Liberalism and World Politics STOR Michael W.Doyle The American Political Science Review,Vol.80,No.4.(Dec.,1986),pp.1151-1169. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-0554%28198612%2980%3A4%3C1151%3ALAWP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-6 The American Political Science Review is currently published by American Political Science Association. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use,available at http://www.istor org/about/terms html.JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides,in part,that unless you have obtained prior permission,you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles,and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal,non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work.Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/journals/apsa.html. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. The JSTOR Archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long-term preservation and access to leading academic journals and scholarly literature from around the world.The Archive is supported by libraries,scholarly societies,publishers, and foundations.It is an initiative of JSTOR,a not-for-profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community take advantage of advances in technology.For more information regarding JSTOR,please contact support@jstor.org. http://www.jstor.org Sat Feb910:24:072008
Liberalism and World Politics Michael W. Doyle The American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4. (Dec., 1986), pp. 1151-1169. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-0554%28198612%2980%3A4%3C1151%3ALAWP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-6 The American Political Science Review is currently published by American Political Science Association. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/journals/apsa.html. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. The JSTOR Archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long-term preservation and access to leading academic journals and scholarly literature from around the world. The Archive is supported by libraries, scholarly societies, publishers, and foundations. It is an initiative of JSTOR, a not-for-profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community take advantage of advances in technology. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. http://www.jstor.org Sat Feb 9 10:24:07 2008
LIBERALISM AND WORLD POLITICS MICHAEL W.DOYLE Johns Hopkins University rowing literature in international reexamine the traditional liberal claim that governments founded on a respect for individual liberty exercise "restraint"and "peaceful intentions"in their foreign policy.I look at three distinct theoretical traditions of liberalism,attributable to three theorists: Schumpeter,a democratic capitalist whose explanation of liberal pacifism we often invoke;Machiavelli,a classical republican whose glory is an imperialism we often practice;and Kant,a liberal republican whose theory of internationalism best accounts for what we are.Despite the contradictions of liberal pacifism and liberal imperialism,I find,with Kant and other democratic republicans,that liberalism does leave a coherent legacy on foreign affairs.Liberal states are different.They are indeed peaceful.They are also prone to make war.Liberal states have created a separate peace,as Kant argued they would,and have also discovered liberal reasons for aggression,as he feared they might.I conclude by arguing that the differences among liberal pacifism,liberal imperialism,and Kant's internationalism are not arbitrary.They are rooted in differing conceptions of the citizen and the state. L romoting freedom elect their governments,wars become im- will produce peace,we have often been possible.Furthermore,citizens appreciate told.In a speech before the British Parlia- that the benefits of trade can be enjoyed ment in June of 1982,President Reagan only under.conditions of peace.Thus the proclaimed that governments founded on very existence of liberal states,such as the a respect for individual liberty exercise U.S.,Japan,and our European allies, restraint"and "peaceful intentions"in makes for peace. their foreign policy.He then announced a Building on a growing literature inin- 'crusade for freedom"and a "campaign ternational political science,I reexamine for democratic development"(Reagan, the liberal claim President Reagan re- June9,1982). iterated for us.I look at three distinct In making these claims the president theoretical traditions of liberalism,at- joined a long list of liberal theorists(and tributable to three theorists:Schumpeter, propagandists)and echoed an old argu- a brilliant explicator of the liberal ment:the aggressive instincts of pacifism the president invoked;Machia- authoritarian leaders and totalitarian rul- velli,a classical republican whose glory is ing parties make for war.Liberal states, an imperialism we often practice;and founded on such individual rights as Kant. equality before the law,free speech and Despite the contradictions of liberal other civil liberties,private property,and pacifism and liberal imperialism,I find, elected representation are fundamentally with Kant and other liberal republicans, against war this argument asserts.When that liberalism does leave a coherent the citizens who bear the burdens of war legacy on foreign affairs.Liberal states are AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW VOL.80 NO.4 DECEMBER,1986
LIBERALISM AND WORLD POLITICS MICHAEL W. DOYLE Johns Hovkins University Building on a growing literature in international political science, I reexamine the traditional liberal claim that governments founded on a respect for individual liberty exercise "restraint" and "peaceful intentions" in their foreign policy. I look at three distinct theoretical traditions of liberalism, attributable to three theorists: Schumpeter, a democratic capitalist whose explanation of liberal pacifism we often invoke; Machiavelli, a classical republican whose glory is an imperialism we often practice; and Kant, a liberal republican whose theory of internationalism best accounts for what we are. Despite the contradictions of liberal pacifism and liberal imperialism, I find, with Kant and other democratic republicans, that liberalism does leave a coherent legacy on foreign affairs. Liberal states are different. They are indeed peaceful. They are also prone to make war. Liberal states have created a separate peace, as Kant argued they would, and have also discovered liberal reasons for aggression, as he feared they might. I conclude by arguing that the differences among liberal pacifism, liberal imperialism, and Kant's internationalism are not arbitrary. They are rooted in differing conceptions of the citizen and the state. Promoting freedom elect their governments, wars become imwill produce peace, we have often been possible. Furthermore, citizens appreciate told. In a speech before the British Parlia- that the benefits of trade can be enjoyed ment in June of 1982, President Reagan only under. conditions of peace. Thus the proclaimed that governments founded on very existence of liberal states, such as the a respect for individual liberty exercise U.S.,Japan, and our European allies, "restraint" and "peaceful intentions" in makes for peace. their foreign policy. He then announced a Building on a growing literature in in- "crusade for freedom" and a "campaign ternational political science, I reexamine for democratic development" (Reagan, the liberal claim President Reagan reJune 9, 1982). iterated for us. I look at three distinct In making these claims the president theoretical traditions of liberalism, atjoined a long list of liberal theorists (and tributable to three theorists: Schumpeter, propagandists) and echoed an old argu- a brilliant explicator of the liberal ment: the aggressive instincts of pacifism the president invoked; Machiaauthoritarian leaders and totalitarian rul- velli, a classical republican whose glory is ing parties make for war. Liberal states, an imperialism we often practice; and founded on such individual rights as Kant. equality before the law, free speech and Despite the contradictions of liberal other civil liberties, private property, and pacifism and liberal imperialism, I find, elected representation are fundamentally with Kant and other liberal republicans, against war this argument asserts. When that liberalism does leave a coherent the citizens who bear the burdens of war legacy on foreign affairs. Liberal states are AMERICANPOLITICALSCIENCEREVIEW VOL. 80 NO. 4 DECEMBER, 1986
