Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade STOR Ronald Rogowski The American Political Science Review,Vol.81,No.4.(Dec.,1987),pp.1121-1137. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-0554%28198712%2981%3A4%3C1121%3APCACET%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Z The American Political Science Review is currently published by American Political Science Association. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use,available at http://www.istor org/about/terms html.JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides,in part,that unless you have obtained prior permission,you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles,and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal,non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work.Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/journals/apsa.html. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. The JSTOR Archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long-term preservation and access to leading academic journals and scholarly literature from around the world.The Archive is supported by libraries,scholarly societies,publishers, and foundations.It is an initiative of JSTOR,a not-for-profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community take advantage of advances in technology.For more information regarding JSTOR,please contact support@jstor.org. http://www.jstor.org Fri Feb814:44:532008
Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade Ronald Rogowski The American Political Science Review, Vol. 81, No. 4. (Dec., 1987), pp. 1121-1137. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-0554%28198712%2981%3A4%3C1121%3APCACET%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Z The American Political Science Review is currently published by American Political Science Association. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/journals/apsa.html. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. The JSTOR Archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long-term preservation and access to leading academic journals and scholarly literature from around the world. The Archive is supported by libraries, scholarly societies, publishers, and foundations. It is an initiative of JSTOR, a not-for-profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community take advantage of advances in technology. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. http://www.jstor.org Fri Feb 8 14:44:53 2008
POLITICAL CLEAVAGES AND CHANGING EXPOSURE TO TRADE RONALD ROGOWSKI University of California Los Angeles ombining the classical theorem of Stolper and Samuelson with a model of politics derived from Becker leads to the conclusion that exogenous changes in the risks or costs of countries'external trade will stimulate domestic conflict between owners of locally scarce and locally abundant factors.A traditional three-factor model then predicts quite specific coalitions and cleavages among owners of land,labor, and capital,depending only on the given country's level of economic development and its land-labor ratio.A preliminary survey of historical periods of expanding and con- tracting trade,and of such specific cases as the German"marriage of iron and rye,"U.S. and Latin American populism,and Asian socialism,suggests the accuracy of this hypothesis.While the importance of such other factors as cultural divisions and political inheritance cannot be denied,the role of exogenous changes in the risks and costs of trade deserves further investigation. countries To be sure,some studies of individual have the political cleavages they do and countries,and even a few comparative why those cleavages change are among inquiries,have argued the significance of the enduring mysteries of comparative changing international trade in particular politics.Among the many factors that circumstances:one thinks,in particular, have been adduced as partial explanations of Abraham 1981,Gerschenkron 1943, are preexisting cultural and religious divi- Gourevitch 1977 and 1986,Rosenberg sions,the rapidity and timing of indus- 1943,Sunkel and Paz 1973.One author, trialization or of the grant of mass suf- Cameron (1978),has even suggested a frage,the sequence of "crises"of mod- relation,at least in recent decades, ernization,the electoral system,and- between exposure to trade and the rate of most recently-the product cycle (see, growth in state expenditure. inter alia,Binder et al.1971;Duverger Arguing much more generally,I shall 1959;Kurth 1979a,1979b;Lipset and try to show that basic results of the theory Rokkan 1967;Rokkan 1970,1981). of international trade-including,in Without denying the importance of any particular,the well-known Stolper- of these variables,I want to suggest the Samuelson Theorem(Stolper and Samuel- relevance of a factor that has,until now, son 1941)-imply that increases or been widely neglected:externally induced decreases in the costs and difficulty of changes-in countries with different fac- international trade should powerfully tor endowments-in exposure to inter- affect domestic political cleavages and national trade. should do so differently,but predictably, AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW VOL.81 NO.4 DECEMBER 1987
POLITICAL CLEAVAGES AND CHANGING EXPOSURE TO TRADE RONALD ROGOWSKI ~ -~ University of California Los Angeles Combining the classical theorem of Stolper and Samuelson with a model of politics derived from Becker leads to the conclusion that exogenous changes in the risks or costs of countries' external trade will stimulate domestic conflict between owners of locally scarce and locally abundant factors. A traditional three-factor model then predicts quite specific coalitions and cleavages among owners of land, labor, and capital, depending only on the given country's level of economic development and its land-labor ratio. A preliminary survey of historical periods of expanding and contracting trade, and of such specific cases as the German "marriage of iron and rye, " U.S. and Latin American populism, and Asian socialism, suggests the accuracy of this hypothesis. While the importance of such other factors as cultural divisions and political inheritance cannot be denied, the role of exogenous changes in the risks and costs of trade deserves further investigation. Why countries To be sure, some studies of individual have the political cleavages they do and countries, and even a few comparative why those cleavages change are among inquiries, have argued the significance of the enduring mysteries of comparative changing international trade in particular politics. Among the many factors that circumstances: one thinks, in particular, have been adduced as partial explanations of Abraham 1981, Gerschenkron 1943, are preexisting cultural and religious divi- Gourevitch 1977 and 1986, Rosenberg sions, the rapidity and timing of indus- 1943, Sunkel and Paz 1973. One author, trialization or of the grant of mass suf- Cameron (1978), has even suggested a frage, the sequence of "crises" of mod- relation, at least in recent decades, ernization, the electoral system, and- between exposure to trade and the rate of most recently-the product cycle (see, growth in state expenditure. inter alia, Binder et al. 1971; Duverger Arguing much more generally, I shall 1959; Kurth 1979a, 1979b; Lipset and try to show that basic results of the theory Rokkan 1967; Rokkan 1970, 1981). of international trade-including, in Without denying the importance of any particular, the well-known Stolperof these variables, I want to suggest the Samuelson Theorem (Stolper and Samuelrelevance of a factor that has, until now, son 1941)-imply that increases or been widely neglected: externally induced decreases in the costs and difficulty of changes-in countries with different fac- international trade should powerfully tor endowments-in exposure to inter- affect domestic political cleavages and national trade. should do so differently, but predictably, AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW VOL. 81 NO. 4 DECEMBER 1987
