1 In Samuel Chu and Kwang-Ching Liu,eds.,Li Hung-chang and China's Early Modernization LI HONGZHANG'S USE OF FOREIGN MILITARY TALENT: THE FORMATIVE PERIOD,1862-1874 Richard J.Smith Rice University No high-ranking official in nineteenth century China had more direct and sustained contact with foreigners than Li Hongzhang.Even the most cursory glance at his memorials,letters,and telegraph messages for the period from 1862 to 1901 reveals that Americans and Europeans loomed large in Li's world of discourse,both official and private.In part,of course,Li's preoccupation with Westerners can be explained by the simple fact of imperialist expansion into Asia during the late Qing period;from the 1840s onward,Chinese officials found it increasingly difficult,if not impossible,to ignore the unsettling presence of foreigners in the Middle Kingdom.But not all Qing bureaucrats responded to the West in the same way,just as not all Westerners reponded to Qing officials in the same way.The salient feature of Li's approach was his Janus-like effort to build up China's wealth and power by using the scientific and technological skills of Westerners,yet all the while working to eliminate dependence upon them--or as he put it, to learn Western methods "without always having to use their men."[1]What were the origins of Li's strategy of "barbarian management?"How did his early experiences with foreigners affect his outlook?And how successful was he in the pursuit of his twin goals? The employment of foreigners was,of course,nothing new in Chinese history.By the mid-nineteenth century,Chinese policymakers could look back on more than two thousand years of precedent in the use of "barbarians"for civil and military purposes.In the early Qing period this tradition included the appointment of Jesuit missionaries as civil officials in the Imperial Board of Astronomy (Qintian jian),the incorporation of Russian soldiers into the dynasty's elite Banner forces,the employment of Dutch troops as "allies"against Zheng Chenggong(Koxinga),and the periodic use of individual Westerners as mercenaries and military technicians in the Opium War era.[2]But China's mid-nineteenth century circumstances were unique in at least two fundamental ways.First,imperialism gave Westerners political and economic power in China vastly disproportunate to their numbers;and secondly,Americans and Europeans had far more to offer China technologically,and perhaps even culturally,than any barbarians in the past. When Li Hongzhang became acting governor of Jiangsu province in April of 1862,it did not take him long to realize both things.The problem was what to do about the situation.In a sense,Li had few choices.The location and timing of his appointment placed him inescapably in the vortex of Sino-foreign relations at the provincial level.As the Taiping Rebellion raged seemingly out of control,the throne and local officials had already acted to secure Western assistance against the rebels.In 1860 the foreign powers defended Shanghai against the Taiping forces of Li Xiucheng,although they simultaneously conducted military operations against the Qing in order to secure compliance with the Treaty of Tianjin(1858).During 1860-1861,negotiations began for the purchase of Western ships and guns,as well as the formal and informal employment of foreign military and naval personnel.By early 1862,not only had the Qing central
1 In Samuel Chu and Kwang-Ching Liu, eds., Li Hung-chang and China's Early Modernization LI HONGZHANG'S USE OF FOREIGN MILITARY TALENT: THE FORMATIVE PERIOD, 1862-1874 Richard J. Smith Rice University No high-ranking official in nineteenth century China had more direct and sustained contact with foreigners than Li Hongzhang. Even the most cursory glance at his memorials, letters, and telegraph messages for the period from 1862 to 1901 reveals that Americans and Europeans loomed large in Li's world of discourse, both official and private. In part, of course, Li's preoccupation with Westerners can be explained by the simple fact of imperialist expansion into Asia during the late Qing period; from the 1840s onward, Chinese officials found it increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to ignore the unsettling presence of foreigners in the Middle Kingdom. But not all Qing bureaucrats responded to the West in the same way, just as not all Westerners reponded to Qing officials in the same way. The salient feature of Li's approach was his Janus-like effort to build up China's wealth and power by using the scientific and technological skills of Westerners, yet all the while working to eliminate dependence upon them--or as he put it, to learn Western methods "without always having to use their men." [1] What were the origins of Li's strategy of "barbarian management?" How did his early experiences with foreigners affect his outlook? And how successful was he in the pursuit of his twin goals? The employment of foreigners was, of course, nothing new in Chinese history. By the mid-nineteenth century, Chinese policymakers could look back on more than two thousand years of precedent in the use of "barbarians" for civil and military purposes. In the early Qing period this tradition included the appointment of Jesuit missionaries as civil officials in the Imperial Board of Astronomy (Qintian jian), the incorporation of Russian soldiers into the dynasty's elite Banner forces, the employment of Dutch troops as "allies" against Zheng Chenggong (Koxinga), and the periodic use of individual Westerners as mercenaries and military technicians in the Opium War era. [2] But China's mid-nineteenth century circumstances were unique in at least two fundamental ways. First, imperialism gave Westerners political and economic power in China vastly disproportunate to their numbers; and secondly, Americans and Europeans had far more to offer China technologically, and perhaps even culturally, than any barbarians in the past. When Li Hongzhang became acting governor of Jiangsu province in April of 1862, it did not take him long to realize both things. The problem was what to do about the situation. In a sense, Li had few choices. The location and timing of his appointment placed him inescapably in the vortex of Sino-foreign relations at the provincial level. As the Taiping Rebellion raged seemingly out of control, the throne and local officials had already acted to secure Western assistance against the rebels. In 1860 the foreign powers defended Shanghai against the Taiping forces of Li Xiucheng, although they simultaneously conducted military operations against the Qing in order to secure compliance with the Treaty of Tianjin (1858). During 1860-1861, negotiations began for the purchase of Western ships and guns, as well as the formal and informal employment of foreign military and naval personnel. By early 1862, not only had the Qing central
2 government committed itself to purchasing a naval force for the Yangzi River to be staffed by British officers(the Lay-Osborn flotilla),but local officials in Jiangsu and Zhejiang had also begun to raise Sino-foreign mercenary contingents such as the Ever- Victorious Army(EVA)to contend with the persistent Taiping menace.Meanwhile,the Sino-foreign Inspectorate of Customs,established in 1854 at Shanghai,had become an ever more visible and influential feature of China's civil administration.Despite his claim to Zeng Guofan that he would simply "strive for self-strengthening and not mix with foreigners,"Li Hongzhang could not have avoided contact with them even if he had wanted to.[3] Li Hongzhang and the Ever-Victorious Army Li quickly sized matters up in 1862.As Professor Kwang-Ching Liu has indicated,the newly-appointed acting governor immediately recognized the inevitability of dealing with foreigners,and lost no time in trying to gain the upper hand with them. Within two weeks of his arrival at Shanghai,he began to acquire modern Western weapons for his Anhui Army,having viewed their effectiveness against the Taipings first-hand.Employment of Western instructors from the Ever-Victorious Army followed naturally.By late 1862,Li's army had acquired over one thousand rifles and employed perhaps a half a dozen Western instructors from the EVA.Less than a year later,the Anhui Army had expanded to over forty thousand men and now boasted more than ten thousand rifles and several large cannon,in addition to about a dozen new foreign drill instructors--most of whom also came from the Ever-Victorious Army.[4] In the early stages of modernizing his military forces,Li relied heavily on the personal assistance of Frederick T.Ward,the colorful American commander of the Ever- Victorious Army.He used Ward's contacts to acquire guns,ships,and other military supplies,and sought to win the American commander's friendship in order to ingratiate himself with the foreign powers.In what would become a characteristic feature of Li's approach to foreign relations,he overestimated American influence,both locally and at the capital;but he had a far more realistic grasp of domestic political realities.He saw, for example,that Ward enjoyed a close personal relationship with the corrupt but powerful local taotai,Wu Xu,and that any effort to undermine the position of one would necessarily provoke the antagonism of the other.[5] As the first Westerner in modern times to hold official rank in the Qing military hierarchy,Ward presented special problems of responsibility and restraint.Although the American adventurer had petitioned to become a Chinese subject,and had married a Chinese woman(the daughter of his merchant-official patron,Yang Fang),his loyalties were difficult to judge,much less to assure.Although in the early stages of his career as a Chinese officer Ward had established an extraordinary reputation for bravery and effectiveness against the Taipings,reports in March and April by Li's predecessor(Xue Huan),that the American commander had not yet shaved his head in the Manchu fashion nor changed to Chinese clothing because he feared the ridicule of other foreigners, provoked the throne to issue several anxious edicts on the subject.Li,however,remained relatively unconcerned.Writing to Zeng Guofan in June he stated that although Ward had not yet shaved his forehead,nor paid him a courtesy visit,he (Li)had no time to quarrel with foreigners over such "petty faults."[6]
