《国际政治经济学》文献资料（Realism and Liberalism in Political Economy）Do Relative Gains Matter

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Do Relative Gains Michael Mastanduno Matter? America's Response to Japanese Industrial Policy For the United States, which future world is preferable:one in which the U.S.economy grows at 25 percent over the next decade,while the Japanese economy grows at 75 percent,or one in which the U.S.grows at only 10 percent,while that of Japan grows 10.3 percent?Robert Reich of Harvard's John F.Kennedy School posed that choice in 1990 in a series of meetings with graduate students, U.S.corporate executives,investment bankers,citizens of Massachusetts, senior State Department officials,and professional economists.A majority of every group,with one exception,expressed a preference for the latter outcome.The economists unanimously chose the former,and,Reich reports, were surprised that other Americans would voluntarily forgo fifteen per- centage points of economic growth in the interest of hampering the progress of one of America's principal trade and financial partners.1 While Reich may have biased the results somewhat by projecting Japanese growth at three times the rate of that of the United States,the overall results of his informal survey are consistent with the findings of other recent sam- plings of American attitudes.A Wall Street Journal/NBC News poll taken in July 1990 found that an overwhelming majority (86 percent)of Americans would prefer a policy of slower growth in both Japan and the United States, I would like to thank Andrew Moravcsik,Richard Samuels,David Lake,Robert Art,Louis Pauly, Joseph Grieco,Robert Jervis,Michael Hawes,Robert Wolfe,and Richard P.Suttmeier for their comments and suggestions.Robert Martinage provided valuable research assistance.I also benefited from discussions of this paper at the 1990 Meeting of the American Political Science Association,at a Queen's University Conference on "Japan,the United States and Canada:The Political Economy of Systems Change,"and at an International Political Economy Seminar at Columbia University.During 1989,I served as a Council of Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow in the Office of the United States Trade Representative.I wish to express my gratitude to officials in that agency,especially Ambassadors Carla A.Hills and S.Linn Williams, and Assistant United States Trade Representatives Joseph A.Massey and James M.Murphy, for providing me with the opportunity to participate in the U.S.policy process and in negotia- tions with the European Community and Japan. Michael Mastanduno is an Assistant Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. 1.Robert Reich,"Do We Want U.S.to Be Rich Or Japan Poor?"Wall Street Journal,June 18, 1990,P.A10. International Security,Summer 1991 (Vol.16,No.1) 1991 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 73

DORelafive Gains 1 Michael Mastanduno Matter? ( America's Response to Japanese Industrial Policy I For the United States, which future world is preferable: one in which the U.S. economy grows at 25 percent over the next decade, while the Japanese economy grows at 75 percent, or one in which the U.S. grows at only 10 percent, while that of Japan grows 10.3 percent? Robert Reich of Harvard's John F. Kennedy School posed that choice in 1990 in a series of meetings with graduate students, U.S. corporate executives, investment bankers, citizens of Massachusetts, senior State Department officials, and professional economists. A majority of every group, with one exception, expressed a preference for the latter outcome. The economists unanimously chose the former, and, Reich reports, were surprised that other Americans would voluntarily forgo fifteen percentage points of economic growth in the interest of hampering the progress of one of America's principal trade and financial partners.' While Reich may have biased the results somewhat by projecting Japanese growth at three times the rate of that of the United States, the overall results of his informal survey are consistent with the findings of other recent samplings of American attitudes. A Wall Street JournallNBC News poll taken in July 1990 found that an overwhelming majority (86 percent) of Americans would prefer a policy of slower growth in both Japan and the United States, I would like to thank Andrew Moravcsik, Richard Samuels, David Lake, Robert Art, Louis Pauly, Joseph Grieco, Robert Jervis, Michael Hawes, Robert Wolfe, and Richard P. Suttmeier for their comments and suggestions. Robert Martinage provided valuable research assistance. I also benefited from discussions of this paper at the 1990 Meeting of the American Political Science Association, at a Queen's University Conference on "Japan, the United States and Canada: The Political Economy of Systems Change," and at an International Political Economy Seminar at Columbia University. During 1989, I served as a Council of Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow in the Office of the United States Trade Representative. I wish to express my gratitude to officials in that agency, especially Ambassadors Carla A. Hills and S. Linn Williams, and Assistant United States Trade Representatives Joseph A. Massey and James M. Murphy, for providing me with the opportunity to participate in the U.S. policy process and in negotiations with the European Community and Japan. Michael Mastanduno is an Assistant Professor of Government at Dartmouth College 1. Robert Reich, "Do We Want U.S. to Be Rich Or Japan Poor?" Wall Street Journal, June 18, 1990, p. A10. I~~ter~~ntio~tal Security, Summer 1991 (Vol. 16, No. 1) 01991 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

