as they would have done with the sailors of any suspect Chinese vessel.ll The above is a brief history of the Arrow, and the background of the Chinese evidence. At this stage, it may be useful to verify the claims of the Chinese officers. Even English documents support their assertion that no foreigner was on board the Arrow when they reached the vessel. The captain, Thomas Kennedy, admitted that he was at the time breakfasting in another vessel called the Dart.l2 His friends, namely, the captain of the Dart, John Leach, and the captain of the CAhusan, Charles Earl, who were eating with him, also testified to the same effect.l3 The other claim of the Chinese officers, that no flags were flying, was challenged by Kennedy and his breakfasting friends, who professed to have watched the incident from a distance.l4 The testimonies of these three men were supported by those of the two Chinese sailors whom Kennedy, hurrying to the scene from his breakfastable, requested the Chinese officers to leave behind to guard the Arrow while they took the rest of the crew away. This discrepancy between the evidence of the two sides leads to another aspect of the study of the Arrow incident, namely, an examination of the circumstances in which the depositions on the British side were made. After twelve members of his crew of fourteen were led away by the Chinese, Kennedy lost no time in reporting his version of the incident to the acting British Consul, Harry Parkes. His story consisted of two main points: the Chinese had arrested the sailors of a British vessel under his charge, and had hauled down the Union Jack, which he claimed had been flying on the mizen-mast. Parkes' immediate reaction, as he told the British Plenipotentiary, Sir John Bowring,l5 and Commissioner Yeh afterwards, was hesitation 'to rely solely on the master's account of so gross an outrage'. He at once despatched 'people' to make inquiries, the result of which led himf so he implied, to conclude lo Ibid., Deposition of Huang Lien-kai. Ibid., Desp. I58, Incl., Yeh-Parkes, I4 October I856. 2 Ibid., Desp. I55, Incl., Kennedy's deposition, g October I856. 13 Ibid., Desp. I55, Incl., Leach's deposition, g October I856; ibid.. Desp. I60, Incl., Earl's deposition, I 6 October I 856. 4 Ibid. The distance was estimated by Kennedy to be between 50 and I00 yards. 5 He was also Governor of Hong Kong and Superintendent of Trade. This content downloaded from 202.120.60.150 on Fri, 28 Feb 2014 04:35:04 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THE ARROW'INCIDENT:A REAPPRAISAL 377 that 'the British lorcha Arrow,while lying with her colours flying in the river near the Dutch Folly',had been boarded by Chinese officers,who carried away nearly the whole of her crew,and added to this act of violence,the significant insult of hauling down the national ensign'.16 These statements give rise to a number of questions which deserve serious attention.Firstly,Parkes had a reputation for impatience and swift action;does his hesitation to believe Kennedy's story mean that he had doubts about the sincerity of the captain?Secondly,who were the people'whom Parkes sent to make inquiries-were they his Chinese employees or junior consular officials?Thirdly,whom did Parkes' agents question-Chinese bystanders if there were any,or British captains like John Leach?This third query is directly related to the second because a serious problem of language and communication is involved.None of Parkes'papers,official or private,throws any light on these problems.Furthermore,Parkes never managed to bring any of the'witnesses'whom his agents were supposed to have questioned,to make testimonies.Nor did Parkes ever produce a written report from his agents as to the nature and result of their investigation.Therefore, the above statements by Parkes were based on no more than verbal messages from people'who were not eye-witnesses but who obtained their information second-hand from an unspecified source. Just as Parkes'assertions were not documented,so also the language he used in his communication to Yeh on the subject was highly emo- tional.His letter began with 'I hasten to bring to your Excellency's notice an insult of a very grave character,which calls for immediate reparation...,confident that your superior judgment will lead you at once to admit that an insult so publicly committed must be equally publicly atoned.'17 The letter ended with a blatant threat to use force to obtain satisfaction.Kennedy's story and the subsequent report of Parkes'agents could hardly have accounted for this agitated state of mind.Parkes'anger and his dubious statement about the flag are the two key factors in the exploration into the background of the evidence on the British side,because it was Parkes who took the depositions on the following day (9 October).It is therefore of importance to discover why the acting Consul was in such an explosive mood. Shortly after Parkes had heard from his own agents,and had been told that the twelve sailors of the Arrow were detained in a Chinese naval vessel nearby,he repaired on board to claim the men.It is inter- 16 F.O.228.213,Parkes-Bowring Desp.150,8 October 1856,and Incl.,Parkes-Yeh, 8 October 1856.The Dutch Folly (Hai-chu)is an island in the middle of the Pearl River at Canton. 