2 government committed itself to purchasing a naval force for the Yangzi River to be staffed by British officers (the Lay-Osborn flotilla), but local officials in Jiangsu and Zhejiang had also begun to raise Sino-foreign mercenary contingents such as the EverVictorious Army (EVA) to contend with the persistent Taiping menace. Meanwhile, the Sino-foreign Inspectorate of Customs, established in 1854 at Shanghai, had become an ever more visible and influential feature of China's civil administration. Despite his claim to Zeng Guofan that he would simply "strive for self-strengthening and not mix with foreigners," Li Hongzhang could not have avoided contact with them even if he had wanted to. [3] Li Hongzhang and the Ever-Victorious Army Li quickly sized matters up in 1862. As Professor Kwang-Ching Liu has indicated, the newly-appointed acting governor immediately recognized the inevitability of dealing with foreigners, and lost no time in trying to gain the upper hand with them. Within two weeks of his arrival at Shanghai, he began to acquire modern Western weapons for his Anhui Army, having viewed their effectiveness against the Taipings first-hand. Employment of Western instructors from the Ever-Victorious Army followed naturally. By late 1862, Li's army had acquired over one thousand rifles and employed perhaps a half a dozen Western instructors from the EVA. Less than a year later, the Anhui Army had expanded to over forty thousand men and now boasted more than ten thousand rifles and several large cannon, in addition to about a dozen new foreign drill instructors--most of whom also came from the Ever-Victorious Army. [4] In the early stages of modernizing his military forces, Li relied heavily on the personal assistance of Frederick T. Ward, the colorful American commander of the EverVictorious Army. He used Ward's contacts to acquire guns, ships, and other military supplies, and sought to win the American commander's friendship in order to ingratiate himself with the foreign powers. In what would become a characteristic feature of Li's approach to foreign relations, he overestimated American influence, both locally and at the capital; but he had a far more realistic grasp of domestic political realities. He saw, for example, that Ward enjoyed a close personal relationship with the corrupt but powerful local taotai, Wu Xu, and that any effort to undermine the position of one would necessarily provoke the antagonism of the other. [5] As the first Westerner in modern times to hold official rank in the Qing military hierarchy, Ward presented special problems of responsibility and restraint. Although the American adventurer had petitioned to become a Chinese subject, and had married a Chinese woman (the daughter of his merchant-official patron, Yang Fang), his loyalties were difficult to judge, much less to assure. Although in the early stages of his career as a Chinese officer Ward had established an extraordinary reputation for bravery and effectiveness against the Taipings, reports in March and April by Li's predecessor (Xue Huan), that the American commander had not yet shaved his head in the Manchu fashion nor changed to Chinese clothing because he feared the ridicule of other foreigners, provoked the throne to issue several anxious edicts on the subject. Li, however, remained relatively unconcerned. Writing to Zeng Guofan in June he stated that although Ward had not yet shaved his forehead, nor paid him a courtesy visit, he (Li) had no time to quarrel with foreigners over such "petty faults." [6]
3 Significantly,the concerns expressed by Qing officials over Ward's devotion to the imperial cause were not entirely groundless.According to letters written in the summer of 1862 to the American Minister,Anson Burlingame,Ward complained vociferously about the "rascally officials"at Shanghai who,he claimed,had robbed him of credit for his accomplishments against the Taipings,and had witheld some 350,000 taels of payment due him.Significantly Ward asked Burlingame to "say a word"to Prince Gong"about my people,and remarked:"if I had not my foot so deeply in the mire I would throw them all overboard."This last remark is a telling one,for it suggests that by August of 1862 Ward had become ensnared in an elaborate web of control spun by local officials.Although claiming to be disgusted with the "lying,swindling and smuggling"that surrounded him,he had become,in fact,a part of the problem by virtue of his multifarious dealings with the undeniably corrupt Yang Fang and Wu Xu.[7] Li was well aware of Ward's involvement in at least some of the illegal activities of Yang and Wu;yet while the American commander remained alive he did not move overtly against either him or them.As a result,Ward continued to work closely with Li, providing advice and assistance in obtaining arms,and cooperating closely with the Anhui Army in military operations against the Taipings.Despite Ward's occasionally complaints over the policies and practices of the "Devilish Governor,"he and Li seem to have been on generally good terms.The American commander recognized the need for Li's political support,while the Jiangsu governor saw in Ward a strong,fearless,and well-connected Western leader,whose weapons were extremely powerful and whose Chinese soldiers were "no different from foreign troops."[8] Ward's death at the battle of Ciqi (in Zhejiang)in late September,1862,brought both opportunities and difficulties to Li.On the one hand,it helped him to undermine the power of Wu Xu,since the Shanghai taotai had relied heavily on Ward.On the other hand,it deprived the Jiangsu governor of a valuable foreign adviser,and brought a raft of administrative problems to his door.These had to do with the politics of replacing Ward as commander of the EVA.Although both the British and the French put forward their own candidates for leadership of the force,Li steadfastly insisted that if a Westerner were to head the Ever-Victorious Army that person would have to be "a man of Ward's stamp, ability,sagacity and willingness to attach himself to the Chinese cause"--someone who would be entirely under Chinese jurisdiction "as to praise or blame."Beijing expressed a similar view,indicating that if foreigners were to lead Chinese troops they had to petition to become Chinese subjects and accept Chinese control as Ward had done.[9] Ward's right-hand man,Henry A.Burgevine--also an American adventurer-- seemed to fit the bill.Like Ward,he was a brave officer who had petitioned to become a Chinese subject,taken a Chinese wife,and devoted himself wholeheartedly to the anti- Taiping cause.Unlike Ward,however,he was impetuous,short-tempered,extravagant, unreliable and difficult to get along with.In early January,1863,after several months of continuous bickering with the Chinese authorities,Burgevine had a particularly serious altercation with Yang Fang over payment of the EVA,during which he struck Yang and took from him forty thousand dollars.Li Hongzhang immediately called for the American commander's dismissal,accusing him of robbery,rebellion and treason. Reportedly,the Chinese government place a reward of 50,000 taels on his head.After failing to secure reinstatement,Burgevine eventually joined the Taipings,only to be captured by the Qing authorities.He "accidentally"drowned in their custody during 1865.[10]
