《国际政治经济学》文献资料（Political Economy of International Trade：Domestic Politics）Before Hegemony. Adam Smith, American Independence, and the Origins of the First Era of Globalization

International Organization http://journals.cambridge.orq/INO Additional services for International Organization: Email alerts:Click here Subscriptions:Click here Commercial reprints:Click here Terms of use Click here Before Hegemony:Adam Smith,American Independence,and the Origins of the First Era of Globalization James Ashley Morrison International Organization/Volume 66/Issue 03/July 2012,pp 395-428 D0:10.1017/S0020818312000148,Published online:13July2012 Link to this article:http://iournals cambridge org/abstract S0020818312000148 How to cite this article: James Ashley Morrison(2012).Before Hegemony:Adam Smith,American Independence,and the Origins of the First Era of Globalization.International 0 rganization,66,pp395-428doi:10.1017/S0020818312000148 Request Permissions Click here CAMNE JOURNALS Downloaded from http://journals.cambridge.org/INO,IP address:211.80.95.69 on 13 Jan 2015

International Organization http://journals.cambridge.org/INO Additional services for International Organization: Email alerts: Click here Subscriptions: Click here Commercial reprints: Click here Terms of use : Click here Before Hegemony: Adam Smith, American Independence, and the Origins of the First Era of Globalization James Ashley Morrison International Organization / Volume 66 / Issue 03 / July 2012, pp 395 - 428 DOI: 10.1017/S0020818312000148, Published online: 13 July 2012 Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0020818312000148 How to cite this article: James Ashley Morrison (2012). Before Hegemony: Adam Smith, American Independence, and the Origins of the First Era of Globalization. International Organization, 66, pp 395-428 doi:10.1017/S0020818312000148 Request Permissions : Click here Downloaded from http://journals.cambridge.org/INO, IP address: 211.80.95.69 on 13 Jan 2015

Before Hegemony:Adam Smith, American Independence,and the Origins of the First Era of Globalization James Ashley Morrison Abstract While extensive scholarship has shown that it is possible to maintain global economic openness after hegemony,economic liberalization is still thought to be unlikely prior to hegemonic ascent.This assumption is based on the conven- tional narrative that Great Britain began lowering its trade barriers in the 1820s as it began its hegemonic ascent.This article shows that Britain began pursuing an open trading structure in the 1780s-in precisely the multipolar world that heg- emonic stability theorists claimed would be least likely to initiate the shift.This change in commercial strategy depended crucially on the intellectual conversion of a key policymaker-the Earl of Shelburne-from mercantilist foreign economic pol- icy to Adam Smith's revolutionary laissez-faire liberalism.Using the case of "the world's most important trading state"in the nineteenth century,this article high- lights the importance of intellectuals-as well as their ideas-in shaping states'for- eign policy strategies.It also provides further evidence of key individuals'significance and their decisions at"critical junctures." I owe to a journey I made with Mr.Smith from Edinburgh to London the difference between light and darkness...The novelty of his principles .. made me unable to comprehend them at the time,but he urged them with so much...eloquence,that they took a certain hold which,though it did not... arrive at full conviction for some few years after,I can truly say has consti- tuted ever since the happiness of my life. -The Earl of Shelburne,Prime Minister(1782-83) I am indebted to Douglas Irwin,Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey,Jack Rakove,Judith Goldstein,Barry Weingast,Richard Boyd,David Steinberg,Jonathan Herzog,Margaret Peters,James Fearon,David Stasavage,Patrick Leblond,Craig Murphy,David Hancock,Moonhawk Kim,Kristina Johnson,Jeff Colgan,and Molly Roberts.I am also grateful to my colleagues at Middlebury College and the par- ticipants in the NEPSA,IPES,and ISA meetings.I also thank the editors and reviewers of this journal for their invaluable suggestions. International Organization 66,Summer 2012,pp.395-428 2012 by The IO Foundation. do:10.1017/S0020818312000148

Before Hegemony: Adam Smith, American Independence, and the Origins of the First Era of Globalization James Ashley Morrison Abstract While extensive scholarship has shown that it is possible to maintain global economic openness after hegemony, economic liberalization is still thought to be unlikely prior to hegemonic ascent+ This assumption is based on the conven￾tional narrative that Great Britain began lowering its trade barriers in the 1820s as it began its hegemonic ascent+ This article shows that Britain began pursuing an open trading structure in the 1780s—in precisely the multipolar world that heg￾emonic stability theorists claimed would be least likely to initiate the shift+ This change in commercial strategy depended crucially on the intellectual conversion of a key policymaker—the Earl of Shelburne—from mercantilist foreign economic pol￾icy to Adam Smith’s revolutionary laissez-faire liberalism+ Using the case of “the world’s most important trading state” in the nineteenth century, this article high￾lights the importance of intellectuals—as well as their ideas—in shaping states’ for￾eign policy strategies+ It also provides further evidence of key individuals’ significance and their decisions at “critical junctures+” I owe to a journey I made with Mr+ Smith from Edinburgh to London the difference between light and darkness +++ The novelty of his principles +++ made me unable to comprehend them at the time, but he urged them with so much +++ eloquence, that they took a certain hold which, though it did not +++ arrive at full conviction for some few years after, I can truly say has consti￾tuted ever since the happiness of my life+ —The Earl of Shelburne, Prime Minister ~1782–83! I am indebted to Douglas Irwin, Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey, Jack Rakove, Judith Goldstein, Barry Weingast, Richard Boyd, David Steinberg, Jonathan Herzog, Margaret Peters, James Fearon, David Stasavage, Patrick Leblond, Craig Murphy, David Hancock, Moonhawk Kim, Kristina Johnson, Jeff Colgan, and Molly Roberts+ I am also grateful to my colleagues at Middlebury College and the par￾ticipants in the NEPSA, IPES, and ISA meetings+ I also thank the editors and reviewers of this journal for their invaluable suggestions+ International Organization 66, Summer 2012, pp+ 395–428 © 2012 by The IO Foundation+ doi:10+10170S0020818312000148