American Political Science Review Vol.80 different.They are indeed peaceful,yet (Schumpeter,1955,p.6).Excluding im- they are also prone to make war,as the perialisms that were mere "catchwords" U.S.and our "freedom fighters"are now and those that were "object-ful"(e.g., doing,not so covertly,against Nicaragua. defensive imperialism),he traces the roots Liberal states have created a separate of objectless imperialism to three sources, peace,as Kant argued they would,and each an atavism.Modern imperialism, have also discovered liberal reasons for according to Schumpeter,resulted from aggression,as he feared they might.I con- the combined impact of a "war machine, clude by arguing that the differences warlike instincts,and export among liberal pacifism,liberal im- monopolism. perialism,and Kant's liberal interna- Once necessary,the war machine later tionalism are not arbitrary but rooted in developed a life of its own and took con- differing conceptions of the citizen and trol of a state's foreign policy:"Created the state by the wars that required it,the machine now created the wars it required" Liberal Pacifism (Schumpeter,1955,p.25).Thus, Schumpeter tells us that the army of an- There is no canonical description of cient Egypt,created to drive the Hyksos liberalism.What we tend to call liberal out of Egypt,took over the state and pur- resembles a family portrait of principles sued militaristic imperialism.Like the and institutions,recognizable by certain later armies of the courts of absolutist characteristics-for example,individual Europe,it fought wars for the sake of freedom,political participation,private glory and booty,for the sake of warriors property,and equality of opportunity- and monarchs-wars gratia warriors. that most liberal states share,although A warlike disposition,elsewhere called none has perfected them all.Joseph "instinctual elements of bloody Schumpeter clearly fits within this family primitivism,"is the natural ideology of a when he considers the international ef- war machine.It also exists independently; fects of capitalism and democracy. the Persians,says Schumpeter(1955,pp Schumpeter's "Sociology of Im- 25-32),were a warrior nation from the perialisms,"published in 1919,made a outset. coherent and sustained argument con- Under modern capitalism,export cerning the pacifying (in the sense of monopolists,the third source of modern nonaggressive)effects of liberal institu- imperialism,push for imperialist expan- tions and principles (Schumpeter,1955; sion as a way to expand their closed see also Doyle,1986,pp.155-59).Unlike markets.The absolute monarchies were some of the earlier liberal theorists who the last clear-cut imperialisms. focused on a single feature such as trade Nineteenth-century imperialisms merely (Montesquieu,1949,vol.1,bk.20,chap. represent the vestiges of the imperialisms 1)or failed to examine critically the created by Louis XIV and Catherine the arguments they were advancing, Great.Thus,the export monopolists are Schumpeter saw the interaction of an atavism of the absolute monarchies, capitalism and democracy as the founda- for they depend completely on the tariffs tion of liberal pacifism,and he tested his imposed by the monarchs and their arguments in a sociology of historical militaristic successors for revenue imperialisms. (Schumpeter,1955,p.82-83).Without He defines imperialism as "an objectless tariffs,monopolies would be eliminated disposition on the part of a state by foreign competition. to unlimited forcible expansion" Modern (nineteenth century)imperi- 1152
American Political Science Review Vol. 80 different. They are indeed peaceful, yet they are also prone to make war, as the U.S. and our "freedom fighters" are now doing, not so covertly, against Nicaragua. Liberal states have created a separate peace, as Kant argued they would, and have also discovered liberal reasons for aggression, as he feared they might. I conclude by arguing that the differences among liberal pacifism, liberal imperialism, and Kant's liberal internationalism are not arbitrary but rooted in differing conceptions of the citizen and the state. Liberal Pacifism There is no canonical description of liberalism. What we tend to call liberal resembles a family portrait of principles and institutions, recognizable by certain characteristics-for example, individual freedom, political participation, private property, and e.quali ty of opportunitythat most liberal states share, although none has perfected them all. Joseph Schumpeter clearly fits within this family when he considers the international effects of capitalism and democracy. Schumpeter's "Sociology of Imperialisms," published in 1919, made a coherent and sustained argument concerning the pacifying (in the sense of nonaggressive) effects of liberal institutions and principles (Schumpeter, 1955; see also Doyle, 1986, pp. 155-59). Unlike some of the earlier liberal theorists who focused on a single feature such as trade (Montesquieu, 1949, vol. 1, bk. 20, chap. 1) or failed to examine critically the arguments they were advancing, Schumpeter saw the interaction of capitalism and democracy as the foundation of liberal pacifism, and he tested his arguments in a sociology of historical imperialisms. He defines imperialism as "an objectless disposition on the part of a state to unlimited forcible expansion" (Schumpeter, 1955, p. 6). Excluding imperialisms that were mere "catchwords" and those that were "object-ful" (e.g., defensive imperialism), he traces the roots of objectless imperialism to three sources, each an atavism. Modern imperialism, according to Schumpeter, resulted from the combined impact of a "war machine," warlike instincts, and export monopolism. Once necessary, the war machine later developed a life of its own and took control of a state's foreign policy: "Created by the wars that required it, the machine now created the wars it required (Schumpeter, 1955, p. 25). Thus, Schumpeter tells us that the army of ancient Egypt, created to drive the Hyksos out of Egypt, took over the state and pursued militaristic imperialism. Like the later armies of the courts of absolutist Europe, it fought wars for the sake of glory and booty, for the sake of warriors and monarchs-wars gratia warriors. A warlike disposition, elsewhere called "instinctual elements of bloody primitivism," is the natural ideology of a war machine. It also exists independently; the Persians, says Schumpeter (1955, pp. 25-32), were a warrior nation from the outset. Under modern capitalism, export monopolists, the third source of modem imperialism, push for imperialist expansion as a way to expand their closed markets. The absolute monarchies were the last clear-cut imperialisms. Nineteenth-century imperialisms merely represent the vestiges of the imperialisms created by Louis XIV and Catherine the Great. Thus, the export monopolists are an atavism of the absolute monarchies, for they depend completely on the tariffs imposed by the monarchs and their militaristic successors for revenue (Schumpeter, 1955, p. 82-83). Without tariffs, monopolies would be eliminated by foreign competition. Modern (nineteenth century) imperi-
1986 Liberalism and World Politics alism,therefore,rests on an atavistic war Schumpeter's explanation for liberal machine,militaristic attitudes left over pacifism is quite simple:Only war profi- from the days of monarchical wars,and teers and military aristocrats gain from export monopolism,which is nothing wars.No democracy would pursue a more than the economic residue of minority interest and tolerate the high monarchical finance.In the modern era, costs of imperialism.When free trade imperialists gratify their private interests. prevails,"no class"gains from forcible From the national perspective,their im- expansion because perialistic wars are objectless. Schumpeter's theme now emerges. foreign raw materials and food stuffs are as Capitalism and democracy are forces for accessible to each nation as though they were in peace.Indeed,they are antithetical to im- its own territory.Where the cultural backward- ness of a region makes normal economic inter- perialism.For Schumpeter,the further course dependent on colonization it does not development of capitalism and democ- matter, assuming free trade,which of the racy means that imperialism will inev- "civilized"nations undertakes the task of coloni- itably disappear.He maintains that zation.