《国际政治经济学》文献资料（Political Economy of International Trade：Domestic Politics）Learning to Love Globalization. Education and Individual Attitudes Toward International Trade

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS International Organization Foundation Learning to Love Globalization:Education and Individual Attitudes toward International Trade Author(s):Jens Hainmueller and Michael J.Hiscox Source:International Organization,Vol.60.No.2 (Spring.2006),pp.469-498 Published by:Cambridge University Press on behalf of the International Organization Foundation Stable URL:http://www.jstor.org/stable/3877900 Accessed:07/07/201103:24 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use,available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp.JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides,in part,that unless you have obtained prior permission,you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles,and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal,non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work.Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cup. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars,researchers,and students discover,use,and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive.We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.For more information about JSTOR,please contact support@jstor.org. Cambridge University Press and International Organization Foundation are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize,preserve and extend access to International Organization. 29 STOR http://www.jstor.org

International Organization Foundation Learning to Love Globalization: Education and Individual Attitudes toward International Trade Author(s): Jens Hainmueller and Michael J. Hiscox Source: International Organization, Vol. 60, No. 2 (Spring, 2006), pp. 469-498 Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the International Organization Foundation Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3877900 . Accessed: 07/07/2011 03:24 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at . http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cup. . Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Cambridge University Press and International Organization Foundation are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to International Organization. http://www.jstor.org

Learning to Love Globalization: Education and Individual Attitudes Toward International Trade Jens Hainmueller and Michael J.Hiscox Abstract Recent studies of public attitudes toward trade have converged on one central finding:support for trade restrictions is highest among respondents with the lowest levels of education.This has been interpreted as strong support for the Stolper- Samuelson theorem,the classic economic treatment of the income effects of trade that predicts that trade openness benefits those owning factors of production with which their economy is relatively well endowed(those with skills in the advanced economies)while hurting others (low-skilled workers).We reexamine the available survey data,showing that the impact of education on attitudes toward trade is almost identical among respondents in the active labor force and those who are not(even those who are retired).We also find that,while individuals with college-level educa- tions are far more likely to favor trade openness than others,other types of education have no significant effects on attitudes,and some actually reduce the support for trade,even though they clearly contribute to skill acquisition.Combined,these results strongly suggest that the effects of education on individual trade preferences are not primarily a product of distributional concerns linked to job skills.We suggest that exposure to economic ideas and information among college-educated individuals plays a key role in shaping attitudes toward trade and globalization.This is not to say that distributional issues are not important in shaping attitudes toward trade-just that they are not clearly manifest in the simple,broad association between education lev- els and support for free trade. A growing body of scholarly research has examined survey data on attitudes toward trade among voters,focusing on individual determinants of protectionist senti- ments.These studies have converged on one central finding:fears about the dis- tributional effects of trade openness among less-educated,blue-collar workers lie at the heart of much of the backlash against globalization in the United States and other advanced economies.Support for new trade restrictions is highest among The authors would like to thank James Alt,Jeffry Frieden,Robert Lawrence,Dani Rodrik,Ron Rogowski,Ken Scheve,Andy Baker,Peter Gourevitch,and Beth Simmons for helpful comments on earlier drafts. International Organization 60,Spring 2006,pp.469-498 2006 by The IO Foundation. D01:10.1017/S0020818306060140

Learning to Love Globalization: Education and Individual Attitudes Toward International Trade Jens Hainmueller and Michael J. Hiscox Abstract Recent studies of public attitudes toward trade have converged on one central finding: support for trade restrictions is highest among respondents with the lowest levels of education. This has been interpreted as strong support for the Stolper￾Samuelson theorem, the classic economic treatment of the income effects of trade that predicts that trade openness benefits those owning factors of production with which their economy is relatively well endowed (those with skills in the advanced economies) while hurting others (low-skilled workers). We reexamine the available survey data, showing that the impact of education on attitudes toward trade is almost identical among respondents in the active labor force and those who are not (even those who are retired). We also find that, while individuals with college-level educa￾tions are far more likely to favor trade openness than others, other types of education have no significant effects on attitudes, and some actually reduce the support for trade, even though they clearly contribute to skill acquisition. Combined, these results strongly suggest that the effects of education on individual trade preferences are not primarily a product of distributional concerns linked to job skills. We suggest that exposure to economic ideas and information among college-educated individuals plays a key role in shaping attitudes toward trade and globalization. This is not to say that distributional issues are not important in shaping attitudes toward trade-just that they are not clearly manifest in the simple, broad association between education lev￾els and support for free trade. A growing body of scholarly research has examined survey data on attitudes toward trade among voters, focusing on individual determinants of protectionist senti￾ments. These studies have converged on one central finding: fears about the dis￾tributional effects of trade openness among less-educated, blue-collar workers lie at the heart of much of the backlash against globalization in the United States and other advanced economies. Support for new trade restrictions is highest among The authors would like to thank James Alt, Jeffry Frieden, Robert Lawrence, Dani Rodrik, Ron Rogowski, Ken Scheve, Andy Baker, Peter Gourevitch, and Beth Simmons for helpful comments on earlier drafts. International Organization 60, Spring 2006, pp. 469-498 ? 2006 by The IO Foundation. DOI: 10.1017/S0020818306060140

