648 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION ing in these four other factors would not leave much of a puzzle to be solved;even Liberman is perfectly willing to admit that conquest typically does not pay when the costs of seizing territory and the actions of rival states are factored in (p.4).He argues that what is a puzzle is"whether the conquest of industrial economies pays,aside from the costs of conquering territory and the costs imposed by retaliating third parties"(p.3). Liberman (1996)points out two key reasons why it is important to specifically study the economic benefits of conquest.First,if conquest does pay economically, then there will exist higher incentives for expansionist states to upset the status quo, and the system consequently will become more unstable and vice versa.Second,if conquest does pay economically,then the only thing that will keep the peace will be the other factors that he excludes from his study such as military deterrence,a willingness to balance against aggression,and the costliness of modern warfare.In short,the eco- nomic benefits of conquest directly affect(a)the degree to which there are incentives to upset the territorial status quo and (b)the degree to which states must be militarily vigilant to maintain the peace. Despite the substantive importance of the economic benefits of conquest,this topic has been relatively neglected in recent years.International relations scholars,of course,routinely discuss the cost-benefit ratio of war as a key parameter in interna- tional relations.Yet,the focus of analysis invariably is on the cost side of this equation, and little attention is paid to the benefit side (e.g.,Zacher 1992,67-71).In recent years, international relations scholars have paid great attention to a number of different fac- tors that have increased the costs of conflict facing leaders of advanced states during the post-World War II period.They include the greatly increased potential destruction of war due to vastly more powerful modern weapons,both nuclear(Waltz 1993;Gaddis 1987)and conventional(Mueller 1988);higher levels of resistance to war on the part of domestic publics (Russett 1993;Rosenau 1990);high potential losses of economic benefits due to increased levels of trade interdependence (Oneal and Russett 1997; Rosecrance 1986);stronger international norms against the use of force (Mueller 1989;Ray 1989);and the dominance of the defense over the offense due to factors such as greatly improved reconnaissance capabilities (Jervis 1978;Van Evera 1990-91).By comparison,scant few pages have been devoted to forwarding arguments about how the economic benefits of conquest might have changed among the most advanced states during the post-World War II period. One possible reason for this neglect is that this subject simply falls between the cracks of international political economy and security studies (Kirshner 1998).The most likely reason is that many international relations scholars simply accept the wide- spread argument that conquering an advanced state no longer pays due to increased levels of nationalism (Rosecrance 1986,34;Gilpin 1981,142;Knorr 1975).In this conventional view,which Liberman (1996)aptly labels the quagmire perspective, empire is now seen as unprofitable due to the costs associated with suppressing upris- 1.A good portion of the references on this topic are noted by Liberman(1996)in note 29 (pp.161- 62)of his book.In addition to these citations listed here by Liberman,see also Ullman(1991,23-25), Singer and Wildavsky (1993,15-16),Van Evera (1990-91,14-15),Jervis (1991-92,49-50),and Rose- crance(1996,48,56).Very few existing analyses devote more than a page or two to the economic benefits of conquest.648 JOURNAL OF CONFLICTRESOLUTION ing in these four other factors would not leave much of a puzzle to be solved; even Liberman is perfectly willing to admit that conquest typically does not pay when the costs of seizing territory and the actions of rival states are factored in (p. 4). He argues that what is a puzzle is "whether the conquest of industrial economies pays, aside from the costs of conquering territory and the costs imposed by retaliating third parties" (p. 3). Liberman (1996) points out two key reasons why it is important to specifically study the economic benefits of conquest. First, if conquest does pay economically, then there will exist higher incentives for expansionist states to upset the status quo, and the system consequently will become more unstable and vice versa. Second, if conquest does pay economically, then the only thing that will keep the peace will be the other factors that he excludes from his study such as military deterrence, a willingness to balance against aggression, and the costliness of modern warfare. In short, the eco￾nomic benefits of conquest directly affect (a) the degree to which there are incentives to upset the territorial status quo and (b) the degree to which states must be militarily vigilant to maintain the peace. Despite the substantive importance of the economic benefits of conquest, this topic has been relatively neglected in recent years. International relations scholars, of course, routinely discuss the cost-benefit ratio of war as a key parameter in interna￾tional relations. Yet, the focus of analysis invariably is on the cost side of this equation, and little attention is paid to the benefit side (e.g., Zacher 1992,67-71). In recent years, international relations scholars have paid great attention to a number of different fac￾tors that have increased the costs of conflict facing leaders of advanced states during the post-World War II period. They include the greatly increased potential destruction of war due to vastly more powerful modern weapons, both nuclear (Waltz 1993; Gaddis 1987) and conventional (Mueller 1988); higher levels of resistance to war on the part of domestic publics (Russett 1993; Rosenau 1990); high potential losses of economic benefits due to increased levels of trade interdependence (Oneal and Russett 1997; Rosecrance 1986); stronger international norms against the use of force (Mueller 1989; Ray 1989); and the dominance of the defense over the offense due to factors such as greatly improved reconnaissance capabilities (Jervis 1978; Van Evera 1990-91). By comparison, scant few pages have been devoted to forwarding arguments about how the economic benefits of conquest might have changed among the most advanced states during the post-World War II period.' One possible reason for this neglect is that this subject simply falls between the cracks of international political economy and security studies (Kirshner 1998). The most likely reason is that many international relations scholars simply accept the wide￾spread argument that conquering an advanced state no longer pays due to increased levels of nationalism (Rosecrance 1986, 34; Gilpin 1981, 142; Knorr 1975). In this conventional view, which Liberman (1996) aptly labels the quagmire perspective, empire is now seen as unprofitable due to the costs associated with suppressing upris- 1. A good portion of the references on this topic are noted by Liberman (1996) in note 29 (pp. 161- 62) of his book. In addition to these citations listed here by Liberman, see also Ullman (1991, 23-25), Singer and Wildavsky (1993, 15-16), Van Evera (1990-91, 14-15), Jervis (1991-92, 49-50), and Rose￾crance (1996, 48, 56). Very few existing analyses devote more than a page or two to the economic benefits of conquest