32141 20567 EAST ASIAN HISTORICAL MONOGRAPHS 下f1 The Diplomacy of Imperial Retreat General Editor.WANG GUNGWU Britain's South China Policy,1924-1931 The East Asian Historical Monographs series commenced publication in the late 1960s with the aim of encouraging scholars of Asian history to go beyond the study of Westem activities in Asia as seen from Westem points of view..Since that time the series has published important works which reflect a strong awareness of the economic and socio- cultural factors in Asia which lie behind political events in the region.The series has established a reputation for the publication of works of innovative historical scholarship. The study and reassessment of Chinese history has assumed a greater importance over the last decade,and the publishers have decided that the series will now concentrate upon works examining the history of China,Hong Kong,and Taiwan. It is the hope of the publishers that the series will continue to meet the demand for Edmund S.K.Fung historical works and to bring the fruits of the research of the region's scholars to a wide reading public. Other titles in this series are listed on the back flap 中研院近史所圖書館 3 055010020567 HONG KONG OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS OXFORD NEW YORK 1991
Contents Acknowledgements ix Romanization xi 1 Introduction 1 2 The China Problem 13 3 British Troubles in South China 30 4 British Response to the Crisis 55 5 The Making of a New China Policy 81 6 The Retreat Begins 105 7 Conciliation and Firmness 129 8 Changes in Chinese Foreign Policy 153 9 London and Nanking,1928-1931 170 10 The Issue of Extraterritoriality 195 11 The Limits of Retreat 215 12 Conclusion 239 Notes 250 Glossary 286 Bibliography 289 Index 303
Acknowledgements IN THE course of my research,I have been helped by a large number of people and institutions.First,I wish to thank Griffith University Research Grant Committee for supporting my field work in Taiwan in 1984 and in England in 1988.My thanks also go to the staff of the following archives and institutions:the Public Record Office,London; the House of Lords Record Office;the Library of the School of Oriental and African Studies;the Library of the London School of Economics and Political Science;the Senate Library of the University of London; the British Library;the University Library,Cambridge;the Nissan Institute of Japanese Studies,St Antony's College,Oxford;Rhodes House Library,Oxford;the Library of Birmingham University;the City Library of Manchester;the Library of Columbia University;the Kuomintang Archives;the Chinese National History Institute,Taipei; the Library of the Institute of Modern History,Academia Sinica;and the Library of the University of Hong Kong.In Australia I have been assisted by the staff of the Menzies Library at the Australian National University,the Commonwealth Library of Australia in Canberra,and Griffith University Library. During my field work in Taipei in 1984 I was attached to the Institute of Modern History,Academia Sinica.Professors Lu Shiqiang,Zhang Pengyuan,and Zhang Yufa extended me their hospitality and gave generously of their time.I was privileged to have benefited from their admirable scholarship. In 1986 I was a Visiting Fellow at the Centre for International Studies, London School of Economics and Political Science,for the Lent Term, during which time I was able to do a good deal of archival research. I wish especially to thank Professor Ian H.Nish,whose encouragement and advice on aspects of my research were particularly helpful. I am also grateful to Mr R.A.Bickers,who is researching British perceptions of China and the Chinese during the period 1928-31,for showing me the extensive notes he took from the Lampson Diaries, which were in the possession of Mr David Steeds of the University College of Wales,Aberystwyth,before being transferred to St Antony's College,Oxford. An earlier draft of the manuscript was read by Professor Ian Nish, Professor Ann Trotter,and my Griffith colleague,Professor Colin
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Romanization Mackerras.I am grateful to them for their time as well as their com- ments and criticisms.Another Griffith colleague,Dr John Butcher,also read it in part,despite his heavy teaching load.It is my pleasure to thank him whole-heartedly. Finally,for help in innumerable ways and for her patience and tol- erance over the years while this book was being written,my special THE pinyin system is used throughout this book for the romanization thanks to my wife,Lucia. of Chinese names and terms except in instances where the old spellings are familiar even to the non-specialist,as for example,Peking and all the major treaty ports."Taipei',not "Taibei',is used in the notes and bibliography.Conventional spellings are also retained for the Kuomintang (KMT),Sun Yat-sen,Chiang Kai-shek,T.V.Soong,H.H.Kung,and some well-known Chinese diplomats and officials who were better known to foreigners in their English names or old spellings,such as Eugene Chen,C.T.Wang,and C.C.Wu
