《国际政治经济学》文献资料（Political Economy of International Trade：Domestic Politics）Support for Free Trade. Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics, and Out-Group Anxiety

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Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest,Sociotropic Politics,and Out-Group Anxiety Edward D.Mansfield and Diana C.Mutz Abstract Although it is widely acknowledged that an understanding of mass atti- tudes about trade is crucial to the political economy of foreign commerce,only a handful of studies have addressed this topic.These studies have focused largely on testing two models,both of which emphasize that trade preferences are shaped by how trade affects an individual's income.The factor endowments or Heckscher- Ohlin model posits that these preferences are affected primarily by a person's skills. The specific factors or Ricardo-Viner model posits that trade preferences depend on the industry in which a person works.We find little support for either of these mod- els using two representative national surveys of Americans.The only potential excep- tion involves the effects of education.Initial tests indicate that educational attainment and support for open trade are directly related,which is often interpreted as support for the Heckscher-Ohlin model.However,further analysis reveals that education's effects are less representative of skill than of individuals'anxieties about involve- ment with out-groups in their own country and beyond.Furthermore,we find strong evidence that trade attitudes are guided less by material self-interest than by percep- tions of how the U.S.economy as a whole is affected by trade. The politics of international trade has been a long-standing puzzle for social sci- entists.Among economists,there is widespread agreement that free trade is ben- eficial.Open trade and cross-national market integration help to allocate factors of production efficiently and to promote the welfare of countries and the world as Earlier versions of this article were presented at the 2006 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association,Philadelphia;seminars at the University of Chicago(Harris School),Emory Uni- versity,Harvard University,and the University of Virginia:and a conference on Domestic Preferences and Foreign Economic Policy,held at Princeton University.We are grateful to Marc Busch,Jens Hain- mueller,So Young Kim,Richard Valelly,the editors of International Organization,and two anony- mous reviewers for helpful comments;to Rumi Morishima,Matthew Tubin,and Carmela Aquino for research assistance;and to the Christopher H.Browne Center for International Politics and the Insti- tute for the Study of Citizens and Politics for financial assistance. Note from the editors:Since one of the authors is an associate editor of this journal,the editors handled this article outside of the normal editorial management system and put in place special proce- dures to ensure rigorous,double-blind peer review. 1.Alston,Kearl,and Vaughan 1992. International Organization 63,Summer 2009,pp.425-57 2009 by The IO Foundation. doi:10.1017/S0020818309090158

Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics, and Out-Group Anxiety Edward D+ Mansfield and Diana C+ Mutz Abstract Although it is widely acknowledged that an understanding of mass attitudes about trade is crucial to the political economy of foreign commerce, only a handful of studies have addressed this topic+ These studies have focused largely on testing two models, both of which emphasize that trade preferences are shaped by how trade affects an individual’s income+ The factor endowments or HeckscherOhlin model posits that these preferences are affected primarily by a person’s skills+ The specific factors or Ricardo-Viner model posits that trade preferences depend on the industry in which a person works+ We find little support for either of these models using two representative national surveys of Americans+ The only potential exception involves the effects of education+ Initial tests indicate that educational attainment and support for open trade are directly related, which is often interpreted as support for the Heckscher-Ohlin model+ However, further analysis reveals that education’s effects are less representative of skill than of individuals’ anxieties about involvement with out-groups in their own country and beyond+ Furthermore, we find strong evidence that trade attitudes are guided less by material self-interest than by perceptions of how the U+S+ economy as a whole is affected by trade+ The politics of international trade has been a long-standing puzzle for social scientists+ Among economists, there is widespread agreement that free trade is beneficial+ 1 Open trade and cross-national market integration help to allocate factors of production efficiently and to promote the welfare of countries and the world as Earlier versions of this article were presented at the 2006 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia; seminars at the University of Chicago ~Harris School!, Emory University, Harvard University, and the University of Virginia; and a conference on Domestic Preferences and Foreign Economic Policy, held at Princeton University+ We are grateful to Marc Busch, Jens Hainmueller, So Young Kim, Richard Valelly, the editors of International Organization, and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments; to Rumi Morishima, Matthew Tubin, and Carmela Aquino for research assistance; and to the Christopher H+ Browne Center for International Politics and the Institute for the Study of Citizens and Politics for financial assistance+ Note from the editors: Since one of the authors is an associate editor of this journal, the editors handled this article outside of the normal editorial management system and put in place special procedures to ensure rigorous, double-blind peer review+ 1+ Alston, Kearl, and Vaughan 1992+ International Organization 63, Summer 2009, pp+ 425–57 © 2009 by The IO Foundation+ doi:10+10170S0020818309090158