3 Significantly, the concerns expressed by Qing officials over Ward's devotion to the imperial cause were not entirely groundless. According to letters written in the summer of 1862 to the American Minister, Anson Burlingame, Ward complained vociferously about the "rascally officials" at Shanghai who, he claimed, had robbed him of credit for his accomplishments against the Taipings, and had witheld some 350,000 taels of payment due him. Significantly Ward asked Burlingame to "say a word" to Prince Gong "about my people," and remarked: "if I had not my foot so deeply in the mire I would throw them all overboard." This last remark is a telling one, for it suggests that by August of 1862 Ward had become ensnared in an elaborate web of control spun by local officials. Although claiming to be disgusted with the "lying, swindling and smuggling" that surrounded him, he had become, in fact, a part of the problem by virtue of his multifarious dealings with the undeniably corrupt Yang Fang and Wu Xu. [7] Li was well aware of Ward's involvement in at least some of the illegal activities of Yang and Wu; yet while the American commander remained alive he did not move overtly against either him or them. As a result, Ward continued to work closely with Li, providing advice and assistance in obtaining arms, and cooperating closely with the Anhui Army in military operations against the Taipings. Despite Ward's occasionally complaints over the policies and practices of the "Devilish Governor," he and Li seem to have been on generally good terms. The American commander recognized the need for Li's political support, while the Jiangsu governor saw in Ward a strong, fearless, and well-connected Western leader, whose weapons were extremely powerful and whose Chinese soldiers were "no different from foreign troops." [8] Ward's death at the battle of Ciqi (in Zhejiang) in late September, 1862, brought both opportunities and difficulties to Li. On the one hand, it helped him to undermine the power of Wu Xu, since the Shanghai taotai had relied heavily on Ward. On the other hand, it deprived the Jiangsu governor of a valuable foreign adviser, and brought a raft of administrative problems to his door. These had to do with the politics of replacing Ward as commander of the EVA. Although both the British and the French put forward their own candidates for leadership of the force, Li steadfastly insisted that if a Westerner were to head the Ever-Victorious Army that person would have to be "a man of Ward's stamp, ability, sagacity and willingness to attach himself to the Chinese cause"--someone who would be entirely under Chinese jurisdiction "as to praise or blame." Beijing expressed a similar view, indicating that if foreigners were to lead Chinese troops they had to petition to become Chinese subjects and accept Chinese control as Ward had done. [9] Ward's right-hand man, Henry A. Burgevine--also an American adventurer-- seemed to fit the bill. Like Ward, he was a brave officer who had petitioned to become a Chinese subject, taken a Chinese wife, and devoted himself wholeheartedly to the antiTaiping cause. Unlike Ward, however, he was impetuous, short-tempered, extravagant, unreliable and difficult to get along with. In early January, 1863, after several months of continuous bickering with the Chinese authorities, Burgevine had a particularly serious altercation with Yang Fang over payment of the EVA, during which he struck Yang and took from him forty thousand dollars. Li Hongzhang immediately called for the American commander's dismissal, accusing him of robbery, rebellion and treason. Reportedly, the Chinese government place a reward of 50,000 taels on his head. After failing to secure reinstatement, Burgevine eventually joined the Taipings, only to be captured by the Qing authorities. He "accidentally" drowned in their custody during 1865. [10]
In the meantime,Li Hongzhang found it necessary to appoint two regular British officers to lead the Ever-Victorious Army--first,John Y.Holland,of the Royal Navy (on a temporary basis);then,in March of 1863,Charles G.Gordon of the Royal Engineers. Brilliant but erratic,Gordon managed to pull the EVA together and once again employ it with effect against the Taipings.Like Ward,he worked closely with Li,although he,too, chafed at the Jiangsu governor's administrative practices--most particularly his consistently dilatory payment of the force.In fact,at several points during Gordon's tenure as commander of the Ever-Victorious Army,he and Li had basic disagreements that threatened to undermine their cooperative venture;and on at least two occasions,the EVA and the Anhui Army nearly came to blows.[11] The most serious altercation between Li and Gordon occurred in late 1863,after the Jiangsu governor had executed several high-ranking Taiping leaders who had surrendered the strategic city of Suzhou to the Anhui Army on December 4,having received Gordon's personal guarantee of their safety.This so-called "Suzhou Incident" provoked a huge outcry on the part of Westerners in China.At Shanghai,for example, representatives of the foreign powers denounced Li in a strongly-worded public proclamation.Gordon,humilated and outraged,threatened to restore Suzhou to the rebels,attack Li's troops with his foreign-led Ever-Victorious Army,and even join the Taipings.The British commander-in-chief,General W.G.Brown,took the Ever- Victorious Army under his own command and directed Gordon to "suspend all active aid to the Imperialist [i.e.Qing]cause,and the British minister,Frederick Bruce,informed the Qing authorities that Gordon could hold no communication with Li Hongzhang,"or in any way be under his orders."[12] The Chinese government,for its part,felt that Li Hongzhang's response to the situation at Suzhou had been perfectly appropriate in light of the threatening attitude of the surrendered rebel leaders,and that the foreign powers had no right or reason to become involved in the matter.Thus,although in Li's report of the Suzhou affair to the throne he had suggested the possibility of punishment for himself in order to placate the Western authorities,Beijing had no such intentions.Commenting simply that "foreigners do not understand the principles involved,"the throne shifted the burden of this delicate matter to the Zongli Yamen.[13] With passions still high and matters at a diplomatic impasse,Li found a strong foreign supporter in Robert Hart,newly-appointed Inspector-General(I.G.)of the Chinese Maritime Cusoms administration.In Shanghai to settle the accounts of the ill- fated Lay-Osborn Flotilla and to take care of other Customs-related business at the treaty port,Hart immediately and almost instinctively began to act as a mediator for the Qing government;and in so doing,he became,wittingly or otherwise,a valuable ally of Li Hongzhang.Hart would continue to play these dual roles of middleman and advocate for Li,with greater or lesser enthusiasm,throughout his long career in China.[14] The I.G.believed from the outset that Gordon should take the field against the Taipings rather than remain in garrison.In his view,the first priority was unquestionably the rapid suppression of the rebels.This development would,Hart reasoned,benefit both the foreign powers and the Qing government--not least in the expansion of Sino-foreign trade.Furthermore,despite the EVA's recent problems with pay and discipline,Hart saw the force as a potent weapon in the Qing-Taiping struggle.Significantly,he also sought to protect Gordon from "impeachment"by Li Hongzhang for insubordination--a possibility he foresaw based on the Lay-Osborn affair and his own growing experience
4 In the meantime, Li Hongzhang found it necessary to appoint two regular British officers to lead the Ever-Victorious Army--first, John Y. Holland, of the Royal Navy (on a temporary basis); then, in March of 1863, Charles G. Gordon of the Royal Engineers. Brilliant but erratic, Gordon managed to pull the EVA together and once again employ it with effect against the Taipings. Like Ward, he worked closely with Li, although he, too, chafed at the Jiangsu governor's administrative practices--most particularly his consistently dilatory payment of the force. In fact, at several points during Gordon's tenure as commander of the Ever-Victorious Army, he and Li had basic disagreements that threatened to undermine their cooperative venture; and on at least two occasions, the EVA and the Anhui Army nearly came to blows. [11] The most serious altercation between Li and Gordon occurred in late 1863, after the Jiangsu governor had executed several high-ranking Taiping leaders who had surrendered the strategic city of Suzhou to the Anhui Army on December 4, having received Gordon's personal guarantee of their safety. This so-called "Suzhou Incident" provoked a huge outcry on the part of Westerners in China. At Shanghai, for example, representatives of the foreign powers denounced Li in a strongly-worded public proclamation. Gordon, humilated and outraged, threatened to restore Suzhou to the rebels, attack Li's troops with his foreign-led Ever-Victorious Army, and even join the Taipings. The British commander-in-chief, General W. G. Brown, took the EverVictorious Army under his own command and directed Gordon to "suspend all active aid to the Imperialist [i.e. Qing] cause," and the British minister, Frederick Bruce, informed the Qing authorities that Gordon could hold no communication with Li Hongzhang, "or in any way be under his orders." [12] The Chinese government, for its part, felt that Li Hongzhang's response to the situation at Suzhou had been perfectly appropriate in light of the threatening attitude of the surrendered rebel leaders, and that the foreign powers had no right or reason to become involved in the matter. Thus, although in Li's report of the Suzhou affair to the throne he had suggested the possibility of punishment for himself in order to