《国际政治经济学》文献资料（Political Economy of International Trade：International Influences）Hegemonic Stability Theory and 19th Century Tariff Levels in Europe

Hegemonic Stability Theory and 19th Century Tariff Levels in Europe STOR Timothy J.McKeown International Organization,Vol.37,No.1.(Winter,1983),pp.73-91 Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-8183%28198324%2937%3A1%3C73%3AHSTAIC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-T International Organization is currently published by The MIT Press. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use,available at http://www.istor.org/about/terms html.JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides,in part,that unless you have obtained prior permission,you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles,and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal,non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work.Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/journals/mitpress.html. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. The JSTOR Archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long-term preservation and access to leading academic journals and scholarly literature from around the world.The Archive is supported by libraries,scholarly societies,publishers, and foundations.It is an initiative of JSTOR,a not-for-profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community take advantage of advances in technology.For more information regarding JSTOR,please contact support@jstor.org. http://www.jstor.org Wed Jan915:03:582008

Hegemonic Stability Theory and 19th Century Tariff Levels in Europe Timothy J. McKeown International Organization, Vol. 37, No. 1. (Winter, 1983), pp. 73-91. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-8183%28198324%2937%3A1%3C73%3AHSTA1C%3E2.0.CO%3B2-T International Organization is currently published by The MIT Press. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/journals/mitpress.html. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. The JSTOR Archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long-term preservation and access to leading academic journals and scholarly literature from around the world. The Archive is supported by libraries, scholarly societies, publishers, and foundations. It is an initiative of JSTOR, a not-for-profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community take advantage of advances in technology. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. http://www.jstor.org Wed Jan 9 15:03:58 2008

Hegemonic stability theory and 19th century tariff levels in Europe Timothy J.McKeown Can the degree of"openness"of the international system,or at least of its capitalist state members,be explained by the existence of a single wealthy, powerful,and technologically advanced state that possesses both the capability and the motivation to create and maintain an open international system?In the past decade a number of students of international politics have essentially answered "yes"to this question.They have argued that the existence of a state possessing clear superiority over its nearest rivals-the United Kingdom in much of the 19th century and the United States in much of the 20th- is a necessary and sufficient condition for such an open system to emerge. They have explained the development of low-tariff trading systems and of the Bretton Woods monetary system in the 19th and 20th centuries in terms of the emergence of such"hegemonic"states.They have argued further that it is the power of these hegemonic states that leads to the emergence of open international economic systems. A hegemonic stability explanation of the existence of open regimes has obvious attractions.It is simple:openness is explained as a function of a certain distribution of capabilities among states.It is plausible:both the United Kingdom and the United States in their respective periods of preem- inence seem to fit the notion of a hegemonic state,both seem to have wanted an open system,both seem to have acted-at least at certain times-to create such a system,and a relatively open system did in fact emerge during the periods of their preeminence.It is also"political":it explains the configuration of the international economic system in terms of "power"rather than in terms of rational exchange. Perhaps for these reasons hegemonic stability theory has attracted an im- pressive assemblage of adherents.Mainstream economists and political sci- This article is based on the author's dissertation,"The Rise and Decline of the Open Trading Regime of the Nineteenth Century,"Stanford University,1982.I would like to thank Robert Keohane,David Sylvan,and two anonymous referees for their comments. International Organization 37,1,Winter 1983 0020-8183/83/010073-18 $1.50 C 1983 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the World Peace Foundation

-- - - Hegemonic stability theory and 19th century tariff levels in Europe Timothy J. McKeown Can the degree of "openness" of the international system, or at least of its capitalist state members, be explained by the existence of a single wealthy, powerful, and technologically advanced state that possesses both the capability and the motivation to create and maintain an open international system? In the past decade a number of students of international politics have essentially answered "yes" to this question. They have argued that the existence of a state possessing clear superiority over its nearest rivals- the United Kingdom in much of the 19th century and the United States in much of the 20th￾is a necessary and sufficient condition for such an open system to emerge. They have explained the development of low-tariff trading systems and of the Bretton Woods monetary system in the 19th and 20th centuries in terms of the emergence of such "hegemonic" states. They have argued further that it is the power of these hegemonic states that leads to the emergence of open international economic systems. A hegemonic stability explanation of the existence of open regimes has obvious attractions. It is simple: openness is explained as a function of a certain distribution of capabilities among states. It is plausible: both the United Kingdom and the United States in their respective periods of preem￾inence seem to fit the notion of a hegemonic state, both seem to have wanted an open system, both seem to have acted-at least at certain times-to create such a system, and a relatively open system did in fact emerge during the periods of their preeminence. It is also "political": it explains the configuration of the international economic system in terms of "power" rather than in terms of rational exchange. Perhaps for these reasons hegemonic stability theory has attracted an im￾pressive assemblage of adherents. Mainstream economists and political sci￾This article is based on the author's dissertation, "The Rise and Decline of the Open Trading Regime of the Nineteenth Century," Stanford University, 1982. I would like to thank Robert Keohane, David Sylvan, and two anonymous referees for their comments. International Organization 37, 1, Winter 1983 0020-8 183/83/0 10073- 18 $1 .SO O 1983 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the World Peace Foundation

