《国际政治经济学》文献资料（Use of History and Sociology in International Political Economy）International Regimes, Transactions, and Change Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Orde

团购合买资源类别：文库，文档格式：PDF，文档页数：42，文件大小：948.37KB

380 International Organization about international regimes stems from deeper epistemological and even ontological differences among observers. International regimes have been defined as social institutions around which actor expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Accordingly,as is true of any social institution,international regimes limit the discretion of their constituent units to decide and act on issues that fall within the regime's domain.And,as is also true of any social institution, ultimate expression in converging expectations and delimited discretion gives international regimes an intersubjective quality.To this extent,inter- national regimes are akin to language-we may think of them as part of"the language of state action.''2The constituent units of a regime,like speakers of a common language,generally have little difficulty in determining what even an entirely new usage signifies.Should it be technically inappropriate or in- correct,they nevertheless may still"'understand''it-in the dual sense of being able to comprehend it and willing to acquiesce in it.In sum,we know international regimes not simply by some descriptive inventory of their con- crete elements,but by their generative grammar,the underlying principles of order and meaning that shape the manner of their formation and transforma- tion.Likewise,we know deviations from regimes not simply by acts that are undertaken,but by the intentionality and acceptability attributed to those acts in the context of an intersubjective framework of meaning.3 The analytical components of international regimes we take to consist of principles,norms,rules,and procedures.As the content for each of these terms is specified,international regimes diverge from social institutions like language,for we do not normally attribute to language any specific "con- summatory"as opposed to"instrumental"values.4 Insofar as international regimes embody principles about fact,causation,and rectitude,as well as political rights and obligations that are regarded as legitimate,they fall closer to the consummatory end of the spectrum,into the realm of political author- ity.Thus,the formation and transformation of international regimes may be said to represent a concrete manifestation of the internationalization of political authority.5 1 Oran R.Young,"International Regimes:Problems of Concept Formation,"'World Politics 32(April 1980);and Stephen D.Krasner's introduction to this volume. 2 This phrase is taken from Bruce Andrews's application of the linguistic metaphor to the study of foreign policy:"The Language of State Action,"International Interactions 6 (November 1979) 3 Cf.Noam Chomsky,Current Issues in Linguistic Theory (The Hague:Mouton,1964), chap.1. 4 These are derived from the standard Weberian distinction between Wert-and Zweckra- tional.Max Weber,Economy and Society,ed.by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press,1978),pp.24-26. s Discussions of political authority often fuse the very meaning of the concept with one of its specific institutional manifestations,that expressed in super-subordinate relations.But,as demonstrated repeatedly in organization theory and recognized by Weber,authority rests on a form of legitimacy that ultimately can derive only from a community of interests.Chester Bar- nard has carried this line of reasoning the furthest:"Authority is another name for the willing- ness and capacity of individuals to submit to the necessities of cooperative systems."The

380 International Organization about international regimes stems from deeper epistemological and even ontological differences among observers. International regimes have been defined as social institutions around which actor expectations converge in a given area of international re1ations.l Accordingly, as is true of any social institution, international regimes limit the discretion of their constituent units to decide and act on issues that fall within the regime's domain. And, as is also true of any social institution, ultimate expression in converging expectations and delimited discretion gives international regimes an intersubjective quality. To this extent, international regimes are akin to language-we may think of them as part of "the language of state acti~n."~ The constituent units of a regime, like speakers of a common language, generally have little difficulty in determining what even an entirely new usage signifies. Should it be technically inappropriate or incorrect, they nevertheless may still "understand" it-in the dual sense of being able to comprehend it and willing to acquiesce in it. In sum, we know international regimes not simply by some descriptive inventory of their concrete elements, but by their generative grammar, the underlying principles of order and meaning that shape the manner of their formation and transformation. Likewise, we know deviations from regimes not simply by acts that are undertaken, but by the intentionality and acceptability attributed to those acts in the context of an intersubjective framework of meaning.3 The analytical components of international regimes we take to consist of principles, norms, rules, and procedures. As the content for each of these terms is specified, international regimes diverge from social institutions like language, for we do not normally attribute to language any specific "consummatory" as opposed to ''instrumental" values. Insofar as international regimes embody principles about fact, causation, and rectitude, as well as political rights and obligations that are regarded as legitimate, they fall closer to the consummatory end of the spectrum, into the realm of political authority. Thus, the formation and transformation of international regimes may be said to represent a concrete manifestation of the internationalization of political authority .5 Oran R. Young, "International Regimes: Problems of Concept Formation," World Politics 32 (April 1980); and Stephen D. Krasner's introduction to this volume. This phrase is taken from Bruce Andrews's application of the linguistic metaphor to the study of foreign policy: "The Language of State Action," International Interactions 6 (November 1979). Cf. Noam Chomsky, Current Issues in Linguistic Theory (The Hague: Mouton, 19641, chap. 1. These are derived from the standard Weberian distinction between Wert- and Zweckrational. Max Weber, Economy and Society, ed. by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 24-26. Discussions of political authority often fuse the very meaning of the concept with one of its specific institutional manifestations, that expressed in super-subordinate relations. But, as demonstrated repeatedly in organization theory and recognized by Weber, authority rests on a form of legitimacy that ultimately can derive only from a community of interests. Chester Barnard has canied this line of reasoning the furthest: "Authority is another name for the willingness and capacity of individuals to submit to the necessities of cooperative systems." The

