Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact The Cold War History of Sino-Soviet Relations June 2005 mean that China would attempt to liberate Taiwan by force.It was just to punish Kuomintang troops and prevent the U.S.from supporting "Two Chinas."China would bear the consequences and would not drag the USSR in if trouble broke out.16 On September 6th,Zhou Enlai met with Gromyko and explained to him the Chinese government's stand on the Taiwan Straits.Gromyko indicated that the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party fully endorsed China's stand and measures.Zhou stated that with the strike on the offshore islands China had considered the possibility of the outbreak of a local war between the U.S.and China in the area,and was prepared to bear come under heavy attack including atomic bombs and the destructions of cities.Zhou Enlai pointed out that the USSR would not need to take part in this stage even if the U.S.used tactical nuclear weapons.Only when the U.S.used more powerful nuclear weapons and risked expanding the war should Russian nuclear retaliation take place.17 According to Gromyko's memoirs,Mao Zedong expressed the same idea in talking to him.Mao told Gromyko that China was not afraid of the nuclear threat.If the U.S.used nuclear weapons,the Chinese government would move to Yanan and go on fighting.18 After exchanging views with China,Khrushchev published an open letter to Eisenhower on September 7 in response to J.F.Dulles's nuclear threat and the Newport Declaration,appealing to U.S.government to exercise caution in their actions in Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits area and not to lightly adopt measures could result in irretrievable consequences.In the letter he especially stressed that any attack on the Soviet Union's great friend,ally and neighbor,the People's Republic of China,would be seen as an attack on Soviet Union.In Gromyko's speech at the UN assembly on September 18 and Khrushchev's second open letter to Eisenhower on September 19th,the same stand was again expressed. At the peak of the crisis after mid-September,Zhou Enlai continuously met with the Charge d'Affaires of the Soviet Embassy in Beijing,S.F.Antonov,and informed him of the CCCPC's policy assumptions.At the meeting on September 18th Zhou Enlai said that China would still focus on punitive attacks on Chiang's troops on Jinmen and Mazu islands.The U.S.did not want to get involved nor did China want to fight the U.S.But China was not afraid of the expansion of the military actions on Jinmen and other islands.At their talk on September 28 Zhou Enlai further pointed out, "Our strikes may be heavy,moderate,or light.But we do not want to beat them to death in one go.Our intention is to make things difficult for them but not to make them desperate.The longer it takes,the greater the difficulties for the U.S."Zhou also informed him of CCCPC's three estimates on the developing situation in the Taiwan Straits:the U.S.might make concessions and reach a compromise with China, although conditions for this were not mature;or the status quo might be maintained, which was highly probable;or the U.S.might stick its head into the noose,though this possibility was unlikely.19 At the same time,Khrushchev had especially called in Chinese Ambassador to the USSR Liu Xiao and had"an important talk."Khrushchev said that after discussion 6Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact The Cold War History of Sino-Soviet Relations June 2005 mean that China would attempt to liberate Taiwan by force. It was just to punish Kuomintang troops and prevent the U.S. from supporting “Two Chinas.” China would bear the consequences and would not drag the USSR in if trouble broke out.16 On September 6th, Zhou Enlai met with Gromyko and explained to him the Chinese government’s stand on the Taiwan Straits. Gromyko indicated that the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party fully endorsed China’s stand and measures. Zhou stated that with the strike on the offshore islands China had considered the possibility of the outbreak of a local war between the U.S. and China in the area, and was prepared to bear come under heavy attack including atomic bombs and the destructions of cities. Zhou Enlai pointed out that the USSR would not need to take part in this stage even if the U.S. used tactical nuclear weapons. Only when the U.S. used more powerful nuclear weapons and risked expanding the war should Russian nuclear retaliation take place.17 According to Gromyko’s memoirs, Mao Zedong expressed the same idea in talking to him. Mao told Gromyko that China was not afraid of the nuclear threat. If the U.S. used nuclear weapons, the Chinese government would move to Yanan and go on fighting.18 After exchanging views with China, Khrushchev published an open letter to Eisenhower on September 7 in response to J.F.Dulles’s nuclear threat and the Newport Declaration, appealing to U.S. government to exercise caution in their actions in Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits area and not to lightly adopt measures could result in irretrievable consequences. In the letter he especially stressed that any attack on the Soviet Union’s great friend, ally and neighbor, the People’s Republic of China, would be seen as an attack on Soviet Union. In Gromyko’s speech at the UN assembly on September 18 and Khrushchev’s second open letter to Eisenhower on September 19th, the same stand was again expressed. At the peak of the crisis after mid-September, Zhou Enlai continuously met with the Charge d’Affaires of the Soviet Embassy in Beijing, S.F.Antonov, and informed him of the CCCPC’s policy assumptions. At the meeting on September 18th Zhou Enlai said that China would still focus on punitive attacks on Chiang’s troops on Jinmen and Mazu islands. The U.S. did not want to get involved nor did China want to fight the U.S. But China was not afraid of the expansion of the military actions on Jinmen and other islands. At their talk on September 28 Zhou Enlai further pointed out, "Our strikes may be heavy, moderate, or light. But we do not want to beat them to death in one go. Our intention is to make things difficult for them but not to make them desperate. The longer it takes, the greater the difficulties for the U.S.” Zhou also informed him of CCCPC’s three estimates on the developing situation in the Taiwan Straits: the U.S. might make concessions and reach a compromise with China, although conditions for this were not mature; or the status quo might be maintained, which was highly probable; or the U.S. might stick its head into the noose, though this possibility was unlikely.19 At the same time, Khrushchev had especially called in Chinese Ambassador to the USSR Liu Xiao and had “an important talk.” Khrushchev said that after discussion 6