396 International Organization What an extraordinary man [Prime Minister William]Pitt is;he understands my ideas better than I do myself. -Adam Smith Theories of international organization have not yet escaped the long shadow of so-called hegemonic stability theory.The neoliberal institutionalists theorized that it was possible for openness to exist independent of hegemony,2 and they empiri- cally demonstrated that openness has persisted even"after hegemony."3 But there still has not been a robust challenge to the hegemonic stability theorists'claim that trade liberalization is least likely in a system populated by large,unequally developed states.4 The debate about the distribution of power's influence on global economic open- ness is as important as ever.Regimes of global economic governance have proven sufficiently durable to maintain openness even in the face of American relative economic decline.But the increasing tensions within these regimes,the ascent of economic powers resistant to complete market integration-like China and India- and the continuing economic malaise all increase the propensity toward closure.3 Will actors continue to support economic openness as the "structure"of the inter- national system evolves?If global markets shift toward closure,can they shift back toward openness absent a rising hegemon? I address these pressing questions by reexamining the origins of the first era of trade liberalization.Focused on the "openness"achieved,scholars of international politics have largely assumed that Britain did not begin pursuing openness until the 1820s.But the pursuit of openness might long antedate its achievement.Indeed, Britain first sought openness in the 1780s,as a threatened power in a hostile,multi- polar system.At that point,Britain relinquished control over the American colo- nies and pursued free trade with friend and foe alike. This article challenges "materialist"explanations for Britain's shift toward free trade that exclusively consider the structure of interests,institutions,and power at the international and domestic levels.The shift toward openness came well before hegemony,in precisely the multipolar world that hegemonic stability theorists claimed would be least likely to initiate the shift.I also show that domestic inter- ests and institutions underdetermined Britain's commercial strategy in the 1780s. These material variables did matter.They defined the range of possibilities.But this was a broad range,and it remained for policymakers to choose among com- peting strategies as they pursued power and plenty. 1.See Kindleberger 1973:Krasner 1976;and Keohane 1997. 2.See Ruggie 1982;Keohane 1984;Lake 1984;and Snidal 1985. 3.See McKeown 1983 and 1991;Conybeare 1983;Webb and Krasner 1989;and Lake 1991. 4.See Krasner 1976,323;and Mansfield 1994,179-80. 5.See Keohane and Nye 2003;Barton et al.2006,192-94;Mearsheimer 2001 and 2010; Schattschneider 1935;and Eichengreen 1989

What an extraordinary man @Prime Minister William# Pitt is; he understands my ideas better than I do myself+ —Adam Smith Theories of international organization have not yet escaped the long shadow of so-called hegemonic stability theory+ 1 The neoliberal institutionalists theorized that it was possible for openness to exist independent of hegemony, 2 and they empiri￾cally demonstrated that openness has persisted even “after hegemony+”3 But there still has not been a robust challenge to the hegemonic stability theorists’ claim that trade liberalization is least likely in a system populated by large, unequally developed states+ 4 The debate about the distribution of power’s influence on global economic open￾ness is as important as ever+ Regimes of global economic governance have proven sufficiently durable to maintain openness even in the face of American relative economic decline+ But the increasing tensions within these regimes, the ascent of economic powers resistant to complete market integration—like China and India— and the continuing economic malaise all increase the propensity toward closure+ 5 Will actors continue to support economic openness as the “structure” of the inter￾national system evolves? If global markets shift toward closure, can they shift back toward openness absent a rising hegemon? I address these pressing questions by reexamining the origins of the first era of trade liberalization+ Focused on the “openness” achieved, scholars of international politics have largely assumed that Britain did not begin pursuing openness until the 1820s+ But the pursuit of openness might long antedate its achievement+ Indeed, Britain first sought openness in the 1780s, as a threatened power in a hostile, multi￾polar system+ At that point, Britain relinquished control over the American colo￾nies and pursued free trade with friend and foe alike+ This article challenges “materialist” explanations for Britain’s shift toward free trade that exclusively consider the structure of interests, institutions, and power at the international and domestic levels+ The shift toward openness came well before hegemony, in precisely the multipolar world that hegemonic stability theorists claimed would be least likely to initiate the shift+ I also show that domestic inter￾ests and institutions underdetermined Britain’s commercial strategy in the 1780s+ These material variables did matter+ They defined the range of possibilities+ But this was a broad range, and it remained for policymakers to choose among com￾peting strategies as they pursued power and plenty+ 1+ See Kindleberger 1973; Krasner 1976; and Keohane 1997+ 2+ See Ruggie 1982; Keohane 1984; Lake 1984; and Snidal 1985+ 3+ See McKeown 1983 and 1991; Conybeare 1983; Webb and Krasner 1989; and Lake 1991+ 4+ See Krasner 1976, 323; and Mansfield 1994, 179–80+ 5+ See Keohane and Nye 2003; Barton et al+ 2006, 192–94; Mearsheimer 2001 and 2010; Schattschneider 1935; and Eichengreen 1989+ 396 International Organization