American Political Science Review Vol.81 in countries with different factor endow- costs,for example,is indistinguishable in ments.Moreover,I shall suggest that its impact from an across-the-board these implications conform surprisingly decrease in every affected state's tariffs well with what has been observed about (Mundell 1957,330);so is any change in patterns of cleavage and about changes in the international regime that decreases the those patterns in a great variety of coun- risks or the transaction costs of trade.The tries during four periods of global change converse is of course equally true:when a in exposure to trade,namely the "long" nation's external transport becomes sixteenth century,the nineteenth century, dearer,or its trade less secure,it is the Depression of the 1930s,and the years affected exactly as if it had imposed a since World War IⅡ. higher tariff. Nonetheless,what I present here The point is of more than academic remains conjectural and preliminary.The interest because we know,historically, evidence I shall be able to advance is sug- that major changes in the risks and costs gestive rather than conclusive.It is prin- of international trade have occurred: cipally the clarity of the logical case that notoriously,the railroads and steamships seems to me to justify further refinement of the nineteenth century brought dras- and testing. tically cheaper transportation (Landes 1969,153-54,196,201-2;Hobsbawm The Stolper-Samuelson Theorem 1979,Chap.3);so,in our own genera- tion,did supertankers,cheap oil,and In 1941 Wolfgang Stolper and Paul containerization (Rosecrance 1986,142). Samuelson solved conclusively the old According to the familiar argument of riddle of gains and losses from protection Kindleberger (1973)and others,inter- (or,for that matter,from free trade). national hegemony decreases both the They showed that in any society protec- risks and the transaction costs of inter- tion benefits-and liberalization of trade national trade;and the decline of hege- harms-owners of factors in which that monic power makes trade more expen- society is poorly endowed,relative to the sive,perhaps-as,according to this inter- rest of the world,as well as producers pretation,in the 1930s-prohibitively so. who use the scarce factors intensively.1 Analyzing a much earlier period,the Conversely,protection harms-and lib- Belgian historian Henri Pirenne (1939) eralization benefits-owners of factors attributed much of the final decline of the the given society holds abundantly rela- Roman Empire to the growing insecurity tive to the rest of the world,and pro- of interregional,and especially of Medi- ducers who use the abundant factors terranean,trade after 600 A.D.3 intensively.2 Thus,in a society rich in Global changes of these kinds,it labor but poor in capital,protection follows,should have had global conse- would benefit capital and harm labor;and quences.The "transportation revolu- liberalization of trade would benefit labor tions"of the sixteenth,the nineteenth, and harm capital. and scarcely less of the mid-twentieth cen- So far,the theorem is what it is usually tury must have benefited,in each affected perceived to be:merely a statement,if an country,owners and intensive employers important and sweeping one,about the of locally abundant factors and must have effects of tariff policy.The picture is harmed owners and intensive employers altered,however,when one realizes that of locally scarce factors.The events of the exogenous changes can have exactly the 1930s should have had exactly the oppo- same effects as increases or decreases in site effect.What,however,will have been protection.A cheapening of transport the political consequences of those shifts 1122
American Political Science Review Vol. 81 in countries with different factor endowments. Moreover, I shall suggest that these implications conform surprisingly well with what has been observed about patterns of cleavage and about changes in those patterns in a great variety of countries during four periods of global change in exposure to trade, namely the "long" sixteenth century, the nineteenth century, the Depression of the 1930s, and the years since World War 11. Nonetheless, what I present here remains conjectural and preliminary. The evidence I shall be able to advance is suggestive rather than conclusive. It is principally the clarity of the logical case that seems to me to justify further refinement and testing. The Stolper-Samuelson Theorem In 1941 Wolfgang Stolper and Paul Samuelson solved conclusively the old riddle of gains and losses from protection (or, for that matter, from free trade). They showed that in any society protection benefits-and liberalization of trade harms-owners of factors in which that society is poorly endowed, relative to the rest of the world, as well as producers who use the scarce factors intensively.1 Conversely, protection harms-and liberalization benefits-owners of factors the given society holds abundantly relative to the rest of the world, and producers who use the abundant factors intensive1y.l Thus, in a society rich in labor but poor in capital, protection would benefit capital and harm labor; and liberalization of trade would benefit labor and harm capital. So far, the theorem is what it is usually perceived to be: merely a statement, if an important and sweeping one, about the effects of tariff policy. The picture is altered, however, when one realizes that exogenous changes can have exactly the same effects as increases or decreases in protection. A cheapening of transport costs, for example, is indistinguishable in its impact from an across-the-board decrease in every affected state's tariffs (Mundell 1957, 330); so is any change in the international regime that decreases the risks or the transaction costs of trade. The converse is of course equally true: when a nation's external transport becomes dearer, or its trade less secure, it is affected exactly as if it had imposed a higher tariff. The point is of more than academic interest because we know, historically, that major changes in the risks and costs of international trade have occurred: notoriously, the railroads and steamships of the nineteenth century brought drastically cheaper transportation (Landes 1969, 153-54, 196, 201-2; Hobsbawm 1979, Chap. 3); so, in our own generation, did supertankers, cheap oil, and containerization (Rosecrance 1986, 142). According to the familiar argument of Kindleberger (1973) and others, international hegemony decreases both the risks and the transaction costs of international trade; and the decline of hegemonic power makes trade more expensive, perhaps-as, according to this interpretation, in the 1930s-prohibitively so. Analyzing a much earlier period, the Belgian historian Henri Pirenne (1939) attributed much of the final decline of the Roman Empire to the growing insecurity of interregional, and especially of Mediterranean, trade after 600 A.DS3 Global changes of these kinds, it follows, should have had global consequences. The "transportation revolutions" of the sixteenth, the nineteenth, and scarcely less of the mid-twentieth century must have benefited, in each affected country, owners and intensive employers of locally abundant factors and must have harmed owners and intensive employers of locally scarce factors. The events of the 1930s should have had exactly the opposite effect. What, however, will have been the political consequences of those shifts
