《国际政治经济学》文献资料（Political Economy of Migration）Educated Preferences

Educated Preferences:Explaining Attitudes Toward Immigration in Europe Jens Hainmueller and Michael J.Hiscox Abstract Recent studies of individual attitudes toward immigration emphasize concerns about labor-market competition as a potent source of anti-immigrant senti- ment,in particular among less-educated or less-skilled citizens who fear being forced to compete for jobs with low-skilled immigrants willing to work for much lower wages.We examine new data on attitudes toward immigration available from the 2003 European Social Survey.In contrast to predictions based on conventional argu- ments about labor-market competition,which anticipate that individuals will oppose immigration of workers with similar skills to their own but support immigration of workers with different skill levels,we find that people with higher levels of educa- tion and occupational skills are more likely to favor immigration regardless of the skill attributes of the immigrants in question.Across Europe,higher education and higher skills mean more support for all types of immigrants.These relationships are almost identical among individuals in the labor force (that is,those competing for jobs)and those not in the labor force.Contrary to the conventional wisdom,then, the connection between the education or skill levels of individuals and views about immigration appears to have very little,if anything,to do with fears about labor- market competition.This finding is consistent with extensive economic research show- ing that the income and employment effects of immigration in European economies are actually very small.We find that a large component of the link between educa- tion and attitudes toward immigrants is driven by differences among individuals in cultural values and beliefs.More educated respondents are significantly less racist and place greater value on cultural diversity than do their counterparts;they are also more likely to believe that immigration generates benefits for the host economy as a whole. Political debates over immigration policy have been rising in volume and inten- sity in recent years in almost all Western economies.On the one hand,immigra- tion is seen by many as an economic and cultural lifeline that can supply firms in The authors would like to thank Beth Simmons,Shigeo Herano,Mike Tomz,James Alt,Jeffry Frieden, Ron Rogowski,Ken Scheve,Torben Iversen,Andy Baker,and Peter Gourevitch for helpful comments on earlier drafts. International Organization 61,Spring 2007,pp.399-442 2007 by The IO Foundation. D0L:10.1017/S0020818307070142

Educated Preferences: Explaining Attitudes Toward Immigration in Europe Jens Hainmueller and Michael J+ Hiscox Abstract Recent studies of individual attitudes toward immigration emphasize concerns about labor-market competition as a potent source of anti-immigrant senti￾ment, in particular among less-educated or less-skilled citizens who fear being forced to compete for jobs with low-skilled immigrants willing to work for much lower wages+ We examine new data on attitudes toward immigration available from the 2003 European Social Survey+ In contrast to predictions based on conventional argu￾ments about labor-market competition, which anticipate that individuals will oppose immigration of workers with similar skills to their own but support immigration of workers with different skill levels, we find that people with higher levels of educa￾tion and occupational skills are more likely to favor immigration regardless of the skill attributes of the immigrants in question+ Across Europe, higher education and higher skills mean more support for all types of immigrants+ These relationships are almost identical among individuals in the labor force ~that is, those competing for jobs! and those not in the labor force+ Contrary to the conventional wisdom, then, the connection between the education or skill levels of individuals and views about immigration appears to have very little, if anything, to do with fears about labor￾market competition+ This finding is consistent with extensive economic research show￾ing that the income and employment effects of immigration in European economies are actually very small+ We find that a large component of the link between educa￾tion and attitudes toward immigrants is driven by differences among individuals in cultural values and beliefs+ More educated respondents are significantly less racist and place greater value on cultural diversity than do their counterparts; they are also more likely to believe that immigration generates benefits for the host economy as a whole+ Political debates over immigration policy have been rising in volume and inten￾sity in recent years in almost all Western economies+ On the one hand, immigra￾tion is seen by many as an economic and cultural lifeline that can supply firms in The authors would like to thank Beth Simmons, Shigeo Herano, Mike Tomz, James Alt, Jeffry Frieden, Ron Rogowski, Ken Scheve, Torben Iversen, Andy Baker, and Peter Gourevitch for helpful comments on earlier drafts+ International Organization 61, Spring 2007, pp+ 399–442 © 2007 by The IO Foundation+ DOI: 10+10170S0020818307070142

400 International Organization key industries with skilled workers,relieve strains on tax-funded pension systems threatened by the graying of the local population,and inject new artistic and intel- lectual life into the nation.On the other hand,there are concerns that immigrants may take jobs away from local workers,subtract more from the government in the form of social services than they give back in taxes,and create ethnic enclaves that balkanize the nation,undermine traditional culture,and lead to crime and other social ills.These latter concerns have encouraged the recent imposition of much tighter immigration controls in several countries while also nurturing the growth of extremist anti-immigrant political movements in many parts of Europe and increasing the incidence of hate crimes directed toward immigrants.The debate seems certain to continue in the years ahead,and grow fiercer. A great deal of new research has examined survey data on individual attitudes toward immigration,focusing on the determinants of anti-immigration sentiments. Some of the most recent and prominent studies have concluded that realistic fears about the economic effects of labor-market competition among low-skilled,blue- collar workers lie at the heart of much anti-immigration feeling.2 These studies all rest their analysis on economic models of the distributive effects of immigration anticipating that low-skilled (that is,less-educated)native workers will lose out when forced to compete for jobs with low-skilled immigrants.3 The key support- ing evidence for their claims is that opposition to immigration among survey respon- dents in advanced industrialized countries is negatively and significantly associated with individual levels of educational attainment.Viewed from this perspective, the immigration debate is to a large extent about economics,and a critical battle line is the one that separates high-skilled and low-skilled workers. But this account does not fit well with the growing body of evidence,available from a variety of studies of European and American labor markets,showing that the effects of immigration flows on income,employment,and unemployment actu- ally appear to be quite small.Since the most sophisticated economic models are quite equivocal about whether immigrants will have an adverse impact on the wages or employment opportunities of local workers,perhaps these latter results should not be so surprising.But this does raise a big question about how exactly one should interpret the clear relationship between the education or skill levels among individuals and their views about immigration.One established line of scholar- ship would regard this pattern not as a reflection of labor-market dynamics,but instead as confirmation that higher levels of education lead to greater ethnic and racial tolerance among individuals and more cosmopolitan outlooks.3 Viewed in 1.See,for example,Gang and Rivera-Batiz 1994b;Citrin et al.1997;and Dustmann and Preston 2001. 2.See,for example,Scheve and Slaughter 2001a and 2001b;Kessler 2001;and Mayda 2006. 3.See Borjas 1999a and 1999b. 4.See Friedberg and Hunt 1995;Bhagwati 2000 and 2002;Dustmann et al.2004;and Card 2005; although see Borjas 2003. 5.See,for example,Espenshade and Calhoun 1993;Citrin et al.1997;and McLaren 2001