Origins of the First Era of Globalization 397 Britain's shift depended on a previously unnoticed variable:the influence of an enterprising intellectual on a key policymaker at a critical juncture.The intellec- tual was Adam Smith.The policymaker was William Petty,the second Earl of Shelburne.And the critical juncture was the American Revolutionary War. A leading member of Parliament,Shelburne commanded the support the oppo- sition needed to capture the government,grant the American colonies indepen- dence,and reform Britain's commercial policy.Initially,Shelburne extolled the mercantile system as the best means to preserve Britain's empire,emphatically arguing that commercial regulation was the solution to-rather than the cause of-the American Revolution.Shelburne's repeated engagement with Smith,how- ever,caused him to rethink this assumption.Ireland's 1779 uprising in favor of free trade provided the empirical evidence that confirmed,in Shelburne's mind, Smith's prediction that mercantilism engenders conflict.When he became prime minister in 1782,Shelburne designed the postwar settlement to embody Smith's prescriptions:American independence,peace with Europe,and trade liberaliza- tion for all.Despite the brief tenure of his government,Shelburne's initiatives pro- vided the framework for the liberalizing reforms that followed in the 1780s and beyond.? No previous scholar has identified the decisive role Smith played in the politi- cal battles that determined America's fate.This may be due to the difficulties inherent in studying Smith and Shelburne.Understanding Smith's role has proven elusive because the fragmentary evidence supports multiple interpretations.Shel- burne presents the inverse challenge:much of his corpus survives,but he has received only a few serious treatments in several centuries.0 In addition to revising our understanding of the origins of the first era of open- ness,this article deepens our understanding of the role ideas play in shaping for- eign policy.Rather than treating "ideas"as disembodied formulations accounting for unexplained variation,this article reembodies ideas in the intellectuals who developed,saw adopted,and helped to implement their policymaking frame- works.It shows that policy-influencing ideas were chosen in part on their intellec- tual merits-their theoretical strength and perceived empirical veracity-and in part on the persuasive capacities of those who pressed them upon policymakers.It 6.The Earl of Shelburne (1737-1805)was born into a wealthy Irish family recently raised to the British peerage.As prime minister(1782-83),Shelburne managed the peace negotiations that ended the American Revolutionary War. 7.This narrative parallels Douglas Irwin's account of Robert Peel's conversion to laissez-faire liberalism in the 1840s.Irwin 1989. 8.See Heckscher 1922,19;Benians 1925;Fay 1934 and 1956,114;Stevens 1975;Willis 1979, 532;Ross1995,295;and Phillipson2010,262-63. 9.Smith instructed the executors of his will to burn his papers.Smith 1997,viii.Scholars disagree about no less important an issue than Smith's influence on the Townshend duties.See Scott 1935;Fay 1956,116;and Viner1965,85. 10.See Fitzmaurice 1875-76;Harlow 1952;Norris 1963;and Ritcheson 1983.Even supposedly comprehensive accounts of the American Revolution treat Shelburne as a peripheral figure.Middle- kauff 2007

Britain’s shift depended on a previously unnoticed variable: the influence of an enterprising intellectual on a key policymaker at a critical juncture+ The intellec￾tual was Adam Smith+ The policymaker was William Petty, the second Earl of Shelburne+ 6 And the critical juncture was the American Revolutionary War+ A leading member of Parliament, Shelburne commanded the support the oppo￾sition needed to capture the government, grant the American colonies indepen￾dence, and reform Britain’s commercial policy+ Initially, Shelburne extolled the mercantile system as the best means to preserve Britain’s empire, emphatically arguing that commercial regulation was the solution to—rather than the cause of—the American Revolution+ Shelburne’s repeated engagement with Smith, how￾ever, caused him to rethink this assumption+ Ireland’s 1779 uprising in favor of free trade provided the empirical evidence that confirmed, in Shelburne’s mind, Smith’s prediction that mercantilism engenders conflict+ When he became prime minister in 1782, Shelburne designed the postwar settlement to embody Smith’s prescriptions: American independence, peace with Europe, and trade liberaliza￾tion for all+ Despite the brief tenure of his government, Shelburne’s initiatives pro￾vided the framework for the liberalizing reforms that followed in the 1780s and beyond+ 7 No previous scholar has identified the decisive role Smith played in the politi￾cal battles that determined America’s fate+ 8 This may be due to the difficulties inherent in studying Smith and Shelburne+ Understanding Smith’s role has proven elusive because the fragmentary evidence supports multiple interpretations+ 9 Shel￾burne presents the inverse challenge: much of his corpus survives, but he has received only a few serious treatments in several centuries+ 10 In addition to revising our understanding of the origins of the first era of open￾ness, this article deepens our understanding of the role ideas play in shaping for￾eign policy+ Rather than treating “ideas” as disembodied formulations accounting for unexplained variation, this article reembodies ideas in the intellectuals who developed, saw adopted, and helped to implement their policymaking frame￾works+ It shows that policy-influencing ideas were chosen in part on their intellec￾tual merits—their theoretical strength and perceived empirical veracity—and in part on the persuasive capacities of those who pressed them upon policymakers+ It 6+ The Earl of Shelburne ~1737–1805! was born into a wealthy Irish family recently raised to the British peerage+ As prime minister ~1782–83!, Shelburne managed the peace negotiations that ended the American Revolutionary War+ 7+ This narrative parallels Douglas Irwin’s account of Robert Peel’s conversion to laissez-faire liberalism in the 1840s+ Irwin 1989+ 8+ See Heckscher 1922, 19; Benians 1925; Fay 1934 and 1956, 114; Stevens 1975; Willis 1979, 532; Ross 1995, 295; and Phillipson 2010, 262–63+ 9+ Smith instructed the executors of his will to burn his papers+ Smith 1997, viii+ Scholars disagree about no less important an issue than Smith’s influence on the Townshend duties+ See Scott 1935; Fay 1956, 116; and Viner 1965, 85+ 10+ See Fitzmaurice 1875–76; Harlow 1952; Norris 1963; and Ritcheson 1983+ Even supposedly comprehensive accounts of the American Revolution treat Shelburne as a peripheral figure+ Middle￾kauff 2007+ Origins of the First Era of Globalization 397

398 International Organization also bolsters the case for the causal power of ideas by recounting an instance where a leading policymaker changed his mind at considerable political and personal cost. This analysis provides further evidence of the value in combining modern social scientific frameworks with the "old history"focus on pivotal actors'shifting responses to evolving material circumstances.In the language of modern social science,Britain's imperial crisis in the 1770s and 1780s constituted a "critical juncture"-a "relatively short [period]of time during which there [was]a substan- tially heightened probability that agents'choices will affect the outcome of inter- est."At such points,"contingency...becomes paramount."2 But to say that outcomes are contingent is not to say that they cannot be studied with analytic rigor.Scholars in a range of fields have employed numerous approaches-formal and informal-to grapple with contingent events.3 Recently,Capoccia and Kele- men synthesized these disparate approaches into two highly specified techniques: "counterfactual analysis and narrative process tracing.This article utilizes both methods to explain Britain's radical policy reorientation in the 1780s. I first challenge the hegemonic stability theorists'choice of dependent variable, showing that their focus on the "openness"achieved,rather than the commercial strategy pursued,is problematic theoretically and empirically.After reviewing the dominant(materialist)explanations for the reforms of the 1780s,the next section proposes that key policymakers'ideas played a crucial role in initiating Britain's shift.Making way for ideational variables,however,requires challenging the con- sensus that Britain's reforms followed inevitably as a result of its military defeat in the American Revolution.I issue that challenge using counterfactual analysis and specify a model showing how intellectuals influence policy at critical junctures.I then develop a narrative that demonstrates the influence both of Smith on Shel- burne and of Shelburne on the transformation of British foreign economic policy. The Dependent Variable:Commercial Strategy versus“Openness'' Krasner attempted to explain the "structure of the international trading system," which he gauged according to observed policies and economic outcomes.For Kras- ner,policymakers'ideas were irrelevant."Stupidity,"after all,"is not a very inter- esting analytic category."5 But interesting or not,"stupidity"is a crucial analytic category.A growing literature recognizes that policymakers'ideas shape not just 11.Rakove2004,3. 12.Capoccia and Kelemen 2007,343,348. 13.These approaches include everything from "analytic narratives"to "virtual history."See Bates et al.1998;and Ferguson 1999. 14.Capoccia and Kelemen 2007,343. 15.Krasner1976.319,323-32

