《社会保障概论》课程教学资源（课后阅读资料）APSR_Volume112. Issue 4.Nov 2018_Between_Presumption_and_Despair_Augustines_Hope_for_the_Commonwealth

American Political Science Review (2018)112.4,1036-1049 doi:10.1017/S0003055418000345 American Political Science Association 2018 Between Presumption and Despair:Augustine's Hope for the Commonwealth MICHAEL LAMB Wake Forest University any political theorists dismiss Augustine as a pessimist about politics,assuming his "other- worldly"account of love precludes hope for this-worldly politics.This article challenges this pessimism by applying recent research on Augustine's"order oflove"to reconstruct his implicit order of hope.Analyzing neglected sermons,letters,and treatises,I argue that Augustine encourages hope for temporal goods as long as that hope is rightly ordered and avoids the corresponding vices of presump- tion and despair.I then identify "civic peace"as a common object of hope that diverse citizens can share By recovering hope as a virtue and reframing civic peace as a positive form of civic friendship,I argue that Augustine commends a hope for the commonwealth that avoids both presumption and despair.I conclude by analyzing how Augustine's vision of the commonwealth can inform contemporary political theory and practice. hile hope has been a prominent theme in Center (2017b)affirms that Democrats and Republi- American politics over the last three decades. cans are more divided over"fundamental political val- it seems conspicuously absent from contem- ues"than they have been since Pew began surveying in porary political discourse.In the face of partisan polar- 1994.Another Pew poll shows that "the overall level of ization,economic inequality,and social division,many trust in government remains near historic lows."with citizens rightly feel tempted to despair,wondering if almost 80%saying they either never trust the govern- politics can offer any hope in our troubled times.A re- ment to do the right thing(11%)or only trust the gov- cent Washington Post-University of Maryland Democ- ernment some of the time(68%)(2017a).These trends racy Poll (2017),for example,suggests that Americans invite us to ask what citizens may hope for in politics have a "starkly pessimistic view of U.S.politics"(Wag- and whether,given current divisions,it is possible to ner and Clement 2017).Seventy-one percent of re- share any of these hopes in common. spondents agreed that current partisan divisions have This article seeks to recover resources for conceptu- "reached a dangerous low point,"which many see as alizing political hope by turning to an unlikely source, the "new normal"rather than a temporary aberration Augustine of Hippo.While Augustine is often regarded (Washington Post-University of Maryland 2017;Wag- as one of the most important thinkers in the history of ner and Clement 2017).A survey by the Pew Research Western political thought,his influence has emerged most recently in strands of political realism that em- Michael Lamb is an Assistant Professor of Politics,Ethics.and In- phasize the "corruption of self-interest"(Niebuhr 1986 terdisciplinary Humanities,Wake Forest University,P.O.Box 7225 129)and seek to "give injustice its due"(Shklar 1989). Winston-Salem,NC 27106,USA(lambkm@wfu.edu). As a result,Augustine is"usually numbered among the For helpful conversation and feedback on previous versions of pessimists"(Elshtain 1998,19).If Augustine offers any this paper,I am grateful to the editors,anonymous reviewers,and hope,most assume that it is a hope for heaven,not for a number of friends and colleagues,including Robert M.Adams. Matthew Anderson,Alexis Andres,Nancy Bedford,Nigel Biggar, politics.As Eric Gregory notes,many interpreters cast John Bowlin.Edward Brooks.Peter Busch.Paul Camacho,Andrew Augustine as"the patron saint of a dour and other- Chignell,Joseph Clair,Kody Cooper,Molly Farneth,Steven Firmin worldly pessimism which emphasizes the radical limits Allan Fitzgerald,Andrius Galisanka,Eric Gregory,Paul Griffiths. of politics and virtue as compared to a heavenly city" Davey Henreckson,Joshua Hordern,Kristen Deede Johnson,Bolek 2011.34). Kabala,Melissa Lane,Sean Larsen,Philip Lorish,Stephen Macedo, Charles Mathewes,Christina McRorie,Ashleen Mechaca-Bagnulo, Undoubtedly,Augustine provides evidence to sup- Samuel Newlands,Anne Norton,Joshua Nunziato,Matthew Puffer port such a view.In City of God,Augustine prosecutes Veronica Roberts,Cameron Silverglate,Sarah Stewart-Kroeker,Jef- a scathing polemic against imperial Rome,assailing the frey Stout,Daniel Strand,Adam Thomas,Melanie Webb,Brian Romans'lust for domination and comparing the Ro- Williams,and audiences at the Northeast Political Science Associa- tion (2011),the American Academy of Religion(2014),the Univer- man empire to a "band of robbers"(1998a,1.Preface, sity of Oxford Christian Ethics Graduate Research Seminar(2014) 5.19,14.28,4.4).Throughout City of God,Augustine a manuscript workshop at High Point University (2015).the Inter. laments the "miserable condition of this life,"bemoan- national Conference on Patristic Studies at the University of Ox. ing the“darkness'”and“undoubted evils'”that accom- ford(2015),LArca delle Virtu Conference at the University of Pavia pany political affairs(1998a,19.8,19.5).He even com- (2017),the Hope Optimism seminar at Cornell University(2017). and the Augustine and Politics Reading Group at the University piles a lengthy list of the "many and grave evils"that of Oxford(2018).For support of this research,I wish to thank the beset human life,going so far as to describe our condi- Princeton University Department of Politics and University Center tion as "a hell on earth"(1998a,22.22-22.23).If these for Human Values,Josephine de Karman Fellowship Trust,Temple- ton World Charity Foundation,Oxford Character Project,McDon ald Centre for Theology,Ethics,and Public Life at the University of Oxford,and Wake Forest University. Following accepted standards in Augustinian studies,all citations to Augustine's texts are to chapter,section,and/or paragraph numbers Received:July 21.2017:revised:February 1.2018:accepted:June 1. rather than page numbers.References to the original Latin are from 2018.First published online:August 7 2018. Augustine (1995). 1036

