《国际政治经济学》文献资料（Use of History and Sociology in International Political Economy）Sectoral Conflict and Foreign Economic Policy

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Sectoral conflict and foreign economic policy, 1914-1940 Jeff Frieden The period from 1914 to 1940 is one of the most crucial and enigmatic in modern world history,and in the history of modern U.S.foreign policy. World War I catapulted the United States into international economic and political leadership,yet in the aftermath of the war,despite grandiose Wilso- nian plans,the United States quickly lapsed into relative disregard for events abroad:it did not join the League of Nations,disavowed responsibil- ity for European reconstruction,would not participate openly in many inter- national economic conferences,and restored high levels of tariff protection for the domestic market.Only in the late 1930s and 1940s,after twenty years of bitter battles over foreign policy,did the United States move to center stage of world politics and economics:it built the United Nations and a string of regional alliances,underwrote the rebuilding of Western Europe, almost single-handedly constructed a global monetary and financial system, and led the world in commercial liberalization. This article examines the peculiar evolution of U.S.foreign economic policy in the interwar years,and focuses on the role of domestic socioeco- nomic and political groups in determining foreign policy.The American interwar experience powerfully demonstrates that the country's interna- tional position and economic evolution do not sufficiently explain its foreign policy.Indeed,although the contours of the international system and the place of the United States in it changed dramatically during and after World War I,these changes had a very different impact on different sectors of The author would like to acknowledge the comments and suggestions of Beverly Crawford, Robert Dallek,Amy Davis,Barbara Geddes,Judith Goldstein,Joanne Gowa,Stephan Hag- gard,John Ikenberry,Robert Jervis,Miles Kahler,Paul Kennedy,Robert Keohane,Charles Kindleberger,Steve Krasner,David Lake,Mike Mastanduno,William McNeil,John Ruggie, Stephen Schuker,Jack Snyder,Arthur Stein,and Richard Sylla. International Organization 42,1,Winter 1988 1988 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the World Peace Foundation

Sectoral conflict and foreign economic policy, 1914-1940 Jeff Frieden The period from 1914 to 1940 is one of the most crucial and enigmatic in modern world history, and in the history of modern U.S. foreign policy. World War I catapulted the United States into international economic and political leadership, yet in the aftermath of the war, despite grandiose Wilsonian plans, the United States quickly lapsed into relative disregard for events abroad: it did not join the League of Nations, disavowed responsibility for European reconstruction, would not participate openly in many international economic conferences, and restored high levels of tariff protection for the domestic market. Only in the late 1930s and 1940s, after twenty years of bitter battles over foreign policy, did the United States move to center stage of world politics and economics: it built the United Nations and a string of regional alliances, underwrote the rebuilding of Western Europe, almost single-handedly constructed a global monetary and financial system, and led the world in commercial liberalization. This article examines the peculiar evolution of U.S. foreign economic policy in the interwar years, and focuses on the role of domestic socioeconomic and political groups in determining foreign policy. The American interwar experience powerfully demonstrates that the country's international position and economic evolution do not sufficiently explain its foreign policy. Indeed, although the contours of the international system and the place of the United States in it changed dramatically during and after World War I, these changes had a very different impact on different sectors of The author would like to acknowledge the comments and suggestions of Beverly Crawford, Robert Dallek, Amy Davis, Barbara Geddes, Judith Goldstein, Joanne Gowa, Stephan Haggard, John Ikenberry, Robert Jervis, Miles Kahler, Paul Kennedy, Robert Keohane, Charles Kindleberger, Steve Krasner, David Lake, Mike Mastanduno, William McNeil, John Ruggie, Stephen Schuker, Jack Snyder, Arthur Stein, and Richard Sylla. International Organization 42, 1, Winter 1988 O 1988 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the World Peace Foundation

60 International Organization American society.World War I dramatically strengthened the overseas eco- nomic interests of many major U.S.banks and corporations,who fought hard for more political involvement by the United States in world affairs. Yet domestically oriented economic groups remained extremely powerful within the United States and sought to maintain a relatively isolated America.Through the 1920s and early 1930s,the two broad coalitions battled to dominate foreign economic policy.The result was an uneasy stand-off in which the two camps entrenched themselves in different por- tions of the state apparatus,so that policy often ran on two tracks and was sometimes internally contradictory.Only the crisis of the 1930s and the eventual destruction of most of America's overseas competitors led to an "internationalist''victory that allowed for the construction of the American- led post-World War II international political economy. The problem To virtually all observers then and since,at the end of World War I the United States seemed to dominate the international political economy.It had financed the victorious war effort and provided most of the war materiel that went into it;its industry was by far the world's largest and most produc- tive.Despite its traditional economic insulation,the sheer size of the U.S. economy made the country the world's largest trading power.The center of world finance had shifted from London to New York.The United States clearly had the military,industrial,and financial capacity to impose its will on Europe.Yet after World War I the United States,in the current arcane iconography of the field,did not play the part of international eco- nomic hegemon,arbiter,and bankroller of the world economic order.The United States was capable of hegemonic action,and President Woodrow Wilson had hegemonic plans,but they were defeated.The problem was not in Europe,for although the British and French were stronger in 1919 than they would be in 1946,they could hardly have stood in the way of American hegemony.Indeed,European complaints about the United States after World War I were in much the opposite direction:the Europeans bitterly protested America's refusal to accept the responsibilities of leadership.The Euro- peans charged that the United States was stingy with its government finance, hostile in its trade policy,scandalous in its refusal to join the League of Nations, unwilling to get involved in overseeing and smoothing Europe's squabbles. The British and French tried for years to entice and cajole a reluctant America into leadership.America would not be budged,at least until 1940. The world's most powerful nation pursued a contradictory and shifting set of foreign economic policies.The country both asserted and rejected world leadership,simultaneously initiated and blocked efforts at European stabili- zation,and began such major cooperative ventures as the League of Nations

