《近代中国对外关系史 The History of Modern China's Foreign Relations》课程教学资源（阅读材料）SIR FREDERICK MAZE AND THE CHINESE hIARITIME CUSTOMS, 1937-1941

SIR FREDERICK MAZE AND THE CHINESE MARITIME CUSTOMS,1937-1941 NICHOLAS R.CLIFFORD N JUNE 1,1943 in Chungking,an Even before the Japanese campaign American citizen,L.K.Little,of 1937,Maze's position as inspector- was named acting inspector-gen-general had been a difficult one.The eral of the Chinese Maritime Customs, revolution of 1911 had seen an increase on the retirement of Sir Frederick Maze. of foreign control over the Customs rev- It was,as Maze pointed out,an event enues,and the administration of the "which may be said to close an epoch of Customs became,in the words of a Brit- quasi-British control of,and influence ish foreign office memorandum,"for a in,the Chinese Maritime Customs,"1 for time the paymaster and to some extent until then the inspector-general had been the master of the Chinese Government."2 British,and British citizens had domi-Yet,headed by Sir Francis Aglen,it had nated the important posts of the admin- held together in one piece,remaining istration.Under Maze's uncle,Sir Robert nominally at least under the control of Hart,inspector-general from 1863 until Peking in the years that followed.The 1908,the Customs,although interna-successes of the Nationalists under tional in composition,had been built up Chiang Kai-shek after 1924 had made largely along British lines.Hart left it Aglen's position a difficult one,how- an honest and efficient servant of the ever,and,caught between Peking and Chinese government,a body whose mem-the southern insurgents,he had been bers had a passionate belief in the bene-dismissed on January 31,1927,and Pek- ficial effects of foreign trade and in the ing had appointed A.H.F.Edwardes territorial integrity of China,and who as officiating inspector-general.The col- were opposed to both foreign spheres of lapse of the northern regime and the influence and native Chinese localism.establishment of the National govern- This was the position which his succes-ment in Nanking in 1928 in turn under- sors tried to maintain,in the years of mined Edwardes'position,and the Na- revolution and war which followed tionalists appointed Maze,who had been Hart's retirement. their adviser on Customs matters,as 1 Maze to Sir H.Seymour,May 25,1943,Con. inspector-general,thus ending a potential fidential letters,etc.,of Sir Frederick Maze (here- schism in the service.a after cited as "C.L.),XV (1941-43),434.I am Maze thus found himself as head of indebted to Lady Maze and to the Librarian of the School of Oriental African Studies of the the Customs during a time of political, University of London for permission to use the economic,and diplomatic turmoil.Not Maze papers,which are deposited there;twenty- seven bound volumes cover the years under 2 Great Britain,Foreign Office,Documents on consideration.I am also indebted to,among British foreign policy,1919-1939,ed.Rohan others,Mr.L.K.Little,who was customs com- Butler and J.P.T.Bury,2d ser.,Vol.VIII (Lon- missioner in Canton during these years and who don,1960),No.1. later became inspector-general,for information s Ibid.;Stanley F.Wright,China's struggle for and advice;and to Mr.Hugh M.Bradley,for. tarif autonomy,1843-1938 (Shanghai,1938),p. merly Sir Frederick's staff secretary. 618. 18

SIR FREDERICK MAZE AND THE CHINESE hIARITIME CUSTOMS, 1937-1941 0. N JUNE 1, 1943 in Chungking, an American citizen, L. K. Little, was named acting inspector-gen￾era1 of the Chinese Maritime Customs, on the retirement of Sir Frederick Maze. It was, as Maze pointed out, an event "which may be said to close an epoch of quasi-British control of, and influence in, the Chinese Maritime Customs,"l for until then the inspector-general had been British, and British citizens had domi￾nated the important posts of the admin￾istration. Under Maze's uncle, Sir Robert Hart, inspector-general from 1863 until 1908, the Customs, although interna￾tional in composition, had been built up largely along British lines. Hart left it an honest and efficient servant of the Chinese government, a body whose mem￾bers had a passionate belief in the bene￾ficial effects of foreign trade and in the territorial integrity of China, and who were opposed to both foreign spheres of influence and native Chinese localism. This was the position which his succes￾sors tried to maintain, in the years of revolution and war which followed Hart's retirement. 1 hiaze to Sir H. Seymour, May 25, 1943, Con￾fidential letters, etc.. of Sir Frederick Maze ihere￾after cited as "C.L."), XV (1911-43), 434. 'I am indebted to Lady Maze and to the Librarian of the School of Oriental African Studies of the University of London for permission to use the Maze papers, which are deposited there; twenty￾seven bound volumes cover the years under consideration. I am also indebted to, among others, hlr. L. K. Little, who was customs com￾missioner in Canton during these years and who later became inspector-general, for information and advice; and to Mr. Hugh M. Bradley, for￾merly Sir Frederick's staff secretary. Even before the Japanese campaign of 1937, Maze's position as inspector￾general had been a difficult one. The revolution of 19 1 1 had seen an increase of foreign control over the Customs rev￾enues, and the administration of the Customs became, in the words of a Brit￾ish foreign office memorandum, "for a time the paymaster and to some extent the master of the Chinese G~vernment."~ Yet, headed by Sir Francis Aglen, it had held together in one piece, remaining nominally at least under the control of Peking in the years that followed. The successes of the Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek after 1924 had made Aglen's position a difficult one, how￾ever, and, caught between Peking and the southern insurgents, he had been dismissed on January 31, 1927, and Pek￾ing had appointed A. H. F. Edwardes as ofliciating inspector-general. The col￾lapse of the northern regime and the establishment of the National govern￾ment in Nanking in 1928 in turn under￾mined Edwardes' position, and the Na￾tionalists appointed Maze, who had been their adviser on Customs matters, as inspector-general, thus ending a potential schism in the service.3 Maze thus iound himself as head of the Customs during a time of political, economic, and diplomatic turmoil. Not 2 Great Britain, Foreign Office, Documents on British foreign policy, 1919-1939, ed. Rohan Butler and J. P. T. Bury, 2d ser., Vol. VIII (Lon￾don, 1960), No. 1. 3 Ibid.; Stanley F. Wright, China's struggle for tariff autonomy, 1843-1938 (Shanghai, 1938). p. 618

SIR FREDERICK MAZE AND CHINESE MARITIME CUSTOMS,1937-1941 19 only did he have to deal with the difficul-approached full sovereignty in interna- ties consequent on the loss of Manchuria tional affairs,it became evident that the in 1931-32,but he found himself faced Customs administration would lose its immediately with the problems of serv-international complexion,and that Brit- ing a new government in a China whose ain would lose her predominant position unity was largely nominal,and a gov-therein.Maze realized that he was pre- ernment determined to achieve for China siding over the Customs in a time of the equality in international affairs transition;what neither he nor anyone denied her by the treaties of the nine-else could tell was the speed with which teenth century.A series of treaties,inau-that transition was to be effected,ac- gurated by the United States in 1928,celerated above all by the undeclared had given China tariff autonomy,and war with Japan which broke out at she had taken advantage of this to initi-Lukouchiao on July 7,1937.The story ate new duties on February 1,1929.The of the Customs in the years from 1937 raising of the tariffs (and there were to 1941 is part of the story of foreign further revisions from 1930 to 1934)had interests in China trying to cope with the effect of increasing Customs rev-the situation which was presented by enues;they went from a low of Ch.Japanese expansion running headlong $107,162,163 in 1927 to Ch.$385,002,673 into Chinese nationalism,and it is made in 1931 and,despite the fall in trade particularly interesting by the unique following the Depression and the loss of position which the Customs held in the Manchurian revenues,remained well period before the war became general, above the $300 million mark thereafter.with the entrance of the Western powers. Also,as part of an effort to stimulate The inspector-general was a servant of economic development,the National gov- the Chinese government,and as such was ernment abolished likin (the internal responsible to the ministry of finance in trade tax which had come into wide-Nanking.He was charged with oversee- spread use after the Taiping Rebellion ing what was the main source of Chinese of 1850-64)and various other internal revenue and the service of the loans, duties on January 1,1931.4 both foreign and domestic,which were The rise in Customs revenues helped secured on that revenue.He had to try to shore up China's falling credit abroad,to hold the service together under the and within China it had the effect of central government,in a China which making Maze the trustee of what hadhad to deal with splinter movements become the largest single source of gov-both in the north,where the Japanese ernment revenues since 1928 when the were the moving force in 1935-36,and land tax had been renounced by Nan-in the south,where the movements were king and turned over to the provincial led by a dissident faction of the Kuo- governments.5 At the same time,as China mintang.At the same time he was more than simply a servant of the Chinese Revenue figures from China,Maritime Cus- government,and he considered himself toms,The trade of China (Shanghai [published annually],1926-36);Wright,p.658. to be under international obligations as s For the economic effects of this situation on well.He summarized these aspects of his China as a whole see Douglas S.Paauw,"Chinese national expenditure during the Nanking pe- riod,"Far Eastern quarterly,XII (1952-53),3-26, nation,1928-1937,"Journal of Asian studies,XVI esp.6-7;"The Kuomintang and economic stag- (1956-57),213-20