American Political Science Review (2018) 112, 4, 1036–1049 doi:10.1017/S0003055418000345 © American Political Science Association 2018 Between Presumption and Despair: Augustine’s Hope for the Commonwealth MICHAEL LAMB Wake Forest University Many political theorists dismiss Augustine as a pessimist about politics, assuming his “other￾worldly” account of love precludes hope for this-worldly politics. This article challenges this pessimism by applying recent research on Augustine’s “order of love” to reconstruct his implicit order of hope. Analyzing neglected sermons, letters, and treatises, I argue that Augustine encourages hope for temporal goods as long as that hope is rightly ordered and avoids the corresponding vices of presump￾tion and despair. I then identify “civic peace” as a common object of hope that diverse citizens can share. By recovering hope as a virtue and reframing civic peace as a positive form of civic friendship, I argue that Augustine commends a hope for the commonwealth that avoids both presumption and despair. I conclude by analyzing how Augustine’s vision of the commonwealth can inform contemporary political theory and practice. While hope has been a prominent theme in American politics over the last three decades, it seems conspicuously absent from contem￾porary political discourse. In the face of partisan polar￾ization, economic inequality, and social division, many citizens rightly feel tempted to despair, wondering if politics can offer any hope in our troubled times. A re￾cent Washington Post–University of Maryland Democ￾racy Poll (2017), for example, suggests that Americans have a “starkly pessimistic view of U.S. politics” (Wag￾ner and Clement 2017). Seventy-one percent of re￾spondents agreed that current partisan divisions have “reached a dangerous low point,” which many see as the “new normal” rather than a temporary aberration (Washington Post–University of Maryland 2017; Wag￾ner and Clement 2017). A survey by the Pew Research Michael Lamb is an Assistant Professor of Politics, Ethics, and In￾terdisciplinary Humanities, Wake Forest University, P.O. Box 7225, Winston-Salem, NC 27106, USA (lambkm@wfu.edu). For helpful conversation and feedback on previous versions of this paper, I am grateful to the editors, anonymous reviewers, and a number of friends and colleagues, including Robert M. Adams, Matthew Anderson, Alexis Andres, Nancy Bedford, Nigel Biggar, John Bowlin, Edward Brooks, Peter Busch, Paul Camacho, Andrew Chignell, Joseph Clair, Kody Cooper, Molly Farneth, Steven Firmin, Allan Fitzgerald, Andrius Galisanka, Eric Gregory, Paul Griffiths, Davey Henreckson, Joshua Hordern, Kristen Deede Johnson, Bolek Kabala, Melissa Lane, Sean Larsen, Philip Lorish, Stephen Macedo, Charles Mathewes, Christina McRorie, Ashleen Mechaca-Bagnulo, Samuel Newlands, Anne Norton, Joshua Nunziato, Matthew Puffer, Veronica Roberts, Cameron Silverglate, Sarah Stewart-Kroeker, Jef￾frey Stout, Daniel Strand, Adam Thomas, Melanie Webb, Brian Williams, and audiences at the Northeast Political Science Associa￾tion (2011), the American Academy of Religion (2014), the Univer￾sity of Oxford Christian Ethics Graduate Research Seminar (2014), a manuscript workshop at High Point University (2015), the Inter￾national Conference on Patristic Studies at the University of Ox￾ford (2015), L’Arca delle Virtù Conference at the University of Pavia (2017), the Hope & Optimism seminar at Cornell University (2017), and the Augustine and Politics Reading Group at the University of Oxford (2018). For support of this research, I wish to thank the Princeton University Department of Politics and University Center for Human Values, Josephine de Karman Fellowship Trust, Temple￾ton World Charity Foundation, Oxford Character Project, McDon￾ald Centre for Theology, Ethics, and Public Life at the University of Oxford, and Wake Forest University. Received: July 21, 2017; revised: February 1, 2018; accepted: June 1, 2018. First published online: August 7, 2018. Center (2017b) affirms that Democrats and Republi￾cans are more divided over “fundamental political val￾ues” than they have been since Pew began surveying in 1994. Another Pew poll shows that “the overall level of trust in government remains near historic lows,” with almost 80% saying they either never trust the govern￾ment to do the right thing (11%) or only trust the gov￾ernment some of the time (68%) (2017a). These trends invite us to ask what citizens may hope for in politics and whether, given current divisions, it is possible to share any of these hopes in common. This article seeks to recover resources for conceptu￾alizing political hope by turning to an unlikely source, Augustine of Hippo.While Augustine is often regarded as one of the most important thinkers in the history of Western political thought, his influence has emerged most recently in strands of political realism that em￾phasize the “corruption of self-interest” (Niebuhr 1986, 129) and seek to “give injustice its due” (Shklar 1989). As a result, Augustine is “usually numbered among the pessimists” (Elshtain 1998, 19). If Augustine offers any hope, most assume that it is a hope for heaven, not for politics. As Eric Gregory notes, many interpreters cast Augustine as “the patron saint of a dour and other￾worldly pessimism which emphasizes the radical limits of politics and virtue as compared to a heavenly city” (2011, 34). Undoubtedly, Augustine provides evidence to sup￾port such a view. In City of God, Augustine prosecutes a scathing polemic against imperial Rome, assailing the Romans’ lust for domination and comparing the Ro￾man empire to a “band of robbers” (1998a, 1. Preface, 5.19, 14.28, 4.4).1 Throughout City of God, Augustine laments the “miserable condition of this life,” bemoan￾ing the “darkness” and “undoubted evils” that accom￾pany political affairs (1998a, 19.8, 19.5). He even com￾piles a lengthy list of the “many and grave evils” that beset human life, going so far as to describe our condi￾tion as “a hell on earth” (1998a, 22.22–22.23). If these 1 Following accepted standards in Augustinian studies, all citations to Augustine’s texts are to chapter, section, and/or paragraph numbers rather than page numbers. References to the original Latin are from Augustine (1995). 1036 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000345