60 International Organization American society. World War I dramatically strengthened the overseas economic interests of many major U.S. banks and corporations, who fought hard for more political involvement by the United States in world affairs. Yet domestically oriented economic groups remained extremely powerful within the United States and sought to maintain a relatively isolated America. Through the 1920s and early 1930s, the two broad coalitions battled to dominate foreign economic policy. The result was an uneasy stand-off in which the two camps entrenched themselves in different portions of the state apparatus, so that policy often ran on two tracks and was sometimes internally contradictory. Only the crisis of the 1930s and the eventual destruction of most of America's overseas competitors led to an "internationalist" victory that allowed for the construction of the Americanled post-World War I1 international political economy. The problem To virtually all observers then and since, at the end of World War I the United States seemed to dominate the international political economy. It had financed the victorious war effort and provided most of the war materiel that went into it; its industry was by far the world's largest and most productive. Despite its traditional economic insulation, the sheer size of the U.S. economy made the country the world's largest trading power. The center of world finance had shifted from London to New York. The United States clearly had the military, industrial, and financial capacity to impose its will on Europe. Yet after World War I the United States, in the current arcane iconography of the field, did not play the part of international economic hegemon, arbiter, and bankroller of the world economic order. The United States was capable of hegemonic action, and President Woodrow Wilson had hegemonic plans, but they were defeated. The problem was not in Europe, for although the British and French were stronger in 1919 than they would be in 1946, they could hardly have stood in the way of American hegemony. Indeed, European complaints about the United States after World War I were in much the opposite direction: the Europeans bitterly protested America's refusal to accept the responsibilities of leadership. The Europeans charged that the United States was stingy with its government finance, hostile in its trade policy, scandalous in its refusal to join the League of Nations, unwilling to get involved in overseeing and smoothing Europe's squabbles. The British and French tried for years to entice and cajole a reluctant America into leadership. America would not be budged, at least until 1940. The world's most powerful nation pursued a contradictory and shifting set of foreign economic policies. The country both asserted and reject~d world leadership, simultaneously initiated and blocked efforts at European stabilization, and began such major cooperative ventures as the League of Nations

Sectoral conflict 61 and the Dawes Plan only to limit its participation in these American initia- tives in ultimately fatal ways.The analytical problem bedevils both eco- nomic ,determinists and political Realists.For those who believe in the primacy of international power politics,it is difficult to explain why a United States able to reconstruct the world political system was unwilling to do so. For those who look at economic affairs first and foremost,America's unchal- lenged position as the world's leading capital exporter should have ac- celerated the trend towards trade liberalization and international monetary leadership begun before World War I;instead,the pendulum swung back towards protectionism and little public U.S.government involvement in international monetary issues. The relevant international relations literature,faced with such analytical anomalies,generally falls back on vague reference to domestic constraints in explaining U.S.foreign economic policy in the interwar period.Charles Kindleberger,whose comparison of the era with the Pax Britannica and Pax Americana is the foundation stone for most international relations thinking on the interwar years,cites E.H.Carr approvingly,to the effect that"in 1918,world leadership was offered,by almost universal consent,to the United States...[and]was declined,"'and concludes that"the one country capable of leadership [i.e.the United States]was bemused by domestic concerns and stood aside."1 Seen from the perspective of American domestic politics,however,the problem is quite reversed.In the context of traditional American apathy or even hostility towards world affairs,the interwar years saw an amazing flurry of global activity by the country's political,economic,and cultural leaders.Against the backdrop of the longstanding indifference of most of the American political system to events abroad,the level of overseas involve- ment in the 1920s and 1930s appears both startling and unprecedented.2 The contradictory role of the United States in the interwar period can be traced to the extremely uneven distribution of international economic inter- ests within American society.America's international economic position did change during and after World War I,yet overseas assets were accumulated by a very concentrated set of economic actors.This left most of the U.S. economy indifferent to foreign economic affairs,while some of the country's leading economic sectors were both deeply involved and deeply concerned with the international economy.American foreign policy was thus torn be- tween insularity and internationalism;the segments of the foreign-policy 1.Charles Kindleberger,The World in Depression 1929-1939 (Berkeley:University of California Press,1973),pp.297-99.The Carr citation is from his The Twenty Years Crisis,1919- 1930 (London:Macmillan,1939),p.234.A popular British satirical history of the 1930s,under the heading"A Bad Thing,"summarized the results of the Great War somewhat more suc- cinctly:"America was thus clearly top nation,and History came to a."Walter Sellar and Robert Yeatman,1066 And All That (New York:Dutton,1931),p.115. 2.Robert Dallek,The American Style of Foreign Policy (New York:Knopf,1983)is a good survey of traditional American insularity