17 Ibid. This content downloaded from 202.120.60.150 on Fri,28 Feb 2014 04:35:04 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THE ARROW INCIDENT: A REAPPRAISAL 377 that 'the British lorcha Arrow, while lying with her colours flying in the river near the Dutch Folly', had been boarded by Chinese officers, who carried away nearly the whole of her crew, 'and added to this act of violence, the significant insult of hauling down the national ensign'.l6 These statements give rise to a number of questions which deserve serious attention. Firstly, Parkes had a reputation for impatience and swift action; does his hesitation to believe Kennedy's story mean that he had doubts about the sincerity of the captain ? Secondly, who were the 'people' whom Parkes sent to make inquiries were they his Chinese employees or junior consular officials? Thirdly, whom did Parkes' agents question -Chinese bystanders if there were any, or British captains like John Leach? This third query is directly related to the second because a serious problem of language and communication is involved. None of Parkes' papers, official or private, throws any light on these problems. Furthermore, Parkes never managed to bring any of the 'witnesses' whom his agents were supposed to have questioned, to make testimonies. Nor did Parkes ever produce a written report from his agents as to the nature and result of their investigation. Therefore, the above statements by Parkes were based on no more than verbal messages from 'people' who were not eye-witnesses but who obtained their information second-hand from an unspecified source. Just as Parkes' assertions were not documented, so also the language he used in his communication to Yeh on the subject was highly emotional. His letter began with 'I hasten to bring to your Excellency's notice an insult of a very grave character, which calls for immediate reparation .. ., confident that your superior judgment will lead you at once to admit that an insult so publicly committed must be equally publicly atoned.'l7 The letter ended with a blatant threat to use force to obtain satisfaction. Kennedy's story and the subsequent report of Parkes' agents could hardly have accounted for this agitated state of mind. Parkes' anger and his dubious statement about the flag are the two key factors in the exploration into the background of the evidence on the British side, because it was Parkes who took the depositions on the following day (g October). It is therefore of importance to discover why the acting Consul was in such an explosive mood. Shortly after Parkes had heard from his own agents, and had been told that the twelve sailors of the Arrow were detained in a Chinese naval vessel nearby, he repaired on board to claim the men. It is inter- 16 F.O. 228.2I3, Parkes-BowringDesp. I50,8 October I8s6,and Incl., Parkes-Yeh, 8 October I856. The Dutch Folly (tIai-chu) is an island in the middle of the Pearl River at Canton. 17 Ibid. This content downloaded from 202.120.60.150 on Fri, 28 Feb 2014 04:35:04 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
378 J.Y.WONG esting to note his description of the episode.To Bowring he simply reported that the Chinese marines refused to accede to his demand, adding that they intimated very distinctly that they would oppose with force any attempt on my part to take the men under my charge'.18 These few words,though much subdued in tone,indicate that more must have been involved.If Parkes did not make clear that he was going to take away the men by force,one wonders why it was necessary for the Chin- ese marines to make it equally clear that they would resist such an action by force.His despatch to Yeh gave more details.He required' the Chinese officer in charge of the naval vessel to bring his prisoners to the British Consulate,there to await examination;but this he refused to do,and upon my claiming them and insisting upon their being delivered to me,he made a