SIR FREDERICK hlXZE AND CHINESE MARITIME CUSTOIMS, 1937-1941 19 only did he have to deal with the difficul￾ties consequent on the loss of Manchuria in 1931-32, but he found himself faced immediately with the problems of serv￾ing a new government in a China whose unity was largely nominal, and a gov￾ernment determined to achieve for China the equality in international affairs denied her by the treaties of the nine￾teenth century. A series of treaties, inau￾gurated by the United States in 1928, had given China tariff autonomy, and she had taken advantage of this to initi￾ate new duties on February 1, 1929. The raising of the tariffs (and there were further revisions from 1930 to 1934) had the effect of increasing Customs rev￾enues; they went from a low of Ch. $107,162,163 in 1927 to Ch. $385,002,673 in 1931 and, despite the fall in trade following the Depression and the loss of Manchurian revenues, remained well above the $300 million mark thereafter. Also, as part of an effort to stimulate economic development, the National gov￾ernment abolished likin (the internal trade tax which had come into wide￾spread use after the Taiping Rebellion of 1850-64) and various other internal duties on January 1, 1931.4 The rise in Customs revenues helped to shore up China's falling credit abroad, and within China it had the effect of making Maze the trustee of what had become the largest single source of gov￾ernment revenues since 1928 when the land tax had been renounced by Nan￾king and turned over to the provincial governments.5 At the same time, as China 4 Revenue figures from China, Maritime Cus￾toms, The trade of China (Shanghai published annuallvl, 1926-361: ,,. ,. Wright. P. . 658. " 5 For the economic effects of this situation on China as a whole see Douglas S. Paauw, "Chinese national expenditure during the Nanking pe￾riod," Far Eastern quarterly, XI1 (1952-53), 3-26, esp. 6-7; "The Kuomintang and economic stag￾approached full sovereignty in interna￾tional affairs, it became evident that the Customs administration would lose its international complexion, and that Brit￾ain would lose her predominant position therein. Maze realized that he was pre￾siding over the Customs in a time of transition; what neither he nor anyone else could tell was the speed with which that transition was to be effected, ac￾celerated above all by the undeclared war with Japan which broke out at Lukouchiao on July 7, 1937. The story of the Customs in the years from 1937 to 1941 is part of the story of foreign interests in China trying to cope with the situation which was presented by Japanese expansion running headlong into Chinese nationalism, and it is made particularly interesting by the unique position which the Customs held in the period before the war became general, with the entrance of the Western powers. The inspector-general was a servant of the Chinese government, and as such was responsible to the ministry of finance in Nanking. He was charged with oversee￾ing what was the main source of Chinese revenue and the service of the loans, both foreign and domestic, which were secured on that revenue. He had to try to hold the service together under the central government, in a China which had to deal with splinter movements both in the north, where the Japanese were the moving force in 1935-36, and in the south, where the movements were led by a dissident faction of the Kuo￾mintang. At the same time he was more than sim~lv a servant of the Chinese A , government, and he considered himself to be under international obligations as well. He summarized these aspects of his nation, 1928-1937," Journal of Asian studies, XVI (1956-57), 213-20

20 NICHOLAS R.CLIFFORD position in a letter of 1939 to the Dutch could complain that British authorities consul-general in Shanghai. did nothing to raise the inspector-gen- eral's prestige,but instead "have fol- The Inspector-General acts as a sort of un- lowed a policy calculated to weaken and official international trustee for the execution of International interests concerned:(a)the lower it in the eyes of Chinese and for- collection of revenue on Chinese and foreign eigners....Nevertheless as a British trade;(b)the lighting of China's coast,mark- subject I consider it to be my duty to ing and lighting the Estuaries of the leading try to assist within limitations those Treaty ports,and the Yangtse,Pearl(Canton) who may endeavour to maintain British and West Rivers;(c)the administration of control in the Inspectorate,although... the principal Chinese harbours (Tientsin, Shanghai,Canton,etc.);and (d)the manage- I am under no obligation to do so as ment of the Debt Department.... far as British officialdom is concerned."8 It follows that International Trade,Ship-And later,looking back,he commented: ping and Finance is dependent upon the "After Sir John Simon left the F.O., Customs Service for its orderly supervision Tand furthermore]the Customs Service stands Eden,who knew little or nothing about for,and endeavours to secure the continu- the Orient,did,or seemed to do,every- ance of the "Open Door"policy;equality of thing possible to weaken the I.G.'s posi- fiscal treatment;the application of a uniform tion-ably seconded by Sir Alexander tariff;re-payment of foreign debts,and, Cadogan.I maintained my stand in spite finally,it represents the only administrative system in China that is based on Western of the F.O.,not because of its backing!" civil lines.... The consciousness that his position It is well known...that if Japan secures thus had three lines of force acting on control...foreign trading interests in China it-Chinese,international,and British- would be irretrievably jeopardized....Were was enough to keep him from becoming I to quit at the present juncture the Japa- nese Government would in that case secure simply an unreckoning instrument of the stronger (if not complete)control over the central government or of anyone else. Service to the detriment and perhaps ulti- Like Hart,he was an Ulsterman,and mate extinction of all foreign interests.8 had a flair for politics."We Irish absorb politics with our mother's milk,"he once And finally,Maze was a British citizen. told his staff secretary,and his political He held no official British position,and skills were needed during these years.10 despite his frequent private complaints Furthermore,during his earlier service about the shabby treatment which he in south China he had established con- and his staff received from Whitehall,he tacts with the Kuomintang,and his out- remained very much concerned with the look was more sympathetic to the south- maintenance of British influence in the ern leaders than had been those of his service and in China.To W.O.Law he predecessors.Another factor which helped described the inspectorate-general as determine his policy was the vulnerabil- "really a sort of unofficial 'outpost of Empire,'in view of the varied British 8 Maze to J.H.Macoun,Feb.10,1936,C.L., interests centered on the Cusoms."7 He XI(1935-36),221-22. s The notation is handwritten at the bottom e Maze to G.W.Boissevain,Aug.23,1939,In. of Maze's letter to Macoun,Oct.31,1989,In- spector-General's personal correspondence (here- spector-General's personal correspondence,non- after cited as "P.C."),May-Aug.1939. resident secretary (hereafter cited as "NRS"), 7 Maze to W.O.Law,Oct.17,1938,ibid., Sept.-Dec.1939,No.3. July-Dec.1938.See also Maze to Lord Lytton, 10 Mr.Hugh M.Bradley to the author,Sept. Jan.31,1940,bid,Aug.1939-Jan.1940. 4,1963

