Modern Asian Studies 37,4(200),Pp.775-797.003 Cambridge University Press DOI:10.1017/S0026749X03004025 Printed in the United Kingdom Breaking the Bonds of Precedent:The 1905-6 Government Reform Commission and the Remaking of the Qing Central State RICHARD S.HOROWITZ California State University,Northridge On January 29,1901,in the grim aftermath of the Boxer Uprising and the humiliating foreign invasion of north China that followed, the Empress Dowager Cixi issued a famous edict that initiated the New Policy (xinzheng)reforms. The weakness of China is caused by the strength of convention and the rigid network of regulations.We have many mediocre officials but few men of talent and courage.The regulations are used by mediocre men as the means of their self-protection,and taken advantage of by government clerks as sources of profit.The government officials exchange numerous docu- ments but they never touch reality.The appointment of capable men is restricted by regulations so rigid that even men of exceptional talent are missed.What misleads the country can be expressed in one word, selfishness,and what suffocates all under heaven is precedent. In the years that followed there were remarkable reforms in many aspects of Qing government.Among the most important and politic- ally sensitive were reforms to the central government structure and its administrative apparatus. In 1905 and 1906 a Government Reform Commission of leading officials was sent abroad in two groups to Europe,the United States and Japan to facilitate quickly the choosing the best elements [of foreign government institutions]and emulating them'.?On Nov- ember 6,1906,after extensive deliberations on the reports and recommendations of the commission members,an edict dramatically I have slightly modified the translation in Chuzo Ichiko,Political and Institu- tional Reform 1901-11'in John K.Fairbank and Kwang-ching Liu (eds),Cambridge History of China,volume 11,part 2 (Cambridge:Cambridge U.P.,1980),375.For the original text see Qing shi lu,Guangxu chao (Taipei,reprint n.d.),476:9.A full translation is in Douglas Reynolds,China:1898-1912:The Xinzheng Revolution and Japan (Cambridge MA:Council on East Asian Studies,1993),201-4. 2 Edict issued by the Grand Council,GX31.6.14 in Qingmo choubei lixian dang'an shiliao (Beijing:Zhonghua Shuju,1979)[hereafter QCLDS]vol.1,1. 0026-749X/03/7.50+$0.10 775
Modern Asian Studies 37, 4 (2003), PP. 775-797. ? 2003 Cambridge University Press DOI:10.1017/S0026749X03004025 Printed in the United Kingdom Breaking the Bonds of Precedent: The 90o5-6 Government Reform Commission and the Remaking of the Qing Central State RICHARD S. HOROWITZ California State University, Northridge On January 29, 19ol01, in the grim aftermath of the Boxer Uprising and the humiliating foreign invasion of north China that followed, the Empress Dowager Cixi issued a famous edict that initiated the New Policy (xinzheng) reforms. The weakness of China is caused by the strength of convention and the rigid network of regulations. We have many mediocre officials but few men of talent and courage. The regulations are used by mediocre men as the means of their self-protection, and taken advantage of by government clerks as sources of profit. The government officials exchange numerous documents but they never touch reality. The appointment of capable men is restricted by regulations so rigid that even men of exceptional talent are missed. What misleads the country can be expressed in one word, selfishness, and what suffocates all under heaven is precedent.' In the years that followed there were remarkable reforms in many aspects of Qing government. Among the most important and politically sensitive were reforms to the central government structure and its administrative apparatus. In 1905 and 19o6 a Government Reform Commission of leading officials was sent abroad in two groups to Europe, the United States and Japan to facilitate 'quickly the choosing the best elements [of foreign government institutions] and emulating them'.2 On November 6, 1906, after extensive deliberations on the reports and recommendations of the commission members, an edict dramatically I have slightly modified the translation in Chuzo Ichiko, 'Political and Institutional Reform 1901-11' in John K. Fairbank and Kwang-ching Liu (eds), Cambridge History of China, volume 11, part 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1980), 375. For the original text see Qing shi lu, Guangxu chao (Taipei, reprint n.d.), 476:9. A full translation is in Douglas Reynolds, China: 1898-gi92: The Xinzheng Revolution and Japan (Cambridge MA: Council on East Asian Studies, 1993), 201-4- 2 Edict issued by the Grand Council, GX31.6.14 in Qingmo choubei lixian dang'an shiliao (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1979) [hereafter QCLDS] vol. 1, 1. 00oo26-749X/03/$7.50+$o.1o 775
776 RICHARD S.HOROWITZ transformed the appearance of the central government.The Six Boards which had formed the central government's main operational ministries were changed beyond recognition-old offices were com- bined and in a few places dissolved,and new offices created.The executive structure of the ministries was reorganized to eliminate the old executive councils made up of two presidents and four vice presidents and create a single responsible executive at the top.The goal was to define the responsibilities of central government agencies more clearly and create a more effective system of leadership. While the Commission and the 1906 reforms have received some scholarly attention,both have been seen as steps towards another goal:the establishment of a constitutional monarchy.3 This is short- sighted,for the 1906 reforms marked an epochal shift in Chinese public administration:a departure from the late Imperial system that had governed China in the Ming and Qing periods,and the acceptance of a European-style ministerial system.Where the effort to create constitutional monarchy proved fleeting,the move to a min- isterial system has endured. This paper examines the effort to transform the upper echelon of the central government.It looks at the 19o6 reforms in relation to efforts to articulate criticisms and proposals for reforms going back to the 186os,and reflects on how both external pressures and an emergent Qing critique of the old system led to the reforms. The Qing Bureaucratic Monarchy and Ministerial Government To understand the significance of the New Policy reforms to govern- ment institutions,we must first consider how the Qing system around 1goo differed from its European and American counterparts. By the mid to late nineteenth century,European states(and those deeply influenced by them like Japan and the United States)had developed elaborate,specialized systems of administration.In each of these states,the central administration was divided into function- 3 Norbert Maienberger,The Emergence of Constitutional Government in China(1905- 1908):The Concept Sanctioned by the Empress Dowager Tz'u-hsi (Bern:Peter Lang,1980), 51-66;E-tu Zen Sun,The Chinese Constitutional Missions of 1905-6,Journal of Modern History 24:3 (1952):252-69;William L.Tung,The Political Institutions of China (The Hague:Martinus Nijhoff,1964),ch.1.This approach goes back to Harold Vinacke,Modern Constitutional Development in China(Princeton:Princeton Uni- versity Press,1920),51-66