1 Introduction 7人2的 DEsPrrE a growing body of literature on twentieth-century British policy in the Far East,relatively little has been published on Anglo-Chinese relations in the 1920s.To be sure,a number of doctoral theses con- cerned with this period have been undertaken.But most of them deal with narrowly defined topics,and few have a coverage that includes the early years_of the Nanking government up to-the outbreak of the Manchurian crisis in 1931..Overall,as a distinct field of scholarship, Sino-British relations in the twentieth century have been rather under- developed.Western diplomatic historians of the Far East have shown far more interest in Anglo-Japanese and American-Japanese relations, especially the extraordinary events of the 1930s and 1940s culminating in the Pacific War,and have tended to study Anglo-Chinese relations as an appendage to great power diplomacy.Likewise,in Chinese historiography,which is generally weak in international studies,there are few works on Sino-British relations during the inter-war period. Writers in the People's Republic of China have,for political reasons, concentrated on American imperialism,and what little they have published on twentieth-century British imperialism relates mainly to Tibet and to British economic and commercial activities in the treaty ports.2 Nor have historians in Taiwan added much to the literature. While some general studies on the movement for the abrogation of the unequal treaties have been undertaken,Taiwanese works on Sino-British relations are rather sketchy.3 That the 1920s should be neglected in terms of scholarly publication is unfortunate,for in several respects this decade represented an ex- traordinary chapter in Sino-British-relations.First,it saw the growth of a Nationalist revolution aimed,internally,at the elimination of warlord rule and,externally,at the abolition of the unequal treaties and the attainment of international equality for China in the family of nations. It witnessed the expansion of Bolshevik influence in the.Far East,the reorganization of the Kuomintang (KMT),and the early development of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP),which,under Soviet influence, formed a united front with the KMT in an anti-warlord and anti- imperialist revolutionary movement.Secondly,it saw a conflict be- -tween Chinese nationalism and British imperialism,one which under-
THE DIPLOMACY OF IMPERIAL RETREAT INTRODUCTION 0 lined the important issues in modern China's external relations.The control or annexation of territories,as J.A.Hobson would have argued, anti-British movement,unfolding in the wake of the May Thirtieth but the exercise of economic_power for the benefit of the metropolis incident and culminating in a 16-month boycott of Hong Kong in 1925- through informaLempire.'For Gallagher and Robinson,'comments H.L. 3 6,was a major event in the history of Anglo-Chinese relations.Thirdly, Wesseling,'informal empire was not so much another type of expansion and most important of all for the present study,the latter half of the as a certain stage in imperialism.It was imperialism before empire."7 decade saw the first phase of Britain's imperial retreat from south China Informal empire meant also imperialism without the desire to assume -an important but largely neglected subject.It is the purpose of this the responsibilities-administrative,financial,and military-of direct book to fill this lacuna in the literature on Britain's Far Eastern policy. formal rule as in the case of a Crown colony for fear that such re- The history of modern China's external relations from the Opium sponsibilities could be a burden'to the mother country or because War (1839-42)to the end of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1945 circumstances did not permit colonization in the formal,imperial way. is often regarded as one of national defeats and humiliations at the In an informal empire,writes J.Osterhammel,'the metropolitan country hands of foreign imperialism.Sun Yat-sen insisted that China was a exerts power and influence within an asymmetrical relationship,but 'sub-colony',and Mao Zedong characterized it as a semi-colonial society does not assume outright domination and formal sovereignty over the dominated for a century by a host of imperialist powers.Equally,in peripheral country.The theory of informal empire goes beyond the the words of one sympathetic Western writer,China was 'the victim imperialism of free trade.It also postulates that Britain aimed at in- of imperialism without annexation'.