also bolsters the case for the causal power of ideas by recounting an instance where a leading policymaker changed his mind at considerable political and personal cost+ This analysis provides further evidence of the value in combining modern social scientific frameworks with the “old history” focus on pivotal actors’ shifting responses to evolving material circumstances+ 11 In the language of modern social science, Britain’s imperial crisis in the 1770s and 1780s constituted a “critical juncture”—a “relatively short @period# of time during which there @was# a substan￾tially heightened probability that agents’ choices will affect the outcome of inter￾est+” At such points, “contingency +++ becomes paramount+”12 But to say that outcomes are contingent is not to say that they cannot be studied with analytic rigor+ Scholars in a range of fields have employed numerous approaches—formal and informal—to grapple with contingent events+ 13 Recently, Capoccia and Kele￾men synthesized these disparate approaches into two highly specified techniques: “counterfactual analysis and narrative process tracing+”14 This article utilizes both methods to explain Britain’s radical policy reorientation in the 1780s+ I first challenge the hegemonic stability theorists’ choice of dependent variable, showing that their focus on the “openness” achieved, rather than the commercial strategy pursued, is problematic theoretically and empirically+ After reviewing the dominant ~materialist! explanations for the reforms of the 1780s, the next section proposes that key policymakers’ ideas played a crucial role in initiating Britain’s shift+ Making way for ideational variables, however, requires challenging the con￾sensus that Britain’s reforms followed inevitably as a result of its military defeat in the American Revolution+ I issue that challenge using counterfactual analysis and specify a model showing how intellectuals influence policy at critical junctures+ I then develop a narrative that demonstrates the influence both of Smith on Shel￾burne and of Shelburne on the transformation of British foreign economic policy+ The Dependent Variable: Commercial Strategy versus “Openness” Krasner attempted to explain the “structure of the international trading system,” which he gauged according to observed policies and economic outcomes+ For Kras￾ner, policymakers’ ideas were irrelevant+ “Stupidity,” after all, “is not a very inter￾esting analytic category+”15 But interesting or not, “stupidity” is a crucial analytic category+ A growing literature recognizes that policymakers’ ideas shape not just 11+ Rakove 2004, 3+ 12+ Capoccia and Kelemen 2007, 343, 348+ 13+ These approaches include everything from “analytic narratives” to “virtual history+” See Bates et al+ 1998; and Ferguson 1999+ 14+ Capoccia and Kelemen 2007, 343+ 15+ Krasner 1976, 319, 323–32+ 398 International Organization

Origins of the First Era of Globalization 399 their goals but also the varying strategies they use to pursue those goals.6 Thus, the "structure of the international trading system"depends in part on the commer- cial strategies policymakers employ.As such,policymakers'commercial strat- egies are well worth consideration in their own right. Ignoring policymakers'ideas,Krasner overlooked the crucial first step in the march to openness.When he did not observe openness until the 1820s,he inferred that Britain,"the instigator and supporter of the new structure,"did not pursue liberalization until that point.7 Prior to Krasner,however,most scholars agreed that Britain's shift in commercial strategy occurred four decades earlier.8 As Ehr- man put it,the reforms of the 1780s "have long been regarded as marking the start of a new and more liberal commercial policy...as the harbingers...of a free-trade summer which the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars then delayed."9 These reforms were a stark departure from centuries of"mercantilist"trade pol- icy.Like realists today,mercantilists recognized that international integration brings absolute gains but they feared that unequal relative gains would threaten national autonomy.20 Policymakers in London attempted to have the best of both worlds by developing an expansive,vertically integrated empire.From Ireland to the Indies, they cultivated overseas colonies to furnish raw materials,alleviate domestic pop- ulation problems,and,ultimately,provide foreign markets for exports.At the same time,they heavily managed trade with rivals in an effort to improve Britain's terms of trade,support the Royal Navy,and amass reserves.21 While their "language" was different,the mercantilists followed the same logic that impels modern states "to induce trade to follow the flag."22 The American Revolution,however,directly challenged this model.Not only did the colonies resist supporting the mother country,but they actually embraced her enemies,reigniting old rivalries.23 After attempting both conciliation and sub- jugation,Britain eventually gave up the fight in 1783. The postwar settlement ended more than just the war.The peace agreements established a framework for reorganizing the international system according to the principles of laissez-faire liberalism.24 The "colonial"trades would be liberal- 16.See Jervis 1976;Odell 1982;Ruggie 1982;Hall 1989;Haas 1992;Goldstein and Keohane 1993; Blyth 2002;Bleich 2003;Legro 2005;Abdelal,Blyth,and Parsons 2010;Schrad 2010;and Branch 2011. 17.Krasner1976,335. 18.Kindleberger recognized that "the movement toward freer trade in Britain began gross in the eighteenth century,net only after the Napoleonic Wars."He focused exclusively on the latter.Kindle- berger 1975,27.See also Semmel 1970,13. 19.Ehrman1962,1. 20.See Grieco,Powell,and Snidal 1993;Gowa 1994;and Mearsheimer 1994. 21.Armitage2000,146-69. 22.See Magnusson 1994;and Gowa 1994,7. 23.The Americans did not revolt under the banner of laissez-faire.Crowley 1993.But British pol- icymakers came to believe that they did. 24.Definitions of these terms abound.I follow those used by Viner 1991 and Irwin 1996.In their view,the mercantilists and the laissez-faire liberals both pursued "power and plenty"but differed on

