Brooks CHANGING BENEFITS OF CONQUEST 647 actually enhances the profitability of conquest.If Liberman is correct,then the incen- tives for aggression in the developed world might actually be increasing over time. In this article,I further analyze the conditions under which conquest is likely to reap significant economic rewards.Because Liberman's (1996)book is the key work on this topic,I begin by reviewing the main elements of his analysis.I then argue that more extensive analysis of the economic benefits of conquest is greatly needed;in par- ticular,it is necessary to look at factors other than the level of popular resistance that may affect the benefits of conquest.Although it is abundantly clear that there have been dramatic economic transformations during the post-World War II period,espe- cially in the most advanced countries,scholars have so far failed to devote sustained attention to whether any of these economic changes can significantly alter the benefits of conquest.I analyze in detail how one recent economic change,the globalization of production,affects the benefits of conquest. I draw on analyses and findings from the recent literature on the globalization of production.This literature,developed primarily by economists and management scholars,has been neglected for the most part by security and peace scholars.I stress that the structure of global production has changed dramatically during the post-World War II period,especially over the past 25 years.Four economic transfor- mations are highlighted here:(a)the increased geographic dispersion of production, (b)the greatly enhanced significance of interfirm alliances,(c)the increased ease of engaging in foreign direct investment(FDI),and (d)the general shift toward "knowledge-based"economies in the most advanced countries.Only the last of these four changes has so far received much attention in the literature.The bulk of my analy- sis is not devoted to reviewing exactly how the structure of global production has changed in recent years.Rather,it advances a series of deductive arguments about why these transformations appear to have reduced the economic benefits of conquest. Although none of these individual arguments has a decisive impact,their collective impact strongly indicates that the benefits have significantly declined,but only among those highly advanced countries in which these economic transformations have so far had a substantial impact. WHY MORE STUDY OF THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF CONQUEST IS NEEDED What exactly do the"economic"benefits of conquest consist of?Liberman(1996) carves out a very useful definition in his book.He brackets all other factors that do not directly affect the economic benefits of conquest:"the balance sheets evaluated in this book do not consider the costs of military conflict or economic sanctions imposed by states outside the empire,the benefits of neutralizing potentially hostile neighbors,or the utility of strategic territory"(p.4).There are several reasons for not considering these four other factors.First,they do not affect the economic benefits of conquest; rather,all of them involve either costs associated with war or strategic benefits from seizing territory.Second,Liberman points out that scholars already have extensively studied how these four other factors affect the cost-benefit ratio for war.Third,bring-Brooks / CHANGING BENEFITS OF CONQUEST 647 actually enhances the profitability of conquest. If Liberman is correct, then the incen￾tives for aggression in the developed world might actually be increasing over time. In this article, I further analyze the conditions under which conquest is likely to reap significant economic rewards. Because Liberman's (1996) book is the key work on this topic, I begin by reviewing the main elements of his analysis. I then argue that more extensive analysis of the economic benefits of conquest is greatly needed; in par￾ticular, it is necessary to look at factors other than the level of popular resistance that may affect the benefits of conquest. Although it is abundantly clear that there have been dramatic economic transformations during the post-World War II period, espe￾cially in the most advanced countries, scholars have so far failed to devote sustained attention to whether any of these economic changes can significantly alter the benefits of conquest. I analyze in detail how one recent economic change, the globalization of production, affects the benefits of conquest. I draw on analyses and findings from the recent literature on the globalization of production. This literature, developed primarily by economists and management scholars, has been neglected for the most part by security and peace scholars. I stress that the structure of global production has changed dramatically during the post-World War II period, especially over the past 25 years. Four economic transfor￾mations are highlighted here: (a) the increased geographic dispersion of production, (b) the greatly enhanced significance of interfirm alliances,(c) the increased ease of engaging in foreign direct investment (FDI), and (d) the general shift toward "knowledge-based" economies in the most advanced countries. Only the last of these four changes has so far received much attention in the literature. The bulk of my analy￾sis is not devoted to reviewing exactly how the structure of global production has changed in recent years. Rather, it advances a series of deductive arguments about why these transformations appear to have reduced the economic benefits of conquest. Although none of these individual arguments has a decisive impact, their collective impact strongly indicates that the benefits have significantly declined, but only among those highly advanced countries in which these economic transformations have so far had a substantial impact. WHY MORE STUDY OF THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF CONQUEST IS NEEDED What exactly do the "economic" benefits of conquest consist of? Liberman (1996) carves out a very useful definition in his book. He brackets all other factors that do not directly affect the economic benefits of conquest: "the balance sheets evaluated in this book do not consider the costs of military conflict or economic sanctions imposed by states outside the empire, the benefits of neutralizing potentially hostile neighbors, or the utility of strategic territory" (p. 4). There are several reasons for not considering these four other factors. First, they do not affect the economic benefits of conquest; rather, all of them involve either costs associated with war or strategic benefits from seizing territory. Second, Liberman points out that scholars already have extensively studied how these four other factors affect the cost-benefit ratio for war. Third, bring-