placate the Western authorities, Beijing had no such intentions. Commenting simply that "foreigners do not understand the principles involved," the throne shifted the burden of this delicate matter to the Zongli Yamen. [13] With passions still high and matters at a diplomatic impasse, Li found a strong foreign supporter in Robert Hart, newly-appointed Inspector-General (I. G.) of the Chinese Maritime Cusoms administration. In Shanghai to settle the accounts of the illfated Lay-Osborn Flotilla and to take care of other Customs-related business at the treaty port, Hart immediately and almost instinctively began to act as a mediator for the Qing government; and in so doing, he became, wittingly or otherwise, a valuable ally of Li Hongzhang. Hart would continue to play these dual roles of middleman and advocate for Li, with greater or lesser enthusiasm, throughout his long career in China. [14] The I.G. believed from the outset that Gordon should take the field against the Taipings rather than remain in garrison. In his view, the first priority was unquestionably the rapid suppression of the rebels. This development would, Hart reasoned, benefit both the foreign powers and the Qing government--not least in the expansion of Sino-foreign trade. Furthermore, despite the EVA's recent problems with pay and discipline, Hart saw the force as a potent weapon in the Qing-Taiping struggle. Significantly, he also sought to protect Gordon from "impeachment" by Li Hongzhang for insubordination--a possibility he foresaw based on the Lay-Osborn affair and his own growing experience
5 with the Qing bureaucracy.Finally,Hart genuinely believed,as did Li,that since the Chinese supported the Ever-Victorious Army,they had every right to its services Few other foreigners in China shared Hart's view.General Brown,for instance, urged that the Ever-Victorious Army be disbanded immediately,"leaving the Chinese to fight their own battles."On December 19,1863,the North-China Herald editorialized: "We are glad that...Major Gordon will refrain from farther [sic]operations.It is by such means only that the Chinese can be acted on.It is hopeless to appeal to their sense of honour,for they have none;but they are keenly alive to their interests,and,rather than sacrifice these,may accomodate their actions to European principles....[If Li Hongzhang finds]that the consequence of his conduct has been to deprive him of the all- important aid of the disciplined Chinese contingent [the EVA],he will in [the]future refrain from acts of treachery.[15] Li greatly resented these foreign insults,but he was also anxious to placate Gordon.He therefore sent Dr.Halliday Macartney,who had also recently entered Li's service as an independent adviser and arsenal superviser,to see Gordon immediately after the Suzhou Incident in an attempt to placate the enraged foreign commander Gordon,as it developed,vigorously denounced Macartney for interceding on Li's behalf, accusing the well-intentioned Scotsman of conduct unbecoming a British gentleman.Yet soon thereafter Gordon reestablished contact with the Jiangsu governor,presumably on the latter's initiative--despite his own initial outrage and Bruce's unambiguous orders. Why?The answer is simple:Gordon desperately wanted to return to action. Quite apart from his well-known and insatiable love of battle,the British commander believed that the Ever-Victorious Army would grow increasingly degenerate and difficult to manage if it remained in garrison at Kunshan.Furthemore,Gordon was quite aware that the Anhui Army had proven itself capable of achieving military victory in his absence.This raised unpalatable possibility that he and his vaunted Sino-foreign force might come to be viewed as no longer indispensible to the safety of Shanghai and the suppression of the Taipings--a blow to Gordon's ego.Finally,according to General Brown,Gordon had received "direct hints"that Li Hongzhang would dismiss him if he refused to take the field against the Taipings.In a letter to the British Minister,Bruce, Gordon later claimed:"I know of a certainty that Burgevine meditates a return to the rebels;that there are upwards of 300 Europeans ready to join them,of no character,and that the Footae [Governor Li]will not accept another British officer if I leave the service, and therefore the Government may have some foreigner [sic]put in,or else the force put under men of Ward's and Burgevine's stamp,of whose action at times we should never feel certain."[16] Meanwhile,Hart had been trying on his own to prod Gordon back into Li Hongzhang's service.Although a memorial written by the Jiangsu governor on February 25,1864,suggests that Li himself initiated a reconciliation with Gordon,using Hart as his intermediary,the I.G.'s journals provide no such indications.An entry for January 18 states simply:"My intention is to endeavor to get Gordon to work again,and to find out all the circumstances connected with the Footae's action in beheading the Wangs [kings] at Suzhou."At this point,Hart was obviously inclined to urge Gordon's return to action regardless of what he might discover about the execution.This was not only because of the I.G.'s views regarding Shanghai's security;it was also because,as he indicated in his private journal,he feared that the Chinese authorities would read Gordon's refusal to fight as evidence of the unmanageability of"an able and reliable"man,who just happened to
5 with the Qing bureaucracy. Finally, Hart genuinely believed, as did Li, that since the Chinese supported the Ever-Victorious Army, they had every right to its services. Few other foreigners in China shared Hart's view. General Brown, for instance, urged that the Ever-Victorious Army be disbanded immediately, "leaving the Chinese to fight their own battles." On December l9, l863, the North-China Herald editorialized: "We are glad that . . . Major Gordon will refrain from farther [sic] operations. It is by such means only that the Chinese can be acted on. It is hopeless to appeal to their sense of honour, for they have none; but they are keenly alive to their interests, and, rather than sacrifice these, may accomodate their actions to European principles . . . . [If Li Hongzhang finds] that the consequence of his conduct has been to deprive him of the allimportant aid of the disciplined Chinese contingent [the EVA], he will in [the] future refrain from acts of treachery." [15] Li greatly resented these foreign insults, but he was also anxious to placate Gordon. He therefore sent Dr. Halliday Macartney, who had also recently entered Li's service as an independent adviser and arsenal superviser, to see Gordon immediately after the Suzhou Incident in an attempt to placate the enraged foreign commander. Gordon, as it developed, vigorously denounced Macartney for interceding on Li's behalf, accusing the well-intentioned Scotsman of conduct unbecoming a British gentleman. Yet soon thereafter Gordon reestablished contact with the Jiangsu governor, presumably on the latter's initiative--despite his own initial outrage and Bruce's unambiguous orders. Why? The answer is simple: Gordon desperately wanted to return to action. Quite apart from his well-known and insatiable love of battle, the British commander believed that the Ever-Victorious Army would grow increasingly degenerate and difficult to manage if it remained in garrison at Kunshan. Furthemore, Gordon was quite aware that the Anhui Army had proven itself capable of achieving military victory in his absence. This raised unpalatable possibility that he and his vaunted Sino-foreign force might come to be viewed as no longer indispensible to the safety of Shanghai and the suppression of the Taipings--a blow to Gordon's ego. Finally, according to General Brown, Gordon had received "direct hints" that Li Hongzhang would dismiss him if he refused to take the field against the Taipings. In a letter to the British Minister, Bruce, Gordon later claimed: "I know of a certainty that Burgevine meditates a return to the rebels; that there are upwards of 300 Europeans ready to join them, of no character, and that the Footae [Governor Li] will not accept another British officer if I leave the service, and therefore the Government may have some foreigner [sic] put in, or else the force put under men of Ward's and Burgevine's stamp, of whose action at times we should never feel certain." [16] Meanwhile, Hart had been trying on his own to prod Gordon back into Li Hongzhang's service. Although a memorial written by the Jiangsu governor on February 25, l864, suggests that Li himself initiated a reconciliation with Gordon, using Hart as his intermediary, the I.G.'s journals provide no such indications. An entry for January l8 states simply: "My intention is to endeavor to get Gordon to work again, and to find out all the circumstances connected with the Footae's action in beheading the Wangs [kings] at Suzhou." At this point, Hart was obviously inclined to urge Gordon's return to action regardless of what he might discover about the execution. This was not only because of the I. G.'s views regarding Shanghai's security; it was also because, as he indicated in his private journal, he feared that the Chinese authorities would read Gordon's refusal to fight as evidence of the unmanageability of "an able and reliable" man, who just happened to