+Until the outbreak of the First World formal control of an indigenous government in order to advance her War the chief of these powers was Great Britain.Not only did Britain own trading and other interests.The control could be political,economic, acquire Hong Kong and later Kowloon in perpetuity (plus the 99-year financial,or military,exercised either by Britain alone or in conjunction lease of the New Territories),but she had the entire Yangzi valley as with other powers where common interests were at stake.In any event, a sphere of influence,where she enjoyed priority treatment in shipping, informal imperialism entailed informal control without involving 're- railway construction,mining,and other industrial enterprises,owned sponsible government'to achieve the same end. concessions at Shameen (a small island opposite Canton),Chinkiang, The main objective of British expansion was,again to invoke Kiukiang,Hankow,and Tientsin,and dominated the International Gallagher and Robinson,to integrate new regions into the expanding Settlement in Shanghai.Almost every question involving China's economy of the_metropolis.?This was not,however,for the mutual sovereign rights-tariff autonomy,extraterritoriality,the maritime benefit or 'co-prosperity'of the metropolis and the periphery,but for customs and salt administrations,the International Settlement and the the maintenance of Britain's dominant position in the world economic Mixed Court in Shanghai-was primarily an issue between China and order.The acquisition of territories,naval-bases,and-spheres-of influence. Britain.'It was the penalty [Britain]had to pay for greatness,'wrote was the means,not the end.Hence the principal objective of British one former Foreign Office adviser.with national pride.5 policy in China was always stated in terms of the expansion of trade, Britain's policy towards China in the second half of the 1920s is and Whitehall was apt to disclaim any territorial designs on that country. studied in this book in terms of a strategic retreat from informal There could be no dispute that Britain's primary interest in China was imperialism.The nature of imperialism is a controversial subject open commercial,but as Edmund Wehrle opines: to different interpretations.One of the theories of imperialism which [Britain]wanted the Manchu regime to keep an open door for the trade of all provides a useful framework for the study of the Western powers' -which meant,in practice,continuing economic dominance by Britain.There relations with modern China is the concept of informal empire,which was no desire on Britain's-part to-undertake the expense or risk the danger owes much to the Gallagher-Robinson theory of the imperialism of free involved in the creation of an 'Indian Empire'in the Valley of Yang[zil.The trade.5 J.Gallagher and R.Robinson have exploded the myth of the result was that China provided a classic example of that type of 'informal anti-imperialist mid-Victorian free trade era and argued that the real imperialism'which characterized nineteenth-century British economic expan- heyday of British imperialism was the mid-Victorian period of economic sion from South America to Asia.0 and commercial hegemony and not the 'new imperialism'of the late Britain had the greatest single economic stake in China and was its nineteenth century.What mattered was not the struggle for political leading creditor,both in business investments and in loans to the Chinese
THE DIPLOMACY OF IMPERIAL RETREAT INTRODUCTION 5 government.British investments,as C.F.Remer has documented in his visited the imperial capital in 1793 there had been visions of unlocking seminal work,were substantial in a variety of fields:import,export and the latent consumerism of the Middle Kingdom and developing it into general trading,real estate,manufacturing,transportation(predominantly a field for British investment.It was the potential,not the current re- shipping),banking and finance (including insurance),public utilities, alities,of the market that attracted foreign enterprise.As H.J.Brett,the mining,and miscellaneous.In 1927 the value of British interests in commercial counsellor at the Shanghai consulate-general,wrote in 1927: China,not including Hong Kong,was estimated at about E200 million.2 '[TJhe real importance of China to us is potential rather than actual, In 1930 these investments,coupled with Chinese government obligations, for she is undoubtedly the largest underdeveloped market in the world, amounted to E244.36 million.Geographically,in 1929,76.6 per cent and the main reason (apart from any political considerations)for trying of British interests were located in Shanghai(f151.53 million),9.3 per to keep our end up out here is that we may be in a position to get our cent in Hong Kong (f18.46 million),and 14.1 per cent in the rest of fair share of the enormous trade that is bound to come sooner or later. China (f27.98 million).14 Indeed,Shanghai's importance to the British It was widely believed that China would offer unlimited opportunity in China could not be overstated.Of the land actually held by foreigners for trade and investment once a reasonable degree of internal order and in Shanghai,probably 90 per cent was British-owned in 1901-2,and stability was restored and the transport infrastructure improved.When no less than 78 per cent was so owned in 1930.The coastal trade that time arrived,the China market would greatly assist in solving the radiating from Shanghai was almost entirely in the hands of three economic and unemployment problems facing