(Schumpeter,1955,pp.75-76) capitalism produces an unwarlike disposi- Schumpeter's arguments are difficult to tion;its populace is "democratized,in- evaluate.In partial tests of quasi- dividualized,rationalized"(Schumpeter, Schumpeterian propositions,Michael 1955,p.68).The people's energies are Haas (1974,pp.464-65)discovered a daily absorbed in production.The cluster that associates democracy, disciplines of industry and the market development,and sustained moderniza- train people in "economic rationalism"; tion with peaceful conditions.However, the instability of industrial life M.Small and J.D.Singer (1976)have necessitates calculation.Capitalism also discovered that there is no clearly "individualizes";"subjective oppor- negative correlation between democracy tunities"replace the "immutable factors" and war in the period 1816-1965-the of traditional,hierarchical society.Ra- period that would be central to tional individuals demand democratic Schumpeter's argument (see also governance. Wilkenfeld,1968,Wright,1942,p.841). Democratic capitalism leads to peace. Later in his career,in Capitalism, As evidence,Schumpeter claims that Socialism,and Democracy,Schumpeter, throughout the capitalist world an op- (1950,pp.127-28)acknowledged that position has arisen to "war,expansion, "almost purely bourgeois common- cabinet diplomacy";that contemporary wealths were often aggressive when it capitalism is associated with peace par- seemed to pay-like the Athenian or the ties;and that the industrial worker of Venetian commonwealths."Yet he stuck capitalism is "vigorously anti-imperialist." to his pacifistic guns,restating the view In addition,he points out that the capital- that capitalist democracy "steadily tells ist world has developed means of prevent- ..against the use of military force and ing war,such as the Hague Court and that for peaceful arrangements,even when the the least feudal,most capitalist society- balance of pecuniary advantage is clearly the United States-has demonstrated the on the side of war which,under modern least imperialistic tendencies(Schumpeter circumstances,is not in general very like- 1955,pp.95-96).An example of the lack ly"(Schumpeter,1950,p.128).1 A recent of imperialistic tendencies in the U.S., study by R.J.Rummel (1983)of "liber- Schumpeter thought,was our leaving tarianism"and international violence is over half of Mexico unconquered in the the closest test Schumpeterian pacifism war of1846-48. has received."Free"states(those enjoying 1153
1986 Liberalism and World Politics alism, therefore, rests on an atavistic war machine, militaristic attitudes left over from the days of monarchical wars, and export monopolism, which is nothing more than the economic residue of monarchical finance. In the modern era, imperialists gratify their private interests. From the national perspective, their imperialistic wars are objectless. Schumpeter's theme now emerges. Capitalism and democracy are forces for peace. Indeed, they are antithetical to imperialism. For Schumpeter, the further development of capitalism and democracy means that imperialism will inevitably disappear. He maint-dlns that capitalism produces an unwarlike disposition; its populace is "democratized, individualized, rationalized (Schumpeter, 1955, p. 68). The people's energies are daily absorbed in production. The disciplines of industry and the market train people in "economic rationalism"; the instability of industrial life necessitates calculation. Capitalism also "individualizes"; "subjective opportunities" replace the "immutable factors" of traditional, hierarchical society. Rational individuals demand democratic governance. Democratic capitalism leads to peace. As evidence, Schumpeter claims that throughout the capitalist world an opposition has arisen to "war, expansion, cabinet diplomacy"; that contemporary capitalism is associated with peace parties; and that the industrial worker of capitalism is "vigorously anti-imperialist." In addition, he points out that the capitalist world has developed means of preventing war, such as the Hague Court and that the least feudal, most capitalist societythe United States-has demonstrated the least imperialistic tendencies (Schumpete~ 1955, pp. 95-96). An example of the lack of imperialistic tendencies in the U.S., Schumpeter thought, was our leaving over half of Mexico unconquered in the war of 1846-48. Schumpeter's explanation for liberal pacifism is quite simple: Only war profiteers and military aristocrats gain from wars. No democracy would pursue a minority interest and tolerate the high costs of imperialism. When free trade prevails, "no class" gains from forcible expansion because foreign raw materials and food stuffs are as accessible to each nation as though they were in its own territory. Where the cultural backwardness of a region makes normal economic intercourse dependent on colonization it does not matter, assuming free trade, which of the "civilized" nations undertakes the task of colonization. (Schumpeter, 1955, pp. 75-76) Schumpeter's arguments are difficult to evaluate. In partial tests of quasiSchumpeterian propositions, Michael Haas (1974, pp. 464-65) discovered a cluster that associates democracy, development, and sustained modernization with peaceful conditions. However, M. Small and J. D. Singer (1976) have discovered that there is no clearly negative correlation between democracy and war in the period 1816-1965-the period that would be central to Schumpeter's argument (see also Wilkenfeld, 1968, Wright, 1942, p. 841). Later in his career, in Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, Schumpeter, (1950, pp. 127-28) acknowledged that "almost purely bourgeois commonwealths were often aggressive when it seemed to pay-like the Athenian or the Venetian commonwealths." Yet he stuck to his pacifistic guns, restating the view that capitalist democracy "steadily tells . . . against the use of military force and for peaceful arrangements, even when the balance of pecuniary advantage is clearly on the side of war which, under modern circumstances, is not in general very likely" (Schumpeter, 1950, p. 128).l A recent study by R. J. Rummel (1983) of "libertarianism" and international violence is the closest test Schumpeterian pacifism has received. "Free" states (those enjoying
American Political Science Review Vol.80 political and economic freedom)were that ruling makes no difference.He also shown to have considerably less conflict presumes that no one is prepared to take at or above the level of economic sanc- those measures(such as stirring up foreign tions than "nonfree"states.The free quarrels to preserve a domestic ruling states,the partly free states(including the coalition)that enhance one's political democratic socialist countries such as power,despite deterimental effects on Sweden),and the nonfree states ac- mass welfare.Third,like domestic counted for 24%,26%,and 61%,respec- politics,world politics are homogenized. tively,of the international violence Materially monistic and democratically during the period examined. capitalist,all states evolve toward free These effects are impressive but not trade and liberty together.Countries dif- conclusive for the Schumpeterian thesis. ferently constituted seem to disappear The data are limited,in this test,to the from Schumpeter's analysis."Civilized" period 1976 to 1980.It includes,for ex- nations govern "culturally backward" ample,the Russo-Afghan War,the Viet- regions.These assumptions are not shared namese invasion of Cambodia,China's by Machiavelli's theory of liberalism. invasion of Vietnam,and Tanzania's in- vasion of Uganda but just misses the U.S., quasi-covert intervention in Angola Liberal Imperialism (1975)and our not so covert war against Nicaragua (1981-).More importantly,it Machiavelli argues,not only that excludes the cold war period,with its republics are not pacifistic,but that they numerous interventions,and the long are the best form of state for imperial history of colonial wars (the Boer War, expansion.Establishing a republic fit for the Spanish-American War,the Mexican imperial expansion is,moreover,the best Intervention,etc.)that marked the way to guarantee the survival of a state. history of liberal,including democratic Machiavelli's republic is a classical capitalist,states (Doyle,1983b;Chan, mixed republic.It is not a democracy- 1984;Weede,1984). which he thought would quickly degen- The discrepancy between the warlike erate into a tyranny-but is characterized history of liberal states and Schumpeter's by social equality,popular liberty,and pacifistic expectations highlights three ex- political participation(Machiavelli,1950, treme assumptions.First,his "material- bk.1,chap.2,p.112;see also Huliung, istic monism"leaves little room for 1983,chap.2;Mansfield,1970;Pocock, noneconomic objectives,whether es- 1975,pp.198-99:Skinner,1981,chap.3). poused by states or individuals.Neither The consuls serve as"kings,"the senate as glory,nor prestige,nor ideological an aristocracy managing the state,and the justification,nor the pure power of ruling people in the assembly as the source of shapes policy.These nonmaterial goals strength. leave little room for positive-sum gains, Liberty results from "disunion"-the such as the comparative advantages of competition and necessity for com- trade.Second,and relatedly,the same is promise required by the division of true for his states.The political life of powers among senate,consuls,and individuals seems to have been homogen- tribunes (the last representing the com- ized at the same time as the individuals mon people).Liberty also results from the were "rationalized,individualized,and popular veto.The powerful few threaten democratized."Citizens-capitalists and the rest with tyranny,Machiavelli says, workers,rural and urban-seek material because they seek to dominate.The mass welfare.Schumpeter seems to presume demands not to be dominated,and their 1154