776 RICHARD S. HOROWITZ transformed the appearance of the central government. The Six Boards which had formed the central government's main operational ministries were changed beyond recognition--old offices were combined and in a few places dissolved, and new offices created. The executive structure of the ministries was reorganized to eliminate the old executive councils made up of two presidents and four vice presidents and create a single responsible executive at the top. The goal was to define the responsibilities of central government agencies more clearly and create a more effective system of leadership. While the Commission and the 1906 reforms have received some scholarly attention, both have been seen as steps towards another goal: the establishment of a constitutional monarchy.3 This is shortsighted, for the 19o6 reforms marked an epochal shift in Chinese public administration: a departure from the late Imperial system that had governed China in the Ming and Qing periods, and the acceptance of a European-style ministerial system. Where the effort to create constitutional monarchy proved fleeting, the move to a ministerial system has endured. This paper examines the effort to transform the upper echelon of the central government. It looks at the 19o6 reforms in relation to efforts to articulate criticisms and proposals for reforms going back to the 186os, and reflects on how both external pressures and an emergent Qing critique of the old system led to the reforms. The Qing Bureaucratic Monarchy and Ministerial Government To understand the significance of the New Policy reforms to government institutions, we must first consider how the Qing system around 1900oo differed from its European and American counterparts. By the mid to late nineteenth century, European states (and those deeply influenced by them like Japan and the United States) had developed elaborate, specialized systems of administration. In each of these states, the central administration was divided into function- 3 Norbert Maienberger, The Emergence of Constitutional Government in China (9go5- 90o8): The Concept Sanctioned by the Empress Dowager Tz'u-hsi (Bern: Peter Lang, 198o), 51-66; E-tu Zen Sun, 'The Chinese Constitutional Missions of 1905-6,'Journal of Modern Histor, 24:3 (1952): 252-69; William L. Tung, The Political Institutions of China (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), ch. 1. This approach goes back to Harold Vinacke, Modern Constitutional Development in China (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1920), 51-66
BREAKING THE BONDS OF PRECEDENT 777 ally defined departments headed by high officials referred to as min- isters.Ministers were expected to manage their departments and advise the chief executive on appropriate policies and legislation. The minister would have ultimate responsibility for success or failure in his particular area.Taken together,the ministers in charge of major state departments formed a cabinet or state council which in theory,if not always in practice,was a senior advisory body to the chief executive.While the relationships between the cabinet and both the sovereigns and national assemblies varied dramatically,this ministerial system had emerged as a common architecture of modern centralized states-and indeed it remains so to the present day.5 By contrast,the Qing bureaucratic monarchy,while at first sight quite similar to the ministerial system,was fundamentally different in its operations.5 The Qing dynasty ruled a vast and complex multi- ethnic empire.The government operated through an elaborate bu- reaucracy centered in Beijing,and the central government selected officials (primarily through the civil service exam system)and dis- patched them to serve in provincial and local positions across the empire.The system was impressive:in Beijing stood a host of central government offices,notably the Six Boards(the Board of Civil Office, The Board of Finance,the Board of Rites,the Board of War,the Board of Punishments,the Board of Public Works)the primary administrative organizations in the central government.The Cen- sorate served as a watchdog to investigate official malfeasance.Two organizations,the Grand Secretariat and the Grand Council,pro- 4 I have used the neutral term ministerial government rather than the term cabinet government which carries the connotations of Walter Bagehot's famous work,The English Constitution and is inevitably associated with the parliamentary system.The American federal government,in which the president is elected,and hires (with the approval of the senate)and fires his subordinates in the executive branch (who cannot be members of Congress),is not a system of cabinet govern- ment in the sense discussed by Bagehot.It is,by my much looser definition,a species of ministerial government. 5 The origins of this system and the reasons for its popularity are beyond the scope of this work.But by the turn of the century leading political thinkers took for granted the existence of the ministerial system,for example Frank J.Goodnow, Politics and Administration:A Study in Government (New York:Macmillan,1goo);J.K. Bluntschli,The Theor of the State,Second Edition (Oxford:Clarendon Press,1892). 6 The idea of the Qing state as a bureaucratic monarchy is developed in Philip A.Kuhn,Soulstealers:the Chinese Sorcery Scare of 1768(Cambridge:Harvard Univer- sity Press,1990),ch.9.For a still useful overview of the Qing government see Pao Chao Hsich,The Government of China (1644-1611)(Baltimore:Johns Hopkins Uni- versity Press,1925)
