396 International Organization What an extraordinary man [Prime Minister William]Pitt is;he understands my ideas better than I do myself. -Adam Smith Theories of international organization have not yet escaped the long shadow of so-called hegemonic stability theory.The neoliberal institutionalists theorized that it was possible for openness to exist independent of hegemony,2 and they empiri- cally demonstrated that openness has persisted even"after hegemony."3 But there still has not been a robust challenge to the hegemonic stability theorists'claim that trade liberalization is least likely in a system populated by large,unequally developed states.4 The debate about the distribution of power's influence on global economic open- ness is as important as ever.Regimes of global economic governance have proven sufficiently durable to maintain openness even in the face of American relative economic decline.But the increasing tensions within these regimes,the ascent of economic powers resistant to complete market integration-like China and India- and the continuing economic malaise all increase the propensity toward closure.3 Will actors continue to support economic openness as the "structure"of the inter- national system evolves?If global markets shift toward closure,can they shift back toward openness absent a rising hegemon? I address these pressing questions by reexamining the origins of the first era of trade liberalization.Focused on the "openness"achieved,scholars of international politics have largely assumed that Britain did not begin pursuing openness until the 1820s.But the pursuit of openness might long antedate its achievement.Indeed, Britain first sought openness in the 1780s,as a threatened power in a hostile,multi- polar system.At that point,Britain relinquished control over the American colo- nies and pursued free trade with friend and foe alike. This article challenges "materialist"explanations for Britain's shift toward free trade that exclusively consider the structure of interests,institutions,and power at the international and domestic levels.The shift toward openness came well before hegemony,in precisely the multipolar world that hegemonic stability theorists claimed would be least likely to initiate the shift.I also show that domestic inter- ests and institutions underdetermined Britain's commercial strategy in the 1780s. These material variables did matter.They defined the range of possibilities.But this was a broad range,and it remained for policymakers to choose among com- peting strategies as they pursued power and plenty. 1.See Kindleberger 1973:Krasner 1976;and Keohane 1997. 2.See Ruggie 1982;Keohane 1984;Lake 1984;and Snidal 1985. 3.See McKeown 1983 and 1991;Conybeare 1983;Webb and Krasner 1989;and Lake 1991. 4.See Krasner 1976,323;and Mansfield 1994,179-80. 5.See Keohane and Nye 2003;Barton et al.2006,192-94;Mearsheimer 2001 and 2010; Schattschneider 1935;and Eichengreen 1989.What an extraordinary man @Prime Minister William# Pitt is; he understands my ideas better than I do myself+ —Adam Smith Theories of international organization have not yet escaped the long shadow of so-called hegemonic stability theory+ 1 The neoliberal institutionalists theorized that it was possible for openness to exist independent of hegemony, 2 and they empiri￾cally demonstrated that openness has persisted even “after hegemony+”3 But there still has not been a robust challenge to the hegemonic stability theorists’ claim that trade liberalization is least likely in a system populated by large, unequally developed states+ 4 The debate about the distribution of power’s influence on global economic open￾ness is as important as ever+ Regimes of global economic governance have proven sufficiently durable to maintain openness even in the face of American relative economic decline+ But the increasing tensions within these regimes, the ascent of economic powers resistant to complete market integration—like China and India— and the continuing economic malaise all increase the propensity toward closure+ 5 Will actors continue to support economic openness as the “structure” of the inter￾national system evolves? If global markets shift toward closure, can they shift back toward openness absent a rising hegemon? I address these pressing questions by reexamining the origins of the first era of trade liberalization+ Focused on the “openness” achieved, scholars of international politics have largely assumed that Britain did not begin pursuing openness until the 1820s+ But the pursuit of openness might long antedate its achievement+ Indeed, Britain first sought openness in the 1780s, as a threatened power in a hostile, multi￾polar system+ At that point, Britain relinquished control over the American colo￾nies and pursued free trade with friend and foe alike+ This article challenges “materialist” explanations for Britain’s shift toward free trade that exclusively consider the structure of interests, institutions, and power at the international and domestic levels+ The shift toward openness came well before hegemony, in precisely the multipolar world that hegemonic stability theorists claimed would be least likely to initiate the shift+ I also show that domestic inter￾ests and institutions underdetermined Britain’s commercial strategy in the 1780s+ These material variables did matter+ They defined the range of possibilities+ But this was a broad range, and it remained for policymakers to choose among com￾peting strategies as they pursued power and plenty+ 1+ See Kindleberger 1973; Krasner 1976; and Keohane 1997+ 2+ See Ruggie 1982; Keohane 1984; Lake 1984; and Snidal 1985+ 3+ See McKeown 1983 and 1991; Conybeare 1983; Webb and Krasner 1989; and Lake 1991+ 4+ See Krasner 1976, 323; and Mansfield 1994, 179–80+ 5+ See Keohane and Nye 2003; Barton et al+ 2006, 192–94; Mearsheimer 2001 and 2010; Schattschneider 1935; and Eichengreen 1989+ 396 International Organization