American Political Science Review Vol. 80 political and economic freedom) were shown to have considerably less conflict at or above the level of economic sanctions than "nonfree" states. The free states, the partly free states (including the democratic socialist countries such as Sweden), and the nonfree states accounted for 24%, 26%, and 61 %, respectively, of the international violence during the period examined. These effects are impressive but not conclusive for the Schumpeterian thesis. The data are limited, in this test, to the period 1976 to 1980. It includes, for example, the Russo-Afghan War, the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, China's invasion of Vietnam, and Tanzania's invasion of Uganda but just misses the U.S., quasi-covert intervention in Angola (1975) and our not so covert war against Nicaragua (1981-). More importantly, it excludes the cold war period, with its numerous interventions, and the long history of colonial wars (the Boer War, the Spanish-American War, the Mexican Intervention, etc.) that marked the history of liberal, including democratic capitalist, states (Doyle, 1983b; Chan, 1984; Weede, 1984). The discrepancy between the warlike history of liberal states and Schumpeter's pacifistic expectations highlights three extreme assumptions. First, his "materialistic monism" leaves little room for noneconomic objectives, whether espoused by states or individuals. Neither glory, nor prestige, nor ideological justification, nor the pure power of ruling shapes policy. These nonmaterial goals leave little room for positive-sum gains, such as the comparative advantages of trade. Second, and relatedly, the same is true for his states. The political life of individuals seems to have been homogenized at the same time as the individuals were "rationalized, individualized, and democratized." Citizens-capitalists and workers, rural and urban-seek material welfare. Schumpeter seems to presume that ruling makes no difference. He also presumes That no one is prepared to take those measures (such as stirring up foreign quarrels to preserve a domestic ruling coalition) that enhance one's volitical power, despite deterimental effhcts on mass welfare. Third, like domestic politics, world politics are homogenized. Materiallv monistic and democraticallv capitalist, all states evolve toward free trade and liberty together. Countries differently constituted seem to disappear from Schumpeter's analysis. "Civilized nations govern "culturally backward" regions.These assumptions are not shared by Machiavelli's theory of liberalism. Liberal Imperialism Machiavelli argues, not only that republics are not pacifistic, but that they are the best form of state for imperial expansion. Establishing a republic fit for imperial expansion is, moreover, the best way to guarantee the survival of a state. Machiavelli's republic is a classical mixed republic. It is not a democracywhich he thought would quickly degenerate into a tyranny-but is characterized by social equality, popular liberty, and political participation (Machiavelli, 1950, bk. 1, chap. 2, p. 112; see also Huliung, 1983, chap. 2; Mansfield, 1970; Pocock, 1975, pp. 198-99; Skinner, 1981, chap. 3). The consuls serve as "kings," the senate as an aristocracy managing the state, and the people in the assembly as the source of strength. Liberty results from "disunionw-the competition and necessity for compromise required by the division of powers among senate, consuls, and tribunes (the last representing the common people). Liberty also results from the popular veto. The powerful few threaten the rest with tyranny, Machiavelli says, because they seek to dominate. The mass demands not to be dominated, and their
1986 Liberalism and World Politics veto thus preserves the liberties of the either case,we want more for ourselves state (Machiavelli,1950,bk.1,chap.5,p. and our states than just material welfare 122).However,since the people and the (materialistic monism).Because other rulers have different social characters,the states with similar aims thereby threaten people need to be "managed"by the few us,we prepare ourselves for expansion to avoid having their recklessness over- Because our fellow citizens threaten us if turn or their fecklessness undermine we do not allow them either to satisfy the ability of the state to expand their ambition or to release their political (Machiavelli,1950,bk.1,chap.53,pp. energies through imperial expansion,we 249-50).Thus the senate and the consuls expand. plan expansion,consult oracles,and There is considerable historical employ religion to manage the resources evidence for liberal imperialism. that the energy of the people supplies. Machiavelli's (Polybius's)Rome and Strength,and then imperial expansion, Thucydides'Athens both were imperial results from the way liberty encourages republics in the Machiavellian sense increased population and property,which (Thucydides,1954,bk.6).The historical grow when the citizens know their lives record of numerous U.S.interventions in and goods are secure from arbitrary the postwar period supports Machiavelli's seizure.Free citizens equip large armies argument (Aron,1973,chaps.3-4; and provide soldiers who fight for public Barnet,1968,chap.11),but the current glory and the common good because these record of liberal pacifism,weak as it is, are,in fact,their own(Machiavelli,1950, calls some of his insights into question.To bk.2,chap.2,pp.287-90).If you seek the extent that the modern populace ac- the honor of having your state expand, tually controls(and thus unbalances)the Machiavelli advises,you should organize mixed republic,its diffidence may out- it as a free and popular republic like weigh elite("senatorial")aggressiveness. Rome,rather than as an aristocratic We can conclude either that(1)liberal republic like Sparta or Venice.Expansion pacifism has at least taken over with the thus calls for a free republic. further development of capitalist "Necessity"-political survival-calls democracy,as Schumpeter predicted it for expansion.If a stable aristocratic would or that (2)the mixed record of republic is forced by foreign conflict "to liberalism-pacifism and imperialism- extend her territory,in such a case we indicates that some liberal states are shall see her foundations give way and Schumpeterian democracies while others herself quickly brought to ruin";if,on the are Machiavellian republics.Before we other hand,domestic security prevails, accept either conclusion,however,we "the continued tranquility would enervate must consider a third apparent regularity her,or provoke internal disensions, of modern world politics. which together,or either of them seperately,will apt to prove her ruin" (Machiavelli,1950,bk.1,chap.6,p. Liberal Internationalism 129).Machiavelli therefore believes it is necessary to take the constitution of Modern liberalism carries with it two Rome,rather than that of Sparta or legacies.They do not affect liberal states Venice,as our model. separately,according to whether they are Hence,this belief leads to liberal im- pacifistic or imperialistic,but simul- perialism.We are lovers of glory, taneously. Machiavelli announces.We seek to rule The first of these legacies is the pacifica- or,at least,to avoid being oppressed.In tion of foreign relations among liberal 1155