74 International Organization entists,and less orthodox scholars,have all embraced some form of the theory.'Given the diversity of intellectual and political commitments among these people,such a degree of consensus is quite remarkable.Unfortunately, it is also quite premature.Important conceptual and empirical difficulties have not been addressed,and alternative explanations for open regimes have received scant attention. 1.Hegemonic stability theory and 19th century tariff levels Hegemonic stability theorists agree that the hegemonic state has both the motivation and the capability to create and maintain open regimes.(Indeed, since theorists do not posit any other method by which these regimes can be created and maintained,the existence of the hegemonic state is both sufficient and necessary for open regimes to exist.)The hegemonic state is able to offer both bribes and threats.Those who emphasize bribery tend to treat open regimes as collective goods.They discuss the hegemonic state in terms reminiscent of Frohlich,Oppenheimer,and Young's discussion of the role of entrepreneurship in the creation of such goods,and worry about the cost to the hegemonic state of all those side-payments.2 Those who emphasize coercion worry less about benefits to other members of the system and more about the benefits flowing to the hegemonic state.3 In either case,it is argued, the hegemonic state has the resources to invest in creating and maintaining compliance with the regime in the face of member states'constant temptations to defect and take a“free ride.” In addition to the capability to create an open regime,the hegemonic state must possess a motivation for doing so.The motivation generally implied (if not actually cited)is that the decision makers of the hegemonic state expect that the open regime,while perhaps conferring benefits on all states, will confer special benefits on the hegemonic power.Its superior capabilities- in producing commodities efficiently,in financing and transporting these commodities,and in protecting these activities with military force,if nec- 1.C.P.Kindleberger,The World in Depression (Boston:Little,Brown,1973);R.Gilpin, U.S.Power and the Multinational Corporation:The Political Economy of Foreign Direct In- vestment (New York:Basic Books,1975);S.D.Krasner,"State Power and the Structure of International Trade,"World Politics 28 (1976),pp.317-47;R.O.Keohane and J.S.Nye, Power and Interdependence:World Politics in Transition (Boston:Little,Brown,1977);H. Magdoff,The Age of Imperialism (New York:Monthly Review Press,1969);A.MacEwan, "The Development of the Crisis in the World Economy,"in B.Steinberg et al.,eds.,U.S. Capitalism in Crisis (New York:Union for Radical Political Economics,1978);I.Wallerstein, The Modern World System,vol.2:Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World- Economy,1600-1750 (New York:Academic Press,1980). 2.Kindleberger,World in Depression;M.v.N.Whitman,"Leadership without Hegemony," Foreign Policy no.20 (1975),pp.138-64;N.Frohlich,J.A.Oppenheimer,and O.Young, Political Leadership and Collective Goods(Princeton:Princeton University Press,1971). 3.See the works by Krasner,Magdoff,and MacEwan cited in note I above

74 International Organization entists, and less orthodox scholars, have all embraced some form of the theory.' Given the diversity of intellectual and political commitments among these people, such a degree of consensus is quite remarkable. Unfortunately, it is also quite premature. Important conceptual and empirical difficulties have not been addressed, and alternative explanations for open regimes have received scant attention. 1. Hegemonic stability theory and 19th century tariff levels Hegemonic stability theorists agree that the hegemonic state has both the motivation and the capability to create and maintain open regimes. (Indeed, since theorists do not posit any other method by which these regimes can be created and maintained, the existence of the hegemonic state is both sufficient and necessary for open regimes to exist.) The hegemonic state is able to offer both bribes and threats. Those who emphasize bribery tend to treat open regimes as collective goods. They discuss the hegemonic state in terms reminiscent of Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Young's discussion of the role of entrepreneurship in the creation of such goods, and worry about the cost to the hegemonic state of all those side- payment^.^ Those who emphasize coercion worry less about benefits to other members of the system and more about the benefits flowing to the hegemonic state.3 In either case, it is argued, the hegemonic state has the resources to invest in creating and maintaining compliance with the regime in the face of member states' constant temptations to defect and take a "free ride." In addition to the capability to create an open regime, the hegemonic state must possess a motivation for doing so. The motivation generally implied (if not actually cited) is that the decision makers of the hegemonic state expect that the open regime, while perhaps conferring benefits on all states, will confer special benefits on the hegemonic power. Its superior capabilities￾in producing commodities efficiently, in financing and transporting these commodities, and in protecting these activities with military force, if nec- 1. C. P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973); R. Gilpin, U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation: The Political Economy of Foreign Direct In￾vestment (New York: Basic Books, 1975); S. D. Krasner, "State Power and the Structure of International Trade," World Politics 28 (1976), pp. 31747; R. 0. Keohane and J. S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977); H. Magdoff, The Age of Imperialism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969); A. MacEwan, "The Development of the Crisis in the World Economy," in B. Steinberg et al., eds., U.S. Capitalism in Crisis (New York: Union for Radical Political Economics, 1978); I. Wallerstein, The Modern World System, vol. 2: Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World￾Economy, 1600-1 750 (New York: Academic Press, 1980). 2. Kindleberger, World in Depression; M. v. N. Whitman, "Leadership without Hegemony," Foreign Policy no. 20 (1975), pp. 138-64; N. Frohlich, J. A. Oppenheimer, and 0.Young, Political Leadership and Collective Goods (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 197 1). 3. See the works by Krasner, Magdoff, and MacEwan cited in note 1 above