display of force,and threatened me with violence if I attempted to take them with me'.19 This was as much of the episode as Parkes would have liked to be known officially.How- ever,one can hardly imagine that this was the end of the story,and indeed it was not.Parkes disclosed the remaining details in a private letter: They refused to do so [give up the sailors],laughed at me...threatened me with violence,and I was actually struck one blow,though to this circum- stance I have never made official allusion,as I wished to keep every personal feature out of view....20 The picture is now clear.Although the Chinese had expressed their determination to resist the Consul's militant threats,Parkes apparently proceeded to free the sailors with his own hands.A scuffle ensued, and consequently Parkes had the substantial grievance of having been physically assaulted. Parkes had demanded in his communication to Yeh that 'an insult so publicly committed must be equally publicly atoned.'The insult referred to here has so far been taken by historians to mean the insult to the Union Jack.If one reads Parkes'communication carefully,one will find that the demand was preceded by a brief account of his version of the episode on board the Chinese naval vessel,and immediately followed by a specific description of how this insult should be publicly atoned:'I therefore request your Excellency to direct that the men who have been carried away from the Arrow be returned by the Captain, Leang-kwo-ting [Liang Kuo-ting],to that vessel in my presence.'21 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid. 20 Lane-Poole,Parkes,I.229,quoting one of Parkes'private letters dated 14Novem- ber 1856. 21 F.O.228.213,Parkes-Bowring Desp.150,Incl.,Parkes-Yeh,8 October 1856. This content downloaded from 202.120.60.150 on Fri,28 Feb 2014 04:35:04 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
378 J. Y. WONG esting to note his description of the episode. To Bowring he simply reported that the Chinese marines refused to accede to his demand, adding that they intimated 'very distinctly that they would oppose with force any attempt on my part to take the men under my charge'.l8 These few words, though much subdued in tone, indicate that more must have been involved. If Parkes did not make clear that he was going to take away the men by force, one wonders why it was necessary for the Chinese marines to make it equally clear that they would resist such an action by force. His despatch to Yeh gave more details. He 'required' the Chinese officer in charge of the naval vessel 'to bring his prisoners to the British Consulate, there to await examination; but this he refused to do, and upon my claiming them and insisting upon their being delivered to me, he made a display of force, and threatened me with violence if I attempted to take them with me'.l9 This was as much of the episode as Parkes would have liked to be known officially. However, one can hardly imagine that this was the end of the story, and indeed it was not. Parkes disclosed the remaining details in a private letter: They refused to do so [give up the sailors] laughed at me . . . threatened me with violence, and I was actually struck one blow, though to this circumstance I have never made official allusionn as I wished to keep every personal feature out of view....20 The picture is now clear. Although the Chinese had expressed their determination to resist the Consul's militant threats, Parkes apparently proceeded to free the sailors with his own hands. A scuffle ensued, and consequently Parkes had the substantial grievance of having been physically assaulted. Parkes had demanded in his communication to Yeh that 'an insult so publicly committed must be equally publicly atoned.' The insult referred to here has so far been taken by historians to mean the insult to the Union Jack. If one reads Parkes' communication carefully, one will Snd that the demand was preceded by a brief account of his version of the episode on board the Chinese naval vessel, and immediately followed by a specific description of how this insult should be publicly atoned: 'I therefore request your Excellency to direct that the men who have been carried away from the Arrow be returned by the Captain, Leang-kwo-ting [Liang Kuo-ting], to that vessel in my presence.' 18 Ibid. 1§ Ibid. 20 Lane-Poole, Parkes, I.22g, quoting one of Parkes' private letters dated I4 November I856. 