20 NICHOLAS R. , CLIFFORD position in a letter of 1939 to the Dutch consul-general in Shanghai. The Inspector-General acts as a sort of un￾official international trustee for the execution of International interests concerned: (a) the collection of revenue on Chinese and foreign trade; (b) the lighting of China's coast, mark￾ing and lighting the Estuaries of the leading Treaty ports, and the Yangtse, Pearl (Canton) and West Rivers; (c) the administration of the principal Chinese harbours (Tientsin, Shanghai, Canton, etc.); and (d) the manage￾ment-of the Debt Department. . . . It follows that International Trade, Ship￾ping and Finance is dependent upon the Customs Service for its orderly supervision [and furthermore] the Customs Service stands for, and endeavours to secure the continu￾ance of the "Open Door" policy; equality of fiscal treatment; the application of a uniform tariff; re-payment of foreign debts, and, finally, it represents the only administrative system in China that is based on Western civil lines. . . . It is xvell known . . . that if Japan secures control . . . foreign trading interests in China wotild be irretrievably jeopardized. . . . Were I to quit at the present juncture the Japa￾nese Go~ernment would in that case secure stronger (if not complete) control over the Service to the detriment and perhaps ulti￾mate extinction of all foreign interest^.^ And finally, Maze was a British citizen. He held no official British position, and despite his frequent private complaints about the shabby treatment which he and his staff received from Tl'hitehall, he remained very much concerned with the maintenance of British influence in the service and in China. To W. 0. Law he described the inspectorate-general as "really a sort of unofficial 'outpost of Empire,' in view of the varied British interests centered on the Cu~oms."~ He 6 Maze to G. TV. Boissevain, Aug. 23, 1939, In￾spector-General's personal correspondence (here￾after cited as "P.C."), May-Aug. 1939. 7 RIaze to IV. 0. Law, Oct. 17, 1938, ibid., July-Dec. 1938. See also Maze to Lord Lytton, Jan. 31, 1940, ibid.,Aug. 1939-Jan. 1940. could complain that British authorities did nothing to raise the inspector-gen￾eral's prestige, but instead "have fol￾lowed a policy calculated to weaken and lower it in the eyes of Chinese and for￾eigners. . . . Nevertheless as a British subject I consider it to be my duty to try to assist within limitations those who may endeavour to maintain British control in the Inspectorate, although . . . I am under no obligation to do so as far as British officialdom is concerned."S And later, looking back, he commented: "After Sir John Simon left the F.O., Eden, who knew little or nothing about the Orient, did, or seemed to do, every￾thing possible to weaken the I.G.'s posi￾tion-ably seconded by Sir Alexander Cadogan. I maintained my stand in spite of the F.O., not because of its ba~king!"~ The consciousness that his position thus had three lines of force acting on it-Chinese, international, and British￾was enough to keep him from becoming simply an unreckoning instrument of the central government or of anyone else. Like Hart, he was an Ulsterman, and had a flair for politics. "We Irish absorb politics with our mother's milk," he once told his staff secretary, and his political skills were needed during these years.1° Furthermore, during his earlier service in south China he had established con￾tacts with the Kuomintang, and his out￾look was more sympathetic to the south￾ern leaders than had been those of his predecessors. Another factor which helped determine his policy was the vulnerabil- 8 Maze to J. H. hfacoun, Feb. 10, 1936, C.L., XI (1935-36), 221-22. Q The notation is handwritten at the bottom of hfare's letter to Macoun, Oct. 31, 1939, In￾spector-General's personal correspondence, non￾resident secretary (hereafter cited as "NRS"), Sept.-Dec. 1939, No. 3. lo 11s. Hugh ;\I. Bradley to the author, Sept. 4, 1963

SIR FREDERICK MAZE AND CHINESE MARITIME CUSTOMS,1937-1941 21 ity of his position;the inspectorate was occupied areas of China,where power located in Shanghai,and after the city lay with the Japanese and their collab- was occupied by the Japanese and the orators.By the end of January 1938 government had retreated up the river every important port north of Hangchow from Nanking,first to Hankow and then Bay had fallen,and,despite some diver- to Chungking,he had to depend upon sion of trade to the south,most of the his own skill and that of his commis-revenues were collected in the occupied sioners in dealing with the Japanese and ports.At first Nanking wanted to evacu- their puppets,helped by whatever sup-ate the northern Customs houses and port he could get from the three "in-open new ones in unoccupied territory, terested Powers,"Britain,America,and but Maze successfully argued against that France. on the ground that it would simply ease He had four chief problems.First and Japan's economic control of the area.12 always uppermost in his mind was the This meant that the Customs,while re- maintenance of the integrity of the serv-maining officially under the orders of ice,keeping it a single unit at least nomi-Minister of Finance H.H.Kung,would nally under his own and the central have to come to some sort of arrange- government's control.In 1932 the Man-ment with the de facto authorities in the churian Customs had broken away (un-occupied regions,and it also raised ques- necessarily,he thought),and in 1935 tions about the disposition of Customs and 1936 a split had again been threat-revenues and the control of Customs ened by the establishment of Japanese-personnel.Maze was convinced that com- sponsored regimes in the northern prov-promise on what he regarded as nones- inces.Second,there was the maintenance sentials was necessary to preserve the of Customs functions:preventive work unity of the service,and he had to argue against smuggling,and the collection and his case against both the Chinese and disposition of the revenues.Here,too,Japanese,while trying to win the support the problem was one which had existed of the neutrals for his position.13 before 1937,with Japanese interference At the end of August 1937 the Japa- in the north and in the Formosa Straits,nese consul-general in Tientsin ap- but again it was aggravated by the war proached W.R.Myers,the British com- after 1937.11 Third,he had to preserve missioner of customs,with a set of the service's international aspect and pre- demands for that city and for Chin- vent the Japanese from taking it over by wangtao.They were chiefly concerned placing their nationals in the key posi-with ensuring that the revenues were not tions.And,finally,there was the broader 12 Maze to Loy Chang,Sept.3,1937,P.C., problem of the place of the Customs in Mar.-Dec.1937:J.W.Ting to Maze,Sept.15, the Chinese war effort. 1937,ibid.,Sept.-Dec.1937. These problems raised the question 13 Sec,for general statements of his position, the letters of Maze to Boissevain and Lord Lyt- of the Customs'role in the undeclared ton (cited in nn.6 and 7,respectively);Maze to war,and above all of their status in the Sir A.Clark Kerr,Mar.4,1938,Inspector Gen- eral's personal correspondence,British embassy 11 Maze to Macoun,Nov.14,1935,C.L.,XI,(hereafter cited as "Br.Emb."),Vol.I,No.54; 126;"Precis of certain confidential correspond- same to G.Miskin,Mar.3,1938,P.C.,Jan.- ence,”May10,1936,ibid.,XIⅡ(1936,03-8： June 1938:same to H.H.Kung,Feb.19,1938, Maze to L.A.Lyall,May 28,1936,ibid.,XII, Br.Emb.,Vol.I,No.47;same to Clark Kerr,Oct. 155-57;Maze to P.E.Naggiar,June 20,1936,25,1938,enclosing a letter to the commissioners bd.,XII,276-81. of southern ports,Br.Emb.,Vol.II.No.238

SIR FREDERICK MAZE AND CHINESE MARITIME CUSTOhZS, 1937-1941 21 ity of his position; the inspectorate was located in Shanghai, and after the city was occupied by the Japanese and the government had retreated up the river from Nanking, first to Hankow and then to Chungking, he had to depend upon his own skill and that of his commis￾sioners in dealing with the Japanese and their puppets, helped by whatever sup￾port he could get from the three "in￾terested Powers," Britain, America, and France. He had four chief problems. First and always uppermost in his mind was the maintenance of the integrity of the serv￾ice, keeping it a single unit at least nomi￾nally under his own and the central government's control. In 1932 the Man￾churian Customs had broken away (un￾necessarily, he thought), and in 1935 and 1936 a split had again been threat￾ened by the establishment of Japanese￾sponsored regimes in the northern prov￾inces. Second, there was the maintenance of Customs functions: preventive work against smuggling, and the collection and disposition of the revenues. Here, too, the problem was one which had existed before 1937, with Japanese interference in the north and in the Formosa Straits, but again it was aggravated by the war after 1937.11 Third, he had to preserve the service's international aspect and pre￾vent the Japanese from taking it over by placing their nationals in the key posi￾there was the broader problem of the place of the Customs in the Chinese war effort. These problems raised the question of the Customs' role in the undeclared war, and above all of their status in the 11 Maze to Macoun, Nov. 14, 1935, C.L., XI, 126; "Precis of certain confidential correspond￾ence," May 10, 1936, ibid., XI1 (1936), 103-8; Maze to L. A. Lyall, May 28, 1936, ibid., XII, 155-5;; hfaze to P. E. Naggiar, June 20, 1936, ibid., SII, 276-81. occupied areas of China, where power lay with the Japanese and their collab￾orators. By the end of January 1938 every important port north of Hangchow Bay had fallen, and, despite some diver￾sion of trade to the south, most of the revenues were collected in the occupied ports. At first Nanking wanted to evacu￾ate the northern Customs houses and open new ones in unoccupied territory, but Maze successfully argued against that on the ground that it would simply ease Japan's economic control of the area.12 This meant that the Customs, while re￾maining officially under the orders of Minister of Finance H. H. Kung, would have to come to some sort of arrange￾ment with the de facto authorities in the occupied regions, and it also raised ques￾tions about the disposition of Customs revenues and the control of Customs personnel. Maze was convinced that com￾promise on what he regarded as nones￾sentials was necessary to preserve the unity of the service, and he had to argue his case agains't both the Chinese and Japanese, while trying to win the support of the neutrals for his position.13 At the end of August 1937 the Japa￾nese consul-general in Tientsin ap￾proached IV. R. Myers, the British com￾missioner of customs, with a set of demands for that city and for Chin￾wangtao. They were chiefly concerned with ensuring that the revenues were not 12 Maze to Lay Chang, Sept. 3, 1937, P.C., ,?.far.-~ec. 1937; J. IV. Ting to Maze, Sept. 15, 1937, ibid., Sept.-Dcc. 1937. 13 See, for general statements of his position, the letters of Maze to Boisscvain and Lord Lyt￾ton (cited in nn. G and 7, respectively); Maze to Sir A. Clark Kerr, Mar. 4, 1938, Inspector Gen￾eral's personal correspondence, British embassy (hereafter cited as "Br.Emb."), Vol. I, No. 54; same to C. Xiiskin, Mar. 3, 1938, P.C., Jan.- June 1938: same to H. H. Kung, Feb. 19, 1938, Br.Emb., Vol. I, No. 47; same to Clark Kerr, Oct. 25, 1938, cnclosing a letter to the commissioners of southern ports, Br.Emb., Vol. 11. No. 238