Britain.Thus the chairman companies,two of which were British,namely,the Indo-China Steam of London's China Association,L.N.Leefe,said in 1925 with some Navigation Company and the China Navigation Company,which were exaggeration that China was 'the one great open market for our goods affiliated,respectively,with Jardine,Matheson and Company and that remains."Likewise,Owen O'Malley,the counsellor at the British Butterfield and Swire,two leading British firms in south China.5 legation in Peking,wrote in 1926:The potential demand for British Shanghai was the foothold of British expansion,the London of the East, exports in China must now be regarded as one of the most promising which ranked on a level higher than Hong Kong in terms of British fields of employment for the unemployed.'20 commercial interests and investments.At the same time,Hong Kong Such hopes took on a special significance at a time when Britain no handled the south coast and the Canton delta trade and nearly all the longer enjoyed a dominant trading position in China.Even before the end South-east Asian,Philippine,and Australian routes.Until the crisis of of the nineteenth century a decline in the relative importance of the British 1925-6 the carrying trade between various ports on the Chinese coast empire in the trade of China had already set in.The share of the British was largely in the hands of British shipping companies. empire,including Hong Kong,had declined from more than 80 per cent Yet China was_not_a major market for British goods.During the of China's total trade in the early 1870s to about 60 per cent at the end 1920s Britain's principal overseas markets were India,Australia,the of the century;by 1913 it had been down to less than half.Between 1913 United States,Germany,the Irish Free State,and France,in that order. and 1930 the share was even smaller owing to fierce competition from China ranked only fifteenth,two places behind Japan,in spite of its Japan and,to a lesser extent,the United States,both of which had emerged huge population.6 In 1924,for example,Britain's trade with China as great powers in the Pacific.2 Naturally the British were anxious to amounted to only 1.5 per cent of the total British trade throughout the regain their dominant position-in-the China trade. world.Trade with the British Empire itself-the Irish Free State, Yet Britain was by no means dependent on Chinese trade as a vital India,Canada,Australia,and New Zealand-exceeded the China trade matter in the sense that Japan was.In other words,important and sub- by a margin of two or three to one.The Union of South Africa also stantial as they were,Britain's interests in China were not vital to her produced about one and a half times more trade with Britain than did economic well-being.Nor did Britain have national security concerns China.Even Argentina and Egypt produced three and two times,re- there in the way that Japan had in Manchuria and parts of north China. spectively,as much trade as did China.7 The fact is that British foreign What was far more important to London's policy-makers'was that trade was oriented towards Europe,the Empire,and America,not the Britain's relationship with China was one that affected her prestige and Far East.Nevertheless,China had always had the allure of the potentially influence in-India,the Far East,and-indeed-all-Asian-nations.2 limitless demand of its huge population.Ever since Lord Macartney Economically the British foothold in China was based on a series
6 THE DIPLOMACY OF IMPERIAL RETREAT INTRODUCTION > of treaties signed with the weak and impotent Manchu government in China from 'the tutelage of any single Power'.That power could be the nineteenth century.As Gallagher and Robinson pointed out,the use Japan,which did not want either a strong or a united China,or Soviet of treaties of'free trade and-friendship'was 'the most common political Russia,'the most sinister influence in the Far East'.25 technique of British expansion."25 These treaties were in the main im- One can disagree with the British official view that just because posed on the Chinese by force.of arms,and the British had maintained Britain had no territorial and political designs on China she could divest their trading position by superior naval power,or gunboat diplomacy. herself of all charges of imperialism.But Wellesley's point was that For many years,limited naval and/or military force had been used to the use of force was becoming increasingly ineffective and counter- support policy objectives,to secure commercial and other advantages,to productive in advancing British interests in China.Still reeling from the maintain the treaty system,and to protect British life and property in effects of the First World War,Britain was in a position of contracting China. resources and diminishing-power,while the general public was war- The gunboat approach was called into question,however,after the weary and profoundly pacific.The real alternative to-confrontation with IGreat War when the surge of Chinese nationalism changed the