Between Power and principle to explaining state compliance with customary law, the way in which the theory operates necessarily will be quite different. The Article proceeds as follows. I begin in Part I by briefly examining the existing international relations and legal literature on the influence of international law on state behavior. I classify the literature into two broad camps--interest-based models and norm- based modelsand seek to trace out in broad outlines the competing explanations offered by each. I conclude this Part by briefly discussing the start of a promising convergence of these two theories upon which this Article seeks to build. Part II begins to delineate my own account of the reach and limits of international law. In this Part, I examine the aspects of international treaty law that have sown the seeds of doubt as to whether it is really "lawat all. I focus particularly on treaty law's largely voluntary nature and the relative absence of central enforcement mechanisms in international law. This discussion forms the foundation for my integrated theory of international law, which I develop in Part Ill. Part IV assesses the theory against existing accounts using new empirical evidence on state behavior under key human rights and environmental treaties, as well as existing empirical studies. Finally, Part V concludes with suggestions for future research and for designing international law arness its real but limited power more effectively Existing literature The divide between advocates and skeptics of international law is in part the legacy of a gradually disappearing schism in scholarship and teaching between students of law and tudents of international relations, manifested institutionally as a split between law schools and political science departments. From the close of World War II through the last decade, scholars at law schools who taught and studied international law ignored many of the questions of context and power relations that had become the central concern of international study in political science departments. Political scientists, for their part, tended to dismiss international law altogether Even within legal academia, international law was, until the last decade, regarded largely as a curiosity-a subject of study truly relevant only to the few who devoted themselves to it. With increased globalization, the isolation of international law has begun to melt away. But what has replaced it is, in many cases, almost equally dismissive. Rather than integrate the work of international legal scholars into the rest of the curriculum, legal academics have instead tended to regard international law merely as an extension of existing areas of domestic law-as simply torts, corporate law, or criminal law that happens to cross Leslie Brierly, The Basis of Obligation in International Law 1-68(Oxford 1958)(Sir Hersch Lauterpacht and C.H.M. Waldock, eds): H. Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community 3-4(Oxford 1933). For a particularly interesting refutation of the assertion that sovereign states cannot be bound by international law, see H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 215-21(Clarendon 1961). See also Richard L. O'Meara, Note, Applving the Critical urisprudence of International Law to the _ Case Concerning the military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, 71 Va l rev 1183, 1203(1985)(claiming that" a truly independent, sovereign state cannot be bound without its consent")Between Power and Principle 7 to explaining state compliance with customary law, the way in which the theory operates necessarily will be quite different. The Article proceeds as follows. I begin in Part I by briefly examining the existing international relations and legal literature on the influence of international law on state behavior. I classify the literature into two broad camps—interest-based models and norm￾based models—and seek to trace out in broad outlines the competing explanations offered by each. I conclude this Part by briefly discussing the start of a promising convergence of these two theories upon which this Article seeks to build. Part II begins to delineate my own account of the reach and limits of international law. In this Part, I examine the aspects of international treaty law that have sown the seeds of doubt as to whether it is really “law” at all. I focus particularly on treaty law’s largely voluntary nature and the relative absence of central enforcement mechanisms in international law. This discussion forms the foundation for my integrated theory of international law, which I develop in Part III. Part IV assesses the theory against existing accounts using new empirical evidence on state behavior under key human rights and environmental treaties, as well as existing empirical studies. Finally, Part V concludes with suggestions for future research and for designing international law to harness its real but limited power more effectively. I. Existing Literature The divide between advocates and skeptics of international law is in part the legacy of a gradually disappearing schism in scholarship and teaching between students of law and students of international relations, manifested institutionally as a split between law schools and political science departments. From the close of World War II through the last decade, scholars at law schools who taught and studied international law ignored many of the questions of context and power relations that had become the central concern of international study in political science departments. Political scientists, for their part, tended to dismiss international law altogether. Even within legal academia, international law was, until the last decade, regarded largely as a curiosity—a subject of study truly relevant only to the few who devoted themselves to it. With increased globalization, the isolation of international law has begun to melt away. But what has replaced it is, in many cases, almost equally dismissive. Rather than integrate the work of international legal scholars into the rest of the curriculum, legal academics have instead tended to regard international law merely as an extension of existing areas of domestic law—as simply torts, corporate law, or criminal law that happens to cross Leslie Brierly, The Basis of Obligation in International Law 1–68 (Oxford 1958) (Sir Hersch Lauterpacht and C.H.M. Waldock, eds); H. Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community 3–4 (Oxford 1933). For a particularly interesting refutation of the assertion that sovereign states cannot be bound by international law, see H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 215–21 (Clarendon 1961). See also Richard L. O’Meara, Note, Applying the Critical Jurisprudence of International Law to the Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, 71 Va L Rev 1183, 1203 (1985) (claiming that “a truly independent, sovereign state cannot be bound without its consent”)