Between Presumption and Despair passages were not enough to justify a"picture of a implicit order of hope,an aspect of his thought that has man pessimistic about politics"(Wills 1999,129),inter- gone unnoticed by scholars of Augustine.Drawing on preters have added fuel(and sometimes brimstone)to sermons,letters,and treatises often overlooked by po- Augustine's fire. litical interpreters,I argue that Augustine allows hope Elsewhere,I analyze these passages and the method- for temporal goods as long as that hope is properly ological assumptions that underwrite overly pes- ordered and thus avoids corresponding forms of disor- simistic interpretations,focusing in particular on how der,namely,the vices of presumption and despair.The interpreters often abstract Augustine's texts from their fourth section considers whether distinctly political historical,rhetorical,and pedagogical contexts.Trained goods can be among hope's proper objects.Focusing in the art of Roman rhetoric,Augustine frequently uses on Augustine's account of the commonwealth,I argue op//s excessive rhetoric about the evils of this world to chas- that Augustine commends "civic peace"as a common ten the earthly desires of his readers and reorder their object of hope that can be shared by diverse citizens hopes to the heavenly city,even as he affirms the value with different ultimate beliefs and commitments. of temporal goods and the importance of earthly poli- Moreover,I contend this "civic peace"consists not tics(Lamb,forthcoming).While understanding Augus- merely in the absence of violence,as many interpreters tine's rhetorical and pedagogical purposes is critical to assume,but in a more positive form of civic friendship complicating influential views of his pessimism,this ar- among diverse citizens in the commonwealth. ticle challenges more substantive assumptions about I conclude by highlighting three ways in which Au- his "order of love,"which often fuels suspicions that gustine's hope for such a commonwealth can inform Augustine is a gloomy pessimist and otherworldly es- contemporary politics.First,Augustine's triad of pre- capist. sumption,hope,and despair provides a more nuanced Hannah Arendt,for example,complains that Augus- conceptual vocabulary for contemporary political dis- tine's otherworldly love makes a "desert out of this course that avoids the common binary between opti- world"and thereby diminishes political agency (1996, mism and pessimism.Second,his vision of the com 4r元 19;cf.93-7).Following Arendt,Martha Nussbaum ar- monwealth reflects a way for diverse citizens to share gues that the"insistent otherworldly direction"of Au- common hopes without requiring either strict neutral- gustine's love encourages passivity in politics and com- ity or totalizing adherence to the same tradition.Fi- & plicity in suffering (2001,551-6).Meanwhile,David nally,his view of civic peace as a form of civic friendship Billings cites Arendt to suggest that Augustine's oth- entails an expansive view of the political that directs erworldly love precludes hope for this-worldly pol- citizens'hopes to objects beyond elections or formal itics (2004,135-6)."Augustine cannot develop an institutions of government,which is especially impor- adequate view of politics,"Billings argues,"because tant at a time when ideological and electoral divisions loving the world for its own sake is idolatry and sec- might tempt despair. ular(worldly)events cannot attain true significance.In other words,while Augustine's eschatological ends do THE ORDER OF LOVE provide a kind of hope,they do not provide political hope-ie.,a hope that can sustain and enrich politi- In On Christian Teaching,Augustine analyzes the cal action"(2004.135-6).Because Augustine considers Christian commandment to love God and neighbor by love of the world to be"idolatry."these critics assume. developing his early and influential account of the "or- he cannot commend any hope for this-worldly politics. der of love: Augustine's hope is not“for the world”but“against'”it Billings 2004.136:cf.Arendt 1996.106). The person who lives a just and holy life is one...who has ordered his love,so that he does not love what it is wrong to This article draws on neglected texts to challenge love,or fail to love what should be loved,or love too much influential interpretations of Augustine's political what should be loved less (or love too little what should pessimism and show how Augustine's hope for the be loved more),or love two things equally if one of them commonwealth can inform contemporary politics.To should be loved either less or more than the other.or love situate the discussion,the first section sets forth Augus things either more of less if they should be loved equally tine's controversial account of the "order of love"(ordo (1997a.1.2728). amoris)and examines criticisms from three prominent political interpreters-Arendt,Nussbaum,and Rein- To determine which objects to love and how to love hold Niebuhr-who worry that Augustine's order of them,Augustine employs a famous distinction between eys love instrumentalizes the neighbor and evacuates the “use”(usus/huti)and“enjoyment'”(fruitio/frui):There world of its value.The second section challenges the as- are some things which are to be enjoyed,some which are to be used.and some whose function is both to en- sumptions underlying these criticisms by synthesizing and integrating recent scholarship in religious studies and use.Those which are to be enjoyed make us to engage political critics who dismiss Augustinian happy;those which are to be used assist us and give us hope because of anxieties about his "otherworldly' a boost,so to speak,as we press on towards our happi- ness,so that we may reach and hold fast to the things love.By highlighting how Augustine's order of love is focused as much on moral psychology as metaphysics,I which make us happy"(1997a,1.3.3).2 Augustine goes show how he allows love for temporal goods as long as that love is properly ordered.The third section builds 2 For an excellent analysis of Augustine's distinction between"use" and "enjoyment"in light of his pilgrimage motif,see Stewart- on this alternative account to reconstruct Augustine's Kroeker(2014;2017,204-4). 1037