Sectoral conflict 61 and the Dawes Plan only to limit its participation in these American initiatives in ultimately fatal ways. The analytical problem bedevils both economic !determinists and political Realists. For those who believe in the primacy of international power politics, it is difficult to explain why a United States able to reconstruct the world political system was unwilling to do so. For those who look at economic affairs first and foremost, America's unchallenged position as the world's leading capital exporter should have accelerated the trend towards trade liberalization and international monetary leadership begun before World War I; instead, the pendulum swung back towards protectionism and little public U.S. government involvement in international monetary issues. The relevant international relations literature, faced with such analytical anomalies, generally falls back on vague reference to domestic constraints in explaining U.S. foreign economic policy in the interwar period. Charles Kindleberger, whose comparison of the era with the Pax Britannica and Pax Americana is the foundation stone for most international relations thinking on the interwar years, cites E. H. Carr approvingly, to the effect that "in 1918, world leadership was offered, by almost universal consent, to the United States . . . [and] was declined," and concludes that "the one country capable of leadership [i.e. the United States] was bemused by domestic concerns and stood aside. "' Seen from the perspective of American domestic politics, however, the problem is quite reversed. In the context of traditional American apathy or even hostility towards world affairs, the interwar years saw an amazing flurry of global activity by the country's political, economic, and cultural leaders. Against the backdrop of the longstanding indifference of most of the American political system to events abroad, the level of overseas involvement in the 1920s and 1930s appears both startling and ~n~recedented.~ The contradictory role of the United States in the interwar period can be traced to the extremely uneven distribution of international economic interests within American society. America's international economic position did change during and after World War I, yet overseas assets were accumulated by a very concentrated set of economic actors. This left most of the U.S. economy indifferent to foreign economic affairs, while some of the country's leading economic sectors were both deeply involved and deeply concerned with the international economy. American foreign policy was thus torn between insularity and internationalism; the segments of the foreign-policy 1. Charles Kindleberger, The World in Depression 1929-1939 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), pp. 297-99. The Carr citation is from his The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919- 1930 (London: Macmillan, 1939), p. 234. A popular British satirical history of the 1930s, under the heading "A Bad Thing," summarized the results of the Great War somewhat more succinctly: "America was thus clearly top nation, and History came to a ." Walter Sellar and Robert Yeatman, 1066 And All That (New York: Dutton, 1931), p. 115. 2. Robert Dallek, The American Style of Foreign Policy (New York: Knopf, 1983) is a good survey of traditional American insularity

62 International Organization bureaucracy that reflected internationally oriented interests tried to use American power to reorganize the world's political economy,while portions of the government tied to domestically oriented sectors insisted on limiting America's international role.The crisis of the 1930s dissolved many of the entrenched interests that had kept policy stalemated and allowed a new group of political leaders to reconstitute a more coherent set of policies. This article builds on the work of historians investigating the interwar period3 and on the contributions of other social scientists concerned with the relationship between the international and domestic political economies. The work of Charles Kindleberger and Peter Gourevitch,among many others,has shown the importance of sectoral economic interests in ex- plaining domestic politics and foreign policymaking in advanced industrial societies.Both Gourevitch and Thomas Ferguson have used a sectoral ap- proach to elucidate domestic and international events in the 1930s.The present article is thus an attempt to build on existing sectoral interpretations of modern political economies,and an extension of the approach to prob- lems in international relations. The argument summarized Between 1900 and 1920,the United States went from a position of relative international economic insignificance to one of predominance.A major inter- 3.The historical literature on the period is so enormous that it is feasible only to cite the most recent important additions.Two review essays and a forum are a good start:Kathleen Burk, Economic Diplomacy Between the Wars,Historical Jour(December 191),pp.1003 15;Jon Jacobson,"'Is There a New International History of the 1920s?"'American Historical Review 88(June 1983),pp.617-45;and Charles Maier,Stephen Schuker,and Charles Kin- dleberger,"The Two Postwar Eras and the Conditions for Stability in Twentieth-Century Western Europe,"American Historical Review 86(April 1981).Other important works include Denise Artaud,La question des dettes interalliees et la reconstruction de I'Europe (Paris: Champion,1979);Frank Costigliola,Awkward Dominion:American Political,Economic,and Cultural Relations with Europe 1919-1933 (Ithaca,N.Y.:Cornell University Press,1984); Michael J.Hogan,Informal Entente:The Private Structure of Cooperation in Anglo-American Economic Diplomacy,1918-1928 (Columbia:University of Missouri Press,1977);Melvyn Leffler,The Elusive Quest:America's Pursuit of European Stability and French Security,1919- 1933 (Chapel Hill:University of North Carolina Press,1979);William McNeil,American Money and the Weimar Republic (New York:Columbia University Press,1986);Stephen Schuker,The End of French Predominance in Europe (Chapel Hill:University of North Carolina Press,1976);and Dan Silverman,Reconstructing Europe after the Great War (Cam- bridge:Harvard University Press,1982).Many of the leading scholars in the field summarize their views in Gustav Schmidt,ed.,Konstellationen Internationaler Politik 1924-1932 (Bochum,W.Ger.:Studienverlag Dr.N.Brockmeyer,1983). 4.Charles Kindleberger,"Group Behavior and International Trade,"Journal of Political Economy 59 (February 1951),pp.30-46;Peter Gourevitch,"International Trade,Domestic Coalitions,and Liberty:Comparative Responses to the Crisis of 1873-1896,'Journal of Inter- disciplinary History 8(Autumn 1977),pp.281-313;Peter Gourevitch,"Breaking with Or- thodoxy:the Politics of Economic Policy Responses to the Depression of the 1930s," International Organization 38 (Winter 1984),pp.95-129;Thomas Ferguson,"From Normalcy to New Deal:Industrial Structure,Party Competition,and American Public Policy in the Great Depression,"'International Organization 38 (Winter 1984),pp.41-94