21 F.O. 228.2X3, Parkes-Bowring Desp. I50a Incl., Parkes-Yeh, 8 October I856. This content downloaded from 202.120.60.150 on Fri, 28 Feb 2014 04:35:04 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THE 'ARROW'INCIDENT:A REAPPRAISAL 379 It should be noted that before the scuffle,Parkes requested the return of the Chinese sailors 'to the British Consulate';after the scuffle,he wanted the Chinese captain to return them to the Arrow in his presence. If the public insult Parkes had in his mind had been the alleged hauling down of the Union Jack from the mast of the Arrow,the reparation he demanded should have been the re-hoisting reverently of the flag by the Chinese marines,instead of a public humiliation of their senior officer.It seems that Parkes'decision to keep personal features out of the quarrel applied only to the writing of his official despatches.His overwhelming desire to avenge his humbling physical defeat was never abated,and was apparent in every communication he subsequently addressed to the Imperial Commissioner.Even when Yeh eventually returned all the twelve sailors to the British Consulate,Parkes refused to receive them because they were not delivered 'in the manner required in my letter of the 8th'.22 The humiliating experience Parkes brought upon himself by the scuffle appears to have had a profound effect on him.It produced the emotional tumult described above,and it probably prompted him to make those dubious statements about the flag.More important,it changed his attitude towards the Arrow affair.As has been mentioned, he was doubtful about the truth of Kennedy's story when he first heard it on the morning of 8 October.By the end of the day,he was writing to Bowring as if he were absolutely certain that the Union Jack had been flying over the Arrow and had been outrageously pulled down.The next day he busied himself with taking depositions con- firmatory of the facts set forth in my letter of yesterday'.23 If the Consul set out to take testimonies to confirm his assertions,it is unlikely that he would take,or include in his official despatches,any statement that he did not wish to hear.Furthermore,he could shape the depositions to his satisfaction when he took them.His role was particularly important when he took the testimonies of the two Chinese sailors left to guard the Arrow.The Chinese sailors spoke little English,and Parkes had to interrogate them closely in Chinese,then translate their answers into English and finally put them together as formal statements.In so doing, Parkes could choose his questions,select his words in the translation, and compose the depositions in the manner he desired.This is a time- consuming task,and probably explains why the Consul was unable to send the depositions to Hong Kong until two days later,on II October, Parliamentary Papers (1857),Papers relating to the Proceedings of H.M.Naval Forces at Canton',p.32,Parkes-Seymour,22 October 1856. 23 F.O.228.213,Parkes-Bowring Desp.151,9 October 1856. This content downloaded from 202.120.60.150 on Fri,28 Feb 2014 04:35:04 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THE 'ARROW' INCIDENT: A iEtEAPPRAISAL 379 It should be noted that before the scuffle, Parkes requested the return of the Chinese sailors 'to the British Consulate'; after the scuffle, he wanted the Chinese captain to return them to the Arrow in his presence. If the public insult Parkes had in his mind had been the alleged hauling down of the Union Jack from the mast of the Arrowj the reparation he demanded should have been the re-hoisting reverently of the flag by the Chinese marines, instead of a public humiliation of their senior officer. It seems that Parkes' decision to keep personal features out of the quarrel applied only to the writing of his official despatches. His overwhelming desire to avenge his humbling physical defeat was never abated, and was apparent in every communication he subsequently addressed to the Imperial Commissioner. Even when Yeh eventually returned all the twelve sailors to the British Consulate, Parkes refused to receive them because they were not delivered 'in the manner required in my letter of the 8th'.22 The humiliating experience Parkes brought upon himself by the scuffle appears to have had a profound effect on him. It produced the emotional tumult described above, and it probably prompted him to make those dubious statements about the flag. More important, it changed his attitude towards the Arrow aSair. As has been mentioned, he was doubtful about the truth of Kennedy's story when he first heard it on the morning of 8 October. By the end of the day, he was writing to Bowring as if he were absolutely certain that the Union Jack had been flying over the Arrow and had been outrageously pulled down. The next day he busied himself with taking 