Between Power and principle borders. This vision, while partially accurate, fails to acknowledge the ways in which international law is fundamentally different from its domestic counterpart.+ Nonetheless, over the past decade, two broad theoretical approaches regarding the role of international law in state behavior have started to cut across the disciplinary divide between political science and international legal scholarship. The first, which I term the interest-based approach, argues that states create and comply with international law only when there is some clear objective reward for doing so; in other words, states follow consequentialist reasoning or what has been termed the "logic of consequences. The ond, which I label the norm-based approach, argues that governments create and comply with treaties not only because they expect a reward for doing So, but also because of their commitment(or the commitment of transnational actors that influence them)to the norms or ideas embodied in the treaties. Hence in this view states often follow what has been termed the "logic of appropriateness"rather than that of consequences. Moreover, nonstate and substate actors are the focus of much more attention in the norm-centered account than in the interest-centered one, for they play an important role in constructing state preferences. As I shall show in the brief review that follows, each of the valuable insights into the ways in which states react to international law. />se accounts offers 13 Harold Koh writes: [T]hat reminds me of something a former law school dean told me sixteen ras coming to Yale to teach International H Transactions: that there is no genuinely transnational body of international business law because transnational business law is like that famous non- book, The Law of the Horse, which consists of Chapter I: Contracting for a Horse, " Chapter II: Owning a Horse, Chapter Ill, "Torts by a Horse, and Chapter Iv: "Litigating over a Horse Harold Hongju Koh, The Globalization of Freedom, 26 Yale J Intl L 305, 305 (2001). Moreover, international law is rarely a required course in law school; this reflects a widespread belief among legal academics that an understanding of international law is uperfluous to a solid legal education See discussion in Part IL. A-B James G. March and Johan P. Olsen introduce the terms"logic of consequences" and"logic of appropriateness, which they draw from their study of cognitive psychology in their research on organizations and political institutions. James G. March and Johan P Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics 160-62 (Free Press 1989)(comparing the logic of consequences-where behavior is willful, fills subjective desires, and is driven by preferences and expectations about consequences-with the logic of appropriateness--where behavior is intentional, fills the obligations of a role in a situation, and stems from a conception of necessity, rather than preference). See also James G. March and Johan P Olsen, The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders 52 Intl Org 943, 949-54(1998); John W. Meyer and Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony, 83 Am J Sociology 340(1977) (critiquing the reliance on consequentialist logic in the social sciences The line between the interest-based and norm-based approaches is far absolute. Interest-based models often fall back on normative insights in order to explainBetween Power and Principle 8 borders.13 This vision, while partially accurate, fails to acknowledge the ways in which international law is fundamentally different from its domestic counterpart.14 Nonetheless, over the past decade, two broad theoretical approaches regarding the role of international law in state behavior have started to cut across the disciplinary divide between political science and international legal scholarship. The first, which I term the interest-based approach, argues that states create and comply with international law only when there is some clear objective reward for doing so; in other words, states follow consequentialist reasoning or what has been termed the “logic of consequences.”15 The second, which I label the norm-based approach, argues that governments create and comply with treaties not only because they expect a reward for doing so, but also because of their commitment (or the commitment of transnational actors that influence them) to the norms or ideas embodied in the treaties. Hence, in this view, states often follow what has been termed the “logic of appropriateness” rather than that of consequences. Moreover, nonstate and substate actors are the focus of much more attention in the norm-centered account than in the interest-centered one, for they play an important role in constructing state preferences.16 As I shall show in the brief review that follows, each of these accounts offers valuable insights into the ways in which states react to international law.17 13 Harold Koh writes: [T]hat reminds me of something a former law school dean told me sixteen years ago when I said I was coming to Yale to teach International Business Transactions: that there is no genuinely transnational body of international business law, because transnational business law is like that famous non￾book, The Law of the Horse, which consists of Chapter I: “Contracting for a Horse,” Chapter II: “Owning a Horse;” Chapter III, “Torts by a Horse,” and Chapter IV: “Litigating over a Horse.” Harold Hongju Koh, The Globalization of Freedom, 26 Yale J Intl L 305, 305 (2001). Moreover, international law is rarely a required course in law school; this reflects a widespread belief among legal academics that an understanding of international law is superfluous to a solid legal education. 14 See discussion in Part II.A–B. 15 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen introduce the terms “logic of consequences” and “logic of appropriateness,” which they draw from their study of cognitive psychology in their research on organizations and political institutions. James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics 160–62 (Free Press 1989) (comparing the logic of consequences—where behavior is willful, fills subjective desires, and is driven by preferences and expectations about consequences—with the logic of appropriateness—where behavior is intentional, fills the obligations of a role in a situation, and stems from a conception of necessity, rather than preference). See also James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders, 52 Intl Org 943, 949–54 (1998); John W. Meyer and Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony, 83 Am J Sociology 340 (1977) (critiquing the reliance on consequentialist logic in the social sciences). 16 The line between the interest-based and norm-based approaches is far from absolute. Interest-based models often fall back on normative insights in order to explain