6 be a foreigner in the Qing service.As such a person himself,Hart apparently felt that any stigma or doubt that might attach to Gordon might also apply to him.Under these ciircumstances,issues of personal morality surrendered to the demands of expediency [17] In any case,on February 1,after a number of false starts,Hart,Li,and Gordon finally met at Suzhou and agreed that the Ever-Victorious Army would take the field following the Chinese New Year.From this point onward,Hart played an integral role in the EVA's affairs.He assisted Gordon in securing prompt and regular pay for his men, and also detached a member of the customs staff,H.E.Hobson,to serve as an interpreter for the force.In addition,Hart helped Li Hongzhang to improve his tattered image among the foreign ministers in Beijing.On February 6,for example,Hart wrote a long letter to Bruce,providing a lengthy and vigorous defense of Li's actions at Suzhou.This letter unquestionably enhanced Li's stock in the foreign diplomatic community.[18] Hart's journal indicates that at this time he also became an adviser to Li,and that the two chatted at length about diplomatic and study missions to Europe,iron and coal mining,foreign steamers,weapons and arsenals,as well as customs matters.These conversations obviously impressed Hart,who lamented later in the year(and in subsequent years as well)that Li--although impetuous,and relatively unconcerned with details--did not hold a position in the Zongli Yamen.From this time onward,Hart came to consider Li an "ally"in his quest to modernize China;and for the next several decades he continually gave Li assistance and advice.But the I.G.was by no means the only one of Li's foreign advisers during this initial and formative period of the governor's contact with Westerners.Nor was he even the most influential.From all indications,Halliday Macartney,who aspired to occupy a position in nineteenth century China analogous to that of the Jesuits Adam Schall von Bell and Ferdinand Verbiest in the early Qing,was Li's most valuable adviser.According to Gordon himself,Li and Macartney "talked for hours"about Western inventions,foreign relations,and other matters of vital concern; and Gordon acknowledged without apparent jealousy that Marcartney had done a great deal for the Chinese in the face of many obstacles.However,the British commander was less willing to admit the key role Macartney played in the Ever-Victorious Army's internal affairs.[19] The Ever-Victorious Army played a significant role in the recovery of several major Taiping strongholds following its return to action in February of 1864;but by May it had become clear to both Li and Gordon that the force had passed its prime,and was in fact deteriorating rapidly.They therefore hastily made plans for its disbandment.In their opinion,the EVA was too expensive,too ineffective,and too "local"in its loyalties to justify further financial support.The Anhui Army,they both believed,was a superior and sufficient instrument for the protection of Jiangsu province.But Hart and the British authorities at Shanghai felt that the Sino-foreign contingent should not be disbanded too precipitously,and that at least part of the EVA should be "kept up permanently"as a local defense force and training program.After extensive and sometimes difficult negotiations involving Hart,the British Consul (Harry Parkes),Gordon,Li and Li's newly recruited and extremely able assistant,Ding Richang,the various parties reached a compromise whereby about a thousand men from the Ever-Victorious Army would be retained under Gordon's temporary supervision as the nucleus of a foreign-training program at Fenghuang shan--a small town about twenty-five miles southwest of Shanghai.[20]
6 be a foreigner in the Qing service. As such a person himself, Hart apparently felt that any stigma or doubt that might attach to Gordon might also apply to him. Under these ciircumstances, issues of personal morality surrendered to the demands of expediency. [17] In any case, on February 1, after a number of false starts, Hart, Li, and Gordon finally met at Suzhou and agreed that the Ever-Victorious Army would take the field following the Chinese New Year. From this point onward, Hart played an integral role in the EVA's affairs. He assisted Gordon in securing prompt and regular pay for his men, and also detached a member of the customs staff, H. E. Hobson, to serve as an interpreter for the force. In addition, Hart helped Li Hongzhang to improve his tattered image among the foreign ministers in Beijing. On February 6, for example, Hart wrote a long letter to Bruce, providing a lengthy and vigorous defense of Li's actions at Suzhou. This letter unquestionably enhanced Li's stock in the foreign diplomatic community. [18] Hart's journal indicates that at this time he also became an adviser to Li, and that the two chatted at length about diplomatic and study missions to Europe, iron and coal mining, foreign steamers, weapons and arsenals, as well as customs matters. These conversations obviously impressed Hart, who lamented later in the year (and in subsequent years as well) that Li--although impetuous, and relatively unconcerned with details--did not hold a position in the Zongli Yamen. From this time onward, Hart came to consider Li an "ally" in his quest to modernize China; and for the next several decades he continually gave Li assistance and advice. But the I.G. was by no means the only one of Li's foreign advisers during this initial and formative period of the governor's contact with Westerners. Nor was he even the most influential. From all indications, Halliday Macartney, who aspired to occupy a position in nineteenth century China analogous to that of the Jesuits Adam Schall von Bell and Ferdinand Verbiest in the early Qing, was Li's most valuable adviser. According to Gordon himself, Li and Macartney "talked for hours" about Western inventions, foreign relations, and other matters of vital concern; and Gordon acknowledged without apparent jealousy that Marcartney had done a great deal for the Chinese in the face of many obstacles. However, the British commander was less willing to admit the key role Macartney played in the Ever-Victorious Army's internal affairs. [19] The Ever-Victorious Army played a significant role in the recovery of several major Taiping strongholds following its return to action in February of 1864; but by May it had become clear to both Li and Gordon that the force had passed its prime, and was in fact deteriorating rapidly. They therefore hastily made plans for its disbandment. In their opinion, the EVA was too expensive, too ineffective, and too "local" in its loyalties to justify further financial support. The Anhui Army, they both believed, was a superior and sufficient instrument for the protection of Jiangsu province. But Hart and the British authorities at Shanghai felt that the Sino-foreign contingent should not be disbanded too precipitously, and that at least part of the EVA should be "kept up permanently" as a local defense force and training program. After extensive and sometimes difficult negotiations involving Hart, the British Consul (Harry Parkes), Gordon, Li and Li's newly recruited and extremely able assistant, Ding Richang, the various parties reached a compromise whereby about a thousand men from the Ever-Victorious Army would be retained under Gordon's temporary supervision as the nucleus of a foreign-training program at Fenghuang shan--a small town about twenty-five miles southwest of Shanghai. [20]
7 The Early Lessons of Barbarian Management By the summer of 1864,Li had learned virtually all he needed to know about the advantages and disadvantages of using foreigners in his self-strengthening enterprises. His experience with the Ever-Victorious Army,and his contact with foreigners such as Ward,Burgevine,Gordon,Hart and Macartney--not to mention his frequent and often frustrating negotiations with various Western civil and military authorities--formed the basis for his opinions regarding foreign assistance and the adoption of Western military technology for the next three decades.What exactly did he learn? Although Li readily perceived the advantages to be gained by utilizing foreign arms,training methods,and personnel,he also recognized the special problems involved in accepting foreign assistance,especially in military affairs.One difficulty was,of course,the danger of inordinate foreign influence.Few Westerners in the Chinese military service were inclined to "turn toward Chinese civilization [xianghua]"in the classic pattern.Most foreign officers,had no admiration for Chinese culture,and few, Ward and Gordon included,bothered to learn Chinese--just as few Chinese learned a foreign language.Disputes between Western officers and the Chinese occurred frequently.Dressed in semi-Western uniforms and responding to foreign command words,the men of the Ever-Victorious Army (and other such contingents)were in the minds of most Chinese "counterfeit foreign-devils"(jia yangguizi)--overpaid,rowdy, unacquainted with Confucian moral instruction and,in Zeng Guofan's words,"utterly coarse."