1986 Liberalism and World Politics veto thus preserves the liberties of the state (Machiavelli, 1950, bk. 1, chap. 5, p. 122). However, since the people and the rulers have different social characters, the people need to be "managed by the few to avoid having their recklessness overturn or their fecklessness undermine the ability of the state to expand (Machiavelli, 1950, bk. 1, chap. 53, pp. 249-50). Thus the senate and the consuls plan expansion, consult oracles, and employ religion to manage the resources that the energy of the people supplies. Strength, and then imperial expansion, results from the way liberty encourages increased population and property, which grow when the citizens know their lives and goods are secure from arbitrary seizure. Free citizens equip large armies and provide soldiers who fight for public glory and the common good because these are, in fact, their own (Machiavelli, 1950, bk. 2, chap. 2, pp. 287-90). If you seek the honor of having your state expand, Machiavelli advises, you should organize it as a free and popular republic like Rome, rather than as an aristocratic republic like Sparta or Venice. Expansion thus calls for a free republic. "Necessityu-political survival-calls for expansion. If a stable aristocratic republic is forced by foreign conflict "to extend her territory, in such a case we shall see her foundations give way and herself quickly brought to ruin"; if, on the other hand, domestic security prevails, "the continued tranquility would enervate her, or provoke internal disensions, which together, or either of them seperately, will apt to prove her ruin" (Machiavelli, 1950, bk. 1, chap. 6, p. 129). Machiavelli therefore believes it is necessary to take the constitution of Rome, rather than that of Sparta or Venice, as our model. Hence, this belief leads to liberal imperialism. We are lovers of glory, Machiavelli announces. We seek to rule or, at least, to avoid being oppressed. In either case, we want more for ourselves and our states than just material welfare (materialistic monism). Because other states with similar aims thereby threaten us, we prepare ourselves for expansion. Because our fellow citizens threaten us if we do not allow them either to satisfy their ambition or to release their political energies through imperial expansion, we expand. There is considerable historical evidence for liberal imperialism. Machiavelli's (Polybius's) Rome and Thucydides' Athens both were imperial republics in the Machiavellian sense (Thucydides, 1954, bk. 6). The historical record of numerous U.S. interventions in the postwar period supports Machiavelli's argument (Aron, 1973, chaps. 3-4; Barnet, 1968, chap. ll), but the current record of liberal pacifism, weak as it is, calls some of his insights into question. To the extent that the modern populace actually controls (and thus unbalances) the mixed republic, its diffidence may outweigh elite ("senatorial") aggressiveness. We can conclude either that (1) liberal pacifism has at least taken over with the further development of capitalist democracy, as Schumpeter predicted it would or that (2) the mixed record of liberalism-pacifism and imperialismindicates that some liberal states are Schumpeterian democracies while others are Machiavellian republics. Before we accept either conclusion, however, we must consider a third apparent regularity of modern world politics. Liberal Internationalism Modern liberalism carries with it two legacies. They do not affect liberal states separately, according to whether they are pacifistic or imperialistic, but simultaneously. The first of these legacies is the pacification of foreign relations among liberal
American Political Science Review Vol.80 states.2 During the nineteenth century,the to the quarrels with our allies that be- United States and Great Britain engaged deviled the Carter and Reagan adminis- in nearly continual strife;however,after trations.It also offers the promise of a the Reform Act of 1832 defined actual continuing peace among liberal states, representation as the formal source of the and as the number of liberal states in- sovereignty of the British parliament, creases,it announces the possibility of Britain and the United States negotiated global peace this side of the grave or their disputes.They negotiated despite, world conquest. for example,British grievances during the Of course,the probability of the out- Civil War against the North's blockade of break of war in any given year between the South,with which Britain had close any two given states is low.The occur- economic ties.Despite severe Anglo- rence of a war between any two adjacent French colonial rivalry,liberal France and states,considered over a long period of liberal Britain formed an entente against time,would be more probable.The ap- illiberal Germany before World War I. parent absence of war between liberal And from 1914 to 1915,Italy,the liberal states,whether adjacent or not,for member of the Triple Alliance with Ger- almost 200 years thus may have sig- many and Austria,chose not to fulfill its nificance.Similar claims cannot be made obligations under that treaty to support for feudal,fascist,communist,au- its allies.Instead,Italy joined in an alli- thoritarian,or totalitarian forms of rule ance with Britain and France,which pre- (Doyle,1983a,pp.222),nor for plural- vented it from having to fight other liberal istic or merely similar societies.More states and then declared war on Germany significant perhaps is that when states are and Austria.Despite generations of forced to decide on which side of an im- Anglo-American tension and Britain's pending world war they will fight,liberal wartime restrictions on American trade states all wind up on the same side de- with Germany,the United States leaned spite the complexity of the paths that take toward Britain and France from 1914 to them there.These characteristics do not 1917 before entering World War I on their prove that the peace among liberals is side. statistically significant nor that liberalism Beginning in the eighteenth century and is the sole valid explanation for the slowly growing since then,a zone of peace.3 They do suggest that we consider peace,which Kant called the "pacific the possibility that liberals have indeed federation"or"pacific union,"has begun established a separate peace-but only to be established among liberal societies. among themselves. More than 40 liberal states currently make Liberalism also carries with it a 'second up the union.Most are in Europe and legacy:international "imprudence" North America,but they can be found on (Hume,1963,pp.346-47).Peaceful every continent,as Appendix 1 indicates. restraint only seems to work in liberals Here the predictions of liberal pacifists relations with other liberals.Liberal states (and President Reagan)are borne out: have fought numerous wars with non- liberal states do exercise peaceful liberal states.(For a list of international restraint,and a separate peace exists wars since 1816 see Appendix 2.) among them.This separate peace pro- Many of these wars have been defen- vides a solid foundation for the United sive and thus prudent by necessity. States'crucial alliances with the liberal Liberal states have been attacked and powers,e.g.,the North Atlantic Treaty threatened by nonliberal states that do Organization and our Japanese alliance. not exercise any special restraint in their This foundation appears to be impervious dealings with the liberal states. 1156
American Political Science Review Vol. 80 state^.^ During the nineteenth century, the United States and Great Britain engaged in nearly continual strife; however, after the Reform Act of 1832 defined actual representation as the formal source of the sovereignty of the British parliament, Britain and the United States negotiated their disputes. They negotiated despite, for example, British grievances during the Civil War against the North's blockade of the South, with which Britain had close economic ties. Despite severe AngloFrench colonial rivalry, liberal France and liberal Britain formed an entente against illiberal Germany before World War I. And from 1914 to 1915, Italy, the liberal member of the Triple Alliance with Germany and Austria, chose not to fulfill its obligations under that treaty to support its allies. Instead, Italy joined in an alliance with Britain and France, which prevented it from having to fight other liberal states and then declared war on Germany and Austria. Despite generations of Anglo-American tension and Britain's wartime restrictions on American trade with Germany, the United States leaned toward Britain and France from 1914 to 1917 before entering World War I on their side. Beginning in the eighteenth century and slowly growing since then, a zone of peace, which Kant called the "pacific federation" or "pacific union," has begun to be established among liberal societies. More than 40 liberal states currently make up the union. Most are in Europe and North America, but they can be found on every continent, as Appendix 1indicates. Here the predictions of liberal pacifists (and