Michael Lamb Matthew 6:9-10).While these eternal goods are the count of these things themselves but on account of an- ultimate objects of hope,Augustine identifies tempo- other good that comes from them,"namely,the tempo- ral goods as proper,if proximate,objects of hope in ral well-being of the community (2003,130.6.12).But, the last four petitions of the Lord's Prayer-Give us he insists,these temporal goods must only be proxi- this day our daily bread,and forgive us our debts as we mate objects to be used rather than ultimate ends to also forgive our debtors,and do not bring us to the time be enjoyed.This admonition again reflects his concerns of trial,but deliver us from the evil one (1999a,30.115 about pride and domination:if honors and positions of citing Matthew 6:11-13).Since these petitions iden- power are"desired on account of an empty pride over tify goods that are "necessary for acquiring the eter- their superiority and on account of the superfluous or nal gifts"and "concern our needs in the present life," even harmful pomp of vanity,it is not proper"(2003, they do not necessarily conflict or compete with eternal 130.6.12).But "if they desire for themselves and for goods(1999a,30.115).Hoping for these goods can be a theirs a sufficient amount of necessary things and do proximate part of realizing the ultimate end.14 not desire any more,they do not desire improperly' Augustine advances a similar claim in a sermon on (2003,130.6.12).While Augustine suggests that human Psalm 129,where he explicitly acknowledges the per- beings ought to"prefer eternal to temporal things"and missibility of hoping for temporal goods:"Am I con- love them"on account of"'God,he still permits hoping demning hope for worldly advantages,if God is be- for temporal goods for the sake of health or friendship sought to grant them?No,but there is another kind as long as this hope does not become disordered or per- of hope proper to Israel.It is not Israel's true calling verse(2003.130.5.11-130.714.130.12.22-130.13.24:see to hope for riches or bodily health or an abundance of also Studer 1990,211). earthly assets,as though such things were its supreme Augustine's emphasis on hoping for such temporal good"(2004,129.11,emphasis added).This final caveat goods in "proper fashion"highlights a crucial feature of is significant:it implies that Augustine allows us to hope his account.If hope is to be virtuous,it,like love,must for certain temporal goods as long we do not hope for be properly ordered (1998a,14.6-9,15.22).Strikingly, 4号元 them as our supreme good,as long as we do not rest in Augustine applies the same distinctions to hope that them,either making them idols or dominating them as he uses to explicate his order of love. if they are ours to possess. In Sermon 157,for example,he invokes the distinc- In places,Augustine even suggests we can hope for tion between using and enjoying in the context of hope some temporal goods for their own sake.In Letter rather than love.He praises those who are "hoping 130 to Proba,as in the Enchiridion,Augustine iden- for eternal things which we cannot see"and admon- tifies proper objects of desire by appealing to the ishes those who are"hooked on temporal things that Lord's Prayer and describes "health"and "friendship" can be seen"(1992b.1575).Yet he acknowledges that as temporal goods properly sought"for their own sake" those who hope for eternal goods should not abandon (propter se)(2003,130.12.22-130.13.24,130.6.13).15He hope for temporal goods:"We too make use of them argues further that human beings may desire "a suf- according to the needs of our journey;but we don't set ficient amount of necessary goods...sought not for our heart's joy on them,in case when they collapse we their own sake but for the sake of [health and friend- should be buried in the ruins.You see,we make use of ship],when they are sought in proper fashion"(2003 this world as though we were not using it,in order to 130.6.13).6 Among these goods,he includes"temporal reach the one who made this world,and remain in him well-being"and even"honors and positions of power" enjoying his eternity"(1992b,1575,emphasis added). (2003,130.6.12).