470 International Organization respondents with the lowest levels of education.These findings are interpreted as strong support for the Stolper-Samuelson theorem,the classic economic treatment of the income effects of trade that predicts that trade openness benefits those own- ing factors of production with which their economy is relatively well endowed (those with high skill levels in the advanced economies)while hurting others (low- skilled and unskilled workers). However,the positive relationship between education and support for trade lib- eralization might also-and perhaps primarily-reflect the facts that more edu- cated respondents tend to be more exposed to economic ideas about the overall efficiency gains for the national economy associated with greater trade openness and tend to be less prone to nationalist and antiforeigner sentiments often linked with protectionism.2 Studies have shown that measures of economic knowledge are strongly associated with education levels among individuals,and exposure to economics at the college level has especially powerful effects.3 A large body of research also shows that increased education-and especially college education- tends to socialize students to have more tolerant,cosmopolitan views of the world.4 It thus seems quite possible that differences of opinion among more and less- educated voters over the trade issue may be shaped less by Stolper-Samuelson- style calculations about the expected distributional effects of trade than by competing ideational and cultural perspectives-that is,education may be impor- tant here primarily because it teaches students to think about trade and globaliza- tion in different ways and/or to evaluate it according to a different set of values. Which of these very different interpretations is more correct?The answer to this question is critical to our understanding of the political economy of trade and the nature of the political disagreements over globalization now taking place.Here we reexamine the available survey data on individual attitudes toward trade,con- ducting a simple test of the effects of education on support for trade that distin- guishes clearly between the Stolper-Samuelson interpretation of this relationship and alternative ideational and cultural accounts.We find that the impact of educa- tion on attitudes toward trade is almost identical among respondents currently in the active labor force and among those who are not (even those who are retired). That the effects of education on trade policy preferences are not mediated by whether or not individuals are actually being paid for the employment of their skills strongly suggests that it is not primarily a product of distributional con- cerns.The analysis also reveals clear nonlinearities in the relationship between education and trade preferences:while individuals who have been exposed to col- lege or university education are far more likely to favor trade openness than those who have not,other types of educational attainment have no significant effects on attitudes and some even reduce the likelihood that individuals support trade even 1.See,for example,Scheve and Slaughter 2001a and 2001b;Mayda and Rodrik 2005;and O'Rourke and Sinnott 2002. 2.See Bauer,Pool,and Dexter 1972,103;and Holsti 1996,87-88. 3.See Saunders 1980;and Gleason and van Scyoc 1995. 4.See for example,Campbell et al.1960,475-81;and Erikson,Luttbeg,and Tedin 1991,155-56

470 International Organization respondents with the lowest levels of education.' These findings are interpreted as strong support for the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, the classic economic treatment of the income effects of trade that predicts that trade openness benefits those own￾ing factors of production with which their economy is relatively well endowed (those with high skill levels in the advanced economies) while hurting others (low￾skilled and unskilled workers). However, the positive relationship between education and support for trade lib￾eralization might also-and perhaps primarily-reflect the facts that more edu￾cated respondents tend to be more exposed to economic ideas about the overall efficiency gains for the national economy associated with greater trade openness and tend to be less prone to nationalist and antiforeigner sentiments often linked with protectionism.2 Studies have shown that measures of economic knowledge are strongly associated with education levels among individuals, and exposure to economics at the college level has especially powerful effects.3 A large body of research also shows that increased education-and especially college education￾tends to socialize students to have more tolerant, cosmopolitan views of the world.4 It thus seems quite possible that differences of opinion among more and less￾educated voters over the trade issue may be shaped less by Stolper-Samuelson￾style calculations about the expected distributional effects of trade than by competing ideational and cultural perspectives-that is, education may be impor￾tant here primarily because it teaches students to think about trade and globaliza￾tion in different ways and/or to evaluate it according to a different set of values. Which of these very different interpretations is more correct? The answer to this question is critical to our understanding of the political economy of trade and the nature of the political disagreements over globalization now taking place. Here we reexamine the available survey data on individual attitudes toward trade, con￾ducting a simple test of the effects of education on support for trade that distin￾guishes clearly between the Stolper-Samuelson interpretation of this relationship and alternative ideational and cultural accounts. We find that the impact of educa￾tion on attitudes toward trade is almost identical among respondents currently in the active labor force and among those who are not (even those who are retired). That the effects of education on trade policy preferences are not mediated by whether or not individuals are actually being paid for the employment of their skills strongly suggests that it is not primarily a product of distributional con￾cerns. The analysis also reveals clear nonlinearities in the relationship between education and trade preferences: while individuals who have been exposed to col￾lege or university education are far more likely to favor trade openness than those who have not, other types of educational attainment have no significant effects on attitudes and some even reduce the likelihood that individuals support trade even 1. See, for example, Scheve and Slaughter 2001a and 2001b; Mayda and Rodrik 2005; and O'Rourke and Sinnott 2002. 2. See Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1972, 103; and Holsti 1996, 87-88. 3. See Saunders 1980; and Gleason and van Scyoc 1995. 4. See for example, Campbell et al. 1960, 475-81; and Erikson, Luttbeg, and Tedin 1991, 155-56

Education and International Trade 471 though they clearly contribute to skill acquisition.These findings indicate that the particular ideational and/or cultural effects associated with college education,and not the gradual accumulation of skills,are critical in shaping individual attitudes toward trade. We conclude that the impact of education on how voters'think about trade and globalization has more to do with exposure to economic ideas and information about the aggregate and varied effects of these economic phenomena,than it does with individual calculations about how trade affects personal income or job secu- rity.This is not to say that the latter types of calculations are not important in shaping individuals'views of trade-just that they are not being manifest in the simple association between education and support for trade openness.As we dis- cuss in the concluding section,we think it is likely that concerns about the effects of trade on personal income and job security might actually hinge on the particu- lar impact of trade openness in specific industries.One of the key implications of our findings is that future empirical tests of the determinants of individual trade preferences need to be substantially refined to identify the impact of distributional concerns on attitudes toward trade and globalization and distinguish these from the impact of ideational and cultural factors. Explaining Attitudes Toward International Trade To date,the analysis of survey data aimed at revealing the determinants of indi- vidual attitudes toward trade has focused predominantly on occupational differ- ences among respondents.A principal aim has been to test standard economic models that describe the income effects of trade for different individuals as a function of the types of productive inputs they own.Examining data from recent American National Election Studies (NES)surveys in the United States,Scheve and Slaughter emphasized the importance of respondents'"human capital"or skills (measured principally by years of education),finding that individuals with lower skills were more likely to support restrictions on imports than those with higher skills.s Mayda and Rodrik and O'Rourke and Sinnott came to similar conclu- sions after examining the data from the 1995 ISSP survey:again skill levels, measured either by years of education (Mayda and Rodrik)or occupational cat- egories (O'Rourke and Sinnott),were found to have large effects on attitudes, with lower skilled individuals being the most protectionist in outlook.In terms of economic theory,these findings have been interpreted as providing strong sup- port for the Stolper-Samuelson theorem,which predicts that trade raises real 5.Scheve and Slaughter 2001a and 2001b. 6.See Mayda and Rodrik 2005;and O'Rourke and Sinnott 2002.Similar types of findings are reported by Balistreri 1997;and Beaulieu 2002,who examined data on support for the Canadian-U.S.Free Trade Agreement in Canada;Gabel 1998,who used Eurobarometer data on attitudes toward European integration;and Baker 2003,using similar survey data on attitudes toward trade in Latin American nations