Between Presumption and Despair passages were not enough to justify a “picture of a man pessimistic about politics” (Wills 1999, 129), inter￾preters have added fuel (and sometimes brimstone) to Augustine’s fire. Elsewhere, I analyze these passages and the method￾ological assumptions that underwrite overly pes￾simistic interpretations, focusing in particular on how interpreters often abstract Augustine’s texts from their historical, rhetorical, and pedagogical contexts.Trained in the art of Roman rhetoric,Augustine frequently uses excessive rhetoric about the evils of this world to chas￾ten the earthly desires of his readers and reorder their hopes to the heavenly city, even as he affirms the value of temporal goods and the importance of earthly poli￾tics (Lamb, forthcoming).While understanding Augus￾tine’s rhetorical and pedagogical purposes is critical to complicating influential views of his pessimism, this ar￾ticle challenges more substantive assumptions about his “order of love,” which often fuels suspicions that Augustine is a gloomy pessimist and otherworldly es￾capist. Hannah Arendt, for example, complains that Augus￾tine’s otherworldly love makes a “desert out of this world” and thereby diminishes political agency (1996, 19; cf. 93–7). Following Arendt, Martha Nussbaum ar￾gues that the “insistent otherworldly direction” of Au￾gustine’s love encourages passivity in politics and com￾plicity in suffering (2001, 551–6). Meanwhile, David Billings cites Arendt to suggest that Augustine’s oth￾erworldly love precludes hope for this-worldly pol￾itics (2004, 135–6). “Augustine cannot develop an adequate view of politics,” Billings argues, “because loving the world for its own sake is idolatry and sec￾ular (worldly) events cannot attain true significance. In other words, while Augustine’s eschatological ends do provide a kind of hope, they do not provide political hope—i.e., a hope that can sustain and enrich politi￾cal action” (2004, 135–6). Because Augustine considers love of the world to be “idolatry,” these critics assume, he cannot commend any hope for this-worldly politics. Augustine’s hope is not “for the world” but “against” it (Billings 2004, 136; cf. Arendt 1996, 106). This article draws on neglected texts to challenge influential interpretations of Augustine’s political pessimism and show how Augustine’s hope for the commonwealth can inform contemporary politics. To situate the discussion, the first section sets forth Augus￾tine’s controversial account of the “order of love” (ordo amoris) and examines criticisms from three prominent political interpreters—Arendt, Nussbaum, and Rein￾hold Niebuhr—who worry that Augustine’s order of love instrumentalizes the neighbor and evacuates the world of its value.The second section challenges the as￾sumptions underlying these criticisms by synthesizing and integrating recent scholarship in religious studies to engage political critics who dismiss Augustinian hope because of anxieties about his “otherworldly” love. By highlighting how Augustine’s order of love is focused as much on moral psychology as metaphysics, I show how he allows love for temporal goods as long as that love is properly ordered. The third section builds on this alternative account to reconstruct Augustine’s implicit order of hope, an aspect of his thought that has gone unnoticed by scholars of Augustine. Drawing on sermons, letters, and treatises often overlooked by po￾litical interpreters, I argue that Augustine allows hope for temporal goods as long as that hope is properly ordered and thus avoids corresponding forms of disor￾der, namely, the vices of presumption and despair. The fourth section considers whether distinctly political goods can be among hope’s proper objects. Focusing on Augustine’s account of the commonwealth, I argue that Augustine commends “civic peace” as a common object of hope that can be shared by diverse citizens with different ultimate beliefs and commitments. Moreover, I contend this “civic peace” consists not merely in the absence of violence, as many interpreters assume, but in a more positive form of civic friendship among diverse citizens in the commonwealth. I conclude by highlighting three ways in which Au￾gustine’s hope for such a commonwealth can inform contemporary politics. First, Augustine’s triad of pre￾sumption, hope, and despair provides a more nuanced conceptual vocabulary for contemporary political dis￾course that avoids the common binary between opti￾mism and pessimism. Second, his vision of the com￾monwealth reflects a way for diverse citizens to share common hopes without requiring either strict neutral￾ity or totalizing adherence to the same tradition. Fi￾nally, his view of civic peace as a form of civic friendship entails an expansive view of the political that directs citizens’ hopes to objects beyond elections or formal institutions of government, which is especially impor￾tant at a time when ideological and electoral divisions might tempt despair. THE ORDER OF LOVE In On Christian Teaching, Augustine analyzes the Christian commandment to love God and neighbor by developing his early and influential account of the “or￾der of love:” The person who lives a just and holy life is one . . . who has ordered his love, so that he does not love what it is wrong to love, or fail to love what should be loved, or love too much what should be loved less (or love too little what should be loved more), or love two things equally if one of them should be loved either less or more than the other, or love things either more of less if they should be loved equally (1997a, 1.27.28). To determine which objects to love and how to love them,Augustine employs a famous distinction between “use” (usus/uti) and “enjoyment” (fruitio/frui): “There are some things which are to be enjoyed, some which are to be used, and some whose function is both to en￾joy and use. Those which are to be enjoyed make us happy; those which are to be used assist us and give us a boost, so to speak, as we press on towards our happi￾ness, so that we may reach and hold fast to the things which make us happy” (1997a, 1.3.3).2 Augustine goes 2 For an excellent analysis of Augustine’s distinction between “use” and “enjoyment” in light of his pilgrimage motif, see Stewart￾Kroeker (2014; 2017, 204–4). 1037 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000345