key industries with skilled workers, relieve strains on tax-funded pension systems threatened by the graying of the local population, and inject new artistic and intel￾lectual life into the nation+ On the other hand, there are concerns that immigrants may take jobs away from local workers, subtract more from the government in the form of social services than they give back in taxes, and create ethnic enclaves that balkanize the nation, undermine traditional culture, and lead to crime and other social ills+ These latter concerns have encouraged the recent imposition of much tighter immigration controls in several countries while also nurturing the growth of extremist anti-immigrant political movements in many parts of Europe and increasing the incidence of hate crimes directed toward immigrants+ The debate seems certain to continue in the years ahead, and grow fiercer+ A great deal of new research has examined survey data on individual attitudes toward immigration, focusing on the determinants of anti-immigration sentiments+ 1 Some of the most recent and prominent studies have concluded that realistic fears about the economic effects of labor-market competition among low-skilled, blue￾collar workers lie at the heart of much anti-immigration feeling+ 2 These studies all rest their analysis on economic models of the distributive effects of immigration anticipating that low-skilled ~that is, less-educated! native workers will lose out when forced to compete for jobs with low-skilled immigrants+ 3 The key support￾ing evidence for their claims is that opposition to immigration among survey respon￾dents in advanced industrialized countries is negatively and significantly associated with individual levels of educational attainment+ Viewed from this perspective, the immigration debate is to a large extent about economics, and a critical battle line is the one that separates high-skilled and low-skilled workers+ But this account does not fit well with the growing body of evidence, available from a variety of studies of European and American labor markets, showing that the effects of immigration flows on income, employment, and unemployment actu￾ally appear to be quite small+ 4 Since the most sophisticated economic models are quite equivocal about whether immigrants will have an adverse impact on the wages or employment opportunities of local workers, perhaps these latter results should not be so surprising+ But this does raise a big question about how exactly one should interpret the clear relationship between the education or skill levels among individuals and their views about immigration+ One established line of scholar￾ship would regard this pattern not as a reflection of labor-market dynamics, but instead as confirmation that higher levels of education lead to greater ethnic and racial tolerance among individuals and more cosmopolitan outlooks+ 5 Viewed in 1+ See, for example, Gang and Rivera-Batiz 1994b; Citrin et al+ 1997; and Dustmann and Preston 2001+ 2+ See, for example, Scheve and Slaughter 2001a and 2001b; Kessler 2001; and Mayda 2006+ 3+ See Borjas 1999a and 1999b+ 4+ See Friedberg and Hunt 1995; Bhagwati 2000 and 2002; Dustmann et al+ 2004; and Card 2005; although see Borjas 2003+ 5+ See, for example, Espenshade and Calhoun 1993; Citrin et al+ 1997; and McLaren 2001+ 400 International Organization

Attitudes Toward Immigration in Europe 401 this light,immigration is an issue that raises fundamental questions about values and identities among individuals,debates over immigration are shaped less by labor- market competition than by cultural conflict,and the division between more-and less-educated natives is primarily a cultural or ideological distinction. Which of these interpretations is more correct?Is the main motivator for oppo- sition to immigration the threat of economic competition,felt most acutely among the less educated?Or is it a deeper animosity toward foreigners and foreign cul- tures,felt least strongly among the more educated?The answer to this question is critical to our understanding of the politics of immigration and the treatment of ethnic minorities.It is crucial,too,for policymakers and others who support immi- gration and worry about the growth of extremist,often violent,anti-immigrant movements.If anti-immigration sentiments are based primarily on economic cal- culations,there are some very direct ways in which policymakers might address them:for instance,by targeting forms of adjustment assistance and job creation programs toward the communities or industries in which the economic impact is felt most heavily.If opposition to immigration is motivated by more deep-seated cultural factors,on the other hand,these types of adjustment assistance are unlikely to be effective and it is much more difficult to imagine simple,short-run measures that would mitigate the political tensions. We examine new data on attitudes toward immigration available from the 2003 European Social Survey (ESS).Unlike other sources of survey data on attitudes toward immigrants,the 2003 ESS provides a rich,detailed set of questions about the immigration issue,probing respondents'views about immigrants from differ- ent countries.The detailed data allow us to provide new tests of the labor-market competition explanation for anti-immigration sentiments among European voters. We focus,in particular,on the complex relationship between education and atti- tudes toward immigration.Our results indicate that,in contrast to predictions based on the conventional arguments about labor-market competition,which anticipate that individuals will oppose immigration of workers with similar skills to their own but support immigration of workers with different skill levels,people with higher education levels are more likely to favor immigration regardless of where the immigrants come from and their likely skill attributes.Across Europe,higher education means more support for all types of immigrants.This is true for alter- native measures of education in all twenty-two ESS countries.The same relation- ship holds for direct (occupational)measures of respondent skill levels:higher skills are associated with greater support for all types of immigration.These rela- tionships are almost identical among those in the labor force and those not in the labor force. The findings thus suggest that,contrary to the conventional wisdom,the con- nection between the educational or skill attributes of individuals and their views about immigration appears to have very little,if anything,to do with fears about labor-market competition.The conventional story appears to be based on a funda- mental misinterpretation of the available evidence.We find that a large com- ponent of the effect of education on individual attitudes toward immigrants is

this light, immigration is an issue that raises fundamental questions about values and identities among individuals, debates over immigration are shaped less by labor￾market competition than by cultural conflict, and the division between more- and less-educated natives is primarily a cultural or ideological distinction+ Which of these interpretations is more correct? Is the main motivator for oppo￾sition to immigration the threat of economic competition, felt most acutely among the less educated? Or is it a deeper animosity toward foreigners and foreign cul￾tures, felt least strongly among the more educated? The answer to this question is critical to our understanding of the politics of immigration and the treatment of ethnic minorities+ It is crucial, too, for policymakers and others who support immi￾gration and worry about the growth of extremist, often violent, anti-immigrant movements+ If anti-immigration sentiments are based primarily on economic cal￾culations, there are some very direct ways in which policymakers might address them: for instance, by targeting forms of adjustment assistance and job creation programs toward the communities or industries in which the economic impact is felt most heavily+ If opposition to immigration is motivated by more deep-seated cultural factors, on the other hand, these types of adjustment assistance are unlikely to be effective and it is much more difficult to imagine simple, short-run measures that would mitigate the political tensions+ We examine new data on attitudes toward immigration available from the 2003 European Social Survey ~ESS!+ Unlike other sources of survey data on attitudes toward immigrants, the 2003 ESS provides a rich, detailed set of questions about the immigration issue, probing respondents’ views about immigrants from differ￾ent countries+ The detailed data allow us to provide new tests of the labor-market competition explanation for anti-immigration sentiments among European voters+ We focus, in particular, on the complex relationship between education and atti￾tudes toward immigration+ Our results indicate that, in contrast to predictions based on the conventional arguments about labor-market competition, which anticipate that individuals will oppose immigration of workers with similar skills to their own but support immigration of workers with different skill levels, people with higher education levels are more likely to favor immigration regardless of where the immigrants come from and their likely skill attributes+ Across Europe, higher education means more support for all types of immigrants+ This is true for alter￾native measures of education in all twenty-two ESS countries+ The same relation￾ship holds for direct ~occupational! measures of respondent skill levels: higher skills are associated with greater support for all types of immigration+ These rela￾tionships are almost identical among those in the labor force and those not in the labor force+ The findings thus suggest that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, the con￾nection between the educational or skill attributes of individuals and their views about immigration appears to have very little, if anything, to do with fears about labor-market competition+ The conventional story appears to be based on a funda￾mental misinterpretation of the available evidence+ We find that a large com￾ponent of the effect of education on individual attitudes toward immigrants is Attitudes Toward Immigration in Europe 401

402 International Organization associated with differences among individuals in cultural values and beliefs.More educated respondents are significantly less racist and place greater value on cul- tural diversity;they are also more likely to believe that immigration generates benefits for the host economy as a whole.Together,these factors account for around 65 percent of the estimated relationship between education and support for immigration. Explaining Individual Attitudes Toward Immigration Which individuals are most likely to oppose immigration?Standard economic mod- els of the income effects of immigration emphasize the importance of the differ- ent types of productive factors people own.What is critical in this respect is the impact that immigration has on relative supplies of factors of production in the local economy.In the most commonly analyzed scenario,it is assumed that immi- grants have relatively low skill levels when compared with native workers.Immi- gration thus increases the supply of low-skilled labor relative to other factors(land, capital,and high-skilled labor).In a simple closed-economy model in which new (low-skilled)immigrants can price themselves into employment only by lowering the wages of native low-skilled workers,as more low-skilled labor is applied to fixed amounts of the other factors,the real wages of the less skilled will decline while the earnings of owners of land,capital,and skills will rise.6 This model of the impact of immigration is often referred to as "factor-proportions"(FP)analy- sis.It renders the distributive effects of inflows of low-skilled immigrants in stark terms:native low-skilled workers are clearly the economic losers.Of course,if immigrants were high-skilled(rather than low-skilled)workers the effect of the inflows would be to lower real wages for native high-skilled workers and to raise real earnings for all others (including low-skilled workers). There has been a good deal of research on public attitudes toward immigration that has looked for signs that economic concerns related to job security do lie behind anti-immigrant sentiments,with mixed results.8 But several recent studies have set out explicitly to test the proposition that a fear of lower wages induces low-skilled individuals,in particular,to oppose immigration.Most prominently, Scheve and Slaughter have examined data from National Election Studies (NES) 6.Standard models assume full employment and wage flexibility,so that the distributional effects are reflected in wages.In models that permit labor-market imperfections,these effects can also take the form of changes in local unemployment rates (see Razin and Sadka 1995:and Angrist and Kugler 2003).Alternative models also allow for geographic differences within national labor markets so that the wage and employment effects of immigration may be concentrated in"gateway communities"where immigrants tend to settle in large numbers (see Card 1990;LaLonde and Topel 1991;and Borjas 1999a, 10-11). 7.See Borjas,Freeman,and Katz 1996 and 1997;and Borjas 1999a. 8.See,for example,Studlar 1977;Harwood 1986;Simon 1987;Gang and Rivera-Batiz 1994b; Citrin et al.1997;Burns and Gimpel 2000;Fetzer 2000;and Dustmann and Preston 2001

associated with differences among individuals in cultural values and beliefs+ More educated respondents are significantly less racist and place greater value on cul￾tural diversity; they are also more likely to believe that immigration generates benefits for the host economy as a whole+ Together, these factors account for around 65 percent of the estimated relationship between education and support for immigration+ Explaining Individual Attitudes Toward Immigration Which individuals are most likely to oppose immigration? Standard economic mod￾els of the income effects of immigration emphasize the importance of the differ￾ent types of productive factors people own+ What is critical in this respect is the impact that immigration has on relative supplies of factors of production in the local economy+ In the most commonly analyzed scenario, it is assumed that immi￾grants have relatively low skill levels when compared with native workers+ Immi￾gration thus increases the supply of low-skilled labor relative to other factors ~land, capital, and high-skilled labor!+ In a simple closed-economy model in which new ~low-skilled! immigrants can price themselves into employment only by lowering the wages of native low-skilled workers, as more low-skilled labor is applied to fixed amounts of the other factors, the real wages of the less skilled will decline while the earnings of owners of land, capital, and skills will rise+ 6 This model of the impact of immigration is often referred to as “factor-proportions” ~FP! analy￾sis+ 7 It renders the distributive effects of inflows of low-skilled immigrants in stark terms: native low-skilled workers are clearly the economic losers+ Of course, if immigrants were high-skilled ~rather than low-skilled! workers the effect of the inflows would be to lower real wages for native high-skilled workers and to raise real earnings for all others ~including low-skilled workers!+ There has been a good deal of research on public attitudes toward immigration that has looked for signs that economic concerns related to job security do lie behind anti-immigrant sentiments, with mixed results+ 8 But several recent studies have set out explicitly to test the proposition that a fear of lower wages induces low-skilled individuals, in particular, to oppose immigration+ Most prominently, Scheve and Slaughter have examined data from National Election Studies ~NES! 6+ Standard models assume full employment and wage flexibility, so that the distributional effects are reflected in wages+ In models that permit labor-market imperfections, these effects can also take the form of changes in local unemployment rates ~see Razin and Sadka 1995; and Angrist and Kugler 2003!+ Alternative models also allow for geographic differences within national labor markets so that the wage and employment effects of immigration may be concentrated in “gateway communities” where immigrants tend to settle in large numbers ~see Card 1990; LaLonde and Topel 1991; and Borjas 1999a, 10–11!+ 7+ See Borjas, Freeman, and Katz 1996 and 1997; and Borjas 1999a+ 8+ See, for example, Studlar 1977; Harwood 1986; Simon 1987; Gang and Rivera-Batiz 1994b; Citrin et al+ 1997; Burns and Gimpel 2000; Fetzer 2000; and Dustmann and Preston 2001+ 402 International Organization

Attitudes Toward Immigration in Europe 403 surveys in the United States in 1992,1994,and 1996 that asked respondents about their preferences regarding immigration restrictions.They found that individuals with lower skills,measured primarily by years of education,were far more likely to support restrictions on immigration than those with higher skills.Mayda reached similar conclusions after examining cross-national survey data on twenty-three nations from the 1995 National Identity Module of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP),as well as data on forty-four nations from the third wave of the World Value Survey (WVS),conducted between 1995 and 1997.10 She reports that respondents with higher levels of skill (again,measured by years of educa- tion)are much more likely to voice pro-immigration opinions than those with lower levels of skill. There are several reasons to be cautious about how we interpret these findings. One issue is whether immigration,in practice,has actually had the distributional effects anticipated by the standard closed-economy models.A growing set of empir- ical studies dedicated to this question has found only small wage and employment effects attributable to immigration flows into European labor markets(there is still much debate about the evidence in the American case).In part this may be because there appears to be a great deal of variation in the skill levels of immigrants,and there is considerable debate now over whether immigrants actually tend,in gen- eral,to have low levels of skills relative to native workers.2 To varying degrees, of course,the immigration policies in many Western countries are actually aimed at selecting candidates for entry based on the quality of their skills and excess local demand for those skills.13 More fundamentally,the most sophisticated economic models are actually quite equivocal about whether immigrants will have an adverse impact on the wages or employment opportunities of local workers with similar skills.14 In the following we briefly summarize the theoretical predictions of current open-economy models of immigration;we provide a detailed technical description in a separate Web 9.Scheve and Slaughter 2001a and 2001b. 10.Mayda2006. 11.For general reviews,see Friedberg and Hunt 1995;and Bhagwati 2000 and 2002.For evidence on the impact of immigration in European labor markets,see Zimmerman 1995:Hunt 1992:DeNew and Zimmerman 1994;Hartog and Zorlu 2005;and Dustmann et al.2004.Evidence on immigration effects on wages in the United States is discussed in Card 1990;Gang and Rivera-Batiz 1994a;Borjas, Freeman,and Katz 1997:and Borjas 1999a.Two recent studies of the effects of immigration on wages and employment in the United States,Borjas 2003 and Card 2005,reach opposing conclusions about the magnitude of these effects. 12.Angrist and Kugler 2003,16,report"considerable overlap between the immigrant and native schooling distributions"for thirteen European countries in 1995 and 1999.Borjas,Freeman,and Katz 1997 and Borjas 1999a present evidence from U.S.census data indicating that,on average,immigrants to the United States had approximately two fewer years of education than natives in 1998.According to Bhagwati 2002,310,however,the evidence of a large native versus immigrant skill difference is less clear judging from data from the Immigration and Naturalization Service. 13.See Bauer,Pool,and Dexter 1972. 14.See Friedberg and Hunt 1995;and Scheve and Slaughter 2001a,135-37

surveys in the United States in 1992, 1994, and 1996 that asked respondents about their preferences regarding immigration restrictions+ 9 They found that individuals with lower skills, measured primarily by years of education, were far more likely to support restrictions on immigration than those with higher skills+ Mayda reached similar conclusions after examining cross-national survey data on twenty-three nations from the 1995 National Identity Module of the International Social Survey Programme ~ISSP!, as well as data on forty-four nations from the third wave of the World Value Survey ~WVS!, conducted between 1995 and 1997+ 10 She reports that respondents with higher levels of skill ~again, measured by years of educa￾tion! are much more likely to voice pro-immigration opinions than those with lower levels of skill+ There are several reasons to be cautious about how we interpret these findings+ One issue is whether immigration, in practice, has actually had the distributional effects anticipated by the standard closed-economy models+ A growing set of empir￾ical studies dedicated to this question has found only small wage and employment effects attributable to immigration flows into European labor markets ~there is still much debate about the evidence in the American case!+ 11 In part this may be because there appears to be a great deal of variation in the skill levels of immigrants, and there is considerable debate now over whether immigrants actually tend, in gen￾eral, to have low levels of skills relative to native workers+ 12 To varying degrees, of course, the immigration policies in many Western countries are actually aimed at selecting candidates for entry based on the quality of their skills and excess local demand for those skills+ 13 More fundamentally, the most sophisticated economic models are actually quite equivocal about whether immigrants will have an adverse impact on the wages or employment opportunities of local workers with similar skills+ 14 In the following we briefly summarize the theoretical predictions of current open-economy models of immigration; we provide a detailed technical description in a separate Web 9+ Scheve and Slaughter 2001a and 2001b+ 10+ Mayda 2006+ 11+ For general reviews, see Friedberg and Hunt 1995; and Bhagwati 2000 and 2002+ For evidence on the impact of immigration in European labor markets, see Zimmerman 1995; Hunt 1992; DeNew and Zimmerman 1994; Hartog and Zorlu 2005; and Dustmann et al+ 2004+ Evidence on immigration effects on wages in the United States is discussed in Card 1990; Gang and Rivera-Batiz 1994a; Borjas, Freeman, and Katz 1997; and Borjas 1999a+ Two recent studies of the effects of immigration on wages and employment in the United States, Borjas 2003 and Card 2005, reach opposing conclusions about the magnitude of these effects+ 12+ Angrist and Kugler 2003, 16, report “considerable overlap between the immigrant and native schooling distributions” for thirteen European countries in 1995 and 1999+ Borjas, Freeman, and Katz 1997 and Borjas 1999a present evidence from U+S+ census data indicating that, on average, immigrants to the United States had approximately two fewer years of education than natives in 1998+ According to Bhagwati 2002, 310, however, the evidence of a large native versus immigrant skill difference is less clear judging from data from the Immigration and Naturalization Service+ 13+ See Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1972+ 14+ See Friedberg and Hunt 1995; and Scheve and Slaughter 2001a, 135–37+ Attitudes Toward Immigration in Europe 403

404 International Organization appendix to this article.5 In an open-economy Heckscher-Ohlin(HO)model,trade can offset the impact of immigration as an economy adjusts to any change in fac- tor supplies by importing less of the goods that can now be produced locally at a lower cost.Again assuming low-skilled immigrants,it is possible that an economy can absorb new workers simply by altering the mix of output of tradable goods, increasing production of low-skill-intensive goods and decreasing production of other goods(in line with the Rybcynski theorem).Wages will not change at all if the local economy is small enough that a change in its output mix has no effect on world prices-a result known as"factor price insensitivity."There are two poss- ible exceptions.If the local economy is very large relative to the rest of the world, of course,the change in output mix can produce a decline in the world prices of low-skill-intensive goods and a subsequent decline in the real wages of low- skilled labor.But this result does not seem applicable for the individual European countries.Alternatively,if the inflow of immigration is itself large,it might induce a change in the set of tradable products that the local economy produces,thus causing a decline in the real wages of low-skilled labor.Yet this also seems like an extreme result,and not one that could be a reasonable basis for calculations about the effects of immigration in most European nations. The theoretical picture becomes no clearer if we allow that the skills of workers can be highly "specific"to particular industries-the standard approach taken in most theoretical recent work on international trade.7 If all goods are traded,so that prices are fixed in world markets,it can be shown that inflows of low-skilled workers will indeed lower real wages for low-skilled natives while raising real wages for high-skilled workers in all industries.(The latter benefits will be larger for high-skilled workers in sectors that use low-skilled labor more intensively.) On the flip side,inflows of any type of high-skilled workers will raise real wages for low-skilled workers while lowering real wages for all high-skilled workers (the latter losses being larger for those who own the same specific skills as the immigrants).While these distributive effects match the predictions generated by the simple closed-economy FP model,they are overturned with the inclusion of nontraded goods in the model.If immigration can lead to a reduction in the price of nontraded goods (that is,if it raises the output of such goods more rapidly than it raises aggregate demand for them),it is unclear whether native workers with skills similar to those of immigrants will be worse off in real terms.(The outcome will depend in part on their consumption tastes.)The effects of immigration inflows on real earnings are similarly ambiguous in the specific-factors model when the country in question is large relative to world markets.18 15.This appendix and other supplements referred to in later sections are available for download at the authors'Web site at (http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/-jhainm/research.htm). 16.Leamer and Levinsohn 1995. 17.See Jones 1971;and Grossman and Helpman 1994. 18.Note that,while we have concentrated on the labor-market effects here,there is also consider- able debate over the impact of immigration on government spending and tax revenues.One common

appendix to this article+ 15 In an open-economy Heckscher-Ohlin ~HO! model, trade can offset the impact of immigration as an economy adjusts to any change in fac￾tor supplies by importing less of the goods that can now be produced locally at a lower cost+ Again assuming low-skilled immigrants, it is possible that an economy can absorb new workers simply by altering the mix of output of tradable goods, increasing production of low-skill-intensive goods and decreasing production of other goods ~in line with the Rybcynski theorem!+ Wages will not change at all if the local economy is small enough that a change in its output mix has no effect on world prices—a result known as “factor price insensitivity+” 16 There are two poss￾ible exceptions+ If the local economy is very large relative to the rest of the world, of course, the change in output mix can produce a decline in the world prices of low-skill-intensive goods and a subsequent decline in the real wages of low￾skilled labor+ But this result does not seem applicable for the individual European countries+ Alternatively, if the inflow of immigration is itself large, it might induce a change in the set of tradable products that the local economy produces, thus causing a decline in the real wages of low-skilled labor+ Yet this also seems like an extreme result, and not one that could be a reasonable basis for calculations about the effects of immigration in most European nations+ The theoretical picture becomes no clearer if we allow that the skills of workers can be highly “specific” to particular industries—the standard approach taken in most theoretical recent work on international trade+ 17 If all goods are traded, so that prices are fixed in world markets, it can be shown that inflows of low-skilled workers will indeed lower real wages for low-skilled natives while raising real wages for high-skilled workers in all industries+ ~The latter benefits will be larger for high-skilled workers in sectors that use low-skilled labor more intensively+! On the flip side, inflows of any type of high-skilled workers will raise real wages for low-skilled workers while lowering real wages for all high-skilled workers ~the latter losses being larger for those who own the same specific skills as the immigrants!+ While these distributive effects match the predictions generated by the simple closed-economy FP model, they are overturned with the inclusion of nontraded goods in the model+ If immigration can lead to a reduction in the price of nontraded goods ~that is, if it raises the output of such goods more rapidly than it raises aggregate demand for them!, it is unclear whether native workers with skills similar to those of immigrants will be worse off in real terms+ ~The outcome will depend in part on their consumption tastes+! The effects of immigration inflows on real earnings are similarly ambiguous in the specific-factors model when the country in question is large relative to world markets+ 18 15+ This appendix and other supplements referred to in later sections are available for download at the authors’ Web site at ^http:00www+people+fas+harvard+edu0;jhainm0research+htm&+ 16+ Leamer and Levinsohn 1995+ 17+ See Jones 1971; and Grossman and Helpman 1994+ 18+ Note that, while we have concentrated on the labor-market effects here, there is also consider￾able debate over the impact of immigration on government spending and tax revenues+ One common 404 International Organization

Attitudes Toward Immigration in Europe 405 Other types of general equilibrium models raise more doubts about the impact we should expect immigration to have on the wages of similarly skilled native workers.If we allow for economies of scale in production in the industries employ- ing immigrants,inflows of new workers can be shown to generate higher real wages for native workers with similar skills in an open-economy model.19 If we treat immigration inflows as a component in the growth of the labor supply,in a fully specified dynamic model of the economy,the impact of such flows on wages over time will depend on the rates of capital accumulation and population growth(and how these are affected by immigration),as well as the rate of skill acquisition among immigrants-points noted by Bhagwati.20 All in all,it is extremely diffi- cult to make firm predictions about the equilibrium effects of immigration on wages and employment opportunities among local workers. If the economic impact of immigration is actually quite small,as both theory and empirics tend to suggest,then what explains the strong negative association between education and anti-immigration sentiments?One clear explanation is pro- vided by theories that relate education to higher levels of ethnic and racial toler- ance among individuals and to a preference for cultural diversity.This is an interpretation favored by many scholars who have made note of the connection between education and individual support for immigration.2 There is a large lit- erature showing that education tends to socialize students to have more tolerant, pro-outsider views of the world.22 As Gang and colleagues note,most Western educational systems are designed quite explicitly to increase social tolerance.23 Chandler and Tsai point out that education fosters tolerance,not just by increasing students'knowledge of foreign cultures and raising levels of critical thinking,but also by generating more diverse and cosmopolitan social networks,especially at the college level.24 On a related theme,Betts argues that support for immigration among the college educated is one aspect of a larger class identity associated with cosmopolitanism and an appreciation for diverse cultures.25 We provide tests of these accounts in the analysis below. concern is that low-skilled immigrants,because they tend to earn less and thus pay less in taxes than natives,and because they are more likely to draw unemployment and other welfare benefits from gov- ernment,are a net drain on government coffers.Economists are divided on whether this is actually the case (see Krugman and Obstfeld 2000,166).Notice,however,that to the extent it is true,since the added tax burden of immigration would fall disproportionately on richer,more highly skilled native workers,these distributional effects would run counter to(and thus mitigate)the types of distribu- tional wage effects emphasized in closed-economy FP models of labor-market competition. 19.See Brezis and Krugman 1993. 20.Bhagwati 2000. 21.See,for example,Betts 1988;Espenshade and Calhoun 1993;Espenshade and Hempstead 1996: Citrin et al.1997;Fetzer 2000;Chandler and Tsai 2001;and Gang,Rivera-Batiz,and Yun 2002. 22.See,for example,Campbell et al.1960,475-81;Erikson,Luttbeg,and Tedin 1991,155-56; McClosky and Brill 1983;and Schuman,Steeh,and Bobo 1985. 23.Gang,Rivera-Batiz,and Yun 2002,13. 24.Chandler and Tsai 2001.See also Case,Greeley,and Fuchs 1989;and Allport 1954. 25.Betts1988

Other types of general equilibrium models raise more doubts about the impact we should expect immigration to have on the wages of similarly skilled native workers+ If we allow for economies of scale in production in the industries employ￾ing immigrants, inflows of new workers can be shown to generate higher real wages for native workers with similar skills in an open-economy model+ 19 If we treat immigration inflows as a component in the growth of the labor supply, in a fully specified dynamic model of the economy, the impact of such flows on wages over time will depend on the rates of capital accumulation and population growth ~and how these are affected by immigration!, as well as the rate of skill acquisition among immigrants—points noted by Bhagwati+ 20 All in all, it is extremely diffi- cult to make firm predictions about the equilibrium effects of immigration on wages and employment opportunities among local workers+ If the economic impact of immigration is actually quite small, as both theory and empirics tend to suggest, then what explains the strong negative association between education and anti-immigration sentiments? One clear explanation is pro￾vided by theories that relate education to higher levels of ethnic and racial toler￾ance among individuals and to a preference for cultural diversity+ This is an interpretation favored by many scholars who have made note of the connection between education and individual support for immigration+ 21 There is a large lit￾erature showing that education tends to socialize students to have more tolerant, pro-outsider views of the world+ 22 As Gang and colleagues note, most Western educational systems are designed quite explicitly to increase social tolerance+ 23 Chandler and Tsai point out that education fosters tolerance, not just by increasing students’ knowledge of foreign cultures and raising levels of critical thinking, but also by generating more diverse and cosmopolitan social networks, especially at the college level+ 24 On a related theme, Betts argues that support for immigration among the college educated is one aspect of a larger class identity associated with cosmopolitanism and an appreciation for diverse cultures+ 25 We provide tests of these accounts in the analysis below+ concern is that low-skilled immigrants, because they tend to earn less and thus pay less in taxes than natives, and because they are more likely to draw unemployment and other welfare benefits from gov￾ernment, are a net drain on government coffers+ Economists are divided on whether this is actually the case ~see Krugman and Obstfeld 2000, 166!+ Notice, however, that to the extent it is true, since the added tax burden of immigration would fall disproportionately on richer, more highly skilled native workers, these distributional effects would run counter to ~and thus mitigate! the types of distribu￾tional wage effects emphasized in closed-economy FP models of labor-market competition+ 19+ See Brezis and Krugman 1993+ 20+ Bhagwati 2000+ 21+ See, for example, Betts 1988; Espenshade and Calhoun 1993; Espenshade and Hempstead 1996; Citrin et al+ 1997; Fetzer 2000; Chandler and Tsai 2001; and Gang, Rivera-Batiz, and Yun 2002+ 22+ See, for example, Campbell et al+ 1960, 475–81; Erikson, Luttbeg, and Tedin 1991, 155–56; McClosky and Brill 1983; and Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo 1985+ 23+ Gang, Rivera-Batiz, and Yun 2002, 13+ 24+ Chandler and Tsai 2001+ See also Case, Greeley, and Fuchs 1989; and Allport 1954+ 25+ Betts 1988+ Attitudes Toward Immigration in Europe 405

406 International Organization Note that one might simply suggest that the actual economic effects of immi- gration are less relevant than people's perceptions of those effects,and that stories reported by the media or statements made by politicians perhaps lead people to believe that immigration poses a larger economic threat to blue-collar workers than it actually does.26 This type of assertion seems quite plausible,but it begs for a theoretical explanation of how and why individuals misperceive the threat posed by immigration.The most obvious explanation for people-and especially less- educated individuals-being prone to see immigrants as an economic threat no matter what the actual labor-market effects,would seem simply to be an argument that links low education levels with xenophobic or racist predilections.That is, such an argument would seem ultimately to rest on the same (noneconomic)cul- tural or ideological factors just discussed,and these factors become the critical determinants of anti-immigrant sentiments rather than the real economic effects of immigration. Besides tolerance and support for cultural diversity,of course,there are a vari- ety of other noneconomic variables that have been identified as predictors of atti- tudes toward immigrants (and which are not so closely connected to education levels).Age tends to be negatively associated with support for immigration,for instance,and women seem generally more opposed to immigration than do men.27 Children of foreigners are predictably more supportive of immigration,as are mem- bers of minority ethnic groups.28 The latter finding would appear to support claims that members of marginalized groups often form common political bonds.29 Mean- while,individuals with right-wing or conservative political ideologies,and those evincing more national pride,are generally more likely to oppose immigration.30 Anti-immigration sentiment in Europe seems to be more intense in communities where immigrants are concentrated,suggesting that more contact with immigrants or perceived strains on locally provided government services foster nativist feel- ings.31 We attempt to account for all of these possibilities in the empirical analysis below. New Data from the European Social Survey We draw our data from the fifth edition of the recently administered European Social Survey.32 The survey covers twenty-two European countries:Austria,France, Norway,Sweden,Finland,Britain,Belgium,Ireland,the Netherlands,Denmark, 26.See Gang,Rivera-Batiz,and Yun 2002,7;and Citrin et al.1997,859. 27.Citrin et al.1997;Dustmann and Preston 2001;and Gang,Rivera-Batiz,and Yun 2002. 28.Citrin et al.1997:and Chandler and Tsai 2001. 29.See Espenshade and Calhoun 1993;and Betz 1994. 30.Chandler and Tsai 2001. 31.Gang,Rivera-Batiz,and Yun 2002. 32.See Stoop,Jowell,and Mohler 2002.A detailed description of the survey can be found at (http:/ www.europeansocialsurvey.org).Accessed 2 February 2007

Note that one might simply suggest that the actual economic effects of immi￾gration are less relevant than people’s perceptions of those effects, and that stories reported by the media or statements made by politicians perhaps lead people to believe that immigration poses a larger economic threat to blue-collar workers than it actually does+ 26 This type of assertion seems quite plausible, but it begs for a theoretical explanation of how and why individuals misperceive the threat posed by immigration+ The most obvious explanation for people—and especially less￾educated individuals—being prone to see immigrants as an economic threat no matter what the actual labor-market effects, would seem simply to be an argument that links low education levels with xenophobic or racist predilections+ That is, such an argument would seem ultimately to rest on the same ~noneconomic! cul￾tural or ideological factors just discussed, and these factors become the critical determinants of anti-immigrant sentiments rather than the real economic effects of immigration+ Besides tolerance and support for cultural diversity, of course, there are a vari￾ety of other noneconomic variables that have been identified as predictors of atti￾tudes toward immigrants ~and which are not so closely connected to education levels!+ Age tends to be negatively associated with support for immigration, for instance, and women seem generally more opposed to immigration than do men+ 27 Children of foreigners are predictably more supportive of immigration, as are mem￾bers of minority ethnic groups+ 28 The latter finding would appear to support claims that members of marginalized groups often form common political bonds+ 29 Mean￾while, individuals with right-wing or conservative political ideologies, and those evincing more national pride, are generally more likely to oppose immigration+ 30 Anti-immigration sentiment in Europe seems to be more intense in communities where immigrants are concentrated, suggesting that more contact with immigrants or perceived strains on locally provided government services foster nativist feel￾ings+ 31 We attempt to account for all of these possibilities in the empirical analysis below+ New Data from the European Social Survey We draw our data from the fifth edition of the recently administered European Social Survey+ 32 The survey covers twenty-two European countries: Austria, France, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Britain, Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands, Denmark, 26+ See Gang, Rivera-Batiz, and Yun 2002, 7; and Citrin et al+ 1997, 859+ 27+ Citrin et al+ 1997; Dustmann and Preston 2001; and Gang, Rivera-Batiz, and Yun 2002+ 28+ Citrin et al+ 1997; and Chandler and Tsai 2001+ 29+ See Espenshade and Calhoun 1993; and Betz 1994+ 30+ Chandler and Tsai 2001+ 31+ Gang, Rivera-Batiz, and Yun 2002+ 32+ See Stoop, Jowell, and Mohler 2002+ A detailed description of the survey can be found at ^http:00 www+europeansocialsurvey+org&+ Accessed 2 February 2007+ 406 International Organization

Attitudes Toward Immigration in Europe 407 Germany,Italy,Luxembourg,Switzerland,Greece,Spain,Portugal,Israel,Czech Republic,Hungary,Poland,and Slovenia.It consists of answers of up to 42,000 respondents to an hour-long questionnaire,with an average country sample of about 2,000 respondents.The broad coverage provides substantial cross-national varia- tion in social,political,and economic contexts.The stratified random sample was designed to be representative of the residential population of each nation,aged sixteen years and above,regardless of their nationality,citizenship,or legal status.33 The questionnaire consists of a "core"module that contains a large range of socioeconomic and demographic questions and several rotating,topic-specific mod- ules,one of which focuses on the issue of immigration.Our primary empirical tests involve individual responses to a set of questions taking the following form: To what extent do you think [respondent's country]should allow people from source]to come and live here? Allow many to come and live here ·Allow some ·Allow a few ·Allow none ·Don't know There are four different versions of this question in which the source of the immigrants is identified alternatively as: The richer countries in Europe The poorer countries in Europe The richer countries outside Europe The poorer countries outside Europe For each of the questions we created a dichotomous variable that equals 1 (pro-immigration)if the answer was“allow many'”or“allow some”and0(anti- immigration)if the answer was "allow a few"or"allow none."34 The dichoto- mous dependent variables just allow a simpler and more intuitive summary of the basic results than alternative treatments using the "raw"categorical variables and estimating ordered probit models (which would require reporting the marginal effects that each independent variable has on the probability of a response falling into each possible category).In the section below on robustness tests,we describe the sensitivity analysis we have performed using ordered probit models and also rerunning all the analysis reported below using all alternative cutoff points for 33.The majority (55 percent)of the questionnaires were administered in face-to-face interviews. For a full discussion of the EES methodology,see Stoop,Jowell,and Mohler 2002. 34.We excluded the few "don't know"and missing answers from the sample.Including these obser- vations as either pro-or anti-immigration answers does not change any of the substantive results we report since only 4 to 5 percent of the answers to each question fall in this category

Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Israel, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia+ It consists of answers of up to 42,000 respondents to an hour-long questionnaire, with an average country sample of about 2,000 respondents+ The broad coverage provides substantial cross-national varia￾tion in social, political, and economic contexts+ The stratified random sample was designed to be representative of the residential population of each nation, aged sixteen years and above, regardless of their nationality, citizenship, or legal status+ 33 The questionnaire consists of a “core” module that contains a large range of socioeconomic and demographic questions and several rotating, topic-specific mod￾ules, one of which focuses on the issue of immigration+ Our primary empirical tests involve individual responses to a set of questions taking the following form: To what extent do you think @respondent’s country# should allow people from @source# to come and live here? • Allow many to come and live here • Allow some • Allow a few • Allow none • Don’t know There are four different versions of this question in which the source of the immigrants is identified alternatively as: • The richer countries in Europe • The poorer countries in Europe • The richer countries outside Europe • The poorer countries outside Europe For each of the questions we created a dichotomous variable that equals 1 ~pro-immigration! if the answer was “allow many” or “allow some” and 0 ~anti￾immigration! if the answer was “allow a few” or “allow none+” 34 The dichoto￾mous dependent variables just allow a simpler and more intuitive summary of the basic results than alternative treatments using the “raw” categorical variables and estimating ordered probit models ~which would require reporting the marginal effects that each independent variable has on the probability of a response falling into each possible category!+ In the section below on robustness tests, we describe the sensitivity analysis we have performed using ordered probit models and also rerunning all the analysis reported below using all alternative cutoff points for 33+ The majority ~55 percent! of the questionnaires were administered in face-to-face interviews+ For a full discussion of the EES methodology, see Stoop, Jowell, and Mohler 2002+ 34+ We excluded the few “don’t know” and missing answers from the sample+ Including these obser￾vations as either pro- or anti-immigration answers does not change any of the substantive results we report since only 4 to 5 percent of the answers to each question fall in this category+ Attitudes Toward Immigration in Europe 407

408 International Organization dichotomization of the dependent variable.None of our findings is sensitive at all to the choice of cutoff point. The crucial advantage gained from examining these ESS data,compared to data from alternative surveys used in previous research,is that separate questions have been posed about specific categories of immigrants that are likely to have very different skill characteristics.These distinctions allow for a much more direct test of the arguments about labor-market competition.Prior studies have rested on the assumption that respondents must always have low-skilled immigrants in mind when answering a general survey question about immigration.35 Here we can assume that respondents will have substantially different expectations about the average skill levels of immigrants from "richer"countries than of those from "poorer"countries.The questions were asked consecutively in the survey,making it clear to respondents that"richer"versus "poorer"was the critical difference-a difference that is most obviously meaningful as it bears upon the expected skill levels of immigrants.Respondents are more likely to associate immigrants from the richer nations with higher-skilled individuals (for example,professional and managerial employees from Germany,France,Britain,and the United States),while associating immigrants from poorer nations with lower-skilled individuals (for example,manual workers and refugees from eastern and southern Europe and from Africa).This set of expectations seems intuitively compelling,but we can also verify that it is empirically very accurate.Immigrants from richer nations do have higher skills,on average,than immigrants from poorer nations. To verify this we examined evidence on the skill levels of immigrants compiled in the International File of Immigration Surveys (IFIS)database by van Tuber- gen.36 This database combines survey data on more than 300,000 immigrants from 180 countries of origin and eighteen destination countries,extracted from the Euro- pean Union's Labour Force Survey,national censuses,and additional country- specific immigrant surveys.37 For the European destination nations the IFIS provides data on immigrants from fifty-one origins:twenty-six European and twenty-five non-European countries.38 The data include codes for whether the individual immi- grants had low,middle,or high levels of educational attainment (these corre- 35.See Scheve and Slaughter 2001a,135. 36.van Tubergen 2004. 37.All surveys were harmonized and pooled by van Tubergen into a cross-national data set that provides comparable individual-level information on immigrants,classified by country of origin,for the period 1980-2001.To our knowledge this represents the most comprehensive data set on immi- grant populations currently available.We are indebted to Frank van Tubergen for allowing us to use these data here. 38.The fourteen European destination nations in the IFIS database are Austria,Belgium,Denmark, Finland,France,Germany,Greece,Ireland,Luxembourg,Netherlands,Portugal,Spain,Sweden,and the United Kingdom.In addition to these fourteen,the European origin countries included Albania, Bulgaria,Ex-Czechoslovakia,Ex-Yugoslavia,Hungary,Iceland,Italy,Malta,Norway,Poland,Roma- nia,and Switzerland.The non-European origin nations are Algeria,Argentina,Australia,Brazil,Cam- bodia,Canada,China,Cyprus,Egypt,Ex-Russia,India,Indonesia,Japan,Lebanon,Mexico,Morocco, New Zealand,Pakistan,Philippine,South Africa,Thailand,Tunisia,Turkey,the United States,and Vietnam

dichotomization of the dependent variable+ None of our findings is sensitive at all to the choice of cutoff point+ The crucial advantage gained from examining these ESS data, compared to data from alternative surveys used in previous research, is that separate questions have been posed about specific categories of immigrants that are likely to have very different skill characteristics+ These distinctions allow for a much more direct test of the arguments about labor-market competition+ Prior studies have rested on the assumption that respondents must always have low-skilled immigrants in mind when answering a general survey question about immigration+ 35 Here we can assume that respondents will have substantially different expectations about the average skill levels of immigrants from “richer” countries than of those from “poorer” countries+ The questions were asked consecutively in the survey, making it clear to respondents that “richer” versus “poorer” was the critical difference—a difference that is most obviously meaningful as it bears upon the expected skill levels of immigrants+ Respondents are more likely to associate immigrants from the richer nations with higher-skilled individuals ~for example, professional and managerial employees from Germany, France, Britain, and the United States!, while associating immigrants from poorer nations with lower-skilled individuals ~for example, manual workers and refugees from eastern and southern Europe and from Africa!+ This set of expectations seems intuitively compelling, but we can also verify that it is empirically very accurate+ Immigrants from richer nations do have higher skills, on average, than immigrants from poorer nations+ To verify this we examined evidence on the skill levels of immigrants compiled in the International File of Immigration Surveys ~IFIS! database by van Tuber￾gen+ 36 This database combines survey data on more than 300,000 immigrants from 180 countries of origin and eighteen destination countries, extracted from the Euro￾pean Union’s Labour Force Survey, national censuses, and additional country￾specific immigrant surveys+ 37 For the European destination nations the IFIS provides data on immigrants from fifty-one origins: twenty-six European and twenty-five non-European countries+ 38 The data include codes for whether the individual immi￾grants had low, middle, or high levels of educational attainment ~these corre- 35+ See Scheve and Slaughter 2001a, 135+ 36+ van Tubergen 2004+ 37+ All surveys were harmonized and pooled by van Tubergen into a cross-national data set that provides comparable individual-level information on immigrants, classified by country of origin, for the period 1980–2001+ To our knowledge this represents the most comprehensive data set on immi￾grant populations currently available+ We are indebted to Frank van Tubergen for allowing us to use these data here+ 38+ The fourteen European destination nations in the IFIS database are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom+ In addition to these fourteen, the European origin countries included Albania, Bulgaria, Ex-Czechoslovakia, Ex-Yugoslavia, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Malta, Norway, Poland, Roma￾nia, and Switzerland+ The non-European origin nations are Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Cam￾bodia, Canada, China, Cyprus, Egypt, Ex-Russia, India, Indonesia, Japan, Lebanon, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippine, South Africa, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, the United States, and Vietnam+ 408 International Organization