President Reagan) are borne out: liberal states do exercise peaceful restraint, and a separate peace exists among them. This separate peace provides a solid foundation for the United States' crucial alliances with the liberal powers, e.g., the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and our Japanese alliance. This foundation appears to be impervious to the quarrels with our allies that bedeviled the Carter and Reagan administrations. It also offers the promise of a continuing peace among liberal states, and as the number of liberal states increases, it announces the possibility of global peace this side of the grave or world conquest. Of course, the probability of the outbreak of war in any given year between any two given states is low. The occurrence of a war between any two adjacent states, considered over a long period of time, would be more probable. The apparent absence of war between liberal states, whether adjacent or not, for almost 200 years thus may have significance. Similar claims cannot be made for feudal, fascist, communist, authoritarian, or totalitarian forms of rule (Doyle, 1983a, pp. 222), nor for pluralistic or merely similar societies. More significant perhaps is that when states are forced to decide on which side of an impending world war they will fight, liberal states all wind up on the same side despite the complexity of the paths that take them there. These characteristics do not prove that the peace among liberals is statistically significant nor that liberalism is the sole valid explanation for the peace.3 They do suggest that we consider the possibility that liberals have indeed established a separate peace-but only among themselves. Liberalism also carries with it a second legacy: international "imprudence" (Hume, 1963, pp. 346-47). Peaceful restraint only seems to work in liberals' relations with other liberals. Liberal states have fought numerous wars with nonliberal states. (For a list of international wars since 1816 see Appendix 2.) Many of these wars have been defensive and thus prudent by necessity. Liberal states have been attacked and threatened by nonliberal states that do not exercise any special restraint in their dealings with the liberal states
1986 Liberalism and World Politics Authoritarian rulers both stimulate and of peaceful rivalry among capitalists,but respond to an international political en- only liberal capitalists maintain peace. vironment in which conflicts of prestige, Leninists expect liberal capitalists to be interest,and pure fear of what other states aggressive toward nonliberal states,but might do all lead states toward war.War they also (and especially)expect them to and conquest have thus characterized the be imperialistic toward fellow liberal careers of many authoritarian rulers and capitalists. ruling parties,from Louis XIV and Kant's theory of liberal interna- Napoleon to Mussolini's fascists,Hitler's tionalism helps us understand these two Nazis,and Stalin's communists. legacies.The importance of Immanuel Yet we cannot simply blame warfare on Kant as a theorist of international ethics the authoritarians or totalitarians,as has been well appreciated (Armstrong, many of our more enthusiastic politicians 1931;Friedrich,1948;Gallie,1978,chap. would have us do.+Most wars arise out of 1;Galston,1975;Hassner,1972;Hinsley, calculations and miscalculations of in- 1967,chap.4;Hoffmann,1965;Waltz, terest,misunderstandings,and mutual 1962;Williams,1983),but Kant also has suspicions,such as those that char- an important analytical theory of interna- acterized the origins of World War I. tional politics.Perpetual Peace,written in However,aggression by the liberal state 1795(Kant,1970,pp.93-130),helps us has also characterized a large number of understand the interactive nature of inter- wars.Both France and Britain fought ex- national relations.Kant tries to teach us pansionist colonial wars throughout the methodologically that we can study nineteenth century.The United States neither the systemic relations of states nor fought a similar war with Mexico from the varieties of state behavior in isolation 1846 to 1848,waged a war of annihilation from each other.Substantively,he antic- against the American Indians,and in- ipates for us the ever-widening pacifica- tervened militarily against sovereign tion of a liberal pacific union,explains states many times before and after World this pacification,and at the same time War II.Liberal states invade weak suggests why liberal states are not pacific nonliberal states and display striking in their relations with nonliberal states. distrust in dealings with powerful Kant argues that perpetual peace will be nonliberal states (Doyle,1983b). guaranteed by the ever-widening accept- Neither realist (statist)nor Marxist ance of three"definitive articles"of peace. theory accounts well for these two When all nations have accepted the legacies.While they can account for definitive articles in a metaphorical aspects of certain periods of international "treaty"of perpetual peace he asks them stability (Aron,1968,pp.151-54; to sign,perpetual peace will have been Russett,1985),neither the logic of the established. balance of power nor the logic of interna- The First Definitive Article requires the tional hegemony explains the separate civil constitution of the state to be peace maintained for more than 150 years republican.By republican Kant means a among states sharing one particular form political society that has solved the prob- of governance-liberal principles and in- lem of combining moral autonomy,in- stitutions.Balance-of-power theory ex- dividualism,and social order.A private pects-indeed is premised upon-flexible property and market-oriented economy arrangements of geostrategic rivalry that partially addressed that dilemma in the include preventive war.Hegemonies wax private sphere.The public,or political, and wane,but the liberal peace holds. sphere was more troubling.His answer Marxist"ultra-imperialists"expect a form was a republic that preserved juridical 1157
1986 Liberalism and World Politics Authoritarian rulers both stimulate and respond to an international political environment in which conflicts of prestige, interest, and pure fear of what other states might do all lead states toward war. War and conquest have thus characterized the careers of many authoritarian rulers and ruling parties, from Louis XIV and Napoleon to Mussolini's fascists, Hitler's Nazis, and Stalin's communists. Yet we cannot simply blame warfare on the authoritarians or totalitarians, as many of our more enthusiastic politicians would have us Most wars arise out of calculations and miscalculations of interest, misunderstandings, and mutual suspicions, such as those that characterized the origins of World War I. However, aggression by the liberal state has also characterized a large number of wars. Both France and Britain fought expansionist colonial wars throughout the nineteenth century. The United States fought a similar war with Mexico from 1846 to 1848, waged a war of annihilation against the American Indians, and intervened militarily against sovereign states many times before and after World War 11. Liberal states invade weak nonliberal states and display striking distrust in dealings with powerful nonliberal states (Doyle, 1983b). Neither realist (statist) nor Marxist theory accounts well for these two legacies. While they can account for aspects of certain periods of international stability (Aron, 1968, pp. 151-54; Russett, 1985), neither the logic of the balance of power nor the logic of international hegemony explains the separate peace maintained for more than 150 years among states sharing one particular form of governance-liberal principles and institutions. Balance-of-power theory expects-indeed is premised upon-flexible arrangements of geostrategic rivalry that include preventive war. Hegemonies wax and wane, but the liberal peace holds. Marxist "ultra-imperialists" expect a form of peaceful rivalry among capitalists, but only liberal capitalists maintain peace. Leninists expect liberal capitalists to be aggressive toward nonliberal states, but they also (and especially) expect them to be imperialistic toward fellow liberal capitalists. Kant's theory of liberal internationalism helps us understand these two legacies. The importance of Immanuel Kant as a theorist of international ethics has been well appreciated (Armstrong, 1931; Friedrich, 1948; Gallie, 1978, chap. 1;Galston, 1975; Hassner, 1972; Hinsley, 1967, chap. 4; Hoffmann, -1965; Waltz, 1962; Williams, 1983), but Kant also has an important analytical theory of intemational politics. Perpetual Peace, written in 1795 (Kant, 1970, pp. 93-130), helps us understand the interactive nature of international relations. Kant tries to teach us methodologically that we can study neither the systemic relations of states nor the varieties of state behavior in isolation from each other. Substantively, he anticipates for us the ever-widening pacification of a liberal pacific union, explains this pacification, and at the same time suggests why liberal states are not pacific in their relations with nonliberal states. Kant argues that perpetual peace will be guaranteed by the ever-widening acceptance of three "definitive articles" of peace. When all nations have accepted the definitive articles in a metaphorical "treaty" of perpetual peace he asks them to sign, perpetual peace will have been established. The First Definitive Article requires the civil constitution of the state to be republican. By republican Kant means a political society that has solved the problem of combining moral autonomy, individualism, and social order. A private property and market-oriented economy partially addressed that dilemma in the private sphere. The public, or political, sphere was more troubling. His answer was a republic that preserved juridical