22 NICHOLAS R.CLIFFORD "improperly administered"-that is,used Myers had exceeded his instructions,and, to help the Chinese-and proposed to while he wrote the commissioner on De- that end that,after deductions had been cember 20 that "your general attitude is made for local administrative expenses approved,"he sent his personal secre- and for the quotas for foreign loans and tary,K.E.Jordan,to the north at the indemnities due from the two ports,the end of the year,ostensibly on routine surplus should be deposited in an"accep- business,but chiefly to investigate the table bank"(the Yokohama Specie Bank)situation in Tientsin.Myers explained rather than in the Central Bank of that he had acted in the best interests China.14 Nanking vacillated,trying to of the service,and that the Japanese de- postpone the issue,despite British,Amer- mands had grown stiffer until they had ican,and French recommendations that demanded the cessation of remittances to Myers be allowed to come to terms,but Shanghai:"To save the situation I delay stiffened the Japanese position,agreed;but I knew if I put this before and,when in mid-October the Chinese you in black and white hell would be let had evolved what was to them a suitable loose.So I kept a diplomatic silence and compromise,it was too late.15 Myers,trusted to time and an opportunity to feeling himself under heavy pressure,was let you know how things stood."18 Maze forced to give in,and agreed to bank accepted this-there was no choice-but the revenues in the Yokohama bank.privately he felt that Myers had acted Furthermore,while his right to remit to with "precipitate haste"in dropping the the inspectorate the local quotas for Chinese requirements,and had given in foreign loans and indemnities was rec-to the Japanese demands"with what may ognized,he gave the Japanese a promise appear to be undue complacency and in writing that this right would not be celerity."19 The telegram embodying the exercised "pending settlement of ques- Chinese compromise of October had been tions arising out of local hostilities."He somewhat ambiguously worded,and,al- explained to Maze that this would mean though this enabled Myers's actions to be only "a certain amount of unavoidable explained both to the central govern- delay"and said that if his arrangement ment and to the Americans as a misun- were repudiated,the customs houses derstanding,in fact there seems to have would be seized and the service wrecked.16 been but little misunderstanding.20 The inspector-general,however,felt that Maze characterized the Tientsin set- tlement as "unsatisfactory,unilateral, 14 W.R.Myers to Maze,Aug.30,P.C..Sept.- and entirely in favour of Japan,"when Dec.1937;United States,Department of State, Foreign relations of the United States:diplomatic he first heard of it,and it created an papers (hereafter cited as "FRUS"),1937,III unfortunate precedent,seriously weak- (Washington,D.C.,1954).858-59. ening the whole position of the Cus- 15"Japanese demands regarding the Tientsin and Chinwangtao customs,"Sept.9,1937;Ting to Maze,Sept.9,1937;draft memorandum,Sept. 14,1987;and Maze to Myers,Oct.13 and 19, 17 Maze to Myers,Dec.20,1937,P.C.,Mar.-Dec. 1937,enclosed in Maze to L.H.Lawford,Nov. 1937. 30,1987,P.C,Mar.-Dec.1937;FRUS,1937,IIL, 1s Myers to Maze,Dec.29,1937,ibid.,Sept.- 859-60,863-64,873-74. Dec.1937. 16 Myers to Japanese consul-general,Tientsin, 19 Maze to E.I.Hall-Patch,Feb.19,1938, Oct.22,1937 (extract);and same to Maze,Oct. Br.Emb.,Vol.I,No.45;FRUS,1938,III,663-64. 29,1937,P.C,Sept.-Dec.1937;FRUS,1937,IIL, 20 Hall-Patch to J.H.Cubbon,Feb.11,1938, 877-78:FRUS,1938,III.654-55. Br.Emb.,Vol.I,No.45

22 ATICHOLAS R. CLIFFORD "improperly administered3'-that is, used to help the Chinese-and proposed to that end that, after deductions had been made for local administrative expenses and for the quotas for foreign loans and indemnities due from the two ports, the surplus should be deposited in an "accep￾table bank" (the Yokohama Specie Bank) rather than in the Central Bank of China.lWanking vacillated, trying to postpone the issue, despite British, Amer￾ican, and French recommendations that Myers be allo~ved to come to terms, but delay stiffened the Japanese position, and, when in mid-October the Chinese had evolved what was to them a suitable compromise, it was too late.l5 Myers, feeling himself under heavy pressure, was forced to give in, and agreed to bank the revenues in the Yokohama bank. Furthermore, while his right to remit to the inspectorate the local quotas for foreign loans and indemnities was rec￾ognized, he gave the Japanese a promise in writing that this right would not be exercised "pending settlement of ques￾tions arising out of local hostilities." He explained to Maze that this would mean only "a certain amount of unavoidable delay" and said that if his arrangement were repudiated, the customs houses would be seized and the service wrecked.16 The inspector-general, however, felt that 14TV. R. Myers to Maze, Au~. 30, P.C., Sept.- Dec. 1937; TJnited States, Department of State, Foreiqn relatfons of the LTnited Slates: diplonialzc papers (hereafter cited as "FRUS"), 1937, I11 (XVashington, D. C., 1934), 858-59. 15 "Japanese demands regarding the Tientsin and Chinwangtao customs," Sept. 9, 1937; Ting to Ma7e, Sept. 9, 1937; draft memorandum, Sept. 14, 1937; and Maze to Myers, Oct. 13 and i9, 1937, enclosed in Maze to L. H. Lawford, Nov. 30, 1937, P.C., Mar.-Dec. 1937; FRUS, 1937, 111, 839-60, 863-64,873-74. 16 hf.rers to Japanese consul-general, Tientsin, Oct. 22, 1937 (extract); and same to Maze, Oct. 29, 1937, P.C., Sept.-Dec. 1937; FRUS, 1937, 111, 877-78; FRUS, 1938, 111, 634-55. Myers had exceeded his instructions, and, while he wrote the commissioner on De￾cember 20 that "your general attitude is approved,"l7 he sent his personal secre￾tary, K. E. Jordan, to the north at the end of the year, ostensibly on routine business, but chiefly to investigate the situation in Tientsin. Myers explained that he had acted in the best interests of the service, and that the Japanese de￾mands had grown stiffer until they had demanded the cessation of remittances to Shanghai: "To save the situation I agreed; but I knew if I put this before you in black and white hell would be let loose. So I kept a diplomatic silence and trusted to time and an opportunity to let you know how things stood."18 Maze accepted this-there was no choice-but privately he felt that hfyers had acted with "precipitate haste" in dropping the Chinese requirements, and had given in to the Japanese demands "with what may appear to be undue complacency and celerity."lQ The telegram embodying the Chinese compromise of October had been somewhat ambiguously worded, and, al￾though this enabled Myers's actions to be explained both to the central govern￾ment and to the Americans as a misun￾derstanding, in fact there seems to have been but little mis~nderstanding.~O hlaze characterized the Tientsin set￾tlement as "unsatisfactory, unilateral, and entirely in favour of Japan," when he first heard of it, and it created an unfortunate precedent, seriously weak￾ening the whole position of the Cus- 17 Maze to Myers, Dec. 20, 1937, P.C., &far.-Dec. 1937. 18 Myers to Maze, Dec. 29, 1937, ibid., Sept.- Dec. 1937. lo &faze to E. I. Hall-Patch, Feb. 19, 1938, Br.Emb., Vol. I, No. 45; FRC'S, 1938, 111, 66344. 20 Hall-Patch to J. H. Cubbon, Feb. 11, 1938, Br.Emb., Vol. I, No. 43