BREAKING THE BONDS OF PRECEDENT 777 ally defined departments headed by high officials referred to as ministers. Ministers were expected to manage their departments and advise the chief executive on appropriate policies and legislation. The minister would have ultimate responsibility for success or failure in his particular area. Taken together, the ministers in charge of major state departments formed a cabinet or state council which in theory, if not always in practice, was a senior advisory body to the chief executive.4 While the relationships between the cabinet and both the sovereigns and national assemblies varied dramatically, this ministerial system had emerged as a common architecture of modern centralized states-and indeed it remains so to the present day.5 By contrast, the Qing bureaucratic monarchy, while at first sight quite similar to the ministerial system, was fundamentally different in its operations.6 The Qing dynasty ruled a vast and complex multiethnic empire. The government operated through an elaborate bureaucracy centered in Beijing, and the central government selected officials (primarily through the civil service exam system) and dispatched them to serve in provincial and local positions across the empire. The system was impressive: in Beijing stood a host of central government offices, notably the Six Boards (the Board of Civil Office, The Board of Finance, the Board of Rites, the Board of War, the Board of Punishments, the Board of Public Works) the primary administrative organizations in the central government. The Censorate served as a watchdog to investigate official malfeasance. Two organizations, the Grand Secretariat and the Grand Council, pro- 4 I have used the neutral term ministerial government rather than the term cabinet government which carries the connotations of Walter Bagehot's famous work, The English Constitution and is inevitably associated with the parliamentary system. The American federal government, in which the president is elected, and hires (with the approval of the senate) and fires his subordinates in the executive branch (who cannot be members of Congress), is not a system of cabinet government in the sense discussed by Bagehot. It is, by my much looser definition, a species of ministerial government. 5 The origins of this system and the reasons for its popularity are beyond the scope of this work. But by the turn of the century leading political thinkers took for granted the existence of the ministerial system, for example Frank J. Goodnow, Politics and Administration: AStudy in Government (New York: Macmillan, 1900); J. K. Bluntschli, The Theory of the State, Second Edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1892). 6 The idea of the Qing state as a bureaucratic monarchy is developed in Philip A. Kuhn, Soulstealers: the Chinese Sorcery Scare of 1768 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), ch.9. For a still useful overview of the Qing government see Pao Chao Hsieh, The Government of China (1644-1611) (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1925)
778 RICHARD S.HOROWITZ cessed the paperwork,advised the emperor and received from him public and confidential decrees.In the provinces a hierarchy of offices stretched from provincial Governors-General and Governors to local- level county magistrates. To foreign observers this seemed quite familiar.The Six Boards looked like the central government ministries and the Grand Council (often translated as 'Council of State')-most of whose members concurrently served in at least one of the Six Boards-seemed like a cabinet.?But a closer inspection suggests that in significant ways the Qing system was different from the ministerial model.First,the nature of the responsibilities of the Six Boards is indicative of a different focus from Western contemporaries.For example,the prominent place given to the appointment of civil officials and orchestration of state ritual (which did not receive similar attention elsewhere)showed a distinctively Confucian agenda underlying the structure of the central state.3 At the same time the lack of a depart- ment of foreign affairs suggests that before the Opium war,state-to- state diplomatic relations were not nearly as important as they were in Europe.It was only in 1861 after the Second Opium War that the Qing created a specialized office,the Zongli Yamen,to deal with relations with Western powers.Second,within their areas of activity, the Qing Six Boards had limited powers.They could not,for example,issue orders directly to provincial-level officials,or equiva- lent-level central government organs.To implement their decisions they needed either voluntary cooperation on the part of other offi- cials or an imperial edict to force the issue.Third,there was no clear distinction between central,provincial and even local state functions. 7 See for example S.Wells Williams'classic nineteenth-century treatise The Middle Kingdom:A Survey of the Geography,Government,Literature,Social Life,Arts,and History of the Chinese Empire and its Inhabitants,Revised Edition (New York:Paragon Reprints,1966),vol.1,415-20.In the introduction to his 1877 handbook on Chinese administrative structure and terminology,W.F.Mayers stated that his goal was to make clear the differences between Chinese and Western institutions and philosophies of government 'to correct the too sanguine views which have been entertained of a speedy entrance of the Chinese,as a government and people,upon the path of European progress.'See W.F.Mayers,The Chinese Government,Third Edition (Shanghai:Kelly and Walsh,1897),iv.For a sophisticated analysis of the Grand Council based on remarkable archival research see Beatrice S.Bartlett,Mon- archs and Ministers:The Grand Council in Mid-Ch'ing China,1723-1820 (Berkeley and Los Angeles:University of California Press,1991). #Here I draw on R.Bin Wong's suggestive terminology,see China Transformed: Historical Change and the Limits of European Experience (Ithaca:Cornell University Press, 1997)
778 RICHARD S. HOROWITZ cessed the paperwork, advised the emperor and received from him public and confidential decrees. In the provinces a hierarchy of offices stretched from provincial Governors-General and Governors to locallevel county magistrates. To foreign observers this seemed quite familiar. The Six Boards looked like the central government ministries and the Grand Council (often translated as 'Council of State')-most of whose members concurrently served in at least one of the Six Boards-seemed like a cabinet.' But a closer inspection suggests that in significant ways the Qing system was different from the ministerial model. First, the nature of the responsibilities of the Six Boards is indicative of a different focus from Western contemporaries. For example, the prominent place given to the appointment of civil officials and orchestration of state ritual (which did not receive similar attention elsewhere) showed a distinctively Confucian agenda underlying the structure of the central state.8 At the same time the lack of a department of foreign affairs suggests that before the Opium war, state-tostate diplomatic relations were not nearly as important as they were in Europe. It was only in 1861 after the Second Opium War that the Qing created a specialized office, the Zongli Yamen, to deal with relations with Western powers. Second, within their areas of activity, the Qing Six Boards had limited powers. They could not, for example, issue orders directly to provincial-level officials, or equivalent-level central government organs. To implement their decisions they needed either voluntary cooperation on the part of other officials or an imperial edict to force the issue. Third, there was no clear distinction between central, provincial and even local state functions. 