'depositions confirmatory of the facts set forth in my letter of yesterday'.23 Ifthe Consul set out to take testimonies to confirm his assertions, it is unlikely that he would take, or include in his official despatches) any statement that he did not wish to hear. Furthermore) he could shape the depositions to his satisfaction when he took them. His role was particularly important when he took the testimonies of the two Chinese sailors left to guard the Arrow. The Chinese sailors spoke little English, and Parkes had to interrogate them closely in Chinese, then translate their answers into English and finally put them together as formal statements. In so doing, Parkes could choose his questions, select his words in the translation, and compose the depositions in the manner he desired. This is a timeconsuming task, and probably explains why the Consul was unable to send the depositions to Hong Kong until two days later, on I I October, 22 Parliamentary Papers (I857), 'Papers relating to the Proceedings of H.M. Naval Forces at Canton', p. 32, Parkes-Seymour, 22 October I856. 23 F.O. 228.2I3, Parkes-Bowring Desp. I5I, 9 October I856. This content downloaded from 202.120.60.150 on Fri, 28 Feb 2014 04:35:04 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
38o J.Y.WONG although he continued to communicate with Bowring every day during the intervening period.24 One can see therefore that the evidence on the British side was far from objective. 米 The second stage in the study of the Arrow incident involves an examination of the evidence on both sides,which should enable us to decide how much weight we can attach to each piece of evidence. First,the British side.On 9 October 1856,Parkes took four depositions: by Thomas Kennedy,John Leach,and the two Chinese sailors.The statement by John Leach can hardly be regarded as reliable indepen- dent testimony.He made his deposition immediately after Kennedy, having,as he stated,heard the deposition of Thomas Kennedy read over to me',and the purpose of his testimony was to fully confirm the statements contained in it'.25 He added no detail other than that given by Kennedy and frequently used the same language and expressions. Therefore his testimony can only be regarded as an abridged repetition of what Kennedy had deposed shortly before.It is not unduly sceptical to suppose that his chief concern was to support whatever Kennedy had said.26 One can also see the hand of Parkes in shaping this document,as it is most unusual for an officer to read the testimony of the first witness over to the second so that the second witness might confirm the state- ment of the first. It is equally difficult to put much faith in the depositions of the two Chinese sailors.We cannot know what pressures might have been put upon them by the time their statements were made-the day after the incident-or what instructions given to them by their captain before they faced their inquisitor.27 The phraseology and details of the state- ment by the first sailor are on the whole different from those of Ken- nedy's.This is to be expected.As has been mentioned,the Chinese sailor spoke little English and Parkes had to interrogate him in Chinese; his answers were subsequently translated and amalgamated into a for- mal statement.Although he was on the spot,unlike Kennedy and Leach, 24 Ibid.,Desp.155,II October 1856.See next note. 25 Ibid.,Incl.,Leach's deposition,9 October 1856. 26 If Kennedy had been telling the truth,then of course it follows that this was probably what Leach would have said. 27 Parkes had already acquired a considerable reputation as a harsh but successful interrogator of Chinese of all classes.For an analysis of the character of Parkes,see G. Daniels,'Sir Harry Parkes:British Representative in Japan,1856-83',unpublished D.Phil.thesis(University of Oxford,1967),Ch.I. This content downloaded from 202.120.60.150 on Fri,28 Feb 2014 04:35:04 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