SIR FREDERICK MAZE AND CHINESE MARITIME CUSTOMS,1937-1941 23 toms.21 This became apparent when in papers and the American diplomatic late November L.H.Lawford,the correspondence,and need not be re- Shanghai commissioner,opened talks viewed here.From the beginning it was with the Japanese on the future of the apparent that Japan would try to extend Customs in that city.The problem there the Tientsin settlement to the rest of was essentially the same as it had been China,and,furthermore,the Japanese in Tientsin:to keep the Japanese from officials in Shanghai made it clear that seizing the revenues,and to try to en-they would tolerate no interference from sure that they would be used for the third parties.This,however,was an out- servicing at least of China's foreign debts look which the civil government in and indemnities.Yet Shanghai was the Tokyo did not share,and Foreign Min- most important port in China,and from ister Hirota promised that full considera- the beginning it was clear that what tion would be given to foreign interests. happened there would affect the whole An Anglo-French-American demarche in position of the Customs in occupied the Japanese capital on November 28-29, territory.Already the situation was com-1937-"parallel"rather than "joint,"in plicated by a number of new factors.In order not to offend American sensibili- the first place,the Japanese controlled ties-had some effect in easing the pres- not only the Chinese city,but the north-sure on Maze and Lawford to come to a ern and eastern regions of the Interna-quick local settlement.E.I.Hall-Patch, tional Settlement as well,excluding for the British embassy's financial adviser, the most part the authority both of the and Clarence E.Gauss,the American Customs and of the Shanghai municipal consul-general,were instructed to handle council from an area where 90 per cent the negotiations for their countries in of the settlement's developed water front-Shanghai,as was the French ambassador age lay.Second,in September Maze had,for his.23 By mid-January 1938,however, at Kung's orders,started to withhold it was apparent that there was little hope from Japan her monthly instalments of of a settlement as long as the talks con- the Boxer Indemnity,placing them in a tinued in Shanghai.The Japanese con- special account in the British Hongkong sul-general,still hoping to solve the and Shanghai Bank.And finally,in early problems bilaterally with Lawford,was October,when the Bank of China with-disinclined to listen to outsiders,24 and, drew from Shanghai,he had arranged as was frequently true in these years,it for the deposit of all Customs revenues, became obvious that the embassy and save those of Tientsin and Chinwangtao,consular authorities,under the influence in the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank,a of the military,were taking a more ag- move to which no publicity was given.22 gressive line than was the foreign office The long and tedious course of the in Tokyo.On January 20 Lawford was Customs negotiations which took place in Shanghai and Tokyo from November 23 Lawford to Maze,Nov.29,Dec.1,1937,P.C.. Mar.-Dec.1937;Sir Robert Craigie to foreign 1937 until May 1938 may be traced office,Nov.27 and 28,1937,Br.Emb.,I,No.0; through the pages both of the Maze FRUS,1937,II1,881-84,886-87.889-90:United States,Department of State,Foreign relations 21 Maze to Hall-Patch,Nov.1,1937,same to of the United States:Japan,1931-1941 (Wash- Macoun,Dec.7,1937,and same to Lawford, ington,D.C,1943),I,730. Dec.28,1937,P.C,Mar.-Dec.1937. 24"A short report on the situation of the 22 Maze to the Yokohama Specie Bank,Sept. Chinese Maritime Customs in September 1940," 29,1937,bd.,FRUS,1937,IL,901. C.L.,XIV,381

SIR rREDLRrCK RI.ZZE AND CHINE:SE hlARITIME CUSTORIS, 1937-1941 23 toms.21 This became apparent when in late November L. H. Lawford, the Shanghai commissioner, opened talks with the Japanese on the future of the Customs in that city. The problem there was essentially the same as it had been in Tientsin: to keep the Japanese from sei7ing the revenues, and to try to en￾sure that they would be used for the servicing at least of China's foreign debts and indemnities. Yet Shanghai was the most important port in China, and from the beginning it was clear that what happened there would affect the whole position of the Customs in occupied territory. Already the situation was com￾plicated by a number of new factors. In the first place, the Japanese controlled not only the Chinese city, but the north￾ern and eastern regions of the Interna￾tional Settlement as well, excluding for the most part the authority both of the Customs and of the Shanghai municipal council from an area where 90 per cent of the settlement's developed water front￾age lay. Second, in September Maze had, at Kung's orders, started to withhold from Japan her monthly instalments of the Boxer Indemnity, placing them in a special account in the British Hongkong and Shanghai Bank. And finally, in early October, when the Bank of China with￾drew from Shanghai, he had arranged for the deposit of all Customs revenues, save those of Tientsin and Chinwangtao, in the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, a papers and the American diplomatic correspondence, and need not be re￾viewed here. From the beginning it was apparent that Japan would try to extend the Tientsin settlement to the rest of China, and, furthermore, the Japanese officials in Shanghai made it clear that they would tolerate no interference from third parties. This, however, was an out￾look which the civil government in Tokyo did not share, and Foreign Min￾ister Hirota promised that full considera￾tion would be given to foreign interests. An Anglo-French-American de'marche in the Japanese capital on November 28-29, 1937-"parallel" rather than "joint," in order not to offend American sensibili￾ties-had some effect in easing the pres￾sure on Maze and Lawford to come to a quick local settlement. E. I. Hall-Patch, the British embassy's financial adviser, and Clarence E. Gauss, the American consul-general, were instructed to handle the negotiations for their countries in Shanghai, as was the French ambassador for his.23 By mid-January 1938, however, it was apparent that there was little hope of a settlement as long as the talks con￾tinued in Shanghai. The Japanese con￾sul-general, still hoping to solve the problems bilaterally with Lawford, was disinclined to listen to outsiders,*4 and, as was frequently true in these years, it became obvious that the embassy and consular authorities, under the influence of the military, were taking a more ag￾move to which no publicity was gi~en.2~ gressive line than was the foreign office The long and tedious course of the Customs negotiations which took place in Shanghai and Tokyo from November 1937 until May 1938 may be traced through the pages both of the Maze 21 Maze to Hall-Patch, Nov. 1, 1937, same to hlaconn, Dec. 7, 1937, and same to Lawford, Dec. 28, 1937, P.C., Mar.-Dec. 1937. 22 Maze to the Yokohama Specie Bank, Sept. 29, 1937, ibid.; FRUS, 1937, 111, 901. in Tokyo. On January 20 Lawford was 23 Lawford to &raze, Nov. 29, Dec. 1, 1937, P.C., Afar.-Dec. 1937; Sir Robert Craigie to foreign office, Nov. 27 and 28, 1937, Br.Emb., I, No. 0: FRUS, 1937, 111, 881-84, 886-87, 889-90; United States, Department of State, Foreign relations of the United States: Japan, 1931-1941 (Wash￾ington, D. C., 1943), I, 730. 24"A short report on the situation of the Chinese Maritime Customs in September 1940," C.L., XIV, 381

