control device from a car, stealing a book from the bookstore. In each of these cases the agent's goals could not be achieved if everyone else did the same thing, so the success of the action depends on making a distinction between what the agent does and what others do. but making oneself an exception this way seems wrong. Kant thought that in cases like this there was even a sort of inconsistency The idea is that in any intentional action, I am implicitly or explicitly acting on a principle of some kind Feldman considers the example of two shopkeepers, both of whom are committed to giving correct change to their customers. They act, however, on different principles, or what Kant called"maxims Mr. Grimbley: When I can gain a good business reputation by giving correct change, I shall give correct change Mr. Hughes: When I can perform a morally right act by giving correct change, I shall give correct change In each case there is a generalized form of the maxim of the form General Form. Whenever one is he/she shall On Kant's view, what matters in evaluating an action is not the consequences, but the principle that is employed in intending or willing. Two individuals can do the same thing, but one of them do wrong and the other right, depending on what they will. Another example, I might loan my car to my neighbor in a manipulative spirit, e.g., with the thought that she will then feel indebted to me and will then agree to babysit my kids on Saturday; or I might loan my car to my neighbor in a generous spirit, e.g., with the thought that it will enable her to accomplish something that she wouldn 't otherwise be able to, at little cost to me. Our evaluation of my action, on Kant s view, will depend on the maxim of the action So in determining what's right we should put our maxims to the test. Here's an interpretation of the Ci based on Feldman (Feldman, p. 104 CI. An act is morally right iff the agent of the act can consistently will that the generalized form of the maxim of the act be universally acted upon. Some maxims fail the test, so the corresponding action is immoral, e.g., (in generalized form) Whenever one has an exam and doesn't feel like studying, she shall copy off of her neighbors work. Presumably we could not all act on this maxim, for if we are all planning to copy off each other, there will be no work to copy! The underlying rationale for an approach such as this is to show that the source of morality is in reason or rationality those who are immoral are in some important sense acting irrationally. On this view, we don' t ground morality in Gods will, or in the seemingly arbitrary moral codes of particular cultures. Morality is grounded in reason itself, and the demands of morality can be discovered through rational reflection Feldman notes two criticisms of this approach, at least as articulated in Cll i It appears in many cases that one can adjust the statement of the maxim so that the problem disappears, e.gcontrol device from a car, stealing a book from the bookstore. In each of these cases the agent's goals could not be achieved if everyone else did the same thing, so the success of the action depends on making a distinction between what the agent does and what others do. But making oneself an exception this way seems wrong. Kant thought that in cases like this there was even a sort of inconsistency. The idea is that in any intentional action, I am implicitly or explicitly acting on a principle of some kind. Feldman considers the example of two shopkeepers, both of whom are committed to giving correct change to their customers. They act, however, on different principles, or what Kant called "maxims": Mr. Grimbley: When I can gain a good business reputation by giving correct change, I shall give correct change. Mr. Hughes: When I can perform a morally right act by giving correct change, I shall give correct change. In each case there is a generalized form of the maxim of the form: General Form: Whenever one is ________, he/she shall ________. On Kant's view, what matters in evaluating an action is not the consequences, but the principle that is employed in intending or willing. Two individuals can do the same thing, but one of them do wrong and the other right, depending on what they will. Another example, I might loan my car to my neighbor in a manipulative spirit, e.g., with the thought that she will then feel indebted to me and will then agree to babysit my kids on Saturday; or I might loan my car to my neighbor in a generous spirit, e.g., with the thought that it will enable her to accomplish something that she wouldn't otherwise be able to, at little cost to me. Our evaluation of my action, on Kant's view, will depend on the maxim of the action. So in determining what's right we should put our maxims to the test. Here's an interpretation of the CI based on Feldman (Feldman, p. 104): CI1: An act is morally right iff the agent of the act can consistently will that the generalized form of the maxim of the act be universally acted upon. Some maxims fail the test, so the corresponding action is immoral, e.g., (in generalized form): Whenever one has an exam and doesn't feel like studying, she shall copy off of her neighbor's work. Presumably we could not all act on this maxim, for if we are all planning to copy off each other, there will be no work to copy! The underlying rationale for an approach such as this is to show that the source of morality is in reason or rationality; those who are immoral are in some important sense acting irrationally. On this view, we don't ground morality in God's will, or in the seemingly arbitrary moral codes of particular cultures. Morality is grounded in reason itself, and the demands of morality can be discovered through rational reflection. Feldman notes two criticisms of this approach, at least as articulated in CI1: i) It appears in many cases that one can adjust the statement of the maxim so that the problem disappears, e.g