7 See for example S. Wells Williams' classic nineteenth-century treatise The Middle Kingdom: A Survey of the Geography, Government, Literature, Social Life, Arts, and History of the Chinese Empire and its Inhabitants, Revised Edition (New York: Paragon Reprints, 1966), vol. 1, 415-20. In the introduction to his 1877 handbook on Chinese administrative structure and terminology, W. F. Mayers stated that his goal was to make clear the differences between Chinese and Western institutions and philosophies of government 'to correct the too sanguine views which have been entertained of a speedy entrance of the Chinese, as a government and people, upon the path of European progress.' See W. F. Mayers, The Chinese Government, Third Edition (Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh, 1897), iv. For a sophisticated analysis of the Grand Council based on remarkable archival research see Beatrice S. Bartlett, Monarchs and Ministers: The Grand Council in Mid-Ch'ing China, I723-1820 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991). 8 Here I draw on R. Bin Wong's suggestive terminology, see China Transformed: Historical Change and the Limits ofEuropean Experience (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997)
BREAKING THE BONDS OF PRECEDENT 779 Provincial and local officials often dealt with what Westerners per- ceived as central government roles such as defense,foreign policy, etc.Provincial Governors-General and Governors,who reported dir- ectly to the throne,were free to offer their own opinions and policy recommendation on these matters.So in a given area of government activity,say finance,the key central government ministry,the Board of Finance,was only one of several key voices. A final difference,of particular relevance in this study,concerned the upper management of the central government ministries,which was strikingly different from European contemporaries.Instead of a single responsible minister,there was an executive committee of six senior officials,half Chinese and half Manchu who jointly decided ministry policies and jointly issued reports to the throne.These men usually concurrently held positions in other departments,a few served in Grand Council or Grand Secretariat,and Manchus usually had some appointment within the Manchu banner system.This system had very serious consequences.No single minister was responsible for either the actions of his board,or the conduct of government in its area of activity.Moreover,it was common for senior officials to have to go from one office to another in the course of a day to fulfill his official duties,limiting the attention he could give to one task.10 Overall,the system was designed to limit individual officials from accumulating too much power,and in theory,to maximize the capa- city of the Throne to intercede.But in reality,swamped by the sheer volume of paper,emperors became profoundly dependent on the Grand Council.The Qing bureaucratic monarchy was very stable, but not nimble.Even small reforms were difficult to implement with- out a consensus of officials involved.Introducing systemic reforms required an extraordinarily broad consensus of officials,or the strong hand of a reforming emperor. As the Qing state faced growing pressure both internally and externally,advocates of reform found that they faced an uphill 9 Richard S.Horowitz,'Central Power and State Making:The Zongli Yamen and Self-Strengthening in China,1860-1880',Ph.D.Dissertation,Harvard Univer- sity1998,114-30. io For example,former U.S.diplomat Chester Holcombe recounts the schedule of an unnamed senior official (almost certainly Wenxiang),working from 3 am to 6 pm while simultaneously serving on the Grand Council,the Grand Secretariat, President of the Ministry of War,and playing the leading role in the Zongli Yamen, The Real Chinaman (New York:Dodd and Mead,1895),93-7. 1 Bartlett,269-78
BREAKING THE BONDS OF PRECEDENT 779 Provincial and local officials often dealt with what Westerners perceived as central government roles such as defense, foreign policy, etc. Provincial Governors-General and Governors, who reported directly to the throne, were free to offer their own opinions and policy recommendation on these matters. So in a given area of government activity, say finance, the key central government ministry, the Board of Finance, was only one of several key voices.9 A final difference, of particular relevance in this study, concerned the upper management of the central government ministries, which was strikingly different from European contemporaries. Instead of a single responsible minister, there was an executive committee of six senior officials, half Chinese and half Manchu who jointly decided ministry policies and jointly issued reports to the throne. These men usually concurrently held positions in other departments, a few served in Grand Council or Grand Secretariat, and Manchus usually had some appointment within the Manchu banner system. This system had very serious consequences. No single minister was responsible for either the actions of his board, or the conduct of government in its area of activity. Moreover, it was common for senior officials to have to go from one office to another in the course of a day to fulfill his official duties, limiting the attention he could give to one task.'0 Overall, the system was designed to limit individual officials from accumulating too much power, and in theory, to maximize the capacity of the Throne to intercede. But in reality, swamped by the sheer volume of paper, emperors became profoundly dependent on the Grand Council." The Qing bureaucratic monarchy was very stable, but not nimble. Even small reforms were difficult to implement without a consensus of officials involved. Introducing systemic reforms required an extraordinarily broad consensus of officials, or the strong hand of a reforming emperor. As the Qing state faced growing pressure both internally and externally, advocates of reform found that they faced an uphill 9 Richard S. Horowitz, 'Central Power and State Making: The Zongli Yamen and Self-Strengthening in China, 186o-188o', Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University 1998, 114-30. 0o For example, former U.S. diplomat Chester Holcombe recounts the schedule of an unnamed senior official (almost certainly Wenxiang), working from 3 am to 6 pm while simultaneously serving on the Grand Council, the Grand Secretariat, President of the Ministry of War, and playing the leading role in the Zongli Yamen, The Real Chinaman (New York: Dodd and Mead, 1895), 93-7. " Bartlett, 269-78