Michael Lamb on to clarify what use and enjoyment entail:"To en- (1996.9-44.106).Moreover,Arendt argues that Augus- joy something is to hold fast to it in love for its own tine's injunction to"use"other human beings to enjoy sake.To use something is to apply whatever it may be God instrumentalizes our neighbors,making them into to the purpose of obtaining what you love-if indeed it mere"means and tools"rather than ends in themselves is something that ought to be loved.(The improper use (1996.37-44).As a result.we no longer love our neigh- of something should be termed abuse.)"(1997a,1.4.4). bor qua neighbor or individual qua individual;rather, With this account in view,Augustine emphasizes we love what is "eternal"in her(1996,96).Loving our that the“supreme'”object to be“enjoyed”is God neighbor simply becomes an "occasion to love God" the "supremely excellent and immortal being":"it is (1996,96-7). only the eternal and unchangeable things which I men- Nussbaum presses similar charges.While she praises tioned that are to be enjoyed;other things are to be Augustine's efforts to restore "compassion,along with used so that we may attain the full enjoyment of those other emotions,to a place of centrality in the earthly things"(1997a,1.5.5-1.6.6,1.22.20).On this account,hu- life,"Nussbaum complains that Augustine's vision of man beings should love only God for God's own sake; Christian love remains too otherworldly and transcen- all other objects must be "used"to"enjoy"God (1997a, dent (2001,551,528-9,552-5).*Targeting his contrast 1.3.3-1.4.4,1.22.20-21). between“human or earthly love”and“Christian love, As Augustine recognizes and critics hasten to point whose core is the love of God,"Nussbaum argues that out,the priority of God in the order of love raises an Augustine"repudiates the one and urges us,disdaining "important question"(magna quaestio):"whether hu- it,to cultivate the other"(2001.528-9).Citing Arendt. mans should enjoy one another or use one another:" she suggests that Augustine's "otherworldly"account of love denies the value of this-worldly striving and We have been commanded to love one another [John 13: eclipses human individuality(2001,549-56).If Augus- 34;15:12,17],but the question is whether one person tine requires human beings to order all loves to God should be loved by another on his own account or for some "it is a little unclear what role is left...for loving real- 4号 other reason.If on his own account,we enjoy him;if for life individual people.For what one loves above all in some other reason,we use him.In my opinion,he should be loved for another reason.For if something is to be loved them is the presence of God and the hope of salvation" on its own account,it is made to constitute the happy life, (2001,549-50).Ultimately,Augustine's attempt to"di- & even if it is not as yet the reality but the hope of it which rect longing away from this-worldly virtue"encourages consoles us at this time (1997a.1.22.20). insensitivity to human suffering and earthly injustice (2001,552-4).Rather than "taking action as best we Thus,Augustine concludes,"a person who loves his can,"Nussbaum concludes,Augustine admonishes us neighbor properly should,in concert with him,aim to to "cover ourselves,mourn,and wait"(2001,556). love God with all his heart.all his soul.and all his Critics are not alone in raising suspicions about Au- mind.In this way,loving him as he would himself,he gustine's order of love.Even an Augustinian as influen- 是 relates his love of himself and his neighbor entirely to tial as Niebuhr shares these concerns.While Niebuhr the love of God.which allows not the slightest trickle praises Augustine as"the first great'realist'in Western to flow away from it and thereby diminish it"(1997a, history,"he identifies "several grave errors in Augus- 1.22.21).For Augustine,the love of neighbor and other tine's account of love"(1986,124,130).In particular, temporal goods must always be"related"or"referred" Niebuhr argues that Augustine's account of love instru- to God(1997a,1.23.22:1998b,4.12.18).Or,as he says mentalizes the neighbor:"The love of the neighbor is in later formulations,human beings must love their for him not part of a double love commandment,but neighbor and the world "in God"(1998b,4.12.18;see merely the instrument of a single love commandment Gregory 2008,42). which bids us flee all mortality,including the neighbor, in favor of the immutable good"(1986,136).Niebuhr blames this Augustinian flight on a lingering Neopla- Political Critics of an Otherworldly tonic focus on the nature of love's objects:"the empha- Augustine sis lies always upon the worthiness or unworthiness of To contemporary readers,especially those with Kan- the object of our love:the insistence is that only God tian sensibilities,Augustine's discussion of"use"and and not some mutable 'good'or person is worthy of "enjoyment"can seem like a blatant violation of the our love"(1986,137).While Niebuhr concedes that this categorical imperative,encouraging citizens to exploit formula is"a safeguard against all forms of idolatry," the world and treat their fellow human beings as mere he nevertheless suggests that"using"the neighbor and means to their ends.Arendt,for example,argues that earthly goods to enjoy God denies human individual- Augustine tends "to strip the world and all tempo- ity and trivializes the value of temporal goods (1986, ral things of their value and to make them relative' (1996,14).3 As a result,Augustine's account of love drains this-worldly life of significance,requiring that According to Nussbaum,the Augustinian "ascent of love and desire L we "stand against the world,not simply without it" from the earthly to the heavenly...strips away and leaves behind the merely human in love"(2001,529). 5 Nussbaum adds a qualifying footnote:"Not all Christian love is love of God:there may be human loves that are distinctively Chris- 3 For an insightful discussion of Arendt's interpretation of Augus- tian.But these other loves are suffused by the love of God,and,as tine,see Gregory (2008,197-240). we shall see,their real object always is,in a way,God"(2001,528n1). 1038