426 International Organization a whole.Historically,however,open trade has been the exception rather than the rule. Studies of the political economy of trade often attribute variations in trade pref- erences to the distributional implications of overseas commerce.Despite the eco- nomic benefits that a given country would accrue from open trade,some individuals suffer economic harm as a result.If these individuals form a politically potent constituency,they may be able to pressure policymakers to increase trade barriers even if doing so is economically counterproductive for the country as a whole.If, on the other hand,the individuals who derive welfare gains from trade are partic- ularly influential,then an open trade regime is likely to take hold.Recent research indicates that,in democratic countries,constituency opinion on trade plays a cen- tral role in influencing the policy positions of public officials.2 There are two principle ways of assessing the distributional consequences of trade.First,the factor endowments approach emphasizes that,in a given country, trade benefits those individuals who own factors of production that are in abun- dant supply relative to the remainder of the world,and harms owners of factors that are in scarce supply.In countries such as the United States,which has a skilled labor force,free trade benefits highly skilled workers and harms less skilled work- ers.Second,the specific factors approach predicts that an individual's attitudes toward trade will reflect characteristics of the industry in which he or she works. People employed in industries that depend on overseas markets should be more supportive of open trade than people working in industries that face considerable competition from imports. A small but growing number of studies have evaluated the strength of these explanations for trade policy preferences.We extend this body of research using two representative national surveys of Americans and more comprehensive mea- sures of industries and occupations than previous studies had available to them.In addition,we link the study of trade preferences to the more extensive body of theory and empirical research on how self-interest enters into the formation of domestic economic policy preferences. Substantial research in other economic policy domains has demonstrated that self-interest rarely shapes the formation of policy opinions because people have a difficult time understanding the connection between personal economic well- being and government policy.By mounting the most thorough individual-level examination to date of the effects of industry and skill on individual trade prefer- ences,we seek to determine whether trade is,indeed,one of those rare exceptions in which personal experiences are successfully politicized.Alternatively,if atti- tudes about trade are formed in a manner similar to attitudes about domestic eco- nomic domains such as unemployment,then trade policy preferences will be based on how people believe a policy affects the country collectively rather than on nar- rowly defined self-interest.Importantly,the analysis of aggregate-level data-the 2.See Fordham and McKeown 2003;and Kono 2008

a whole+ Historically, however, open trade has been the exception rather than the rule+ Studies of the political economy of trade often attribute variations in trade preferences to the distributional implications of overseas commerce+ Despite the economic benefits that a given country would accrue from open trade, some individuals suffer economic harm as a result+ If these individuals form a politically potent constituency, they may be able to pressure policymakers to increase trade barriers even if doing so is economically counterproductive for the country as a whole+ If, on the other hand, the individuals who derive welfare gains from trade are particularly influential, then an open trade regime is likely to take hold+ Recent research indicates that, in democratic countries, constituency opinion on trade plays a central role in influencing the policy positions of public officials+ 2 There are two principle ways of assessing the distributional consequences of trade+ First, the factor endowments approach emphasizes that, in a given country, trade benefits those individuals who own factors of production that are in abundant supply relative to the remainder of the world, and harms owners of factors that are in scarce supply+ In countries such as the United States, which has a skilled labor force, free trade benefits highly skilled workers and harms less skilled workers+ Second, the specific factors approach predicts that an individual’s attitudes toward trade will reflect characteristics of the industry in which he or she works+ People employed in industries that depend on overseas markets should be more supportive of open trade than people working in industries that face considerable competition from imports+ A small but growing number of studies have evaluated the strength of these explanations for trade policy preferences+ We extend this body of research using two representative national surveys of Americans and more comprehensive measures of industries and occupations than previous studies had available to them+ In addition, we link the study of trade preferences to the more extensive body of theory and empirical research on how self-interest enters into the formation of domestic economic policy preferences+ Substantial research in other economic policy domains has demonstrated that self-interest rarely shapes the formation of policy opinions because people have a difficult time understanding the connection between personal economic wellbeing and government policy+ By mounting the most thorough individual-level examination to date of the effects of industry and skill on individual trade preferences, we seek to determine whether trade is, indeed, one of those rare exceptions in which personal experiences are successfully politicized+ Alternatively, if attitudes about trade are formed in a manner similar to attitudes about domestic economic domains such as unemployment, then trade policy preferences will be based on how people believe a policy affects the country collectively rather than on narrowly defined self-interest+ Importantly, the analysis of aggregate-level data—the 2+ See Fordham and McKeown 2003; and Kono 2008+ 426 International Organization

Self-Interest,Sociotropic Politics,and Out-Group Anxiety 427 approach used by most previous studies of trade preferences-cannot differentiate between these two possibilities.Thus,uniquely,this study simultaneously exam- ines both how personal economic self-interest and perceptions of the collective national interest influence trade preferences. Our findings indicate that accounting for perceptions of how the U.S.economy is affected by trade is important to modeling trade preferences.Consistent with previous research on the impact of self-interest on policy attitudes,our data show little support for either the factor endowments or the specific factors model.By contrast,perceptions of how trade affects the country as a whole-what are often referred to as "sociotropic"perceptions-play a substantial role in shaping atti- tudes about foreign commerce,a role that is largely independent of self-interest. Indeed,these perceptions are among the most important influences on opinions about trade. Finally,we further improve our understanding of mass trade preferences by incor- porating into our model indicators of domestic ethnocentrism and foreign policy attitudes.There is little support for free trade among people who believe the United States should take an isolationist stance on international affairs more generally or those who feel that members of other ethnic and racial groups are less praisewor- thy than their own racial or ethnic group.Although such views have no direct bearing on the economic benefits of trade,they are far more predictive of trade preferences than indicators of economic self-interest. Taken as a whole,the results of this article cast doubt on the ability of standard political economy models to explain trade preferences.Furthermore,the fact that sociotropic perceptions and out-group anxiety are such powerful predictors of these preferences indicates that research on trade policy would benefit by developing psychologically based models that address how individuals process information about the economy,and how they form attitudes about people and places beyond their borders. The Origins of Trade Preferences Much of the existing research on trade preferences has been guided by two mod- els.The factor endowments,or Heckscher-Ohlin,model assumes that all factors of production within a country are mobile across sectors,that markets are perfectly competitive,and that there are constant returns to scale in production.Based on these assumptions,Stolper and Samuelson showed that,in a given country,open trade benefits owners of factors of production that are abundant,relative to the remain- der of the world,and harms owners of scarce factors.3 Consequently,in the United States-a country endowed with an abundance of highly skilled and well-educated labor relative to the rest of the world-free trade benefits highly skilled workers 3.Stolper and Samuelson 1941