78o RICHARD S.HOROWITZ struggle.Conservative officials took advantage of the diffusion of power to slow efforts at reform-and officials in the central govern- ment in Beijing faced particular difficulties in introducing and imple- menting reforms in the face of a vacillating court,and the number and power of conservative officials in the capital.After 1875,leader- ship in the self-strengthening process clearly shifted to the provincial officials.2 The one effort at reform from the throne,the Hundred Days reforms in 1898,fell apart in the face of entrenched opposition both at court and within the bureaucracy. Critics of the System before 1901 It is not surprising therefore,that long before the Xinzheng reforms began,Qing officials and outside observers began to articulate con- cerns about the functioning of the Qing system and the inability of the central government to act effectively.As early as 1866,the Zongli Yamen circulated to senior officials Customs Inspector Gen- eral Robert Hart's Bystander's Memorandum.'Hart sharply criti- cized the functioning of many aspects of the Qing state,but he par- ticularly noted that even the most reputable of central government officials were burdened with too many roles,and lacked the time to give proper attention to their responsibilities,and allowing subordin- ate officials to arrogate power for themselves-and act for selfish purposes rather than the public good.13 The fact that the Yamen, which could have buried (or heavily edited)the memorandum chose to circulate it,suggests that they saw some merit in these criticisms. Less than a decade later,concerned by the growing threats from the outside,the Zongli Yamen and especially its dying leader Wenxi- ang framed a series of memorials pressing for accelerated reforms. In a memorial that initiated the famous 1874-75 defense policy debate the Zongli Yamen leadership noted the problems it faced in pressing for urgently needed defense reforms,and keeping them going over the long haul.Those of one mind have been few and those with divergent arguments many.Because those at the center have been obtuse,and those outside have been unable to know the whole situation.The government therefore fails to solve its problems 12 Horowitz,104-14. 3Chouban yiwu shimo,tongzhi (Taipei:Wenhai chubanshe,1970),40:14-14b.See also,Kung-chuan Hsiao,A Modern China and a New World:Kang Yu-wei,Reformer and Utopian,1858-1927(Seattle:U.of Washington Press,1975),264
780 RICHARD S. HOROWITZ struggle. Conservative officials took advantage of the diffusion of power to slow efforts at reform-and officials in the central government in Beijing faced particular difficulties in introducing and implementing reforms in the face of a vacillating court, and the number and power of conservative officials in the capital. After 1875, leadership in the self-strengthening process clearly shifted to the provincial officials." The one effort at reform from the throne, the Hundred Days reforms in 1898, fell apart in the face of entrenched opposition both at court and within the bureaucracy. Critics of the System before 19go1 It is not surprising therefore, that long before the Xinzheng reforms began, Qing officials and outside observers began to articulate concerns about the functioning of the Qing system and the inability of the central government to act effectively. As early as 1866, the Zongli Yamen circulated to senior officials Customs Inspector General Robert Hart's 'Bystander's Memorandum.' Hart sharply criticized the functioning of many aspects of the Qing state, but he particularly noted that even the most reputable of central government officials were burdened with too many roles, and lacked the time to give proper attention to their responsibilities, and allowing subordinate officials to arrogate power for themselves-and act for selfish purposes rather than the public good.'3 The fact that the Yamen, which could have buried (or heavily edited) the memorandum chose to circulate it, suggests that they saw some merit in these criticisms. Less than a decade later, concerned by the growing threats from the outside, the Zongli Yamen and especially its dying leader Wenxiang framed a series of memorials pressing for accelerated reforms. In a memorial that initiated the famous 1874-75 defense policy debate the Zongli Yamen leadership noted the problems it faced in pressing for urgently needed defense reforms, and keeping them going over the long haul. 'Those of one mind have been few and those with divergent arguments many. Because those at the center have been obtuse, and those outside have been unable to know the whole situation. The government therefore fails to solve its problems 12 Horowitz, 104-14. 13 Choubanyiwu shimo, tongzhi (Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1970), 40: 14-14b. See also, Kung-chuan Hsiao, A Modern China and a New World: Kang Yu-wei, Reformer and Utopian, I858-I927 (Seattle: U. of Washington Press, 1975), 264
BREAKING THE BONDS OF PRECEDENT 781 promptly making it an inviting target.'4 They hoped that an open debate among senior officials on the priorities of national defense would help to bring about change. At this time,Wenxiang,the most influential of the Zongli Yamen's leaders,took another tack.In a remarkable memorial he sought to coax the young Tongzhi Emperor into directly intervening to pro- mote reform and breaking down institutionalized opposition: We must change our minds and accept the urgency of the situation,have firm sense of purpose and stick to it for a long time.We must pursue [self- strengthening reforms]to a conclusion....Hereafter,when the statesmen and officials memorialize on matters concerning the current situation,I request that in accordance with precedent,[Your Majesty should]come forth and deliberate and discuss it thoroughly together with Prince Gong [the senior Grand Councilor and the titular leader of the Zongli Yamen], choose those suggestions which are appropriate and implement