Michael Lamb on to clarify what use and enjoyment entail: “To en￾joy something is to hold fast to it in love for its own sake. To use something is to apply whatever it may be to the purpose of obtaining what you love—if indeed it is something that ought to be loved. (The improper use of something should be termed abuse.)” (1997a, 1.4.4). With this account in view, Augustine emphasizes that the “supreme” object to be “enjoyed” is God, the “supremely excellent and immortal being”: “it is only the eternal and unchangeable things which I men￾tioned that are to be enjoyed; other things are to be used so that we may attain the full enjoyment of those things” (1997a, 1.5.5–1.6.6, 1.22.20).On this account, hu￾man beings should love only God for God’s own sake; all other objects must be “used” to “enjoy”God (1997a, 1.3.3–1.4.4, 1.22.20–21). As Augustine recognizes and critics hasten to point out, the priority of God in the order of love raises an “important question” (magna quaestio): “whether hu￾mans should enjoy one another or use one another:” We have been commanded to love one another [John 13: 34; 15: 12, 17], but the question is whether one person should be loved by another on his own account or for some other reason. If on his own account, we enjoy him; if for some other reason, we use him. In my opinion, he should be loved for another reason. For if something is to be loved on its own account, it is made to constitute the happy life, even if it is not as yet the reality but the hope of it which consoles us at this time (1997a, 1.22.20). Thus, Augustine concludes, “a person who loves his neighbor properly should, in concert with him, aim to love God with all his heart, all his soul, and all his mind. In this way, loving him as he would himself, he relates his love of himself and his neighbor entirely to the love of God, which allows not the slightest trickle to flow away from it and thereby diminish it” (1997a, 1.22.21). For Augustine, the love of neighbor and other temporal goods must always be “related” or “referred” to God (1997a, 1.23.22; 1998b, 4.12.18). Or, as he says in later formulations, human beings must love their neighbor and the world “in God” (1998b, 4.12.18; see Gregory 2008, 42). Political Critics of an Otherworldly Augustine To contemporary readers, especially those with Kan￾tian sensibilities, Augustine’s discussion of “use” and “enjoyment” can seem like a blatant violation of the categorical imperative, encouraging citizens to exploit the world and treat their fellow human beings as mere means to their ends. Arendt, for example, argues that Augustine tends “to strip the world and all tempo￾ral things of their value and to make them relative” (1996, 14).3 As a result, Augustine’s account of love drains this-worldly life of significance, requiring that we “stand against the world, not simply without it” 3 For an insightful discussion of Arendt’s interpretation of Augus￾tine, see Gregory (2008, 197–240). (1996, 9–44, 106).Moreover,Arendt argues that Augus￾tine’s injunction to “use” other human beings to enjoy God instrumentalizes our neighbors, making them into mere “means and tools” rather than ends in themselves (1996, 37–44). As a result, we no longer love our neigh￾bor qua neighbor or individual qua individual; rather, we love what is “eternal” in her (1996, 96). Loving our neighbor simply becomes an “occasion to love God” (1996, 96–7). Nussbaum presses similar charges. While she praises Augustine’s efforts to restore “compassion, along with other emotions, to a place of centrality in the earthly life,” Nussbaum complains that Augustine’s vision of Christian love remains too otherworldly and transcen￾dent (2001, 551, 528–9, 552–5).4 Targeting his contrast between “human or earthly love” and “Christian love, whose core is the love of God,” Nussbaum argues that Augustine “repudiates the one and urges us, disdaining it, to cultivate the other” (2001, 528–9).5 Citing Arendt, she suggests that Augustine’s “otherworldly” account of love denies the value of this-worldly striving and eclipses human individuality (2001, 549–56). If Augus￾tine requires human beings to order all loves to God, “it is a little unclear what role is left … for loving real￾life individual people. For what one loves above all in them is the presence of God and the hope of salvation” (2001, 549–50). Ultimately, Augustine’s attempt to “di￾rect longing away from this-worldly virtue” encourages insensitivity to human suffering and earthly injustice (2001, 552–4). Rather than “taking action as best we can,” Nussbaum concludes, Augustine admonishes us to “cover ourselves, mourn, and wait” (2001, 556). Critics are not alone in raising suspicions about Au￾gustine’s order of love. Even an Augustinian as influen￾tial as Niebuhr shares these concerns. While Niebuhr praises Augustine as “the first great ‘realist’ in Western history,” he identifies “several grave errors in Augus￾tine’s account of love” (1986, 124, 130). In particular, Niebuhr argues that Augustine’s account of love instru￾mentalizes the neighbor: “The love of the neighbor is for him not part of a double love commandment, but merely the instrument of a single love commandment which bids us flee all mortality, including the neighbor, in favor of the immutable good” (1986, 136). Niebuhr blames this Augustinian flight on a lingering Neopla￾tonic focus on the nature of love’s objects: “the empha￾sis lies always upon the worthiness or unworthiness of the object of our love; the insistence is that only God and not some mutable ‘good’ or person is worthy of our love” (1986, 137).While Niebuhr concedes that this formula is “a safeguard against all forms of idolatry,” he nevertheless suggests that “using” the neighbor and earthly goods to enjoy God denies human individual￾ity and trivializes the value of temporal goods (1986, 4 According to Nussbaum, the Augustinian “ascent of love and desire from the earthly to the heavenly . . . strips away and leaves behind the merely human in love” (2001, 529). 5 Nussbaum adds a qualifying footnote: “Not all Christian love is love of God: there may be human loves that are distinctively Chris￾tian. But these other loves are suffused by the love of God, and, as we shall see, their real object always is, in a way, God” (2001, 528n1). 1038 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000345