their goals but also the varying strategies they use to pursue those goals+ 16 Thus, the “structure of the international trading system” depends in part on the commer￾cial strategies policymakers employ+ As such, policymakers’ commercial strat￾egies are well worth consideration in their own right+ Ignoring policymakers’ ideas, Krasner overlooked the crucial first step in the march to openness+ When he did not observe openness until the 1820s, he inferred that Britain, “the instigator and supporter of the new structure,” did not pursue liberalization until that point+ 17 Prior to Krasner, however, most scholars agreed that Britain’s shift in commercial strategy occurred four decades earlier+ 18 As Ehr￾man put it, the reforms of the 1780s “have long been regarded as marking the start of a new and more liberal commercial policy +++ as the harbingers +++ of a free-trade summer which the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars then delayed+”19 These reforms were a stark departure from centuries of “mercantilist” trade pol￾icy+ Like realists today, mercantilists recognized that international integration brings absolute gains but they feared that unequal relative gains would threaten national autonomy+ 20 Policymakers in London attempted to have the best of both worlds by developing an expansive, vertically integrated empire+ From Ireland to the Indies, they cultivated overseas colonies to furnish raw materials, alleviate domestic pop￾ulation problems, and, ultimately, provide foreign markets for exports+ At the same time, they heavily managed trade with rivals in an effort to improve Britain’s terms of trade, support the Royal Navy, and amass reserves+ 21 While their “language” was different, the mercantilists followed the same logic that impels modern states “to induce trade to follow the flag+”22 The American Revolution, however, directly challenged this model+ Not only did the colonies resist supporting the mother country, but they actually embraced her enemies, reigniting old rivalries+ 23 After attempting both conciliation and sub￾jugation, Britain eventually gave up the fight in 1783+ The postwar settlement ended more than just the war+ The peace agreements established a framework for reorganizing the international system according to the principles of laissez-faire liberalism+ 24 The “colonial” trades would be liberal- 16+ See Jervis 1976; Odell 1982; Ruggie 1982; Hall 1989; Haas 1992; Goldstein and Keohane 1993; Blyth 2002; Bleich 2003; Legro 2005; Abdelal, Blyth, and Parsons 2010; Schrad 2010; and Branch 2011+ 17+ Krasner 1976, 335+ 18+ Kindleberger recognized that “the movement toward freer trade in Britain began gross in the eighteenth century, net only after the Napoleonic Wars+” He focused exclusively on the latter+ Kindle￾berger 1975, 27+ See also Semmel 1970, 13+ 19+ Ehrman 1962, 1+ 20+ See Grieco, Powell, and Snidal 1993; Gowa 1994; and Mearsheimer 1994+ 21+ Armitage 2000, 146–69+ 22+ See Magnusson 1994; and Gowa 1994, 7+ 23+ The Americans did not revolt under the banner of laissez-faire+ Crowley 1993+ But British pol￾icymakers came to believe that they did+ 24+ Definitions of these terms abound+ I follow those used by Viner 1991 and Irwin 1996+ In their view, the mercantilists and the laissez-faire liberals both pursued “power and plenty” but differed on Origins of the First Era of Globalization 399

400 International Organization ized.The new American states were granted free trade with Britain and much of its empire.In 1785,London offered essentially free trade to Ireland in exchange for moderate taxation.The change in Britain's approach to its adversaries was equally dramatic.Between 1785 and 1793,Britain pursued more than ten recipro- cal trade agreements.25 While most of these negotiations became stymied,its 1786 agreement with France-Britain's chief rival-proved nothing short of revolution- ary.Previously,Britain had embargoed most French goods.The remaining imports faced an average tariff rate of more than 75 percent ad valorem.The Anglo- French Commercial Treaty of 1786 eliminated tariffs on many goods and reduced the rates on most of the rest to just 10 to 15 percent.26 While the ensuing military conflicts reignited commercial warfare,Britain returned to its strategy of commer- cial liberalization after victory had been assured.27 Thus,the 1780s brought Britain's first decisive shift from mercantilism to laissez- faire liberalism.Under the old system,policymakers pursued "power and plenty" by redirecting foreign trade into intra-imperial commerce.Under the new system, policymakers pursued these same goals with different means.They dismantled the system of mercantile restrictions,allowing trade to flow "naturally"among friends and foes alike. The Independent Variable:Ideational Versus Material Explanations It may be that Britain's hegemonic ascent was necessary to transform the structure of the international trading system in the nineteenth century.But the "distribution of potential economic power"clearly cannot explain Britain's shift toward laissez- faire in the 1780s.At that point,Britain was only slightly more competitive than its European rivals.28 To all but a few leading policymakers,Smith's calls for trade liberalization seemed not merely utopian but downright dangerous.After all,mer- cantilism was widely celebrated as the cause of Britannia's development from a collection of middling,factious kingdoms into an"opulent"world power.29 Those familiar with the history of Britain's shift toward openness have offered no shortage of explanations for the dramatic policy shift.Recognizing that states the extent to which government intervention was required to secure these goals.Beneath his rhetoric Smith understood this disagreement in the same terms.Wyatt-Walter 1996,14. 25.Ehrman1962,1. 26.Heckscher1922,13-20. 27.Harlow overstated the case when he suggested that"Shelburne's slogan...'We prefer trade to dominion'was...the general principle on which the Second Empire was...established."The bitter- ness left by the American Revolution did not diminish Britain's appetite for territorial acquisition.In its "second"empire,however,Britain granted its colonies more autonomy and pursued trade liberal- ization with allies and adversaries alike.See Harlow 1952,1-11;and Hyam 2010,76-77. 28.See Pares 1953;Henderson 1957,111-12;and Ehrman 1962,203-9. 29.See Parliamentary History,vol.26,346-47;and Crowley 1993,13