International regimes,transactions,and change 381 What is the "generative grammar''that shapes the internationalization of political authority?The most common interpretation has been stated suc- cinctly by Kenneth Waltz:the elements of international authority,he main- tains,"are barely once removed from the capability that provides [their] foundation....''6 On this interpretation others,in turn,have built what now amounts to a prevalent model of the formation and transformation of inter- national economic regimes.In its simplest form,the model makes this pre- diction:if economic capabilities are so concentrated that a hegemon exists, as in the case of Great Britain in the late 19th century and the U.S.A.after World War II,an "'open''or "liberal''international economic order will come into being.In the organization of a liberal order,pride of place is given to market rationality.This is not to say that authority is absent from such an order.It is to say that authority relations are constructed in such a way as to give maximum scope to market forces rather than to constrain them.Specific regimes that serve such an order,in the areas of money and trade,for exam- ple,limit the discretion of states to intervene in the functioning of self- regulating currency and commodity markets.These may be termed "strong"regimes,because they restrain self-seeking states in a competitive international political system from meddling directly in domestic and inter- national economic affairs in the name of their national interests.And the strength of these regimes,of course,is backed by the capabilities of the heg- emon.If and as such a concentration of economic capabilities erodes,the liberal order is expected to unravel and its regimes to become weaker,ulti- mately being replaced by mercantilist arrangements,that is,by arrange- ments under which the constituent units reassert national political authority over transnational economic forces.If the order established by British eco- nomic supremacy in the 19th century and that reflecting the supremacy of the United States after World War II illustrate liberal orders with strong regimes,the interwar period illustrates the darker corollary of the axiom. I do not claim that this model is fundamentally wrong.But it does not take us very far in understanding international economic regimes,and,by extension,the formation and transformation of international regimes in gen- Functions of the Executive(Cambridge:Harvard University Press,1968),p.184.See also the important statement by Peter Blau,"Critical Remarks on Weber's Theory of Authority," American Political Science Review 57 (June 1963).An illustration (though unintended)of how not to think of authority if the concept is to be at all useful in a discussion of international relations is provided by Harry Eckstein,"Authority Patterns:A Structural Basis for Political Inquiry,"American Political Science Review 67(December 1973).More elaborate typologies of forms of authority relations in international regimes may be found in my papers,"'International Responses to Technology:Concepts and Trends,"International Organization 29(Summer 1975),and"Changing Frameworks of International Collective Behavior:On the Complemen- tarity of Contradictory Tendencies,"in Nazli Choucri and Thomas Robinson,eds.,Forecasting in International Relations (San Francisco:W.H.Freeman,1978). 4 Theory of International Politics (Reading,Mass.:Addison-Wesley,1979),p.88. The relevant literature is cited in Robert O.Keohane,"The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes,1967-1977,"in Ole Holsti et al.,eds., Change in the International System (Boulder,Col.:Westview Press,1980)

International regimes, transactions, and change 381 What is the "generative grammar" that shapes the internationalization of political authority? The most common interpretation has been stated succinctly by Kenneth Waltz: the elements of international authority, he maintains, "are barely once removed from the capability that provides [their] foundation. . . ."'j On this interpretation others, in turn, have built what now amounts to a prevalent model of the formation and transformation of international economic regimes. In its simplest form, the model makes this prediction: if economic capabilities are so concentrated that a hegemon exists, as in the case of Great Britain in the late 19th century and t,he U.S.A. after World War 11, an "open" or "liberal" international economic order will come into being.' In the organization of a liberal order, pride of place is given to market rationality. This is not to say that authority is absent from such an order. It is to say that authority relations are constructed in such a way as to give maximum scope to market forces rather than to constrain them. Specific regimes that serve such an order, in the areas of money and trade, for example, limit the discretion of states to intervene in the functioning of selfregulating currency and commodity markets. These may be termed "strong" regimes, because they restrain self-seeking states in a competitive international political system from meddling directly in domestic and international economic affairs in the name of their national interests. And the strength of these regimes, of course, is backed by the capabilities of the hegemon. If and as such a concentration of economic capabilities erodes, the liberal order is expected to unravel and its regimes to become weaker, ultimately being replaced by mercantilist arrangements, that is, by arrangements under which the constituent units reassert national political authority over transnational economic forces. If the order established by British economic supremacy in the 19th century and that reflecting the supremacy of the United States after World War I1 illustrate liberal orders with strong regimes, the interwar period illustrates the darker corollary of the axiom. I do not claim that this model is fundamentally wrong. But it does not take us very far in understanding international economic regimes, and, by extension, the formation and transformation of international regimes in genFunctions of the Executive (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 184. See also the important statement by Peter Blau, "Critical Remarks on Weber's Theory of Authority,'' American Political Science Review 57 (June 1963). An illustration (though unintended) of how not to think of authority if the concept is to be at all useful in a discussion of international relations is provided by Hany Eckstein, "Authority Patterns: A Structural Basis for Political Inquiry," American Political Science Review 67 (December 1973). More elaborate typologies of forms of authority relations in international regimes may be found in my papers, "International Res~onses to Technology: Concepts and Trends," International Organization 29 (Summer 1975, and "Changing ~Fkneworks of International Collective ~ehavior: On the Complementaritv of Contradictorv Tendencies." in Nazli Choucri and Thomas Robinson. eds.. . .forecast in^- in ~~ternational ~elaiions(San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1978). Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p. 88. 'The relevant literature is cited in Robert 0.Keohane, "The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes, 1967-1977," in Ole Holsti et al., eds., Change in the International System (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1980)