Between Presumption and Despair 137-8).While Augustine is"too much the Christian to "enjoyment."Most interpreters tend to view this rela- engage in a consistent mystic depreciation of the re- tion as a means-end relation and then read it through sponsibilities and joys of this earthly life,"he nonethe- a distinctly Kantian lens,assuming that Augustine less insists on "performing these tasks for the ulti- requires that we "use"temporal goods and human mate,rather than the immediate end"(1986.137).Like neighbors instrumentally as mere "means and tools" Arendt and Nussbaum,Niebuhr concludes that Augus- to "enjoy"eternal ends (Arendt 1996,32-4,37 40:cf. tinian love,taken on its own,furnishes a world-denying Chadwick 1986.64:Marrou 1957.79).Critics then indict pessimism Augustine for denying that the neighbor and the world These objections threaten to undermine any plausi- have any intrinsic value.When this use/enjoyment ble Augustinian hope for politics.If Augustine's order distinction is interpreted through a Kantian lens,it gen- of love instrumentalizes the neighbor and deserts the erates charges of ethical instrumentalism and political world,it is difficult to see how Augustine can coun- pessimism. tenance any hope for this-worldly politics.While Au- Recently,scholars in religious studies,including Eric gustine's rhetoric occasionally gives support for such Gregory (2008,197-240),Charles Mathewes(2007,74- readings,influential scholars in religious studies have 94),Sarah Stewart-Kroeker (2014;2017,204-44),and recently challenged this interpretation,offering more Rowan Williams (1989).among others,have challenged subtle accounts of Augustine's order of love that rec- these assumptions by denying the implicit metaphysi- ommend an expansive love for temporal goods,includ- cal and eschatological dualism they impute to Augus- ing the goods of politics.Unfortunately,this scholar- tine.Augustine's God is not located simply in some ship has yet to penetrate political theory.By lifting this "absolute future"or "transcendent region,"as Arendt alternative account into the discipline and showing its and Nussbaum assume (Arendt 1996,48-50.cf.36- wide acceptance among respected scholars in religious 44:cf.Nussbaum2001.549-56:2009.18-22).6 Rather. studies,I hope to challenge prevailing interpretations God is“Being itself,”the“author and creator of every- of Augustine's otherworldliness and open new vistas on thing”(1998b,9.4.11;cf71723;1997a,1.10.10;cf1998a 4号 his political thought. 8.6,12.2).If God is the "true ground"of all Being, then God is not completely separate from the world (1998a,14.13).Rather,everything that exists has its be- THE ORDER OF LOVE RECONSIDERED ing because it participates in God's being(1998a,11.28, 12.5).7 Moreover,if God is supremely good,then every- Three assumptions tend to underwrite otherworldly thing that exists also participates in God's goodness.It interpretations of Augustine's order of love.The first follows that,for Augustine,"Everything that exists is is that the metaphysical status of love's object-its good”(1998b,712.18:cf1953,11.21.18.35:1990.21.3: "worthiness or unworthiness,"to quote Niebuhr- 1997a,1.32.35;1998a,11.21,12.1,12.5) solely determines love's moral quality (Niebuhr 1986 This participationist ontology has radical implica- 137;cf.Arendt1996,30-4;Nussbaum2001,542-3; tions for understanding Augustine's order of love.First, for analysis,see Gregory 2008,40-7,197-240,337n28) it challenges critics'first assumption that the meta- Because an infinite,eternal,and unchanging God is physical status of love's objects determines their moral the most perfect being,the assumption goes,God is quality (Gregory 2008,40-1,221,337n28;Stewart- the highest object of love,and since temporal goods are Kroeker,2014,211;2017,227).Rather than quarantin- subject to fortune and finitude,they cannot provide the ing God to some transcendent realm and denying the security that eternal goods can.To realize our ultimate goods of the world,Augustine suggests a more fun- good,then,human beings should turn away from fleet- damental continuity between heaven and earth,time ing goods and toward the eternal good of God.Any and eternity.If everything that exists is,in some way, love of the world "for its own sake"is,as Billings sug- good,then even finite,temporal goods partake in God's gests,.“idolatry'”(2004,135-6). goodness.Temporal goods are still goods.As Augus- This concern about idolatry licenses a second as- tine writes."Whatever God has made is good.Some sumption,namely,that love of eternal and temporal are great goods,some are small goods,but all are good. goods is mutually exclusive or competitive.Human be- Some are celestial good things,some are earthly good ings must enjoy either God or neighbor;they cannot things;some are spiritual goods,some are bodily goods; love both fully for their own sakes(Niebuhr 1986,136- some are eternal goods,some are temporal goods.But 7;Arendt 1996,30;Nussbaum 2001,528-9;see Gregory 四 2008,3-5,35-47 221,319-50).This assumption is evi dent not only in Billings's concerns about idolatry,but 6 Standard accounts of Augustine in political theory share this em- in Nussbaum's suggestion that Augustine"repudiates' phasis on transcendence.Sophie Lunn-Rockliffe suggests that,for human or earthly love"and "urges us,disdaining it Augustine,"the truly important community is not this-worldly,but to cultivate [love of God]"(2001,528-9).As Eric Gre- transcendent"and argues that Augustine's primary critique against classical philosophers targeted their "inappropriately earthly focus" gory observes,the assumption behind such complaints 2011,150-1) is that Augustine endorses a "competitive tournament For discussion,see Gregory (2008,41-4):Mathewes(2007.74-94): of loves between God and the world"(2008.330:cf.36. Jenson(2006,8-15):and Coles(1992,17-8). 221,260,323) As Augustine writes(1998a,12.4),"For,though earthly things were This either-or account of love fuels a third assump- not intended to be coequal with heavenly things,it would still not be fitting for the universe to lack these things altogether,even though tion about Augustine's distinction between "use"and heavenly things are better." 1039