com- Chinese nationalism would lie in a recognition of its just cause and, plexion of the Chinese political arena.The nationalism of post-war most importantly,a conciliation of it.This meant beating a retreat, China was a political movement which had acquired a new dimension unpleasant as it might be,from a position which was becoming more and a new dynamism.Better organized than ever before and using and more untenable and which could no longer be defended politically economic weapons,it was supported by a more patriotic and politically or militarily unless with the full support and co-operation of the other conscious urban population.Strikes,boycotts,and demonstrations against interested powers.It meant also giving up informal control of the Chinese foreign domination were resorted to with increasing frequency,not only government and letting the Chinese do things by themselves. damaging foreign trade but also leading to violence which threatened There may be objections to the theory that China was part of Britain's foreign life and property.Above all,Chinese nationalism-was-now informal empire.Of course,there could not have been an imperial championed by a regenerated political party,the KMT,which was fast retreat had China not been part of Britain's informal empire.Critics developing from a relatively weak regional regime into a powerful may argue that Britain never had a desire to add China to her imperial national force promising to bring about a new and united China. burden,nor was she prepared to go to war with another power over The challenge for Britain in the post-war period was to expand British her interests in China in the inter-war period.Had Britain considered trade on the principle of the 'open door'without relying on gunboat China part of her informal empire she would not have reacted numbly diplomacy while still being able to protect British interests,life,and to the numerous Japanese occupations by force of Chinese territories property in a revolutionary but war-torn China and to co-operate with in the 1930s,beginning with the Mukden incident of 18 September other great powers on matters of common interest.As the deputy under- 1931,which ended Sino-British negotiations for the relinquishment of secretary of state for foreign affairs and the chief architect of Britain's Britain's extraterritorial rights in China.It can also be argued that China policy,Sir Victor Wellesley,stated in 1925: Britain's support for the 'open door'did not make China part of her We have no territorial or imperialistic aims.Our first concern is the security informal empire or that China should have been deemed part of Ameri- of British lives and property,the maintenance of the 'Open Door'and equal ca's informal empire since the United States,not Britain,was the most opportunity for all.Our second is to see that China does not fall under the vocal sponsor of the 'open door'. tutelage of any single Power.For these reasons we desire to see a united,well- There is force in these arguments which cannot be ignored.However, ordered and prosperous China,and it is our policy to endeavour to co-operate as is well known,China in the inter-war period was a divided country to that end with the other Great Powers concerned.34 politically,administratively,and militarily.In geopolitical terms there As'a nation of shopkeepers',Britain desired to keep the shops open were several Chinas:north and south,China proper and Manchuria, and preserve her trading interests.A 'united,well-ordered,prosperous maritime China and the hinterland,and so on-a situation that in- and peaceful China'would be conducive to British trade,but no one, fluenced the policies of the foreign powers which were concerned about except the Chinese themselves,desired a strong China.As Wellesley their respective spheres of interest.Though they all recognized only one understood it,to maintain the 'open door'meant the preservation of government in China,none of the great powers had a policy that applied
P THE DIPLOMACY OF IMPERIAL RETREAT INTRODUCTION 9 practically to the whole of the country.With the possible exception of From the very beginning the retreat was based on a strategy of the United States,all were interested in a particular part of the country considered expediency laid down on broad and general lines which where they enjoyed a special position and framed their policies on that were to be pursued with flexibility and suited to the ever-changing basis.Japan,for example,had one policy for Manchuria and quite phases of the Chinese revolution.It was in essence a course of gradual another for China proper.?6 Britain had no policy for north China and adaptation of the pre-war status of British subjects and interests in Manchuria,but had one for the south concentrating on the Yangzi region. China to post-war conditions,a policy of what John Gittings calls What happened to Manchuria and the north was not a matter of great 'ameliorative imperialism'27 This policy was an enlightened one to be importance to England as long as British interests in the south were sure.But it was dictated by self-interest,tangible and material objectives, not in jeopardy.When Whitehall officials described their China policy not altruistic or moralistic considerations.Britain's policy-makers ap- in terms of the security of British life and property,the maintenance proached the problem of China in a shrewd,hard-headed manner,with of the 'open door'and equal opportunity for all,and a desire to see the same pragmatism as they tackled other problems in the East where a united,well-ordered,and prosperous China,they were talking in British interests were at stake.Their emphasis was on long-term economic generalities.Specifically,their concern had always been for Britain's and commercial advantages that would accrue from a friendly relationship interests in the Yangzi region,and their policy was,to all intents and with the Chinese.Moreover,the conciliation of Chinese nationalism, purposes,formulated with south China in mind,a position which re- while significant in itself,was part of Britain's global retreat from mained unchanged during the inter-war period.In this sense the Yangzi power since the First World War.In numerous issues,especially in region,as distinct from the whole of China,was part of Britain's.informal empire.Thus this study will focus on south China (using the Yangzi Europe,the British found themselves virtually impotent in this century river as the convenient dividing line between north and south),where of their supposed dominance.Slowly but surely Britain was on the decline as a great power because of her inability or unwillingness to C the British faced a major crisis in their relations with the Chinese in match her resources to the risks involved.28 the mid-1920s,and will confine itself to describing Britain's south China Apart from economic and commercial considerations,there were policy as one of imperial retreat during the period under review. compelling political reasons why Britain wished to come to terms with The retreat,designed by the Foreign Office with cabinet approval, Chinese nationalism.To try to capture the Nationalist movement by was aimed at meeting Chinese nationalism,at least half way,so that sympathizing with it and endeavouring to get it on the 'right line'could a more peaceful and friendly atmosphere conducive to the expansion of British trade in China could be restored.This did not mean the assist in the formation of a Chinese government that would look upon the West as a friend rather than an enemy.Ultimately this would prove appeasement of the Chinese,as Britain did not sacrifice her own to be the most cost-effective way of dealing with the Bolshevik influ- principles in acceding to their demands.What it meant was that certain ence in China which many Britons regarded as the fundamental cause relatively unimportant rights and privileges could be relinquished by negotiation and agreement with the Chinese authorities in order to protect of their troubles in Asia.If and when the Russians lost ground in China their menace to India and Afghanistan would also diminish.Conversely, the most important interests at stake.It would entail a modification of continued confrontation with Chinese nationalism would drive the KMT the unequal treaties and thereby undermine the very foundation on which further into the communist camp and intensify the anti-British and anti- the imperialism of informal empire had been based.Ultimately it would imperialist feelings around the country. change the character of British expansion in China.If and when the British,along with other foreign nationals,were stripped of their special As Wellesley theorized,it was a test of generalship to conduct an orderly retreat,but how to prevent it from being turned into a rout rights and privileges,they would have to carry out their trade on terms would be a test of statesmanship.2 "The great point about a retreat,' to be negotiated with the Chinese on a basis of mutual benefit and he opined,'is to avoid defeat so that one may come out of the scuffle reciprocity.Only then could they really divest themselves of charges of imperialism.In the short term the retreat would give Britons in China with one's prestige and striking power unimpaired.'The idea was that little cause for comfort,but eventually it would redound to their long- Britain must not be forced into a situation where it would be stampeded term economic and commercial interests. into action-that is,into giving things away more than necessary- and that Britain,not China,should be the judge of the extent and pace
10 THE DIPLOMACY OF IMPERIAL RETREAT INTRODUCTION 11 of concessions.Above all,the retreat must not be seen by the Chinese, and when the United Kingdom was facing a decline in its economic the British communities in the treaty ports,or any of the foreign powers and military power.It focuses on Britain's relations with the Nationalists as a sign of weakness,least of all a defeat for the British empire.In first as a regional regime in south China and then as a national gov- other words,no British_prestige should be lost,otherwise there would ernment having effective control over the largest part of the Yangzi be disastrous repercussions on British standing in the colonies,par- region but less than one-third of the country.The year 1924 has been ticularly India,where an independence movement was well under way. chosen as a starting point because it marked the reorganization of the The concern about prestige reflected the general feeling of the empire- KMT and the beginning of an anti-imperialist movement in the south conscious British establishment,London's top civil servants,the which soon forced the British government to undertake a reappraisal conservative press,and the business communities in China.It was often of its China policy.The year 1931 serves_as_a convenient finishing in the name of restoring or upholding British prestige that arguments point because it was the Manchurian crisis that prevented the Nationalist for forcible action in China were advanced. government from proceeding any further with the campaign for treaty The objective of British diplomacy in China after 1926 was therefore revision. to implement the new policy in an orderly manner.The new policy was, The period 1924-31 spanned three British administrations:the short- in the Foreign Office parlance,one of 'patient and liberal conciliation', lived Labour government of 1924 was followed by five years of Con- patient because the process of redressing the Chinese grievances was servative rule and,in 1929,by a second Labour government until late a gradual one-the surrender of special rights and privileges by ne- in 1931 when a coalition National government took over.It was the gotiation pari passu with the improvement in China's internal condi- Baldwin government which made the decision to beat a retreat.The tions-and liberal because for the first time since the days of the policy enjoyed the support of the Labour Party and was followed by Opium War the British government was prepared to make changes to the MacDonald administration,helped by the continuity in office of the the treaty system and to abandon a policy of gunboat diplomacy.Putting two influential Foreign Office officials in the China area,Sir Victor an end to gunboat diplomacy did not mean,however,that force no Wellesley and adviser Sir John Pratt.There were personnel changes in longer had a place in Britain's China policy.Given the continuing the Far Eastern Department,but these changes did not affect the general disorder,chaos,and political instability in the country which threatened thrust of its new China policy,the implementation of which in China foreign life and property,forcible action would still be necessary in was the responsibility of Sir Miles Lampson whose term as British some situations for defensive purposes against mob violence and/or minister in Peking expired in 1933.On the Nationalist side,the period attacks by any Chinese forces for whatever reason.Yet the application 1924-31 also spanned-three regimes:Canton,Wuhan,and Nanking. of force,however discriminate and justifiable from the British point of The short-lived Wuhan regime marked the last phase of the KMT-CCP view,was liable to be interpreted by the Chinese as imperialist ag- united front and the beginning of the end of Bolshevik influence in gression,thereby provoking more boycotts,strikes,and demonstrations. China,and the year 1928 saw a turning point in the KMT's attitude That was the dilemma facing London's policy-makers,to which there towards the British.During the Nanking period there was a significant was no easy solution.Nevertheless,they pursued the strategy of improvement in Anglo-Chinese relations,even though for non-political combining conciliation with firmness-commitment to the conciliation reasons the share of British trade in China continued to decline. of Chinese nationalism on the one hand and obligation to the protection This book addresses a number of specific issues relating,on the one of British life,property,and their most important interests in China on hand,to the policy-making process in London and the main factors, the other.These dual aspects of British policy were not necessarily both domestic and external,which influenced that process,and,on the incompatible or contradictory,for the important thing was to control other hand,to Chinese politics in so far as it affected China's external and limit the use of force so that it would serve,rather than undermine, behaviour.Was the Foreign Office in control of policy-making?Did the cause of conciliation.3 it have any differences of opinion with the Colonial Office over Hong This book is not designed to give equal treatment to both sides in Kong and with the British legation in Peking and His Majesty's Gov- the bilateral relationship.Rather,it is a study of British response to ernment's other representatives in China on policy matters?And on the Chinese nationalism at a time when China was in the throes of revolution Chinese side:was there any significant policy change after 1927?To