them.If the situation makes implementing them difficult,or you are unable to issue explicit instructions,in personal audience issue the edict orally in order that by making known your Majesty's thinking,in the future good words will not be hidden,and there will be a complete policy for self-strengthening.5 Ill with respiratory disease,Wenxiang concluded dramatically,giving the memorial the air of advice from the deathbed:'Your minister has been ill for a long time with no cure.I was only afraid that summoned to an audience,I would start to gasp for breath and would be unable to speak,and I would be unable to finish what I wished to say.'16 Wenxiang's goal in this appeal seems to have been to get the Emperor to support the reformist officials in two ways:first by look- ing to Prince Gong as a primary source of advice,and second by supporting the idea of reform even when it was impractical to imple- ment a specific measure,shift the tone of debate away from conser- vative criticism.Wenxiang's appeal went for naught.The Tongzhi emperor died within months,and Wenxiang himself succumbed to respiratory disease within two years.But this memorial suggests that in the eyes of a seasoned official,infuence from the throne could shape the tenor of the debate and was necessary to lubricate the creaky machinery of government. These examples point to some of the structural problems that advocates of reform faced.The Zongli Yamen leadership did not try Dao Xian Tong Guang sichao zouyi (Taipei:Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan,1970), vol.6:2610-11. 15Ibid.,26o6. 16 Ibid
BREAKING THE BONDS OF PRECEDENT 781 promptly making it an inviting target.'14 They hoped that an open debate among senior officials on the priorities of national defense would help to bring about change. At this time, Wenxiang, the most influential of the Zongli Yamen's leaders, took another tack. In a remarkable memorial he sought to coax the young Tongzhi Emperor into directly intervening to promote reform and breaking down institutionalized opposition: We must change our minds and accept the urgency of the situation, have firm sense of purpose and stick to it for a long time. We must pursue [selfstrengthening reforms] to a conclusion.... Hereafter, when the statesmen and officials memorialize on matters concerning the current situation, I request that in accordance with precedent, [Your Majesty should] come forth and deliberate and discuss it thoroughly together with Prince Gong [the senior Grand Councilor and the titular leader of the Zongli Yamen], choose those suggestions which are appropriate and implement them. If the situation makes implementing them difficult, or you are unable to issue explicit instructions, in personal audience issue the edict orally in order that by making known your Majesty's thinking, in the future good words will not be hidden, and there will be a complete policy for self-strengthening.'5 Ill with respiratory disease, Wenxiang concluded dramatically, giving the memorial the air of advice from the deathbed: 'Your minister has been ill for a long time with no cure. I was only afraid that summoned to an audience, I would start to gasp for breath and would be unable to speak, and I would be unable to finish what I wished to say."' Wenxiang's goal in this appeal seems to have been to get the Emperor to support the reformist officials in two ways: first by looking to Prince Gong as a primary source of advice, and second by supporting the idea of reform even when it was impractical to implement a specific measure, shift the tone of debate away from conservative criticism. Wenxiang's appeal went for naught. The Tongzhi emperor died within months, and Wenxiang himself succumbed to respiratory disease within two years. But this memorial suggests that in the eyes of a seasoned official, influence from the throne could shape the tenor of the debate and was necessary to lubricate the creaky machinery of government. These examples point to some of the structural problems that advocates of reform faced. The Zongli Yamen leadership did not try 14 Dao Xian Tong Guang sichao zouyi (Taipei: Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan, 1970), vol. 6: 2610-11. '1 Ibid., 266. '6 Ibid
782 RICHARD S.HOROWITZ to alter the system,rather they hoped that new tactics would bring about change.But during the late nineteenth century,neither the intervention of the throne nor a broad based debate on the issues worked to advance the reform agenda.The throne was lukewarm to the self-strengthening efforts,and from the mid-187os onward the practice of using inclusive court conferences in which many senior officials participated in discussions of foreign policy crises further strengthened the hand of conservatives.7 The effort of the Guangxu emperor to personally spur reform in 1898 ran into entrenched opposition,spurring a coup d'etat. Perhaps the first prominent political figure to identify the central government administrative structure as a systemic obstacle to reform was the Cantonese intellectual and political reformer Kang Youwei.As early as 1888 Kang criticized the management of the Six Boards,arguing that Not one of the presidents and vice presidents has definite responsibility,'and that they did not give their whole attention'to their responsibilities 'as most of them hold concurrent posts in other parts of the government.'As a result,he argued,even capable men quickly gave up playing an active role.In 1895,in his second memorial to throne,Kang placed this in a historical context, arguing that since China had historically been surrounded by smaller and weaker states,primary attention had focused not on external threats but the potential for internal rebellion.During the Ming period,methods of control became even more thorough...For each responsibility there were several officials involved,and each official was given several responsibilities,thereby divided authority and lim- iting freedom of action.'In Kang's view,therefore,the diffusion of authority endemic to the Ming-Qing bureaucracy was directly related to China's autocratic system. By early 1898 Kang was convinced that the existing central bu- reaucracy was unalterably opposed to change.He suggested that the best route to reform would be to create a separate Bureau of Admin- istration (zhidu ju)divided into twelve offices:law,budget,education, agriculture,industry,commerce,railroads,postal services,mines, 17 Marianne Bastid,Ching-i and the Self-Strengthening Movement'in Qingji zigiang yundong yantao huilun wenji (Taipei:Institute of Modern History,Academia Sinica,1987),2:87393. Cited in Kung-chuan Hsiao,A Modern China and a New World:Kang Yu-wei, Reformer and Utopian,18581927(Seattle:U.of Washington Press,1975),p.263: Tang Zhijun (ed.),Kang Youwei zheng lun ji (Beijing:Zhonghua shuju,1981),1:57-8. 1 Tang Zhijun,1:151.See also Hsiao,265