[21] The problems created by the Ever-Victorious Army's system of foreign officering went well beyond cultural subversion and the inevitable friction of daily Sino-foreign contact.Independent freebooters like Ward,Burgevine,and their subordinates,tended to be arrogant and unmanageable;while commanding officers on loan from regular Western military and naval forces,such as Holland and Gordon,invited continual interference from their home governments.Even civilian advisers such as Hart--although a Qing bureaucrat and reportedly "as completely Chinese in his sympathies as the Chinese himself"--created problems for Li.Despite his appreciation for the I.G.'s useful and energetic services,Li occasionally described him as "quite contentious,"and wrote that his willingness to exert himself on China's behalf was primarily because he coveted his large salary.[22] Furthermore,foreigners involved in Chinese military affairs inevitably constituted a security risk.Rumors circulated throughout Ward's lifetime that he planned to dethrone the Manchus;Burgevine actually defected to the Taipings in 1863,together with several officers of the Ever-Victorious Army;Gordon threatened to join the rebels and attack the Anhui Army in the aftermath of the Suzhou Incident;and after disbandment of the EVA in 1864,several prominent officers of the force entered the Taiping service under Li Shixian.[23] From the Qing government's standpoint,the exposure of foreigners to the inner workings of the Qing military only increased the possibility of subterfuge.According to some reports,contact with Western officers in the Ever-Victorious Army encouraged certain "anti-Mandarin"tendencies on the part of the Chinese rank-and-file--even though anti-foreignism seems to have been by far the more common outcome.Furthermore, Westerners in the Qing military service were clearly in a position to report on Chinese
7 The Early Lessons of Barbarian Management By the summer of 1864, Li had learned virtually all he needed to know about the advantages and disadvantages of using foreigners in his self-strengthening enterprises. His experience with the Ever-Victorious Army, and his contact with foreigners such as Ward, Burgevine, Gordon, Hart and Macartney--not to mention his frequent and often frustrating negotiations with various Western civil and military authorities--formed the basis for his opinions regarding foreign assistance and the adoption of Western military technology for the next three decades. What exactly did he learn? Although Li readily perceived the advantages to be gained by utilizing foreign arms, training methods, and personnel, he also recognized the special problems involved in accepting foreign assistance, especially in military affairs. One difficulty was, of course, the danger of inordinate foreign influence. Few Westerners in the Chinese military service were inclined to "turn toward Chinese civilization [xianghua]" in the classic pattern. Most foreign officers, had no admiration for Chinese culture, and few, Ward and Gordon included, bothered to learn Chinese--just as few Chinese learned a foreign language. Disputes between Western officers and the Chinese occurred frequently. Dressed in semi-Western uniforms and responding to foreign command words, the men of the Ever-Victorious Army (and other such contingents) were in the minds of most Chinese "counterfeit foreign-devils" (jia yangguizi)--overpaid, rowdy, unacquainted with Confucian moral instruction and, in Zeng Guofan's words, "utterly coarse." [21] The problems created by the Ever-Victorious Army's system of foreign officering went well beyond cultural subversion and the inevitable friction of daily Sino-foreign contact. Independent freebooters like Ward, Burgevine, and their subordinates, tended to be arrogant and unmanageable; while commanding officers on loan from regular Western military and naval forces, such as Holland and Gordon, invited continual interference from their home governments. Even civilian advisers such as Hart--although a Qing bureaucrat and reportedly "as completely Chinese in his sympathies as the Chinese himself"--created problems for Li. Despite his appreciation for the I. G.'s useful and energetic services, Li occasionally described him as "quite contentious," and wrote that his willingness to exert himself on China's behalf was primarily because he coveted his large salary. [22] Furthermore, foreigners involved in Chinese military affairs inevitably constituted a security risk. Rumors circulated throughout Ward's lifetime that he planned to dethrone the Manchus; Burgevine actually defected to the Taipings in 1863, together with several officers of the Ever-Victorious Army; Gordon threatened to join the rebels and attack the Anhui Army in the aftermath of the Suzhou Incident; and after disbandment of the EVA in 1864, several prominent officers of the force entered the Taiping service under Li Shixian. [23] From the Qing government's standpoint, the exposure of foreigners to the inner workings of the Qing military only increased the possibility of subterfuge. According to some reports, contact with Western officers in the Ever-Victorious Army encouraged certain "anti-Mandarin" tendencies on the part of the Chinese rank-and-file--even though anti-foreignism seems to have been by far the more common outcome. Furthermore, Westerners in the Qing military service were clearly in a position to report on Chinese
8 military matters to their home governments,which they in fact did.Western drill also had its apparent hazards.Thus,in the name of security,Prince Gong inveighed strongly against the use of foreign command words in the training of Chinese troops--although the practice continued.[24] Another problem with the employment of Western military men,less threatening than frustrating,was the prospect of interference in Chinese military affairs on the part of foreign governments.Motivated by an unclear mixture of altruism and self-interest,the Western powers,particularly France and Great Britain,proved to be especially meddlesome as they competed for increased influence in Chinese military affairs. Military aid became a foreign policy tool.Throughout the 1860s and therafter,the foreign ministers in Beijing made continual demands for Chinese military reform along Western lines,in addition to requesting honors,authority and other special favors for their respective nationals in the Chinese service.At the local level,foreign civil and military officials made thinly veiled threats to advance personal or national interests.The Burgevine affair demonstrated that the lack of official attachment to a foreign government and even Chinese "citizenship,"did not preclude the foreign powers from intervening in what was properly a domestic matter,and the Suzhou Incident underscored the potential for foreign control of a Chinese military force.[25] Li Hongzhang understood and lamented all of these things,but he also learned that there were ways to handle them.One was by exploiting international rivalries.In early 1863,for instance,he wrote that if the British continued to cause difficulties in pressing for their own commander of the Ever-Victorious Army,the force might simply be placed under Tardif de Moidrey or Commander Bonnefoy--both French nationals who had recently been invested with Chinese military rank by Beijing.The British could(and did)threaten to withdraw the Ever-Victorious Army's guns if they did not get their way, but they could not be certain that the French would refrain from supplying both officers and artillery to the force if Li chose to look to France for aid.Similarly,after the Suzhou massacre,one reason the British did not simply deny further assistance to the Qing out of disgust seems to have been a fear,exploited by Li,that France or another country would gain influence over the Ever-Victorious Army.In April 1864,Bruce wrote to Lord Russell in London:"If we were to withdraw our officers we should thereby do an unfriendly act towards this Government,but we should not prevent foreigners being employed.In the same vein,Gordon noted in May that "refusal of the license to serve [Li Hongzhang]will oblige the Chinese to resort to foreigners not of our nation."[26] Li also learned how to manipulate individual foreign employees.Based on his experiences with Ward and Burgevine in particular,Li saw only too clearly that traditional signs of barbarian submission,such as the acquisition of Chinese "citizenship,"could neither guarantee the loyalty of foreigners nor even assure that they would be subject to Chinese legal jurisdiction.[27]On the other hand,it is true that Li could not help but appreciate the cultural transformation of individuals such as Macartney,who took a Chinese wife,and Jean Pennell,a Frenchman who entered Li's military service in 1862. Pennell was originally attached to Liu Ming-ch'uan's "foreign-artillery battalion" (vangpao ying),and by 1863 he had shaved his forehead,changed to Chinese clothing, and begun acquiring a knowledge of Chinese.Sometime later,he married a Chinese woman,and in 1866,after receiving several awards for distinction in battle(including Manchu batulu rank and zongbing [brigade-general]status),he petitioned to become a