24 NICHOLAS R.CLIFFORD handed a new set of proposals,providing the British refused to comment on for the deposit of the revenues in the a "hypothetical"situation,although Yokohama Specie Bank in his name,and Charge R.G.Howe did transmit Lon for the payment of loan quotas and of don's promise of support,"provided you Customs costs.Maze was apparently keep us informed and are guided by our ready to accept these at least as a basis advice."27 For Maze the situation was for discussion,but the British embassy more than hypothetical;it embodied the now balked.They wanted the revenues whole question of what his relationship placed in the Hongkong and Shanghai to the puppets should be,and the possi Bank,they argued that loan quotas bility of the establishment of a separate should be determined by all the inter-Customs for occupied China continued ested powers and not simply by the Japa-to haunt him until Pearl Harbor. nese and Customs authorities (as the For the moment,however,nothing Japanese wanted),and,furthermore,they came of the threat.In early February still hoped that the service of internal 1938 Maze met Kung in Hongkong and loans might be provided for.25 once more talked him out of withdraw The situation was further complicated ing the Customs service from the oc. by the establishment,on December 14,cupied areas,while securing the minis 1937,of the Japanese-sponsored Peking ter's tacit agreement to Maze's retaining Provisional Government for the north,a working contact with the Japanese- under Wang Keh-min.This body an-a policy which,the inspector-general nounced a series of tariff reductions on later commented,"excited mixed com- January 21,1938,and,not surprisingly,ments and adverse reaction"in the Chi. Japan was the chief beneficiary.Ameri-nese capital.2s Otherwise,however,Kung can and British protests had no effect,refused to give him much freedom of and Maze wanted to neutralize the ac-action,refused to introduce the 1931 tion by recommending to Kung that tariff,continued his opposition to de- China lower her own rates from the high posit in the Yokohama Specie Bank,and 1934 level then in force to the lower refused to authorize payment of the tariff of 1931,to prevent a diversion of Boxer Indemnity arrears to Japan.2 trade to the north.26 Nor was this all Kung himself was torn in two directions; Maze had to worry about from Peking.he was at once a member of a govern. On January 8 he wrote the British,ment understandably more concerned French,and American representatives in with the prosecution of the war than Shanghai that Wang might "appoint"with the claims of foreign bondholders, him inspector-general,and,when he re-and yet he recognized the validity of fused,would "dismiss"him and put Maze to Naggiar,Jan.8,1938,Br.Emb.,VoL someone more pliant in his place.The I,No.4:R.G.Howe to Maze,Jan.19,1938 United States did not reply,the French bid,No.5;FRUS,1938,IⅡ，627-28,632-33 Rightly or wrongly it was rumored that Myers gave a general assurance of support,and might be offered the post (FRUS,1937,III,906- 8),and there was a strong hint of this in K.E. 25 Ibid.,pp.381-82;Lawford to Maze,Jan.20, Jordan's long report of his trip to the north 1938,P.C.,May-Oct.1939;minute of interview (Jordan to Maze,Dec.31,1937-Jan.5,1938. by Hall-Patch,Feb.1,1938,P.C.,Jan.-June 1938; P.C.,Jan.-June 1938). FR/S,1938,IL,632-33.635-36. 2s"The 'China Incident'to 'Pearl Harbour, 26 R.G.Howe to Maze,Jan.28,1938,Br.Emb., 1937-1941,”C.L,XV,180-81. Vol.I,No.11;Maze to Kung,Jan.25,1938, 29 Kung to Maze,Feb.10,1938,Br.Emb.,Vol. ibid.,No.8;FRUS,1938,III,634-40. I,N0.86a

24 NICHOLAS R. CLIFFORD handed a new set of proposals, providing for the deposit of the revenues in the Yokohama Specie Bank in his name, and for the payment of loan quotas and of Customs costs. Maze was apparently ready to accept these at least as a basis for discussioi~, but the British embassy now balked. They wanted the revenues placed in the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, they argued that loan quotas should be determined by all the inter￾ested powers and not siniply by the Japa￾nese and Customs authorities (as the Japanese wanted), and, furthermore, they still hoped that the service of internal loans might be provided for.25 The situation was further complicated by the establishment, on December 14, 1937, of the Japanese-sponsored Peking Provisional Government for the north, under lj'ang Keh-min. This body an￾nounced a series of tariff reductions on January 21, 1938, and, not surprisingly, Japan was the chief beneficiary. Ameri￾can and British protests had no effect, and Maze wanted to neutralize the ac￾tion by recommending to Kung that China lower her own rates from the high 1931 level then in force to the lower tariff of 1931, to prevent a diversion of trade to the north." Nor was this all hlaze had to worry about from Peking. On January 8 he wrote the British, French, and American representatives in Shanghai that TZ'ang might "appoint" him inspector-general, and, when he re￾fuwd, would "dismiss" him and put someone Inore pliant in his place. The Unitetl States did not reply, the French ga\e a general assurance of support, and ?:, Iljiil., pp. 381-82; Lawford to Maze, Jan. 20, 1938, P.C., Jfay-Oct. 1939; minute of interview bv Hall-Patch. Feb. 1, 1938, P.C., Jan.-June 1938; FIi177, 1938. 111, 632-33, 635-36. 2C R,G. EIowe to Maze, Jan. 28, 1938, Br.Emb., Yol. I, So. 11; 3Iaze to Kung, Jan. 25, 1938, ibid., No. 8; FKCrS, 1938, 111, 634-40. the British refused to comment or a "hypothetical" situation, althougl￾ChargC R. G. Howe did transmit Lon don's promise of support, "provided you keep us informed and are guided by OUT advice."27 For Maze the situation wa: more than hypothetical; it embodied the whole question of what his relations hi^ to the puppets should be, and the possi. bility of the establishment of a separate Customs for occupied China continued to haunt him until Pearl Harbor. For the moment, however, nothing came of the threat. In early February 1938 Maze met Icung in Hongkong and once more talked him out of withdraw. ing- the Customs service from the oc￾cupied areas, while securing the minis￾ter's tacit agreement to Raze's retaining a working contact with the Japanese￾a policy which, the inspector-general later commented, "excited mixed com￾ments and adverse reaction" in the Chi￾nese capital.'s Otherwise, however, Kung refused to give him much freedom 01 action, refused to introduce the 1931 tariff, contintled his opposition to de￾pcsit in the Yokohama Specie Bank, and refused to authorize payment of the Boxer Indemnity arrears to Kung himself was torn in two directions; he was at once a member of a govern￾ment understandably more concerned with the prosecution of the war than with the claims of foreign bondholders, and yet he recognized the validity of 27 3Iaze to Kaggiar, Jan. 8, 1938, Br.Emb., Vol. I, KO. 4; I<. G. Howe to hIazc, Jan. 19, 1938 ibiii., So. 5; FKU.9, 1938, 111, 627-28, 632-39 Rightly or wrongly it was rumored that hfyer! might be offered the post (FIIC'S, 1937, 111, 906- 8), and there was a strong hint of this in K. E. Jordan's long report of his trip to the north (Jordan to JIa7e, Dec. 31, 1937-Jan. 5, 1935 P.C., Jan.-Jur~e 1938). 23"Thc 'Chitla Incident' to 'Pearl Harbour, 1937-1941," C.L., XV, 180-81. 23 Knng to hlaze, Feb. 10, 1938, Br.Emb., Vol. I, No. 3Ga

SIR FREDERICK MAZE AND CHINESE MARITIME CUSTOMS,1937-1941 25 Maze's arguments for the necessity of that a split was developing on the Cus- compromise to keep the Customs ad-toms question between Britain and ministration unified.So now,as later,America.In December Washington had he was obliged to issue instructions come to feel that rather than work for a which firmly rejected any compromise,specific plan (as Britain wanted)which while in fact he looked the other way as would then have to be urged on an un- a modus vivendi was reached which willing China,the Western powers would allow the Customs to function should instead press for assurances from under the Japanese.Thus when the Tokyo safeguarding both the revenues British urged him to accept the 1931 and the administration of the Customs. tariff,he answered:"The Chinese Gov-If these were obtained,the question of ernment considers it better that these the bank of deposit-so important to Japanese acts of violence appear as such Britain-would no longer be critical. rather than that they be accomplished Thus,when on February 9,the British with Chinese Customs officials acting in presented Washington with a proposal effect as a tool and with some degree of for international control of the revenues, regularity."3o And when in late February the state department answered that they he told Maze to instruct the commis-could not support it,but would do noth- sioners in the occupied ports to try to ing to prejudice the British position. prevent the introduction of the new Without active American support,the tariff,to seek release of the revenues,British were unwilling to act in concert and not to place them in a Japanese with the French alone,and in late Feb- bank,Maze privately told the British ruary,when Craigie was given a new ambassador,Sir Archibald Clark Kerr,plan to present,he asked Ambassador that the instructions were so moderately Arsene-Henry not to support him,since phrased that they would cause no this would only emphasize the American trouble.3i In practice Kung was generally failure to do so.33 ready to follow Maze's arguments for This latter set of proposals signaled flexibility "to maintain our position in the end of the effort to put the revenues the enemy's camp,"32 but obviously he in the British bank,34 and now the dis- could not spell this out explicitly. cussions moved more rapidly.By the end After the British refused the Japa-of March a basic plan had been worked nese proposals of January 20,1938,the out,but it took another month to put talks moved to Tokyo.Here they lost it in final form,despite Craigie's warn- most of their international aspect,evolv-ing that speed was necessary.The am- ing into bilateral negotiations between bassador had originially envisaged an the foreign office and the British ambas-agreement between Maze and the Japa- sador,Sir Robert Craigie.Since Lukou-nese consulate-general,but the inspector- chiao,Britain had emerged as the chief general refused this,35 and what eventu- spokesman of foreign interests in China,ally emerged was a draft agreement in and by now it was becoming apparent Tokyo,accompanied by an exchange of 30 Kung to D.Mackillop,Feb.24,1938,P.C., letters between Craigie and Vice-Minister Tan.-June 1938. 31 Clark Kerr to Maze,Mar.2,1938,and Maze 33FRUS,1937,II1,898-903;ibid.,1938,III, to Clark Kerr,Mar.4,1938,Br.Emb.,Vol.1.626,655-56,662. No.54. 34Ibid.,1938,IIL,661-63. 32 Maze to Kung,Feb.19,1938,ibid.,No.47. 35Ibid,pp.671-74,676,678-81