International Security 16:174 over one in which both grew faster,if the latter meant allowing Japan to take the lead economically.A New York Times poll conducted at about the same time found Americans believing that Japan would be the number one eco- nomic power in the world in the next century,and,by a substantial margin, that Japanese economic power posed a greater threat to American security than did the military power of the Soviet Union.2 These surveys suggest,among other things,that a significant part of the American public is concerned about relative gains,or relative position,in the country's economic relationship with Japan.Americans are concerned that even if both countries prosper from their relationship,Japan may grow faster than the United States,acquire a greater share of world markets and financial assets,or dominate the United States in the development and application of advanced technology.Over the long run,such developments could pose a threat to America's economic welfare,political autonomy,and perhaps even to its military security.As Reich notes,such concerns are the dark side of the U.S.-Japanese relationship-infrequently discussed,yet ever-present in the thinking of Americans,and perhaps of Japanese as well. This article addresses how much the U.S.government shares these con- cerns,and the extent to which they are reflected in American economic policy toward Japan.Do "relative gains concerns"-concerns that economic inter- action with Japan,while mutually beneficial,may benefit Japan more than the United States and thereby pose a threat to American national security, broadly defined-have a significant influence on official U.S.thinking and policy?If so,why,in what ways,and under which circumstances?Are such concerns spread uniformly,or are they concentrated within certain executive agencies?Do they reflect anxiety over economic welfare,political autonomy, or military security? I seek to answer these questions by examining America's response during the late 1980s to Japanese industrial policy in three areas-aircraft,satellites, and high-definition television (HDTV).My overall finding is that relative gains concerns do matter significantly,but not unconditionally.A sensitivity 2.Urban C.Lehner and Alan Murray,"Will the U.S.Find the Resolve to Meet the Japanese Challenge?"Wall Street Journal,July 2,1990,p.A1;and Michael Oreskes,"Americans Express Worry on Japan,As Feelings in Tokyo Seem to Soften,"New York Times,July 10,1990,p.A11. The latter reported that by a margin of 58 percent to 26 percent,Americans viewed the economic power of Japan as a greater threat to American security than the military power of the Soviet Union

International Security 16:1 1 74 over one in which both grew faster, if the latter meant allowing Japan to take the lead economically. A New York Times poll conducted at about the same time found Americans believing that Japan would be the number one economic power in the world in the next century, and, by a substantial margin, that Japanese economic power posed a greater threat to American security than did the military power of the Soviet Uni~n.~ These surveys suggest, among other things, that a significant part of the American public is concerned about relative gains, or relative position, in the country's economic relationship with Japan. Americans are concerned that even if both countries prosper from their relationship, Japan may grow faster than the United States, acquire a greater share of world markets and financial assets, or dominate the United States in the development and application of advanced technology. Over the long run, such developments could pose a threat to America's economic welfare, political autonomy, and perhaps even to its military security. As Reich notes, such concerns are the dark side of the U.S.-Japanese relationship-infrequently discussed, yet ever-present in the thinking of Americans, and perhaps of Japanese as well. This article addresses how much the U.S. government shares these concerns, and the extent to which they are reflected in American economic policy toward Japan. Do "relative gains concernsu-concerns that economic interaction with Japan, while mutually beneficial, may benefit Japan more than the United States and thereby pose a threat to American national security, broadly defined-have a significant influence on official U.S. thinking and policy? If so, why, in what ways, and under which circumstances? Are such concerns spread uniformly, or are they concentrated within certain executive agencies? Do they reflect anxiety over economic welfare, political autonomy, or military security? I seek to answer these questions by examining America's response during the late 1980s to Japanese industrial policy in three areas-aircraft, satellites, and high-definition television (HDTV). My overall finding is that relative gains concerns do matter significantly, but not unconditionally. A sensitivity 2. Urban C. Lehner and Alan Murray, "Will the U.S. Find the Resolve to Meet the Japanese Challenge?" Wall Street Journal, July 2, 1990, p. Al; and Michael Oreskes, "Americans Express Worry on Japan, As Feelings in Tokyo Seem to Soften," New York Times, July 10, 1990, p. All. The latter reported that by a margin of 58 percent to 26 percent, Americans viewed the economic power of Japan as a greater threat to American security than the military power of the Soviet Union

Do Relative Gains Matter?75 to such concerns was strongly evident in the U.S.policy process in each of the three cases,and reflected primarily anxiety over U.S.economic welfare. Policy outcomes,however,varied.In one case-satellites-U.S.officials adopted a controversial policy initiative that reflected relative gains consid- erations fully and unambiguously.In a second case-aircraft-relative gains concerns compelled U.S.officials to undertake,at considerable diplomatic cost,a major policy change,involving the reconsideration of a defense pro- duction agreement with Japan.Once the United States reconsidered,how- ever,relative gains concerns were not decisive in shaping its final policy.In the third case-HDTV-relative gains concerns were apparent yet affected U.S.policy only modestly,if at all. My explanation for this pattern is lodged at the intersection of international and domestic levels of analysis.International structural changes-the relative decline of U.S.economic power,the concomitant rise of that of Japan,and the diminution of the Soviet military threat-account for the increasing sen- sitivity of the United States to relative gains considerations during the latter half of the 1980s.In the absence of such changes,it is inconceivable that relative gains concerns or the policies associated with them would have emerged as prominently as they did in the formulation of U.S.policy toward Japan.U.S.officials,however,were deeply divided over the utility and desirability of a relative gains strategy.Officials at the Commerce Department and to a lesser extent at the Office of the U.S.Trade Representative(USTR) were sympathetic;those at the State and Defense Departments and at the Council of Economic Advisors(CEA)were largely skeptical.These prefer- ences reflected primarily the institutional missions of their respective agen- cies.Given these divisions,a struggle over policy emerged in each of the three areas under investigation.The outcomes of those struggles,and thus the extent to which relative gains concerns were ultimately translated into policy,were shaped by domestic factors,in particular ideology and the institutional setting within which the policy struggles took place. The next section of this article places the concern over relative gains in the context of American foreign policy and international relations theory.The following three sections examine,respectively,the FSX fighter aircraft con- troversy,the decision to identify Japanese satellite practices as a "Super 301" target under the 1988 trade act,and the dispute over whether to provide U.S.government support for HDTV.A concluding section summarizes the argument and explores its analytical and policy implications