382 International Organization eral.8 This is so precisely because it does not encompass the phenomeno- logical dimensions of international regimes. From this vantage point,I develop three theoretical arguments;each yields an interpretation of central features of the postwar international eco- nomic order that is distinct from the prevailing view. The first concerns the "generative grammar''or what I shall call the "structure''of the internationalization of political authority.Whatever its institutional manifestations,political authority represents a fusion of power with legitimate social purpose.The prevailing interpretation of international authority focuses on power only;it ignores the dimension of social purpose.9 The problem with this formulation is that power may predict the form of the international order,but not its content.For example,in the era of the third hegemon in the complex of modern state-system and capitalist-world- economy,the Dutch in the 17th century,the condition of hegemony coexisted with mercantilist behavior,10 and it would be straining credulity to attribute this difference solely or even mainly to differences in the relative economic supremacy of the three hegemons without discussing differences in social purpose.Moreover,had the Germans succeeded in their quest to establish a "'New International Order''after World War II,the designs Hjalmar Schacht would have instituted were the very mirror image of Bret- ton Woods11-obviously,differences in social purpose again provide the key.Lastly,the common tendency to equate the 19th century liberal inter- national economic order and its post-World War II counterpart itself obscures exceedingly important differences in their domestic and interna- tional organization,differences that stem from the fact that the one repre- sented laissez-faire liberalism and the other did not.In sum,to say anything sensible about the content of international economic orders and about the regimes that serve them,it is necessary to look at how power and legitimate social purpose become fused to project political authority into the interna- tional system.Applied to the post-World War II context,this argument leads me to characterize the international economic order by the term"'em- Nor should it be expected to.As Waltz makes clear,his is a theory intended to predict that certain conditioning and constraining forces will take effect within the international system as a whole depending upon variation in its structure,not to account for such"process-level''out- comes as international regimes.Some of the literature cited by Keohane attempts to do more than this,however,though Keohane himself reaches a conclusion that is not at variance with my own. More accurately,it either assumes social purpose (as in Waltz,Theory of International Politics),or seeks to deduce it from state power (as in Krasner,"State Power and the Structure of International Trade,"World Politics 28 [April 1976]). 10 To my knowledge,the case of Dutch supremacy in the world economy has not been ad- dressed in the "hegemonic stability''literature;but see Immanuel Wallerstein,The Modern World System,vol.2 (New York:Academic Press,1980),chap.2. 1 A brief description may be found in Armand Van Dormael,Bretton Woods:Birth of a Monetary System (London:Macmillan,1978),chap.1.The classic statement of how it actually worked remains Albert O.Hirschman,National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade, expanded ed.(Berkeley:University of California Press,1980)

382 International Organization eral.8 This is so precisely because it does not encompass the phenomenological dimensions of international regimes. From this vantage point, I develop three theoretical arguments; each yields an interpretation of central features of the postwar international economic order that is distinct from the prevailing view. The first concerns the "generative grammar" or what I shall call the "structure" of the internationalization of political authority. Whatever its institutional manifestations, political authority represents a fusion of power with legitimate social purpose. The prevailing interpretation of international authority focuses on power only; it ignores the dimension of social purp~se.~ The problem with this formulation is that power may predict the form of the international order, but not its content. For example, in the era of the third hegemon in the complex of modem state-system and capitalist-worldeconomy, the Dutch in the 17th century, the condition of hegemony coexisted with mercantilist behavior,1° and it would be straining credulity to attribute this difference solely or even mainly to differences in the relative economic supremacy of the three hegemons without discussing differences in social purpose. Moreover, had the Germans succeeded in their quest to establish a "New International Order" after World War 11, the designs Hjalmar Schacht would have instituted were the very mirror image of Bretton Woodsll-obviously, differences in social purpose again provide the key. Lastly, the common tendency to equate the 19th century liberal international economic order and its post-World War I1 counterpart itself obscures exceedingly important differences in their domestic and international organization, differences that stem from the fact that the one represented laissez-faire liberalism and the other did not. In sum, to say anything sensible about the content of international economic orders and about the regimes that serve them, it is necessary to look at how power and legitimate social purpose become fused to project political authority into the international system. Applied to the post-World War I1 context, this argument leads me to characterize the international economic order by the term "emNor should it be expected to. As Waltz makes clear, his is a theory intended to predict that certain conditioning and constraining forces will take effect within the international system as a whole depending upon variation in its structure, not to account for such "process-level'' outcomes as international regimes. Some of the literature cited by Keohane attempts to do more than this, however, though Keohane himself reaches a conclusion that is not at variance with my own. More accurately, it either assumes social purpose (as in Waltz, Theory of International Politics), or seeks to deduce it from state power (as in Krasner, "State Power and the Structure of International Trade," World Politics 28 [April 19761). lo To my knowledge, the case of Dutch supremacy in the world economy has not been addressed in the "hegemonic stability" literature; but see Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System, vol. 2 (New York: Academic Press, 1980), chap. 2. l1 A brief description may be found in Armand Van Dormael, Brettoh Woods: Birth of a Monetary System (London: Macmillan, 1978), chap. 1. The classic statement of how it actually worked remains Albert 0. Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade, expanded ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980)