SIR FKEDERICK h1tZZE AND CHINESE hlARITIME CUSTOMS, 1937-1941 25 Maze's arguments for the necessity of compromise to keep the Customs ad￾ministration unified. So now, as later, he was obliged to issue instructions which firmly rejected any compromise, while in fact he looked the other way as a modzrs uiuendi was reached which would allow the Customs to function under the Japanese. Thus when the Biitish urged him to accept the 1931 tariff, he answered: "The Chinese Gov￾ernment considers it better that these Japanese acts of violence appear as such rather than that they be accomplished with Chinese Customs officials acting in effect as a tool and with some degree of reg~larity."~~ And when in late February he told Maze to instruct the commis￾sioners in the occupied ports to try to prevent the introduction of the new tariff, to seek release of the revenues, and not to place them in a Japanese bank, hlaze privately told the British ambassador, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, that the instructions were so moderately phrased that they would cause no troubIe.31 In practice Kung was generally ready to follow Maze's arguments for flexibility "to maintain our position in the enemy's camp,"32 but obviously he could not spell this out explicitly. After the British refused the Japa￾nese proposals of January 20, 1938, the talks moved to Tokyo. Here they lost most of their international aspect, evolv￾ing into bilateral negotiations between the foreign office and the British ambas￾sador, Sir Robert Craigie. Since Lukou￾chiao, Britain had emerged as the chief spokesman of foreign interests in China, and by now it was becoming apparent 3oKung to D. hlacKillop, Fcb. 24, 1938, P.C., Jan.-June 1938. 31 Clark Kerr to RIaze, Mar. 2, 1938, and RIazc to Clark Kerr, Mar. 4, 1938, Br.Emb., X'ol. 1. hTo.54. 32 Maze to Kung, Feb. 19, 1938, ibid., No. 47. that a split was developing on the Cus￾toms question between Britain and America. In December TVashington had come to feel that rather than work for a specific plan (as Britain wanted) which would then have to be urged on an un￾willing China, the TVestern powers should instead press for assurances from Tokyo safegi~nrding both the revenues and the administration of the Customs. If these were obtained, the question of the bank of deposit-so important to Britain-would no longer be critical. Thus, when on February 9, the British presented TVashington with a proposal for international control of the revenues, the state department answered that they could not support it, but ~vould do noth￾ing to prejudice the British position. Tt'ithout active American support, the British were unwilling to act in concert with the French alone, and in late Feb￾ruary, when Craigie was given a new plan to present, he asked Ambassador Arskne-Henry not to support him, since this would only emphasize the American failure to do so.33 This latter set of proposals signaled the end of the effort to put the revenues in the British bank,34 and now the dis￾cussions moved more rapidly. By the end of hfarch a basic plan had been worked out, but it took another month to put it in final form, despite Craigie's warn￾ing that speed was necessary. The am￾bassador had originially envisaged an agreement between Maze and the Japa￾nese consulate-general, but the inspector￾general refused this,3j and what eventu￾ally emerged was a draft agreement in Tokyo, accompanied by an exchange of letters between Craigie and Vice-Minister 33 FRUS, 1937, 111, 898-903; ibid., 1938, 111, 626, 655-56, 662. 31. Ibid., 1938, 111, 661-63. 35 Ibid., pp. 671-54, 656, 658-81

26 NICHOLAS R.CLIFFORD Horinouchi Kensuke.Maze played no for all China.37 London nevertheless felt official role in the proceedings,and in-it was the best arrangement possible,and deed there is remarkably little in his now sought the approval of the other papers on the subject. powers.Paris agreed,but Washington re- The agreement of late April made the mained silent,awaiting China's reaction; following provisions.All revenues from through a mistake,however,the com- occupied China would be deposited in munique announcing the agreement on the Yokohama Specie Bank in the names May 3 stated that America had "no ob- of the commissioners.From these rev-jection."Craigie apologized to Joseph C. enues foreign-loan quotas would be re-Grew,the American ambassador,but the mitted to the inspector-general's account damage was done,despite Cordell Hull's in the Shanghai branch of the bank for statement later that day trying to correct full service on foreign loans and indem-the impression thus given to the world.3s nities.These services would be treated Meanwhile China balked,and in a note as a first charge on the revenues,after of May 6 to London reserved her rights deducting the administrative expenses of and her freedom of action.39 the Customs,including those of the in- Whatever its disadvantages,the agree- spectorate-general.Quotas for each port ment would have provided for the con- would be determined monthly by the tributions by the occupied ports of their Japanese and the inspectorate-general.shares of the foreign-loan service.Not The arrears of the Boxer Indemnity and only would this have kept China's credit future quotas on this and other debts strong,as the British were never tired owed to Japan would be paid to her.of repeating,but it would have kept The balances held in the Hongkong and most of the revenues out of the Yoko- Shanghai Bank of the revenues collected hama Specie Bank,where they remained from the occupied ports during hostili-a perpetual temptation to the Japanese ties would be transferred to the Yoko-and their puppets,and where in fact hama Specie Bank.Finally,there was an they could be used for loans to the pup exchange of letters whereby Tokyo gave pets and for the purchase of the foreign assurances that the quotas from north-exchange which Japan needed so badly.40 ern ports would be paid in Chinese na-And it is at least arguable that from a tional currency36-a point of some im-strictly financial point of view China portance since a new currency issued by would have fared somewhat better than the Federal Reserve Bank of the Wang Japan.Maze,who strongly favored the regime had been introduced in the north. A number of the assurances which 37 For the original British desiderata see ibid., Craigie had originally sought were lack- Pp.661-63. ing.Nothing was said of the return of 38Ibid,pP.684-86,688-89.692-95;North Customs vessels seized by Japan;noth- China Herald (Shanghai,weckly).May 11,1938, p.218.Washington was also concerned about ing was said of the exercise of Customs what it considered to be the too-facile agreement authority over Japanese non-military im- by Craigie that China should provide the for- ports;and nothing was said of Japanese eign exchange cover for the remittances from occupied ports (FRUS,1938,III,689-90,699-700, co-operation in reaching a uniform tariff 705-7,709-10;Arthur N.Young,China and the helping hand,1937-1945 [Cambridge,Mass., 1963],P.94). se Ibid.,pp.678-81;sce also pp.683-84,692- 39FRUS,1938,ITI,7045. 9 40 See FRUS,1939,IIL,402-3

26 NICHOLAS R. CLIFFORD Horinouchi Kensuke. Male played no official role in the proceedings, and in￾deed there is remarkably little in his papers on the subject. The agreement of late April made the following provisions. All revenues from occupied China would be deposited in the Yokohama Specie Bank in the names of the commissioners. From these rev￾enues foreign-loan quotas would be re￾mitted to the inspector-general's account in the Shanghai branch of tbe bank for full service on foreign loans and indem￾nities. These services would be treated as a first charge on the revenues, after deducting the administrative expenses of the Customs, including those of the in￾spectorate-general. Quotas for each port would be determined monthly by the Japanese and the inspectorate-general. The arrears of the Boxer Indemnity and future quotas on this and other debts owed to Japan would be paid to her. The balances held in the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank of the revenues collected from the occupied ports during hostili￾ties wo~~lcl be transferred to the Yoko￾hama Specie Bank. Finally, there was an exchange of letters whereby Tokyo gave assurances that the quotas from north￾ern ports would be paid in Chinese na￾tional c~rrency3~--a point of some im￾portance since a new currency issued by the Federal Reserve Bank of the SVang regime had been introduced in the north. A number of the assurances which Craigie had originally sought were lack￾ing. Nothing was said of the return of Customs vessels seized by Japan; noth￾ing was said of the exercise of Customs authority over Japanese non-military im￾ports; and nothing was said of Japanese co-operation in reaching a uniform tariff 30 Ibid., pp. 655-81; see also pp. 683-84, 692- 94. for all China.37 London nevertheless felt it was the best arrangement possible, and now sought the approval of the other powers. Paris agreed, but Washington re￾mained silent, awaiting China's reaction; through a mistake, however, the com￾munique announcing the agreement on May 3 stated that America had "no ob￾jection." Craigie apologized to Joseph C. Grew, the American ambassador, but the damage was done, despite Cordell Hull's statement later that day trying to correct the impression thus given to the ~orld.~8 Meanwhile China balked, and in a note of May 6 to London reserved her rights and her freedom of action.39 Whatever its disadvantages, the agree￾ment would have provided for the con￾tributions by the occupied ports of their shares of the foreign-loan service. Not only would this have kept China's credit strong, as the British were never tired of repeating, but it would have kept most of the revenues out of the Yoko￾hama Specie Bank, where they remained a perpetual temptation to the Japanese and their puppets, and where in fact they could be used for loans to the pup￾pets and for the purchase of the foreign exchange which Japan needed so badly.40 And it is at least arguable that from a strictly financial point of view China would have fared somewhat better than Japan. Maze, who strongly favored the 37 For the original British desiderata see ibid., pp. 661-63. 38 lbid., pp. 684-86, 688-89, 692-95; North China Herald (Shanghai, weekly), Alay 11, 1938, p. 218. TVashington was also concerned about what it considered to be the too-facile agreement by craigic that China should provide the for- eign exchange cover for the remittances from occupied ports (FRUS, 1938, 111, 689-90, 699-500, 705-7, 709-10; Arthur N. Young, China and the helping Izand, 1937-1945 [Cambridge, Mass., 19631, p. 94). 39 FRL'S, 1938, 111, 7045. 40 See FRUS, 1939, 111, 402-3