Changing Exposure to Trade of wealth and income?To answer that whether it is advanced or backward and question we require a rudimentary model (2)whether its land-labor ratio is high or of the political process and a somewhat low.We recognize,in other words,only more definite one of the economy. economies that are (1)capital rich,land rich,and labor poor;(2)capital rich,land poor,and labor rich;(3)capital poor, Simple Models of the land rich,and labor poor;or(4)capital Polity and the Economy poor,land poor,and labor rich. I shall assume of domestic political processes only two things:(1)that the Political Effects of Increasing beneficiaries of a change will try to con- Exposure to Trade tinue and accelerate it,while the victims of the same change will endeavor to I shall now try to demonstrate that the retard or to halt it;and(2)that those who Stolper-Samuelson Theorem,applied to enjoy a sudden increase in (actual or our simple model,implies that increasing potential)4wealth and income will exposure to trade must result in urban- thereby be enabled to expand their polit- rural conflict in two kinds of economies ical influence as well (cf.Becker 1983).As and in class conflict in the two others. regards international trade,(1)implies Consider first the upper right-hand cell that the gainers from any exogenous of Figure 1:the advanced (therefore change will seek to continue and to capital-rich)economy endowed abun- expand free trade,while the losers will dantly in labor but poorly in land. seek protection (and,if that fails,imper- Expanding trade must benefit both cap- ialism);5(2)implies that those who gain, italists and workers;it harms only land- or are positioned to gain,economically owners and the pastoral and agricultural from exogenous changes in international enterprises that use land intensively.Both trade will increase their political power as capitalists and workers-that is to say, well. almost the entire urban sector-should Economically,I propose to adopt with favor free trade;agriculture should on the minor refinements the traditional three- whole be protectionist.Moreover,we factor model-land,labor,and capital- expect the capitalists and the workers to and to assume,for now,that the land- try,very likely in concert,to expand their labor ratio informs us fully about any political influence.Depending on pre- country's endowment of those two fac- existing circumstances,they may seek tors.No country,in other words,can be concretely an extension of the franchise,a rich both in land and in labor:a high reapportionment of seats,a diminution in land-labor ratio implies abundance of the powers of an upper house or of a land and scarcity of labor;a low ratio sig- gentry-based political elite,or a violent nifies the opposite.(I shall later relax this "bourgeois"revolution. assumption.)Finally,I shall simply define Urban-rural conflict should also arise in an advanced economy as one in which backward,labor-poor economies (the capital is abundant. lower left-hand cell of Figure 1)when This model of factor endowments in- trade expands,albeit with a complete evitably oversimplifies reality and will reversal of fronts.In such "frontier" require amendment.Its present simplicity, societies,both capital and labor are however,permits us in theory to place scarce:hence both are harmed by expand- any country's economy into one of four ing trade and will seek protection.Only cells (see Figure 1),according to (1) land is abundant,and therefore only agri- 1123
Changing Exposure to Trade of wealth and income? To answer that question we require a rudimentary model of the political process and a somewhat more definite one of the economy. Simple Models of the Polity and the Economy I shall assume of domestic political processes only two things: (1) that the beneficiaries of a change will try to continue and accelerate it, while the victims of the same change will endeavor to retard or to halt it; and (2) that those who enjoy a sudden increase in (actual or p~tential)~wealth and income will thereby be enabled to expand their political influence as well (cf. Becker 1983). As regards international trade, (1) implies that the gainers from any exogenous change will seek to continue and to expand free trade, while the losers will seek protection (and, if that fails, imperiali~m);~(2) implies that those who gain, or are positioned to gain, economically from exogenous changes in international trade will increase their political power as well. Economically, I propose to adopt with minor refinements the traditional threefactor model-land, labor, and capitaland to assume, for now, that the landlabor ratio informs us fully about any country's endowment of those two factors. No country, in other words, can be rich both in land and in labor: a high land-labor ratio implies abundance of land and scarcity of labor; a low ratio signifies the opposite. (I shall later relax this assumption.) Finally, I shall simply define an advanced economy as one in which capital is abundant. This model of factor endowments inevitably oversimplifies reality and will require amendment. Its present simplicity, however, permits us in theory to place any country's economy into one of four cells (see Figure I), according to (1) whether it is advanced or backward and (2)whether its land-labor ratio is high or low. We recognize, in other words, only economies that are (1)capital rich, land rich, and labor poor; (2) capital rich, land poor, and labor rich; (3) capital poor, land rich, and labor poor; or (4) capital poor, land poor, and labor rich. Political Effects of Increasing Exposure to Trade I shall now try to demonstrate that the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem, applied to our simple model, implies that increasing exposure to trade must result in urbanrural conflict in two kinds of economies and in class conflict in the two others. Consider first the upper right-hand cell of Figure 1: the advanced (therefore capital-rich) economy endowed abundantly in labor but poorly in land. Expanding trade must benefit both capitalists and workers; it harms only landowners and the pastoral and agricultural enterprises that use land intensively. Both capitalists and workers-that is to say, almost the entire urban sector-should favor free trade; agriculture should on the whole be protectionist. Moreover, we expect the capitalists and the workers to try, very likely in concert, to expand their political influence. Depending on preexisting circumstances, they may seek concretely an extension of the franchise, a reapportionment of seats, a diminution in the powers of an upper house or of a gentry-based political elite, or a violent "bourgeois" revolution. Urban-rural conflict should also arise in backward, labor-poor economies (the lower left-hand cell of Figure 1)when trade expands, albeit with a complete reversal of fronts. In such "frontier" societies, both capital and labor are scarce: hence both are harmed by expanding trade and will seek protection. Only land is abundant, and therefore only agri-