ized+ The new American states were granted free trade with Britain and much of its empire+ In 1785, London offered essentially free trade to Ireland in exchange for moderate taxation+ The change in Britain’s approach to its adversaries was equally dramatic+ Between 1785 and 1793, Britain pursued more than ten recipro￾cal trade agreements+ 25 While most of these negotiations became stymied, its 1786 agreement with France—Britain’s chief rival—proved nothing short of revolution￾ary+ Previously, Britain had embargoed most French goods+ The remaining imports faced an average tariff rate of more than 75 percent ad valorem+ The Anglo￾French Commercial Treaty of 1786 eliminated tariffs on many goods and reduced the rates on most of the rest to just 10 to 15 percent+ 26 While the ensuing military conflicts reignited commercial warfare, Britain returned to its strategy of commer￾cial liberalization after victory had been assured+ 27 Thus, the 1780s brought Britain’s first decisive shift from mercantilism to laissez￾faire liberalism+ Under the old system, policymakers pursued “power and plenty” by redirecting foreign trade into intra-imperial commerce+ Under the new system, policymakers pursued these same goals with different means+ They dismantled the system of mercantile restrictions, allowing trade to flow “naturally” among friends and foes alike+ The Independent Variable: Ideational Versus Material Explanations It may be that Britain’s hegemonic ascent was necessary to transform the structure of the international trading system in the nineteenth century+ But the “distribution of potential economic power” clearly cannot explain Britain’s shift toward laissez￾faire in the 1780s+ At that point, Britain was only slightly more competitive than its European rivals+ 28 To all but a few leading policymakers, Smith’s calls for trade liberalization seemed not merely utopian but downright dangerous+ After all, mer￾cantilism was widely celebrated as the cause of Britannia’s development from a collection of middling, factious kingdoms into an “opulent” world power+ 29 Those familiar with the history of Britain’s shift toward openness have offered no shortage of explanations for the dramatic policy shift+ Recognizing that states the extent to which government intervention was required to secure these goals+ Beneath his rhetoric Smith understood this disagreement in the same terms+ Wyatt-Walter 1996, 14+ 25+ Ehrman 1962, 1+ 26+ Heckscher 1922, 13–20+ 27+ Harlow overstated the case when he suggested that “Shelburne’s slogan +++ ‘We prefer trade to dominion’ was +++ the general principle on which the Second Empire was +++ established+” The bitter￾ness left by the American Revolution did not diminish Britain’s appetite for territorial acquisition+ In its “second” empire, however, Britain granted its colonies more autonomy and pursued trade liberal￾ization with allies and adversaries alike+ See Harlow 1952, 1–11; and Hyam 2010, 76–77+ 28+ See Pares 1953; Henderson 1957, 111–12; and Ehrman 1962, 203–9+ 29+ See Parliamentary History, vol+ 26, 346–47; and Crowley 1993, 13+ 400 International Organization

Origins of the First Era of Globalization 401 do not behave as monolithic actors,such scholars examine the interplay of ideas, interests,and institutions within Britain.These scholars all confront the correla- tion between the meteoric rise of Smith's ideas and the commercial reforms of the 1780s. Traditionally,scholars assumed that Smith's ideas must have sparked the reforms. They point to the reforms'Smithian character and the homage that leading reform- ers paid to Smith.All these scholars concede,however,that this intellectual re- orientation followed after Britain lost the fight to keep its American colonies.30 This concession has prompted materialists to insist that Smith's ideas were embraced because they fit Britain's new circumstances.For centuries,the story goes,London's policymakers had been in the pockets of England's "merchants and manufacturers."Fearful of international competition,these special interests promoted mercantilism as an intellectual justification for protecting them from foreign competitors and developing complementary colonies "as captive markets and monopolized suppliers."3 By the middle of the eighteenth century,however, keeping the colonies within the system had become remarkably expensive while British industry and trade were becoming competitive abroad.Entrenched inter- ests hesitated to abandon the system that served them so well,but military defeat made American independence "inevitable."32 With the American colonies lost, British policymakers had to reconsider their commercial strategy.33 Thus,the reforms were really attempts to find new revenue streams,to keep the American market open,and to open new foreign markets-so-called "free trade imperial- ism."34 When these policymakers discovered the serendipitous fit between their policies and Smith's prescriptions,they retroactively anointed him the progenitor of their movement.35 Thus the timing of Britain's shift from mercantilism to laissez-faire proves cru- cial.Smith had been lobbying leading policymakers to abandon the mercantilist project in America since the 1760s.After repeated failures,he took to the presses, publishing his Wealth of Nations shortly before the Americans declared indepen- dence.According to all previous accounts,however,Smith's ideas were embraced only after the military contest in America had been decided.If this were true,it would be difficult not to conclude that the shocking loss of the American colonies played a critical role in the adoption of Smith's ideas. 30.See Heckscher 1922,19-21;Harlow 1952,223,228,488-89;Crowley 1993;and Hamilton 2008. 31.Crowley 1993,xiii. 32.Harlow1952,210-28. 33.See ibid..228:and Willis 1979.528. 34.See Fay 1934;Gallagher and Robinson 1953;Harlow 1952,201,210,228;Henderson 1957; and Semmel 1970,7-8. 35.Ehrman 1962,49;Willis 1979;and Ritcheson 1983 emphasize policymakers'opportunistic use of Smith's arguments and limited implementation of his prescriptions.Others argue that the esteem accorded to Smith's Wealth of Nations resulted from Britain's shift toward liberalism rather than vice versa.See Teichgraeber 1987,360;Crowley 1990,340;and Rashid 1998