8 military matters to their home governments, which they in fact did. Western drill also had its apparent hazards. Thus, in the name of security, Prince Gong inveighed strongly against the use of foreign command words in the training of Chinese troops--although the practice continued. [24] Another problem with the employment of Western military men, less threatening than frustrating, was the prospect of interference in Chinese military affairs on the part of foreign governments. Motivated by an unclear mixture of altruism and self-interest, the Western powers, particularly France and Great Britain, proved to be especially meddlesome as they competed for increased influence in Chinese military affairs. Military aid became a foreign policy tool. Throughout the 1860s and therafter, the foreign ministers in Beijing made continual demands for Chinese military reform along Western lines, in addition to requesting honors, authority and other special favors for their respective nationals in the Chinese service. At the local level, foreign civil and military officials made thinly veiled threats to advance personal or national interests. The Burgevine affair demonstrated that the lack of official attachment to a foreign government and even Chinese "citizenship," did not preclude the foreign powers from intervening in what was properly a domestic matter, and the Suzhou Incident underscored the potential for foreign control of a Chinese military force. [25] Li Hongzhang understood and lamented all of these things, but he also learned that there were ways to handle them. One was by exploiting international rivalries. In early 1863, for instance, he wrote that if the British continued to cause difficulties in pressing for their own commander of the Ever-Victorious Army, the force might simply be placed under Tardif de Moidrey or Commander Bonnefoy--both French nationals who had recently been invested with Chinese military rank by Beijing. The British could (and did) threaten to withdraw the Ever-Victorious Army's guns if they did not get their way, but they could not be certain that the French would refrain from supplying both officers and artillery to the force if Li chose to look to France for aid. Similarly, after the Suzhou massacre, one reason the British did not simply deny further assistance to the Qing out of disgust seems to have been a fear, exploited by Li, that France or another country would gain influence over the Ever-Victorious Army. In April 1864, Bruce wrote to Lord Russell in London: "If we were to withdraw our officers we should thereby do an unfriendly act towards this Government, but we should not prevent foreigners being employed." In the same vein, Gordon noted in May that "refusal of the license to serve [Li Hongzhang] will oblige the Chinese to resort to foreigners not of our nation." [26] Li also learned how to manipulate individual foreign employees. Based on his experiences with Ward and Burgevine in particular, Li saw only too clearly that traditional signs of barbarian submission, such as the acquisition of Chinese "citizenship," could neither guarantee the loyalty of foreigners nor even assure that they would be subject to Chinese legal jurisdiction. [27] On the other hand, it is true that Li could not help but appreciate the cultural transformation of individuals such as Macartney, who took a Chinese wife, and Jean Pennell, a Frenchman who entered Li's military service in 1862. Pennell was originally attached to Liu Ming-ch'uan's "foreign-artillery battalion" (yangpao ying), and by 1863 he had shaved his forehead, changed to Chinese clothing, and begun acquiring a knowledge of Chinese. Sometime later, he married a Chinese woman, and in 1866, after receiving several awards for distinction in battle (including Manchu batulu rank and zongbing [brigade-general] status), he petitioned to become a
Chinese subject and to be registered as a native of Hefei (Luzhou,Anhui).Li's memorial reporting Pennell's petition was couched in standard world order rhetoric,complete with references to the foreigner's admiration for Chinese customs and the emperor's "cherishing and soothing men from afar."But Li recognized that there was substance to Pennell's petition,unlike those of Ward and Burgevine.Pennell's thorough sinicization allowed him to fit in perfectly with his Chinese peers in the Anhui Army and facilitated Li's control over him.[28] Unfortunately for Li,Pennell's cultural sensitivity,like that of Macartney,was rare among Westerners in nineteenth century China.Recognizing this,the Jiangsu governor adopted a strategy of barbarian management that emphasized concrete inducements over cultural commitments.For over two thousand years the Chinese had relied heavily upon financial rewards as a means of attracting and maintaining the loyalty of foreign employees.Ward's legendary thirst for money conformed closely to a long- standing stereotype of foreigners,and even Gordon seemed,at least in Li's eyes,quite greedy.In fact,however,Gordon disdained monetary rewards,and as a matter of principle refused a ten thousand tael gift from the Qing government in the aftermath of the Suzhou Incident.[29] But while Gordon could not be tempted by material inducements,he,like Ward, wanted desperately to be appreciated.Li therefore played effectively on his ego, continually telling Gordon about the memorials he had written concerning the British commander's achievements in battle,and conveying the substance of appreciative edicts in response.He even gave Gordon the impression that the Empress Dowager,Cixi,took a personal interest in the Ever-Victorious Army.Meanwhile,Li's subordinates in the Anhui Army and other military units kept in constant contact with Gordon,not only sharing information but also sending compliments.Li's praise of Gordon,it should be added,was genuine.Although occasionally disturbed by the latter's impatience,impetuousness,and sudden outbursts of temper,his memorials repeatedly commended the foreign commander for his bravery,zeal,obedience,military wisdom,and effective use of Western weapons.[30] Li employed bureaucratic controls as an institutional complement to self- conscious flattery.From the very outset of Gordon's employment,the Jiangsu governor constantly reminded the British commander,as well as other British officials,both civil and military,that the Ever-Victorious Army was a Qing military force,under Li's own direction.Soon after Gordon's appointment as commander of the EVA,Li told the local British Consul,John Markham,that he had recently requested that Gordon be given a Qing military commission as a brigade-general (zongbing)so that he could consider him "part of my command.Li had in fact made the same point in his memorial of April 12-- although he also had to admit that he was bound to offer Gordon zongbing status by the terms of an agreement with the British in mid-January of 1863.On April 27,in response to Li's memorial,Beijing granted Gordon a temporary commission as brigade-general, charging him with the task of keeping the Ever-Victorious Army under control. Significantly,the edict to the Grand Council did not require the British commander to become a Chinese subject or change to Chinese clothing.Li conveyed the substance of these and related documents to Gordon,leaving him with no illusions about his position. "The Futai considers the force as his own,"Gordon wrote in early May,"under an officer who has entered the Chinese Service and has nothing further to say to the British Authorities for the time that he remains in the Chinese Service."[31]
9 Chinese subject and to be registered as a native of Hefei (Luzhou, Anhui). Li's memorial reporting Pennell's petition was couched in standard world order rhetoric, complete with references to the foreigner's admiration for Chinese customs and the emperor's "cherishing and soothing men from afar." But Li recognized that there was substance to Pennell's petition, unlike those of Ward and Burgevine. Pennell's thorough sinicization allowed him to fit in perfectly with his Chinese peers in the Anhui Army and facilitated Li's control over him. [28] Unfortunately for Li, Pennell's cultural sensitivity, like that of Macartney, was rare among Westerners in nineteenth century China. Recognizing this, the Jiangsu governor adopted a strategy of barbarian management that emphasized concrete inducements over cultural commitments. For over two thousand years the Chinese had relied heavily upon financial rewards as a means of attracting and maintaining the loyalty of foreign employees. Ward's legendary thirst for money conformed closely to a longstanding stereotype of foreigners, and even Gordon seemed, at least in Li's eyes, quite greedy. In fact, however, Gordon disdained monetary rewards, and as a matter of principle refused a ten thousand tael gift from the Qing government in the aftermath of the Suzhou Incident. [29] But while Gordon could not be tempted by material inducements, he, like Ward, wanted desperately to be appreciated. Li therefore played effectively on his ego, continually telling Gordon about the memorials he had written concerning the British