Education and International Trade 471 though they clearly contribute to skill acquisition. These findings indicate that the particular ideational and/or cultural effects associated with college education, and not the gradual accumulation of skills, are critical in shaping individual attitudes toward trade. We conclude that the impact of education on how voters' think about trade and globalization has more to do with exposure to economic ideas and information about the aggregate and varied effects of these economic phenomena, than it does with individual calculations about how trade affects personal income or job secu￾rity. This is not to say that the latter types of calculations are not important in shaping individuals' views of trade-just that they are not being manifest in the simple association between education and support for trade openness. As we dis￾cuss in the concluding section, we think it is likely that concerns about the effects of trade on personal income and job security might actually hinge on the particu￾lar impact of trade openness in specific industries. One of the key implications of our findings is that future empirical tests of the determinants of individual trade preferences need to be substantially refined to identify the impact of distributional concerns on attitudes toward trade and globalization and distinguish these from the impact of ideational and cultural factors. Explaining Attitudes Toward International Trade To date, the analysis of survey data aimed at revealing the determinants of indi￾vidual attitudes toward trade has focused predominantly on occupational differ￾ences among respondents. A principal aim has been to test standard economic models that describe the income effects of trade for different individuals as a function of the types of productive inputs they own. Examining data from recent American National Election Studies (NES) surveys in the United States, Scheve and Slaughter emphasized the importance of respondents' "human capital" or skills (measured principally by years of education), finding that individuals with lower skills were more likely to support restrictions on imports than those with higher skills.5 Mayda and Rodrik and O'Rourke and Sinnott came to similar conclu￾sions after examining the data from the 1995 ISSP survey: again skill levels, measured either by years of education (Mayda and Rodrik) or occupational cat￾egories (O'Rourke and Sinnott), were found to have large effects on attitudes, with lower skilled individuals being the most protectionist in outlook.6 In terms of economic theory, these findings have been interpreted as providing strong sup￾port for the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, which predicts that trade raises real 5. Scheve and Slaughter 2001a and 2001b. 6. See Mayda and Rodrik 2005; and O'Rourke and Sinnott 2002. Similar types of findings are reported by Balistreri 1997; and Beaulieu 2002, who examined data on support for the Canadian-U.S. Free Trade Agreement in Canada; Gabel 1998, who used Eurobarometer data on attitudes toward European integration; and Baker 2003, using similar survey data on attitudes toward trade in Latin American nations

472 International Organization incomes for those who own factors with which the economy is relatively well endowed (that is,labor skills in the developed economies),while disadvantaging owners of other factors (unskilled or low-skilled labor).?Scheve and Slaughter highlight as a"key finding"of their study the conclusion that "the preferences about trade and immigration policy align strongly with labor market skills."8 Mayda and Rodrik report that the results from their analysis of the importance of educational attainment in shaping views about trade are "strikingly supportive of the implications of the factor-endowments model and of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem."9 Yet there are other,plausible,ways to interpret the positive relationship between the education levels of surveyed individuals and their support for trade openness. It seems particularly limiting to consider education only as a measure of workers' skill levels,relevant only in the way it affects the expected income effects of trade for each individual.Education may be relevant here for other reasons-other causal mechanisms may be generating the observed association between education levels and protrade attitudes.We think there are two likely candidates:an ideational mech- anism that hinges on the role played by economic ideas and knowledge in the formation of economic policy preferences;and a cultural mechanism that relates commitments to key values,such as tolerance and cosmopolitanism,to attitudes toward foreign policy issues. The ideational argument is fairly straightforward.Highly educated respondents are likely to think about international trade in different ways compared to less- educated counterparts;the highly educated use a more sophisticated set of ideas about cause-and-effect relationships and more information about the effects of trade for themselves and for others.10 College-educated individuals,in particular,are likely to be far more informed than others about the aggregate efficiency gains associated with expanded trade,especially if they have had any contact at all with economics courses and with the theory of comparative advantage.While there is a firm consensus among economists on the virtues of trade openness,the counterin- tuitive loveliness of the law of comparative advantage makes it much more diffi- cult to convey the case for trade outside the college classroom.Studies of economic "literacy"among the public have shown that general measures of eco- nomic knowledge are strongly associated with education levels among individu- als,and college education in particular.2 Exposure to at least one college-level economics course is an especially powerful predictor of economic knowledge.Crit- 7.Stolper and Samuelson 1941.This theorem has been used extensively in the analysis of trade politics;see Rogowski 1989;and Hiscox 2002. 8.Scheve and Slaughter 2001b.9. 9.Mayda and Rodrik 2005,1409. 10.Among scholars who have examined surveys of public attitudes toward trade,the topic is typi- cally regarded as a complex issue about which most survey respondents have low levels of informa- tion;see Bauer,Pool,and Dexter 1972,81-84;Destler 1995,180;and Pryor 2002. 11.See Krugman 1993. 12.See,for example,Saunders 1980;and Gleason and van Scyoc 1995

472 International Organization incomes for those who own factors with which the economy is relatively well endowed (that is, labor skills in the developed economies), while disadvantaging owners of other factors (unskilled or low-skilled labor).' Scheve and Slaughter highlight as a "key finding" of their study the conclusion that "the preferences about trade and immigration policy align strongly with labor market skills."8 Mayda and Rodrik report that the results from their analysis of the importance of educational attainment in shaping views about trade are "strikingly supportive of the implications of the factor-endowments model and of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem." 9 Yet there are other, plausible, ways to interpret the positive relationship between the education levels of surveyed individuals and their support for trade openness. It seems particularly limiting to consider education only as a measure of workers' skill levels, relevant only in the way it affects the expected income effects of trade for each individual. Education may be relevant here for other reasons-other causal mechanisms may be generating the observed association between education levels and protrade attitudes. We think there are two likely candidates: an ideational mech￾anism that hinges on the role played by economic ideas and knowledge in the formation of economic policy preferences; and a cultural mechanism that relates commitments to key values, such as tolerance and cosmopolitanism, to attitudes toward foreign policy issues. The ideational argument is fairly straightforward. Highly educated respondents are likely to think about international trade in different ways compared to less￾educated counterparts; the highly educated use a more sophisticated set of ideas about cause-and-effect relationships and more information about the effects of trade for themselves and for others.10 College-educated individuals, in particular, are likely to be far more informed than others about the aggregate efficiency gains associated with expanded trade, especially if they have had any contact at all with economics courses and with the theory of comparative advantage. While there is a firm consensus among economists on the virtues of trade openness, the counterin￾tuitive loveliness of the law of comparative advantage makes it much more diffi￾cult to convey the case for trade outside the college classroom." Studies of economic "literacy" among the public have shown that general measures of eco￾nomic knowledge are strongly associated with education levels among individu￾als, and college education in particular.12 Exposure to at least one college-level economics course is an especially powerful predictor of economic knowledge. Crit- 7. Stolper and Samuelson 1941. This theorem has been used extensively in the analysis of trade politics; see Rogowski 1989; and Hiscox 2002. 8. Scheve and Slaughter 2001b, 9. 9. Mayda and Rodrik 2005, 1409. 10. Among scholars who have examined surveys of public attitudes toward trade, the topic is typi￾cally regarded as a complex issue about which most survey respondents have low levels of informa￾tion; see Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1972, 81-84; Destler 1995, 180; and Pryor 2002. 11. See Krugman 1993. 12. See, for example, Saunders 1980; and Gleason and van Scyoc 1995

Education and International Trade 473 ically,related studies show that higher levels of economic knowledge among sur- veyed individuals have large positive effects on support for free trade.3 This type of ideational argument does have precedents in both the international political economy and broader international relations literatures.Ideas,viewed as beliefs about cause-and-effect relationships,have been assigned key roles in accounts of policymaking in a variety of areas,including international cooperation on envi- ronmental issues and arms control.14 On the trade issue specifically,scholars have linked the removal of mercantilist restrictions on trade in Europe in the nineteenth century to the ideas of Smith and Ricardo and the birth of classical trade theory.5 The multilateral trade liberalization pursued among Western nations after 1945 has been connected to neoclassical economic theories and the spread of Keynesian ideas in particular.16 These types of accounts have traditionally focused on the impor- tance of particular ideas among policymakers,and the transmission of ideas to gov- ernment officials via transnational networks of experts and activists.7 Examining the distribution of economic ideas among voters,and how this might be connected to policy preferences,might be an interesting and important extension. Another plausible explanation for the relationship between education and atti- tudes toward trade focuses on differences in cultural values:highly educated indi- viduals are less prone than others to nationalist and antiforeigner sentiments that are often linked with protectionism in political debates.There is a large scholarly literature showing that education,at least in the United States,tends to socialize students to have more tolerant,pro-outsider views of the world.18 Education can foster tolerance,not just by increasing students'knowledge of foreign cultures and raising levels of critical thinking,but also by generating more diverse and cosmopolitan social networks,especially at the college level.Indeed,Betts has argued that one aspect of class identity that emerges among the college-educated in Western nations is a commitment to cosmopolitanism and an appreciation for diverse cultures.20 Studies of survey data also show that various measures of nation- alism and national pride are significant predictors of support for trade protection.2 13.See Walstad 1997;and Walstad and Rebeck 2002.Walstad and Rebeck 2002 make the larger point that scholarly analysis of public opinion on economic issues makes the erroneous implicit assump- tion that survey respondents are undifferentiated in terms of their economic knowledge.In fact,indi- viduals differ dramatically in their levels of economic knowledge,as measured by their scores on a set of test questions covering basic economic concepts and facts,and such knowledge scores are signifi- cant predictors of attitudes about a range of economic policy issues 14.For a general discussion,see Goldstein and Keohane 1993;on environmental negotiations,see Haas 1992;on arms control,see Adler 1992;and Price 1998. 15.See Kindleberger 1975;and Bhagwati 1988. 16.See Ruggie 1998;and Goldstein 1988.See also Hall 1989 for essays on the particular impact of Keynesian macroeconomic theory among policymakers in the 1930s and 1940s. 17.For example,Haas 1992;and Keck and Sikkink 1998. 18.For example,Campbell et al.1960,475-81;Erikson,Luttbeg,and Tedin 1991,155-56;and McClosky and Brill 1983. 19.See Case,Greeley,and Fuchs 1989;and Allport 1954. 20.Bets1988. 21.See Mayda and Rodrik 2005,1414-16;and O'Rourke and Sinnott 2002,173.On these points, see also Holsti 1996,87-88

Education and International Trade 473 ically, related studies show that higher levels of economic knowledge among sur￾veyed individuals have large positive effects on support for free trade."3 This type of ideational argument does have precedents in both the international political economy and broader international relations literatures. Ideas, viewed as beliefs about cause-and-effect relationships, have been assigned key roles in accounts of policymaking in a variety of areas, including international cooperation on envi￾ronmental issues and arms control.14 On the trade issue specifically, scholars have linked the removal of mercantilist restrictions on trade in Europe in the nineteenth century to the ideas of Smith and Ricardo and the birth of classical trade theory.15 The multilateral trade liberalization pursued among Western nations after 1945 has been connected to neoclassical economic theories and the spread of Keynesian ideas in particular.16 These types of accounts have traditionally focused on the impor￾tance of particular ideas among policymakers, and the transmission of ideas to gov￾ernment officials via transnational networks of experts and activists.I Examining the distribution of economic ideas among voters, and how this might be connected to policy preferences, might be an interesting and important extension. Another plausible explanation for the relationship between education and atti￾tudes toward trade focuses on differences in cultural values: highly educated indi￾viduals are less prone than others to nationalist and antiforeigner sentiments that are often linked with protectionism in political debates. There is a large scholarly literature showing that education, at least in the United States, tends to socialize students to have more tolerant, pro-outsider views of the world.'" Education can foster tolerance, not just by increasing students' knowledge of foreign cultures and raising levels of critical thinking, but also by generating more diverse and cosmopolitan social networks, especially at the college level.19 Indeed, Betts has argued that one aspect of class identity that emerges among the college-educated in Western nations is a commitment to cosmopolitanism and an appreciation for diverse cultures.20 Studies of survey data also show that various measures of nation￾alism and national pride are significant predictors of support for trade protection.21 13. See Walstad 1997; and Walstad and Rebeck 2002. Walstad and Rebeck 2002 make the larger point that scholarly analysis of public opinion on economic issues makes the erroneous implicit assump￾tion that survey respondents are undifferentiated in terms of their economic knowledge. In fact, indi￾viduals differ dramatically in their levels of economic knowledge, as measured by their scores on a set of test questions covering basic economic concepts and facts, and such knowledge scores are signifi￾cant predictors of attitudes about a range of economic policy issues. 14. For a general discussion, see Goldstein and Keohane 1993; on environmental negotiations, see Haas 1992; on arms control, see Adler 1992; and Price 1998. 15. See Kindleberger 1975; and Bhagwati 1988. 16. See Ruggie 1998; and Goldstein 1988. See also Hall 1989 for essays on the particular impact of Keynesian macroeconomic theory among policymakers in the 1930s and 1940s. 17. For example, Haas 1992; and Keck and Sikkink 1998. 18. For example, Campbell et al. 1960, 475-81; Erikson, Luttbeg, and Tedin 1991, 155-56; and McClosky and Brill 1983. 19. See Case, Greeley, and Fuchs 1989; and Allport 1954. 20. Betts 1988. 21. See Mayda and Rodrik 2005, 1414-16; and O'Rourke and Sinnott 2002, 173. On these points, see also Holsti 1996, 87-88

474 International Organization This type of argument resonates with a growing body of research in inter- national relations that focuses on the importance of cultural values and concep- tions of identity and how they shape the interests pursued by policymakers in international affairs-in areas including military strategy,humanitarian interven- tion,and support for human rights.22 It is more difficult to find cultural accounts of trade politics or policymaking,specifically,in the political economy literature, though references to the popular appeal of protectionism when linked with nation- alism and xenophobia are common.23 How then should we interpret the observed connection between education and support for trade?Besides the standard account,which focuses on Stolper- Samuelson-style distributional concerns,alternative accounts that stress the impor- tance of economic ideas and related values also seem highly plausible.We suggest a simple test to establish whether the education connection is primarily reflecting concerns about the effects of trade on respondents'personal incomes or whether it is a manifestation of broader differences in ideas and/or values among sur- veyed individuals.We examine the impact of education levels on attitudes toward trade among respondents currently in the active labor force and among those who are not.If the Stolper-Samuelson interpretation of the education effect is accu- rate,this effect should be contingent on whether or not individuals are actually being paid for the employment of their skills in the labor market.24 The Effects of Education on Trade Preferences Our new empirical tests draw from two key sources of data on individual trade preferences:the NES and the International Social Survey Program (ISSP).These are the same data sets employed by the two most prominent studies of individual attitudes toward trade in recent years:the analyses by Scheve and Slaughter and Mayda and Rodrik.5 In the following section we briefly describe each dataset and present the results for our split-sample tests. Tests Using the NES Data The NES surveys are fielded in the United States around the time of presidential elections and designed to gather data on Americans'social backgrounds,political predispositions,opinions on questions of public policy,and participation in polit- 22.For general discussions,see Wendt 1999;Ruggie 1998;and Finnemore and Sikkink 1998.For studies of strategy,see Katzenstein 1996;on human rights,see Sikkink 1993. 23.For example,Bauer,Pool,and Dexter 1972,103. 24.Similar split-sample tests have been used in studies of anti-immigrant sentiments to help dis- cern whether greater opposition to immigration among less educated survey respondents(compared with more educated counterparts)reflects different degrees of concern about having to compete with immigrants in the job market:see Scheve and Slaughter 2001c;Mayda 2004;and also Hainmueller and Hiscox 2004. 25.Scheve and Slaughter 2001a and 2001b;and Mayda and Rodrik 2005

474 International Organization This type of argument resonates with a growing body of research in inter￾national relations that focuses on the importance of cultural values and concep￾tions of identity and how they shape the interests pursued by policymakers in international affairs-in areas including military strategy, humanitarian interven￾tion, and support for human rights.22 It is more difficult to find cultural accounts of trade politics or policymaking, specifically, in the political economy literature, though references to the popular appeal of protectionism when linked with nation￾alism and xenophobia are common.23 How then should we interpret the observed connection between education and support for trade? Besides the standard account, which focuses on Stolper￾Samuelson-style distributional concerns, alternative accounts that stress the impor￾tance of economic ideas and related values also seem highly plausible. We suggest a simple test to establish whether the education connection is primarily reflecting concerns about the effects of trade on respondents' personal incomes or whether it is a manifestation of broader differences in ideas and/or values among sur￾veyed individuals. We examine the impact of education levels on attitudes toward trade among respondents currently in the active labor force and among those who are not. If the Stolper-Samuelson interpretation of the education effect is accu￾rate, this effect should be contingent on whether or not individuals are actually being paid for the employment of their skills in the labor market.24 The Effects of Education on Trade Preferences Our new empirical tests draw from two key sources of data on individual trade preferences: the NES and the International Social Survey Program (ISSP). These are the same data sets employed by the two most prominent studies of individual attitudes toward trade in recent years: the analyses by Scheve and Slaughter and Mayda and Rodrik.25 In the following section we briefly describe each dataset and present the results for our split-sample tests. Tests Using the NES Data The NES surveys are fielded in the United States around the time of presidential elections and designed to gather data on Americans' social backgrounds, political predispositions, opinions on questions of public policy, and participation in polit- 22. For general discussions, see Wendt 1999; Ruggie 1998; and Finnemore and Sikkink 1998. For studies of strategy, see Katzenstein 1996; on human rights, see Sikkink 1993. 23. For example, Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1972, 103. 24. Similar split-sample tests have been used in studies of anti-immigrant sentiments to help dis￾cern whether greater opposition to immigration among less educated survey respondents (compared with more educated counterparts) reflects different degrees of concern about having to compete with immigrants in the job market: see Scheve and Slaughter 2001c; Mayda 2004; and also Hainmueller and Hiscox 2004. 25. Scheve and Slaughter 2001a and 2001b; and Mayda and Rodrik 2005

Education and International Trade 475 ical life.26 In 1992,for the first time,the NES included a question that asked respondents about their attitudes toward international trade.The question was the following:"Some people have suggested placing new limits on foreign imports in order to protect American jobs.Others say that such limits would raise con- sumer prices and hurt American exports.Do you favor or oppose placing new limits on imports,or haven't you thought much about this?" Scheve and Slaughter used responses to this question from the 1992 NES sur- vey as their measure of individual trade policy preferences.27 We have replicated their approach here to conduct the split-sample test,while also examining data from the 1996 NES survey that included the same trade question.28 We created the dichotomous dependent variable TRADE OPINION,coded as 1 for responses that favored protection("new limits on foreign imports")and 0 for those opposed.The "haven't thought much about this"answers are coded as missing,as in the Scheve and Slaughter analysis. The principal measure of education is sCHOOLING,which simply records the years of full-time education completed by each respondent (a cap is set by the NES at seventeen years).This is the measure employed by Scheve and Slaugh- ter.To allow for nonlinear education effects,we have also constructed a set of dummy variables indicating each respondent's highest level of educational at- tainment:JUNIOR HIGH (1 =8 years of schooling;0 otherwise);HIGH SCHOOL (1 high school degree;0=otherwise);HIGHER EDUCATION (1 some years of post-high school education,including junior or community college;0=other- wise);CoLLEGE (1 four-year bachelor's degree;0 otherwise);and GRADU- ATE(1=postgraduate degree;0=otherwise).29 Assuming that education has linear effects on trade preferences seems appropriate if one assumes that each additional year of education (of any type)improves an individual's skills(and changes his or her attitudes)by a roughly constant amount.It is less appropriate if education has other,nonlinear types of effects associated with the ideas and information individuals possess about the way the economy works or the kinds of values and preferences they develop-as noted above,college education appears to play an overwhelming role in terms of its impact on ideas and cultural values among individuals. For different subsamples of respondents,we estimated binary probit models using TRADE OPINION as the dependent variable,testing for the effects of SCHOOLING or the different education dummy variables while controlling for a variety of other individual characteristics that might plausibly affect trade preferences.We esti- mated each model with two sets of covariates:a limited set of standard sociode- 26.For details,see Miller et al.1992;and Rosenstone et al.1996.For more on NES see (http:// www.umich.edu/-nes/).Accessed 10 January 2006. 27.Scheve and Slaughter 2001a. 28.Also examined in Scheve and Slaughter 2001b. 29.Note that there are too few respondents who failed to finish elementary school to allow us to estimate the separate effect of elementary-level education here:the excluded category in our analysis of education effects when using these dummy variables is all those with less than eight years of schooling

Education and International Trade 475 ical life.26 In 1992, for the first time, the NES included a question that asked respondents about their attitudes toward international trade. The question was the following: "Some people have suggested placing new limits on foreign imports in order to protect American jobs. Others say that such limits would raise con￾sumer prices and hurt American exports. Do you favor or oppose placing new limits on imports, or haven't you thought much about this?" Scheve and Slaughter used responses to this question from the 1992 NES sur￾vey as their measure of individual trade policy preferences.27 We have replicated their approach here to conduct the split-sample test, while also examining data from the 1996 NES survey that included the same trade question.28 We created the dichotomous dependent variable TRADE OPINION, coded as 1 for responses that favored protection ("new limits on foreign imports") and 0 for those opposed. The "haven't thought much about this" answers are coded as missing, as in the Scheve and Slaughter analysis. The principal measure of education is SCHOOLING, which simply records the years of full-time education completed by each respondent (a cap is set by the NES at seventeen years). This is the measure employed by Scheve and Slaugh￾ter. To allow for nonlinear education effects, we have also constructed a set of dummy variables indicating each respondent's highest level of educational at￾tainment: JUNIOR HIGH (1 = 8 years of schooling; 0 = otherwise); HIGH SCHOOL (1 = high school degree; 0 = otherwise); HIGHER EDUCATION (1 = some years of post-high school education, including junior or community college; 0 = other￾wise); COLLEGE (1 = four-year bachelor's degree; 0 = otherwise); and GRADU￾ATE (1 = postgraduate degree; 0 = otherwise).29 Assuming that education has linear effects on trade preferences seems appropriate if one assumes that each additional year of education (of any type) improves an individual's skills (and changes his or her attitudes) by a roughly constant amount. It is less appropriate if education has other, nonlinear types of effects associated with the ideas and information individuals possess about the way the economy works or the kinds of values and preferences they develop-as noted above, college education appears to play an overwhelming role in terms of its impact on ideas and cultural values among individuals. For different subsamples of respondents, we estimated binary probit models using TRADE OPINION as the dependent variable, testing for the effects of SCHOOLING or the different education dummy variables while controlling for a variety of other individual characteristics that might plausibly affect trade preferences. We esti￾mated each model with two sets of covariates: a limited set of standard sociode- 26. For details, see Miller et al. 1992; and Rosenstone et al. 1996. For more on NES see (http:// www.umich.edu/-nes/). Accessed 10 January 2006. 27. Scheve and Slaughter 2001a. 28. Also examined in Scheve and Slaughter 2001b. 29. Note that there are too few respondents who failed to finish elementary school to allow us to estimate the separate effect of elementary-level education here: the excluded category in our analysis of education effects when using these dummy variables is all those with less than eight years of schooling

476 International Organization mographic controls (age,in years,gender,and race),which preserved the maximum number of observations across the subsamples;and a more extensive set of con- trols (the standard controls plus indicators of UNION MEMBERSHIP,PARTY IDENTI- FICATION,and IDEOLOGY),which closely matched the more extensive specifications used by Scheve and Slaughter.30(See the Appendix for a description of all vari- ables used along with summary statistics). We expect the measures of education to be negatively associated with support for trade protection(as measured by TRADE OPINION),either because highly skilled individuals expect trade to increase their real wages and poorly skilled respon- dents expect trade to decrease their real wages (a la Stolper-Samuelson),because more-educated respondents know more about the overall economic benefits asso- ciated with trade openness,and/or because the more-educated are less likely to nurture antiforeigner sentiments.If this link between education and individual atti- tudes toward trade is primarily due to expectations about wages,however,the results from our estimations of trade preferences among respondents not actively engaged in the labor market should differ substantially when compared with those from our estimations of preferences among respondents who are currently employed.To test for this difference,we created subsamples of the full NES survey sample,separat- ing those who were in paid work from those not in paid work.31 Since those not 30.We have used age in years,because this is the most straightforward approach and is the mea- sure provided in the NES data;Scheve and Slaughter 2001b instead included a range of dummy vari- ables covering separate age brackets.We have reestimated all our results using the respective age dummies and the results are virtually identical.We have also used dummy variables for multiple racial categories here,while Scheve and Slaughter appear to have used a single-race dummy variable.Again, the results are almost identical regardless of how the race variable is entered in the models.The main variables we exclude are the ones constructed by Scheve and Slaughter using non-NES data:sEcToR NET EXPORT SHARE(net exports as a share of output for the industry in which the respondent is employed),and sECToR TARIFF(customs duties as a share of the total value of imports for the industry in which the respondent is employed).Neither of these variables have significant effects on trade pref- erences,according to the results reported by Scheve and Slaughter(2001b,59-60),and their inclusion in the estimations makes no difference at all to the estimated effects of education on trade opinion.We also excluded the other variables Scheve and Slaughter derive from non-NES data-the measure of oCCUPATION WAGE (the national average weekly wage for the respondent's occupation,which they use as an alternative to years of education as an indicator of skill level),and measures of couNTY EXPOSURE to trade liberalization (the shares of total employment in the respondent's home county accounted for by industries with above average tariffs or net imports).Scheve and Slaughter find that county exposure,when interacted with a dichotomous indicator of home ownership,does have a sig- nificant negative impact on support for trade openness,but the inclusion of these added controls in their models has a minuscule and statistically insignificant effect on the estimated impact of education on trade preferences(2001a,285;2001b,64),so we have not attempted to replicate the construction of these added controls here.Note that,because there is very little missing data for variables measured in the NES (the schooling measure has only 6 percent of observations missing in 1992,and 0 percent missing in 1996),and there is less missing data for all the other variables),we do not have to resort to imputation of missing data-Scheve and Slaughter(2001a,278)report having to impute up to 73.4 percent of the observations for other(non-NES)variables they included in their analysis. 31.The subsamples are determined by answers to a NES question asking respondents about their current employment status.Answer choices included the following:working now,temporarily laid-off, unemployed,retired,student,homemaker,and permanently disabled.Our"currently in paid work" subsample includes those that answered"in work now";those answering otherwise are classified as "currently not in paid work."Those with missing employment status are coded as missing.We also

476 International Organization mographic controls (age, in years, gender, and race), which preserved the maximum number of observations across the subsamples; and a more extensive set of con￾trols (the standard controls plus indicators of UNION MEMBERSHIP, PARTY IDENTI￾FICATION, and IDEOLOGY), which closely matched the more extensive specifications used by Scheve and Slaughter.30 (See the Appendix for a description of all vari￾ables used along with summary statistics). We expect the measures of education to be negatively associated with support for trade protection (as measured by TRADE OPINION), either because highly skilled individuals expect trade to increase their real wages and poorly skilled respon￾dents expect trade to decrease their real wages (at la Stolper-Samuelson), because more-educated respondents know more about the overall economic benefits asso￾ciated with trade openness, and/or because the more-educated are less likely to nurture antiforeigner sentiments. If this link between education and individual atti￾tudes toward trade is primarily due to expectations about wages, however, the results from our estimations of trade preferences among respondents not actively engaged in the labor market should differ substantially when compared with those from our estimations of preferences among respondents who are currently employed. To test for this difference, we created subsamples of the full NES survey sample, separat￾ing those who were in paid work from those not in paid work.31 Since those not 30. We have used age in years, because this is the most straightforward approach and is the mea￾sure provided in the NES data; Scheve and Slaughter 2001b instead included a range of dummy vari￾ables covering separate age brackets. We have reestimated all our results using the respective age dummies and the results are virtually identical. We have also used dummy variables for multiple racial categories here, while Scheve and Slaughter appear to have used a single-race dummy variable. Again, the results are almost identical regardless of how the race variable is entered in the models. The main variables we exclude are the ones constructed by Scheve and Slaughter using non-NES data: SECTOR NET EXPORT SHARE (net exports as a share of output for the industry in which the respondent is employed), and SECTOR TARIFF (customs duties as a share of the total value of imports for the industry in which the respondent is employed). Neither of these variables have significant effects on trade pref￾erences, according to the results reported by Scheve and Slaughter (2001b, 59-60), and their inclusion in the estimations makes no difference at all to the estimated effects of education on trade opinion. We also excluded the other variables Scheve and Slaughter derive from non-NES data-the measure of OCCUPATION WAGE (the national average weekly wage for the respondent's occupation, which they use as an alternative to years of education as an indicator of skill level), and measures of COUNTY EXPOSURE to trade liberalization (the shares of total employment in the respondent's home county accounted for by industries with above average tariffs or net imports). Scheve and Slaughter find that county exposure, when interacted with a dichotomous indicator of home ownership, does have a sig￾nificant negative impact on support for trade openness, but the inclusion of these added controls in their models has a minuscule and statistically insignificant effect on the estimated impact of education on trade preferences (2001a, 285; 2001b, 64), so we have not attempted to replicate the construction of these added controls here. Note that, because there is very little missing data for variables measured in the NES (the schooling measure has only 6 percent of observations missing in 1992, and 0 percent missing in 1996), and there is less missing data for all the other variables), we do not have to resort to imputation of missing data-Scheve and Slaughter (2001a, 278) report having to impute up to 73.4 percent of the observations for other (non-NES) variables they included in their analysis. 31. The subsamples are determined by answers to a NES question asking respondents about their current employment status. Answer choices included the following: working now, temporarily laid-off, unemployed, retired, student, homemaker, and permanently disabled. Our "currently in paid work" subsample includes those that answered "in work now"; those answering otherwise are classified as "currently not in paid work." Those with missing employment status are coded as missing. We also