approach used by most previous studies of trade preferences—cannot differentiate between these two possibilities+ Thus, uniquely, this study simultaneously examines both how personal economic self-interest and perceptions of the collective national interest influence trade preferences+ Our findings indicate that accounting for perceptions of how the U+S+ economy is affected by trade is important to modeling trade preferences+ Consistent with previous research on the impact of self-interest on policy attitudes, our data show little support for either the factor endowments or the specific factors model+ By contrast, perceptions of how trade affects the country as a whole—what are often referred to as “sociotropic” perceptions—play a substantial role in shaping attitudes about foreign commerce, a role that is largely independent of self-interest+ Indeed, these perceptions are among the most important influences on opinions about trade+ Finally, we further improve our understanding of mass trade preferences by incorporating into our model indicators of domestic ethnocentrism and foreign policy attitudes+ There is little support for free trade among people who believe the United States should take an isolationist stance on international affairs more generally or those who feel that members of other ethnic and racial groups are less praiseworthy than their own racial or ethnic group+ Although such views have no direct bearing on the economic benefits of trade, they are far more predictive of trade preferences than indicators of economic self-interest+ Taken as a whole, the results of this article cast doubt on the ability of standard political economy models to explain trade preferences+ Furthermore, the fact that sociotropic perceptions and out-group anxiety are such powerful predictors of these preferences indicates that research on trade policy would benefit by developing psychologically based models that address how individuals process information about the economy, and how they form attitudes about people and places beyond their borders+ The Origins of Trade Preferences Much of the existing research on trade preferences has been guided by two models+ The factor endowments, or Heckscher-Ohlin, model assumes that all factors of production within a country are mobile across sectors, that markets are perfectly competitive, and that there are constant returns to scale in production+ Based on these assumptions, Stolper and Samuelson showed that, in a given country, open trade benefits owners of factors of production that are abundant, relative to the remainder of the world, and harms owners of scarce factors+ 3 Consequently, in the United States—a country endowed with an abundance of highly skilled and well-educated labor relative to the rest of the world—free trade benefits highly skilled workers 3+ Stolper and Samuelson 1941+ Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics, and Out-Group Anxiety 427

428 International Organization and damages less-skilled individuals.Open trade increases the demand for skilled workers,since the United States has a comparative advantage in the production of goods that use this input intensively.As the demand for such workers rises,so do their wages.Conversely,heightened trade decreases the demand for low-skilled labor in the United States and depresses its wage rate since goods produced using such labor intensively can be produced more efficiently abroad.'The factor endow- ments approach therefore predicts that highly skilled workers in the United States should be protrade,whereas other workers should hold more protectionist views. Empirical studies of trade policy attitudes have generated a fair amount of sup- port for this theory.In a set of cross-national analyses,O'Rourke and Sinnott and Mayda and Rodrik find that mass opinion about trade corresponds closely to pre- dictions stemming from the factor endowments approach.s Scheve and Slaughter provide some additional support for this approach,based on an analysis of public attitudes in the United States;and Balistreri concludes that this model helps to explain Canadian attitudes toward the Canadian-U.S.Free Trade Agreement.'None- theless,a number of recent studies have raised questions about the fit between trade preferences and the factor endowments model.s A key assumption in the Heckscher-Ohlin model is that factors of production can move quickly and easily from one sector to another.In the long run,this assumption is not difficult to jus- tify.In the short run,however,it can be difficult for people (not to mention other factors of production)to change the sector in which they are employed. The specific factors,or Ricardo-Viner,model is an alternative framework that assumes that,at least in the short run,certain factors of production cannot be shifted across sectors.If workers cannot easily move from one sector to another,then they will base their trade preferences on how changes in trade policy are expected to affect the industry in which they are currently employed.This model suggests that individuals who work in export-oriented sectors of the economy will support open trade because they personally benefit from it,while those in import-competing sectors will be more protectionist.Equally,an individual employed in a nontraded sector of the economy should be more protrade than someone employed in an industry that faces substantial competition from foreign imports. Few studies have tried to evaluate whether trade preferences correspond to the specific factors model,primarily due to a lack of data on individuals'industry of 4.Leamer 1984. 5.The human capital model makes similar predictions about the attitudes of highly skilled workers in countries with a highly skilled labor force.In this model,however,the reason highly skilled work- ers should support open trade is that they can more easily shift occupations and industries,and thus adapt successfully to economic change.See Gabel 1998;Baker 2003 and 2005;Kaltenthaler,Gelleny, and Ceccoli 2004:and Kocher and Minushkin 2006. 6.See O'Rourke and Sinnott 2002;and Mayda and Rodrik 2005 7.See Balistreri 1997;and Scheve and Slaughter 2001. 8.See Baker 2003;and Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006. 9.The model may still prove useful if citizens use a relatively long time frame to evaluate the impact of trade policies.On this point,see Mayda and Rodrik 2005

