International Security 13:3 56 would require atomic bombs.That response prompted Truman to order the preparation of plans for launching an atomic attack in the event the Soviet Union entered the fighting.23 During the next three weeks,however,the president and his advisers came to see more diplomatic and political than military utility in nuclear weapons.That perception grew out of developments surrounding the first engagements between American and North Korean forces.Washington in- tervened in Korea to defend the principle of collective security and America's leadership of the non-communist world.24 Policy-makers hoped for "resound- ing military success achieved by demonstrably overwhelming power."25 But neither bombing North Korea nor blocking key roads slowed the enemy juggernaut plunging southward.In their first encounters,it was American troops rather than Pyongyang's soldiers who retreated.26 Alarmed by these results,General Douglas MacArthur begged Washington to double the force at his disposal so that he might hold at least the southern tip of the Korean peninsula.27 But his superiors were not prepared to make definitive choices at this point.Meeting with the Cabinet on July 7,1950,the president groped for some way to "let the world know we mean business."Central Intelligence Agency(CIA)Director Roscoe Hillenkoetter proposed seeking United Na- tions sanction for use of the atomic bomb even if doing so could not guarantee that Moscow would restrain Pyongyang and Beijing.Although he remained skeptical of Soviet intentions,Truman declined to make so overt a threat. Downplaying the immediate danger,he insisted that the Soviets were "sev- enty percent bluffers."28 Then,making a Solomonic choice between the Pen- 23.Ibid.,pp.159-160.It should be noted that no one present voiced the slightest objection to the president's order. 24.Ernest R.May,"Lessons"of the Past (New York:Oxford University Press,1973),pp.75-78; William Stueck,Jr.,The Road to Confrontation (Chapel Hill:University of North Carolina Press, 1981),pp.191-192,255-257. 25.FRLS,1950,Vol.7,Korea,p.278. 26.Roy K.Flint,"Task Force Smith and the 24th Division:Delay and Withdrawal,5-19 July 1950,"in Charles E.Heller and William A.Stofft,eds.,America's First Battles 1776-1965(Law- rence:University Press of Kansas,1986),pp.266-299;Clay Blair,Forgotten War:America in Korea 1950-1953(New York:Times Books,1987),pp.101-111. 27.D.Clayton James,The Years of MacArthur,Vol.3(Boston:Houghton Mifflin,1985),Pp.441- 442;James F.Schnabel and Robert J.Watson,The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy,Volume 3,The Korean War,part I(Washington,D.C.:Joint Chiefs of Staf0CS],1978),pp.179-185. 28.Cabinet meeting notes,July 7,1950,Box 1,Matthew J.Connelly papers,Truman Library; "Memorandum on psychological use'of the Atomic bomb in Korea Conflict,"July 6,1950, This content downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 21:10:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsInternational Security 13:3 156 would require atomic bombs. That response prompted Truman to order the preparation of plans for launching an atomic attack in the event the Soviet Union entered the fighting.23 During the next three weeks, however, the president and his advisers came to see more diplomatic and political than military utility in nuclear weapons. That perception grew out of developments surrounding the first engagements between American and North Korean forces. Washington in￾tervened in Korea to defend the principle of collective security and America's leadership of the non-communist world.24 Policy-makers hoped for "resound￾ing military success achieved by demonstrably overwhelming power."25 But neither bombing North Korea nor blocking key roads slowed the enemy juggernaut plunging southward. In their first encounters, it was American troops rather than Pyongyang's soldiers who retreated.26 Alarmed by these results, General Douglas MacArthur begged Washington to double the force at his disposal so that he might hold at least the southern tip of the Korean peninsula.27 But his superiors were not prepared to make definitive choices at this point. Meeting with the Cabinet on July 7, 1950, the president groped for some way to "let the world know we mean business." Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director Roscoe Hillenkoetter proposed seeking United Na￾tions sanction for use of the atomic bomb even if doing so could not guarantee that Moscow would restrain Pyongyang and Beijing. Although he remained skeptical of Soviet intentions, Truman declined to make so overt a threat. Downplaying the immediate danger, he insisted that the Soviets were "sev￾enty percent bluffers."28 Then, making a Solomonic choice between the Pen- 23. Ibid., pp. 159-160. It should be noted that no one present voiced the slightest objection to the president's order. 24. Ernest R. May, "Lessons" of the Past (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 75-78; William Stueck, Jr., The Road to Confrontation (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981), pp. 191-192, 255-257. 25. FRUS, 1950, Vol. 7, Korea, p. 278. 26. Roy K. Flint, "Task Force Smith and the 24th Division: Delay and Withdrawal, 5-19 July 1950," in Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft, eds., America's First Battles 1776-1965 (Law￾rence: University Press of Kansas, 1986), pp. 266-299; Clay Blair, Forgotten War: America in Korea 1950-1953 (New York: Times Books, 1987), pp. 101-111. 27. D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur, Vol. 3 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985), pp. 441- 442; James F. Schnabel and Robert J. Watson, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Volume 3, The Korean War, part I (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS], 1978), pp. 179-185. 28. Cabinet meeting notes, July 7, 1950, Box 1, Matthew J. Connelly papers, Truman Library; "Memorandum on psychological use' of the Atomic bomb in Korea Conflict," July 6, 1950, This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 21:10:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions