m PROJECT MUSE' Showing Ideas as Causes:The Origins of the European Lag iggons 0 International Organization,Volume 56,Number 1,Winter 2002,pp. 47-84(Article) Published by The MIT Press For additional information about this article http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/ino/summary/v056/56.1parsons.html Access provided by Shanghai Jiao Tong University(26 Mar 2015 09:15 GMT)
6KRZLQJ,GHDVDV&DXVHV 7KH2ULJLQVRIWKH(XURSHDQ 8QLRQ Craig Parsons International Organization, Volume 56, Number 1, Winter 2002, pp. 47-84 (Article) 3XEOLVKHGE\7KH0,73UHVV For additional information about this article Access provided by Shanghai Jiao Tong University (26 Mar 2015 09:15 GMT) http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/ino/summary/v056/56.1parsons.html
Showing Ideas as Causes:The Origins of the European Union Craig Parsons Why does Western Europe,with its quasi-federal European Union (EU),have international institutions that are so much more developed than those in other regions?Scholars give two main answers.For"structuralists"like Andrew Morav- csik and Alan Milward,the EU responded to objective structural imperatives. International interdependence was particularly acute in postwar Europe,so govern- ments built particularly strong institutions to meet policy challenges.For "institu- tionalists"in the tradition of Ernst Haas,structural imperatives may have driven initial postwar institution building,but subsequent steps were heavily path-depen- dent.Once some power was delegated to "supranational"agents in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)in 1952,those agents crafted new projects and mobilized coalitions to extend supranational institutions.From this"spillover"arose the broader European Economic Community(EEC)in 1958-the direct foundation of today's EU-and its later development.2 Although I accept insights from both approaches,I argue that neither explains why Europeans chose this"community"Europe over radically different alternatives in the 1950s.If postwar structural conditions generated widely perceived impera- tives to European cooperation,they did not dictate its shape or extent.If institutional path-dependence helped"lock in"the contested EEC institutions after 1958,it did not push Europeans in any specific direction before then.Within vague structural and institutional pressures,only certain ideas led Europeans to the EEC rather than to less extensive cooperation in much weaker international institutions(or without For comments I thank Chris Ansell,Neil Fligstein.Nicolas Jabko,Elizabeth Kier,Andrew Moravcsik, Paul Pitman,Wayne Sandholtz,Robert Rauchhaus.Jeffrey Vanke,Steve Weber,two anonymous reviewers and the editors of International Organization,and audiences at the University of British Columbia,the University of Califomia at Berkeley,Harvard University,the Georgia Institute of Technology,and Syracuse University.For research support I thank the National Science Foundation,the MacArthur Foundation,and the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation. 1.See Moravcsik 1998;and Milward 1992. 2.See Haas 1958:and Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998. International Organization 56,1.Winter 2002.pp.47-84 2002 by The IO Foundation and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Showing Ideas as Causes: The Origins of the European Union Craig Parsons Why does Western Europe, with its quasi-federal European Union (EU), have international institutions that are so much more developed than those in other regions? Scholars give two main answers. For “structuralists” like Andrew Moravcsik and Alan Milward, the EU responded to objective structural imperatives.1 International interdependence was particularly acute in postwar Europe, so governments built particularly strong institutions to meet policy challenges. For “institutionalists” in the tradition of Ernst Haas, structural imperatives may have driven initial postwar institution building, but subsequent steps were heavily path-dependent. Once some power was delegated to “supranational” agents in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952, those agents crafted new projects and mobilized coalitions to extend supranational institutions. From this “spillover” arose the broader European Economic Community (EEC) in 1958—the direct foundation of today’s EU—and its later development.2 Although I accept insights from both approaches, I argue that neither explains why Europeans chose this “community” Europe over radically different alternatives in the 1950s. If postwar structural conditions generated widely perceived imperatives to European cooperation, they did not dictate its shape or extent. If institutional path-dependence helped “lock in” the contested EEC institutions after 1958, it did not push Europeans in any specific direction before then. Within vague structural and institutional pressures, only certain ideas led Europeans to the EEC rather than to less extensive cooperation in much weaker international institutions (or without For comments I thank Chris Ansell, Neil Fligstein, Nicolas Jabko, Elizabeth Kier, Andrew Moravcsik, Paul Pitman, Wayne Sandholtz, Robert Rauchhaus, Jeffrey Vanke, Steve Weber, two anonymous reviewers and the editors of International Organization, and audiences at the University of British Columbia, the University of California at Berkeley, Harvard University, the Georgia Institute of Technology, and Syracuse University. For research support I thank the National Science Foundation, the MacArthur Foundation, and the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation. 1. See Moravcsik 1998; and Milward 1992. 2. See Haas 1958; and Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998. International Organization 56, 1, Winter 2002, pp. 47–84 © 2002 by The IO Foundation and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
48 International Organization formal institutions at all).Only advocates of a new ideology of integration-what I call the"community model"perceived interests in the unprecedented institutional project showcased in the ECSC and EEC.Had Europeans followed other viable, historically active ideas about their interests in cooperation-the "confederal"or "traditional"models-they would have solved their problems through more stan- dard diplomatic instruments.Today's Europe would reflect the rule,not the exception,in international relations. This argument confronts two major obstacles.The first is theoretical:Isolating ideas as causes is difficult.A growing literature points to actors'subjective beliefs as important causes of political outcomes.But if ideational theorists argue persua- sively that ideas are often non-negligible factors in politics,they have trouble specifying how much ideas matter.Skeptics thus remain free to dismiss ideas as residual to objective responses to structural or institutional constraints.I argue that certain conditions allow for more concrete and specific claims about ideas.Where ideas strongly cross-cut lines of shared material interests in a polity,we can isolate individuals'beliefs most clearly from objective pressures.Cross-cutting ideas can also fragment coalitions and parties,creating situations similar to the "chaos"and "multiple equilibria"described by game theorists.Entrepreneurial leaders may gain the autonomy to set the policy agenda around their own personal ideas,and to mobilize one of several potential coalitions behind them.Leaders'ideas,as an autonomous causal factor,thereby select from a range of structural and institutional possibilities. The second obstacle is historical:Tracing certain ideas across Europe and the 1950s is an immense task.I surmount this problem by focusing on the pivotal case of French strategic choices.Experts agree that European cooperation took the shape it did in the 1950s-the institutionally strong,geographically limited EECabove all because the French government demanded it.The preferences of the other main actors(Germany,Britain,Benelux)summed to favor broader and weaker institu- tional options.I show that rather than reflecting structural or institutional pressures, French insistence on the EEC resulted from community-minded leadership.Alter- native confederal or traditional French strategies were strongly represented and at least as viable domestically and internationally and would have oriented European bargaining to different outcomes.The differences between the EEC and these alternatives display the range across which French community ideas mattered. Ideas and the "How Much?"Problem Ideas are subjective claims about descriptions of the world,causal relationships,or the normative legitimacy of certain actions.The basic reasons to suspect that ideas 3.See Hall 1989 and 1993:Onuf 1989:Wendt 1989 and 1997:Sikkink 1991:Goldstein 1993; Goldstein and Keohane 1993:Checkel 1993:Katzenstein 1996:Kier 1997:McNamara 1998:and Berman 1998
formal institutions at all). Only advocates of a new ideology of integration—what I call the “community model”—perceived interests in the unprecedented institutional project showcased in the ECSC and EEC. Had Europeans followed other viable, historically active ideas about their interests in cooperation—the “confederal” or “traditional” models—they would have solved their problems through more standard diplomatic instruments. Today’s Europe would reflect the rule, not the exception, in international relations. This argument confronts two major obstacles. The first is theoretical: Isolating ideas as causes is difficult. A growing literature points to actors’ subjective beliefs as important causes of political outcomes.3 But if ideational theorists argue persuasively that ideas are often non-negligible factors in politics, they have trouble specifying how much ideas matter. Skeptics thus remain free to dismiss ideas as residual to objective responses to structural or institutional constraints. I argue that certain conditions allow for more concrete and specific claims about ideas. Where ideas strongly cross-cut lines of shared material interests in a polity, we can isolate individuals’ beliefs most clearly from objective pressures. Cross-cutting ideas can also fragment coalitions and parties, creating situations similar to the “chaos” and “multiple equilibria” described by game theorists. Entrepreneurial leaders may gain the autonomy to set the policy agenda around their own personal ideas, and to mobilize one of several potential coalitions behind them. Leaders’ ideas, as an autonomous causal factor, thereby select from a range of structural and institutional possibilities. The second obstacle is historical: Tracing certain ideas across Europe and the 1950s is an immense task. I surmount this problem by focusing on the pivotal case of French strategic choices. Experts agree that European cooperation took the shape it did in the 1950s—the institutionally strong, geographically limited EEC—above all because the French government demanded it. The preferences of the other main actors (Germany, Britain, Benelux) summed to favor broader and weaker institutional options. I show that rather than reflecting structural or institutional pressures, French insistence on the EEC resulted from community-minded leadership. Alternative confederal or traditional French strategies were strongly represented and at least as viable domestically and internationally and would have oriented European bargaining to different outcomes. The differences between the EEC and these alternatives display the range across which French community ideas mattered. Ideas and the “How Much?” Problem Ideas are subjective claims about descriptions of the world, causal relationships, or the normative legitimacy of certain actions. The basic reasons to suspect that ideas 3. See Hall 1989 and 1993; Onuf 1989; Wendt 1989 and 1997; Sikkink 1991; Goldstein 1993; Goldstein and Keohane 1993; Checkel 1993; Katzenstein 1996; Kier 1997; McNamara 1998; and Berman 1998. 48 International Organization
Origins of the EU 49 influence behavior have been well elaborated by the overlapping"constructivist" and "sociological institutionalist"schools in international relations and by compar- ative political economists like Peter Hall.4 These scholars have had difficulty moving from ontological propositions to strong empirical demonstrations,however, due to two related problems.The first is the "Janus-faced"nature of ideas. Sometimes actors'beliefs guide their actions;sometimes apparent beliefs only rationalize strategies chosen for other reasons."Distinguishing between the two situations can be difficult.Second,even assuming ideas have causal effects,they do so as interpretations or "filters"of the objective environment.Wherever ideas have causal effects-in Max Weber's famous phrase,as "switchmen"among various material possibilities-so does the objective context they interpret.The challenge for causal ideational argument is to isolate the ideational filter from its context,to separate the subjective components of actors'perceived"interests"from their direct responses to the environment. The postmodern extreme of the ideational literature meets this challenge by denying it.The very notion of an accessible objective context is rejected,making interpretation of ideas the entire exercise,without attempts to assess how ideas relate to objective pressures.'More mainstream ideational arguments,however,use fairly standard social-science methods to suggest the need for similar kinds of interpre- tation.Most common in the constructivist.sociological institutionalist.and com- parative literatures is a reliance on "process tracing."The observer traces the objective pressures impinging on certain decisions and concludes that they did not fully determine a choice.Thus we need to interpret the beliefs that did.Cross-case comparisons are also often used to set up interpretation.In contexts ranging from the early Industrial Revolution to interwar military strategizing,scholars suggest that actors in objectively similar situations adopted different strategies due to different ideas.10 Other studies show the need for interpretation in the proliferation of similar policies across structurally different cases. Especially when combined,these methods produce strong claims that ideas can affect politics to some degree.Their main weakness,however,is an apparent inability to show how much ideas cause certain outcomes.Scholars using these methods offer qualitative assessments of indeterminacy left by objective pressures and interpretations of how certain ideas resolved it.Yet skeptics can always question the former assessment,suggesting(for example)that it underestimates the objective economic pressures toward a choice-meaning that ideas caused it less than has been claimed.A process-tracing focus on a single course of action also offers little 4.See,in particular,Wendt 1989;Onuf 1989;Finnemore 1996;and Hall 1989. 5.See Laitin 1986,11-20:Tetlock 1991,47:Shepsle 1985:and Krasner 1993. 6.Weber1958.280. 7.For a recent example in EU studies,see Diez 1999. 8.George 1979. 9.See Hall 1989 and 1993;Goldstein and Keohane 1993,26:and Adler and Haas 1992. 10.See Biernacki 1995:Kier 1997:Berman 1998;and Hattam 1992. 11.Finnemore 1996
influence behavior have been well elaborated by the overlapping “constructivist” and “sociological institutionalist” schools in international relations and by comparative political economists like Peter Hall.4 These scholars have had difficulty moving from ontological propositions to strong empirical demonstrations, however, due to two related problems. The first is the “Janus-faced” nature of ideas. Sometimes actors’ beliefs guide their actions; sometimes apparent beliefs only rationalize strategies chosen for other reasons.5 Distinguishing between the two situations can be difficult. Second, even assuming ideas have causal effects, they do so as interpretations or “filters” of the objective environment. Wherever ideas have causal effects—in Max Weber’s famous phrase, as “switchmen” among various material possibilities—so does the objective context they interpret.6 The challenge for causal ideational argument is to isolate the ideational filter from its context, to separate the subjective components of actors’ perceived “interests” from their direct responses to the environment. The postmodern extreme of the ideational literature meets this challenge by denying it. The very notion of an accessible objective context is rejected, making interpretation of ideas the entire exercise, without attempts to assess how ideas relate to objective pressures.7 More mainstream ideational arguments, however, use fairly standard social-science methods to suggest the need for similar kinds of interpretation. Most common in the constructivist, sociological institutionalist, and comparative literatures is a reliance on “process tracing.”8 The observer traces the objective pressures impinging on certain decisions and concludes that they did not fully determine a choice. Thus we need to interpret the beliefs that did.9 Cross-case comparisons are also often used to set up interpretation. In contexts ranging from the early Industrial Revolution to interwar military strategizing, scholars suggest that actors in objectively similar situations adopted different strategies due to different ideas.10 Other studies show the need for interpretation in the proliferation of similar policies across structurally different cases.11 Especially when combined, these methods produce strong claims that ideas can affect politics to some degree. Their main weakness, however, is an apparent inability to show how much ideas cause certain outcomes. Scholars using these methods offer qualitative assessments of indeterminacy left by objective pressures and interpretations of how certain ideas resolved it. Yet skeptics can always question the former assessment, suggesting (for example) that it underestimates the objective economic pressures toward a choice—meaning that ideas caused it less than has been claimed. A process-tracing focus on a single course of action also offers little 4. See, in particular, Wendt 1989; Onuf 1989; Finnemore 1996; and Hall 1989. 5. See Laitin 1986, 11–20; Tetlock 1991, 47; Shepsle 1985; and Krasner 1993. 6. Weber 1958, 280. 7. For a recent example in EU studies, see Diez 1999. 8. George 1979. 9. See Hall 1989 and 1993; Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 26; and Adler and Haas 1992. 10. See Biernacki 1995; Kier 1997; Berman 1998; and Hattam 1992. 11. Finnemore 1996. Origins of the EU 49
50 International Organization counterfactual leverage:What was the range of possibilities without these ideas?12 Cross-case comparisons help in this respect,suggesting alternatives in similar situations.But cross-national comparisons are rarely similar enough for analysts to ascribe all their variation to ideas.Critics may suspect that unnoticed differences in structural or institutional situations account for part of the divergence.3 Overall,laments one sympathetic reviewer,ideas in today's literature are"simply another rather than the causal factor."14 For skeptics,these"how much"questions make all the difference.If variation in ideas alone cannot be tied to specific variation in major outcomes,concludes a less sympathetic reviewer,ideas can still be downplayed as"a valuable supplement to [objective-]interest-based,rational actor models."15 One Way to Tie Ideas to Outcomes We need not conclude that ideas and clear causal arguments are incompatible,as a third reviewer implies.6 Settings where ideas cross-cut prevailing lines of organi- zation can clearly display their causal impact.French decision making in early European integration is one very significant example.While such cases cannot prove that ideas matter everywhere,they should convince skeptics that ideas can be major causes in politics.This section first considers how to isolate ideas'effects on individuals'views.Then it suggests how individual-level ideas can affect major outcomes. Cross-Cutting Ideas and Individual Variation Cross-cutting ideas have particularly clear effects because they offer the sharpest possible contrast to the expectations of objective-interest theories.All such theories define actors'interests in terms of objective conditions at some level of organiza- tion.For realists,individuals in a state share interests defined by the distribution of power;political party theorists trace members'interests to electoral or coalitional constraints;bureaucratic theorists highlight units'interests within organizational rivalries;and liberals or Marxists derive group interests from economic constraints (in different ways).Ideational approaches posit,in contrast,that actors interpret their interests through ideas that can vary independently from their objective positions. Their greatest divergence with objective-interest theories thus occurs where ideas vary as independently as possible from organizational lines in an arena,strongly 12.On counterfactuals and ideas,Blyth 1997,235;in general,Fearon 1991;and Tetlock and Belkin 1996. 13.Berman1998.11. 14.Blyth 1997,236.A reviewer of constructivism echoes that"norms are invoked as one of several causal variables with little or no insight given on how much of the outcome they explain."Checkel 1998, 339. 15.Jacobsen1995.,285 16.Yee1996.102
counterfactual leverage: What was the range of possibilities without these ideas?12 Cross-case comparisons help in this respect, suggesting alternatives in similar situations. But cross-national comparisons are rarely similar enough for analysts to ascribe all their variation to ideas. Critics may suspect that unnoticed differences in structural or institutional situations account for part of the divergence.13 Overall, laments one sympathetic reviewer, ideas in today’s literature are “simply another rather than the causal factor.”14 For skeptics, these “how much” questions make all the difference. If variation in ideas alone cannot be tied to specific variation in major outcomes, concludes a less sympathetic reviewer, ideas can still be downplayed as “a valuable supplement to [objective-] interest-based, rational actor models.”15 One Way to Tie Ideas to Outcomes We need not conclude that ideas and clear causal arguments are incompatible, as a third reviewer implies.16 Settings where ideas cross-cut prevailing lines of organization can clearly display their causal impact. French decision making in early European integration is one very significant example. While such cases cannot prove that ideas matter everywhere, they should convince skeptics that ideas can be major causes in politics. This section first considers how to isolate ideas’ effects on individuals’ views. Then it suggests how individual-level ideas can affect major outcomes. Cross-Cutting Ideas and Individual Variation Cross-cutting ideas have particularly clear effects because they offer the sharpest possible contrast to the expectations of objective-interest theories. All such theories define actors’ interests in terms of objective conditions at some level of organization. For realists, individuals in a state share interests defined by the distribution of power; political party theorists trace members’ interests to electoral or coalitional constraints; bureaucratic theorists highlight units’ interests within organizational rivalries; and liberals or Marxists derive group interests from economic constraints (in different ways). Ideational approaches posit, in contrast, that actors interpret their interests through ideas that can vary independently from their objective positions. Their greatest divergence with objective-interest theories thus occurs where ideas vary as independently as possible from organizational lines in an arena, strongly 12. On counterfactuals and ideas, Blyth 1997, 235; in general, Fearon 1991; and Tetlock and Belkin 1996. 13. Berman 1998, 11. 14. Blyth 1997, 236. A reviewer of constructivism echoes that “norms are invoked as one of several causal variables with little or no insight given on how much of the outcome they explain.” Checkel 1998, 339. 15. Jacobsen 1995, 285. 16. Yee 1996, 102. 50 International Organization
Origins of the EU 51 cross-cutting groups of people in similar material positions.This does not mean that ideas have stronger causal effects where they cross-cut groups;ideas shared within powerful groups may be equally (or more)significant for important outcomes.It simply means that ideas'autonomous effects should be particularly demonstrable in these cases. To see this assertion in greater detail,consider how it responds to the"how much" problem.We could isolate ideas precisely if we found an extremely close compar- ison,contrasting actors in near-identical places in the objective world to highlight the purely subjective variations in their behavior.Such comparisons are available at the individual level,within groups.Close organizational peers share positions in the objective world;comparing their views of their groups'interests can separate variation in their ideas from variation in objective pressures.Take two French diplomats,with similar social backgrounds and party sympathies,in the same office of the foreign ministry in 1950.One insists on French interests in a new "suprana- tional"Franco-German federation;the other sees French interests in policies based on an informal partnership with Britain.These similarly placed individuals face all the same objective pressures but seem to interpret them differently.If other similarly placed individuals across France also disagree (displaying a pattern that cross-cuts parties,bureaucracies,economic groups),and if these debates persist through important decisions (showing they were not just an initial vetting of options),we can conclude that objective pressures at these levels leave French interests indeterminate across these alternatives.If,in addition,we have the kind of"interpretive"evidence typically offered by ideational accounts-actors consistently say and write that they believe certain things,and that their peers think differently-we have strong evidence that ideas alone are causing individual variation across that range.7 This conclusion does not rule out that historical or psychological factors other than simple"ideas"(like past socialization,psychological dispositions,or individual experiences)may have led to this pattern of debate.But as long as we cannot trace current patterns of mobilization to current objective conditions (and can trace related patterns of rhetoric),we have evidence that subjective factors are currently influencing action.Psychological or historical factors may help explain why actors came to hold certain ideas,but neither factor invalidates the claim that subjective ideas are now causing variation in behavior.In other words,explaining the distribution of ideas as dependent variables is legitimately separate from showing their presence and effects as independent variables.s Far from exaggerating the range of purely subjective variation in individuals' views,this approach should minimize interpretive biases.Unlike in most ideational arguments,it is the actors,not the observer,who define the range across which ideas matter (see Figure 1).One actor wants to pursue strategy X;one of her close 17.Provided there are no clear individual-level incentives to disagree,as in career competition.I see no pattern of such incentives in my case.Disincentives to interal disagreement seem more common in most organizations. 18.See Kingdon 1984.77:Kier 1997.148:and Kowert and Legro 1996.469
cross-cutting groups of people in similar material positions. This does not mean that ideas have stronger causal effects where they cross-cut groups; ideas shared within powerful groups may be equally (or more) significant for important outcomes. It simply means that ideas’ autonomous effects should be particularly demonstrable in these cases. To see this assertion in greater detail, consider how it responds to the “how much” problem. We could isolate ideas precisely if we found an extremely close comparison, contrasting actors in near-identical places in the objective world to highlight the purely subjective variations in their behavior. Such comparisons are available at the individual level, within groups. Close organizational peers share positions in the objective world; comparing their views of their groups’ interests can separate variation in their ideas from variation in objective pressures. Take two French diplomats, with similar social backgrounds and party sympathies, in the same office of the foreign ministry in 1950. One insists on French interests in a new “supranational” Franco-German federation; the other sees French interests in policies based on an informal partnership with Britain. These similarly placed individuals face all the same objective pressures but seem to interpret them differently. If other similarly placed individuals across France also disagree (displaying a pattern that cross-cuts parties, bureaucracies, economic groups), and if these debates persist through important decisions (showing they were not just an initial vetting of options), we can conclude that objective pressures at these levels leave French interests indeterminate across these alternatives. If, in addition, we have the kind of “interpretive” evidence typically offered by ideational accounts—actors consistently say and write that they believe certain things, and that their peers think differently—we have strong evidence that ideas alone are causing individual variation across that range.17 This conclusion does not rule out that historical or psychological factors other than simple “ideas” (like past socialization, psychological dispositions, or individual experiences) may have led to this pattern of debate. But as long as we cannot trace current patterns of mobilization to current objective conditions (and can trace related patterns of rhetoric), we have evidence that subjective factors are currently influencing action. Psychological or historical factors may help explain why actors came to hold certain ideas, but neither factor invalidates the claim that subjective ideas are now causing variation in behavior. In other words, explaining the distribution of ideas as dependent variables is legitimately separate from showing their presence and effects as independent variables.18 Far from exaggerating the range of purely subjective variation in individuals’ views, this approach should minimize interpretive biases. Unlike in most ideational arguments, it is the actors, not the observer, who define the range across which ideas matter (see Figure 1). One actor wants to pursue strategy X; one of her close 17. Provided there are no clear individual-level incentives to disagree, as in career competition. I see no pattern of such incentives in my case. Disincentives to internal disagreement seem more common in most organizations. 18. See Kingdon 1984, 77; Kier 1997, 148; and Kowert and Legro 1996, 469. Origins of the EU 51
52 International Organization Ideas as sole cause Leads to outcome A Leads to outcome Strategy X Strategy Y Actor I Actor2 (in same objective position) FIGURE 1.How much cross-cutting ideas matter peers,in the same objective position,wants to pursue strategy Y.Given solid evidence of differing preferences,and careful verification that they face identical objective constraints,this control for objective causes is as free from bias as qualitative observations can be. Furthermore,this method may tend to underestimate the overall impact of ideas on individuals'views.Open disagreements may well be narrow debates within a consensus built on other ideas.19 Nor may individuals voice the full range and strength of their views in internal debates,especially in hierarchical organizations like goverments.Even when they do,obtaining information about internal dissent is often difficult.This approach highlights the effects of ideas only where ideas separate most demonstrably from objective factors,without making claims about their less visible impact. Leaders'Ideas and Entrepreneurial Coalition-Building Variation in individuals'ideas does not mean ideas matter in government strategies. Whatever individuals debate,objective pressures in coalition building may ulti- mately impose one view on policy choices.Under certain conditions,however,they may not.A massive game-theoretic literature notes that when democratic groups face three or more alternatives on a given issue,or a decision involving two or more issues,multiple outcomes may be able to attract majority support.In the extreme situation of a pure"Condorcet paradox,"where even thirds of the group rank three alternatives in incompatible ways,no option spontaneously garners a majority.The result is that actors with agenda-setting authority can pass any option.20 Even with less perfectly divided preferences,bargaining over multiple issues can introduce similar flexibility.21 Leaders may use payoffs across issues to make winners out of 19.For example,French elites in the 1950s may share ideas about the state,democracy,capitalism, and so on that limit their debate over European policies. 20.Given options x,y.z,even thirds have rank-ordered preferences .ryz,yzx,and zry.See Arrow 1951; and Riker 1980.For a recent overview,see Nurmi 1999. 21.See Kramer 1973:and McKelvey and Wendell 1976
peers, in the same objective position, wants to pursue strategy Y. Given solid evidence of differing preferences, and careful verification that they face identical objective constraints, this control for objective causes is as free from bias as qualitative observations can be. Furthermore, this method may tend to underestimate the overall impact of ideas on individuals’ views. Open disagreements may well be narrow debates within a consensus built on other ideas.19 Nor may individuals voice the full range and strength of their views in internal debates, especially in hierarchical organizations like governments. Even when they do, obtaining information about internal dissent is often difficult. This approach highlights the effects of ideas only where ideas separate most demonstrably from objective factors, without making claims about their less visible impact. Leaders’ Ideas and Entrepreneurial Coalition-Building Variation in individuals’ ideas does not mean ideas matter in government strategies. Whatever individuals debate, objective pressures in coalition building may ultimately impose one view on policy choices. Under certain conditions, however, they may not. A massive game-theoretic literature notes that when democratic groups face three or more alternatives on a given issue, or a decision involving two or more issues, multiple outcomes may be able to attract majority support. In the extreme situation of a pure “Condorcet paradox,” where even thirds of the group rank three alternatives in incompatible ways, no option spontaneously garners a majority. The result is that actors with agenda-setting authority can pass any option.20 Even with less perfectly divided preferences, bargaining over multiple issues can introduce similar flexibility.21 Leaders may use payoffs across issues to make winners out of 19. For example, French elites in the 1950s may share ideas about the state, democracy, capitalism, and so on that limit their debate over European policies. 20. Given options x, y, z, even thirds have rank-ordered preferences xyz, yzx, and zxy. See Arrow 1951; and Riker 1980. For a recent overview, see Nurmi 1999. 21. See Kramer 1973; and McKelvey and Wendell 1976. FIGURE 1. How much cross-cutting ideas matter 52 International Organization
Origins of the EU 53 positions that would lose in a single-issue vote.Especially in some combination of these conditions-three alternatives on one issue,and in multidimensional issue space-individual leaders may enjoy broad autonomy to build the majorities they prefer. There is nothing inherently ideational about such leadership.Game-theoretic analyses tend to picture leaders using this leverage for personal material gain.When connected to ideational variation at the individual level,however,these dynamics can tie variation in ideas alone to variation in strategies and outcomes.The cross-cutting debates described earlier not only highlight ideational variation at the individual level;they also create broad patterns of divided preferences and rich possibilities for issue linkages.Leaders may then enjoy opportunities to choose among"multiple equilibria"on the basis of their personal ideas.Showing that this happened requires three kinds of evidence:that individual ideas varied over distinct alternatives (as described earlier),that divided preferences or issue linkages made those alternatives viable options,and that leaders indeed asserted their personal views and used agenda-setting power and issue linkages to assemble coalitional support behind them.Given such evidence,we can say that leaders'ideas,as autonomous factors,caused one strategy across the range of active alternatives.By contrasting the outcome to the counterfactual consequences of alternatives,we can specify a range of variation in outcomes caused by variation in ideas alone. Less abstractly.how would this process look?As a new cross-cutting debate emerged,top leaders'views on that issue would disconnect from their previous coalitional support.Support for various strategies would be scattered across parties and other organizations.As long as a leader retained office and agenda-setting power due to support on other (non-cross-cutting)issues,the leader could build majorities for any of several choices on the cross-cutting issue.Note that this does not require that the cross-cutting issue be obviously less important than the non-cross-cutting issue.In democracies,voters may be less informed or concerned (or both)about certain debates than policymakers.This seems particularly common in the domain of foreign policy.22 Electoral coalition building and office holding can continue to operate along the "normal"issues resonant with voters,even though policymakers perceive a new debate as crucial.This disconnect can allow a leader to retain control of the agenda during a major cross-cutting debate.We would see the leader's choices contested by elites who shared the leader's main coalitional. party,bureaucratic,and economic positions,differing only in holding other ideas in the cross-cutting debate.But the leader's agenda-setting power,or use of pressure or payoffs on other issues,would decide the outcome. The next section argues that French policymaking in early European institution building illustrates this process.Across three strategies that were viable domesti- cally and internationally,leaders built majority support for their own ideas. 22.See Rosenau 1961:Margolis and Mauser 1989;and the annual Index to International Public Opinion
positions that would lose in a single-issue vote. Especially in some combination of these conditions—three alternatives on one issue, and in multidimensional issue space—individual leaders may enjoy broad autonomy to build the majorities they prefer. There is nothing inherently ideational about such leadership. Game-theoretic analyses tend to picture leaders using this leverage for personal material gain. When connected to ideational variation at the individual level, however, these dynamics can tie variation in ideas alone to variation in strategies and outcomes. The cross-cutting debates described earlier not only highlight ideational variation at the individual level; they also create broad patterns of divided preferences and rich possibilities for issue linkages. Leaders may then enjoy opportunities to choose among “multiple equilibria” on the basis of their personal ideas. Showing that this happened requires three kinds of evidence: that individual ideas varied over distinct alternatives (as described earlier), that divided preferences or issue linkages made those alternatives viable options, and that leaders indeed asserted their personal views and used agenda-setting power and issue linkages to assemble coalitional support behind them. Given such evidence, we can say that leaders’ ideas, as autonomous factors, caused one strategy across the range of active alternatives. By contrasting the outcome to the counterfactual consequences of alternatives, we can specify a range of variation in outcomes caused by variation in ideas alone. Less abstractly, how would this process look? As a new cross-cutting debate emerged, top leaders’ views on that issue would disconnect from their previous coalitional support. Support for various strategies would be scattered across parties and other organizations. As long as a leader retained office and agenda-setting power due to support on other (non-cross-cutting) issues, the leader could build majorities for any of several choices on the cross-cutting issue. Note that this does not require that the cross-cutting issue be obviously less important than the non–cross-cutting issue. In democracies, voters may be less informed or concerned (or both) about certain debates than policymakers. This seems particularly common in the domain of foreign policy.22 Electoral coalition building and office holding can continue to operate along the “normal” issues resonant with voters, even though policymakers perceive a new debate as crucial. This disconnect can allow a leader to retain control of the agenda during a major cross-cutting debate. We would see the leader’s choices contested by elites who shared the leader’s main coalitional, party, bureaucratic, and economic positions, differing only in holding other ideas in the cross-cutting debate. But the leader’s agenda-setting power, or use of pressure or payoffs on other issues, would decide the outcome. The next section argues that French policymaking in early European institution building illustrates this process. Across three strategies that were viable domestically and internationally, leaders built majority support for their own ideas. 22. See Rosenau 1961; Margolis and Mauser 1989; and the annual Index to International Public Opinion. Origins of the EU 53
54 International Organization French Ideas and the Origins of the EU Western Europe first developed uniquely strong international institutions in the 1950s.At the end of that decade,six governments committed to deep and broad cooperation in the EEC,including the delegation of considerable powers to"supra- national"agents in the EEC's executive commission and court. Experts agree that French choices were particularly important to the EEC's birth. All three of the major supranational projects of the 1950s-the ECSC,the failed European Defense Community (EDC),and the EEC-took shape because govern- ments that preferred other European projects conceded to the French.When the French proposed the ECSC in 1950,the British refused to join any supranational plan.German and Benelux leaders,though skeptical of supranationality and reluc- tant to proceed without Britain,eventually followed the French lead.23 When the French proposed the EDC as a similar framework for West German rearmament,all the other Europeans argued for a simpler plan within NATO.France's ECSC partners(Germany,Benelux,Italy)eventually agreed to negotiate EDC but quickly dropped it when the French tured against it in 1954.24 While the EEC itself was not a French proposal-originating with ultra-Europeanist Dutch foreign minister Jan Willem Beyen-it was partly crafted to appeal to the French.Beyen notwithstand- ing,most Benelux and German leaders preferred trade liberalization in the broader and institutionally weak format championed by the British.They hesitantly sup- ported Beyen's EEC plan because they feared the French would only accept liberalization within a"little Europe"with elaborate economic safeguards.25 In sum, no one contests that without French insistence on institutionally strong,geograph- ically limited institution building in the 1950s no such framework would have resulted. Two alternatives to my account,however,see this French position as strongly determined by nonideational factors.For structuralists,objective economic and geopolitical constraints selected French strategies.Historians like Milward and William Hitchcock argue that France needed a new basis for controlling and cooperating with a resurgent West Germany in 1950;the ECSC's supranational oversight of basic industries was the straightforward solution.26 Similar concerns about overseeing German military power pushed the French to the EDC.The incentives of this larger delegation of sovereignty were less clear,however,and the EDC died.But soon economic interests,transmitted through interest groups, refocused the French on an institutionally strong "little Europe."Weak French business feared British plans for broad trade liberalization,preferring a smaller and more managed trade pact.Growing farm surpluses led French farmers to insist that 23.See Kersten 1988:Milward 1988;Ludlow 1997,17:and Buhrer 1995 24.See Fursdon 1980:and de la Gorce 1979.91-159. 25.See Asbeek-Brusse 1997,157:Milward 1992.192:Griffiths 1990:and Bouwman 1995,141. 26.Milward emphasizes French economic needs for the ECSC:Hitchcock emphasizes geopolitics. See Milward 1984:and Hitchcock 1998
French Ideas and the Origins of the EU Western Europe first developed uniquely strong international institutions in the 1950s. At the end of that decade, six governments committed to deep and broad cooperation in the EEC, including the delegation of considerable powers to “supranational” agents in the EEC’s executive commission and court. Experts agree that French choices were particularly important to the EEC’s birth. All three of the major supranational projects of the 1950s—the ECSC, the failed European Defense Community (EDC), and the EEC—took shape because governments that preferred other European projects conceded to the French. When the French proposed the ECSC in 1950, the British refused to join any supranational plan. German and Benelux leaders, though skeptical of supranationality and reluctant to proceed without Britain, eventually followed the French lead.23 When the French proposed the EDC as a similar framework for West German rearmament, all the other Europeans argued for a simpler plan within NATO. France’s ECSC partners (Germany, Benelux, Italy) eventually agreed to negotiate EDC but quickly dropped it when the French turned against it in 1954.24 While the EEC itself was not a French proposal—originating with ultra-Europeanist Dutch foreign minister Jan Willem Beyen—it was partly crafted to appeal to the French. Beyen notwithstanding, most Benelux and German leaders preferred trade liberalization in the broader and institutionally weak format championed by the British. They hesitantly supported Beyen’s EEC plan because they feared the French would only accept liberalization within a “little Europe” with elaborate economic safeguards.25 In sum, no one contests that without French insistence on institutionally strong, geographically limited institution building in the 1950s no such framework would have resulted. Two alternatives to my account, however, see this French position as strongly determined by nonideational factors. For structuralists, objective economic and geopolitical constraints selected French strategies. Historians like Milward and William Hitchcock argue that France needed a new basis for controlling and cooperating with a resurgent West Germany in 1950; the ECSC’s supranational oversight of basic industries was the straightforward solution.26 Similar concerns about overseeing German military power pushed the French to the EDC. The incentives of this larger delegation of sovereignty were less clear, however, and the EDC died. But soon economic interests, transmitted through interest groups, refocused the French on an institutionally strong “little Europe.” Weak French business feared British plans for broad trade liberalization, preferring a smaller and more managed trade pact. Growing farm surpluses led French farmers to insist that 23. See Kersten 1988; Milward 1988; Ludlow 1997, 17; and Bu¨hrer 1995. 24. See Fursdon 1980; and de la Gorce 1979, 91–159. 25. See Asbeek-Brusse 1997, 157; Milward 1992, 192; Griffiths 1990; and Bouwman 1995, 141. 26. Milward emphasizes French economic needs for the ECSC; Hitchcock emphasizes geopolitics. See Milward 1984; and Hitchcock 1998. 54 International Organization
Origins of the EU 55 any deal include a sheltered agricultural regime.This further alienated the British (with their Commonwealth agricultural preferences).The EEC was the result:The Germans and Benelux agreed to liberalization largely on French terms.Thus,claims Moravcsik,we can trace French choices to clear majorities based on objective societal interests.27 For institutionalist pioneer Ernst Haas,structural pressures led the French to the ECSC,but institutional feedback led on to the EEC.He suggested that French interest groups and parties did not spontaneously perceive interests in extending the ECSC to the EDC or EEC.Only the ECSC's supranational agents led domestic groups to perceive such interests.Chief among them was Jean Monnet,the French bureaucrat who presided over the ECSC's"High Authority"from 1952 to 1955,and thereafter led a lobby called the "Action Committee for the United States of Europe."Without the initial creation of supranational agents in the ECSC,implied this "neofunctionalist"account,leaders in France (and elsewhere)were unlikely to pursue the EEC.French choices can be traced to a majority of sectoral associations and their party representatives,but only supranational(not national)leadership built that majority.28 I accept elements of both approaches but strongly revise their causal claims.The institutionalist story requires more blatant revision.Between the initial,narrow ECSC deal and the much more extensive EEC,literally no major French actors shifted their policy preferences in response to supranational lobbying.Nonetheless, once the broader EEC bargain was struck,we need an institutionalist logic of path-dependence to understand why it was consolidated into Europe's fundamental architecture in the 1960s.My qualification of the structuralist case is less direct but no less profound.Any explanation of European institution building must begin with the economic and geopolitical context.Yet structuralists overlook the immense political battle that took place over different interpretations of that context.As of 1950,otherwise-similar French elites debated three ideational "models"of their interests in Europe.The divide between“community,”“confederal,”and“tradi-- tional"views did not quite display the impasse of a Condorcet paradox,but the availability of many issue linkages made all three options domestically viable.2 Corresponding deals were viable in international bargaining."Pro-community" leaders who obtained power on other,disconnected issues used their agenda-setting authority to assemble majorities behind their personal ideas and to strike particular 27.Moravcsik 1998.86. 28.For similar arguments about the EEC's later development,see Fligstein and Mara-Drita 1996;and Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998. 29.Labeling“community"views S,for“supranational,.”“confederal'"views C,and“traditional" views T.French elites divided into preference orderings SCT.CTS.and TCS.In single-issue voting.this would produce a confederal majority.Only issue linkages made"community"policies a viable outcome
any deal include a sheltered agricultural regime. This further alienated the British (with their Commonwealth agricultural preferences). The EEC was the result: The Germans and Benelux agreed to liberalization largely on French terms. Thus, claims Moravcsik, we can trace French choices to clear majorities based on objective societal interests.27 For institutionalist pioneer Ernst Haas, structural pressures led the French to the ECSC, but institutional feedback led on to the EEC. He suggested that French interest groups and parties did not spontaneously perceive interests in extending the ECSC to the EDC or EEC. Only the ECSC’s supranational agents led domestic groups to perceive such interests. Chief among them was Jean Monnet, the French bureaucrat who presided over the ECSC’s “High Authority” from 1952 to 1955, and thereafter led a lobby called the “Action Committee for the United States of Europe.” Without the initial creation of supranational agents in the ECSC, implied this “neofunctionalist” account, leaders in France (and elsewhere) were unlikely to pursue the EEC. French choices can be traced to a majority of sectoral associations and their party representatives, but only supranational (not national) leadership built that majority.28 I accept elements of both approaches but strongly revise their causal claims. The institutionalist story requires more blatant revision. Between the initial, narrow ECSC deal and the much more extensive EEC, literally no major French actors shifted their policy preferences in response to supranational lobbying. Nonetheless, once the broader EEC bargain was struck, we need an institutionalist logic of path-dependence to understand why it was consolidated into Europe’s fundamental architecture in the 1960s. My qualification of the structuralist case is less direct but no less profound. Any explanation of European institution building must begin with the economic and geopolitical context. Yet structuralists overlook the immense political battle that took place over different interpretations of that context. As of 1950, otherwise-similar French elites debated three ideational “models” of their interests in Europe. The divide between “community,” “confederal,” and “traditional” views did not quite display the impasse of a Condorcet paradox, but the availability of many issue linkages made all three options domestically viable.29 Corresponding deals were viable in international bargaining. “Pro-community” leaders who obtained power on other, disconnected issues used their agenda-setting authority to assemble majorities behind their personal ideas and to strike particular 27. Moravcsik 1998, 86. 28. For similar arguments about the EEC’s later development, see Fligstein and Mara-Drita 1996; and Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998. 29. Labeling “community” views S, for “supranational,” “confederal” views C, and “traditional” views T, French elites divided into preference orderings SCT, CTS, and TCS. In single-issue voting, this would produce a confederal majority. Only issue linkages made “community” policies a viable outcome. Origins of the EU 55