62 International Organization bureaucracy that reflected internationally oriented interests tried to use American power to reorganize the world's political economy, while portions of the government tied to domestically oriented sectors insisted on limiting America's international role. The crisis of the 1930s dissolved many of the entrenched interests that had kept policy stalemated and allowed a new group of political leaders to reconstitute a more coherent set of policies. This article bbilds on the work of historians investigating the interwar period3 and on the contributions of other social scientists concerned with the relationship between the international and domestic political economies. The work of Charles Kindleberger and Peter Gourevitch, among many others, has shown the importance of sectoral economic interests in explaining domestic politics and foreign policymaking in advanced industrial societies. Both Gourevitch and Thomas Ferguson have used a sectoral approach to elucidate domestic and international events in the 1930s. The present article is thus an attempt to build on existing sectoral interpretations of modern political economies, and an extension of the approach to problems in international relation^.^ The argument summarized Between 1900 and 1920, the United States went from a position of relative international economic insignificance to one of predominance. A major inter- 3. The historical literature on the period is so enormous that it is feasible only to cite the most recent important additions. Two review essays and a forum are a good start: Kathleen Burk, "Economic Diplomacy Between the Wars," Historical Journal 24 (December 1981), pp. 1003- 15; Jon Jacobson, "Is There a New International History of the 1920s?" American Historical Review 88 (June 1983), pp. 617-45; and Charles Maier, Stephen Schuker, and Charles Kindleberger, "The Two Postwar Eras and the Conditions for Stability in Twentieth-Century Western Europe," American Historical Review 86 (April 1981). Other important works include Denise Artaud, La question des dettes interallie'es et la reconstruction de ['Europe (Paris: Champion, 1979); Frank Costigliola, Awkward Dominion: American Political, Economic, and Cultural Relations with Europe 1919-1933 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984); Michael J. Hogan, Informal Entente: The Private Structure of Cooperation in Anglo-American Economic Diplomacy, 1918-1928 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1977); Melvyn Leffler, The Elusive Quest: America's Pursuit of European Stability and French Security, 1919- 1933 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979); William McNeil, American Money and the Weimar Republic (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986); Stephen Schuker, The End of French Predominance in Europe (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1976); and Dan Silverman, Reconstructing Europe after the Great War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982). Many of the leading scholars in the field summarize their views in Gustav Schmidt, ed., Konstellationen Internationaler Politik 1924-1932 (Bochum, W. Ger.: Studienverlag Dr. N. Brockmeyer, 1983). 4. Charles Kindleberger, "Group Behavior and International Trade," Journal of Political Economy 59 (February 1951), pp. 30-46; Peter Gourevitch, "International Trade, Domestic Coalitions, and Liberty: Comparative Responses to the Crisis of 1873-1896," Journal of lnterdisciplinary History 8 (Autumn 1977), pp. 281-313; Peter Gourevitch, "Breakin with Orthodoxy: the Politics of Economic Policy Responses to the Depression of ti 1930s," International Organization 38 (Winter 1984), pp. 95-129; Thomas Ferguson, "From Normalcy to New Deal: Industrial Structure, Party Competition, and American Public Policy in the Great Depression," International Organization 38 (Winter 1984), pp. 41-94

Sectoral conflict 63 national borrower and host of foreign direct investment before 1900,by 1920 the United States was the world's leading new lender and foreign direct investar.The development of American overseas investments was in itself unsurprising,and in this the United States simply repeated the experience of other developed countries.Yet the rapidity of the country's shift from a major capital importer and raw-materials exporter to the leading exporter of capital,largely because of the peculiarities of the international economy in the ten years after 1914,was quite extraordinary.Even as a few major American economic actors were catapulted into global economic leadership, most of the economy remained as inward-looking as ever.This division in American economic orientation was at the root of the foreign-policy prob- lems of the 1920s and 1930s. As American industry and finance matured and the country became richer in capital,many large American corporations and banks looked abroad for markets and investment opportunities.United States overseas investment thus grew gradually from the 1890s until the eve of World War I.As Table 1 indicates,American foreign direct investment was appreciable by 1900;it was concentrated in raw materials extraction and agriculture in the Caribbean basin.By 1912,foreign direct investment was quite substantial and overseas lending had become of some importance;the focus was still the Caribbean area. The gradual expansion of American overseas investment,especially over- seas lending,was given a tremendous shove by World War I.The war forced several belligerent countries to borrow heavily from the United States,and previous borrowers from European capital markets now turned to the United States to satisfy their needs for capital.As Table 1 shows,American holdings of foreign bonds soared from less than 5 percent of total American holdings of non-government bonds in 1912 to nearly 17 percent in 1922. Foreign direct investment also grew rapidly,as European preoccupation with war and reconstruction cleared the way for many American corpora- tions to expand further into the Third World and,after the war ended,in Europe itself.The 1920s saw a continuation of the wartime increase in overseas American lending and investment.American overseas investment in industrial production-especially manufacturing and utilities-and petro- leum grew particularly rapidly. By 1929 American overseas private assets-direct and portfolio invest- ments,along with other assorted long-and short-term assets-were twenty- one billion dollars.Overseas investments in 1929 were equivalent to over one-fifth of the country's gross national product,a level that was reached again only in 1981.5 Although America's overseas investments were substantial by the 1920s, they were very unevenly distributed among important sectors of the U.S. 5.For figures on U.S.foreign private assets,see Raymond Goldsmith,A Study of Savings in the United States,vol.1 (Princeton,N.J.:Princeton University Press,1955),p.1093

Sectoral conflict 63 national borrower and host of foreign direct investment before 1900, by 1920 the United States was the world's leading new lender and foreign direct investar. The development of American overseas investments was in itself unsurprising, and in this the United States simply repeated the experience of other developed countries. Yet the rapidity of the country's shift from a major capital importer and raw-materials exporter to the leading exporter of capital, largely because of the peculiarities of the international economy in the ten years after 1914, was quite extraordinary. Even as a few major American economic actors were catapulted into global economic leadership, most of the economy remained as inward-looking as ever. This division in American economic orientation was at the root of the foreign-policy problems of the 1920s and 1930s. As American industry and finance matured and the country became richer in capital, many large American corporations and banks looked abroad for markets and investment opportunities. United States overseas investment thus grew gradually from the 1890s until the eve of World War I. As Table 1 indicates, American foreign direct investment was appreciable by 1900; it was concentrated in raw materials extraction and agriculture in the Caribbean basin. By 1912, foreign direct investment was quite substantial and overseas lending had become of some importance; the focus was still the Caribbean area. The gradual expansion of American overseas investment, especially overseas lending, was given a tremendous shove by World War I. The war forced several belligerent countries to borrow heavily from the United States, and previous borrowers from European capital markets now turned to the United States to satisfy their needs for capital. As Table 1 shows, American holdings of foreign bonds soared from less than 5 percent of total American holdings of non-government bonds in 1912 to nearly 17 percent in 1922. Foreign direct investment also grew rapidly, as European preoccupation with war and reconstruction cleared the way for many American corporations to expand further into the Third World and, after the war ended, in Europe itself. The 1920s saw a continuation of the wartime increase in overseas American lending and investment. American overseas investment in industrial production-especially manufacturing and utilities-and petroleum grew particularly rapidly. By 1929 American overseas private assets-direct and portfolio investments, along with other assorted long- and short-term assets-were twentyone billion dollars. Overseas investments in 1929 were equivalent to over one-fifth of the country's gross national product, a level that was reached again only in 1981 .5 Although America's overseas investments were substantial by the 1920s, they were very unevenly distributed among important sectors of the U.S. 5. For figures on U.S. foreign private assets, see Raymond Goldsmith, A Study of Savings in the United States, vol. 1 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1955), p. 1093

64 International Organization TABLE 1.Indicators of the importance of U.S.foreign investment, 1900-1939 (in millions of dollars and percent) 1900 1912 1922 1929 1933 1939 1.U.S.foreign 751 2,476 5,050 7,850 7,000 6,750 direct investment 2.Domestic corporate and 37,275 75,100 131,904 150,326 109,375 119,324 agricultural wealtha 3.Row 1 as a percent 2.0% 3.3% 3.8% 5.2% 6.4% 5.7% of Row 2 4.U.S.foreign 159 623 4,000 7,375 5,048 2,6005 bondholdingsb 5.U.S.holdings of 5,151 14,524 23,687 38,099 37,748 32,502 non-government bondse 6.4/5,percent 3.1% 4.3% 16.9% 19.4% 13.4% 8.0% a.Net reproducible tangible wealth of U.S.corporations and agriculture. b.Due to the different sources used,figures here conflict with those in Table 4:those of Table 4 are probably more reliable,but to ensure comparability Goldsmith's figures are used throughout the table. c.Excludes only holdings of securities issued by U.S.federal,state,or local governments. d.Includes stocks(for 1900 only). e.Author's estimates. f.Figures are for 1934,from Foreign Bondholders Protective Council,Annual Report for 1934 (Washington,D.C.:FBPC,1935),p.224.This includes only bonds being serviced;a more reasonable measure would include the market value of bonds in default.If this av- eraged 30%of par value,figures for 1933-34 would be $5,954 million and 15.8%for rows 4 and 6,respectively. g.Figures for 1939 holdings of foreign bonds are from Goldsmith and are probably under- stated. Sources.Foreign investment:Raymond Goldsmith,A Study of Saving in the United States, vol.1 (Princeton,N.J.:Princeton University Press,1955),p.1093. Domestic data:Raymond Goldsmith,Robert Lipsey,and Morris Mendelson,Studies in the National Balance Sheet of the United States,vol.2 (Princeton,N.J.:Princeton University Press,.1963),pp.72-83. economy.Tables 2 and 3 illustrate that,while overseas investment was extremely important for the financial community and some industrial sec- tors,most other sectors'foreign assets were insignificant.American foreign investments in mining and petroleum were considerable,both absolutely and relative to capital invested in corresponding activities within the United States.Foreign investment was also of great relative importance to corpora- tions in machinery and equipment (especially electrical appliances),motor vehicles,rubber products,and chemicals.Yet these sectors,which ac- counted for well over half of all overseas investment in manufacturing,repre- sented barely one-fifth of the country's manufacturing plant;far more American industries were quite uninvolved in overseas productionl Although only a few industries had major foreign operations,foreign lend- ing was a favorite activity on Wall Street.As Table 3 shows,between 1919 and 1929 new foreign capital issues in New York averaged over a billion

64 International Organization TABLE 1. Indicators of the importance of U.S.foreign investment, 1900-1939 (in millions of dollars and percent) 1. U.S. foreign direct investment 751 2,476 5,050 7,850 7,000' 6,750 2. Domestic corporate and agricultural wealtha 37,275 75,100 131,904 150,326 109,375 119,324 3. Row 1 as a percent of Row 2 2.0% 3.3% 3.8% 5.2% 6.4% 5.7% 4. U.S. foreign bondholdingsb 159d 623 4,000 7,375 5,048' 2,600g 5. U.S. holdings of non-government bondsc 5,151 14,524 23,687 38,099 37,748 32,502 6. 415, percent 3.1% 4.3% 16.9% 19.4% 13.4% 8.0% a. Net reproducible tangible wealth of U.S. corporations and agriculture. b. Due to the different sources used, figures here conflict with those in Table 4; those of Table 4 are probably more reliable, but to ensure comparability Goldsmith's figures are used throughout the table. c. Excludes only holdings of securities issued by U.S. federal, state, or local governments. d. Includes stocks (for 1900 only). e. Author's estimates. f. Figures are for 1934, from Foreign Bondholders Protective Council, Annual Report for 1934 (Washington, D.C.: FBPC, 1935), p. 224. This includes only bonds being serviced; a more reasonable measure would include the market value of bonds in default. If this av- eraged 30% of par value, figures for 1933-34 would be $5,954 million and 15.8% for rows 4 and 6, respectively. g. Figures for 1939 holdings of foreign bonds are from Goldsmith and are probably under- stated. Sources. Foreign investment: Raymond Goldsmith, A Study of Saving in the United States, vol. 1 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1955), p. 1093. Domestic data: Raymond Goldsmith, Robert Lipsey, and Morris Mendelson, Studies in the National Balance Sheet of the United States, vol. 2 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 72-83. economy. Tables 2 and 3 illustrate that, while overseas investment was extremely important for the financial community and some industrial sectors, most other sectors' foreign assets were insignificant. American foreign investments in mining and petroleum were considerable, both absolutely and relative to capital invested in corresponding activities within the United States. Foreign investment was also of great relative importance to corporations in machinery and equipment (especially electrical appliances), motor vehicles, rubber products, and chemicals. Yet these sectors, which accounted for well over half of all overseas investment in manufacturing, represented barely one-fifth of the country's manufacturing plant; far more American industries were quite uninvolved in overseas production\ Although only a few industries had major foreign operations, foreign lending was a favorite activity on Wall Street. As Table 3 shows, between 1919 and 1929 new foreign capital issues in New York averaged over a billion

Sectoral conflict 65 TABLE 2.Foreign direct investment and book value of fixed capital of selected U.S.industries,1929(in millions of dollars and percent) y Foreign direct Book value of A/B in Sector investment fixed capital percent Mining and petroleuma.b s2,278 s12,886 17.7% Public utilities,transport 1,625 41,728 3.9% and communications Manufacturing 1,534 23,672 6.5% Machinery and equipment 444 1,907 23.3% Motor vehicles 184 1,232 14.9% Rubber products 60 434 13.8% Chemicals 130 1,497 8.7% Foodstuffs 222 4,001 5.5% Lumber and products 69 2,001 3.4% Metals and products 150 4,788 3.1% Textiles and products 71 2,932 2.4% Stone,clay and glass products 23 1,451 1.6% Leather and products 4 269 1.3% Agricultured 875 51,033 1.5% a.Figures for total manufacturing do not include petroleum refining,which is included under s“Mining and petroleum.” b.Figures for domestic mining and petroleum invested capital are for the book value of cap- ital including land but excluding working capital. c.Value of plant and equipment. d.Domestic invested capital is reproducible tangible assets of agricultural sector. Sources.Foreign direct investment:U.S.Departent of Commerce,American Direct Invest- ments in Foreign Countries (Washington,D.C.:GPO,1930),pp.29-36. Domestic fixed capital:Daniel Creamer,Sergei Dobrovolsky and Israel Borenstein,Capital in Manufacturing and Mining (Princeton,N.J.:Princeton University Press,1960),pp.248-51, 317-18;Melville J.Ulmer,Capital in Transportation,Communications and Public Utilities (Princeton,N.J.:Princeton University Press,1960),pp.235-37;Raymond Goldsmith, Robert Lipsey and Morris Mendelson,Studies in the National Balance Sheet of the United States vol.2(Princeton,N.J.:Princeton University Press,1963),pp.78-79. dollars a year,over one-sixth of all issues (excluding federal,state,and local securities);in a couple of years the proportion approached one-third.The United States was the world's principal long-term lender,and foreign lend- ing was very important to American finance. The reasons for the uneven pattern of overseas investment are fairly straightforward.It is not surprising that a capital-starved world would turn for loans to the capital-rich United States,especially to the Northeastern financial powerhouses.Foreign direct investment,on the other hand,re- sponded to more specific incentives.Tariff barriers,which proliferated after World War I,forced former or prospective exporters to locate production facilities in overseas markets;often the advantages of local production were great even in the absence of tariffs.Foreign direct investment was thus largely confined to firms with specific technological,managerial,or market-

Sectoral conflict 65 TABLE 2. Foreign direct investment and book value ofjixed capital of selected U.S. industries, 1929 (in millions of dollars and percent) Sector A Foreign direct investment B Book value of $xed capital AIB in percent Mining and petr~leum".~ Public utilities, transport and communications Manufacturing Machinery and equipment Motor vehicles Rubber products Chemicals Foodstuffs Lumber and products Metals and products Textiles and products Stone, clay and glass products Leather and products a. Figures for total manufacturing do not include petroleum refining, which is included under "Mining and petroleum." b. Figures for domestic mining and petroleum invested capital are for the book value of cap- ital including land but excluding working capital. c. Value of plant and equipment. d. Domestic invested capital is reproducible tangible assets of agricultural sector. Sources. Foreign direct investment: U.S. Departent of Commerce, American Direct Invest- ments in Foreign Countries (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1930), pp. 29-36. Domestic fixed capital: Daniel Creamer, Sergei Dobrovolsky and Israel Borenstein, Capital in Manufacturing and Mining (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 248-51, 317-18; Melville J. Ulmer, Capital in Transportation, Communications and Public Utilities (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 235-37; Raymond Goldsmith, Robert Lipsey and Moms Mendelson, Studies in the National Balance Sheet of the United States vol. 2 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 78-79. dollars a year, over one-sixth of all issues (excluding federal, state, and local securities); in a couple of years the proportion approached one-third. The United States was the world's principal long-term lender, and foreign lending was very important to American finance. The reasons for the uneven vattern of overseas investment are fairly straightforward. It is not surprising that a capital-starved world would turn for loans to the capital-rich United States, especially to the Northeastern financial Foreign direct investment, on the other hand, responded to more specific incentives. Tariff barriers, which proliferated after World War I, forced former or prospective exporters to locate production facilities in overseas markets; often the advantages of local production were great even in the absence of tariffs. Foreign direct investment was thus largely confined to firms with specific technological, managerial, or market-

66 International Organization TABLE 3.New corporate and foreign capital issues in New York, 1919-1929 (in millions of dollars and percent) A B All corporate Foreign B/A issues issues in percent 1919 52,742 $771 28.1% 1920 2,967 603 20.3% 1921 2,391 692 28.9% 1922 2,775 863 31.1% 1923 2,853 498 17.5% 1924 3,831 1,217 31.8% 1925 6,219 1,316 21.2% 1926 8,628 1,288 14.9% 1927 9.936 1,577 15.9% 1928 9,894 1,489 15.0% 1929 11,604 706 6.1% Total,1919-1929 63,840 11,020 17.3% Annual average,1919-1929 5,804 1,002 17.3% Source.United States Department of Commerce,Handbook of American Underwriting of Foreign Securities (Washington,D.C.:GPO,1930),pp.32-37. ing advantages,such as motor vehicles,electric appliances and utilities,and petroleum,as well as in the extraction of resources available more readily abroad.There was little overseas investment by industries producing such relatively standardized goods as steel,clothing,and footwear;they generally had little exporting experience,and few advantages over firms in their lines of business abroad.Thus the major money-center investment and commer- cial banks were highly international,as were the more technologically ad- vanced manufacturing and extractive industries;traditional labor-intensive industries,which were by far the majority,were little involved in foreign investment. American industrial export interests were similar to its foreign invest- ments.The major industrial sectors with overseas investments were also the country's leading industrial exporters,as product-cycle theory would pre- dict.6 Refiners of copper and petroleum,and producers of machinery and equipment,motor vehicles,chemicals,and processed food were all major exporters as well as major foreign investors.The only important exceptions to the general congruence of trade and asset diversification were the steel industry and some agricultural interests,especially in the South.Neither steel producers nor,of course,cotton and tobacco farmers had many over- seas investments.To a large extent,then,the trade and foreign investment line-ups were complementary. 6.The classical explanation of the process is Raymond Vernon,"International Investment and International Trade in the Product Cycle,'Ouarterly Journal of Economics 80 (May 1966), pp,190-207. 7.On agricultural and industrial trade preferences in the 1920s,see Barry Eichengreen,"The

66 International Organization TABLE 3. New corporate and foreign capital issues in New York, 1919-1929 (in millions of dollars and percent) A B All corporate Foreign BIA issues issues in percent 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 Total, 1919-1929 Annual average, 1919-1929 Source. United States Department of Commerce, Handbook of American Underwriting of Foreign Securities (Washington, D.C. : GPO, 1930), pp. 32-37. ing advantages, such as motor vehicles, electric appliances and utilities, and petroleum, as well as in the extraction of resources available more readily abroad. There was little overseas investment by industries producing such relatively standardized goods as steel, clothing, and footwear; they generally had little exporting experience, and few advantages over firms in their lines of business abroad. Thus the major money-center investment and commercial banks were highly international, as were the more technologically advanced manufacturing and extractive industries; traditional labor-intensive industries, which were by far the majority, were little involved in foreign investment. American industrial export interests were similar to its foreign investments. The major industrial sectors with overseas investments were also the country's leading industrial exporters, as product-cycle theory would predi~t.~ Refiners of copper and petroleum, and producers of machinery and equipment, motor vehicles, chemicals, and processed food were all major exporters as well as major foreign investors. The only important exceptions to the general congruence of trade and asset diversification were the steel industry and some agricultural interests, especially in the South. Neither steel producers nor, of course, cotton and tobacco farmers had many overseas investments. To a large extent, then, the trade and foreign investment line-ups were c~m~lementary.~ 6. The classical explanation of the process is Raymond Vernon, "International Investment and International Trade in the Product Cycle," Quarterly - Journal ofEconomics 80 (May 1966), pp. 190-207. 7. On agricultural and industrial trade preferences in the 1920s, see Barry Eichengreen, "The

Sectoral conflict 67 Sectors with major overseas investment interests would be expected to have a different foreign economic and political outlook than sectors with little or no international production or sales.Internationally oriented banks and corporations would be generally favorable to freer trade,the former to allow debtors to earn foreign exchange and the latter both because intra-firm trade was important to them and because they tended to fear retaliation. Internationally oriented sectors could also be expected to support an exten- sion of American diplomatic commitments abroad,both specifically to safe- guard their investments and more generally to provide an international environment conducive to foreign economic growth.Those sectors that sold but did not invest abroad would be sympathetic to American attempts to stabilize foreign markets,but might oppose international initiatives that rein- forced competing producers overseas.Economic sectors with few foreign assets or sales could be anticipated to support protectionist policies in their industries,because they were not importing from overseas subsidiaries, tended to be less competitive,and had few worries about retaliation.Such sectors would be unsupportive of major American international involvement that might strengthen real or potential competitors of U.S.industry. Two broad blocs on foreign economic policy did indeed emerge after World War I,and their preferences were more or less as might have been predicted.One group of economic interests was"internationalist'':it sup- ported American entry into the League of Nations,U.S.financing of Euro- pean reconstruction,commercial liberalization,and international monetary and financial cooperation.The other cluster of economic interests was the "isolationists":it opposed the League and American financing of Europe, called for renewed trade protection,and was indifferent or hostile to global financial and monetary accords.8 The two sets of policy preferences were competing rather than complementary,and although there were some actors in a middle ground,the extreme unevenness of American overseas economic expansion meant that preferences tended to harden in their opposition. The central dilemma of U.S.foreign economic policy for fifteen years after World War I was the great economic strength of two opposing sets of economic and political actors,neither of which was powerful enough to vanquish the other.Among the consequences of interest to the analyst of international relations is that the state did not undertake to impose a foreign policy derived from America's international position upon recalcitrant do- mestic actors;instead,the central state apparatus found itself torn between Political Economy of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff,"Discussion Paper No.1244,Harvard Institute for Economic Research,May 1986. 8.Opposition to the League was indeed led by a prominent nationalist Massachusetts senator whose adamant insistence on protecting manufactured goods while allowing the free import of inputs was ably captured by"'Mr.Dooley,who noted that"Hinnery Cabin Lodge pleaded f'r freedom f'r th'skins iv cows"in ways that"wud melt th'heart iv th'coldest mannyfacthrer iv button shoes."Cited in John A.Garraty,Henry Cabot Lodge (New York:Knopf,1953),p.268; the book contains ample,and somewhat weightier,evidence of Lodge's economic nationalism

Sectoral conflict 67 Sectors with major overseas investment interests would be expected to have a different foreign economic and political outlook than sectors with little or no international production or sales. Internationally oriented banks and corporations would be generally favorable to freer trade, the former to allow debtors to earn foreign exchange and the latter both because intra-firm trade was important to them and because they tended to fear retaliation. Internationally oriented sectors could also be expected to support an extension of American diplomatic commitments abroad, both specifically to safeguard their investments and more generally to provide an international environment conducive to foreign economic growth. Those sectors that sold but did not invest abroad would be sympathetic to American attempts to stabilize foreign markets, but might oppose international initiatives that reinforced competing producers overseas. Economic sectors with few foreign assets or sales could be anticipated to support protectionist policies in their industries, because they were not importing from overseas subsidiaries, tended to be less competitive, and had few worries about retaliation. Such sectors would be unsupportive of major American international involvement that might strengthen real or potential competitors of U.S. industry. Two broad blocs on foreign economic policy did indeed emerge after World War I, and their preferences were more or less as might have been predicted. One group of economic interests was "internationalist": it supported American entry into the League of Nations, U.S. financing of European reconstruction, commercial liberalization, and international monetary and financial cooperation. The other cluster of economic interests was the "isolationists": it opposed the League and American financing of Europe, called for renewed trade protection, and was indifferent or hostile to global financial and monetary accords.' The two sets of policy preferences were competing rather than complementary, and although there were some actors in a middle ground, the extreme unevenness of American overseas economic expansion meant that preferences tended to harden in their opposition. The central dilemma of U.S. foreign economic policy for fifteen years after World War I was the great economic strength of two opposing sets of economic and political actors, neither of which was powerful enough to vanquish the other. Among the consequences of interest to the analyst of international relations is that the state did not undertake to impose a foreign policy derived from America's international position upon recalcitrant domestic actors; instead, the central state apparatus found itself torn between Political Economy of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff," Discussion Paper No. 1244, Harvard Institute for Economic Research, May 1986. 8. Opposition to the League was indeed led by a prominent nationalist Massachusetts senator whose adamant insistence on protecting manufactured goods while allowing the free import of inputs was ably captured by "Mr. Dooley," who noted that "Hinnery Cabin Lodge pleaded f'r freedom f'r th' skins iv cows" in ways that "wud melt th' heart iv th' coldest mannyfacthrer iv button shoes." Cited in John A. Garraty, Henry Cabot Lodge (New York: Knopf, 1953), p. 268; the book contains ample, and somewhat weightier, evidence of Lodge's economic nationalism

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