380 J. Y. WONG although he continued to communicate with Bowring every day during the intervening period.24 One can see therefore that the evidence on the British side was far from objective. * * * The second stage in the study of the Arrow incident involves an examination of the evidence on both sides, which should enable us to decide how much weight we can attach to each piece of evidence. First the British side. On g October I856 Parkes took four depositions: by Thomas Kennedy, John Leach, and the two Chinese sailors. The statement by John Leach can hardly be regarded as reliable independent testimony. He made his deposition immediately after Kennedy, having, as he stated, 'heard the deposition of Thomas Kennedy read over to me', and the purpose of his testimony was to 'fully confirm the statements contained in it'.25 He added no detail other than that given by Kennedy and frequently used the same language and expressions. Therefore his testimony can only be regarded as an abridged repetition of what Kennedy had deposed shortly before. It is not unduly sceptical to suppose that his chief concern was to support whatever Kennedy had said.26 One can also see the hand of Parkes in shaping this document, as it is most unusual for an officer to read the testimony of the first witness over to the second so that the second witness might confirm the statement of the first. It is equally difficult to put much faith in the depositions of the two Chinese sailors. We cannot know what pressures might have been put upon them by the time their statements were made- the day after the incident- or what instructions given to them by their captain before they faced their inquisitor.27 The phraseology and details of the statement by the first sailor are on the whole diffierent from those of Kennedy's. This is to be expected. As has been mentioned, the Chinese sailor spoke little English and Parkes had to interrogate him in Chinese; his answers were subsequently translated and amalgamated into a- formal statement. Although he was on the spot, unlike Kennedy and Leach, 24 Ibid., Desp. I55, I I October I856. See next note. 25 Nid., Incl., Leach's deposition, g October I856. 26 If Kennedy had been telling the truth, then of course it follows that this was probably what Leach would have said. 27 Parkes had already acquired a considerable reputation as a harsh but successful interrogator of Chinese of all classes. For an analysis of the character of Parkes, see G. Daniels, 'Sir Harry Parkes: British Representative in Japan, I856-83X, unpublished D.Phil. thesis (University of Oxford, I967), Ch. I. This content downloaded from 202.120.60.150 on Fri, 28 Feb 2014 04:35:04 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THE ARROW'INCIDENT:A REAPPRAISAL 381 the crucial passage of his testimony in which the insult to the flag is alleged to have been committed adds no detail to that given by Ken- nedy,except that the Chinese flung [the ensign]on the deck without unreeving it from the halyards'.28 This by itself hardly adds a significant element of conviction.Such an embellishment could plausibly be explained as the result of his close examination by Parkes.Moreover, there is no mention in this evidence of the Blue Peter,which all other sources agree should have been flying along with the Union Jack(and, supposing the validity of the British allegations,pulled down with it). The only other support for the British case is a brief declaration by Consul Parkes that the second Chinese sailor: Leung A-yung,on being examined by the Consul deposed to the same facts as Chin A-shing.He distinctly saw the flag hauled down by one of the soldiers.He and another man were busily engaged in a sampan unmooring the lorcha at the moment when the mandarins boarded.29 As we shall see later,it is impossible to discount the possibility that Leung A-yung was simply saying what he had been told to say.It thus seems that the evidence of Captain Leach and the two Chinese sailors cannot be relied upon as independent or trustworthy.As it is apparent that Parkes built his case against the Chinese on four documents,three of which are of little value,the basic consideration in evaluating the British evidence is simply:was Kennedy's version the true one? Here,an important point deserves attention.Charles Earl,the American captain of the English lorcha Chusan,who was breakfasting with Kennedy and Leach when the incident occurred,did not make any statement along with them on g October.His presence and activities on the previous day,it is to be noted,were mentioned in the depositions of the other two captains,and could not have escaped the notice of the Consul.It is obvious that both Parkes and Kennedy were anxious to acquire a testimony from him to strengthen their case;but Earl did not make one.This gives rise to a provocative question:was Earl unable or did he decline to do so?It is not true that he was unavailable,because,so far as we know,he was still at Canton as late as I6 October.Possibly he declined.It is not clear why he eventually changed his mind and made a deposition on 16 October to corroborate 2s F.O.228.213,Parkes-Bowring Desp.155,9 October 1856,Incl.,Chin A-shing's deposition,9 October 1856.See next note. 2 Ibid.,Leung A-yung's deposition,9 