do not behave as monolithic actors, such scholars examine the interplay of ideas, interests, and institutions within Britain+ These scholars all confront the correla￾tion between the meteoric rise of Smith’s ideas and the commercial reforms of the 1780s+ Traditionally, scholars assumed that Smith’s ideas must have sparked the reforms+ They point to the reforms’ Smithian character and the homage that leading reform￾ers paid to Smith+ All these scholars concede, however, that this intellectual re￾orientation followed after Britain lost the fight to keep its American colonies+ 30 This concession has prompted materialists to insist that Smith’s ideas were embraced because they fit Britain’s new circumstances+ For centuries, the story goes, London’s policymakers had been in the pockets of England’s “merchants and manufacturers+” Fearful of international competition, these special interests promoted mercantilism as an intellectual justification for protecting them from foreign competitors and developing complementary colonies “as captive markets and monopolized suppliers+”31 By the middle of the eighteenth century, however, keeping the colonies within the system had become remarkably expensive while British industry and trade were becoming competitive abroad+ Entrenched inter￾ests hesitated to abandon the system that served them so well, but military defeat made American independence “inevitable+”32 With the American colonies lost, British policymakers had to reconsider their commercial strategy+ 33 Thus, the reforms were really attempts to find new revenue streams, to keep the American market open, and to open new foreign markets—so-called “free trade imperial￾ism+”34 When these policymakers discovered the serendipitous fit between their policies and Smith’s prescriptions, they retroactively anointed him the progenitor of their movement+ 35 Thus the timing of Britain’s shift from mercantilism to laissez-faire proves cru￾cial+ Smith had been lobbying leading policymakers to abandon the mercantilist project in America since the 1760s+ After repeated failures, he took to the presses, publishing his Wealth of Nations shortly before the Americans declared indepen￾dence+ According to all previous accounts, however, Smith’s ideas were embraced only after the military contest in America had been decided+ If this were true, it would be difficult not to conclude that the shocking loss of the American colonies played a critical role in the adoption of Smith’s ideas+ 30+ See Heckscher 1922, 19–21; Harlow 1952, 223, 228, 488–89; Crowley 1993; and Hamilton 2008+ 31+ Crowley 1993, xiii+ 32+ Harlow 1952, 210–28+ 33+ See ibid+, 228; and Willis 1979, 528+ 34+ See Fay 1934; Gallagher and Robinson 1953; Harlow 1952, 201, 210, 228; Henderson 1957; and Semmel 1970, 7–8+ 35+ Ehrman 1962, 49; Willis 1979; and Ritcheson 1983 emphasize policymakers’ opportunistic use of Smith’s arguments and limited implementation of his prescriptions+ Others argue that the esteem accorded to Smith’s Wealth of Nations resulted from Britain’s shift toward liberalism rather than vice versa+ See Teichgraeber 1987, 360; Crowley 1990, 340; and Rashid 1998+ Origins of the First Era of Globalization 401

402 International Organization Challenging that narrative,I argue that Britain's capitulation after the Battle of Yorktown(1781)depended on the prior transformation of a pivotal policymaker's commercial strategy.This thesis defends the "idiographic"counterfactual that if Shelburne had not engaged Smith's ideas,the American Revolutionary War would have ended on vastly different terms.36 This,of course,cuts against the consensus that American independence was determined by the fortunes of war. Military Disaster Was an Insufficient Cause It is widely assumed that Britain's capitulation became "inevitable"after the loss at Yorktown in 1781.37 Students of international politics,however,know better than to blithely accept claims of historical inevitability.38 Determining the causal weight of multiple variables,however,proves difficult given that Britain's deci- sion to grant independence constitutes a single case.I use both of Fearon's meth- ods to test causality in such small-N cases.First,I increase the number of "actual cases"by comparing Yorktown to similar military setbacks.Second,I develop "counterfactual cases"that might have followed if Shelburne had not embraced Smith's ideas(all else remaining equal).39 Beyond the fact that it was the last major American battle in the war,it is dif- ficult to understand why Yorktown is so commonly assumed to have been"deci- sive."40 The loss at Yorktown,while substantial,was hardly Britain's wartime nadir. The loss at Saratoga in 1777 was equally costly from a military standpoint.4 More important,the loss prompted the French to formally commit to the American cause, transforming a "settler revolt"into a world war.2 The summer of 1779 was even bleaker.Following Spain's declaration of war,the French and Spanish amassed an invasion force of 30,000.43 Caught completely unprepared,the meager military force in Britain improvised coastal earthwork defenses while the government enacted universal impressment.44 Had unfavorable winds and sickness not fore- stalled the Franco-Spanish armada,the "American"Revolutionary War may have ended with the British surrendering to the French and Spanish in England. More nuanced accounts emphasize Britain's cumulative losses,suggesting that Yorktown put Britain over a critical threshold."As the nation began to feel the drain and disappointment of an unsuccessful war,"Harlow suggests,"bellicosity 36.Tetlock and Belkin 1996,7-8. 37.Whiteley1996,197. 38.Fearon1991,173. 39.Ibid,172. 40.Wood1990.292 41.Each campaign cost Britain roughly 8,000 troops.See Ketchum 1999,437;and Lengel 2005. 343. 42.Greene2000,100. 43.Mackesy1993,279-81. 44.Fitzmaurice 1875-76.vol.3.48

Challenging that narrative, I argue that Britain’s capitulation after the Battle of Yorktown ~1781! depended on the prior transformation of a pivotal policymaker’s commercial strategy+ This thesis defends the “idiographic” counterfactual that if Shelburne had not engaged Smith’s ideas, the American Revolutionary War would have ended on vastly different terms+ 36 This, of course, cuts against the consensus that American independence was determined by the fortunes of war+ Military Disaster Was an Insufficient Cause It is widely assumed that Britain’s capitulation became “inevitable” after the loss at Yorktown in 1781+ 37 Students of international politics, however, know better than to blithely accept claims of historical inevitability+ 38 Determining the causal weight of multiple variables, however, proves difficult given that Britain’s deci￾sion to grant independence constitutes a single case+ I use both of Fearon’s meth￾ods to test causality in such small-N cases+ First, I increase the number of “actual cases” by comparing Yorktown to similar military setbacks+ Second, I develop “counterfactual cases” that might have followed if Shelburne had not embraced Smith’s ideas ~all else remaining equal!+ 39 Beyond the fact that it was the last major American battle in the war, it is dif- ficult to understand why Yorktown is so commonly assumed to have been “deci￾sive+”40 The loss at Yorktown, while substantial, was hardly Britain’s wartime nadir+ The loss at Saratoga in 1777 was equally costly from a military standpoint+ 41 More important, the loss prompted the French to formally commit to the American cause, transforming a “settler revolt” into a world war+ 42 The summer of 1779 was even bleaker+ Following Spain’s declaration of war, the French and Spanish amassed an invasion force of 30,000+ 43 Caught completely unprepared, the meager military force in Britain improvised coastal earthwork defenses while the government enacted universal impressment+ 44 Had unfavorable winds and sickness not fore￾stalled the Franco-Spanish armada, the “American” Revolutionary War may have ended with the British surrendering to the French and Spanish in England+ More nuanced accounts emphasize Britain’s cumulative losses, suggesting that Yorktown put Britain over a critical threshold+ “As the nation began to feel the drain and disappointment of an unsuccessful war,” Harlow suggests, “bellicosity 36+ Tetlock and Belkin 1996, 7–8+ 37+ Whiteley 1996, 197+ 38+ Fearon 1991, 173+ 39+ Ibid+, 172+ 40+ Wood 1990, 292+ 41+ Each campaign cost Britain roughly 8,000 troops+ See Ketchum 1999, 437; and Lengel 2005, 343+ 42+ Greene 2000, 100+ 43+ Mackesy 1993, 279–81+ 44+ Fitzmaurice 1875–76, vol+ 3, 48+ 402 International Organization

