Between Power and principle A. Interest-Based Models The interest-based approach has its roots in the realist view of international cooperation, which became dominant in American political science scholarship in the wake of World War II. In this view, states are seen as rational, unitary actors in pursuit of self interest. Early realist accounts used this vision of state action to argue that internationa agreements exist and are enforced only when they serve the interests of the most powerful states. More recent scholarship, by contrast, argues that regimes"including legal otherwise inexplicable state behavior in the human rights arena, and norm-centered accounts do not deny the power of rational self-interest to motivate state behavior. Indeed, Moravcsik has aptly labeled this a"curious convergenceof the two main theoretical accounts in his work on the European Convention on Human Rights. Moravcsik, 54 Intl Org at 224-25 (cited in note 7). Moreover, several scholars have done excellent work at the intersection of interest-based and norm-based accounts. See, for example, Martin Shapiro Alec Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges: Constitutional Powers in Europe(2000). And much work in the so-called English School of international relations cannot be characterized as falling solely within one camp or the other. The goal here is therefore not to exaggerate the differences between the approaches, but simply to outline the prevailing modes of thought on the role of international law in shaping state behavior 17 This outline (as well as what follows) necessarily simplifies what are deeply complex theoretical accounts For a more comprehensive introduction to these theoretical approaches, see Oona A Hathaway and Harold Hongju Koh, Foundations of International Law and Politics(Foundation Press 2004). See also Oona A Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference,, 111 Yale L J 1935, 1942-62(2002) 8 Indeed, E H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau, among others, made the case that states are simply rational unitary actors motivated by their geopolitical interests. Law, in this view, is nothing more than one of a variety of tools used by states to enhance their own power See generally Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations(cited in note 3); Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis(cited in note 3); Morgenthau, 34 Am J Intl L 260(cited in note 3). In the 1970s, Kenneth Waltz and others expanded on the realist perspective, arguing that states may pursue a broader set of interests and sometimes make strategic decisions to engage in international cooperation. Nonetheless, even in this "neorealist" approach, states primary motivation remains preservation and accumulation of power. As Waltz put it in his classic book, Theory of International Politics, states are "unitary actors who, at a minimum seek their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination. Kenneth N Waltz, Theory of International Politics 118(McGraw-Hill 1979). In this view, the most powerful states create and join treaties that advance their power interests and then force eaker states to join and comply by threatening sanctions or promising benefits defined as "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables in Stephen D. Krasner, ed, International Regimes 1, 2 (Cornell 1983). Compare Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power andBetween Power and Principle 9 A. Interest-Based Models The interest-based approach has its roots in the realist view of international cooperation, which became dominant in American political science scholarship in the wake of World War II. In this view, states are seen as rational, unitary actors in pursuit of self￾interest. Early realist accounts used this vision of state action to argue that international agreements exist and are enforced only when they serve the interests of the most powerful states.18 More recent scholarship, by contrast, argues that regimes19—including legal otherwise inexplicable state behavior in the human rights arena, and norm-centered accounts do not deny the power of rational self-interest to motivate state behavior. Indeed, Moravcsik has aptly labeled this a “curious convergence” of the two main theoretical accounts in his work on the European Convention on Human Rights. Moravcsik, 54 Intl Org at 224–25 (cited in note 7). Moreover, several scholars have done excellent work at the intersection of interest-based and norm-based accounts. See, for example, Martin Shapiro & Alec Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges: Constitutional Powers in Europe (2000). And much work in the so-called English School of international relations cannot be characterized as falling solely within one camp or the other. The goal here is therefore not to exaggerate the differences between the approaches, but simply to outline the prevailing modes of thought on the role of international law in shaping state behavior. 17 This outline (as well as what follows) necessarily simplifies what are deeply complex theoretical accounts. For a more comprehensive introduction to these theoretical approaches, see Oona A. Hathaway and Harold Hongju Koh, Foundations of International Law and Politics (Foundation Press 2004). See also Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 Yale L J 1935, 1942–62 (2002). 18 Indeed, E.H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau, among others, made the case that states are simply rational unitary actors motivated by their geopolitical interests. Law, in this view, is nothing more than one of a variety of tools used by states to enhance their own power. See generally Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (cited in note 3); Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis (cited in note 3); Morgenthau, 34 Am J Intl L 260 (cited in note 3). In the 1970s, Kenneth Waltz and others expanded on the realist perspective, arguing that states may pursue a broader set of interests and sometimes make strategic decisions to engage in international cooperation. Nonetheless, even in this “neorealist” approach, states’ primary motivation remains preservation and accumulation of power. As Waltz put it in his classic book, Theory of International Politics, states are “unitary actors who, at a minimum seek their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination.” Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics 118 (McGraw-Hill 1979). In this view, the most powerful states create and join treaties that advance their power interests and then force weaker states to join and comply by threatening sanctions or promising benefits. 19 Regimes are defined as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations.” Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables in Stephen D. Krasner, ed, International Regimes 1, 2 (Cornell 1983). Compare Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and