Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact The Cold War History of Sino-Soviet Relations June 2005 of September 1958),because the USSR did not know what China's strategic objectives were,it announced its support for China's actions and tried to take some concrete steps on the one hand,while on the other hand it sought through a variety of channel to ascertain China's intentions so as to influence and restrict China's actions. Realizing that war might break out in the Taiwan Straits area,the Soviet military showed great caution and restraint at this stage.Although the USSR might have known in advance what action China would take,the Soviet leaders were nonetheless astonished that China had absolutely not informed them of the time,objective and plan of the bombardment.13 Hence the knowledge of China's intentions became the essential prerequisite for the USSR's policy decisions and the Soviet embassy in China became the important source of relevant information.After the bombardment the Soviet embassy immediately telegraphed the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party to say that China had sent a message only after the bombardment on August 23 and had not in any way given advance notice of its intentions in this important military and political action.From the beginning of the crisis till the end of 1958,Soviet embassy sent in all 52 reports on the matter.According to these reports, the Russians believed that"It would not be entirely correct to regard the solution of the Taiwan issue...as purely a domestic affair of China.In the first stage of the development of the Taiwan conflict our Chinese friends have demonstrated a rather simplistic approach to evaluating the degree of urgency of the Taiwan problem and have let the possibility of aggravating the international situation emerge to keep the United States'on the verge of war'from their side too."The reports also pointed out that"Our Chinese friends started to show excessive sensitivity toward the problems of soverignty and independence of their country,reservations about the measures that used to be taken by both countries jointly."The Soviets obviously believed that the Chinese showed a tendency towards solving Asian problems themselves.They did not think it necessary to consult the USSR about their planned actions,though they would expect its support when the situation got out of control.14 On receiving the reports from the Soviet Embassy,Khrushchev immediately demanded that the embassy inform Beijing that considering that China had just begun socialist construction and was quite backward both economically and militarily,she did not at present have the capacity to launch a modern war and carry out a landing operation on Taiwan.There was no need for the whole socialist camp including the USSR to get involved in this war.To thise Mao Zedong replied,via Foreign Ministry, that these islands were Chinese territory and their liberation was China's internal affair.15 Because the USSR could not exactly learn what China had in mind,it decided to send Gromyko to China.Before this,the Soviet Embassy Counsellor,Sudarikov, called on Zhou Enlai on September 5 under Khrushchev's instructions.Zhou Enlai used the meeting to discuss China's analysis of the situations in Taiwan Straits from both the domestic and international perspectives,the problems between Taiwan and the U.S.,and China's stand,tactics and the actions China had taken.Zhou Enlai especially stressed that the bombardment of the islands of Jinmen and Mazu did not 5Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact The Cold War History of Sino-Soviet Relations June 2005 of September 1958), because the USSR did not know what China’s strategic objectives were, it announced its support for China’s actions and tried to take some concrete steps on the one hand, while on the other hand it sought through a variety of channel to ascertain China’s intentions so as to influence and restrict China’s actions. Realizing that war might break out in the Taiwan Straits area, the Soviet military showed great caution and restraint at this stage. Although the USSR might have known in advance what action China would take, the Soviet leaders were nonetheless astonished that China had absolutely not informed them of the time, objective and plan of the bombardment.13 Hence the knowledge of China’s intentions became the essential prerequisite for the USSR’s policy decisions and the Soviet embassy in China became the important source of relevant information. After the bombardment the Soviet embassy immediately telegraphed the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party to say that China had sent a message only after the bombardment on August 23 and had not in any way given advance notice of its intentions in this important military and political action. From the beginning of the crisis till the end of 1958, Soviet embassy sent in all 52 reports on the matter. According to these reports, the Russians believed that “It would not be entirely correct to regard the solution of the Taiwan issue …as purely a domestic affair of China. In the first stage of the development of the Taiwan conflict our Chinese friends have demonstrated a rather simplistic approach to evaluating the degree of urgency of the Taiwan problem and have let the possibility of aggravating the international situation emerge to keep the United States ‘on the verge of war’ from their side too.” The reports also pointed out that “Our Chinese friends started to show excessive sensitivity toward the problems of soverignty and independence of their country, reservations about the measures that used to be taken by both countries jointly.” The Soviets obviously believed that the Chinese showed a tendency towards solving Asian problems themselves. They did not think it necessary to consult the USSR about their planned actions, though they would expect its support when the situation got out of control.14 On receiving the reports from the Soviet Embassy, Khrushchev immediately demanded that the embassy inform Beijing that considering that China had just begun socialist construction and was quite backward both economically and militarily, she did not at present have the capacity to launch a modern war and carry out a landing operation on Taiwan. There was no need for the whole socialist camp including the USSR to get involved in this war. To thise Mao Zedong replied, via Foreign Ministry , that these islands were Chinese territory and their liberation was China’s internal affair. 15 Because the USSR could not exactly learn what China had in mind, it decided to send Gromyko to China. Before this, the Soviet Embassy Counsellor, Sudarikov, called on Zhou Enlai on September 5 under Khrushchev’s instructions. Zhou Enlai used the meeting to discuss China’s analysis of the situations in Taiwan Straits from both the domestic and international perspectives, the problems between Taiwan and the U.S., and China’s stand, tactics and the actions China had taken. Zhou Enlai especially stressed that the bombardment of the islands of Jinmen and Mazu did not 5