and damages less-skilled individuals+ 4 Open trade increases the demand for skilled workers, since the United States has a comparative advantage in the production of goods that use this input intensively+ As the demand for such workers rises, so do their wages+ Conversely, heightened trade decreases the demand for low-skilled labor in the United States and depresses its wage rate since goods produced using such labor intensively can be produced more efficiently abroad+ 5 The factor endowments approach therefore predicts that highly skilled workers in the United States should be protrade, whereas other workers should hold more protectionist views+ Empirical studies of trade policy attitudes have generated a fair amount of support for this theory+ In a set of cross-national analyses, O’Rourke and Sinnott and Mayda and Rodrik find that mass opinion about trade corresponds closely to predictions stemming from the factor endowments approach+ 6 Scheve and Slaughter provide some additional support for this approach, based on an analysis of public attitudes in the United States; and Balistreri concludes that this model helps to explain Canadian attitudes toward the Canadian–U+S+ Free Trade Agreement+ 7 Nonetheless, a number of recent studies have raised questions about the fit between trade preferences and the factor endowments model+ 8 A key assumption in the Heckscher-Ohlin model is that factors of production can move quickly and easily from one sector to another+ In the long run, this assumption is not difficult to justify+ In the short run, however, it can be difficult for people ~not to mention other factors of production! to change the sector in which they are employed+ 9 The specific factors, or Ricardo-Viner, model is an alternative framework that assumes that, at least in the short run, certain factors of production cannot be shifted across sectors+ If workers cannot easily move from one sector to another, then they will base their trade preferences on how changes in trade policy are expected to affect the industry in which they are currently employed+ This model suggests that individuals who work in export-oriented sectors of the economy will support open trade because they personally benefit from it, while those in import-competing sectors will be more protectionist+ Equally, an individual employed in a nontraded sector of the economy should be more protrade than someone employed in an industry that faces substantial competition from foreign imports+ Few studies have tried to evaluate whether trade preferences correspond to the specific factors model, primarily due to a lack of data on individuals’ industry of 4+ Leamer 1984+ 5+ The human capital model makes similar predictions about the attitudes of highly skilled workers in countries with a highly skilled labor force+ In this model, however, the reason highly skilled workers should support open trade is that they can more easily shift occupations and industries, and thus adapt successfully to economic change+ See Gabel 1998; Baker 2003 and 2005; Kaltenthaler, Gelleny, and Ceccoli 2004; and Kocher and Minushkin 2006+ 6+ See O’Rourke and Sinnott 2002; and Mayda and Rodrik 2005+ 7+ See Balistreri 1997; and Scheve and Slaughter 2001+ 8+ See Baker 2003; and Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006+ 9+ The model may still prove useful if citizens use a relatively long time frame to evaluate the impact of trade policies+ On this point, see Mayda and Rodrik 2005+ 428 International Organization

Self-Interest,Sociotropic Politics,and Out-Group Anxiety 429 employment in most extant surveys.Mayda and Rodrik try to infer respondents' industry from occupational data;but this is an imperfect solution,with many indi- viduals assigned to multiple overlapping sectors because of inadequate informa- tion.10 Nonetheless,Mayda and Rodrik find evidence that is broadly consistent with the specific factors model.In a similarly motivated analysis,Scheve and Slaughter compare the factor endowments and specific factors models,using edu- cational attainment and the average yearly earnings for the respondent's occupa- tion as indicators of skill,and the comparative advantage or disadvantage of the respondent's industry of employment as specific factors indicators.Their study provides evidence for the factor endowments model,but none supportive of the specific factors model. Notably,the underlying premise in both models described above is that atti- tudes toward trade are largely a function of who is personally helped or hurt by trade policies.As Mayda and Rodrik note,"to the extent that individuals are moti- vated by material self-interest,these models provide important hints about an individual's likely attitudes toward trade depending upon his/her factor type or sector of employment."12 Unfortunately,the explanatory value of these models has been quite limited to date,and even simple demographics often explain more about trade preferences than variables linked to either model. Beyond these two dominant theoretical frameworks,existing studies have also produced a set of empirical findings that remain in need of a theoretical frame- work.For example,Mayda and Rodrik find that social status,relative incomes, and values play a more important role than variables highlighted by either eco- nomic model.3 Upper-class people are more likely to be protrade as are those with higher relative incomes.In addition,older people appear to be more protec- tionist than younger generations. In the same vein,although educational attainment tends to be highly correlated with support for trade,the appropriate interpretation of this relationship remains unclear.14 If education is simply serving as a proxy for skill level,then this rela- tionship can be interpreted as support for the factor endowments model.This,in fact,is how these results are typically viewed. But there are many other plausible explanations for why education might relate to trade preferences.Well-educated people are different from their less-educated counterparts in numerous ways,including levels of tolerance for out-groups(such as foreigners),risk preferences,levels of dogmatism,and preferences for immedi- ate versus delayed gratification.To the extent that trade preferences are driven by 10.Ibid. 11.Scheve and Slaughter 2001. 12.Mayda and Rodrik 2005,1394. 13.Mayda and Rodrik 2005. 14.For studies that have found such a correlation,see Bauer,Pool,and Dexter 1963,chap.6;Scheve and Slaughter 2001;O'Rourke and Sinnott 2002;Kaltenthaler,Gelleny,and Ceccoli 2004;and Mayda and Rodrik 2005