782 RICHARD S. HOROWITZ to alter the system, rather they hoped that new tactics would bring about change. But during the late nineteenth century, neither the intervention of the throne nor a broad based debate on the issues worked to advance the reform agenda. The throne was lukewarm to the self-strengthening efforts, and from the mid-187os onward the practice of using inclusive court conferences in which many senior officials participated in discussions of foreign policy crises further strengthened the hand of conservatives." The effort of the Guangxu emperor to personally spur reform in 1898 ran into entrenched opposition, spurring a coup d'etat. Perhaps the first prominent political figure to identify the central government administrative structure as a systemic obstacle to reform was the Cantonese iritellectual and political reformer Kang Youwei. As early as 1888 Kang criticized the management of the Six Boards, arguing that 'Not one of the presidents and vice presidents has definite responsibility,' and that they did not give their 'whole attention' to their responsibilities 'as most of them hold concurrent posts in other parts of the government.' As a result, he argued, even capable men quickly gave up playing an active role.'8 In 1895, in his second memorial to throne, Kang placed this in a historical context, arguing that since China had historically been surrounded by smaller and weaker states, primary attention had focused not on external threats but the potential for internal rebellion. 'During the Ming period, methods of control became even more thorough ... For each responsibility there were several officials involved, and each official was given several responsibilities, thereby divided authority and limiting freedom of action."9 In Kang's view, therefore, the diffusion of authority endemic to the Ming-Qing bureaucracy was directly related to China's autocratic system. By early 1898 Kang was convinced that the existing central bureaucracy was unalterably opposed to change. He suggested that the best route to reform would be to create a separate Bureau of Administration (zhiduju) divided into twelve offices: law, budget, education, agriculture, industry, commerce, railroads, postal services, mines, 7 Marianne Bastid, 'Ching-i and the Self-Strengthening Movement' in Qingji ziqiangyundongyantao huilun wenji (Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1987), 2: 873-93. 18 Cited in Kung-chuan Hsiao, A Modern China and a New World: Kang Yu-wei, Reformer and Utopian, 1858-1927 (Seattle: U. of Washington Press, 1975), p. 263; Tang Zhijun (ed.),Kang Youwei zheng lunji (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1981), 1: 57-8. 19 Tang Zhijun, 1:151. See also Hsiao, 265
BREAKING THE BONDS OF PRECEDENT 783 travel and social organizations,Army,Navy.Each of these offices was to plan reforms in the realm of government indicated.Kang's ori- ginal text merely suggests that the purpose was to establish a plan- ning group within the central government making proposals to make government more responsive to the people.But as Hsiao Kung-chuan suggests,this seems to have been a prototype for a cabinet.20 Kang's assessment of the problems in the central government min- istries,in many respects prefigured the arguments made in 1905-6, although his assertion that'dividing authority and limiting freedom of action'of capable officials was linked to autocratic rule,while perceptive,was not politic.Kang's exile at the end of the Hundred Days Reforms undoubtedly limited his influence from the orthodox bureaucracy.There is some evidence,however,that his former stu- dent,Liang Qichao,influenced Duanfang,one of the key members of the 1905-6 Government Reform Commission.21 The Boxer Settlement and the Birth of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs While dissatisfaction with the functioning of the central state was apparent among Qing officials and political activists before the New Policy period began,foreign diplomatic pressure played an important role in initiating the process of institutional reform.In the aftermath of the Boxer uprising and the foreign invasion in 1goo,the foreign commissioners negotiating a peace settlement turned their attention to the Zongli Yamen,the Qing government's foreign office.In the negotiations for a peace settlement in 1901,the foreign powers demanded,and got major changes to transform the Zongli Yamen, very much a creature of the bureaucratic monarchy,into a European- style foreign ministry. The Zongli Yamen had long been a source of frustration for for- eigners.Created in 1861 after the Second Opium War,the Zongli Yamen had initially been an effective intstrument for Qing foreign policy.But it was quite different from a European foreign ministry. The Yamen's scope of activities was loosely defined by the Chinese term yangwu meaning Foreign Matters'which implied not only diplo- 20 Tang Zhijun,1:215-16;Hsiao,266-7. 21 Roger Thompson,China's Local Councils in an Age of Reform(Cambridge:Council on East Asian Studies,1995),41-2;Philip Huang,Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and Modern Chinese Liberalism (Seattle:University of Washington,1972),103,106
BREAKING THE BONDS OF PRECEDENT 783 travel and social organizations, Army, Navy. Each of these offices was to plan reforms in the realm of government indicated. Kang's original text merely suggests that the purpose was to establish a planning group within the central government making proposals to make government more responsive to the people. But as Hsiao Kung-chuan suggests, this seems to have been a prototype for a cabinet.20 Kang's assessment of the problems in the central government ministries, in many respects prefigured the arguments made in 1905-6, although his assertion that 'dividing authority and limiting freedom of action' of capable officials was linked to autocratic rule, while perceptive, was not politic. Kang's exile at the end of the Hundred Days Reforms undoubtedly limited his influence from the orthodox bureaucracy. There is some evidence, however, that his former student, Liang Qichao, influenced Duanfang, one of the key members of the 1905-6 Government Reform Commission.21 The Boxer Settlement and the Birth of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs While dissatisfaction with the functioning of the central state was apparent among Qing officials and political activists before the New Policy period began, foreign diplomatic pressure played an important role in initiating the process of institutional reform. In the aftermath of the Boxer uprising and the foreign invasion in 1900oo, the foreign commissioners negotiating a peace settlement turned their attention to the Zongli Yamen, the Qing government's foreign office. In the negotiations for a peace settlement in igo1, the foreign powers demanded, and got major changes to transform the Zongli Yamen, very much a creature of the bureaucratic monarchy, into a Europeanstyle foreign ministry. The Zongli Yamen had long been a source of frustration for foreigners. Created in 1861 after the Second Opium War, the Zongli Yamen had initially been an effective intstrument for Qing foreign policy. But it was quite different from a European foreign ministry. The Yamen's scope of activities was loosely defined by the Chinese termyangwu meaning 'Foreign Matters' which implied not only diplo- 20 Tang Zhijun, 1: 215-16; Hsiao, 266-7. 