Whenever one has an exam and doesn't feel like studying, and everyone else is well-prepared, and she can do it without being caught, she shall copy off her neighbor's work ii) In some cases a maxim cannot be generalized, but its failure is not due to moral factors. ( Bank example, Feldman, p 116 Although there seems to be something right about the"You are No Exception Principle"it isn't clear that the first version of the Ci has captured it. Can you figure out a better version that gets at the intuition better? ) So let's turn to another formulation of the CI drawing on the"Respect for Persons Principle".ONeill interprets the principle this way(see rR p 717 CI 2: Right actions are those that are guided by intentions to treat persons as far as possible as ends in themselves, and never as a mere means, i. e, one must not undertake to involve others in a scheme of action to which they could not in principle(rationally? )consent This allows that we can use others as a means to accomplish our own ends after all, we rely crucially on others all the time. You rely on the cashier at the store to transact your business, you rely on your professors to teach you things-we serve as a means to your ends of gaining knowledge. But these are cases in which there is consent-your professors aren,'t deceived or coerced into serving your needs. According to CI2, cheating on your final would be wrong because you would be using me(or your TA)as a mere means to a good grade you would be involving us in a scheme whereby you would get a good grade, but it would be a scheme that we would not-or better: could not reasonably-consent to So according to ONeill, the Kantian picture has a strong negative component comprising the duty ofjustice Dont treat others as a mere means And a positive component comprising the duty of beneficence As far as possible treat others as ends in themselves, i.e., as a rational person with his or her own aims, objectives, goals, conceptions of the good, etc So, we must never use, exploit, deceive, or coerce others; but it is a more difficult and complicated matter to figure out how to help others achieve their own ends, "...we cannot seek everything that others want; their wants are too numerous and diverse, and, of course, sometimes incompatible. It follows that beneficence has to be selective "(718) According to ONeill, in deliberation we need only consider the possible actions that occur to us and determine whether or not they involve treating another as a mere means. An act is permissible if it does not use another as a mere means; impermissible if it does. Beyond avoiding injustice, our"duty is complete if in addition [our] life plans have in the circumstances been 718) Moreover, on the Kantian view (in contrast to utilitarianism) The focus of moral evaluation is the maxim or principle implicit in the act, not the results. a good action might have bad esults and vv. E.g., I might attempt to save a drowning child and cause his death instead. My action has bad results, but my intention/maxim respected the child as an end in himself Or, a burglar might enter a house with the intention of stealing property and in doing so prevent a murder; but the good results don 't make the action good i Acts can't be ranked on an order of merit i The theory works well when information is scarce. Utilitarian calculations require a lot of data in order to make plausible predictions about consequences. But because it is usually clear when an action would use another as a mere means(inWhenever one has an exam and doesn't feel like studying, and everyone else is well-prepared, and she can do it without being caught, she shall copy off her neighbor's work. ii) In some cases a maxim cannot be generalized, but its failure is not due to moral factors. (Bank example, Feldman, p. 116.) Although there seems to be something right about the "You are No Exception Principle" it isn't clear that the first version of the CI has captured it. (Can you figure out a better version that gets at the intuition better?) So let's turn to another formulation of the CI drawing on the "Respect for Persons Principle". O'Neill interprets the principle this way (see RR p. 717): CI 2: Right actions are those that are guided by intentions to treat persons as far as possible as ends in themselves, and never as a mere means, i.e., one must not undertake to involve others in a scheme of action to which they could not in principle (rationally?) consent. This allows that we can use others as a means to accomplish our own ends; after all, we rely crucially on others all the time. You rely on the cashier at the store to transact your business; you rely on your professors to teach you things­we serve as a means to your ends of gaining knowledge. But these are cases in which there is consent­your professors aren't deceived or coerced into serving your needs. According to CI2, cheating on your final would be wrong because you would be using me (or your TA) as a mere means to a good grade: you would be involving us in a scheme whereby you would get a good grade, but it would be a scheme that we would not­or better: could not reasonably­consent to. So according to O'Neill, the Kantian picture has a strong negative component comprising the duty of justice: Don't treat others as a mere means. And a positive component comprising the duty of beneficence: As far as possible treat others as ends in themselves, i.e., as a rational person with his or her own aims, objectives, goals, conceptions of the good, etc. So, we must never use, exploit, deceive, or coerce others; but it is a more difficult and complicated matter to figure out how to help others achieve their own ends, "...we cannot seek everything that others want; their wants are too numerous and diverse, and, of course, sometimes incompatible. It follows that beneficence has to be selective." (718) According to O'Neill, in deliberation we need only consider the possible actions that occur to us and determine whether or not they involve treating another as a mere means. An act is permissible if it does not use another as a mere means; impermissible if it does. Beyond avoiding injustice, our "duty is complete if in addition [our] life plans have in the circumstances been reasonably beneficent." (RR, p. 718) Moreover, on the Kantian view (in contrast to utilitarianism): ï The focus of moral evaluation is the maxim or principle implicit in the act, not the results. A good action might have bad results and vv. E.g., I might attempt to save a drowning child and cause his death instead. My action has bad results, but my intention/maxim respected the child as an end in himself. Or, a burglar might enter a house with the intention of stealing property and in doing so prevent a murder; but the good results don't make the action good. ï Acts can't be ranked on an order of merit. ï The theory works well when information is scarce. Utilitarian calculations require a lot of data in order to make plausible predictions about consequences. But because it is usually clear when an action would use another as a mere means (in