《国际政治经济学》文献资料（Realism and Liberalism in Political Economy）Taking Preferences Seriously A Liberal Theory of International Politics

Taking Preferences Seriously:A Liberal Theory of International Politics STOR Andrew Moravcsik International Organization,Vol.51,No.4.(Autumn,1997),pp.513-553 Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-8183%28199723%2951%3A4%3C513%3ATPSALT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C International Organization is currently published by The MIT Press. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use,available at http://www.istor org/about/terms html.JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides,in part,that unless you have obtained prior permission,you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles,and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal,non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work.Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/journals/mitpress.html. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. The JSTOR Archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long-term preservation and access to leading academic journals and scholarly literature from around the world.The Archive is supported by libraries,scholarly societies,publishers, and foundations.It is an initiative of JSTOR,a not-for-profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community take advantage of advances in technology.For more information regarding JSTOR,please contact support@jstor.org. http://www.jstor.org Sun Sep1622:02:352007

Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics Andrew Moravcsik International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 4. (Autumn, 1997), pp. 513-553. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-8183%28199723%2951%3A4%3C513%3ATPSALT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C International Organization is currently published by The MIT Press. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/journals/mitpress.html. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. The JSTOR Archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long-term preservation and access to leading academic journals and scholarly literature from around the world. The Archive is supported by libraries, scholarly societies, publishers, and foundations. It is an initiative of JSTOR, a not-for-profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community take advantage of advances in technology. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. http://www.jstor.org Sun Sep 16 22:02:35 2007

Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics Andrew Moravcsik This article reformulates liberal international relations (IR)theory in a nonideological and nonutopian form appropriate to empirical social science.Liberal IR theory elaborates the insight that state-society relations-the relationship of states to the domestic and transna- tional social context in which they are embedded-have a fundamental impact on state behavior in world politics.Societal ideas,interests,and institutions influence state behavior by shaping state preferences,that is,the fundamental social purposes underlying the strate- gic calculations of goverments.For liberals,the configuration of state preferences matters most in world politics-not,as realists argue,the configuration of capabilities and not,as institutionalists(that is,functional regime theorists)maintain,the configuration of informa- tion and institutions.This article codifies this basic liberal insight in the form of three core theoretical assumptions,derives from them three variants of liberal theory,and demon- strates that the existence of a coherent liberal theory has significant theoretical,methodologi- cal,and empirical implications.Restated in this way,liberal theory deserves to be treated as a paradigmatic alternative empirically coequal with and analytically more fundamen- tal than the two dominant theories in contemporary IR scholarship:realism and insti- tutionalism. For detailed comments and criticisms,I am grateful above all to Anne-Marie Slaughter,who was there from the beginning,and to Lea Brilmayer,Lawrence Broz,Marc Busch,James Caporaso,Dale Copeland, David Dessler,Jeffry Frieden,Martha Finnemore,Charles Glazer,Michael Griesdorf,Stefano Guzzini, Ernst Haas,Stanley Hoffmann,Stephen Holmes,Ted Hopf,Alan Houston,David Lumsdaine,Robert Keohane,Yuen Khong,Larry Kramer,David Long,Steven Lukes,James Marquart,Lisa Martin,Jonathan Mercer,Henry Nau,Kalypso Nicolaidis,James Nolt,Joseph Nye,John Odell,Kenneth Oye,Robert Paarlberg,Daniel Philpott,Gideon Rose,Judith Shklar,David Skidmore,Allison Stanger,Janice Stein, Andrew Wallace,Celeste Wallander,Stephen Walt,Alexander Wendt,Mark Zacher,Fareed Zakaria,Michael Zurn,and three anonymous referees.I thank also two other critics:Peter Katzenstein encouraged a more direct comparison with constructivist approaches and John Mearsheimer invited me to state the liberal case vis-a-vis realism in a series of public debates.I am also indebted to participants in seminars at the Program on International Politics,Economics,and Security (PIPES),University of Chicago;University of Konstanz:University of Toronto;University of California,San Diego:Olin Institute and Center for Inter- national Affairs,Harvard University;International Jurisprudence Colloquium,New York University Law School;Fletcher School,Tufts University;and the European University Institute.For research support,I thank Amit Sevak,Brian Portnoy,and PIPES.For more detailed and documented versions of this article, see Moravcsik 1992. International Organization 51,4,Autumn 1997,pp.513-53 1997 by The IO Foundation and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics Andrew Moravcsik This article reformulates liberal international relations (R) theory in a nonideological and nonutopian form appropriate to empirical social science. Liberal R theory elaborates the insight that state-society relations-the relationship of states to the domestic and transna￾tional social context in which they are embedded-have a fundamental impact on state behavior in world politics. Societal ideas, interests, and institutions influence state behavior by shaping state preferences, that is, the fundamental social purposes underlying the strate￾gic calculations of governments. For liberals, the configuration of state preferences matters most in world politics-not, as realists argue, the configuration of capabilities and not, as institutionalists (that is, functional regime theorists) maintain, the configuration of informa￾tion and institutions. This article codifies this basic liberal insight in the form of three core theoretical assumptions, derives from them three variants of liberal theory, and demon￾strates that the existence of a coherent liberal theory has significant theoretical, methodologi￾cal, and empirical implications. Restated in this way, liberal theory deserves to be treated as a paradigmatic alternative empirically coequal with and analytically more fundamen￾tal than the two dominant theories in contemporary IR scholarship: realism and insti￾tutionalism. For detailed comments and criticisms, I am grateful above all to Anne-Marie Slaughter, who was there from the beginning, and to Lea Brilmayer, Lawrence Broz, Marc Busch, James Caporaso, Dale Copeland, David Dessler, Jeffry Frieden, Martha Finnemore, Charles Glazer, Michael Griesdorf, Stefano Guzzini, Ernst Haas, Stanley Hoffmann, Stephen Holmes, Ted Hopf, Alan Houston, David Lumsdaine, Robert Keohane, Yuen Khong, Larry Kramer, David Long, Steven Lukes, James Marquart, Lisa Martin, Jonathan Mercer, Henry Nau, Kalypso Nicolai'dis, James Nolt, Joseph Nye, John Odell, Kenneth Oye, Robert Paarlberg, Daniel Philpott, Gideon Rose, Judith Shklar, David Skidmore, Allison Stanger, Janice Stein, Andrew Wallace, Celeste Wallander, Stephen Walt, Alexander Wendt, Mark Zacher, Fareed Zakaria, Michael Ziirn, and three anonymous referees. I thank also two other critics: Peter Katzenstein encouraged a more direct comparison with constructivist approaches and John Mearsheimer invited me to state the liberal case vis-8-vis realism in a series of public debates. I am also indebted to participants in seminars at the Program on International Politics, Economics, and Security (PIPES), University of Chicago; University of Konstanz; University of Toronto; University of California, San Diego; Olin Institute and Center for Inter￾national Affairs, Harvard university; International Jurisprudence Colloquium, New York university Law School; Fletcher School, Tufts University; and the European University Institute. For research support, I thank Amit Sevak, Brian Portnoy, and PIPES. For more detailed and documented versions of this article, see Moravcsik 1992. International Organization 5 1,4, Autumn 1997, pp. 513-53 o 1997 by The I0 Foundation and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