International regimes,transactions,and change 383 bedded liberalism,''which I show to differ from both its classical ancestor and its ignominious predecessor even as it has systematically combined central features of both. My second theoretical argument concerns the relationship between in- ternational economic regimes and developments in the international econ- omy,particularly at the level of private transaction flows.12 Conventional structural arguments,whether Realist or Marxist,see transnationalization as a direct reflection of hegemony:high levels of trade and capital flows obtain under the pax Britannica and the pax Americana.The regimes for trade and money are largely epiphenomenal adjuncts that may be invoked to legitimate this outcome,but they have little or no real bearing on it.Conventional lib- erals,on the other hand,hold that high levels of trade and capital flows will obtain only if there is strict adherence to open international economic re- gimes,so that these become virtually determinative.Neither formulation is satisfactory. The relationship between economic regimes and international transac- tion flows is inherently problematical,because the domain of international regimes consists of the behavior of states,vis-a-vis one another and vis-a- vis the market-place,not the market-place itself.Nevertheless,simply on a priori grounds we may argue that because there is no direct relation- ship,it is highly unlikely that the character of international regimes would have a determinative impact on international transaction flows;and yet, because international regimes do encompass the behavior of states vis- a-vis the market-place,it stands to reason that they would have some effect on international transaction flows.I contend that the nature of this relation- ship,at least in the first instance,is one of complementarity.That is to say, international economic regimes provide a permissive environment for the emergence of specific kinds of international transaction flows that actors take to be complementary to the particular fusion of power and purpose that is embodied within those regimes.13 The contextual specificity of this com- plementarity makes equations of the variety"pax Britannica is equal to pax Americana,''as well as insistence on universal regime formulae to achieve a given outcome,extremely dubious propositions. Applying this argument to the postwar international economic order,I conclude that the emergence of several specific developments in transna- tional economic activities can be accounted for at least in part by their per- ceived first-order contribution to the regimes for trade and money.14 These regimes,then,are neither determinative nor irrelevant,but provide part of the context that shapes the character of transnationalization. i In this connection,see also Charles Lipson's chapter in this volume. 1 This is not to ignore the possibility that the same developments may have second-order consequences or long-term effects that pose stresses or even contradictions for international economic regimes,a problem which I take up in a later section. 14 The present formulation of this conclusion owes much to Albert Fishlow's commentary on an earlier version at the Palm Springs Conference,for which I am obliged to him

International regimes, transactions, and change 383 bedded liberalism," which I show to differ from both its classical ancestor and its ignominious predecessor even as it has systematically combined central features of both. My second theoretical argument concerns the relationship between international economic regimes and developments in the international economy, particularly at the level of private transaction flows.12 Conventional structural arguments, whether Realist or Marxist, see transnationalization as a direct reflection of hegemony: high levels of trade and capital flows obtain under the pax Britannica and the pax Americana. The regimes for trade and money are largely epiphenomena1 adjuncts that may be invoked to legitimate this outcome, but they have little or no real bearing on it. Conventional liberals, on the other hand, hold that high levels of trade and capital flows will obtain only if there is strict adherence to open international economic regimes, so that these become virtually determinative. Neither formulation is satisfactory. The relationship between economic regimes and international transaction flows is inherently problematical, because the domain of international regimes consists of the behavior of states, vis-a-vis one another and vis-avis the market-place, not the market-place itself. Nevertheless, simply on a priori grounds we may argue that because there is no direct relationship, it is highly unlikely that the character of international regimes would have a determinative impact on international transaction flows; and yet, because international regimes do encompass the behavior of states visa-vis the market-place, it stands to reason that they would have some effect on international transaction flows. I contend that the nature of this relationship, at least in the first instance, is one of complementarity. That is to say, international economic regimes provide a permissive environment for the emergence of specijic kinds of international transaction flows that actors take to be complementary to the particular fusion of power and purpose that is embodied within those regimes.13 The contextual specificity of this complementarity makes equations of the variety "pax Britannica is equal to pax Americana," as well as insistence on universal regime formulae to achieve a given outcome, extremely dubious propositions. Applying this argument to the postwar international economic order, I conclude that the emergence of several specific developments in transnational economic activities can be accounted for at least in part by their perceived first-order contribution to the regimes for trade and money.14 These regimes, then, are neither determinative nor irrelevant, but provide part of the context that shapes the character of transnationalization. I2 In this connection, see also Charles Lipson's chapter in this volume. l3 This is not to ignore the possibility that the same developments may have second-order consequences or long-term effects that pose stresses or even contradictions for international economic regimes, a problem which I take up in a later section. l4 The present formulation of this conclusion owes much to Albert Fishlow's commentary on an earlier version at the Palm Springs Conference, for which I am obliged to him