October 1856.I have not been able to find the Chinese characters of Chin A-shing or Leung A-yung.Consequently they have to remain in their present form,which is probably Cantonese. This content downloaded from 202.120.60.150 on Fri,28 Feb 2014 04:35:04 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THE 'ARROW INCIDENT: A REAPPRAISAL 38I the crucial passage of his testimony in which the insult to the flag is alleged to have been committed adds no detail to that given by Kennedy, except that the Chinese 'flung [the ensign] on the deck without unreeving it from the halyards'.28 This by itself hardly adds a significant element of conviction. Such an embellishment could plausibly be explained as the result of his close examination by Parkes. Moreover, there is no mention in this evidence of the Blue Peter, which all other sources agree should have been flying along with the Union Jack (and, supposing the validity of the British allegations, pulled down with it). The only other support for the British case is a brief declaration by Consul Parkes that the second Chinese sailor: Leung A-yung, on being examined by the Consul deposed to the same facts as Chin A-shing. He distinctly saw the flag hauled down by one of the soldiers. He and another man were busily engaged in a sampan unmooring the lorcha at the moment when the mandarins boarded.29 As we shall see later, it is impossible to discount the possibility that Leung A-yung was simply saying what he had been told to say. It thus seems that the evidence of Captain Leach and the two Chinese sailors cannot be relied upon as independent or trustworthy. As it is apparent that Parkes built his case against the Chinese on four documents, three of which are of little value, the basic consideration in evaluating the British evidence is simply: was Kennedy's version the true one ? Here, an important point deserves attention. Charles Earl, the American captain of the English lorcha Chusan, who was breakfasting with Kennedy and Leach when the incident occurred, did not make any statement along with them on g October. His presence and activities on the previous day, it is to be noted, were mentioned in the depositions of the other two captains, and could not have escaped the notice of the Consul. It is obvious that both Parkes and Kennedy were anxious to acquire a testimony from him to strengthen their case; but Earl did not make one. This gives rise to a provocative question: was Earl unable or did he decline to do so? It is not true that he was unavailable, because, so far as we know, he was still at Canton as late as I6 October. Possibly he declined. It is not clear why he eventually changed his mind and made a deposition on I6 October to corroborate 28 F.O. 228.2I3, Parkes-Bowring Desp. I55, 9 October I856, Incl., Chin A-shing's deposition, g October I856. See next note. 29 Ibid., Leung A-yung's deposition, g October I856. I have not been able to find the Chinese characters of Chin A-shing or Leung A-yung. Consequently they have to remain in their present form, which is probably Cantonese. This content downloaded from 202.120.60.150 on Fri, 28 Feb 2014 04:35:04 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
382 J.Y.WONG Kennedy's story.30 The importance of this document,however,has been greatly exaggerated by Douglas Hurd.Hurd argued that since Leach and the two Chinese sailors were interested parties,their state- ments could not be taken seriously;but Earl was a significant witness because he was an American and therefore was a disinterested party.31 This view is wholly unconvincing because,although Earl was an Ameri- can,he was in the employ of the British,he was a friend of Kennedy and Leach,he was breakfasting with them during the incident,and he also went to the scene with them afterwards.Clearly he was as involved in the matter as was Leach,and if Leach's statement cannot be taken seriously,neither can that of Earl.Furthermore,Earl's belated piece of evidence was greatly undermined by one factor.When Bowring received Earl's deposition,he failed to send it to the Foreign Office as he had done with the others.32 He did not even mention it in his cor- respondence,official or private.33 When he finally did so,34 it was already seven months after he and his colleagues had waged an un- declared war with Canton because of the incident.35 He pleaded 'in- dulgence from the state of agitation and excitement'.36 This shows that his main concern was the exploitation of the alleged insult to the flag.37 He was not interested in the trustworthiness of Kennedy's story. Now,let us turn to the Chinese side.Naturally,the assurances given by the Chinese officers to Commissioner Yeh that the flag had not been insulted are open to similar doubts.If Kennedy had been telling the truth,the Chinese officers would have had good reasons to lie.Costin cast doubt on the Chinese evidence when he wrote: The evidence in the possession of the Imperial Commissioner Yeh on the question of ownership was provided by a member of the crew 'lying bound 30 F.O.228.213,Parkes-Bowring Desp.160,16 October 1856,and Incl.,Earl's deposition,16 October 1856. 