SIR FREDERICK MAZE AND CHINESE MARITIME CUSTOMS,1937-1941 27 agreement,later pointed out that by the gain,and it is worth remembering that end of May 1939 Japan's releases would it happened only three weeks after Nev- have exceeded her receipts by some Ch.ille Chamberlain had recognized the $46,400,000.41 Italian conquest of Abyssinia in return From a practical standpoint the agree-for an uncertain promise that Italian ment might have helped China,but the troops would leave Spain. trouble was that its framers seem to have Despite all the British pressure and looked only at the practical aspects of Maze's arguments,the Chinese refused the agreement,missing almost entirely its to release the Boxer Indemnity arrears, political and emotional ramifications.To or to permit the transfer of the surpluses a world unfamiliar with the workings of in the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, the Customs,it looked as if Britain had and the agreement consequently never handed over their control to the Japa-went into effect.Nor was an alternative nese,and it is possible to understand British proposal of late May any more Kung's protestation that he would be successful.Kung would allow the in- "shot as a traitor"if he tried to carry spector-general to try to find a way out out the agreement.42 Nor could anything only through "purely banking transac- disguise the fact,as the Chinese pointed tions,"but he vetoed even this when he out,that this was the first time since the discovered it would still mean paying the Washington Conference that two coun-Boxer arrears to Japan.45 One payment tries had reached an important decision alone was made under the terms of the on China without consulting her.43 And agreement and this was for the liquida- the mishandling of the publicity served tion of the quotas on a Japanese loan, to emphasize the rift between Britain and for the time being an overdraft on and America on Asian policy.Craigie's the Central Bank made it possible for view was that Britain had done the dirty China to meet her obligations,including, work,in part for America's benefit,and it appears,the current Japanese portions America now threatened to sabotage the of the Boxer Indemnity.46 Meanwhile in agreement by refusing to give a non- Shanghai Maze authorized Lawford to objection.44 To the world it appeared deposit current revenues in the Yoko- that Britain had struck a doubtful bar- hama Specie Bank but refused to transfer the balances from the Hongkong and 41"Customs revenues:foreign loan and indem- ity charges thereon,"June 12,1939,P.C.,May- Shanghai Bank without Chinese author- Oct.1939.See also Maze to Kung,Sept.12,1938, ization.This proved to be the basis for Br.Emb.,Vol.III,No.214.The opposing view Customs financial administration in oc- was expressed by a Chinese memorandum of July 7,1938,given by Kung to Clark Kerr (P.C., cupied territory henceforth,and despite July-Dec.1938). efforts on both sides to make changes 42 Clark Kerr to Maze,June 18,1938,Br.Emb., Vol.II,No.158;and see the comment of the American ambassador in Hankow,FRUS,1938, 45 British embassy,Shanghai,to British for- III,682-83.The Chinese viewpoint,both politi- eign office,May 23,1938,and British embassy, cal and financial,is discussed in Young,pp.Tokyo,to same,May 24,1938,Br.Emb.,Vol.II 92-96. No.128;Clark Kerr to Maze,June 18,1938,ibid., 43 North China Herald,May 11,1938,p.218.No.158;Maze to Naggiar and Clarence E.Gauss, 44 On Anglo-American differences in this pe- June 27,1938,and Kung to Maze,June 25,1938, riod see Nicholas R.Clifford,"Britain,America ibid.,No.166;Young,p.92. and the Far East,1937-1940:a failure in co- 4e Maze to Clark Kerr,July 15,1938,Br.Emb.. operation,"Journal of British studies,III (Nov. Vol.II,No.153;same to same,July 30,1938, 1963).137-54. ibid.,No.191;FRUS,1938,IIL,728-29

- - SIR FREDERICK XIAZE AND CHINE agreement, later pointed out that by the end of May 1939 Japan's releases would have exceeded her receipts by some Ch. $46,400,000.41 From a practical standpoint the agree￾ment might have helped China, but the trouble was that its framers seem to have looked only at the practical aspects of the agreement, missing almost entirely its political and emotional ramifications. To a world unfamiliar with the workings of the Customs, it looked as if Britain had handed over their control to the Tapa￾nese, and it is possible to understand Kung's protestation that he would be "shot as a traitor" if he tried to carry out the agreement.42 Nor could anything disguise the fact, as the Chinese pointed out, that this was the first time since the Washington Conference that two coun￾tries had reached an important decision on China without consulting her.43 And the mishandling of the publicity served to emphasize the rift between Britain and America on Asian policy. Craigie's view was that Britain had done the dirty work, in part for America's benefit, and America now threatened to sabotage the agreement by refusing to give a non- 0bjection.~4 To the world it appeared that Britain had struck a doubtful bar- 41 "Customs revenues: foreign loan and indem￾ity charges thereon," June 12, 1939, P.C., hfay￾Oct. 1939. See also Maze to Kung, Sept. 12, 1938, Br.Emb., Vol. 111, No. 214. The opposing view was expressed by a Chinese memorandum of July 7, 1938, given by Kung to Clark Kerr (P.C., July-Dec. 1938). 42 Clark Kerr to Rfaze, June 18, 1938, Br.Emb., Vol. 11, No. 158; and see the comment of the American ambassador in I-Iankow, FRUS, 1938, 111, 682-83. The Chinese viewpoint, both politi￾cal and financial, is discussed in Young, pp. 92-96. 4s North CJtina Herald, hiay 11, 1938, p. 218. 44 On Anglo-American differences in this pe￾riod see Nicholas R. Clifford, "Britain, America and the Far East, 1937-1940: a failure in co￾operation," Jotunal of British studies, I11 (Nov. 1963), 137-54. gain, and it is worth remembering that it happened only three weeks after Nev￾ille Chamberlain had recognized the Italian conquest of Abyssinia in return for an uncertain promise that It a 1' Ian troops would leave Spain. Despite all the British pressure and Maze's arguments, the Chinese refused to release the Boxer Indemnity arrears, or to permit the transfer of the surpluses in the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, and the agreement consequently never went into effect. Nor was an alternative British proposal of late May any more successful. Kung would allow the in￾spector-general to try to find a way out only through "purely banking transac￾tions," but he vetoed even this when he discovered it would still mean paying the Boxer arrears to Japan.45 One payment alone was made under the terms of the agreement ancl this was for the liquida￾tion of the quotas on a Japanese loan, and for the time being an overdraft on the Central Bank made it possible for China to meet her obligations, including, it appears, the current Japanese portions of the Boxer Indemnity.46 Meanwhile in Shanghai Maze authorized Lawford to deposit current revenues in the Yoko￾hama Specie Bank but refused to transfer the balances from the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank without Chinese author￾ization. This proved to be the basis for Customs financial administration in oc￾cupied territory henceforth, and despite efforts on both sides to make changes 45 Briti~h embassy, Shan~hai, to British for￾eign office, hiay 23, 1938, and British embassy, Tokyo, to same, hfay 24, 1938, Br.Emb., Vol. 11, No. 128; Clark Kerr to Maze, June 18, 1938, ibid., No. 158; Maze to Naggiar and Clarence E. Gauss, June 2i, 1938, and Kung to Maze, June 25, 1938, ibid., No. 166; Young, p. 92. 46 hfaze to Claih Kerr, July 15, 1938, Rr.Em11.. Vol. 11, 153; same to same, July 30, 1938, ibid., No. 191; FRUS, 1938, 111, 728-29