Do Relative Gains Matter? 1 75 to such concerns was strongly evident in the U.S. policy process in each of the three cases, and reflected primarily anxiety over U.S. economic welfare. Policy outcomes, however, varied. In one case-satellites-U.S. officials adopted a controversial policy initiative that reflected relative gains considerations fully and unambiguously. In a second case-aircraft-relative gains concerns compelled U.S. officials to undertake, at considerable diplomatic cost, a major policy change, involving the reconsideration of a defense production agreement with Japan. Once the United States reconsidered, however, relative gains concerns were not decisive in shaping its final policy. In the third case-HDTV-relative gains concerns were apparent yet affected U.S. policy only modestly, if at all. My explanation for this pattern is lodged at the intersection of international and domestic levels of analysis. International structural changes-the relative decline of U.S. economic power, the concomitant rise of that of Japan, and the diminution of the Soviet military threat-account for the increasing sensitivity of the United States to relative gains considerations during the latter half of the 1980s. In the absence of such changes, it is inconceivable that relative gains concerns or the policies associated with them would have emerged as prominently as they did in the formulation of U.S. policy toward Japan. U.S. officials, however, were deeply divided over the utility and desirability of a relative gains strategy. Officials at the Commerce Department and to a lesser extent at the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) were sympathetic; those at the State and Defense Departments and at the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA) were largely skeptical. These preferences reflected primarily the institutional missions of their respective agencies. Given these divisions, a struggle over policy emerged in each of the three areas under investigation. The outcomes of those struggles, and thus the extent to which relative gains concerns were ultimately translated into policy, were shaped by domestic factors, in particular ideology and the institutional setting within which the policy struggles took place. The next section of this article places the concern over relative gains in the context of American foreign policy and international relations theory. The following three sections examine, respectively, the FSX fighter aircraft controversy, the decision to identify Japanese satellite practices as a "Super 301" target under the 1988 trade act, and the dispute over whether to provide U.S. government support for HDTV. A concluding section summarizes the argument and explores its analytical and policy implications

International Security 16:1 76 Relative Gains,Realism,and American Foreign Policy The question of America's sensitivity to relative gains considerations is rel- evant to both American foreign policy and international relations theory.The policy significance stems from the fact that over the past several years,a debate has emerged within the United States over how to deal with the growing economic power of Japan,pitting "traditionalists"against"revision- ists."Although it is not generally characterized as such,the fundamental cleavage between the two schools involves whether U.S.policy-makers should think and act in terms of relative gains. Traditionalists believe that to focus on the pursuit of relative gains is at best misguided,and at worst,potentially destructive to the U.S.-Japan rela- tionship.3 It is misguided because both the United States and Japan benefit a great deal in absolute terms from their economic interaction,and their growing interdependence assures that neither side can effectively exploit the economic relationship to take advantage of the other politically.As Raymond Vernon has recently argued,in economic terms each country "has a hand on the other's throat,"and for either to threaten the other would be tanta- mount to threatening a nuclear first strike.4 Relative gains calculations can be destructive,to the extent that they lead to or reinforce the twin evils of protectionism and nationalism.A U.S.protectionist strategy-designed,per- haps,to slow the economic growth or technological progress of Japan- would be damaging in and of itself,and also could lead to a trade and investment war,which would leave both sides even worse off.Moreover,by casting the relationship in terms of a competition for relative gains,U.S. officials would risk inciting nationalist fervor,as America's "Japan bashers" and Japan's "America bashers"reinforced each other's worst tendencies.5 3.See,for example,I.M.Destler and Michael Nacht,"Beyond Mutual Recrimination:Building a Solid U.S.-Japan Relationship in the 1990s,"International Security,Vol.15,No.3(Winter 1990/ 91),pp.92-119;Philip Tresize,"Japan,the Enemy?"The Brookings Review (Winter 1989/90) Pp.3-13;Kan Ito,"Trans-Pacific Anger,"Foreign Policy,No.78(Spring 1990),pp.131-52;David Brock,"The Theory and Practice of Japan-Bashing,"The National Interest,No.17 (Fall 1989), Pp.17-28;Alan Romberg,"U.S.-Japan Relations:A Partnership in Search of Definition,"Critical Issues 1988-1 (New York:Council on Foreign Relations,1988);and George R.Packard,"The Coming U.S.-Japan Crisis,"Foreign Affairs,Vol.66,No.2 (Winter 87-88),pp.348-367. 4.Raymond Vernon,"On Glass Houses and Japan-Bashing,New York Times,June 21,1989,p. A25.Vernon refers,presumably,to a situation of mutual assured destruction in which strike and retaliation would devastate both. 5.American revisionists are frequently accused of "Japan-bashing"by their critics.The most celebrated example of Japanese "America-bashing"is Akio Morita and Shintaro Ishihara,The Japan That Can Say No:The New UI.S.-Japan Relations Card(Kobunsha:Kappa-Holmes,1989),an unofficial English translation of which circulated widely in Washington during 1989 and 1990

International Security 16:1 1 76 Relative Gains, Realism, and American Foreign Policy The question of America's sensitivity to relative gains considerations is relevant to both American foreign policy and international relations theory. The policy significance stems from the fact that over the past several years, a debate has emerged within the United States over how to deal with the growing economic power of Japan, pitting "traditionalists" against "revisionists." Although it is not generally characterized as such, the fundamental cleavage between the two schools involves whether U.S. policy-makers should think and act in terms of relative gains. Traditionalists believe that to focus on the pursuit of relative gains is at best misguided, and at worst, potentially destructive to the U.S.-Japan relati~nship.~It is misguided because both the United States and Japan benefit a great deal in absolute terms from their economic interaction, and their growing interdependence assures that neither side can effectively exploit the economic relationship to take advantage of the other politically. As Raymond Vernon has recently argued, in economic terms each country "has a hand on the other's throat," and for either to threaten the other would be tantamount to threatening a nuclear first strike.%elative gains calculations can be destructive, to the extent that they lead to or reinforce the twin evils of protectionism and nationalism. A U.S. protectionist strategy-designed, perhaps, to slow the economic growth or technological progress of Japanwould be damaging in and of itself, and also could lead to a trade and investment war, which would leave both sides even worse off. Moreover, by casting the relationship in terms of a competition for relative gains, U.S. officials would risk inciting nationalist fervor, as America's "Japan bashers" and Japan's "America bashers" reinforced each other's worst tenden~ies.~ 3. See, for example, I.M. Destler and Michael Nacht, "Beyond Mutual Recrimination: Building a Solid U.S.-Japan Relationship in the 1990s," I~zternational Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 19901 91), pp. 92-119; Philip Tresize, "Japan, the Enemy?" The Brookings Review (Winter 1989190), pp. 3-13; Kan Ito, "Trans-Pacific Anger," Foreign Policy, No. 78 (Spring 1990), pp. 131-52; David Brock, "The Theory and Practice of Japan-Bashing," The National Interest, No. 17 (Fall 1989), pp. 17-28; Alan Romberg, "U.S.-Japan Relations: A Partnership in Search of Definition," Critical Issties 1988-1 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1988); and George R. Packard, "The Coming U.S.-Japan Crisis," Forelgn Affairs, Vol. 66, No. 2 (Winter 87-88), pp. 348-367. 4. Raymond Vernon, "On Glass Houses and Japan-Bashing," New York Times, June 21, 1989, p. A25. Vernon refers, presumably, to a situation of mutual assured destruction in which strike and retaliation would devastate both. 5. American revisionists are frequently accused of "Japan-bashing" by their critics. The most celebrated example of Japanese "America-bashing" is Akio Morita and Shintaro Ishihara, The Japan That Can Say No: The New U.S.-lapan Relations Card (Kobunsha: Kappa-Holmes, 1989), an unofficial English translation of which circulated widely in Washington during 1989 and 1990

Do Relative Gains Matter?77 Such an "orgy of mutual bashing,"inspired,according to traditionalists, perhaps inadvertently by government officials who are still captives of anti- quated notions of "national sovereignty"and "national interest,"would cre- ate profound political conflict,and would jeopardize the close security ties that have developed between the United States and Japan in the postwar era.6 Revisionists,while not unconcerned with the above risks,nevertheless tend to be more sympathetic to,if not openly supportive of,an American policy toward Japan inspired by a sensitivity to relative economic gains.? Revisionists are disturbed by patterns in U.S.-Japanese economic interaction which,they believe,if allowed to persist are likely to work over time to the detriment of America's national interests.America's growing financial de- pendence on Japan is one such trend,which has the potential to reduce the future real income of the United States and grant Japan a source of leverage over U.S.behavior.Even more disturbing is America's relative decline tech- nologically,as Japanese firms outcompete their U.S.counterparts not only in traditional industries of the past but in the high-growth,technology- intensive activities of the present and future,such as semiconductors,fine ceramics,and robotics.Revisionists see little chance that such trends will be reversed,as long as the United States remains wedded to traditional policies that subordinate economic to political and security concerns,and treat Japan as a liberal capitalist state cast in the same mold as the United States.Such thinking and policies fail to grasp that Japan has institutionalized a distinctive version of capitalism,and that its technological and commercial success is driven by a government-business partnership that places growth,market share,and producer interests above the concerns of efficiency and consumer welfare.While Japan is clearly not an enemy,its trade policies tend to be adversarial.The United States,according to revisionists,while not necessarily emulating Japan,needs to adjust itself ideologically and institutionally;it must,in the words of Chalmers Johnson,"recognize that Japan has replaced the USSR as America's most important foreign policy problem"and "adopt 6.The quoted phrases are from Ito,"Trans-Pacific Anger,"pp.137,146. 7.Leading revisionist thinkers and some of their works include James Fallows,"Containing Japan,"The Atlantic Monthly,May 1989,pp.40-54;Clyde Prestowitz,Jr.,Trading Places:How We Are Giving Our Future To Japan And How To Reclaim It,rev.ed.(New York:Basic Books,1990); Chalmers Johnson,"How to Think about Economic Competition From Japan,"in Kenneth Pyle, ed.,The Trade Crisis:How Will Japan Respond?(Seattle:Society for Japanese Studies,1987),pp.71- 83;Charles Ferguson,"America's High-Tech Decline,"Foreign Policy,No.74 (1989),pp.123- 144;and Karel Van Wolferen,The Enigma of Japanese Power (New York:Knopf,1989)

Do Relative Gains Matter? 1 77 Such an "orgy of mutual bashing," inspired, according to traditionalists, perhaps inadvertently by government officials who are still captives of antiquated notions of "national sovereignty" and "national interest," would create profound political conflict, and would jeopardize the close security ties that have developed between the United States and Japan in the postwar era. Revisionists, while not unconcerned with the above risks, nevertheless tend to be more sympathetic to, if not openly supportive of, an American policy toward Japan inspired by a sensitivity to relative economic gains.7 Revisionists are disturbed by patterns in U.S.-Japanese economic interaction which, they believe, if allowed to persist are likely to work over time to the detriment of America's national interests. America's growing financial dependence on Japan is one such trend, which has the potential to reduce the future real income of the United States and grant Japan a source of leverage over U.S. behavior. Even more disturbing is America's relative decline technologically, as Japanese firms outcompete their U.S. counterparts not only in traditional industries of the past but in the high-growth, technologyintensive activities of the present and future, such as semiconductors, fine ceramics, and robotics. Revisionists see little chance that such trends will be reversed, as long as the United States remains wedded to traditional policies that subordinate economic to political and security concerns, and treat Japan as a liberal capitalist state cast in the same mold as the United States. Such thinking and policies fail to grasp that Japan has institutionalized a distinctive version of capitalism, and that its technological and commercial success is driven by a government-business partnership that places growth, market share, and producer interests above the concerns of efficiency and consumer welfare. While Japan is clearly not an enemy, its trade policies tend to be adversarial. The United States, according to revisionists, while not necessarily emulating Japan, needs to adjust itself ideologically and institutionally; it must, in the words of Chalmers Johnson, "recognize that Japan has replaced the USSR as America's most important foreign policy problem" and "adopt 6. The quoted phrases are from Ito, "Trans-Pacific Anger," pp. 137, 146. 7. Leading revisionist thinkers and some of their works include James Fallows, "Containing Japan," The Atlantic Monthly, May 1989, pp. 40-54; Clyde Prestowitz, Jr., Trading Places: How We Are Giving Our Future To Japan And How To Reclaim It, rev. ed. (New York: Basic Books, 1990); Chalmers Johnson, "How to Think about Economic Competition From Japan," in Kenneth Pyle, ed., The Trade Crisis: How Will Japan Respond? (Seattle: Society for Japanese Studies, 1987), pp. 71- 83; Charles Ferguson, "America's High-Tech Decline," Foreign Policy, No. 74 (1989), pp. 123- 144; and Karel Van Wolferen, The Enigma of Japa~iese Power (New York: Knopf, 1989)

International Security 16:178 policies to get the United States back into consumer electronics and other industries of the future."8 Thus,while traditionalists tend to believe that the risks of pursuing a relative gains strategy outweigh any potential benefits,revisionists are more fearful of the risks of not pursuing such a strategy,of a complacent United States that fails to recognize and react to an economic challenge.Given their shared concern with what the United States should do,proponents of each should be interested in an analysis that seeks to understand what the U.S. government can do.Under what circumstances is it likely to be responsive to relative gains concerns,and,since some are potentially more harmful than others,what policy instruments is it likely to employ? The question of America's response has theoretical relevance as well.One of the key insights of the realist approach to international relations is that nation-states are consistently sensitive to considerations of relative gain and advantage.9 As Robert Gilpin has observed:"Nation-states are engaged in a never-ending struggle to improve or preserve their relative power posi- tions."10 Relative position matters because nation-states exist in anarchy, without a higher governing authority.Anarchy breeds fear and distrust, leading nation-states to worry,at the extreme,that they will be conquered or destroyed by their more powerful counterparts.Even if nation-states do not fear for their physical survival,they worry that a decrease in their power capabilities relative to those of other nation-states will compromise their political autonomy,expose them to the influence attempts of others,or lessen their ability to prevail in political disputes with allies and adversaries. Realists thus expect the behavior of nation-states to reflect a sensitivity to changes in their relative position and capabilities.For example,realists an- ticipate that nation-states will react to shifts in relative military or economic power that disadvantage them,either by mobilizing resources internally or by devising some other means to lessen the impact or offset the consequences 8.Chalmers Johnson,"Their Behavior,Our Policy,"The National Interest,No.17 (Fall 1989), p.26. 9.See Kenneth Waltz,Theory of International Politics (Reading,Mass.:Addison Wesley,1979); Robert Jervis,"Realism,Game Theory,and Cooperation,"World Politics,Vol.40,No.3(April 1988),Pp.334-336;and especially Joseph Grieco,Cooperation Among Nations:Europe,America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade (Ithaca:Cornell University Press,1990).A thoughtful conceptual critique of the realist position is Duncan Snidal,"Relative Gains Don't Prevent International Cooperation"(unpublished manuscript,1989). 10.Robert Gilpin,U.S.Power and the Multinational Corporation (New York:Basic Books,1975), p.35(emphasis added)

International Security 16:l 1 78 policies to get the United States back into consumer electronics and other industries of the future. Thus, while traditionalists tend to believe that the risks of pursuing a relative gains strategy outweigh any potential benefits, revisionists are more fearful of the risks of not pursuing such a strategy, of a complacent United States that fails to recognize and react to an economic challenge. Given their shared concern with what the United States should do, proponents of each should be interested in an analysis that seeks to understand what the U.S. government can do. Under what circumstances is it likely to be responsive to relative gains concerns, and, since some are potentially more harmful than others, what policy instruments is it likely to employ? The question of America's response has theoretical relevance as well. One of the key insights of the realist approach to international relations is that nation-states are consistently sensitive to considerations of relative gain and ad~antage.~As Robert Gilpin has observed: "Nation-states are engaged in a never-ending struggle to improve or preserve their relative power positions."1° Relative position matters because nation-states exist in anarchy, without a higher governing authority. Anarchy breeds fear and distrust, leading nation-states to worry, at the extreme, that they will be conquered or destroyed by their more powerful counterparts. Even if nation-states do not fear for their physical survival, they worry that a decrease in their power capabilities relative to those of other nation-states will compromise their political autonomy, expose them to the influence attempts of others, or lessen their ability to prevail in political disputes with allies and adversaries. Realists thus expect the behavior of nation-states to reflect a sensitivity to changes in their relative position and capabilities. For example, realists anticipate that nation-states will react to shifts in relative military or economic power that disadvantage them, either by mobilizing resources internally or by devising some other means to lessen the impact or offset the consequences 8. Chalmers Johnson, "Their Behavior, Our Policy," The National Interest, No. 17 (Fall 1989), p. 26. 9. See Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison Wesley, 1979); Robert Jervis, "Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation," World Politics, Vol. 40, No. 3 (April 1988), pp. 334-336; and especially Joseph Grieco, Cooperation Among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990). A thoughtful conceptual critique of the realist position is Duncan Snidal, "Relative Gains Don't Prevent International Cooperation" (unpublished manuscript, 1989). 10. Robert Gilpin, U.S. Power and the.Multinationa1 Corporation (New York: Basic Books, 1975), p. 35 (emphasis added)

Do Relative Gains Matter?79 of such shifts.11 At the extreme,states may opt for war;Thucydides suggests as much in his classical realist account by arguing that what made the Peloponnesian War inevitable was the "growth of Athenian power and the fear it caused in Sparta."12 It follows that,for realists,the willingness of a nation-state to engage in cooperative ventures with others will be affected not only by whether and how much it believes it will gain in absolute terms,but also by its perception and assessment of which states will gain more in relative terms.This is not to suggest that a nation-state in pursuit of relative gains will eschew coop- eration altogether,or that it will refuse to participate if any gains are enjoyed by its partner.It is to suggest that while absolute gains seekers are more interested in the creation of joint benefits than in their distribution,relative gains seekers are more concerned with distribution,even at the expense of creation.More precisely,a nation-state in pursuit of relative gains will seek to avoid or restructure relationships or cooperative ventures in order to reduce or eliminate gaps in benefits that favor its partners.13 It would be prepared to accept less benefits in absolute terms,if by so doing it could narrow a gap in benefits that favored its partners.On the other hand,such a state would be willing to increase cooperation and mutual benefits,as long as the resulting distribution of benefits did not widen the gap to its disad- vantage. In general,the extent to which state behavior exhibits a concern for relative gains will vary,depending upon whether interaction involves allies or ad- versaries,and economic or military relationships.14 Such concerns are likely to be most prominent in the military interactions(e.g.,arms races and arms control)of potential adversaries,who possess the capabilities-and perhaps the motives-to destroy or otherwise physically harm each other.Since eco- nomic power underpins political and military influence,even economic re- 11.An attempt,grounded in realism,to predict how states with different domestic structures and international capabilities will react to shifts in internal and external power positions is Michael Mastanduno,David A.Lake,and G.John Ikenberry,"Toward a Realist Theory of State Action,"International Studies Quarterly,Vol.33,No.4 (December 1989),pp.457-474. 12.Thucydides,The Peloponnesian Wars,trans.Rex Warner(New York:Penguin,1954),p.49. 13.Realists expect nation-states to avoid gaps that favor their partners,but not necessarily to maximize gaps in their own favor.Nation-states are not"gap maximizers."They are,in Joseph Grieco's terms,"defensive positionalists."See Grieco,Cooperation Among Nations,pp.44-45;and Kenneth Waltz,"Reflections on Theory of International Politics:A Response to My Critics,"in Robert O.Keohane,ed.,Neorealism and its Critics (New York:Columbia University Press,1986). 14.A useful discussion is Charles Lipson,"International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs,"World Politics,Vol.37,No.1 (October 1984),pp.1-23,at 12-18

Do Relative Gains Matter? 1 79 of such shifts.ll At the extreme, states may opt for war; Thucydides suggests as much in his classical realist account by arguing that what made the Peloponnesian War inevitable was the "growth of Athenian power and the fear it caused in Sparta."12 It follows that, for realists, the willingness of a nation-state to engage in cooperative ventures with others will be affected not only by whether and how much it believes it will gain in absolute terms, but also by its perception and assessment of which states will gain more in relative terms. This is not to suggest that a nation-state in pursuit of relative gains will eschew cooperation altogether, or that it will refuse to participate if any gains are enjoyed by its partner. It is to suggest that while absolute gains seekers are more interested in the creation of joint benefits than in their distribution, relative gains seekers are more concerned with distribution, even at the expense of creation. More precisely, a nation-state in pursuit of relative gains will seek to avoid or restructure relationships or cooperative ventures in order to reduce or eliminate gaps in benefits that favor its partners.13 It would be prepared to accept less benefits in absolute terms, if by so doing it could narrow a gap in benefits that favored its partners. On the other hand, such a state would be willing to increase cooperation and mutual benefits, as long as the resulting distribution of benefits did not widen the gap to its disadvantage. In general, the extent to which state behavior exhibits a concern for relative gains will vary, depending upon whether interaction involves allies or adversaries, and economic or military relationships.14 Such concerns are likely to be most prominent in the military interactions (e.g., arms races and arms control) of potential adversaries, who possess the capabilities-and perhaps the motives-to destroy or otherwise physically harm each other. Since economic power underpins political and military influence, even economic re- 11. An attempt, grounded in realism, to predict how states with different domestic structures and international capabilities will react to shifts in internal and external power positions is Michael Mastanduno, David A. Lake, and G. John Ikenberry, "Toward a Realist Theory of State Action," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 4 (December 1989), pp. 457-474. 12. Thucydides, The Peloponnesian Wars, trans. Rex Warner (New York: Penguin, 1954), p. 49. 13. Realists expect nation-states to avoid gaps that favor their partners, but not necessarily to maximize gaps in their own favor. Nation-states are not "gap maximizers." They are, in Joseph Grieco's terms, "defensive positionalists." See Grieco, Cooperation Among Nations, pp. 44-45; and Kenneth Waltz, "Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics," in Robert 0.Keohane, ed., Neorealism and its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986). 14. A useful discussion is Charles Lipson, "International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs," World Politics, Vol. 37, No. 1 (October 1984), pp. 1-23, at 12-18

International Security 16:180 lations among potential adversaries are likely to be influenced strongly by relative gains considerations,as evidenced by America's forty-year effort to use export controls to weaken Soviet military,and at times economic,capa- bilities.15 On the other hand,relative gains calculations can be expected to be less important in economic relations among long-standing military allies.Since such states pose far less of a security threat to each other,they can afford to be less concerned by shifts in relative economic capabilities.This inclination to downplay relative gains considerations is likely to be reinforced by the fact that alliance members share an interest in enhancing their collective economic capabilities in absolute terms,in order to counter commonly per- ceived external security threats more effectively. Nevertheless,realists would have to expect that,even in economic relations among allies,relative gains concerns will not be completely absent.16 First, in an anarchical environment,the possibility of armed conflict never disap- pears entirely.The prudent nation-state must calculate that today's ally may be the adversary of tomorrow-or the next decade-and thus is likely to be wary of patterns of economic interaction or cooperative ventures that dispro- portionately benefit its allies.Second,even if the chance of armed conflict remains remote,states worry about the consequences of economic interaction for their political autonomy.Asymmetrical interdependence may lead to political vulnerability,providing opportunities for other states-even friendly ones-to constrain a nation-state's political choices or exercise leverage over its behavior.17 Third,states may be concerned about the consequences for their national economic welfare,to the extent that mutually beneficial inter- action puts their firms at a competitive disadvantage,leads to a shrinkage of their industrial base,or results in the movement of high value-added activity away from their territory.For any or all of these reasons,realists must expect states to pursue relative gains and,if necessary,forgo some of the benefits 15.Michael Mastanduno,Economic Containment:CoCom and the Politics of East-West Trade(forth- coming,Cornell University Press,1992). 16.Jervis,"Realism,Game Theory,and Cooperation,"p.335;and Grieco,Cooperation Among Nations,ch.7.Grieco finds that the extent to which members of the European Community were willing to support non-tariff barrier code proposals during the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations was influenced significantly by their assessment of whether or not the United States would reap greater economic benefits in relative terms if such codes were implemented. 17.See Robert O.Keohane and Joseph S.Nye,Jr.,Power and Interdependence:World Politics in Transition (Boston:Little Brown,1977)

International Security 16:l / 80 lations among potential adversaries are likely to be influenced strongly by relative gains considerations, as evidenced by America's forty-year effort to use export controls to weaken Soviet military, and at times economic, capabilities.lj On the other hand, relative gains calculations can be expected to be less important in economic relations among long-standing military allies. Since such states pose far less of a security threat to each other, they can afford to be less concerned by shifts in relative economic capabilities. This inclination to downplay relative gains considerations is likely to be reinforced by the fact that alliance members share an interest in enhancing their collective economic capabilities in absolute terms, in order to counter commonly perceived external security threats more effectively. Nevertheless, realists would have to expect that, even in economic relations among allies, relative gains concerns will not be completely absent.16 First, in an anarchical environment, the possibility of armed conflict never disappears entirely. The prudent nation-state must calculate that today's ally may be the adversary of tomorrow-or the next decade-and thus is likely to be wary of patterns of economic interaction or cooperative ventures that disproportionately benefit its allies. Second, even if the chance of armed conflict remains remote, states worry about the consequences of economic interaction for their political autonomy. Asymmetrical interdependence may lead to political vulnerability, providing opportunities for other states-even friendly ones-to constrain a nation-state's political choices or exercise leverage over its behavior.17 Third, states may be concerned about the consequences for their national economic welfare, to the extent that mutually beneficial interaction puts their firms at a competitive disadvantage, leads to a shrinkage of their industrial base, or results in the movement of high value-added activity away from their territory. For any or all of these reasons, realists must expect states to pursue relative gains and, if necessary, forgo some of the benefits 15. Michael Mastanduno, Economic Contairiment: CoCom and the Politics of East-West Trade (forthcoming, Cornell University Press, 1992). 16. Jervis, "Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation," p. 335; and Grieco, Cooperatioil Arnong Nations, ch. 7. Grieco finds that the extent to which members of the European Community were willing to support non-tariff barrier code proposals during the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations was influenced significantly by their assessment of whether or not the United States would reap greater economic benefits in relative terms if such codes were implemented. 17. See Robert 0.Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Power aiid Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little Brown, 1977)