Origins of the First Era of Globalization 403 began to fade...into war-weariness and a longing for peace."45 But this is diffi- cult to square with Britain's uninterrupted bellicosity throughout the"long"eigh- teenth century.After all,Britain fought in a major military conflict in virtually every decade from the 1690s to the 1810s.In the two decades prior to the Revo- lutionary War,Britain had expended unprecedented quantities of blood and trea- sure to expand its control over North America.46 But even these sums were dwarfed by the costs incurred just a few years later in the French Revolutionary and Napo- leonic Wars.Between 1793 and 1815,Britain spent fl billion and suffered 250,000 casualties fighting abroad-more than ten times its costs in the American Revolu- tionary War.7 Throughout this period,Britain remained materially capable of with- standing losses like that suffered at Yorktown.In 1782,it wanted resolve,not capacity. By comparing Britain's position in 1782 to its bleaker circumstances before and after,it becomes clear that military losses were necessary but insufficient to make Britain concede American independence.Indeed,we can construct several"easily imagined"counterfactual courses that Britain might have taken after Yorktown.48 Historical data show that each alternative path was "available,considered,and narrowly defeated by the relevant actors."4 Britain might simply have continued the war,albeit with a different military strategy.This was precisely the option the king pressed upon Lord North,the Tory prime minister.so Assuming North would retain power,the king spent much of the ensuing parliamentary recess discussing alternative military strategies and com- manders with his prime minister.3!King George III was not (yet)mad.Britain had lost 8,000 troops at Yorktown,but it had another 30,000 garrisoned through- out America.32 These forces easily could have been deployed on another cam- paign had the pro-independence opposition not captured the government. Second,Britain could have acknowledged de jure independence but nonethe- less pursued de facto dependence.33 After the defeat at Saratoga(in 1777),the king had proposed using loyalist strongholds to"continue destroying the trade and ports of the rebellious colonies"and,by "distressing the rebels,""secure the depen- dence of America."54 This strategy remained equally valid after Yorktown- particularly after several major naval victories in 1782.Short of maintaining 45.See Harlow 1952,210;and Middlekauff 2007,590. 46.Harlow1952,454. 47.See Tombs and Tombs 2006,179;and Monod 2009,282. 48.Tetlock and Belkin 1996,8. 49.Capoccia and Kelemen 2007,356. 50.Lord North(1732-92)was a leading Tory.As prime minister(1770-82),he reluctantly endeav- ored to pacify the American colonies. 51.Donne1867,392-402. 52.Mackesy1993,435. 53.Military capitulation may have determined the "form"of the Anglo-American relationship,but it did not dictate its "content."Ruggie 1982,382. 54.Donne1867,148.161-63,207

began to fade +++ into war-weariness and a longing for peace+”45 But this is diffi- cult to square with Britain’s uninterrupted bellicosity throughout the “long” eigh￾teenth century+ After all, Britain fought in a major military conflict in virtually every decade from the 1690s to the 1810s+ In the two decades prior to the Revo￾lutionary War, Britain had expended unprecedented quantities of blood and trea￾sure to expand its control over North America+ 46 But even these sums were dwarfed by the costs incurred just a few years later in the French Revolutionary and Napo￾leonic Wars+ Between 1793 and 1815, Britain spent £1 billion and suffered 250,000 casualties fighting abroad—more than ten times its costs in the American Revolu￾tionary War+ 47 Throughout this period, Britain remained materially capable of with￾standing losses like that suffered at Yorktown+ In 1782, it wanted resolve, not capacity+ By comparing Britain’s position in 1782 to its bleaker circumstances before and after, it becomes clear that military losses were necessary but insufficient to make Britain concede American independence+ Indeed, we can construct several “easily imagined” counterfactual courses that Britain might have taken after Yorktown+ 48 Historical data show that each alternative path was “available, considered, and narrowly defeated by the relevant actors+”49 Britain might simply have continued the war, albeit with a different military strategy+ This was precisely the option the king pressed upon Lord North, the Tory prime minister+ 50 Assuming North would retain power, the king spent much of the ensuing parliamentary recess discussing alternative military strategies and com￾manders with his prime minister+ 51 King George III was not ~yet! mad+ Britain had lost 8,000 troops at Yorktown, but it had another 30,000 garrisoned through￾out America+ 52 These forces easily could have been deployed on another cam￾paign had the pro-independence opposition not captured the government+ Second, Britain could have acknowledged de jure independence but nonethe￾less pursued de facto dependence+ 53 After the defeat at Saratoga ~in 1777!, the king had proposed using loyalist strongholds to “continue destroying the trade and ports of the rebellious colonies” and, by “distressing the rebels,” “secure the depen￾dence of America+”54 This strategy remained equally valid after Yorktown— particularly after several major naval victories in 1782+ Short of maintaining 45+ See Harlow 1952, 210; and Middlekauff 2007, 590+ 46+ Harlow 1952, 454+ 47+ See Tombs and Tombs 2006, 179; and Monod 2009, 282+ 48+ Tetlock and Belkin 1996, 8+ 49+ Capoccia and Kelemen 2007, 356+ 50+ Lord North ~1732–92! was a leading Tory+ As prime minister ~1770–82!, he reluctantly endeav￾ored to pacify the American colonies+ 51+ Donne 1867, 392–402+ 52+ Mackesy 1993, 435+ 53+ Military capitulation may have determined the “form” of the Anglo-American relationship, but it did not dictate its “content+” Ruggie 1982, 382+ 54+ Donne 1867, 148, 161– 63, 207+ Origins of the First Era of Globalization 403