employment in most extant surveys+ Mayda and Rodrik try to infer respondents’ industry from occupational data; but this is an imperfect solution, with many individuals assigned to multiple overlapping sectors because of inadequate information+ 10 Nonetheless, Mayda and Rodrik find evidence that is broadly consistent with the specific factors model+ In a similarly motivated analysis, Scheve and Slaughter compare the factor endowments and specific factors models, using educational attainment and the average yearly earnings for the respondent’s occupation as indicators of skill, and the comparative advantage or disadvantage of the respondent’s industry of employment as specific factors indicators+ 11 Their study provides evidence for the factor endowments model, but none supportive of the specific factors model+ Notably, the underlying premise in both models described above is that attitudes toward trade are largely a function of who is personally helped or hurt by trade policies+ As Mayda and Rodrik note, “to the extent that individuals are motivated by material self-interest, these models provide important hints about an individual’s likely attitudes toward trade depending upon his0her factor type or sector of employment+”12 Unfortunately, the explanatory value of these models has been quite limited to date, and even simple demographics often explain more about trade preferences than variables linked to either model+ Beyond these two dominant theoretical frameworks, existing studies have also produced a set of empirical findings that remain in need of a theoretical framework+ For example, Mayda and Rodrik find that social status, relative incomes, and values play a more important role than variables highlighted by either economic model+ 13 Upper-class people are more likely to be protrade as are those with higher relative incomes+ In addition, older people appear to be more protectionist than younger generations+ In the same vein, although educational attainment tends to be highly correlated with support for trade, the appropriate interpretation of this relationship remains unclear+ 14 If education is simply serving as a proxy for skill level, then this relationship can be interpreted as support for the factor endowments model+ This, in fact, is how these results are typically viewed+ But there are many other plausible explanations for why education might relate to trade preferences+ Well-educated people are different from their less-educated counterparts in numerous ways, including levels of tolerance for out-groups ~such as foreigners!, risk preferences, levels of dogmatism, and preferences for immediate versus delayed gratification+ To the extent that trade preferences are driven by 10+ Ibid+ 11+ Scheve and Slaughter 2001+ 12+ Mayda and Rodrik 2005, 1394+ 13+ Mayda and Rodrik 2005+ 14+ For studies that have found such a correlation, see Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1963, chap+ 6; Scheve and Slaughter 2001; O’Rourke and Sinnott 2002; Kaltenthaler, Gelleny, and Ceccoli 2004; and Mayda and Rodrik 2005+ Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics, and Out-Group Anxiety 429

430 International Organization characteristics such as ethnocentricism,out-group hostility,or isolationist foreign policy tendencies,education's influence may have little to do with economic self-interest. Hainmueller and Hiscox argue that education represents something other than skill level.5 They find that the effect of education on trade preferences is much the same for Americans who are not currently employed as for those who are working. Equally,there is no distinguishable difference in the effects of education between working individuals and retirees,a subset of nonworking individuals who are unlikely to re-enter the labor force.In their view,the fact that education's impact is not contingent on whether an individual is receiving wages for using his or her skills casts doubt on the factor endowments model.Rather than serving as a proxy for skill,they argue that education represents the effects of exposure to economic ideas among the college-educated.Because mainstream economists generally favor open trade,college-educated individuals will have more exposure to arguments about the economic benefits of foreign commerce than those with less formal education. This claim is consistent with Hainmueller and Hiscox's findings that college- educated individuals have especially protrade attitudes,but these individuals are distinctive from their less educated counterparts in many other ways as well.As Nie,Junn,and Stehlik-Barry point out,education is a powerful predictor of many civic virtues.16 Unfortunately,it is poorly understood why education is linked to these outcomes.Empirical research suggests that education affects political pref- erences in at least two ways:(1)through occupational prominence and position in social networks,and(2)through cognitive proficiency and analytical ability.7 If education serves as a proxy for skill level,then it falls into the first of these cat- egories.Under these circumstances,education influences trade preferences because of where schooling locates people in socioeconomic strata.But since education also contributes to tolerance of different cultures and countries,as well as a belief on the part of Americans that the United States should be more actively engaged in foreign affairs,it remains to be seen if exposure to arguments about the virtues of international trade is driving Hainmueller and Hiscox's results.18 Furthermore,the expected trade attitudes of retirees are far from clear.That education's impact on such attitudes is indistinguishable between workers and retir- ees could reflect a tendency for trade preferences to persist over the course of a lifetime,rather than changing suddenly at retirement.Thus,based on this analysis alone,it is difficult to determine whether skill level influences the formation of trade preferences. The common finding that women are more protectionist than men,even after controlling for educational differences,also has been attributed to a college edu- 15.Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006. 16.Nie,Junn,and Stehlik-Barry 1996. 17.Ibid. 18.See Bauer,Pool,and Dexter 1963,chap.6;Erikson and Tedin 2005;and Fordham 2008