384 International Organization My third theoretical argument concerns the occurrence of change in and of regimes.The prevailing model postulates one source of regime change, the ascendancy or decline of economic hegemons,and two directions of re- gime change,greater openness or closure.If,however,we allow for the possibility that power and purpose do not necessarily covary,then we have two potential sources of change and no longer any simple one-to-one corre- spondence between source and direction of change.For example,we could have a situation in which there exists a predominant economic power whose economic program differs fundamentally from that of its leading rivals(e.g., Dutch supremacy in the 17th century).Or,we could have a situation in which power and purpose covary negatively,that is,in which neither a hegemon nor a congruence of social purpose exists among the leading economic pow- ers(the interwar period approximates this case).We could have a situation in which power and purpose covary positively (e.g.,Bretton Woods).There remains the situation of no hegemon but a congruence of social purpose among the leading economic powers (albeit imperfectly,the post-1971 in- ternational economic order illustrates this possibility). It is the last possibility that interests me most.It suggests the need for a more nuanced formulation of regime change than is currently available.If and as the concentration of economic power erodes,and the "strength''of international regimes is sapped thereby,we may be sure that the instruments of regimes also will have to change.15 However,as long as purpose is held constant,there is no reason to suppose that the normative framework of regimes must change as well.In other words,referring back to our analytical components of international regimes,rules and procedures (instruments) would change but principles and norms (normative frameworks)would not. Presumably,the new instruments that would emerge would be better adapted to the new power situation in the international economic order.But insofar as they continued to reflect the same sense of purpose,they would represent a case of norm-governed as opposed to norm-transforming change. Applying this argument to the post-1971 period leads me to suggest that many of the changes that have occurred in the regimes for money and trade have been norm-governed changes rather than,as is often maintained, reflecting the collapse of Bretton Woods and a headlong rush into mercan- tilism.Indeed,in certain cases earlier acts by the hegemon had violated the normative frameworks of these regimes,so that some post-1971 changes may be viewed as adaptive restorations of prior sets of norms in the context of a new and different international economic environment.Both occur- rences may to taken to demonstrate what we might call "the relative au- tonomy''of international regimes (with due apologies to the appropriate quarters). The various parts of my argument clearly stand or fall together.Ulti- 1sThe"hegemonic stability'school effectively demonstrates why this is so.See Keohane, Theory of Hegemonic Stability

384 International Organization My third theoretical argument concerns the occurrence of change in and of regimes. The prevailing model postulates one source of regime change, the ascendancy or decline of economic hegemons, and two directions of regime change, greater openness or closure. If, however, we allow for the possibility that power and purpose do not necessarily covary, then we have two potential sources of change and no longer any simple one-to-one correspondence between source and direction of change. For example, we could have a situation in which there exists a predominant economic power whose economic program differs fundamentally from that of its leading rivals (e.g., Dutch supremacy in the 17th century). Or, we could have a situation in which power and purpose covary negatively, that is, in which neither a hegemon nor a congruence of social purpose exists among the leading economic powers (the interwar period approximates this case). We could have a situation in which power and purpose covary positively (e.g., Bretton Woods). There remains the situation of no hegemon but a congruence of social purpose among the leading economic powers (albeit imperfectly, the post-1971 international economic order illustrates this possibility). It is the last possibility that interests me most. It suggests the need for a more nuanced formulation of regime change than is currently available. If and as the concentration of economic power erodes, and the "strength" of international regimes is sapped thereby, we may be sure that the instruments of regimes also will have to change.15 However, as long as purpose is held constant, there is no reason to suppose that the normative framework of regimes must change as well. In other words, referring back to our analytical components of international regimes, rules and procedures (instruments) would change but principles and norms (normative frameworks) would not. Presumably, the new instruments that would emerge would be better adapted to the new power situation in the international economic order. But insofar as they continued to reflect the same sense of purpose, they would represent a case of norm-governed as opposed to norm-transforming change. Applying this argument to the post-1971 period leads me to suggest that many of the changes that have occurred in the regimes for money and trade have been norm-governed changes rather than, as is often maintained, reflecting the collapse of Bretton Woods and a headlong rush into mercantilism. Indeed, in certain cases earlier acts by the hegemon had violated the normative frameworks of these regimes, so that some post-1971 changes may be viewed as adaptive restorations of prior sets of norms in the context of a new and different international economic environment. Both occurrences may to taken to demonstrate what we might call "the relative autonomy" of international regimes (with due apologies to the appropriate quarters). The various parts of my argument clearly stand or fall together. Ultil5 The "hegemonic stability" school effectively demonstrates why this is so. See Keohane, "Theory of Hegemonic Stability