514 International Organization Grounding liberal theory in a set of core social scientific assumptions helps over- come a disjuncture between contemporary empirical research on world politics and the language employed by scholars to describe IR as a field.Liberal hypotheses stressing variation in state preferences play an increasingly central role in IR scholar- ship.These include explanations stressing the causal importance of state-society re- lations as shaped by domestic institutions(for example,the "democratic peace"),by economic interdependence(for example,endogenous tariff theory),and by ideas about national,political,and socioeconomic public goods provision(for example,theories about the relationship between nationalism and conflict).Liberal hypotheses do not include,for reasons clarified later,functional regime theory.Yet the conceptual lan- guage of IR theory has not caught up with contemporary research.IR theorists con- tinue to speak as if the dominant theoretical cleavage in the field were the dichotomy between realism and ("neoliberal")institutionalism.The result:liberal IR theory of the kind outlined earlier is generally ignored as a major paradigmatic alternative. Worse,its lack of paradigmatic status has permitted critics to caricature liberal theory as a normative,even utopian,ideology.Postwar realist critics such as Hans Morgenthau and E.H.Carr took rhetorical advantage of liberalism's historical role as an ideology to contrast its purported altruism(“idealism,“legalism,”“moralism,” or "utopianism")with realism's "theoretical concern with human nature as it actu- ally is [and]historical processes as they actually take place."Forty years later,little has changed.Robert Gilpin's influential typology in international political economy juxtaposes a positive mercantilist view("politics determines economics")against a narrower and conspicuously normative liberal one ("economics should determine politics").Kenneth Waltz,a realist critic,asserts that "if the aims...of states be- come matters of...central concern,then we are forced back to the descriptive level; and from simple descriptions no valid generalizations can be drawn."2 Liberals have responded to such criticisms not by proposing a unified set of positive social scientific assumptions on which a nonideological and nonutopian liberal theory can be based,as has been done with considerable success for realism and institutionalism,but by conceding its theoretical incoherence and turning instead to intellectual history.It is widely accepted that any nontautological social scientific theory must be grounded in a set of positive assumptions from which arguments,explanations,and predictions can be de- rived.3 Yet surveys of liberal IR theory either collect disparate views held by "classical" liberal publicists or define liberal theory teleologically,that is,according to its purported optimism concerning the potential for peace,cooperation,and intemational institutions in world history.Such studies offer an indispensable source of theoretical and normative inspi- ration.Judged by the more narrowly social scientific criteria adopted here,however,they do not justify reference to a distinct "liberal"IR theory. Leading liberal IR theorists freely concede the absence of coherent microfounda- tional assumptions but conclude therefrom that a liberal IR theory in the social scien- 1.See Morgenthau 1960,4;Keohane 1989,68,n.17;and Howard 1978,134. 2.See Waltz 1979,65,27;Gilpin 1975,27 (emphasis in original);and Gilpin 1987. 3.See Bueno de Mesquita 1996,64-65;and Keohane 1986

514 International Organization Grounding liberal theory in a set of core social scientific assumptions helps over￾come a disjuncture between contemporary empirical research on world politics and the language employed by scholars to describe IR as a field. Liberal hypotheses stressing variation in state preferences play an increasingly central role in IR scholar￾ship. These include explanations stressing the causal importance of state-society re￾lations as shaped by domestic institutions (for example, the "democratic peace"), by economic interdependence (for example, endogenous tariff theory), and by ideas about national, political, and socioeconomic public goods provision (for example, theories about the relationship between nationalism and conflict). Liberal hypotheses do not include, for reasons clarified later, functional regime theory. Yet the conceptual lan￾guage of IR theory has not caught up with contemporary research. IR theorists con￾tinue to speak as if the dominant theoretical cleavage in the field were the dichotomy between realism and ("neoliberal") institutionalism. The result: liberal IR theory of the kind outlined earlier is generally ignored as a major paradigmatic alternative. Worse, its lack of paradigmatic status has permitted critics to caricature liberal theory as a normative, even utopian, ideology. Postwar realist critics such as Hans Morgenthau and E. H. Carr took rhetorical advantage of liberalism's historical role as an ideology to contrast its purported altruism ("idealism," "legalism," "moralism," or "utopianism") with realism's "theoretical concern with human nature as it actu￾ally is [and] historical processes as they actually take place."' Forty years later, little has changed. Robert Gilpin's influential typology in international political economy juxtaposes a positive mercantilist view ("politics determines economics") against a narrower and conspicuously normative liberal one ("economics should determine politics"). Kenneth Waltz, a realist critic, asserts that "if the aims . . . of states be￾come matters of. . . central concern, then we are forced back to the descriptive level; and from simple descriptions no valid generalizations can be dra~n."~ Liberals have responded to such criticisms not by proposing a unified set of positive social scientific assumptions on which a nonideological and nonutopian liberal theory can be based, as has been done with considerable success for realism and institutionalism, but by conceding its theoretical incoherence and turning instead to intellectual history. It is widely accepted that any nontautological social scientific theory must be grounded in a set of positive assumptions from which arguments, explanations, and predictions can be de￾rived.3 Yet surveys of liberal IR theory either collect disparate views held by "classical" liberal publicists or define liberal theory teleologically, that is, according to its purported optimism concerning the potential for peace, cooperation, and international institutions in world history. Such studies offer an indispensable source of theoretical and normative inspi￾ration. Judged by the more narrowly social scientific criteria adopted here, however, they do not jusa reference to a distinct "liberal" IR theory. Leading liberal IR theorists freely concede the absence of coherent microfounda￾tional assumptions but conclude therefrom that a liberal IR theory in the social scien- 1. See Morgenthau 1960,4; Keohane 1989,68, n. 17; and Howard 1978, 134. 2. See Waltz 1979,65,27; Gilpin 1975, 27 (emphasis in original); and Gilpin 1987. 3. See Bueno de Mesquita 1996,64-65; and Keohane 1986