Do Relative Gains Matter?81 of cooperation or economic exchange in the short run,in order to assure security,broadly defined,over the long run. In economic relations among allies,hegemonic or dominant states can be expected to be least sensitive to relative gains considerations.Such states possess a preponderance of economic advantages,including large size and exceptional productivity,and may be endowed with substantial financial assets and natural resources as well.18 These advantages afford hegemonic states the luxury of being more complacent about their relative economic position than non-hegemonic states,who may aspire to hegemonic status or at least fear slipping further behind. The general pattern of postwar American foreign economic policy towards Western Europe and Japan appears to bear out this logic.The United States found itself locked in a struggle for military and geopolitical influence with the Soviet Union,and,particularly in the early postwar years,far ahead of its allies in terms of economic capabilities.Consequently U.S.officials shaped America's economic relationships with Western Europe and Japan to support broader geopolitical objectives.The United States pursued absolute gains through the reduction of tariff barriers,and at the same time adopted policies (e.g.,support for European integration,and tolerance for Japanese protec- tionism and restrictions on foreign direct investment)that discriminated asymmetrically against the United States.9 Rather than pursuing relative gains itself,the United States facilitated the ability of its allies to strengthen their economic capabilities relative to those of the United States. Realism would lead one to expect,however,that as structural conditions changed-that is,as America's relative economic power declined,and as the Soviet military threat diminished-U.S.policy in economic relations with its allies would come to reflect a greater sensitivity to relative gains.As its relative economic power declines,a hegemonic state will feel that it is less able to afford,and thus will be less likely to tolerate,"free riding"by its allies that works to its relative economic disadvantage.Furthermore,as com- monly perceived military threats diminish,the hegemonic state will be less inclined,in economic disputes with its allies,to subordinate its national 18.Stephen D.Krasner,"State Power and the Structure of International Trade,"World Politics, Vol.28,No.3 (April 1976),pp.317-343;and David A.Lake,Power,Protection,and Free Trade: International Sources of LI.S.Commercial Strategy,1887-1939(Ithaca:Cornell University Press,1988). 19.See Gilpin,U.S.Power;and Stephen D.Krasner,"American Policy and Global Economic Stability,"in William P.Avery and David P.Rapkin,eds.,America in a Changing World Political Economy (New York:Longman,1982),pp.29-48

Do Relative Gains Matter? / 81 of cooperation or economic exchange in the short run, in order to assure security, broadly defined, over the long run. In economic relations among allies, hegemonic or dominant states can be expected to be least sensitive to relative gains considerations. Such states possess a preponderance of economic advantages, including large size and exceptional productivity, and may be endowed with substantial financial assets and natural resources as we11.18 These advantages afford hegemonic states the luxury of being more complacent about their relative economic position than non-hegemonic states, who may aspire to hegemonic status or at least fear slipping further behind. The general pattern of postwar American foreign economic policy towards Western Europe and Japan appears to bear out this logic. The United States found itself locked in a struggle for military and geopolitical influence with the Soviet Union, and, particularly in the early postwar years, far ahead of its allies in terms of economic capabilities. Consequently U.S. officials shaped America's economic relationships with Western Europe and Japan to support broader geopolitical objectives. The United States pursued absolute gains through the reduction of tariff barriers, and at the same time adopted policies (e.g., support for European integration, and tolerance for Japanese protectionism and restrictions on foreign direct investment) that discriminated asymmetrically against the United States.19 Rather than pursuing relative gains itself, the United States facilitated the ability of its allies to strengthen their economic capabilities relative to those of the United States. Realism would lead one to expect, however, that as structural conditions changed-that is, as America's relative economic power declined, and as the Soviet military threat diminished-U.S. policy in economic relations with its allies would come to reflect a greater sensitivity to relative gains. As its relative economic power declines, a hegemonic state will feel that it is less able to afford, and thus will be less likely to tolerate, "free riding" by its allies that works to its relative economic disadvantage. Furthermore, as commonly perceived military threats diminish, the hegemonic state will be less inclined, in economic disputes with its allies, to subordinate its national 18. Stephen D. Krasner, "State Power and the Structure of International Trade," World Politics, Vol. 28, No. 3 (April 1976), pp. 317-343; and David A. Lake, Power, Protection, and Free Trade: International Sources of U.S. Commercial Strategy, 1887-1939 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988). 19. See Gilpin, U.S. Power; and Stephen D. Krasner, "American Policy and Global Economic Stability," in William P. Avery and David P. Rapkin, eds., America in a Changing World Political Economy (New York: Longman, 1982), pp. 29-48

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