American Political Science Review Vol.81 Figure 1.Four Main Types of Factor Endowments Land-Labor Ratio High Low Abundant: Abundant: Capital Capital Advanced Economy Land Labor Scarce: Scarce: Labor Land Abundant: Abundant: Land Labor Backward Economy Scarce: Scarce: Capital Capital Labor Land culture will gain from free trade.Farmers scarce,workers and labor-intensive and pastoralists will try to expand their industries will embrace protection and(if influence in some movement of a "Pop- need be)imperialism.The benefited sec- ulist"and antiurban stripe. tors will seek to expand their political Conversely,in backward economies power,if not by disfranchisement then with low land-labor ratios (the lower by curtailment of workers'economic right-hand cell of Figure 1),land and prerogatives and suppression of their capital are scarce and labor is abundant. organizations. The model therefore predicts class con- These implications of the theory of flict:labor will pursue free trade and international trade(summarized in Figure expanded political power (including,in 2)seem clear,but do they in any way some circumstances,a workers'revolu- describe reality?I shall address that ques- tion);landowners,capitalists,and tion more fully below,but for now it is capital-intensive manufacturers will unite worth observing how closely the experi- to support protection,imperialism,and a ence of three major countries-Germany, politics of continued exclusion.(Lest the Britain,and the United States-conforms picture of a rising in support of freer to this analysis in the period of rapidly markets seem too improbable a priori,I expanding trade in the last third of the observe at once its general conformity nineteenth century;and how far it can go with Popkin's 1979 astute interpretation to explain otherwise puzzling disparities of the Vietnamese revolution.) in those states'patterns of political The reverse form of class conflict is evolution. expected to arise in the final case,that of Germany and the United States were an advanced but land-rich economy (the both still relatively backward,that is, upper left-hand cell of Figure 1)under capital-poor,societies:both,in fact, increasing exposure to trade.Because imported considerable amounts of capital both capital and land are abundant, in this period(Feis 1965,24-25 and Chap. capitalists,capital-intensive industries, 3).Germany,however,was rich in labor and agriculture will all benefit from,and and poor in land;the United States,of will endorse,free trade;labor being course,was in exactly the opposite posi- 1124
American Political Science Review Vol. 81 Figure I. Four Main Types of Factor Endowments I Advanced Economy Backward Economy Land-Labor Ratio High Low Abundant: Abundant: Capital Capital Land Labor Scarce: Scarce: Labor Land Abundant: Abundant: Land Labor Scarce: Scarce: Capital Capital Labor Land culture will gain from free trade. Farmers and pastoralists will try to expand their influence in some movement of a "Populist" and antiurban stripe. Conversely, in backward economies with low land-labor ratios (the lower right-hand cell of Figure I), land and capital are scarce and labor is abundant. The model therefore predicts class conflict: labor will pursue free trade and expanded political power (including, in some circumstances, a workers' revolution); landowners, capitalists, and capital-intensive manufacturers will unite to support protection, imperialism, and a politics of continued exclusion. (Lest the picture of a rising in support of freer markets seem too improbable a priori, I observe at once its general conformity with Popkin's 1979 astute interpretation of the Vietnamese revolution.) The reverse form of class conflict is expected to arise in the final case, that of an advanced but land-rich economy (the upper left-hand cell of Figure 1)under increasing exposure to trade. Because both capital and land are abundant, capitalists, capital-intensive industries, and agriculture will all benefit from, and will endorse, free trade; labor being scarce, workers and labor-intensive industries will embrace protection and (if need be) imperialism. The benefited sectors will seek to expand their political power, if not by disfranchisement then by curtailment of workers' economic prerogatives and suppression of their organizations. These implications of the theory of international trade (summarized in Figure 2) seem clear, but do they in any way describe reality? I shall address that question more fully below, but for now it is worth observing how closely the experience of three major countries-Germany, Britain, and the United States-conforms to this analysis in the period of rapidly expanding trade in the last third of the nineteenth century; and how far it can go to explain otherwise puzzling disparities in those states' patterns of political evolution. Germany and the United States were both still relatively backward, that is, capital-poor, societies: both, in fact, imported considerable amounts of capital in this period (Feis 1965,24-25 and Chap. 3). Germany, however, was rich in labor and poor in land; the United States, of course, was in exactly the opposite posi-
Changing Exposure to Trade Figure 2.Predicted Effects of Expanding Exposure to Trade Land-Labor Ratio High Low Class cleavage: Urban-rural cleavage: Land and capital free-trading, Capital and labor free-trading, Advanced Economy assertive assertive Labor defensive,protectionist Land defensive,protectionist (Radicalism) Urban-rural cleavage: Class cleavage: Land free-trading,assertive Labor free-trading,assertive Backward Economy Labor and capital defensive, Land and capital defensive, protectionist protectionist (U.S.Populism) (Socialism) tion.Again,the demonstration is easy: its extensive exports of that factor to the the United States imported-and Ger- United States,Canada,Australia,New many exported(not least to the United Zealand,and Africa.Britain therefore States)-workers.The theory,of course, falls into the upper right-hand quadrant predicts class conflict in Germany,with of Figure 1 and is predicted to exhibit a labor the "revolutionary"and free-trading rural-urban cleavage,with fronts oppo- element and with land and capital united site to those found in the United States: in support of protection and imperialism. capitalists and labor unite in support of Surely this description will not ring false free trade and in demands for expanded to any student of German socialism or of political power,while landowners and Germany's infamous "marriage of iron agriculture support protection and im- and rye."7 For the United States,con- perialism. versely,the theory predicts-quite accu- While this picture surely obscures rately,I submit-urban-rural conflict, important nuances,it illuminates a crucial with the agrarians now assuming the difference between Britain and,for exam- "revolutionary"and free-trading role and ple,Germany in this period:in Britain, with capital and labor uniting in a protec- capitalists and labor did unite effectively tionist and imperialist coalition.E.E. in the Liberal party and forced an Schattschneider (1960)or Walter Dean expanded suffrage and curtailment of(still Burnham (1970)could hardly have de- principally landowning)aristocratic scribed more succinctly the history of power;in Germany,with liberalism shat- populism and of the election of 1896. tered(Sheehan 1978),the suffrage for the Britain,on the other hand,was already powerful state parliaments was actually an advanced economy in the later nine- contracted,and-far from eroding aristo- teenth century,one in which capital was cratic power-the bourgeoisie grew more so abundant that it was exported in vast and more verjunkert in style and quantities (Feis 1965,Chap.1).That it aspirations. was also rich in labor is demonstrated by 1125