characteristics such as ethnocentricism, out-group hostility, or isolationist foreign policy tendencies, education’s influence may have little to do with economic self-interest+ Hainmueller and Hiscox argue that education represents something other than skill level+ 15 They find that the effect of education on trade preferences is much the same for Americans who are not currently employed as for those who are working+ Equally, there is no distinguishable difference in the effects of education between working individuals and retirees, a subset of nonworking individuals who are unlikely to re-enter the labor force+ In their view, the fact that education’s impact is not contingent on whether an individual is receiving wages for using his or her skills casts doubt on the factor endowments model+ Rather than serving as a proxy for skill, they argue that education represents the effects of exposure to economic ideas among the college-educated+ Because mainstream economists generally favor open trade, college-educated individuals will have more exposure to arguments about the economic benefits of foreign commerce than those with less formal education+ This claim is consistent with Hainmueller and Hiscox’s findings that collegeeducated individuals have especially protrade attitudes, but these individuals are distinctive from their less educated counterparts in many other ways as well+ As Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry point out, education is a powerful predictor of many civic virtues+ 16 Unfortunately, it is poorly understood why education is linked to these outcomes+ Empirical research suggests that education affects political preferences in at least two ways: ~1! through occupational prominence and position in social networks, and ~2! through cognitive proficiency and analytical ability+ 17 If education serves as a proxy for skill level, then it falls into the first of these categories+ Under these circumstances, education influences trade preferences because of where schooling locates people in socioeconomic strata+ But since education also contributes to tolerance of different cultures and countries, as well as a belief on the part of Americans that the United States should be more actively engaged in foreign affairs, it remains to be seen if exposure to arguments about the virtues of international trade is driving Hainmueller and Hiscox’s results+ 18 Furthermore, the expected trade attitudes of retirees are far from clear+ That education’s impact on such attitudes is indistinguishable between workers and retirees could reflect a tendency for trade preferences to persist over the course of a lifetime, rather than changing suddenly at retirement+ Thus, based on this analysis alone, it is difficult to determine whether skill level influences the formation of trade preferences+ The common finding that women are more protectionist than men, even after controlling for educational differences, also has been attributed to a college edu- 15+ Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006+ 16+ Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996+ 17+ Ibid+ 18+ See Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1963, chap+ 6; Erikson and Tedin 2005; and Fordham 2008+ 430 International Organization

Self-Interest,Sociotropic Politics,and Out-Group Anxiety 431 cation,in this case to differences in the kinds of courses taken by men and women. Burgoon and Hiscox,for example,maintain that college-educated men are more likely than college-educated women to be exposed to mainstream economic argu- ments about the gains from trade.They argue that the gender gap in trade policy attitudes stems from the fact that protrade ideas reach more men than women through their college coursework.19 More generally,Burgoon and Hiscox and Hainmueller and Hiscox make the important point that the kind of information to which citizens are exposed is likely to play a crucial role in shaping trade preferences.20 To extend their argument beyond the educational environment,it is easy to see how if a person is a union member, they will be exposed to a different kind of information about the impact of free trade policies than a nonunion worker.As new concerns about globalization arise,orga- nizations regularly communicate with their members to encourage certain policy preferences and to inform them about how they think people will be affected by particular policies.Likewise,members of the retiree organization AARP may receive regular information about the perils of financial insecurity in today's global econ- omy,thus cultivating the impression of risk and volatility that could drive percep- tions of the need for protectionist policies.Particularly in the current highly specialized media environment,different people receive different information.21 Whether this information variability is an outgrowth of the college courses they took,of newsletters,or of the daily newspaper,it helps shape perceptions that may or may not have a basis in the individual's personal economic reality.We refer to this collection of models emphasizing information differences as a source of variance in trade preferences as information-based models. Intuitively,information of the kind one might be exposed to in college or in a daily newspaper would seem to pale in comparison to the hard reality of eco- nomic risk faced by a worker in a given occupation or industry.Surely threats to one's livelihood would seem to be a more potent influence on policy preferences. Surprisingly,the literature on economic policy preferences suggests that self- interest is unlikely to play an influential role in shaping attitudes toward free trade.2 A large body of research demonstrates that self-interest enters into the formation of policy opinions only under very special and rare circumstances.23 Because of the counterintuitive nature of this claim,social scientists have searched extensively for instances in which economic self-interest played a signif- icant role in the formation of policy preferences,but with little success.Evidence suggests that the economic impact of policies on individual families has little,if any,influence on their policy preferences.24 The lack of self-interested policy pref- 19.Burgoon and Hiscox 2004. 20.See Burgoon and Hiscox 2004;and Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006. 21.Prior2007. 22.For a review of this literature,see Kiewiet 1983. 23.Sears and Funk 1990. 24.Ibid

cation, in this case to differences in the kinds of courses taken by men and women+ Burgoon and Hiscox, for example, maintain that college-educated men are more likely than college-educated women to be exposed to mainstream economic arguments about the gains from trade+ They argue that the gender gap in trade policy attitudes stems from the fact that protrade ideas reach more men than women through their college coursework+ 19 More generally, Burgoon and Hiscox and Hainmueller and Hiscox make the important point that the kind of information to which citizens are exposed is likely to play a crucial role in shaping trade preferences+ 20 To extend their argument beyond the educational environment, it is easy to see how if a person is a union member, they will be exposed to a different kind of information about the impact of free trade policies than a nonunion worker+ As new concerns about globalization arise, organizations regularly communicate with their members to encourage certain policy preferences and to inform them about how they think people will be affected by particular policies+ Likewise, members of the retiree organization AARP may receive regular information about the perils of financial insecurity in today’s global economy, thus cultivating the impression of risk and volatility that could drive perceptions of the need for protectionist policies+ Particularly in the current highly specialized media environment, different people receive different information+ 21 Whether this information variability is an outgrowth of the college courses they took, of newsletters, or of the daily newspaper, it helps shape perceptions that may or may not have a basis in the individual’s personal economic reality+ We refer to this collection of models emphasizing information differences as a source of variance in trade preferences as information-based models+ Intuitively, information of the kind one might be exposed to in college or in a daily newspaper would seem to pale in comparison to the hard reality of economic risk faced by a worker in a given occupation or industry+ Surely threats to one’s livelihood would seem to be a more potent influence on policy preferences+ Surprisingly, the literature on economic policy preferences suggests that selfinterest is unlikely to play an influential role in shaping attitudes toward free trade+ 22 A large body of research demonstrates that self-interest enters into the formation of policy opinions only under very special and rare circumstances+ 23 Because of the counterintuitive nature of this claim, social scientists have searched extensively for instances in which economic self-interest played a significant role in the formation of policy preferences, but with little success+ Evidence suggests that the economic impact of policies on individual families has little, if any, influence on their policy preferences+ 24 The lack of self-interested policy pref- 19+ Burgoon and Hiscox 2004+ 20+ See Burgoon and Hiscox 2004; and Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006+ 21+ Prior 2007+ 22+ For a review of this literature, see Kiewiet 1983+ 23+ Sears and Funk 1990+ 24+ Ibid+ Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics, and Out-Group Anxiety 431