American Political Science Review Vol.80 freedom-the legal equality of citizens as spread further and further by a series of alliances subjects-on the basis of a representative of this kind.(Kant,PP p.104) government with a separation of powers. The pacific union is not a single peace Juridical freedom is preserved because the treaty ending one war,a world state,nor morally autonomous individual is by a state of nations.Kant finds the first in- means of representation a self-legislator sufficient.The second and third are im- making laws that apply to all citizens possible or potentially tyrannical.Na- equally,including himself'or herself. tional sovereignty precludes reliable Tyranny is avoided because the in- subservience to a state of nations;a world dividual is subject to laws he or she does state destroys the civic freedom on which not also administer (Kant,PP,pp.99- the development of human capacities rests 102;Riley,1985,chap.5).3 (Kant,UH,p.50).Although Kant ob- Liberal republics will progressively liquely refers to various classical establish peace among themselves by interstate confederations and modern means of the pacific federation,or union diplomatic congresses,he develops no (foedus pacificum),described in Kant's systematic organizational embodiment of Second Definitive Article.The pacific this treaty and presumably does not find union will establish peace within a federa- institutionalization necessary (Riley, tion of free states and securely maintain 1983,chap.5;Schwarz,1962,p.77).He the rights of each state.The world will not appears to have in mind a mutual non- have achieved the"perpetual peace"that aggression pact,perhaps a collective provides the ultimate guarantor of repub- security agreement,and the cosmopolitan lican freedom until "a late stage and after law set forth in the Third Definitive many unsuccessful attempts"(Kant,UH, Article.? p.47).At that time,all nations will have The Third Definitive Article establishes learned the lessons of peace through right a cosmopolitan law to operate in conjunc- conceptions of the appropriate constitu- tion with the pacific union.The cosmo- tion,great and sad experience,and good politan law "shall be limited to conditions will.Only then will individuals enjoy of universal hospitality."In this Kant calls perfect republican rights or the full for the recognition of the "right of a for- guarantee of a global and just peace.In eigner not to be treated with hostility the meantime,the "pacific federation"of when he arrives on someone else's terri- liberal republics-"an enduring and grad- tory."This "does not extend beyond those ually expanding federation likely to pre- conditions which make it possible for vent war"-brings within it more and them [foreigners]to attempt to enter into more republics-despite republican col- relations [commerce]with the native in- lapses,backsliding,and disastrous wars- habitants"(Kant,PP,p.106).Hospitality creating an ever-expanding separate peace does not require extending to foreigners (Kant,PP,p.105).6 Kant emphasizes that either the right to citizenship or the right to settlement,unless the foreign visitors it can be shown that this idea of federalism,ex- would perish if they were expelled.For- tending gradually to encompass all states and thus leading to perpetual peace,is practicable eign conquest and plunder also find no and has objective reality.For if by good fortune justification under this right.Hospitality one powerful and enlightened nation can form a does appear to include the right of access republic (which is by nature inclined to seek and the obligation of maintaining the peace),this will provide a focal point for federal association among other states.These will join opportunity for citizens to exchange up with the first one,thus securing the freedom goods and ideas without imposing the of each state in accordance with the idea of inter- obligation to trade (a voluntary act in all national right,and the whole will gradually cases under liberal constitutions). 1158
American Political Science Review Vol. 80 freedom-the legal equality of citizens as subjects-on the basis of a representative government with a separation of powers. Juridical freedom is preserved because the morally autonomous individual is by means of representation a self-legislator making laws that apply to all citizens equally, including himself ' or herself. Tyranny is avoided because the individual is subject to laws he or she does not also administer (Kant, PP, pp. 99- 102; Riley, 1985, chap. 5).' Liberal republics will progressively establish peace among themselves by means of the pacific federation, or union (foedus pacificurn), described in Kant's Second Definitive Article. The pacific union will establish peace within a federation of free states and securely maintain the rights of each state. The world will not have achieved the "perpetual peace" that provides the ultimate guarantor of republican freedom until "a late stage and after many unsuccessful attempts" (Kant, UH, p. 47). At that time, all nations will have learned the lessons of peace through right conceptions of the appropriate constitution, great and sad experience, and good will. Only then will individuals enjoy perfect republican rights or the full guarantee of a global and just peace. In the meantime, the "pacific federation" of liberal republics-"an enduring and gradually expanding federation likely to prevent warw-brings within it more and more republics-despite republican collapses, backsliding, and disastrous warscreating an ever-expanding separate peace (Kant, PP, p. 105).6 Kant emphasizes that it can be shown that this idea of federalism, extending gradually to encompass all states and thus leading to perpetual peace, is practicable and has objective reality. For if by good fortune one powerful and enlightened nation can form a republic (which is by nature inclined to seek peace), this will provide a focal point for federal association among other states. These will join up with the first one, thus securing the freedom of each state in accordance with the idea of international right, and the whoIe wiII graduaIIy spread further and further by a series of alliances of this kind. (Kant, PP p. 104) The pacific union is not a single peace treaty ending one war, a world state, nor a state of nations. Kant finds the first insufficient. The second and third are impossible or potentially tyrannical. National sovereignty precludes reliable subservience to a state of nations; a world state destroys the civic freedom on which the development of human capacities rests (Kant, UH, p. 50). Although Kant obliquely refers to various classical interstate confederations and modern diplomatic congresses, he develops no systematic organizational embodiment of this treaty and presumably does not find institutionalization necessary (Riley, 1983, chap. 5; Schwarz, 1962, p. 77). He appears to have in mind a mutual nonaggression pact, perhaps a collective security agreement, and the cosmopolitan law set forth in the Third Definitive Article.' The Third Definitive Article establishes a cosmopolitan law to operate in conjunction with the pacific union. The cosmopolitan law "shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality." In this Kant calls for the recognition of the "right of a foreigner not to be treated with hostility when he arrives on someone else's territory." This "does not extend beyond those conditions which make it possible for them [foreigners] to attempt to enter into relations [commerce] with the native inhabitants" (Kant, PP, p. 106). Hospitality does not require extending to foreigners either the right to citizenship or the right to settlement, unless the foreign visitors would perish if they were expelled. Foreign conquest and plunder also find no justification under this right. Hospitality does appear to include the right of access and the obligation of maintaining the opportunity for citizens to exchange goods and ideas without imposing the obligation to trade (a voluntary act in all cases under liberal constitutions)