International regimes,transactions,and change 385 mately,they lead back to my depiction of international authority as reflect- ing a fusion of power and legitimate social purpose.An historical illustration of this interpretation of the"'structure''of international authority therefore serves as my point of departure. 1.The structure of international authority Karl Polanyi's magisterial work,The Great Transformation,was first published in 1944.In it,he developed a distinction between "embedded'' and "'disembedded''economic orders:"normally,the economic order is merely a function of the social,in which it is contained.Under neither tribal, nor feudal,nor mercantile conditions was there,as we have shown,a sepa- rate economic system in society.Nineteenth century society,in which eco- nomic activity was isolated and imputed to a distinctive economic motive, was,indeed,a singular departure.''16 The best known international forms taken by this"'singular departure''were,of course,the regimes of free trade and the gold standard.What were their bases? The internationalization of domestic authority relations Charles Kindleberger,who is justly accorded a leading role in having established the efficacy of the "hegemonic stability''model in his book on the Great Depression,17 subsequently managed to write an account of the rise of free trade in western Europe without even mentioning British eco- nomic supremacy as a possible source of explanation.18 He focused instead on a fundamental reordering of the relationships between domestic political authority and economic processes.Free trade,he reminds us,was due first of all to the general breakdown of the manor and guild system and the so-called policy of supply,through which a complex structure of social regulations rather than market exchange determined the organization of economic activity at home and abroad.Indeed,the earliest measures under- taken in order to free trade were to dismantle prohibitions on exports,pro- hibitions that had restricted the outward movement of materials,machinery, and artisans.The bulk of these prohibitions was not removed until well into the 1820s and 1830s,and in some instances even later.A second part of the stimulus"'came from the direct self-interest of particular dominant groups. Boston:Beacon Press,1944,p.71.The historical claims are backed up in Polanyi et al., eds.,Trade and Markets in the Early Empires (Glencoe,Ill.:Free Press,1957). 17 Charles P.Kindleberger,The World in Depression,1929-1939 (Berkeley:University of California Press,1973),esp.chaps.1 and 14. 1s"The Rise of Free Trade in Western Europe,1820-1875,"Journal of Economic History 35 (March1975):20-55

International regimes, transactions, and change 385 mately, they lead back to my depiction of international authority as reflecting a fusion of power and legitimate social purpose. An historical illustration of this interpretation of the "structure" of international authority therefore serves as my point of departure. 1. The structure of international authority Karl Polanyi's magisterial work, The Great Transformation, was first published in 1944. In it, he developed a distinction between "embedded" and "disembedded" economic orders: "normally, the economic order is merely a function of the social, in which it is contained. Under neither tribal, nor feudal, nor mercantile conditions was there, as we have shown, a separate economic system in society. Nineteenth century society, in which economic activity was isolated and imputed to a distinctive economic motive, was, indeed, a singular departure."16 The best known international forms taken by this "singular departure" were, of course, the regimes of free trade and the gold standard. What were their bases? The internationalization of domestic authority relations Charles Kindleberger, who is justly accorded a leading role in having established the efficacy of the "hegemonic stability" model in his book on the Great Depression,I7 subsequently managed to write an account of the rise of free trade in western Europe without even mentioning British economic supremacy as a possible source of explanation.ls He focused instead on a fundamental reordering of the relationships between domestic political authority and economic processes. Free trade, he reminds us, was due first of all to the general breakdown of the manor and guild system and the so-called policy of supply, through which a complex structure of social regulations rather than market exchange determined the organization of economic activity at home and abroad. Indeed, the earliest measures undertaken in order to free trade were to dismantle prohibitions on exports, prohibitions that had restricted the outward movement of materials, machinery, and artisans. The bulk of these prohibitions was not removed until well into the 1820s and 1830s, and in some instances even later. A second part of the stimulus "came from the direct self-interest of particular dominant groups. l6 Boston: Beacon Press, 1944, p. 71. The historical claims are backed up in Polanyi et al., eds., Trade and Markets in the Early Empires (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957). l7 Charles P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929-1939 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), esp. chaps. 1 and 14. l8 "The Rise of Free Trade in Western Europe, 1820-1875," Journal of Economic History 35 (March 1975): 20-55

386 International Organization ."19 In the Netherlands,these were merchants,shipowners,and bankers; in Great Britain,the manufacturing sectors backed by the intellectual hegemony established by the Manchester School;in France,largely indus- trial interests employing imported materials and equipment in production, though they would not have succeeded against the weight of countervailing interests had not Louis Napoleon imposed free trade for unrelated reasons of international diplomacy;in Prussia,grain and timber exporters,though Bismarck was not adverse to using trade treaties in the pursuit of broader objectives and free trade treaties seemed to be au courant;in Italy,the ef- forts of Cavour,which prevailed over disorganized opposition.Equally par- ticularistic factors were at work in Belgium,Denmark,Norway,Sweden, Spain,and Portugal.But how did such diverse forces come to converge on the single policy response of free trade?In a certain sense,Kindleberger contends,Europe in this period should be viewed not as a collection of sepa- rate economies,but "as a single entity which moved to free trade for ideological or perhaps better doctrinal reasons.'2 The image of the market became an increasingly captivating social metaphor and served to focus di- verse responses on the outcome of free trade.And unless one holds that ideology and doctrine exist in a social vacuum,this ascendancy of market rationality in turn must be related to the political and cultural ascendance of the middle classes.In Polanyi's inimitable phrase,"Laissez-faire was planned...." In sum,this shift in what we might call the balance between"authority' and "'market''fundamentally transformed state-society relations,by rede- fining the legitimate social purposes in pursuit of which state power was expected to be employed in the domestic economy.The role of the state became to institute and safeguard the self-regulating market.To be sure,this shift occurred unequally throughout western Europe,and at uneven tempos. And of course nowhere did it take hold so deeply and for so long a period as in Great Britain.Great Britain's supremacy in the world economy had much to do with the global expansion of this new economic order,and even more with its stability and longevity.But the authority relations that were insti- tuted in the international regimes for money and trade reflected a new bal- ance of state-society relations that expressed a collective reality. These expectations about the proper scope of political authority in eco- nomic relations did not survive World War I.Despite attempts at restora- tion,by the end of the interwar period there remained little doubt about how thoroughly they had eroded.Polanyi looked back over the period of the "twenty years'crisis"from the vantage point of the Second World War-at the emergence of mass movements from the Left and the Right throughout Europe,the revolutionary and counterrevolutionary upheavals in central 19Ibid.,p.50. 2Ibid.,p.51,italics added. aPolanyi describes the parallel movements,in the case of Great Britain,of the middle class into the political arena and the state out of the economic arena

386 International Organization . . ."I9 In the Netherlands, these were merchants, shipowners, and bankers; in Great Britain, the manufacturing sectors backed by the intellectual hegemony established by the Manchester School; in France, largely industrial interests employing imported materials and equipment in production, though they would not have succeeded against the weight of countervailing interests had not Louis Napoleon imposed free trade for unrelated reasons of international diplomacy; in Prussia, grain and timber exporters, though Bismarck was not adverse to using trade treaties in the pursuit of broader objectives and free trade treaties seemed to be au courant; in Italy, the efforts of Cavour, which prevailed over disorganized opposition. Equally particularistic factors were at work in Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Spain, and Portugal. But how did such diverse forces come to converge on the single policy response of free trade? In a certain sense, Kindleberger contends, Europe in this period should be viewed not as a collection of separate economies, but "as a single entity which moved to free trade for ideological or perhaps better doctrinal reasons."20 The image of the market became an increasingly captivating social metaphor and served to focus diverse responses on the outcome of free trade. And unless one holds that ideology and doctrine exist in a social vacuum, this ascendancy of market rationality in turn must be related to the political and cultural ascendance of the middle classes. In Polanyi's inimitable phrase, "Laissez-faire was planned. . . ."21 In sum, this shift in what we might call the balance between "authority" and "market" fundamentally transformed state-society relations, by redefining the legitimate social purposes in pursuit of which state power was expected to be employed in the domestic economy. The role of the state became to institute and safeguard the self-regulating market. To be sure, this shift occurred unequally throughout western Europe, and at uneven tempos. And of course nowhere did it take hold so deeply and for so long a period as in Great Britain. Great Britain's supremacy in the world economy had much to do with the global expansion of this new economic order, and even more with its stability and longevity. But the authority relations that were instituted in the international regimes for money and trade reflected a new balance of state-society relations that expressed a collective reality. These expectations about the proper scope of political authority in economic relations did not survive World War I. Despite attempts at restoration, by the end of the interwar period there remained little doubt about how thoroughly they had eroded. Polanyi looked back over the period of the "twenty years' crisis" from the vantage point of the Second World War-at the emergence of mass movements from the Left and the Right throughout Europe, the revolutionary and counterrevolutionary upheavals in central lg Ibid., p. 50. 20 Ibid., p. 51, italics added. Polanyi describes the parallel movements, in the case of Great Britain, of the middle class into the political arena and the state out of the economic arena

International regimes,transactions,and change 387 and eastern Europe in the 1917-20 period,the General Strike of 1926 in Great Britain,and,above all,the rapid succession of the abandonment of the gold standard by Britain,the instituting of the Five Year Plans in the Soviet Union,the launching of the New Deal in the United States,unorthodox budgetary policies in Sweden,corporativismo in Fascist Italy,and Wirkschaftslenkung followed by the creation of both domestic and interna- tional variants of the "new economic order''by the Nazis in Germany. Running throughout these otherwise diverse events and developments,he saw the common thread of social reaction against market rationality.State- society relations again had undergone a profound-indeed,the great- transformation,as land,labor,and capital had all seized upon the state in the attempt to reimpose broader and more direct social control over market forces.Once this domestic transformation began,late in the 19th century, international liberalism of the orthodox kind was doomed.Thus,it was the singular tragedy of the interwar period,Polanyi felt,to have attempted to restore internationally,in the form of the gold-exchange standard in par- ticular,that which no longer had a corresponding social base domestically. The new international economic order that would emerge from World War II,Polanyi concluded,on the one hand would mark the end of"'capitalist internationalism,as governments learned the lesson that international au- tomaticity stands in fundamental and potentially explosive contradiction to an active state domestically,and,on the other hand,the emergence of delib- erate management of international economic transactions by means of col- laboration among governments.22 Some of Polanyi's thoughts about the future had already been enter- tained by the individuals who would come to be directly responsible for negotiating the monetary component of the postwar international economic order.In the depth of the Depression,Harry Dexter White had pondered the problem of how to buffer national economies from external disturbances without,at the same time,sacrificing the benefits of international economic relations."'The path,I suspect,may lie in the direction of centralized control over foreign exchanges and trade.''23 Indeed,in 1934 White had applied for a fellowship to study planning techniques at the Institute of Economic Investi- gations of Gosplan in Moscow.Instead,he accepted an offer to go to Wash- ington and work in the New Deal.For his part,one of the first assignments that Keynes undertook after he joined the British Treasury in 1940 was to draft the text of a radio broadcast designed to discredit recent propaganda proclamations by Walther Funk,minister for economic affairs and president of the Reichsbank in Berlin,on the economic and social benefits that the "'New Order''would bring to Europe and the world.Keynes was instructed to stress the traditional virtues of free trade and the gold standard.But this, he felt,"will not have much propaganda value.''Britain would have to offer 2 The Great Transformation,esp.chaps.2 and 19-21. 23 Quoted in Van Dormael,Bretton Woods,p.41

International regimes, transactions, and change 387 and eastern Europe in the 1917-20 period, the General Strike of 1926 in Great Britain, and, above all, the rapid succession of the abandonment of the gold standard by Britain, the instituting of the Five Year Plans in the Soviet Union, the launching of the New Deal in the United States, unorthodox budgetary policies in Sweden, corporativismo in Fascist Italy, and Wirkschaftslenkung followed by the creation of both domestic and international variants of the "new economic order" by the Nazis in Germany. Running throughout these otherwise diverse events and developments, he saw the common thread of social reaction against market rationality. Statesociety relations again had undergone a profound-indeed, the greattransformation, as land, labor, and capital had all seized upon the state in the attempt to reimpose broader and more direct social control over market forces. Once this domestic transformation began, late in the 19th century, international liberalism of the orthodox kind was doomed. Thus, it was the singular tragedy of the interwar period, Polanyi felt, to have attempted to restore internationally, in the form of the gold-exchange standard in particular, that which no longer had a corresponding social base domestically. The new international economic order that would emerge from World War 11, Polanyi concluded, on the one hand would mark the end of "capitalist internationalism," as governments learned the lesson that international automaticity stands in fundamental and potentially explosive contradiction to an active state domestically, and, on the other hand, the emergence of deliberate management of international economic transactions by means of collaboration among go~ernments.~~ Some of Polanyi's thoughts about the future had already been entertained by the individuals who would come to be directly responsible for negotiating the monetary component of the postwar international economic order. In the depth of the Depression, Harry Dexter White had pondered the problem of how to buffer national economies from external disturbances without, at the same time, sacrificing the benefits of international economic relations. "The path, I suspect, may lie in the direction of centralized control over foreign exchanges and trade."23 Indeed, in 1934 White had applied for a fellowship to study planning techniques at the Institute of Economic Investigations of Gosplan in Moscow. Instead, he accepted an offer to go to Washington and work in the New Deal. For his part, one of the first assignments that Keynes undertook after he joined the British Treasury in 1940 was to draft the text of a radio broadcast designed to discredit recent propaganda proclamations by Walther Funk, minister for economic affairs and president of the Reichsbank in Berlin, on the economic and social benefits that the "New Order" would bring to Europe and the world. Keynes was instructed to stress the traditional virtues of free trade and the gold standard. But this, he felt, "will not have much propaganda value." Britain would have to offer 22 The Great Transformation, esp. chaps. 2 and 19-21. 23 Quoted in Van Dormael, Bretton Woods, p. 41

点击进入文档下载页（PDF格式）

共42页，可试读14页，点击继续阅读 ↓↓

点击下载（PDF格式）

浏览记录