432 International Organization erences occurs not out of a mass tendency toward altruism,but rather because citizens have a difficult time linking their personal economic situations to public policies.Furthermore,this pattern is not restricted to the economic realm.The list of failed attempts to observe the influence of self-interest in the formation of pol- icy preferences is by now quite lengthy.25 Exceptions to this general rule have received a great deal of attention,if only because of their rarity.26 But this is not to say that economic conditions are unrelated to policy prefer- ences.Instead,because people tend to formulate policy preferences on the basis of collective,national-level information (that is,perceptions of how a given pol- icy has affected the nation as a whole),economic conditions can influence these preferences,but through a fundamentally different process than what has been sug- gested by theories emphasizing self-interest.Even something as personally jarring as losing a job has far less impact on political preferences than the perception that unemployment is worsening as a collective,national problem.27 Thus,to the extent that trade preferences are similar to attitudes toward other aspects of economic policy,they will stem from people's perceptions of the collective impact that trade policy has on the nation.This pattern has been dubbed sociotropic influence because of the tendency it suggests for relying on collective-level information rather than personal experience.28 Sociotropic models are,at root,information-based explanations.They are rooted in people's perceptions (or misperceptions)derived from any number of sources of information,beyond personal life experience.Most interestingly,such percep- tions are not mere generalizations from personal experience.The two kinds of information that have been found to influence national-level collective percep- tions are:(1)local information,such as information about the local economy,and (2)mass media coverage of economic issues.Citizens tend to process personal- level experiences and concerns in a fashion that compartmentalizes them from the political world.29 Collective-level information,on the other hand,is more easily linked to government policy.An unemployed person is unlikely to blame the gov- ernment for his or her personal situation,but people who are aware of rising job- lessness in their country or community are likely to hold the government accountable for this development,regardless of their employment status.In the case of trade preferences,if available information convinces a person that many in the United States are being adversely affected by free trade,even if he is not,it 25.For a full review,see ibid. 26.Green and Gerken,for example,found that smoking-related policy preferences were signif- cantly influenced by whether a person was a smoker.The few exceptions are simple policies with straightforward effects on individuals,such as the effects of nonsmoking policies on smokers.As com- plex,difficult to understand agreements,trade policies would not naturally fall into this category of policies in which one would expect self-interest to affect political preferences.See Green and Gerken 1989. 27.See Sears and Funk 1990;and Mutz 1992. 28.Kinder and Kiewiet 1981. 29.See,for example,Brody and Sniderman 1977;and Mutz 1994

erences occurs not out of a mass tendency toward altruism, but rather because citizens have a difficult time linking their personal economic situations to public policies+ Furthermore, this pattern is not restricted to the economic realm+ The list of failed attempts to observe the influence of self-interest in the formation of policy preferences is by now quite lengthy+ 25 Exceptions to this general rule have received a great deal of attention, if only because of their rarity+ 26 But this is not to say that economic conditions are unrelated to policy preferences+ Instead, because people tend to formulate policy preferences on the basis of collective, national-level information ~that is, perceptions of how a given policy has affected the nation as a whole!, economic conditions can influence these preferences, but through a fundamentally different process than what has been suggested by theories emphasizing self-interest+ Even something as personally jarring as losing a job has far less impact on political preferences than the perception that unemployment is worsening as a collective, national problem+ 27 Thus, to the extent that trade preferences are similar to attitudes toward other aspects of economic policy, they will stem from people’s perceptions of the collective impact that trade policy has on the nation+ This pattern has been dubbed sociotropic influence because of the tendency it suggests for relying on collective-level information rather than personal experience+ 28 Sociotropic models are, at root, information-based explanations+ They are rooted in people’s perceptions ~or misperceptions! derived from any number of sources of information, beyond personal life experience+ Most interestingly, such perceptions are not mere generalizations from personal experience+ The two kinds of information that have been found to influence national-level collective perceptions are: ~1! local information, such as information about the local economy, and ~2! mass media coverage of economic issues+ Citizens tend to process personallevel experiences and concerns in a fashion that compartmentalizes them from the political world+ 29 Collective-level information, on the other hand, is more easily linked to government policy+ An unemployed person is unlikely to blame the government for his or her personal situation, but people who are aware of rising joblessness in their country or community are likely to hold the government accountable for this development, regardless of their employment status+ In the case of trade preferences, if available information convinces a person that many in the United States are being adversely affected by free trade, even if he is not, it 25+ For a full review, see ibid+ 26+ Green and Gerken, for example, found that smoking-related policy preferences were signifi- cantly influenced by whether a person was a smoker+ The few exceptions are simple policies with straightforward effects on individuals, such as the effects of nonsmoking policies on smokers+ As complex, difficult to understand agreements, trade policies would not naturally fall into this category of policies in which one would expect self-interest to affect political preferences+ See Green and Gerken 1989+ 27+ See Sears and Funk 1990; and Mutz 1992+ 28+ Kinder and Kiewiet 1981+ 29+ See, for example, Brody and Sniderman 1977; and Mutz 1994+ 432 International Organization

Self-Interest,Sociotropic Politics,and Out-Group Anxiety 433 will be the former,sociotropic perception that shapes his trade policy preferences rather than how trade has influenced his personal economic well-being. To summarize,research on the role of economic well-being on political prefer- ences would warn against the assumption of self-interest as the driving force behind attitudes toward trade.Studies of mass opinion have repeatedly shown that indi- viduals rarely form political preferences on the basis of economic self-interest. Although early studies of U.S.voting behavior attributed the surge enjoyed by incumbent parties in good economic times,and the anti-incumbent preferences in bad economic times,to so-called "pocketbook"voting,once these studies moved beyond aggregates to the individual level of analysis,it became clear that self- interest was not the mechanism driving economic accountability.The people helped or hurt by the economy were not those rewarding and punishing accordingly; instead,accountability rested on citizens'perceptions of how the nation as a whole was faring-perceptions that might or might not be accurate. In some ways,this account is quite consistent with the relatively poor perfor- mance of the leading political economy models in explaining individuals'trade policy attitudes.Effects have appeared weak to nonexistent in many studies or have been derived from measures such as education,the interpretation of which remains ambiguous.Moreover,because many studies have used aggregate-level measures of preferences and impact,and none have asked about sociotropic per- ceptions,previous research has not been able to distinguish these various sources of trade preferences. In this study,we use individual-level data that include multiple measures of attitudes toward trade.To date,few analyses of trade preferences have utilized data gathered at the individual level.30 In all but a handful of studies,trade atti- tudes have been inferred from aggregate vote results,patterns of campaign contri- butions,or the outcomes of the policy debates themselves.Importantly,aggregate- level data can produce evidence of self-interested attitudes toward trade policies that is impossible to distinguish from preferences formed on a sociotropic basis, that is,on the basis of how people think the collective as a whole is influenced. In addition,previous individual-level studies have generally relied on single- item indicators.Individual questions tend to be unreliable and sensitive to ques- tion wording and to the framing of options,problems that are easily avoided if responses across a variety of measures produce a reliable index.31 We also use these data to expand the potential ways in which self-interest might enter into these policy preferences,beyond skill levels and industry impact. Interestingly,most research on this topic has not viewed trade as a political issue.Instead,the emphasis in explaining trade attitudes has been on how trade 30.These studies include Bauer,Pool,and Dexter 1963:Balistreri 1997:Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Baker 2003 and 2005;Burgoon and Hiscox 2004;Kaltenthaler,Gelleny,and Ceccoli 2004;Mayda and Rodrik 2005;Hays,Ehrlich,and Peinhardt 2005:Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006;Hiscox 2006:and Kocher and Minushkin 2006. 31.See Bauer,Pool,and Dexter 1963,84-85;Worldviews 2002;and Hiscox 2006

will be the former, sociotropic perception that shapes his trade policy preferences rather than how trade has influenced his personal economic well-being+ To summarize, research on the role of economic well-being on political preferences would warn against the assumption of self-interest as the driving force behind attitudes toward trade+ Studies of mass opinion have repeatedly shown that individuals rarely form political preferences on the basis of economic self-interest+ Although early studies of U+S+ voting behavior attributed the surge enjoyed by incumbent parties in good economic times, and the anti-incumbent preferences in bad economic times, to so-called “pocketbook” voting, once these studies moved beyond aggregates to the individual level of analysis, it became clear that selfinterest was not the mechanism driving economic accountability+ The people helped or hurt by the economy were not those rewarding and punishing accordingly; instead, accountability rested on citizens’ perceptions of how the nation as a whole was faring—perceptions that might or might not be accurate+ In some ways, this account is quite consistent with the relatively poor performance of the leading political economy models in explaining individuals’ trade policy attitudes+ Effects have appeared weak to nonexistent in many studies or have been derived from measures such as education, the interpretation of which remains ambiguous+ Moreover, because many studies have used aggregate-level measures of preferences and impact, and none have asked about sociotropic perceptions, previous research has not been able to distinguish these various sources of trade preferences+ In this study, we use individual-level data that include multiple measures of attitudes toward trade+ To date, few analyses of trade preferences have utilized data gathered at the individual level+ 30 In all but a handful of studies, trade attitudes have been inferred from aggregate vote results, patterns of campaign contributions, or the outcomes of the policy debates themselves+ Importantly, aggregatelevel data can produce evidence of self-interested attitudes toward trade policies that is impossible to distinguish from preferences formed on a sociotropic basis, that is, on the basis of how people think the collective as a whole is influenced+ In addition, previous individual-level studies have generally relied on singleitem indicators+ Individual questions tend to be unreliable and sensitive to question wording and to the framing of options, problems that are easily avoided if responses across a variety of measures produce a reliable index+ 31 We also use these data to expand the potential ways in which self-interest might enter into these policy preferences, beyond skill levels and industry impact+ Interestingly, most research on this topic has not viewed trade as a political issue+ Instead, the emphasis in explaining trade attitudes has been on how trade 30+ These studies include Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1963; Balistreri 1997; Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Baker 2003 and 2005; Burgoon and Hiscox 2004; Kaltenthaler, Gelleny, and Ceccoli 2004; Mayda and Rodrik 2005; Hays, Ehrlich, and Peinhardt 2005; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006; Hiscox 2006; and Kocher and Minushkin 2006+ 31+ See Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1963, 84–85; Worldviews 2002; and Hiscox 2006+ Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics, and Out-Group Anxiety 433

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