1986 Liberalism and World Politics Perpetual peace,for Kant,is an epi- we now come to the essential question regarding stemology,a condition for ethical action, the prospect of perpetual peace.What does and,most importantly,an explanation of nature do in relation to the end which man's own how the "mechanical process of nature reason prescribes to him as a duty,i.e.how does visibly exhibits the purposive plan of pro- nature help to promote his moral purpose?And how does nature guarantee that what man ought ducing concord among men,even against to do by the laws of his freedom (but does not their will and indeed by means of their do)will in fact be done through nature's compul- very discord"(Kant,PP,p.108;UH,pp. sion,without prejudice to the free agency of 44-45).Understanding history requires an man?...This does not mean that nature im- poses on us a duty to do it,for duties can only be epistemological foundation,for without a imposed by practical reason.On the contrary, teleology,such as the promise of per- nature does it herself,whether we are willing or petual peace,the complexity of history not:facta volentem ducunt,nolentem tradunt. would overwhelm human understanding (PP,p.112) (Kant,UH,pp.51-53).Perpetual peace, The guarantee thus rests,Kant argues,not however,is not merely a heuristic device on the probable behavior of moral angels, with which to interpret history.It is but on that of "devils,so long as they guaranteed,Kant explains in the "First possess understanding"(PP,p.112).In Addition"to Perpetual Peace ("On the explaining the sources of each of the three Guarantee of Perpetual Peace"),to result definitive articles of the perpetual peace, from men fulfilling their ethical duty or, Kant then tells us how we (as free and in- failing that,from a hidden plan.Peace is telligent devils)could be motivated by an ethical duty because it is only under fear,force,and calculated advantage to conditions of peace that all men can treat undertake a course of action whose out- each other as ends,rather than means to come we could reasonably anticipate to an end (Kant,UH,p.50;Murphy,1970, be perpetual peace.Yet while it is possible chap.3).In order for this duty to be prac- to conceive of the Kantian road to peace tical,Kant needs,of course,to show that in these terms,Kant himself recognizes peace is in fact possible.The widespread and argues that social evolution also sentiment of approbation that he saw makes the conditions of moral behavior aroused by the early success of the French less onerous and hence more likely (CF, revolutionaries showed him that we can pp.187-89:Kelly,,1969,pp.106-13).In indeed be moved by ethical sentiments tracing the effects of both political and with a cosmopolitan reach(Kant,CF,pp. moral development,he builds an account 181-82;Yovel,1980,pp.153-54).This of why liberal states do maintain peace does not mean,however,that perpetual among themselves and of how it will(by peace is certain ("prophesiable").Even the implication,has)come about that the scientifically regular course of the planets pacific union will expand.He also ex- could be changed by a wayward comet plains how these republics would engage striking them out of orbit.Human in wars with nonrepublics and therefore freedom requires that we allow for much suffer the"sad experience"of wars that an greater reversals in the course of history. ethical policy might have avoided. We must,in fact,anticipate the possibility The first source of the three definitive of backsliding and destructive wars- articles derives from a political evolu- though these will serve to educate nations tion-from a constitutional law.Nature to the importance of peace(Kant,UH,pp. (providence)has seen to it that human be- 47-48). ings can live in all the regions where they In the end,however,our guarantee of have been driven to settle by wars.(Kant, perpetual peace does not rest on ethical who once taught geography,reports on conduct.As Kant emphasizes, the Lapps,the Samoyeds,the Pescheras.) 1159
1986 Liberalism and World Politics Perpetual peace, for Kant, is an epistemology, a condition for ethical action, and, most importantly, an explanation of how the "mechanical process of nature visibly exhibits the purposive plan of producing concord among men, even against their will and indeed by means of their very discord" (Kant, PP,p. 108; UH, pp. 44-45). Understanding history requires an epistemological foundation, for without a teleology, such as the promise of perpetual peace, the complexity of history would overwhelm human understanding (Kant, UH, pp. 51-53). Perpetual peace, however, is not merely a heuristic device with which to interpret history. It is guaranteed, Kant explains in the "First Addition" to Perpetual Peace ("On the Guarantee of Perpetual Peace"), to result from men fulfilling their ethical duty or, failing that, from a hidden plan.' Peace is an ethical duty because it is only under conditions of peace that all men can treat each other as ends, rather than means to an end (Kant, UH, p. 50; Murphy, 1970, chap. 3). In order for this duty to be practical, Kant needs, of course, to show that peace is in fact possible. The widespread sentiment of approbation that he saw aroused by the early success of the French revolutionaries showed him that we can indeed be moved by ethical sentiments with a cosmopolitan reach (Kant, CF, pp. 181-82; Yovel, 1980, pp. 153-54). This does not mean, however, that perpetual peace is certain ("prophesiable"). Even the scientifically regular course of the planets could be changed by a wayward comet striking them out of orbit. Human freedom requires that we allow for much greater reversals in the course of history. We must, in fact, anticipate the possibility of backsliding and destructive warsthough these will serve to educate nations to the importance of peace (Kant, UH, pp. 47-48). In the end, however, our guarantee of perpetual peace does not rest on ethical conduct. As Kant emphasizes, we now come to the essential question regarding the prospect of perpetual peace. What does nature do in relation to the end which man's own reason prescribes to him as a duty, i.e. how does nature help to promote his moral purpose? And how does nature guarantee that what man ought to do by the laws of his freedom (but does not do) will in fact be done through nature's compulsion, without prejudice to the free agency of man? .. . This does not mean that nature imposes on us a duty to do it, for duties can only be imposed by practical reason. On the contrary, nature does it herself, whether we are willing or not: facta volentem ducunt, nolentem tradunt. (PP, p. 112) The guarantee thus rests, Kant argues, not on the probable behavior of moral angels, but on that of "devils, so long as they possess understanding" (PP, p. 112). In explaining the sources of each of the three definitive articles of the perpetual peace, Kant then tells us how we (as free and intelligent devils) could be motivated by fear, force, and calculated advantage to undertake a course of action whose outcome we could reasonably anticipate to be perpetual peace. Yet while it is possible to conceive of the Kantian road to peace in these terms, Kant himself recognizes and argues that social evolution also makes the conditions of moral behavior less onerous and hence more likely (CF, pp. 187-89; Kelly, 1969, pp. 106-13). In tracing the effects of both political and moral development, he builds an account of why liberal states do maintain peace among themselves and of how it will (by implication, has) come about that the pacific union will expand. He also explains how these republics would engage in wars with nonrepublics and therefore suffer the "sad experience" of wars that an ethical policy might have avoided. The first source of the three definitive articles derives from a political evolution-from a constitutional law. Nature (providence) has seen to it that human beings can live in all the regions where they have been driven to settle by wars. (Kant, who once taught geography, reports on the Lapps, the Samoyeds, the Pescheras.)