Liberal Theory of International Politics 515 tific sense cannot exist.Robert Keohane,an institutionalist sympathetic to liberal- ism,maintains that"in contrast to Marxism and Realism,Liberalism is not committed to ambitious and parsimonious structural theory."Michael Doyle,a pioneer in ana- lyzing the "democratic peace,"observes that liberal IR theory,unlike others,lacks "canonical"foundations.Mark Zacher and Richard Matthew,sympathetic liberals, assert that liberalism should be considered an "approach,"not a theory,since "its propositions cannot be...deduced from its assumptions."4 Accurate though this may be as a characterization of intellectual history and current theory,it is second- best social science. I seek to move beyond this unsatisfactory situation by proposing a set of core assumptions on which a general restatement of positive liberal IR theory can be grounded.In the first section of the article I argue that the basic liberal insight about the centrality of state-society relations to world politics can be restated in terms of three positive assumptions,concerning,respectively,the nature of fundamental so- cial actors,the state,and the international system. Drawing on these assumptions,I then elaborate three major variants of liberal theory-each grounded in a distinctive causal mechanism linking social preferences and state behavior.Ideational liberalism stresses the impact on state behavior of conflict and compatibility among collective social values or identities concerning the scope and nature of public goods provision.Commercial liberalism stresses the im- pact on state behavior of gains and losses to individuals and groups in society from transnational economic interchange.Republican liberalism stresses the impact on state behavior of varying forms of domestic representation and the resulting incen- tives for social groups to engage in rent seeking.5 Finally,I demonstrate that the identification of coherent theoretical assumptions is not simply an abstract and semantic matter.It has significant methodological,theo- retical,and empirical implications.The utility of a paradigmatic restatement should be evaluated on the basis of four criteria,each relevant to the empirical researcher: superior parsimony,coherence,empirical accuracy,and multicausal consistency First,a theoretical restatement should be general and parsimonious,demonstrat- ing that a limited number of microfoundational assumptions can link a broad range of previously unconnected theories and hypotheses.This restatement does so by show- ing how liberalism provides a general theory of IR linking apparently unrelated areas of inguiry.The theory outlined here applies equally to liberal and nonliberal states,economic and national security affairs,conflictual and nonconflictual situa- tions,and the behavior both of individual states ("foreign policy")and of aggrega- tions of states ("international relations").Liberal theory,moreover,explains impor- tant phenomena overlooked by alternative theories,including the substantive content of foreign policy,historical change,and the distinctiveness of interstate relations among modern Western states. 4.See Keohane 1990,166,172-73;Doyle 1986,1152;Zacher and Matthew 1992,2;Matthew and Zacher1995,107-11,117-20;Hoffmann1987,1995:and Nye1988. 5.For other such distinctions,see Keohane 1990;and Doyle 1983

Liberal Theory of International Politics 515 tific sense cannot exist. Robert Keohane, an institutionalist sympathetic to liberal￾ism, maintains that "in contrast to Marxism and Realism, Liberalism is not committed to ambitious and parsimonious structural theory." Michael Doyle, a pioneer in ana￾lyzing the "democratic peace," observes that liberal IR theory, unlike others, lacks "canonical" foundations. Mark Zacher and Richard Matthew, sympathetic liberals, assert that liberalism should be considered an "approach," not a theory, since "its propositions cannot be . . . deduced from its assumption^."^ Accurate though this may be as a characterization of intellectual history and current theory, it is second￾best social science. I seek to move beyond this unsatisfactory situation by proposing a set of core assumptions on which a general restatement of positive liberal IR theory can be grounded. In the first section of the article I argue that the basic liberal insight about the centrality of state-society relations to world politics can be restated in terms of three positive assumptions, concerning, respectively, the nature of fundamental so￾cial actors, the state, and the international system. Drawing on these assumptions, I then elaborate three major variants of liberal theory--each grounded in a distinctive causal mechanism linking social preferences and state behavior. Ideational liberalism stresses the impact on state behavior of conflict and compatibility among collective social values or identities concerning the scope and nature of public goods provision. Commercial liberalism stresses the im￾pact on state behavior of gains and losses to individuals and groups in society from transnational economic interchange. Republican liberalism stresses the impact on state behavior of varying forms of domestic representation and the resulting incen￾tives for social groups to engage in rent ~eeking.~ Finally, I demonstrate that the identification of coherent theoretical assumptions is not simply an abstract and semantic matter. It has significant methodological, theo￾retical, and empirical implications. The utility of a paradigmatic restatement should be evaluated on the basis of four criteria, each relevant to the empirical researcher: superior parsimony, coherence, empirical accuracy, and multicausal consistency. First, a theoretical restatement should be general and parsimonious, demonstrat￾ing that a limited number of microfoundational assumptions can link a broad range of previously unconnected theories and hypotheses. This restatement does so by show￾ing how liberalism provides a general theory of IR linking apparently unrelated areas of inquiry. The theory outlined here applies equally to liberal and nonliberal states, economic and national security affairs, conflictual and nonconflictual situa￾tions, and the behavior both of individual states ("foreign policy ") and of aggrega￾tions of states ("international relations"). Liberal theory, moreover, explains impor￾tant phenomena overlooked by alternative theories, including the substantive content of foreign policy, historical change, and the distinctiveness of interstate relations among modem Western states. 4. See Keohane 1990, 166, 172-73; Doyle 1986, 1152; Zacher and Matthew 1992, 2; Matthew and Zacher 1995, 107-1 1, 117-20; Hoffmann 1987, 1995; and Nye 1988. 5. For other such distinctions, see Keohane 1990; and Doyle 1983

516 International Organization Second,a theoretical restatement should be rigorous and coherent,offering a clear definition of its own boundaries.This restatement does so by demonstrating that institutionalist theories of regimes-commonly treated as liberal due to ideological and historical connotations-are in fact based on assumptions closer to realism than to liberalism.This helps to explain why IR theorists have found it difficult to distill a set of coherent microfoundational assumptions for liberal theory. Third,a theoretical restatement should demonstrate empirical accuracy vis-a-vis other theories;it should expose anomalies in existing work,forcing reconsideration of empirical findings and theoretical positions.This restatement of liberal theory meets this criterion by revealing significant methodological biases in empirical evalu- ations of realist theories of "relative gains-seeking"and constructivist analyses of ideas and IR due to the omission of liberal alternatives.If these biases were corrected, liberal accounts might well supplant many widely accepted realist and institutional- ist,as well as constructivist,explanations of particular phenomena in world politics. Fourth,a theoretical restatement should demonstrate multicausal consistency.By specifying the antecedent conditions under which it is valid and the precise causal links to policy outcomes,a theory should specify rigorously how it can be synthe- sized with other theories into a multicausal explanation consistent with tenets of fundamental social theory.This restatement does so by reversing the nearly universal presumption among contemporary IR theorists that"systemic"theories like realism and institutionalism should be employed as an analytical "first cut,"with theories of "domestic"preference formation brought in only to explain anomalies-a prescrip- tion that is both methodologically biased and theoretically incoherent.In its place,this restatement dictates the reverse:Liberal theory is analytically prior to both realism and institutionalism because it defines the conditions under which their assumptions hold. If this proposed reformulation of liberal IR theory meets these four criteria,as I argue it does,there is good reason to accord it a paradigmatic position empirically coequal with and analytically prior to realism and institutionalism,as well as construc- tivism,in theory and research on world politics. Core Assumptions of Liberal IR Theory Liberal IR theory's fundamental premise-that the relationship between states and the surrounding domestic and transnational society in which they are embedded criti- cally shapes state behavior by influencing the social purposes underlying state pref- erences-can be restated in terms of three core assumptions.These assumptions are appropriate foundations of any social theory of IR:they specify the nature of societal actors,the state,and the international system. Assumption 1:The Primacy of Societal Actors The fundamental actors in international politics are individuals and private groups, who are on the average rational and risk-averse and who organize exchange and collective action to promote differentiated interests under constraints imposed by material scarcity,conficting values,and variations in societal influence

516 International Organization Second, a theoretical restatement should be rigorous and coherent, offering a clear definition of its own boundaries. This restatement does so by demonstrating that institutionalist theories of regimes-commonly treated as liberal due to ideological and historical connotations-are in fact based on assumptions closer to realism than to liberalism. This helps to explain why IR theorists have found it difficult to distill a set of coherent microfoundational assumptions for liberal theory. Third, a theoretical restatement should demonstrate empirical accuracy vis-a-vis other theories; it should expose anomalies in existing work, forcing reconsideration of empirical findings and theoretical positions. This restatement of liberal theory meets this criterion by revealing sign$cant methodological biases in empirical evalu￾ations of realist theories of "relative gains-seeking" and constructivist analyses of ideas and IR due to the omission of liberal alternatives. If these biases were corrected, liberal accounts might well supplant many widely accepted realist and institutional￾ist, as well as constructivist, explanations of particular phenomena in world politics. Fourth, a theoretical restatement should demonstrate multicausal consistency. By specifying the antecedent conditions under which it is valid and the precise causal links to policy outcomes, a theory should specify rigorously how it can be synthe￾sized with other theories into a multicausal explanation consistent with tenets of fundamental social theory. This restatement does so by reversing the nearly universal presumption among contemporary IR theorists that "systemic" theories like realism and institutionalism should be employed as an analytical "first cut," with theories of "domestic" preference formation brought in only to explain anomalies-a prescrip￾tion that is both methodologically biased and theoretically incoherent. In its place, this restatement dictates the reverse: Liberal theory is analytically prior to both realism and institutionalism because it defines the conditions under which their assumptions hold. If this proposed reformulation of liberal IR theory meets these four criteria, as I argue it does, there is good reason to accord it a paradigmatic position empirically coequal with and analytically prior to realism and institutionalism, as well as construc￾tivism, in theory and research on world politics. Core Assumptions of Liberal IR Theory Liberal IR theory's fundamental premise-that the relationship between states and the surrounding domestic and transnational society in which they are embedded criti￾cally shapes state behavior by influencing the social purposes underlying state pref￾erences--can be restated in terms of three core assumptions. These assumptions are appropriate foundations of any social theory of IR: they specify the nature of societal actors, the state, and the international system. Assumption I: The Primacy of Societal Actors The fundamental actors in international politics are individuals and private groups, who are on the average rational and risk-averse and who organize exchange and collective action to promote differentiated interests under constraints imposed by material scarcity, conflicting values, and variations in societal influence

Liberal Theory of International Politics 517 Liberal theory rests on a"bottom-up"view of politics in which the demands of individuals and societal groups are treated as analytically prior to politics.Political action is embedded in domestic and transnational civil society,understood as an aggregation of boundedly rational individuals with differentiated tastes,social com- mitments,and resource endowments.Socially differentiated individuals define their material and ideational interests independently of politics and then advance those interests through political exchange and collective action.6 Individuals and groups are assumed to act rationally in pursuit of material and ideal welfare.7 For liberals,the definition of the interests of societal actors is theoretically central. Liberal theory rejects the utopian notion that an automatic harmony of interest exists among individuals and groups in society;scarcity and differentiation introduce an inevitable measure of competition.Where social incentives for exchange and collec- tive action are perceived to exist,individuals and groups exploit them:the greater the expected benefits,the stronger the incentive to act.In pursuing these goals,individu- als are on the average risk-averse;that is,they strongly defend existing investments but remain more cautious about assuming cost and risk in pursuit of new gains.What is true about people on the average,however,is not necessarily true in every case: some individuals in any given society may be risk-acceptant or irrational. Liberal theory seeks to generalize about the social conditions under which the behavior of self-interested actors converges toward cooperation or conflict.Conflict- ual societal demands and the willingness to employ coercion in pursuit of them are associated with a number of factors,three of which are relevant to this discussion: divergent fundamental beliefs,conflict over scarce material goods,and inequalities in political power.Deep,irreconcilable differences in beliefs about the provision of public goods,such as borders,culture,fundamental political institutions,and local social practices,promote conflict,whereas complementary beliefs promote harmony and cooperation.Extreme scarcity tends to exacerbate confict over resources by increasing the willingness of social actors to assume cost and risk to obtain them. Relative abundance,by contrast,lowers the propensity for conflict by providing the opportunity to satisfy wants without inevitable conflict and giving certain individuals and groups more to defend.Finally,where inequalities in societal influence are large, conflict is more likely.Where social power is equitably distributed,the costs and benefits of actions are more likely to be internalized to individuals-for example, through the existence of complex,cross-cutting patterns of mutually beneficial inter- action or strong and legitimate domestic political institutions-and the incentive for selective or arbitrary coercion is dampened.By contrast,where power asymmetries permit groups to evade the costs of redistributing goods,incentives arise for exploit- ative,rent-seeking behavior,even if the result is inefficient for society as a whole.8 6.This does not imply a "pre-social"conception of the individual unencumbered by nation,commu- nity,family,or other collective identities but only that these identities enter the political realm when individuals and groups engage in political exchange on the basis of them;see,for example,Coleman 1990. 7.Kant1991,44. 8.Milgrom and Roberts 1990,86-87

Liberal Theory of International Politics 517 Liberal theory rests on a "bottom-up" view of politics in which the demands of individuals and societal groups are treated as analytically prior to politics. Political action is embedded in domestic and transnational civil society, understood as an aggregation of boundedly rational individuals with differentiated tastes, social com￾mitments, and resource endowments. Socially differentiated individuals define their material and ideational interests independently of politics and then advance those interests through political exchange and collective a~tion.~ Individuals and groups are assumed to act rationally in pursuit of material and ideal welfare.' For liberals, the definition of the interests of societal actors is theoretically central. Liberal theory rejects the utopian notion that an automatic harmony of interest exists among individuals and groups in society; scarcity and differentiation introduce an inevitable measure of competition. Where social incentives for exchange and collec￾tive action are perceived to exist, individuals and groups exploit them: the greater the expected benefits, the stronger the incentive to act. In pursuing these goals, individu￾als are on the average risk-averse; that is, they strongly defend existing investments but remain more cautious about assuming cost and risk in pursuit of new gains. What is true about people on the average, however, is not necessarily true in every case: some individuals in any given society may be risk-acceptant or irrational. Liberal theory seeks to generalize about the social conditions under which the behavior of self-interested actors converges toward cooperation or conflict. Conflict￾ual societal demands and the willingness to employ coercion in pursuit of them are associated with a number of factors, three of which are relevant to this discussion: divergent fundamental beliefs, conflict over scarce material goods, and inequalities in political power. Deep, irreconcilable differences in beliefs about the provision of public goods, such as borders, culture, fundamental political institutions, and local social practices, promote conflict, whereas complementary beliefs promote harmony and cooperation. Extreme scarcity tends to exacerbate conflict over resources by increasing the willingness of social actors to assume cost and risk to obtain them. Relative abundance, by contrast, lowers the propensity for conflict by providing the opportunity to satisfy wants without inevitable conflict and giving certain individuals and groups more to defend. Finally, where inequalities in societal influence are large, conflict is more likely. Where social power is equitably distributed, the costs and benefits of actions are more likely to be internalized to individuals-for example, through the existence of complex, cross-cutting patterns of mutually beneficial inter￾action or strong and legitimate domestic political institutions-and the incentive for selective or arbitrary coercion is dampened. By contrast, where power asymmetries permit groups to evade the costs of redistributing goods, incentives arise for exploit￾ative, rent-seeking behavior, even if the result is inefficient for society as a whole. 6. This does not imply a "pre-social" conception of the individual unencumbered by nation, commu￾nity, family, or other collective identities but only that these identities enter the political realm when individuals and groups engage in political exchange on the basis of them; see, for example, Coleman 1990. 7. Kant 1991,44. 8. Milgrom and Roberts 1990, 86-87

518 International Organization Assumption 2:Representation and State Preferences States (or other political institutions)represent some subset of domestic society,on the basis of whose interests state officials define state preferences and act purpo- sively in world politics. In the liberal conception of domestic politics,the state is not an actor but a repre- sentative institution constantly subject to capture and recapture,construction and reconstruction by coalitions of social actors.Representative institutions and practices constitute the critical"transmission belt"by which the preferences and social power of individuals and groups are translated into state policy.Individuals turn to the state to achieve goals that private behavior is unable to achieve efficiently.9 Government policy is therefore constrained by the underlying identities,interests,and power of individuals and groups (inside and outside the state apparatus)who constantly pres- sure the central decision makers to pursue policies consistent with their preferences. This is not to adopt a narrowly pluralist view of domestic politics in which all individuals and groups have equal influence on state policy,nor one in which the structure of state institutions is irrelevant.No government rests on universal or unbi- ased political representation;every government represents some individuals and groups more fully than others.In an extreme hypothetical case,representation might empower a narrow bureaucratic class or even a single tyrannical individual,such as an ideal-typical Pol Pot or Josef Stalin.Between theoretical extremes of tyranny and democracy,many representative institutions and practices exist,each of which privi- leges particular demands;hence the nature of state institutions,alongside societal interests themselves,is a key determinant of what states do internationally. Representation,in the liberal view,is not simply a formal attribute of state institu- tions but includes other stable characteristics of the political process,formal or infor- mal,that privilege particular societal interests.Clientalistic authoritarian regimes may distinguish those with familial,bureaucratic,or economic ties to the governing elite from those without.Even where government institutions are formally fair and open,a relatively inegalitarian distribution of property,risk,information,or organi- zational capabilities may create social or economic monopolies able to dominate policy.Similarly,the way in which a state recognizes individual rights may shape opportunities for voice.10 Certain domestic representational processes may tend to select as leaders individuals,groups,and bureaucracies socialized with particular attitudes toward information,risk,and loss.Finally,cost-effective exit options,such as emigration,noncompliance,or the transfer of assets to new jurisdictions or uses, insofar as they constrain governments,may be thought of as substitutes for formal representation.1I 9.Representative political institutions and practices result from prior contracts and can generally be taken for granted in explaining foreign policy;but where the primary interests and allegiances of indi- viduals and private groups are transferred to subnational or supranational institutions empowered to repre- sent them effectively,a liberal analysis would naturally shift to these levels. 10.Doyle1997,251-300. 11.North and Thomas 1973,87

518 International Organization Assumption 2: Representation and State Preferences States (or other political institutions) represent some subset of domestic society, on the basis of whose interests state offzcials dejne state preferences and act purpo￾sively in world politics. In the liberal conception of domestic politics, the state is not an actor but a repre￾sentative institution constantly subject to capture and recapture, construction and reconstruction by coalitions of social actors. Representative institutions and practices constitute the critical "transmission belt" by which the preferences and social power of individuals and groups are translated into state policy. Individuals turn to the state to achieve goals that private behavior is unable to achieve effi~iently.~ Government policy is therefore constrained by the underlying identities, interests, and power of individuals and groups (inside and outside the state apparatus) who constantly pres￾sure the central decision makers to pursue policies consistent with their preferences. This is not to adopt a narrowly pluralist view of domestic politics in which all individuals and groups have equal influence on state policy, nor one in which the structure of state institutions is irrelevant. No government rests on universal or unbi￾ased political representation; every government represents some individuals and groups more fully than others. In an extreme hypothetical case, representation might empower a narrow bureaucratic class or even a single tyrannical individual, such as an ideal-typical Pol Pot or Josef Stalin. Between theoretical extremes of tyranny and democracy, many representative institutions and practices exist, each of which privi￾leges particular demands; hence the nature of state institutions, alongside societal interests themselves, is a key determinant of what states do internationally. Representation, in the liberal view, is not simply a formal attribute of state institu￾tions but includes other stable characteristics of the political process, formal or infor￾mal, that privilege particular societal interests. Clientalistic authoritarian regimes may distinguish those with familial, bureaucratic, or economic ties to the governing elite from those without. Even where government institutions are formally fair and open, a relatively inegalitarian distribution of property, risk, information, or organi￾zational capabilities may create social or economic monopolies able to dominate policy. Similarly, the way in which a state recognizes individual rights may shape opportunities for voice.1° Certain domestic representational processes may tend to select as leaders individuals, groups, and bureaucracies socialized with particular attitudes toward information, risk, and loss. Finally, cost-effective exit options, such as emigration, noncompliance, or the transfer of assets to new jurisdictions or uses, insofar as they constrain governments, may be thought of as substitutes for formal representation. '' 9. Representative political institutions and practices result from prior contracts and can generally be taken for granted in explaining foreign policy; but where the primary interests and allegiances of indi￾viduals and private groups are transferred to subnational or supranational institutions empowered to repre￾sent them effectively, a liberal analysis would naturally shift to these levels. 10. Doyle 1997,251-300. 11. North and Thomas 1973,87

Liberal Theory of International Politics 519 Societal pressures transmitted by representative institutions and practices alter"state preferences."This term designates an ordering among underlying substantive out- comes that may result from international political interaction.Here it is essential- particularly given the inconsistency of common usage-to avoid conceptual confu- sion by keeping state“preferences”distinct from national“strategies,.”“tactics,” and "policies,"that is,the particular transient bargaining positions,negotiating de- mands,or policy goals that constitute the everyday currency of foreign policy.State preferences,as the concept is employed here,comprise a set of fundamental interests defined across "states of the world."Preferences are by definition causally indepen- dent of the strategies of other actors and,therefore,prior to specific interstate politi- cal interactions,including external threats,incentives,manipulation of information, or other tactics.By contrast,strategies and tactics-sometimes also termed "prefer- ences"in game-theoretical analyses-are policy options defined across intermediate political aims,as when governments declare an "interest"in "maintaining the bal- ance of power,,”“containing'or“appeasing'an adversary,.or exercising“global leadership."12 Liberal theory focuses on the consequences for state behavior of shifts in fundamental preferences,not shifts in the strategic circumstances under which states pursue them. Representative institutions and practices determine not merely which social coali- tions are represented in foreign policy,but how they are represented.Two distinc- tions are critical.First,states may act in either a unitary or "disaggregated"way.In many traditional areas of foreign policy,"politics stops at the water's edge,"and there is strong coordination among national officials and politicians.In other areas, the state may be"disaggregated,"with different elements-executives,courts,cen- tral banks,regulatory bureaucracies,and ruling parties,for example-conducting semiautonomous foreign policies in the service of disparate societal interests.13 Sec- ond,domestic decision making may be structured so as to generate state preferences that satisfy a strong rationality condition,such as transitivity or strict expected utility maximization,or so as to satisfy only the weaker rationality criterion of seeking efficient means.Recently,formal theorists have derived specific conditions under which nonunitary state behavior can be analyzed"as if"it were unitary and rational, implying that much superficially "nonrational"or "nonunitary"behavior should actually be understood in terms of shifting state preferences.4 Taken together,assumptions 1 and 2 imply that states do not automatically maxi- mize fixed,homogeneous conceptions of security,sovereignty,or wealth per se,as realists and institutionalists tend to assume.Instead they are,in Waltzian terms,"func- tionally differentiated";that is,they pursue particular interpretations and combina- tions of security,welfare,and sovereignty preferred by powerful domestic groups 12.The phrase "country A changed its preferences in response to an action by country B"is thus a misuse of the term as defined here,implying less than consistently rational behavior;see Sebenius 1991, 207. 13.See Slaughter 1995;and Keohane and Nye 1971. 14.Achen1995

Liberal Theory of International Politics 519 Societal pressures transmitted by representative institutions and practices alter "state preferences." This term designates an ordering among underlying substantive out￾comes that may result from international political interaction. Here it is essential￾particularly given the inconsistency of common usage-to avoid conceptual confu￾sion by keeping state "preferences" distinct from national "strategies," "tactics," and "policies," that is, the particular transient bargaining positions, negotiating de￾mands, or policy goals that constitute the everyday currency of foreign policy. State preferences, as the concept is employed here, comprise a set of fundamental interests defined across "states of the world." Preferences are by definition causally indepen￾dent of the strategies of other actors and, therefore, prior to specific interstate politi￾cal interactions, including external threats, incentives, manipulation of information, or other tactics. By contrast, strategies and tactics-sometimes also termed "prefer￾ences" in game-theoretical analyses-are policy options defined across intermediate political aims, as when governments declare an "interest" in "maintaining the bal￾ance of power," "containing" or "appeasing" an adversary, or exercising "global leadership."12 Liberal theory focuses on the consequences for state behavior of shifts in fundamental preferences, not shifts in the strategic circumstances under which states pursue them. Representative institutions and practices determine not merely which social coali￾tions are represented in foreign policy, but how they are represented. Two distinc￾tions are critical. First, states may act in either a unitary or "disaggregated" way. In many traditional areas of foreign policy, "politics stops at the water's edge," and there is strong coordination among national officials and politicians. In other areas, the state may be "disaggregated," with different elements-executives, courts, cen￾tral banks, regulatory bureaucracies, and ruling parties, for example-conducting semiautonomous foreign policies in the service of disparate societal interests.I3 Sec￾ond, domestic decision making may be structured so as to generate state preferences that satisfy a strong rationality condition, such as transitivity or strict expected utility maximization, or so as to satisfy only the weaker rationality criterion of seeking efficient means. Recently, formal theorists have derived specific conditions under which nonunitary state behavior can be analyzed "as if" it were unitary and rational, implying that much superficially "nonrational" or "nonunitary" behavior should actually be understood in terms of shifting state preferences. l4 Taken together, assumptions 1 and 2 imply that states do not automatically maxi￾mize fixed, homogeneous conceptions of security, sovereignty, or wealth per se, as realists and institutionalists tend to assume. Instead they are, in Waltzian terms, "func￾tionally differentiated"; that is, they pursue particular interpretations and combina￾tions of security, welfare, and sovereignty preferred by powerful domestic groups 12. The phrase "country A changed its preferences in response to an action by country B" is thus a misuse of the term as defined here, implying less than consistently rational behavior; see Sebenius 1991, 207. 13. See Slaughter 1995; and Keohane and Nye 1971. 14. Achen 1995

520 International Organization enfranchised by representative institutions and practices.15 As Arnold Wolfers,John Ruggie,and others have observed,the nature and intensity of national support for any state purpose-even apparently fundamental concerns like the defense of politi- cal and legal sovereignty,territorial integrity,national security,or economic welfare- varies decisively with the social context.16 It is not uncommon for states knowingly to surrender sovereignty,compromise security,or reduce aggregate economic wel- fare.In the liberal view,trade-offs among such goals,as well as cross-national differ- ences in their definition,are inevitable,highly varied,and causally consequential.7 Assumption 3:Interdependence and the International System The configuration of interdependent state preferences determines state behavior. For liberals,state behavior reflects varying patterns of state preferences.States require a"purpose,"a perceived underlying stake in the matter at hand,in order to provoke conflict,propose cooperation,or take any other significant foreign policy action.The precise nature of these stakes drives policy.This is not to assert that each state simply pursues its ideal policy,oblivious of others;instead,each state seeks to realize its distinctive preferences under varying constraints imposed by the prefer- ences of other states.Thus liberal theory rejects not just the realist assumption that state preferences must be treated as if naturally conflictual,but equally the institution- alist assumption that they should be treated as if they were partially convergent, compromising a collective action problem.18 To the contrary,liberals causally privi- lege variation in the configuration of state preferences,while treating configurations of capabilities and information as if they were either fixed constraints or endogenous to state preferences. The critical theoretical link between state preferences,on the one hand,and the behavior of one or more states,on the other,is provided by the concept of policy interdependence.Policy interdependence is defined here as the set of costs and ben- efits created for foreign societies when dominant social groups in a society seek to realize their preferences,that is,the pattern of transnational externalities resulting from attempts to pursue national distinctive purposes.Liberal theory assumes that the pattern of interdependent state preferences imposes a binding constraint on state behavior. Patterns of interdependence or externalities induced by efforts to realize state pref- erences can be divided into three broad categories,corresponding to the strategic situation (the pattern of policy externalities)that results.19 Where preferences are naturally compatible or harmonious,that is,where the externalities of unilateral poli- 15.Ruggie1983,265. 16.Ruggie1982,1983 17.On the contradictions within Waltz's effort to avoid these ambiguities,see Baldwin 1997,21-22. 18.Keohane 1984,10;1986,193.Note that these are all "as if"assumptions.The world must be consistent with them,but need not fulfill them precisely. 19.See Stein 1982:Snidal 1985;and Martin 1992

520 International Organization enfranchised by representative institutions and practices.15 As Arnold Wolfers, John Ruggie, and others have observed, the nature and intensity of national support for any state purpose--even apparently fundamental concerns like the defense of politi￾cal and legal sovereignty, territorial integrity, national security, or economic welfare￾varies decisively with the social context.16 It is not uncommon for states knowingly to surrender sovereignty, compromise security, or reduce aggregate economic wel￾fare. In the liberal view, trade-offs among such goals, as well as cross-national differ￾ences in their definition, are inevitable, highly varied, and causally ~onsequential.'~ Assumption 3: Interdependence and the International System The configuration of interdependent state preferences determines state behavior: For liberals, state behavior reflects varying patterns of state preferences. States require a "purpose," a perceived underlying stake in the matter at hand, in order to provoke conflict, propose cooperation, or take any other significant foreign policy action. The precise nature of these stakes drives policy. This is not to assert that each state simply pursues its ideal policy, oblivious of others; instead, each state seeks to realize its distinctive preferences under varying constraints imposed by the prefer￾ences of other states. Thus liberal theory rejects not just the realist assumption that state preferences must be treated as if naturally conflictual, but equally the institution￾alist assumption that they should be treated as if they were partially convergent, compromising a collective action problem.l8 To the contrary, liberals causally privi￾lege variation in the configuration of state preferences, while treating configurations of capabilities and information as if they were either fixed constraints or endogenous to state preferences. The critical theoretical link between state preferences, on the one hand, and the behavior of one or more states, on the other, is provided by the concept of policy interdependence. Policy interdependence is defined here as the set of costs and ben￾efits created for foreign societies when dominant social groups in a society seek to realize their preferences, that is, the pattern of transnational externalities resulting from attempts to pursue national distinctive purposes. Liberal theory assumes that the pattern of interdependent state preferences imposes a binding constraint on state behavior. Patterns of interdependence or externalities induced by efforts to realize state pref￾erences can be divided into three broad categories, corresponding to the strategic situation (the pattern of policy externalities) that results.19 Where preferences are naturally compatible or harmonious, that is, where the externalities of unilateral poli- 15. Ruggie 1983,265. 16. Ruggie 1982, 1983. 17. On the contradictions within Waltz's effort to avoid these ambiguities, see Baldwin 1997, 21-22. 18. Keohane 1984, 10; 1986, 193. Note that these are all "as if" assumptions. The world must be consistent with them, but need not fulfill them precisely. 19. See Stein 1982;Snidal 1985; and Martin 1992

Liberal Theory of International Politics 521 cies are optimal for others (or insignificant),there are strong incentives for coexist- ence with low conflict. Where,by contrast,underlying state preferences are zero-sum or deadlocked,that is,where an attempt by dominant social groups in one country to realize their prefer- ences through state action necessarily imposes costs(negative externalities)on domi- nant social groups in other countries,governments face a bargaining game with few mutual gains and a high potential for interstate tension and conflict.The decisive precondition for costly attempts at coercion,for example,is neither a particular con- figuration of power,as realists assert,nor of uncertainty,as institutionalists maintain, but a configuration of preferences conflictual enough to motivate willingness to ac- cept high cost and risk.20 In other words,intense conflict requires that an aggressor or revisionist state advance demands to which other states are unwilling to submit. Revisionist preferences-underlying,socially grounded interests in revising the sta- tus quo-are distinct from revisionist "strategies,"that is,a need to alter the status quo to protect enduring interests under new strategic circumstances.Liberals focus on the former,realists (and institutionalists)on the latter.Hence while both theories predict security confict,they do so under different circumstances.For example,in- creased military spending in response to an adversary's arms buildup is a change in strategy with fixed preferences consistent with realism;increased spending initiated by a new ruling elite ideologically committed to territorial aggrandizement is a pref- erence-induced change in strategy consistent with liberalism.21 Where,finally,motives are mixed such that an exchange of policy concessions through coordination or precommitment can improve the welfare of both parties relative to unilateral policy adjustment(i.e.,a collective action problem),states have an incentive to negotiate policy coordination.Games like coordination,assurance, prisoner's dilemma,and suasion have distinctive dynamics,as well as impose pre- cise costs,benefits,and risks on the parties.Within each qualitative category,incen- tives vary further according to the intensity of preferences. For liberals,the form,substance,and depth of cooperation depends directly on the nature of these patterns of preferences.Hence where "Pareto-inefficient"'outcomes are observed-trade protection is a commonly cited example-liberals turn first to countervailing social preferences and unresolved domestic and transnational distribu- tional conflicts,whereas institutionalists and realists,respectively,turn to uncertainty and particular configurations of interstate power.22 Liberal Theory as Systemic Theory These liberal assumptions,in particular the third-in essence,"what states want is the primary determinant of what they do"'-may seem commonsensical,even tauto- logical.Yet mainstream IR theory has uniformly rejected such claims for the past 20.Note that some rationalist analyses dismiss such risk-acceptant preferences as "irrational";see Fearon 1995. 21.For example,Van Evera 1990-91,32. 22.Grieco's study of NTB regulation is discussed later

Liberal Theory of International Politics 521 cies are optimal for others (or insignificant), there are strong incentives for coexist￾ence with low conflict. Where, by contrast, underlying state preferences are zero-sum or deadlocked, that is, where an attempt by dominant social groups in one country to realize their prefer￾ences through state action necessarily imposes costs (negative externalities) on domi￾nant social groups in other countries, governments face a bargaining game with few mutual gains and a high potential for interstate tension and conflict. The decisive precondition for costly attempts at coercion, for example, is neither a particular con￾figuration of power, as realists assert, nor of uncertainty, as institutionalists maintain, but a configuration of preferences conflictual enough to motivate willingness to ac￾cept high cost and risk.20 In other words, intense conflict requires that an aggressor or revisionist state advance demands to which other states are unwilling to submit. Revisionist preferences-underlying, socially grounded interests in revising the sta￾tus quo-are distinct from revisionist "strategies," that is, a need to alter the status quo to protect enduring interests under new strategic circumstances. Liberals focus on the former, realists (and institutionalists) on the latter. Hence while both theories predict security conflict, they do so under different circumstances. For example, in￾creased military spending in response to an adversary's arms buildup is a change in strategy with fixed preferences consistent with realism; increased spending initiated by a new ruling elite ideologically committed to territorial aggrandizement is a pref￾erence-induced change in strategy consistent with liberali~m.~' Where, finally, motives are mixed such that an exchange of policy concessions through coordination or precommitment can improve the welfare of both parties relative to unilateral policy adjustment (i.e., a collective action problem), states have an incentive to negotiate policy coordination. Games like coordination, assurance, prisoner's dilemma, and suasion have distinctive dynamics, as well as impose pre￾cise costs, benefits, and risks on the parties. Within each qualitative category, incen￾tives vary further according to the intensity of preferences. For liberals, the form, substance, and depth of cooperation depends directly on the nature of these patterns of preferences. Hence where "Pareto-inefficient" outcomes are observed-trade protection is a commonly cited example-liberals turn first to countervailing social preferences and unresolved domestic and transnational distribu￾tional conflicts, whereas institutionalists and realists, respectively, turn to uncertainty and particular configurations of interstate power.22 Liberal Theory as Systemic Theory These liberal assumptions, in particular the third-in essence, "what states want is the primary determinant of what they do"-may seem commonsensical, even tauto￾logical. Yet mainstream IR theory has uniformly rejected such claims for the past 20. Note that some rationalist analyses dismiss such risk-acceptant preferences as "irrational"; see Fearon 1995. 21. For example, Van Evera 199G91,32. 22. Grieco's study of NTB regulation is discussed later