“Yes,”Augustine affirms,“it is proper Here,Augustine employs the use/enjoyment distinc- to will these things if it is their responsibility to pro- tion to chasten listeners against hoping for proximate vide for those who live subject to them,not on ac- temporal goods as their supreme good or ultimate end. In other sermons,Augustine identifies rightly or- 14 Alan Mittleman is one of the few interpreters to note the permis- dered hope by identifying corresponding forms of sibility of Augustinian hope for temporal goods:"Despite his dis- disorder-namely,the vices of presumption and de- paragement of the misplaced,worldly hopes of paganism,Augus- spair.In Sermon 87,for example,Augustine identifies tine does not deride worldly hope altogether.Just as he reconstructs 'two evils'”that“kill souls'":“despair"(desperatio)and virtue within a Christian mode as the practice of love,he validates "perverse hope"(peruersa spes)(1991a,8710).17 De- hope for those worldly goods necessary for a Christian life,that is,for spair is the privation of hope.Desperatio means liter- the life of the City of God as it steadfastly endures within the earthly city.Ultimate hopes coexist with proximate hopes.Just as the rabbis ally to be "without hope,"which Augustine considers read a domesticated eschatology out of the petitionary prayers of a great evil since it causes us to withdraw from the the liturgy,so,too,Augustine finds the Lord's Prayer to be a concise good rather than"stretch"toward it in hope (see 1992a, expression of legitimate hope"(2009,155: see also Studer 1990.211. 105.7;2004,129.10).When we despair,our hope be- 217). 15 For an illuminating discussion of Letter 130,see Clair(2016,52- comes deficient,and we lose the capacity to seek our 65). objects of hope or patiently endure the difficulties and 16 Augustine makes a similar claim in The Excellence of Marriage delays associated with attaining a future good (1992b, (1999b,9.9):"Undoubtedly we should take note that God gives us some benefits that are to be sought after for their own sake,such as wisdom,health and friendship,and others are necessary for the sake i7 I translate peruersa as“"perverse"rather than“wrongheaded,”as of something else,such as learning,food,drink,marriage,and sleep Hill does.In Sermon 352A.7(1997b),Augustine also describes"per- ing together."He goes on to emphasize the importance of proper verse hope”(spem peruersam)and“unbelieving despair”(infidelem “use”(1999b,9.9). desperationem)as the two vices related to hope. 1042Michael Lamb Matthew 6: 9–10). While these eternal goods are the ultimate objects of hope, Augustine identifies tempo￾ral goods as proper, if proximate, objects of hope in the last four petitions of the Lord’s Prayer—Give us this day our daily bread, and forgive us our debts as we also forgive our debtors, and do not bring us to the time of trial, but deliver us from the evil one (1999a, 30.115, citing Matthew 6: 11–13). Since these petitions iden￾tify goods that are “necessary for acquiring the eter￾nal gifts” and “concern our needs in the present life,” they do not necessarily conflict or compete with eternal goods (1999a, 30.115). Hoping for these goods can be a proximate part of realizing the ultimate end.14 Augustine advances a similar claim in a sermon on Psalm 129, where he explicitly acknowledges the per￾missibility of hoping for temporal goods: “Am I con￾demning hope for worldly advantages, if God is be￾sought to grant them? No, but there is another kind of hope proper to Israel. It is not Israel’s true calling to hope for riches or bodily health or an abundance of earthly assets, as though such things were its supreme good” (2004, 129.11, emphasis added). This final caveat is significant:it implies that Augustine allows us to hope for certain temporal goods as long we do not hope for them as our supreme good, as long as we do not rest in them, either making them idols or dominating them as if they are ours to possess. In places, Augustine even suggests we can hope for some temporal goods for their own sake. In Letter 130 to Proba, as in the Enchiridion, Augustine iden￾tifies proper objects of desire by appealing to the Lord’s Prayer and describes “health” and “friendship” as temporal goods properly sought “for their own sake” (propter se) (2003, 130.12.22–130.13.24, 130.6.13).15 He argues further that human beings may desire “a suf￾ficient amount of necessary goods ...sought not for their own sake but for the sake of [health and friend￾ship], when they are sought in proper fashion” (2003, 130.6.13).16 Among these goods, he includes “temporal well-being” and even “honors and positions of power” (2003, 130.6.12). “Yes,” Augustine affirms, “it is proper to will these things if it is their responsibility to pro￾vide for those who live subject to them, not on ac- 14 Alan Mittleman is one of the few interpreters to note the permis￾sibility of Augustinian hope for temporal goods: “Despite his dis￾paragement of the misplaced, worldly hopes of paganism, Augus￾tine does not deride worldly hope altogether. Just as he reconstructs virtue within a Christian mode as the practice of love, he validates hope for those worldly goods necessary for a Christian life, that is, for the life of the City of God as it steadfastly endures within the earthly city. Ultimate hopes coexist with proximate hopes. Just as the rabbis read a domesticated eschatology out of the petitionary prayers of the liturgy, so, too, Augustine finds the Lord’s Prayer to be a concise expression of legitimate hope” (2009, 155; see also Studer 1990, 211, 217). 15 For an illuminating discussion of Letter 130, see Clair (2016, 52– 65). 16 Augustine makes a similar claim in The Excellence of Marriage (1999b, 9.9): “Undoubtedly we should take note that God gives us some benefits that are to be sought after for their own sake, such as wisdom, health and friendship, and others are necessary for the sake of something else, such as learning, food, drink, marriage, and sleep￾ing together.” He goes on to emphasize the importance of proper “use” (1999b, 9.9). count of these things themselves but on account of an￾other good that comes from them,” namely, the tempo￾ral well-being of the community (2003, 130.6.12). But, he insists, these temporal goods must only be proxi￾mate objects to be used rather than ultimate ends to be enjoyed. This admonition again reflects his concerns about pride and domination: if honors and positions of power are “desired on account of an empty pride over their superiority and on account of the superfluous or even harmful pomp of vanity, it is not proper” (2003, 130.6.12). But “if they desire for themselves and for theirs a sufficient amount of necessary things and do not desire any more, they do not desire improperly” (2003, 130.6.12). While Augustine suggests that human beings ought to “prefer eternal to temporal things” and love them “on account of” God, he still permits hoping for temporal goods for the sake of health or friendship, as long as this hope does not become disordered or per￾verse (2003, 130.5.11-130.7.14, 130.12.22–130.13.24; see also Studer 1990, 211). Augustine’s emphasis on hoping for such temporal goods in “proper fashion” highlights a crucial feature of his account. If hope is to be virtuous, it, like love, must be properly ordered (1998a, 14.6–9, 15.22). Strikingly, Augustine applies the same distinctions to hope that he uses to explicate his order of love. In Sermon 157, for example, he invokes the distinc￾tion between using and enjoying in the context of hope rather than love. He praises those who are “hoping for eternal things which we cannot see” and admon￾ishes those who are “hooked on temporal things that can be seen” (1992b, 157.5). Yet he acknowledges that those who hope for eternal goods should not abandon hope for temporal goods: “We too make use of them according to the needs of our journey; but we don’t set our heart’s joy on them, in case when they collapse we should be buried in the ruins. You see, we make use of this world as though we were not using it, in order to reach the one who made this world, and remain in him, enjoying his eternity” (1992b, 157.5, emphasis added). Here, Augustine employs the use/enjoyment distinc￾tion to chasten listeners against hoping for proximate, temporal goods as their supreme good or ultimate end. In other sermons, Augustine identifies rightly or￾dered hope by identifying corresponding forms of disorder—namely, the vices of presumption and de￾spair. In Sermon 87, for example, Augustine identifies “two evils” that “kill souls”: “despair” (desperatio) and “perverse hope” (peruersa spes) (1991a, 87.10).17 De￾spair is the privation of hope. Desperatio means liter￾ally to be “without hope,” which Augustine considers a great evil since it causes us to withdraw from the good rather than “stretch” toward it in hope (see 1992a, 105.7; 2004, 129.10). When we despair, our hope be￾comes deficient, and we lose the capacity to seek our objects of hope or patiently endure the difficulties and delays associated with attaining a future good (1992b, 17 I translate peruersa as “perverse” rather than “wrongheaded,” as Hill does. In Sermon 352A.7 (1997b), Augustine also describes “per￾verse hope” (spem peruersam) and “unbelieving despair” (infidelem desperationem) as the two vices related to hope. 1042 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000345