21 Roger Thompson, China's Local Councils in an Age of Reform (Cambridge: Council on East Asian Studies, 1995), 41-2; Philip Huang, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and Modern Chinese Liberalism (Seattle: University of Washington, 1972), 103, 106
784 RICHARD S.HOROWITZ macy,but virtually anything to do with the West.The Yamen dealt not only with diplomatic relations but also with such diverse activit- ies as the administration of the Imperial Maritime Customs Service, the purchase of foreign weaponry,and the management of a variety of projects to import modern manufacturing and communications technology.22 At the same time,the Zongli Yamen was one of several players within the Qing government in all of these areas,and in diplomacy lacked the authority over other government agencies that foreigners expected.Its organization was similar to the six boards: an executive committee of between 5 and 1o men managed opera- tions,and the senior among these officials almost always had sub- stantial concurrent assignments.It was not just the senior ministers who were burdened with concurrent posts.Because the Yamen was initially conceptualized as a temporary agency,subordinate staff were also shared-with Yamen secretaries spending a half day at either the Grand Council or one of the Six Boards,and a half day working at the Zongli Yamen.25 After Wenxiang's death in 1876 and Prince Gong's dismissal eight years later,the Yamen became both less progressive,less powerful and lacked a clear leader responsive to foreign diplomats'concerns. By the mid-188os the Yamen drew away from making difficult decisions or participating in important negotiations.Usually these were turned over to officials outside of the capital,notably Li Hongzhang,who was Governor-General of Zhili and the Superin- tendent of Trade in the Northern Ports.Foreigners were of two minds about this.On the one hand,they found Li to be an easier man to negotiate with than anyone else-burdened with defending North China in the event of war,Li was sensitive to the potentially catastrophic possibilities of open conflict,and he was more willing to compromise.On the other hand,they were infuriated by what they regarded as the lack of attention they got in Beijing,and were quick to be offended by virtually any slight.2+In the mid to late 18gos, 22 On the range of Zongli Yamen activities see Liu Guanghua,Qingji Zongli Yamen de zhizhang'reprinted in Zhongguo jindai xiandai shi lun ji (Taipei:Commer- cial Press,.1985),7:229-338. 23 The discussion of the Zongli Yamen's organization is based on Horowitz,Cent- ral Power,'64-91. 24 A clear expression of these concerns is a dispatch from U.S.Minister Charles Denby to Washington on the Zongli Yamen dated November 5,1889 in Jules Davids (ed.),American Diplomatic and Public Papers:The United States and China,1861-1893. Series II,Volume 2(Wilmington:Scholarly Resources,1979),351-62.See also Holcombe,The Real Chinaman,9-28
784 RICHARD S. HOROWITZ macy, but virtually anything to do with the West. The Yamen dealt not only with diplomatic relations but also with such diverse activities as the administration of the Imperial Maritime Customs Service, the purchase of foreign weaponry, and the management of a variety of projects to import modern manufacturing and communications technology.22 At the same time, the Zongli Yamen was one of several players within the Qing government in all of these areas, and in diplomacy lacked the authority over other government agencies that foreigners expected. Its organization was similar to the six boards: an executive committee of between 5 and io men managed operations, and the senior among these officials almost always had substantial concurrent assignments. It was not just the senior ministers who were burdened with concurrent posts. Because the Yamen was initially conceptualized as a temporary agency, subordinate staff were also shared-with Yamen secretaries spending a half day at either the Grand Council or one of the Six Boards, and a half day working at the Zongli Yamen.23 After Wenxiang's death in 1876 and Prince Gong's dismissal eight years later, the Yamen became both less progressive, less powerful and lacked a clear leader responsive to foreign diplomats' concerns. By the mid-188os the Yamen drew away from making difficult decisions or participating in important negotiations. Usually these were turned over to officials outside of the capital, notably Li Hongzhang, who was Governor-General of Zhili and the Superintendent of Trade in the Northern Ports. Foreigners were of two minds about this. On the one hand, they found Li to be an easier man to negotiate with than anyone else-burdened with defending North China in the event of war, Li was sensitive to the potentially catastrophic possibilities of open conflict, and he was more willing to compromise. On the other hand, they were infuriated by what they regarded as the lack of attention they got in Beijing, and were quick to be offended by virtually any slight." In the mid to late 189os, 22 On the range of Zongli Yamen activities see Liu Guanghua, 'Qingji Zongli Yamen de zhizhang' reprinted in Zhongguojindai xiandai shi lunji (Taipei: Commercial Press, 1985), 7: 229-338. 2" The discussion of the Zongli Yamen's organization is based on Horowitz, 'Central Power,' 64-91. 24 A clear expression of these concerns is a dispatch from U.S. Minister Charles Denby to Washington on the Zongli Yamen dated November 5, 1889 in Jules Davids (ed.), American Diplomatic and Public Papers: The United States and China, 1861-1893, Series II, Volume 2 (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1979), 351-62. See also Holcombe, The Real Chinaman, 9-28