Hegemony theory and tariff levels 75 essary-will enable it to prevail over other states in the worldwide competition to extract the most gains from an open system.We may borrow from his- torians'arguments concerning the imperialism of free trade to argue that open systems are favored by the strong.4 Both Robert Gilpin and Stephen Krasner have explained the period of free trade in the mid 19th century as a product of British hegemony.The defeat of France in 1815 had removed the last serious challenger to British dominance outside Europe.The territorial redistribution that followed the end of the Napoleonic Wars checked French and Russian expansion on the European continent;British naval superiority checked extracontinental ex- pansion.3 Thereafter,British economic superiority asserted itself:the com- bination of efficient and technologically advanced British industry,rapid improvements in transportation,and the pax Britannica led to British dom- ination of the international economy by the mid 19th century.5 An increasingly open international trading system accompanied these de- velopments in the period 1820-1879.Britain was the "instigator and sup- porter"of the new structure of international trade.She used military force in Latin America and Africa;her military strength was important in Napoleon III's calculations regarding the desirability of a commercial treaty with Britain in 1860.7 Economically,her well-developed banking and finance system worked in conjunction with the emerging gold standard to create an inter- national payments system characterized by high levels of confidence and liquidity.8 When British hegemony began to decline,the open trading system began to decline as well.The pax Britannica was at its height in the period 1849-1880;thereafter,other states began to challenge British naval supe- riority,colonization became widespread,and states began to defect from the open trading system.British economic superiority began to fall off after 1880 as well.As Krasner notes,"Britain did not have the military or economic power to forestall these policies."However,the practical effects of this"mod- est"'closure were not as great as one might suppose,since the decline in trade as a proportion of national incomes was modest and since the United States had never been part of the open world system in the first place.0 2.Some conceptual difficulties Although hegemonic stability theory does have attractive properties,and although the preceding account is plausible and presents some empirical 4.J.Gallagher and R.Robinson,"The Imperialism of Free Trade,"Economic History Review, 2 d series,6(1953),pp.1-l5. 5.Gilpin,U.S.Power,pp.80-82. 6.Ibid,pp.83-85. 7.Krasner,"State Power,"pp.335-36. 8.Ibid,p.336. 9.Gilpin,U.S.Power,p.81. 10.Krasner,"State Power,"p.337

Hegemony theory and tariff levels 75 essary-will enable it to prevail over other states in the worldwide competition to extract the most gains from an open system. We may borrow from his￾torians' arguments concerning the imperialism of free trade to argue that open systems are favored by the strong4 Both Robert Gilpin and Stephen Krasner have explained the period of free trade in the mid 19th century as a product of British hegemony. The defeat of France in 18 15 had removed the last serious challenger to British dominance outside Europe. The territorial redistribution that followed the end of the Napoleonic Wars checked French and Russian expansion on the European continent; British naval superiority checked extracontinental ex￾pan~ion.~Thereafter, British economic superiority asserted itselE the com￾bination of efficient and technologically advanced British industry, rapid improvements in transportation, and the pax Britannica led to British dom￾ination of the international economy by the mid 19th ~entury.~ An increasingly open international trading system accompanied these de￾velopments in the period 1820-1879. Britain was the "instigator and sup￾porter" of the new structure of international trade. She used military force in Latin America and Africa; her military strength was important in Napoleon 111's calculations regarding the desirability of a commercial treaty with Britain in 1860.' Economically, her well-developed banking and finance system worked in conjunction with the emerging gold standard to create an inter￾national payments system characterized by high levels of confidence and liq~idity.~ When British hegemony began to decline, the open trading system began to decline as well. The pax Britannica was at its height in the period 1849-1880; thereafter, other states began to challenge British naval supe￾riority, colonization became widespread, and states began to defect from the open trading ~ystem.~ British economic superiority began to fall off after 1880 as well. As Krasner notes, "Britain did not have the military or economic power to forestall these policies." However, the practical effects of this "mod￾est" closure were not as great as one might suppose, since the decline in trade as a proportion of national incomes was modest and since the United States had never been part of the open world system in the first place.I0 2. Some conceptual difficulties Although hegemonic stability theory does have attractive properties, and although the preceding account is plausible and presents some empirical 4. J. Gallagher and R. Robinson, "The Imperialism of Free Trade," Economic History Review, 2d series, 6 (1953), pp. 1-15. 5. Gilpin, U.S. Power, pp. 80-82. 6. Ibid., pp. 83-85. 7. Krasner, "State Power," pp. 335-36. 8. Ibid., p. 336. 9. Gilpin, U.S. Power, p. 81. 10. Krasner, "State Power," p. 337

76 International Organization evidence consistent with its argument,the conceptual difficulties are formidable. First,when is a state hegemonic?While it may not be necessary to posit possession of some precise share of world capabilities as a threshold for qualification as a hegemonic state,at least one ought to be as explicit as possible about the distributions of capability associated with hegemony,near- hegemony,and nonhegemony.For instance,what are we to make of the periods 1815-1849 and 1880-1914 in the light of Krasner's and Gilpin's comments?If the defeat of France,the settlement of Vienna,and undisputed British naval superiority really were the key ingredients in the establishment of British hegemony,why does Gilpin date the peak of that hegemony as beginning only in 1849?Similarly,if-as Krasner argues-Britain was not yet at the peak of her hegemony when she allegedly secured the opening of the trading system in the early 1860s,are we then to conclude that near- hegemonic states can achieve the same sorts of successes as truly hegemonic states?If so,how can we reconcile British success in the near-hegemonic period of the 1860s with British failure to maintain an open system in the near-hegemonic period of the 1880s? Related to this difficulty is the silence of hegemonic stability theory on the motivations and capabilities of the nonhegemonic states that are most likely to rival the hegemonic power.It might be the case that states that are nearly as efficient and technologically advanced as the hegemonic state exhibit nearly as strong a preference for an open trading system as the hegemonic leader.If that were true,then conflict over a desired trading system would be slight and little inducement would be required to achieve these states' assent to an open trading system.However,if potential rivals to the hegemonic state are less optimistic about their abilities to catch up to the hegemonic state,they may conclude that their interests are not served by an open trading system.In such a case the states that oppose an open system might well coalesce against the hegemonic state and its favored policy.If this were to occur,the capabilities required to maintain an open system would be much greater than under the first contingency;a level of capability sufficient to maintain hegemony in the first instance could well prove insufficient in the second. A third conceptual difficulty is even more serious.In what sense is heg- emonic stability theory about "power"?Gilpin's consideration of the im- portance of power rests on his general observation about the superiority of the Royal Navy,but he conveys no sense of how this military advantage translated into Britain's desired policy outcome.Krasner does provide some concrete examples of the role of military power in changing the tariff policies of states in Latin America and in securing regions of Africa for the British (He could have added the imposition of low tariffs on Turkey and China, an effort that engaged Britain and other Western states as well.)However, if hegemonic stability theory's only prediction were that a dominant European

76 International Organization evidence consistent with its argument, the conceptual difficulties are formidable. First, when is a state hegemonic? While it may not be necessary to posit possession of some precise share of world capabilities as a threshold for qualification as a hegemonic state, at least one ought to be as explicit as possible about the distributions of capability associated with hegemony, near￾hegemony, and nonhegemony. For instance, what are we to make of the periods 18 15-1 849 and 1880-19 14 in the light of Krasner's and Gilpin's comments? If the defeat of France, the settlement of Vienna, and undisputed British naval superiority really were the key ingredients in the establishment of British hegemony, why does Gilpin date the peak of that hegemony as beginning only in 1849? Similarly, if-as Krasner argues-Britain was not yet at the peak of her hegemony when she allegedly secured the opening of the trading system in the early 1860s, are we then to conclude that near￾hegemonic states can achieve the same sorts of successes as truly hegemonic states? If so, how can we reconcile British success in the near-hegemonic period of the 1860s with British failure to maintain an open system in the near-hegemonic period of the 1880s? Related to this difficulty is the silence of hegemonic stability theory on the motivations and capabilities of the nonhegemonic states that are most likely to rival the hegemonic power. It might be the case that states that are nearly as efficient and technologically advanced as the hegemonic state exhibit nearly as strong a preference for an open trading system as the hegemonic leader. If that were true, then conflict over a desired trading system would be slight and little inducement would be required to achieve these states' assent to an open trading system. However, if potential rivals to the hegemonic state are less optimistic about their abilities to catch up to the hegemonic state, they may conclude that their interests are not served by an open trading system. In such a case the states that oppose an open system might well coalesce against the hegemonic state and its favored policy. If this were to occur, the capabilities required to maintain an open system would be much greater than under the first contingency; a level of capability sufficient to maintain hegemony in the first instance could well prove insufficient in the second. A third conceptual difficulty is even more serious. In what sense is heg￾emonic stability theory about "power''? Gilpin's consideration of the im￾portance of power rests on his general observation about the superiority of the Royal Navy, but he conveys no sense of how this military advantage translated into Britain's desired policy outcome. Krasner does provide some concrete examples of the role of military power in changing the tariff policies of states in Latin America and in securing regions of Africa for the British. (He could have added the imposition of low tariffs on Turkey and China, an effort that engaged Britain and other Western states as well.) However, if hegemonic stability theory's only prediction were that a dominant European

Hegemony theory and tariff levels 77 power could successfully coerce less developed countries,isolated both geo- graphically and diplomatically from potential allies,then most students of international politics would correctly conclude that they were being offered nothing more substantial than a rather uninteresting prediction based on a standard"power"theory ofinternational outcomes.Clearly,the critical chal- lenge to the hegemonic state is to win the adherence of its important rivals to the open system;the challenge to hegemonic stability theory is to explain how the hegemonic state manages this victory. Krasner's argument relies primarily on"potential economic power"as the basis of the hegemonic state's success in securing compliance with an open trading system.In his words,military force is not likely to play much of a role in this process since it is a "not very efficient"tool for altering the economic policies of other states and is "unlikely to be employed against medium-size states"in any event.But if military force can only be used successfully against some less developed countries,then economic "power" must be the primary lever used against the larger,more important states. The difficulty here is that if the term "economic power"is to have any meaning that is not already captured by economists'notions of ability to pay and"effective demand,"it must refer to the threatened or actual delivery of negative payoffs to the policy's target.Otherwise,the discussion ofeconomic "power"essentially becomes a discussion of economic bribery:how much is the hegemonic state willing to pay others to secure their adherence to an open regime?While this may be an interesting question and while one may choose to define"power"to include the ability to distribute positive payoffs, the fact remains that equating bribery with"power"simply renames rather than explains the phenomenon. Krasner considers two examples of the use of negative economic power, one of which,the withholding of foreign aid,he chooses with the particular recent behavior of the United States in mind.The other example,competing with the target country in third-country markets,does not seem apposite inasmuch as it is firms that decide in a capitalist state where to sell com- modities.2 Do states actually threaten other states with "competition"in foreign markets?Or do they promise to blunt the competitive activities of their country's firms in those markets in order to secure concessions on tariff policy?Such events seem extremely unlikely,and Krasner provides no reason to make us believe otherwise. There is,however,a much more potent and historically relevant weapon of economic "power"available to the hegemonic state:it can threaten to cut off one nation's access to its rich home market while allowing other nations continued access to that market.Threatening to raise tariffs unless 11.bid,p.322. 12.A partial exception to this is to be found in those cases where a decision not to sell,i.e., an embargo or some form of voluntary export restraint,has been imposed by the state

Hegemony theory and tariff levels 77 power could successfully coerce less developed countries, isolated both geo￾graphically and diplomatically from potential allies, then most students of international politics would correctly conclude that they were being offered nothing more substantial than a rather uninteresting prediction based on a standard "power" theory of international outcomes. Clearly, the critical chal￾lenge to the hegemonic state is to win the adherence of its important rivals to the open system; the challenge to hegemonic stability theory is to explain how the hegemonic state manages this victory. Krasner's argument relies primarily on "potential economic power" as the basis of the hegemonic state's success in securing compliance with an open trading system. In his words, military force is not likely to play much of a role in this process since it is a "not very efficient" tool for altering the economic policies of other states and is "unlikely to be employed against medium-size states" in any event." But if military force can only be used successfully against some less developed countries, then economic "power" must be the primary lever used against the larger, more important states. The difficulty here is that if the term "economic power" is to have any meaning that is not already captured by economists' notions of ability to pay and "effective demand," it must refer to the threatened or actual delivery of negative payoffs to the policy's target. Otherwise, the discussion of economic "power" essentially becomes a discussion of economic bribery: how much is the hegemonic state willing to pay others to secure their adherence to an open regime? While this may be an interesting question and while one may choose to define "power" to include the ability to distribute positive payoffs, the fact remains that equating bribery with "power" simply renames rather than explains the phenomenon. Krasner considers two examples of the use of negative economic power, one of which, the withholding of foreign aid, he chooses with the particular recent behavior of the United States in mind. The other example, competing with the target country in third-country markets, does not seem apposite inasmuch as it is firms that decide in a capitalist state where to sell com￾modities.12 Do states actually threaten other states with "competition" in foreign markets? Or do they promise to blunt the competitive activities of their country's firms in those markets in order to secure concessions on tariff policy? Such events seem extremely unlikely, and Krasner provides no reason to make us believe otherwise. There is, however, a much more potent and historically relevant weapon of economic "power" available to the hegemonic state: it can threaten to cut off one nation's access to its rich home market while allowing other nations continued access to that market. Threatening to raise tariffs unless 11. Ibid., p. 322. 12. A partial exception to this is to be found in those cases where a decision not to sell, i.e., an embargo or some form of voluntary export restraint, has been imposed by the state

78 International Organization the target state lowers its own is clearly a coercive policy,even when it is coupled to the"carrot"of preferential access to the hegemonic state's own market in exchange for the target state's tariff concessions.This strategy would seem to be quite attractive to a hegemonic state.By negotiating with other countries in a series of bilateral negotiations rather than in a multilateral setting,it reduces the possibility that nonhegemonic states will cooperate against it,and takes full advantage of the opportunities to play off the weaker states against one another.The selective awarding of access to the home market husbands the hegemonic state's "bargaining chips"and precludes spectators from taking a free ride on the target country's concessions to the hegemonic state (obtaining access to the hegemonic state's home market on the same favorable terms without having to pay any "price"in the form of tariff reductions).Such a policy is also consistent with what Hirschman terms a "power"policy in commercial relations:the deliberate fostering of trade with those states that are most vulnerable to subsequent manipulation via the exploitation of asymmetrical and unequal dependencies created by such trade.13 However,the larger and more developed the target state is,the costlier will be the short-term sacrifices in the dominant state's welfare re- quired to establish the dependency pattern.(Larger,more developed states may not be subject to entrapment in such dependency relations at any price if there is no influential domestic political interest strongly tied to continuing commercial relations with the dominant country;if there is no small group of products that alone earn foreign exchange;if geography does not constrain the choice of trading partners;and if military or other noneconomic influences can be successfully resisted.) Thus,if Krasner's assessment of the role of military force in regime change is correct,the "power"'of the hegemonic state is essentially economic power in an oligopolistic setting.Again,this is not an empty conclusion,but it is quite a departure from traditional balance-of-power arguments about the centrality of military force in the achievement of national objectives. A fourth difficulty with hegemonic stability theory lies in its treatment of regimes as collective goods.While it is true that in large-number (i.e.,com- petitive)situations it has been suggested that"coercion or some other special device"is necessary for the good to be supplied,4 it does not seem very sensible to view the international system as isomorphic with an economic system of perfect competition.Table 1 shows shares of total world trade held by various states and regions in the 19th century.If we consider just the four leaders-France,Great Britain,Germany,and the United States- we find that their total share of world trade was 48 percent in 1850;by 1913 they still accounted for 46 percent.(If we add to these totals the trade of 13.A.O.Hirschman,National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade(Berkeley:University of California Press,1945). 14.M.Olson,The Logic of Collective Action (New York:Schocken,1968),p..2

78 International Organization the target state lowers its own is clearly a coercive policy, even when it is coupled to the "carrot" of preferential access to the hegemonic state's own market in exchange for the target state's tariff concessions. This strategy would seem to be quite attractive to a hegemonic state. By negotiating with other countries in a series of bilateral negotiations rather than in a multilateral setting, it reduces the possibility that nonhegemonic states will cooperate against it, and takes full advantage of the opportunities to play off the weaker states against one another. The selective awarding of access to the home market husbands the hegemonic state's "bargaining chips" and precludes spectators from taking a free ride on the target country's concessions to the hegemonic state (obtaining access to the hegemonic state's home market on the same favorable terms without having to pay any "price" in the form of tariff reductions). Such a policy is also consistent with what Hirschman terms a "power" policy in commercial relations: the deliberate fostering of trade with those states that are most vulnerable to subsequent manipulation via the exploitation of asymmetrical and unequal dependencies created by such trade.13 However, the larger and more developed the target state is, the costlier will be the short-term sacrifices in the dominant state's welfare re￾quired to establish the dependency pattern. (Larger, more developed states may not be subject to entrapment in such dependency relations at any price if there is no influential domestic political interest strongly tied to continuing commercial relations with the dominant country; if there is no small group of products that alone earn foreign exchange; if geography does not constrain the choice of trading partners; and if military or other noneconomic influences can be successfully resisted.) Thus, if Krasner's assessment of the role of military force in regime change is correct, the "power" of the hegemonic state is essentially economic power in an oligopolistic setting. Again, this is not an empty conclusion, but it is quite a departure from traditional balance-of-power arguments about the centrality of military force in the achievement of national objectives. A fourth difficulty with hegemonic stability theory lies in its treatment of regimes as collective goods. While it is true that in large-number (i.e., com￾petitive) situations it has been suggested that "coercion or some other special device" is necessary for the good to be supplied,14 it does not seem very sensible to view the international system as isomorphic with an economic system of perfect competition. Table 1 shows shares of total world trade held by various states and regions in the 19th century. If we consider just the four leaders-France, Great Britain, Germany, and the United States￾we find that their total share of world trade was 48 percent in 1850; by 19 13 they still accounted for 46 percent. (If we add to these totals the trade of 13. A. 0.Hirschrnan, National Power and theStructureofForeign Trade(Berke1ey: University of California Press, 1945). 14. M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (New York: Schocken, 1968), p. 2

Hegemony theory and tariff levels 79 TABLE 1.Percentage distribution of world trade by states and regions, 1850-1913 1850 1870 1890 1913 Great Britain 22 25 22 16 France 11 10 9 > Germany 6 10 11 12 Other Europe 28 27 27 29 United States 8 9 11 Latin America 8 6 5 8 British Colonies 10 13 18 Other 7 4 4 Source:W.W.Rostow,The World Economy:History and Prospect(Austin:University of Texas Press,1978),Table II-8.Due to rounding,not all columns total 100%. British colonies,the respective percentages would rise to 57%and about 56%.)The international trading system thus exhibited a fair amount of con- centration in the economist's sense.'5 If this judgment is accepted,then arguments concerning the necessary conditions for the supply of collective goods in large-number systems are simply irrelevant.As Olson notes,in small-number (i.e.,oligopolistic)systems the members "can provide them- selves with collective goods without relying on any positive inducements apart from the good itself."6 This conclusion implies that the presence of a hegemonic state is not a necessary condition (though it still may be a sufficient one)for the emergence of open economic regimes in such an oli- gopolistic system. The final difficulty faced by hegemonic stability theory is one that it shares with power theories in general-a lack of attention to theoretical prediction or empirical examination of the process whereby the hegemonic state does or does not achieve open regimes.In the words of a standard text on modeling in the social sciences,the theory of hegemonic stability has a poor "sense of process."7 It is not very helpful in telling us what actors did in order for a system to move from point A to point B.The linkage between shifts in capabilities and shifts in regimes or other outcomes is inferred by noting 15.If we considered the trade of those states that had lost tariff autonomy-China,the Ottoman Empire,certain Latin American states-the total would be even higher,but the dem- onstration of control from the core is more problematic than in the case of formal colonies. 16.Olson,Logic of Collective Action,p.33. 17.C.A.Lave and J.G.March,An Introduction to Models in the Social Sciences (New York:Harper Row,1975)

Hegemony theory and tariff levels 79 TABLE 1. Percentage distribution of world trade by states and regions, 1850-1913 Great Britain 22 2 5 22 16 France 11 10 9 7 Germany 8 10 11 12 Other Europe 28 27 27 29 United States 7 8 9 11 Latin America 8 6 5 8 British Colonies 9 10 13 Other 7 4 4 Source: W. W. Rostow, The World Economy: History and Prospect (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978), Table 11-8. Due to rounding, not all columns total 100%. British colonies, the respective percentages would rise to 57% and about 56O/o.) The international trading system thus exhibited a fair amount of con￾centration in the economist's sense.15 If this judgment is accepted, then arguments concerning the necessary conditions for the supply of collective goods in large-number systems are simply irrelevant. As Olson notes, in small-number (i.e., oligopolistic) systems the members "can provide them￾selves with collective goods without relying on any positive inducements apart from the good itself."16 This conclusion implies that the presence of a hegemonic state is not a necessary condition (though it still may be a sufficient one) for the emergence of open economic regimes in such an oli￾gopolistic system. The final difficulty faced by hegemonic stability theory is one that it shares with power theories in general-a lack of attention to theoretical prediction or empirical examination of the process whereby the hegemonic state does or does not achieve open regimes. In the words of a standard text on modeling in the social sciences, the theory of hegemonic stability has a poor "sense of process."17 It is not very helpful in telling us what actors did in order for a system to move from point A to point B. The linkage between shifts in capabilities and shifts in regimes or other outcomes is inferred by noting 15. If we considered the trade of those states that had lost tariff autonomy-China, the Ottoman Empire, certain Latin American states-the total would be even higher, but the dem￾onstration of control from the core is more problematic than in the case of formal colonies. 16. Olson, Logic of Collective Action, p. 33. 17. C. A. Lave and J. G. March, An Introduction to Models in the Social Sciences (New York: Harper & Row, 1975)

80 International Organization TABLE 2.British overseas trade by geographic region,1854 (percentages) Continent Share of Imports Share of Exports Share of Re-exports Europe 39.7 39.4 76.9 Africa 5.5 4.5 2.7 Asia 15.2 14.0 3.2 N.America 24.4 7.0 35.6 S.America 12.3 2.7 Australasia 2.9 9.3 7.5 a.Figure is for 1854-1857.Export figures do not total 100%because of this variability in dates. Source:W.Schlote,British Overseas Trade from 1700 to the 1830s (Oxford:Basil Blackwell, 1952),pp.35,80.Data for"Britain"actually refer to Great Britain and Ireland.Values are actual'”rather than“official.” covariation (generally in a low-N setting),without any attempt to trace the process whereby changes in capabilities translate into different outcomes. 3.Empirical issues In the preceding section I argued that the crucial practical and theoretical issue in the construction of an open trade regime is how the hegemonic state manages to win the adherence of large,well-developed potential challengers to an open system.The significance of this for the case of Great Britain in the 19th century is illustrated by Table 2. The European countries absorbed a plurality of the value of British exports, and dominated Britain's re-export activity.Their sudden defection from the regime would have created an immense dislocation of British commerce. Since,with the exception of the United States,Britain's only plausible rivals were to be found in Europe,the political and economic significance of Eu- ropean adherence to an open trading system greatly outweighs that of the less developed world's.It is therefore reasonable to focus attention on the empirical issue of whether hegemonic stability theory offers an adequate explanation for most of the states of Europe having adopted an open trading system by the latter 1860s.If a hegemonic stability theory were correct,what ought we to find when we examine British interaction with the European states? First,we ought to find an "active"British policy on lowering tariffs.We would expect to find numerous British proposals for commercial treaties, British efforts to persuade others to adopt lower tariffs on their intrinsic

80 International Organization TABLE 2. British overseas trade by geographic region, 1854 (percentages) Continent Share of Imports Share of Exports Share of Re-exports Europe 39.7 Africa 5.5 Asia 15.2 N. America 24.4 S. America 12.3 Australasia 2.9 a. Figure is for 1854-1857. Export figures do not total 100°/o because of this variability in dates. Source: W. Schlote, British Overseas Tradefrom 1700 to the 1830s (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1952), pp. 35, 80. Data for "Britain" actually refer to Great Britain and Ireland. Values are "actual" rather than "official." covariation (generally in a low-N setting), without any attempt to trace the process whereby changes in capabilities translate into different outcomes. 3. Empirical issues In the preceding section I argued that the crucial practical and theoretical issue in the construction of an open trade regime is how the hegemonic state manages to win the adherence of large, well-developed potential challengers to an open system. The significance of this for the case of Great Britain in the 19th century is illustrated by Table 2. The European countries absorbed a plurality of the value of British exports, and dominated Britain's re-export activity. Their sudden defection from the regime would have created an immense dislocation of British commerce. Since, with the exception of the United States, Britain's only plausible rivals were to be found in Europe, the political and economic significance of Eu￾ropean adherence to an open trading system greatly outweighs that of the less developed world's. It is therefore reasonable to focus attention on the empirical issue of whether hegemonic stability theory offers an adequate explanation for most of the states of Europe having adopted an open trading system by the latter 1860s. If a hegemonic stability theory were correct, what ought we to find when we examine British interaction with the European states? First, we ought to find an "active'' British policy on lowering tariffs. We would expect to find numerous British proposals for commercial treaties, British efforts to persuade others to adopt lower tariffs on their intrinsic

Hegemony theory and tariff levels 81 merits,and other behavior that would suggest that British decision makers allocated significant attention and effort to securing a more open trading system. Second,we ought to find British efforts to capitalize upon British bargaining advantages in order to secure the lowering of European states'tariffs.In particular,we ought to observe British efforts to link the tariff issue to bar- gaining over other issues,and to seek tariff reductions as a guid pro quo for British diplomatic,military,or economic support.We also ought to find instances of British attempts to use economic or even military coercive di- plomacy in efforts to secure relevant concessions on tariffs.In particular,we ought to find attempts to negotiate reciprocal,nongeneralizing tariff reductions (i.e.,treaties without a most-favored-nation clause). Third,we ought to find that these attempts were successful.Hegemonic stability theory makes claims not only about a hegemonic state's behavior but also about the outcome of its behavior.If the target states successfully resisted British initiatives or liberalized"voluntarily"(that is,in the absence of any attempts by Britain to induce them to do so),then the case for the theory would be considerably weakened. Assuming that this is a fair statement of the implications of current versions of hegemonic stability theory,an empirical finding counter to these predictions would imply that the theory as a whole does not constitute an adequate explanation for changes in mid 19th century tariff levels.However,such a finding would say nothing about the truth of specific components of various versions of hegemonic stability theory.It is indeed possible that many of these components are true but,even if they were not,those scholars who adhere to the epistemological strategy of Milton Friedman would no doubt contend that a demonstration of the falsity of component propositions in no way reflects upon the soundness of the theory.By testing implications, rather than components,such a contention simply cannot arise. We now briefly consider the evidence presented in some standard historical works on British commercial diplomacy in the 19th century.There is a lack of consensus among hegemonic stability theorists about the timing of the end of British hegemony.Hence I focus on British efforts to secure European adherence to an open trading system,rather than on possible later efforts to maintain that system.Since hegemonic stability theory posits hegemon- to-target influence as the mechanism for propagating an open trading system, the investigation centers on this process rather than on the origins of Britain's low tariff policy.(Whatever the origins of Britain's policy,the case for or against the theory clearly rests on whether the open trading system was propagated in the way the theory postulates.) In the period 1750-1815,Britain attempted to use the granting of pref- erential access to the British home market as a bargaining chip;in turn, Britain frequently sought preferential access to other markets when nego- tiating.This policy was officially ended by the Reciprocity of Duties Act of

Hegemony theory and tariff levels 81 merits, and other behavior that would suggest that British decision makers allocated significant attention and effort to securing a more open trading system. Second, we ought to find British efforts to capitalize upon British bargaining advantages in order to secure the lowering of European states' tariffs. In particular, we ought to observe British efforts to link the tariff issue to bar￾gaining over other issues, and to seek tariff reductions as a quid pro quo for British diplomatic, military, or economic support. We also ought to find instances of British attempts to use economic or even military coercive di￾plomacy in efforts to secure relevant concessions on tariffs. In particular, we ought to find attempts to negotiate reciprocal, nongeneralizing tariff reductions (i.e., treaties without a most-favored-nation clause). Third, we ought to find that these attempts were successful. Hegemonic stability theory makes claims not only about a hegemonic state's behavior but also about the outcome of its behavior. If the target states successfully resisted British initiatives or liberalized "voluntarily" (that is, in the absence of any attempts by Britain to induce them to do so), then the case for the theory would be considerably weakened. Assuming that this is a fair statement of the implications of current versions of hegemonic stability theory, an empirical finding counter to these predictions would imply that the theory as a whole does not constitute an adequate explanation for changes in mid 19th century tariff levels. However, such a finding would say nothing about the truth of specific components of various versions of hegemonic stability theory. It is indeed possible that many of these components are true but, even if they were not, those scholars who adhere to the epistemological strategy of Milton Friedman would no doubt contend that a demonstration of the falsity of component propositions in no way reflects upon the soundness of the theory. By testing implications, rather than components, such a contention simply cannot arise. We now briefly consider the evidence presented in some standard historical works on British commercial diplomacy in the 19th century. There is a lack of consensus among hegemonic stability theorists about the timing of the end of British hegemony. Hence I focus on British efforts to secure European adherence to an open trading system, rather than on possible later efforts to maintain that system. Since hegemonic stability theory posits hegemon￾to-target influence as the mechanism for propagating an open trading system, the investigation centers on this process rather than on the origins of Britain's low tariff policy. (Whatever the origins of Britain's policy, the case for or against the theory clearly rests on whether the open trading system was propagated in the way the theory postulates.) In the period 1750-1815, Britain attempted to use the granting of pref￾erential access to the British home market as a bargaining chip; in turn, Britain frequently sought preferential access to other markets when nego￾tiating. This policy was officially ended by the Reciprocity of Duties Act of