Between Power and principle regimes--can influence the behavior of international actors. States create and comply with the requirements of international regimes, these scholars claim, because the regimes allow Interdependence: World Politics in Transition 19(Little Brown 1977)(defining internation regimes as " governing arrangements that affect relationships of interdependence, or networks of rules, norms, and procedures that regularize behavior and control its effects") term"regimes"is now commonly used interchangeably with "institutions. See, for example, Ronald B. Mitchell and Patricia M. Keilbach, Situation Structure and Institutional Design: Reciprocity, Coercion, and Exchange, in Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal, eds, The Rational Design of International Institutions 131, 133(2004)(We also use the term regime interchangeably with institution. )(emphasis added In political science, recent variants of this approach are variously labeled"modified tructural realism,”“ intergovernmental institutionalism,”"“ neoliberal institutionalism,”and new institutionalism. See, for example, Robert O. Keohane, Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Bevond, in Robert O Keohane, ed, Neorealism and Its Critics_158, 190-97( Columbia 1986)(outlining a research plan for Modified Structural Realism) Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie, International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State, 40 Intl Org 753, 759-60(1986)(explaining that international regimes can help clarify why in the 1970s states did not respond to the pressure on institutional arrangements in "beggar-thy-neighbor terms"); Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy 63(Princeton 1984)("Theories of regimes can incorporate realist insights about the role of power and interest, while also indicating the inadequacy of theories that define interests so narrowly that they fail to take he role of institutions into account. ) Modified Structural Realism is the immediate bridge from Structural Realism, often referred to as Neorealism. See, for example, Robert O Keohane, Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics, in Keohane, ed, Neorealism and Its Critics 1, 17. See, for example, Judith Goldstein, et al, eds, Legalization and World Politics (MiT 2001)(examining the legalization of regimes and the impact of regimes on world politics); Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Nidal, The Rational Design of International Institutions, in Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal, eds, The Rational Design of International Institutions 1, 2, 3, 7(2004)(referring to various treaties as included among the institutions the volume examines). Legal scholars have contributed to this reconceptualization by using institutionalist approaches to examine state compliance with international law. See Andrew T Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 Cal L Rev 1823(2002)(putting forward a theory of international legal compliance in which rational, self-interested states and international law punish violations through reputational and direct sanctions); Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U Chi L Rev 1113(1999)(presenting a theory of customary international law that draws on rational choice theory); John K. Setear, Ar Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of International Relations Theory and International Law, 37 Harv Intl LJ 139(1996)(using an institutional approach to explain the Law of TreatiesBetween Power and Principle 10 regimes—can influence the behavior of international actors.20 States create and comply with the requirements of international regimes, these scholars claim, because the regimes allow Interdependence: World Politics in Transition 19 (Little Brown 1977) (defining international regimes as “governing arrangements that affect relationships of interdependence,” or “networks of rules, norms, and procedures that regularize behavior and control its effects”). The term “regimes” is now commonly used interchangeably with “institutions.” See, for example, Ronald B. Mitchell and Patricia M. Keilbach, Situation Structure and Institutional Design: Reciprocity, Coercion, and Exchange, in Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal, eds, The Rational Design of International Institutions 131, 133 (2004) (“We also use the term regime interchangeably with institution.”) (emphasis added). 20 In political science, recent variants of this approach are variously labeled “modified structural realism,” “intergovernmental institutionalism,” “neoliberal institutionalism,” and “new institutionalism.” See, for example, Robert O. Keohane, Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond, in Robert O Keohane, ed, Neorealism and Its Critics 158, 190–97 (Columbia 1986) (outlining a research plan for Modified Structural Realism); Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie, International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State, 40 Intl Org 753, 759–60 (1986) (explaining that international regimes can help clarify why in the 1970s states did not respond to the pressure on institutional arrangements in “beggar-thy-neighbor terms”); Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy 63 (Princeton 1984) (“Theories of regimes can incorporate realist insights about the role of power and interest, while also indicating the inadequacy of theories that define interests so narrowly that they fail to take the role of institutions into account.”). Modified Structural Realism is the immediate bridge from Structural Realism, often referred to as Neorealism. See, for example, Robert O. Keohane, Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics, in Keohane, ed, Neorealism and Its Critics 1, 17. See, for example, Judith Goldstein, et al, eds, Legalization and World Politics (MIT 2001) (examining the legalization of regimes and the impact of regimes on world politics); Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal, The Rational Design of International Institutions, in Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal, eds, The Rational Design of International Institutions 1, 2, 3, 7 (2004) (referring to various treaties as included among the institutions the volume examines). Legal scholars have contributed to this reconceptualization by using institutionalist approaches to examine state compliance with international law. See Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 Cal L Rev 1823 (2002) (putting forward a theory of international legal compliance in which rational, self-interested states and international law punish violations through reputational and direct sanctions); Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U Chi L Rev 1113 (1999) (presenting a theory of customary international law that draws on rational choice theory); John K. Setear, An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of International Relations Theory and International Law, 37 Harv Intl L J 139 (1996) (using an institutional approach to explain the Law of Treaties)