commander's achievements in battle, and conveying the substance of appreciative edicts in response. He even gave Gordon the impression that the Empress Dowager, Cixi, took a personal interest in the Ever-Victorious Army. Meanwhile, Li's subordinates in the Anhui Army and other military units kept in constant contact with Gordon, not only sharing information but also sending compliments. Li's praise of Gordon, it should be added, was genuine. Although occasionally disturbed by the latter's impatience, impetuousness, and sudden outbursts of temper, his memorials repeatedly commended the foreign commander for his bravery, zeal, obedience, military wisdom, and effective use of Western weapons. [30] Li employed bureaucratic controls as an institutional complement to selfconscious flattery. From the very outset of Gordon's employment, the Jiangsu governor constantly reminded the British commander, as well as other British officials, both civil and military, that the Ever-Victorious Army was a Qing military force, under Li's own direction. Soon after Gordon's appointment as commander of the EVA, Li told the local British Consul, John Markham, that he had recently requested that Gordon be given a Qing military commission as a brigade-general (zongbing) so that he could consider him "part of my command." Li had in fact made the same point in his memorial of April 12-- although he also had to admit that he was bound to offer Gordon zongbing status by the terms of an agreement with the British in mid-January of 1863. On April 27, in response to Li's memorial, Beijing granted Gordon a temporary commission as brigade-general, charging him with the task of keeping the Ever-Victorious Army under control. Significantly, the edict to the Grand Council did not require the British commander to become a Chinese subject or change to Chinese clothing. Li conveyed the substance of these and related documents to Gordon, leaving him with no illusions about his position. "The Futai considers the force as his own," Gordon wrote in early May, "under an officer who has entered the Chinese Service and has nothing further to say to the British Authorities for the time that he remains in the Chinese Service." [31]
10 Meanwhile,Li subjected his foreign employees to constant surveillance.The same Qing commanders who sent information and compliments to Gordon also kept a close eye on him.Thus,for example,we find that the Green Standard Colonel Li Hengsong sent independent reports to Li on Gordon's administrative problems and military movements.Other Qing commanders,including Cheng Xueqi of the Anhui Army,did the same.Meanwhile,civil officials such as the Sungjiang prefect,Jia Yiqian, also filed reports on Gordon's activities.[32]Furthermore,Li had the Anhui Army to rely on as a potent means of control.By late 1863 it had grown to about sixty thousand men, and although some were trained by foreign officers,none had any loyalty to them-- except,perhaps to Pennell.Foreigner observers often spoke of the large numbers of "excellent troops"under Li's commanders;and the North-China Herald went so far as to suggest (after the Suzhou Incident)that the Ever-Victorious Army would have"a sorry chance"against Cheng Xueqi's army if the two forces had clashed.Li and his commanders obviously were not anxious for a confrontation,but neither did they fear Gordon's troops.[33] The Legacy of Foreign-Assistance in Military Affairs Throughout the remainder of Li's illustrious career he continued to avail of Western assistance in all realms of self-strengthening.Although a full treatment of this vast topic lies well beyond the reach of this article,a few examples of Li's approach to the employment of foreigners in military affairs after 1864 may indicate some of the ways in which his experiences during the Taiping period conditioned his later outlook and policies. The foreign-training program at Fenghuang shan provided Li with an opportunity to implement his policies of barbarian management without the immediate and profound pressures of the Taiping Rebellion.He was under no illusions about the camp's origins, however;without British pressure,and the persistent urging of Hart,it would never have come into existence.Li knew only too well from his experience with the Ever-Victorious Army that foreign assistance invited foreign interference,and from the very beginning he perceived in Western demands for the expansion of foreign-training programs an attempt to "seize our military authority and squander our financial resources."He was "enraged," therefore,when Consul Harry Parkes demanded that six British officers be appointed to the serve as instructors at Fenghuang shan in the fall of 1864.[34] Li understood,as did Hart and most other foreign observers,that the retention of a force "officered by Englishmen--whether you style them Military instructors or commanding officers"would promote rivalry among the other Western powers.But British officials in the vicinity of Shanghai at the time considered the move justifiable, perhaps even essential,in the light of growing French influence in foreign-training programs.On July 29,1864,for example,Consul Parkes reported to Wade with dismay that there were "probably"more French than British subjects serving the Qing government in a military capacity.This theme of Anglo-French competition,which had emerged prominently in 1862,remained a feature of Western military assistance to the Qing government throughout much of the remainder of the nineteenth century;and ironically,some of Hart's own Customs employees,notably Prosper Giquel and Eugene de Meritens,proved especially active in promoting French interests against the British. [35]
10 Meanwhile, Li subjected his foreign employees to constant surveillance. The same Qing commanders who sent information and compliments to Gordon also kept a close eye on him. Thus, for example, we find that the Green Standard Colonel Li Hengsong sent independent reports to Li on Gordon's administrative problems and military movements. Other Qing commanders, including Cheng Xueqi of the Anhui Army, did the same. Meanwhile, civil officials such as the Sungjiang prefect, Jia Yiqian, also filed reports on Gordon's activities. [32] Furthermore, Li had the Anhui Army to rely on as a potent means of control. By late 1863 it had grown to about sixty thousand men, and although some were trained by foreign officers, none had any loyalty to them-- except, perhaps to Pennell. Foreigner observers often spoke of the large numbers of "excellent troops" under Li's commanders; and the North-China Herald went so far as to suggest (after the Suzhou Incident) that the Ever-Victorious Army would have "a sorry chance" against Cheng Xueqi's army if the two forces had clashed. Li and his commanders obviously were not anxious for a confrontation, but neither did they fear Gordon's troops. [33] The Legacy of Foreign-Assistance in Military Affairs Throughout the remainder of Li's illustrious career he continued to avail of Western assistance in all realms of self-strengthening. Although a full treatment of this vast topic lies well beyond the reach of this article, a few examples of Li's approach to the employment of foreigners in military affairs after 1864 may indicate some of the ways in which his experiences during the Taiping period conditioned his later outlook and policies. The foreign-training program at Fenghuang shan provided Li with an opportunity to implement his policies of barbarian management without the immediate and profound pressures of the Taiping Rebellion. He was under no illusions about the camp's origins, however; without British pressure, and the persistent urging of Hart, it would never have come into existence. Li knew only too well from his experience with the Ever-Victorious Army that foreign assistance invited foreign interference, and from the very beginning he perceived in Western demands for the expansion of foreign-training programs an attempt to "seize our military authority and squander our financial resources." He was "enraged," therefore, when Consul Harry Parkes demanded that six British officers be appointed to the serve as instructors at Fenghuang shan in the fall of 1864. [34] Li understood, as did Hart and most other foreign observers, that the retention of a force "officered by Englishmen--whether you style them Military instructors or commanding officers" would promote rivalry among the other Western powers. But British officials in the vicinity of Shanghai at the time considered the move justifiable, perhaps even essential, in the light of growing French influence in foreign-training programs. On July 29, l864, for example, Consul Parkes reported to Wade with dismay that there were "probably" more French than British subjects serving the Qing government in a military capacity. This theme of Anglo-French competition, which had emerged prominently in 1862, remained a feature of Western military assistance to the Qing government throughout much of the remainder of the nineteenth century; and ironically, some of Hart's own Customs employees, notably Prosper Giquel and Eugene de Meritens, proved especially active in promoting French interests against the British. [35]