31 D.Hurd,The Arrow War:An Anglo-Chinese Confusion,1856-1860 (London,1967), p.30.Hurd further maintains that Earl gave evidence seven months after the incident, giving as reference F.O.17.269.If one compares his reference with that in my foot- notes,it is clear that Mr Hurd has not read the documents himself(see notes no.30 and33-34). 3 Consequently Earl's statement is not among the Parliamentary Papers. 33 There is no allusion to it in Bowring's letters to Lord Clarendon until seven months later (see next note),or in his correspondence with his sons(Ryl.Eng.MSS 1228 and 1229 series)in England. 34 F.O.17.268,Bowring-Clarendon Desp.224,7 May 1857. 3s War was not formally declared until December 1857 by Lord Elgin. 36 F.O.17.268,Bowring-Clarendon Desp.224,7 May 1857. 37 See my article,entitled 'Sir John Bowring and the Canton City Question', Bulletin of the John Rylands University Library of Manchester(September 1973). This content downloaded from 202.120.60.150 on Fri,28 Feb 2014 04:35:04 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
382 J. Y. WONG Kennedy's story.30 The importance of this document, however, has been greatly exaggerated by Douglas Hurd. Hurd argued that since Leach and the two Chinese sailors were interested parties, their statements could not be taken seriously; but Earl was a significant witness because he was an American and therefore was a, disinterested party.3t This view is wholly unconvincing because, although Earl was an American, he was in the employ of the British, he was a friend of Kennedy and Leach, he was breakfasting with them during the incidentn and he also went to the scene with them afterwards. Clearly he was as involved in the matter as was Leach, and if Leach's statement cannot be taken seriously, neither can that of Earl. Furthermore, Earl's belated piece of evidence was greatly undermined by one factor. When Bowring received Earls deposition, he failed to send it to the Foreign Office as he had done with the others.32 He did not even mention it in his correspondence, official or private.33 When he Enally did so34 it was already seven months after he and his colleagues had waged an undeclared war with Canton because of the incident.35 He pleaded 'indulgence from the state of agitation and excitement'.36 This shows that his main concern was the exploitation of the alleged insult to the flag.37 He was not interested in the trustworthiness of Kennedy's story. Now, let us turn to the Chinese side. lfaturally, the assurances given by the Chinese officers to Commissioner Yeh that the flag had not been insulted are open to similar doubts. If Kennedy had been telling the truth, the Chinese officers would have had good reasons to lWie. Costin cast doubt on the Chinese evidence when he wrote: The evidence in the possession of the -Imperial Commissioner Yeh on the question of ownership was provided by a member of the crew 'lying bound 30 F.O. 228.2I3, Parkes-Bowring Desp. I60n I6 October I856, and Incl., Earl's deposition, I 6 October I 856. 31 D. Hurd, The Arrow War: An Anglo-Chinese Confusion, I85SI860 (London, I967), p. 30. Hurd further maintains that Earl gave evidence seven months after the incident, giving as reference F.O. I 7.X69. If one compares his reference with that in my footnotes, it is clear that Mr Hurd has not read the documents himself (see notes no. 30 and 33-34) 32 Consequently Earl's statement is not among the Parliamentary Papers. 33 There is no allusion to it in Bowring's letters to Lord Clarendon until seven months later (see next note), or in his correspondence with his sons (Ryl. Eng. MSS I228 and I229 series) in England. 34 F.O. I 7.268, Bowring-Clarendon Desp. 224, 7 oMay I857. 35 War was not formally declared until Oecember I857 by Lord Elgin. 36 F.O. I7.268, Bowring-Clarendon Desp. 224, 7 May I857. 37 See my article, entitled 'Sir John Bowring and the Canton (:::ity Q!lestion' Bulletin of the yohn }2ylands Unisersity Library of Manchester (September I973). This content downloaded from 202.120.60.150 on Fri, 28 Feb 2014 04:35:04 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions