24.00: Problems of Philosophy Prof. Sally Haslanger December 2 200 Kantian Ethics(and more on famine) So far we've looked at egoist and utilitarian approaches to ethics. The main objection we considered to egoism was that it failed to accommodate the common sense idea that morality involves a kind of impartiality, at the very least it seems that we should not be morally prohibited from taking an impartial stance; yet egoism requires that you count yourself as more important than anyone else in your deliberation, so seems to require a deep and systematic partiality towards oneself. Utilitarianism, however, took the opposite extreme: on a utilitarian view your happiness counts for no more or less than anyone else's. What matters is producing through your action as much(average) happiness as possible, there is no moral suffering grave misfortune(e.g, famine). To some minds, utilitarianism(and views like it)go too far in valuesaarpe've basis for partiality towards or against anyone capable of happiness. Each of us are to be counted exactly the same also seen how a modified version of utilitarianism(in Singer) might have us respond to the plight of others who impartiality The question now is whether there are further approaches to morality that might have different results, in particular, ones less extreme on the partiality/impartiality spectrum. The answer(of course)is"yes The most important alternative, historically speaking, derives from the work of Immanuel Kant(1724-1804), and so predictably is called a Kantian approach, or sometimes a deontological approach. At the core of Kant's ethics is a principle known as the Categorical Imperative(CI). Kant articulates the Ci in a variety of different forms, but the details of these forms and their interrelations will not be our concern in this course. For our purposes, it will be enough to reflect briefly on two basic Kantian ideas that correspond to two formulations of the Ci Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become universal law(RR, p. 689) So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means (RR, p 693) Feldman suggests that these two principles correspond roughly to two further deeply held ideas about morality(Feldman, p.133) You are No Exception Principle: If you wouldn't want everyone else to act in a certain way, then you shouldn't act in that way yourself. "(Feldman, p. 98) an Respect for Persons Principle: In all action one should respect the intrinsic value of human life. Feldman, p.121,133 The"You are No Exception Principle"does seem to be ubiquitous in moral life. We often criticize others for being hypocrites"for doing exactly what they object to in others; but more importantly, we generally think it is wrong to do something that we know would be problematic if everyone else did it too, e.g., cheating on an exam, removing a pollution24.00: Problems of Philosophy Prof. Sally Haslanger December 2, 2001 Kantian Ethics (and more on famine) So far we've looked at egoist and utilitarian approaches to ethics. The main objection we considered to egoism was that it failed to accommodate the common sense idea that morality involves a kind of impartiality, at the very least it seems that we should not be morally prohibited from taking an impartial stance; yet egoism requires that you count yourself as more important than anyone else in your deliberation, so seems to require a deep and systematic partiality towards oneself. Utilitarianism, however, took the opposite extreme: on a utilitarian view your happiness counts for no more or less than anyone else's. What matters is producing through your action as much (average) happiness as possible; there is no moral basis for partiality towards or against anyone capable of happiness. Each of us are to be counted exactly the same. We've also seen how a modified version of utilitarianism (in Singer) might have us respond to the plight of others who are suffering grave misfortune (e.g., famine). To some minds, utilitarianism (and views like it) go too far in valuing impartiality. The question now is whether there are further approaches to morality that might have different results, in particular, ones less extreme on the partiality/impartiality spectrum. The answer (of course) is "yes". The most important alternative, historically speaking, derives from the work of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), and so predictably is called a Kantian approach, or sometimes a deontological approach. At the core of Kant's ethics is a principle known as the Categorical Imperative (CI). Kant articulates the CI in a variety of different forms, but the details of these forms and their interrelations will not be our concern in this course. For our purposes, it will be enough to reflect briefly on two basic Kantian ideas that correspond to two formulations of the CI: Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become universal law. (RR, p. 689) So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means. (RR, p. 693) Feldman suggests that these two principles correspond roughly to two further deeply held ideas about morality (Feldman, p. 133): You are No Exception Principle: "If you wouldn't want everyone else to act in a certain way, then you shouldn't act in that way yourself." (Feldman, p. 98) and Respect for Persons Principle: In all action one should respect the intrinsic value of human life. (Feldman, p. 121, 133) The "You are No Exception Principle" does seem to be ubiquitous in moral life. We often criticize others for being "hypocrites" for doing exactly what they object to in others; but more importantly, we generally think it is wrong to do something that we know would be problematic if everyone else did it too, e.g., cheating on an exam, removing a pollution