Education and International Trade 477 currently in paid work include a varied set of individuals,such as those that are unemployed,students,and homemakers(and may be seeking paid work or plan to seek to work soon),we have also isolated one particular group-those individuals who are retired-who are highly unlikely to reenter paid work in the future and be concerned about how their(potential)wages might be affected by trade.32 The key results from the estimations are reported in Table 1,which displays the estimated effects of education on individual trade preferences in the full NES sam- ple and in each of the different subsamples.To facilitate comparison across sub- samples,rather than showing estimated probit coefficients,we report estimated marginal effects:that is,the change in the probability of favoring protectionism associated with an infinitesimal change in sCHOOLING(for the specific dummy vari- ables for levels of highest educational attainment,the discrete change in the prob- ability is shown). Comparing the results across the subsamples,we find little difference in the estimated effects of education on attitudes toward trade.In all cases,the estimated effects of SCHOOLING are similar,both in terms of magnitude and level of statisti- cal significance,across all models(none of the coefficients is significantly differ- ent from the others across subsamples at conventional levels).This is true for estimations using both the 1992 and the 1996 NES data.For example,in the case of the 1996 survey,using the extensive set of covariates,a change from zero to seventeen years of sCHOOLING(while holding the other covariates at their respec- tive sample means)is associated with an average decrease in the probability of favoring protection of about 0.59(s.e.0.05)for the full sample,0.51 (s.e.0.09) for those currently in paid work,0.48(s.e.0.11)for those currently not in paid work,and 0.53(s.e.0.11)for those who are retired (Models 9 to 12,Panel B).33 The observed relationship between education and trade preferences becomes even more similar across subsamples once we replace the sCHOOLING measure with the separate education dummies.For example,compared to individuals with less than junior high-level educations,completing a CoLLEGE education decreases the probability of being in favor of protection by about 0.28(s.e.0.08)for the full include those few retired/students/disabled/homemakers who also indicated that they are "currently working more than 20 hours per week"in our"currently in paid work"subsample.When the latter are excluded from the"currently in paid work"subsample,the magnitudes of the schooling effect become, if anything,more similar across the in-and out-of-paid-work subsamples than in the results we show here.Full results of these robustness tests are available on request. 32.While pensions for retired workers in some prominent U.S.industries (for example,steel)have been linked to the financial health of their former employers,this is the exception and not the rule. Recent studies of U.S.retirees indicate that less than 17 percent of retirement income in the median household comes from employer-provided pension plans(see Sass 2003,6;and Social Security Admin- istration 2002).The connection between employer-provided pensions and the financial health of the firm also is attenuated by the standards for funding and fiduciary conduct established by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act in 1974(see Sass 1997).On this issue,we might also note that we get identical results when we perform the same tests comparing retirees with workers using the ISSP data (see below),drawn from a variety of countries with a variety of pension and retirement income systems. 33.Predicted effects here,and below,are calculated using the"Clarify"software developed by King, Tomz,and Wittenberg 2001.For each such calculation,all other covariates are set at the sample mean values

Education and International Trade 477 currently in paid work include a varied set of individuals, such as those that are unemployed, students, and homemakers (and may be seeking paid work or plan to seek to work soon), we have also isolated one particular group-those individuals who are retired-who are highly unlikely to reenter paid work in the future and be concerned about how their (potential) wages might be affected by trade.32 The key results from the estimations are reported in Table 1, which displays the estimated effects of education on individual trade preferences in the full NES sam￾ple and in each of the different subsamples. To facilitate comparison across sub￾samples, rather than showing estimated probit coefficients, we report estimated marginal effects: that is, the change in the probability of favoring protectionism associated with an infinitesimal change in SCHOOLING (for the specific dummy vari￾ables for levels of highest educational attainment, the discrete change in the prob￾ability is shown). Comparing the results across the subsamples, we find little difference in the estimated effects of education on attitudes toward trade. In all cases, the estimated effects of SCHOOLING are similar, both in terms of magnitude and level of statisti￾cal significance, across all models (none of the coefficients is significantly differ￾ent from the others across subsamples at conventional levels). This is true for estimations using both the 1992 and the 1996 NES data. For example, in the case of the 1996 survey, using the extensive set of covariates, a change from zero to seventeen years of SCHOOLING (while holding the other covariates at their respec￾tive sample means) is associated with an average decrease in the probability of favoring protection of about 0.59 (s.e. 0.05) for the full sample, 0.51 (s.e. 0.09) for those currently in paid work, 0.48 (s.e. 0.11) for those currently not in paid work, and 0.53 (s.e. 0.11) for those who are retired (Models 9 to 12, Panel B).33 The observed relationship between education and trade preferences becomes even more similar across subsamples once we replace the SCHOOLING measure with the separate education dummies. For example, compared to individuals with less than junior high-level educations, completing a COLLEGE education decreases the probability of being in favor of protection by about 0.28 (s.e. 0.08) for the full include those few retired/students/disabled/homemakers who also indicated that they are "currently working more than 20 hours per week" in our "currently in paid work" subsample. When the latter are excluded from the "currently in paid work" subsample, the magnitudes of the schooling effect become, if anything, more similar across the in- and out-of-paid-work subsamples than in the results we show here. Full results of these robustness tests are available on request. 32. While pensions for retired workers in some prominent U.S. industries (for example, steel) have been linked to the financial health of their former employers, this is the exception and not the rule. Recent studies of U.S. retirees indicate that less than 17 percent of retirement income in the median household comes from employer-provided pension plans (see Sass 2003, 6; and Social Security Admin￾istration 2002). The connection between employer-provided pensions and the financial health of the firm also is attenuated by the standards for funding and fiduciary conduct established by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act in 1974 (see Sass 1997). On this issue, we might also note that we get identical results when we perform the same tests comparing retirees with workers using the ISSP data (see below), drawn from a variety of countries with a variety of pension and retirement income systems. 33. Predicted effects here, and below, are calculated using the "Clarify" software developed by King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2001. For each such calculation, all other covariates are set at the sample mean values