Changing Exposure to Trade Figure 2. Predicted Effects of Expanding Exposure to Trade Land-Labor Ratio Advanced Economy Backward Economy High Class cleavage: Land and capital free-trading, assertive Labor defensive, protectionist Urban-rural cleavage: Land free-trading, assertive Labor and capital defensive, protectionist (U.S. Populism) Low Urban-rural cleavage: Capital and labor free-trading, assertive Land defensive, protectionist (Radicalism) Class cleavage: Labor free-trading, assertive Land and capital defensive, protectionist (Socialism) tion. Again, the demonstration is easy: the United States imported-and Germany exported (not least to the United States)-workerse6 The theory, of course, predicts class conflict in Germany, with labor the "revolutionary" and free-trading element and with land and capital united in support of protection and imperialism. Surely this description will not ring false to any student of German socialism or of Germany's infamous "marriage of iron and rye."' For the United States, conversely, the theory predicts-quite accurately, I submit-urban-rural conflict, with the agrarians now assuming the "revolutionary" and free-trading role and with capital and labor uniting in a protectionist and imperialist coalition. E. E. Schattschneider (1960) or Walter Dean Burnham (1970) could hardly have described more succinctly the history of populism and of the election of 1896.8 Britain, on the other hand, was already an advanced economy in the later nineteenth century, one in which capital was so abundant that it was exported in vast quantities (Feis 1965, Chap. 1).That it was also rich in labor is demonstrated by its extensive exports of that factor to the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Afri~a.~ Britain therefore falls into the upper right-hand quadrant of Figure 1and is predicted to exhibit a rural-urban cleavage, with fronts opposite to those found in the United States: capitalists and labor unite in support of free trade and in demands for expanded political power, while landowners and agriculture support protection and imperialism. While this picture surely obscures important nuances, it illuminates a crucial difference between Britain and, for example, Germany in this period: in Britain, capitalists and labor did unite effectively in the Liberal party and forced an expanded suffrage and curtailment of (still principally landowning) aristocratic power; in Germany, with liberalism shattered (Sheehan 1978), the suffrage for the powerful state parliaments was actually contracted, and-far from eroding aristocratic power-the bourgeoisie grew more and more verjunkert in style and aspirations
American Political Science Review Vol.81 Political Effects of Declining intense exploiter of the only scarce factor, Exposure to Trade gains significantly and quickly tries to translate its gain into greater political When declining hegemony or rising control. costs of transportation substantially con- Urban-rural conflict is also predicted strict external trade,the gainers and losers for backward,land-rich countries under are simply the reverse of those under declining trade;but here agriculture is on increasing exposure to trade:owners of the defensive.Labor and capital being locally scarce factors prosper,owners of both scarce,both benefit from the con- locally abundant ones suffer.The latter, traction of trade;land,as the only locally however,can invoke no such simple abundant factor,retreats.The urban sec- remedy as protection or imperialism; tors unite,in a parallel to the "radical" aside from tentative "internationalist" coalition of labor-rich developed coun- efforts to restore orderly markets(Goure- tries under expanding trade,to demand vitch 1986,Chap.4),they must largely an increased voice in the state. accept their fate.Power and policy,we Finally,in backward economies rich in expect,will shift in each case toward the labor rather than land,class conflict owners and intensive users of scarce resumes,with labor this time on the factors. defensive.Capital and land,as the locally Let us first consider the situation of the scarce factors,gain from declining trade; highly developed (and therefore,by our labor,locally abundant,loses economic- earlier definition,capital-rich)economies. ally and is soon threatened politically. In an economy of this kind with a high Observe again,as a first test of the land-labor ratio (the upper left-hand cell plausibility of these results-summarized of Figure 1),we should expect intense in Figure 3-how they appear to account class conflict precipitated by a newly for some prominent disparities of political aggressive working class.Land and response to the last precipitous decline of capital are both abundant in such an international trade,the Depression of the economy;hence,under declining trade, 1930s.The U.S.New Deal represented a owners of both factors (and producers sharp turn to the left and occasioned a who use either factor intensively)lose. significant increase in organized labor's Labor being the only scarce resource, political power.In Germany,a depression workers are well positioned to reap a sig- of similar depth (gauged by unemploy- nificant windfall from the protection that ment rates and declines in industrial pro- dearer or riskier trade affords;and, duction [Landes 1969,391))brought to according to our earlier assumption,like power first Hindenburg's and then Hitler's any other benefited class they will soon dictatorship.In both,landowners exer- try to parlay their greater economic into cised markedly greater influence than greater political power.Capitalists and they had under Weimar(Abraham 1981, landowners,even if they were previously 85-115 and Chap.4;Gessner 1977);and at odds,will unite to oppose labor's indeed a credible case can be made out demands. that the rural sector was the principal Quite to the contrary,declining trade in early beneficiary of the Nazi regime (see, an advanced economy that is labor rich inter alia,Gerschenkron 1943,154-63; and land poor (the upper right-hand cell Gies1968;Holt1936,173-74,194ff.: of Figure 1)will entail urban-rural con- Schoenbaum 1966,156-63).10 Yet this is flict.Capital and labor,being both abun- exactly the broad difference that the dant,are both harmed by the contraction model would lead us to anticipate if we of external trade.Agriculture,as the accept that by 1930 both countries were 1126
American Political Science Review Vol. 81 Political Effects of Declining Exposure to Trade When declining hegemony or rising costs of transportation substantially constrict external trade, the gainers and losers are simply the reverse of those under increasing exposure to trade: owners of locally scarce factors prosper, owners of locally abundant ones suffer. The latter, however, can invoke no such simple remedy as protection or imperialism; aside from tentative "internationalist" efforts to restore orderly markets (Gourevitch 1986, Chap. 4), they must largely accept their fate. Power and policy, we expect, will shift in each case toward the owners and intensive users of scarce factors. Let us first consider the situation of the highly developed (and therefore, by our earlier definition, capital-rich) economies. In an economy of this kind with a high land-labor ratio (the upper left-hand cell of Figure I), we should expect intense class conflict precipitated by a newly aggressive working class. Land and capital are both abundant in such an economy; hence, under declining trade, owners of both factors (and producers who use either factor intensively) lose. Labor being the only scarce resource, workers are well positioned to reap a significant windfall from the protection that dearer or riskier trade affords; and, according to our earlier assumption, like any other benefited class they will soon try to parlay their greater economic into greater political power. Capitalists and landowners, even if they were previously at odds, will unite to oppose labor's demands. Quite to the contrary, declining trade in an advanced economy that is labor rich and land poor (the upper right-hand cell of Figure 1)will entail urban-rural conflict. Capital and labor, being both abundant, are both harmed by the contraction of external trade. Agriculture, as the intense exploiter of the only scarce factor, gains significantly and quickly tries to translate its gain into greater political control. Urban-rural conflict is also predicted for backward, land-rich countries under declining trade; but here agriculture is on the defensive. Labor and capital being both scarce, both benefit from the contraction of trade; land, as the only locally abundant factor, retreats. The urban sectors unite, in a parallel to the "radical" coalition of labor-rich developed countries under expanding trade, to demand an increased voice in the state. Finally, in backward economies rich in labor rather than land, class conflict resumes, with labor this time on the defensive. Capital and land, as the locally scarce factors, gain from declining trade; labor, locally abundant, loses economically and is soon threatened politically. Observe again, as a first test of the plausibility of these results-summarized in Figure 3-how they appear to account for some prominent disparities of political response to the last precipitous decline of international trade, the Depression of the 1930s. The U.S.New Deal represented a sharp turn to the left and occasioned a significant increase in organized labor's political power. In Germany, a depression of similar depth (gauged by unemployment rates and declines in industrial production [Landes 1969, 3911) brought to power first Hindenburg's and then Hitler's dictatorship. In both, landowners exercised markedly greater influence than they had under Weimar (Abraham 1981, 85-115 and Chap. 4; Gessner 1977); and indeed a credible case can be made out that the rural sector was the principal early beneficiary of the Nazi regime (see, inter alia, Gerschenkron 1943, 154-63; Gies 1968; Holt 1936, 173-74, 194ff.; Schoenbaum 1966, 156-63).1° Yet this is exactly the broad difference that the model would lead us to anticipate if we accept that by 1930 both countries were
Changing Exposure to Trade Figure 3.Predicted Effects of Declining Exposure to Trade Land-Labor Ratio High Low Class cleavage: Urban-rural cleavage: Advanced Economy Labor gains power. Land gains power. Land and capital lose. Labor and capital lose. (U.S.New Deal) (Western European Fascism) Urban-rural cleavage: Class cleavage: Backward Economy Labor and capital gain power. Land and capital gain power. Land loses. Labor loses. (South American Populism) (Asian Eastern European Fascism) economically advanced-although Ger- probably not under the domination-of many,after reparations and cessions of landowners and capitalists (Kato 1974; industrial territory,was surely less abun- Reischauer1974,186-87,195-99).(Sim- dant in capital than the United States- ilar suppressions of labor occurred in but the United States remained rich in China and Vietnam [Clubb 1972,135-40; land,which in Germany was scarce.Only Popkin 1979,xix,215].) an obtuse observer would claim that such In considering these contrasting re- factors as cultural inheritance and recent sponses,should we not take into account defeat in war played no role;but surely it that Argentina and Brazil were rich in is also important to recognize the sectoral land and poor in labor(recall the extent of impact of declining trade in the two immigration,especially into Argentina), societies.11 while in Japan (and,with local excep- As regards the less-developed econo- tions,in Asia generally)labor was abun- mies of the time,it may be profitable to dant and land was scarce (respectively, contrast the Depression's impact on such the lower left-and right-hand cells of South American cases as Argentina and Figure 3)? Brazil with its effects in the leading Asian country,Japan.In Argentina and Brazil, it is usually asserted(Cardoso and Faletto 1979,124-26 and Chap.5;Skidmore and A Preliminary Survey Smith 1984,59-60;Sunkel and Paz 1973, of the Evidence 352-54),the Depression gave rise to,or at the least strengthened,"Populist"coali- I want now to undertake a more sys- tions that united labor and the urban mid- tematic,if still sketchy,examination of dle classes in opposition to traditional, the historical evidence that bears on the landowning elites.In Japan,growing mili- hypotheses developed here.This effort tary influence suppressed representative will serve principally to suggest directions institutions and nascent workers'organi- for further research;it can in no way be zations,ruling in the interest-albeit described as conclusive. 1127
Channinn Exposure to Trade Figure 3. Predicted Effects of Declining Exposure to Trade Land-Labor Ratio High Low Advanced Economy Class cleavage: Labor gains power. Land and capital lose. (U.S. New Deal) Urban-rural cleavage: Land gains power. Labor and capital lose. (Western European Fascism) Backward Economy Urban-rural cleavage: Labor and capital gain power. Land loses. Class cleavage: Land and capital gain power. Labor loses. (South American Populism) (Asian & Eastern European Fascism) economically advanced-although Germany, after reparations and cessions of industrial territory, was surely less abundant in capital than the United Statesbut the United States remained rich in land, which in Germany was scarce. Only an obtuse observer would claim that such factors as cultural inheritance and recent defeat in war played no role; but surely it is also important to recognize the sectoral impact of declining trade in the two societies.l1 As regards the less-developed economies of the time, it may be profitable to contrast the Depression's impact on such South American cases as Argentina and Brazil with its effects in the leading Asian country, Japan. In Argentina and Brazil, it is usually asserted (Cardoso and Faletto 1979, 124-26 and Chap. 5; Skidmore and Smith 1984, 59-60; Sunkel and Paz 1973, 352-54), the Depression gave rise to, or at the least strengthened, "Populist" coalitions that united labor and the urban middle classes in opposition to traditional, landowning elites. In Japan, growing military influence suppressed representative institutions and nascent workers' organizations, ruling in the interest-albeit d probably not under the domination-of landowners and capitalists (Kato 1974; Reischauer 1974, 186-87, 195-99). (Similar suppressions of labor occurred in China and Vietnam [Clubb 1972, 135-40; Popkin 1979, xix, 2151.) In considering these contrasting responses, should we not take into account that Argentina and Brazil were rich in land and poor in labor (recall the extent of immigration, especially into Argentina), while in Japan (and, with local exceptions, in Asia generally) labor was abundant and land was scarce (respectively, the lower left- and right-hand cells of Figure 3)? A Preliminary Survey of the Evidence I want now to undertake a more systematic, if still sketchy, examination of the historical evidence that bears on the hypotheses developed here. This effort will serve principally to suggest directions for further research; it can in no way be described as conclusive
American Political Science Review Vol.81 The "Long"Sixteenth Century landowners and capitalists in many of these regions.12 It has long been recognized that im- provements in navigation and shipbuild- The Nineteenth Century ing permitted,from about 1450 on,a pre- viously unimagined expansion of trade, We can again proceed regionally,gen- which eventuated in the European "dis- eralizing on the sketch of Britain, Ger- covery"and colonization of the Americas many,and the United States developed (Cipolla 1965).Among social scientists, earlier for this period.For the period just Immanuel Wallerstein (1974)has studied before the great cheapening of transpor- this period most intensively;and it is tation-roughly at the middle of the nine- worth emphasizing that the present analy- teenth century13-Britain can stand as the sis conforms with essential aspects,and, surrogate for the advanced and labor-rich indeed,permits some clarification,of his. economies of northwest Europe generally, Within the context of the age,what including Belgium,the Netherlands,and Wallerstein calls the core economies of the northern France(Hobsbawm 1962,Chap. new world system-those,essentially,of 9;Landes 1969,Chap.3).For this whole northwestern Europe-were defined by region,as for Britain,the model predicts their abundance in capital and labor,and that expanding trade would engender by their relative scarcity of land.The rural-urban conflict:capitalists and periphery can be described as the exact workers,united in support of free trade inverse:rich in land,poor in both capital and greater urban influence,oppose a and-often leading to the adoption of more traditional and protectionist landed slavery or serfdom-labor.Under ex- sector.It does not seem to me farfetched panding trade,the regimes of the core to see the powerful liberalism and radical- come to be dominated by a "bourgeois" ism of this whole region in the later nine- coalition of capital and skilled labor(the teenth century (Carstairs 1980,50,62; Dutch Republic,the Tudors),and of the Cobban 1965,21-28,58-67;Daalder manufactures that use both intensively; 1966,196-98;Lorwin1966,152-55)-or, the older,landed elites lose ground.Con- for that matter,much of the conflict versely,in the periphery,land-in the between secularism and clericalism-in persons of plantation owners and this light. Gutsherren-suppresses both capital and Almost all of the rest of Europe at the labor and,indeed,almost all urban life. dawn of this period can be compared with So far the equation seems apt.Can we, Germany:poor in capital and in land, however,not go on to define that Waller- rich in labor.1 (The land-labor ratio steinian chimera,the semiperiphery seems as a rule to have declined as one (Wallerstein 1974,102-7),as comprising moved from north to south within the economies that fall into the lower right- economically backward regions of Europe hand cell of Figure 1,economies poor in [see figures for 1846 in Bowden,Karpo- capital and land,rich in labor?That vich,and Usher 1937,3].)As it does for would,I suspect,accurately describe most Germany,the model predicts for these of the southern European economies in other countries,particularly in southern this period;and it would correctly predict Europe,class conflict as a consequence of (see again Figure 2)the intense class con- increasing exposure to trade:workers flict(including the German Peasants War (including agricultural wage laborers) [Moore 1967,463-67])and the wholly press for more open markets and greater retrograde and protectionist policies influence;capitalists and landowners adopted by a peculiarly united class of unite in support of protection and more 1128
American Political Science Review Vol. 81 The "Long" Sixteenth Century It has long been recognized that improvements in navigation and shipbuilding permitted, from about 1450 on, a previously unimagined expansion of trade, which eventuated in the European "discovery" and colonization of the Americas (Cipolla 1965). Among social scientists, Immanuel Wallerstein (1974) has studied this period most intensively; and it is worth emphasizing that the present analysis conforms with essential aspects, and, indeed, permits some clarification, of his. Within the context of the age, what Wallerstein calls the core economies of the new world system-those, essentially, of northwestern Europe-were defined by their abundance in capital and labor, and by their relative scarcity of land. The periphery can be described as the exact inverse: rich in land, poor in both capital and-often leading to the adoption of slavery or serfdom-labor. Under expanding trade, the regimes of the core come to be dominated by a "bourgeois" coalition of capital and skilled labor (the Dutch Republic, the Tudors), and of the manufactures that use both intensively; the older, landed elites lose ground. Conversely, in the periphery, land-in the persons of plantation owners and Gutsherren-suppresses both capital and labor and, indeed, almost all urban life. So far the equation seems apt. Can we, however, not go on to define that Wallersteinian chimera, the semiperiphery (Wallerstein 1974, 102-7), as comprising economies that fall into the lower righthand cell of Figure 1, economies poor in capital and land, rich in labor? That would, I suspect, accurately describe most of the southern European economies in this period; and it would correctly predict (see again Figure 2) the intense class conflict (including the German Peasants War [Moore 1967, 463-671) and the wholly retrograde and protectionist policies adopted by a peculiarly united class of landowners and capitalists in many of these regions.12 The Nineteenth Century We can again proceed regionally, generalizing on the sketch of Britain, Germany, and the United States developed earlier for this period. For the period just before the great cheapening of transportation-roughly at the middle of the nineteenth century13-Britain can stand as the surrogate for the advanced and labor-rich economies of northwest Europe generally, including Belgium, the Netherlands, and northern France (Hobsbawm 1962, Chap. 9; Landes 1969, Chap. 3). For this whole region, as for Britain, the model predicts that expanding trade would engender rural-urban conflict: capitalists and workers, united in support of free trade and greater urban influence, oppose a more traditional and protectionist landed sector. It does not seem to me farfetched to see the powerful liberalism and radicalism of this whole region in the later nineteenth century (Carstairs 1980, 50, 62; Cobban 1965, 21-28, 58-67; Daalder 1966, 196-98; Lorwin 1966,152-55)-or, for that matter, much of the conflict between secularism and clericalism-in this light. Almost all of the rest of Europe at the dawn of this period can be compared with Germany: poor in capital and in land, rich in labor.14 (The land-labor ratio seems as a rule to have declined as one moved from north to south within the economically backward regions of Europe [see figures for 1846 in Bowden, Karpovich, and Usher 1937, 31.) As it does for Germany, the model predicts for these other countries, particularly in southern Europe, class conflict as a consequence of increasing exposure to trade: workers (including agricultural wage laborers) press for more open markets and greater influence; capitalists and landowners unite in support of protection and more
Changing Exposure to Trade traditional rule.In its main aspect,this The Depression of the 1930s seems to me only a restatement of a cen- tral tendency that has long been Here the fit between theory and reality remarked,namely that class conflict in seems quite strong.Not only the United the nineteenth century came at an earlier States but Canada,Australia,and New phase of industrialization,and more bit- Zealand were by this time advanced, terly,to southern and central than to land-rich economies.Labor,their only northwestern Europe (e.g.,Lipset 1970, scarce factor,gained from the collapse of 28-30;Macridis 1978,485-87;cf.Thom- international trade:workers became more son 1962,375-78);and it seems to me a militant,policy shifted to the left.Most more credible account of these regions' Latin American societies remained land- extremism than Duverger's (1959,238) rich but backward;and for them this was famous invocation of an allegedly more quite generally the period of "Populist" mercurial "Latin"temperament. coalitions of the two scarce factors,labor The United States,finally,represents and capital.In developed northern the land-rich,but labor-and capital-poor Europe,owners and exploiters of the "frontier societies"of this period gener- locally scarce factor of land grew more ally:most of both Americas,Australia, assertive,and generally more powerful, New Zealand,even those parts of central wherever previous developments had not and southern Africa that would soon be caused them to disappear;capitalists and opened to commercial agriculture.Here, workers lost ground.Finally,throughout expanding trade benefits and strengthens the backward regions of the world econ- landowners and farmers against protec- omy,where labor was abundant and land tionist capitalists and workers(although, was scarce-not only in Asia but in as in the United States,the protectionist southern and eastern Europe-labor lost forces may still prevail);rural-urban con- to a renascent coalition of the locally flict ensues,precipitated by demands scarce factors of land and capital:in from the rural sector. Spain,Italy,Rumania,Hungary,and Again,this does not at first glance Poland,to name only the most prominent appear wide of the mark.In many of the cases (Carsten 1967,Chaps.2,5 and pp. Latin American societies,this period 194-204). cemented landed rule (Skidmore and Smith 1984,50;Sunkel and Paz 1973, After World War II 306-21);in the United States and Canada, it was characterized by conflicts between Under U.S.hegemony,and with new the industrial East and the agricultural economies in transportation and com- West (Easterbrook and Aitken 1958, munication,the West since World War II 503-4);in almost wholly agricultural has experienced one of history's more Australia,trade precipitated a cleavage dramatic expansions of international between free-trading landowners and trade (Organization for Economic Coop- increasingly protectionist rural and urban eration and Development [OECD]1982, wage labor (Gollan 1955,esp.162-69; 62-63).Again,the theory would lead us Greenwood 1955,216-20). to expect different regional consequences. In all of these cases,as I have empha- In the developed,labor-rich and land- sized before,other factors were surely at poor economies-including now not only work and important aspects are neglected most of Europe but Japan-the model by the present analysis;but it is essential would predict an "end of ideology,"at also not to ignore the benefits and costs of least as regards issues of class:labor and expanding trade to the various sectors. capital,both beneficiaries of expanding 1129
Changing Exposure to Trade traditional rule. In its main aspect, this seems to me only a restatement of a central tendency that has long been remarked, namely that class conflict in the nineteenth century came at an earlier phase of industrialization, and more bitterly, to southern and central than to northwestern Europe (e.g., Lipset 1970, 28-30; Macridis 1978, 485-87; cf. Thomson 1962, 375-78); and it seems to me a more credible account of these regions' extremism than Duverger's (1959, 238) famous invocation of an allegedly more mercurial "Latin" temperament. The United States, finally, represents the land-rich, but labor- and capital-poor "frontier societies" of this period generally: most of both Americas, Australia, New Zealand, even those parts of central and southern Africa that would soon be opened to commercial agriculture. Here, expanding trade benefits and strengthens landowners and farmers against protectionist capitalists and workers (although, as in the United States, the protectionist forces may still prevail); rural-urban conflict ensues, precipitated by demands from the rural sector. Again, this does not at first glance appear wide of the mark. In many of the Latin American societies, this period cemented landed rule (Skidmore and Smith 1984, 50; Sunkel and Paz 1973, 306-21); in the United States and Canada, it was characterized by conflicts between the industrial East and the agricultural West (Easterbrook and Aitken 1958, 503-4); in almost wholly agricultural Australia, trade precipitated a cleavage between free-trading landowners and increasingly protectionist rural and urban wage labor (Gollan 1955, esp. 162-69; Greenwood 1955, 216-20). In all of these cases, as I have emphasized before, other factors were surely at work and important aspects are neglected by the present analysis; but it is essential also not to ignore the benefits and costs of expanding trade to the various sectors. The Depression of the 1930s Here the fit between theory and reality seems quite strong. Not only the United States but Canada, Australia, and New Zealand were by this time advanced, land-rich economies. Labor, their only scarce factor, gained from the collapse of international trade: workers became more militant, policy shifted to the left. Most Latin American societies remained landrich but backward; and for them this was quite generally the period of "Populist" coalitions of the two scarce factors, labor and capital. In developed northern Europe, owners and exploiters of the locally scarce factor of land grew more assertive, and generally more powerful, wherever previous developments had not caused them to disappear; capitalists and workers lost ground. Finally, throughout the backward regions of the world economy, where labor was abundant and land was scarce-not only in Asia but in southern and eastern Europe-labor lost to a renascent coalition of the locally scarce factors of land and capital: in Spain, Italy, Ridmania, Hungary, and Poland, to name only the most prominent cases (Carsten 1967, Chaps. 2, 5 and pp. 194-204). After World War I1 Under U.S. hegemony, and with new economies in transportation and communication, the West since World War I1 has experienced one of history's more dramatic expansions of international trade (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD] 1982, 62-63). Again, the theory would lead us to expect different regional consequences. In the developed, labor-rich and landpoor economies-including now not only most of Europe but Japan-the model would predict an "end of ideology," at least as regards issues of class: labor and capital, both beneficiaries of expanding