Between Presumption and Despair 137–8). While Augustine is “too much the Christian to engage in a consistent mystic depreciation of the re￾sponsibilities and joys of this earthly life,” he nonethe￾less insists on “performing these tasks for the ulti￾mate, rather than the immediate end” (1986, 137). Like Arendt and Nussbaum, Niebuhr concludes that Augus￾tinian love, taken on its own, furnishes a world-denying pessimism. These objections threaten to undermine any plausi￾ble Augustinian hope for politics. If Augustine’s order of love instrumentalizes the neighbor and deserts the world, it is difficult to see how Augustine can coun￾tenance any hope for this-worldly politics. While Au￾gustine’s rhetoric occasionally gives support for such readings, influential scholars in religious studies have recently challenged this interpretation, offering more subtle accounts of Augustine’s order of love that rec￾ommend an expansive love for temporal goods, includ￾ing the goods of politics. Unfortunately, this scholar￾ship has yet to penetrate political theory. By lifting this alternative account into the discipline and showing its wide acceptance among respected scholars in religious studies, I hope to challenge prevailing interpretations of Augustine’s otherworldliness and open new vistas on his political thought. THE ORDER OF LOVE RECONSIDERED Three assumptions tend to underwrite otherworldly interpretations of Augustine’s order of love. The first is that the metaphysical status of love’s object—its “worthiness or unworthiness,” to quote Niebuhr— solely determines love’s moral quality (Niebuhr 1986, 137; cf. Arendt 1996, 30–4; Nussbaum 2001, 542–3; for analysis, see Gregory 2008, 40–7, 197–240, 337n28). Because an infinite, eternal, and unchanging God is the most perfect being, the assumption goes, God is the highest object of love, and since temporal goods are subject to fortune and finitude, they cannot provide the security that eternal goods can. To realize our ultimate good, then, human beings should turn away from fleet￾ing goods and toward the eternal good of God. Any love of the world “for its own sake” is, as Billings sug￾gests, “idolatry” (2004, 135–6). This concern about idolatry licenses a second as￾sumption, namely, that love of eternal and temporal goods is mutually exclusive or competitive. Human be￾ings must enjoy either God or neighbor; they cannot love both fully for their own sakes (Niebuhr 1986, 136– 7; Arendt 1996, 30; Nussbaum 2001, 528–9; see Gregory 2008, 3–5, 35–47, 221, 319–50). This assumption is evi￾dent not only in Billings’s concerns about idolatry, but in Nussbaum’s suggestion that Augustine “repudiates” “human or earthly love” and “urges us, disdaining it, to cultivate [love of God]” (2001, 528–9). As Eric Gre￾gory observes, the assumption behind such complaints is that Augustine endorses a “competitive tournament of loves between God and the world” (2008, 330; cf. 36, 221, 260, 323). This either-or account of love fuels a third assump￾tion about Augustine’s distinction between “use” and “enjoyment.” Most interpreters tend to view this rela￾tion as a means-end relation and then read it through a distinctly Kantian lens, assuming that Augustine requires that we “use” temporal goods and human neighbors instrumentally as mere “means and tools” to “enjoy” eternal ends (Arendt 1996, 32–4, 37, 40; cf. Chadwick 1986, 64;Marrou 1957, 79). Critics then indict Augustine for denying that the neighbor and the world have any intrinsic value. When this use/enjoyment distinction is interpreted through a Kantian lens,it gen￾erates charges of ethical instrumentalism and political pessimism. Recently, scholars in religious studies, including Eric Gregory (2008, 197–240), Charles Mathewes (2007, 74– 94), Sarah Stewart-Kroeker (2014; 2017, 204–44), and Rowan Williams (1989), among others, have challenged these assumptions by denying the implicit metaphysi￾cal and eschatological dualism they impute to Augus￾tine. Augustine’s God is not located simply in some “absolute future” or “transcendent region,” as Arendt and Nussbaum assume (Arendt 1996, 48–50, cf. 36– 44; cf. Nussbaum 2001, 549–56; 2009, 18–22).6 Rather, God is “Being itself,” the “author and creator of every￾thing” (1998b, 9.4.11; cf. 7.17.23; 1997a, 1.10.10; cf. 1998a, 8.6, 12.2). If God is the “true ground” of all Being, then God is not completely separate from the world (1998a, 14.13). Rather, everything that exists has its be￾ing because it participates in God’s being (1998a, 11.28, 12.5).7 Moreover,if God is supremely good, then every￾thing that exists also participates in God’s goodness. It follows that, for Augustine, “Everything that exists is good” (1998b, 7.12.18; cf. 1953, 11.21, 18.35; 1990, 21.3; 1997a, 1.32.35; 1998a, 11.21, 12.1, 12.5). This participationist ontology has radical implica￾tions for understanding Augustine’s order of love. First, it challenges critics’ first assumption that the meta￾physical status of love’s objects determines their moral quality (Gregory 2008, 40–1, 221, 337n28; Stewart￾Kroeker, 2014, 211; 2017, 227). Rather than quarantin￾ing God to some transcendent realm and denying the goods of the world, Augustine suggests a more fun￾damental continuity between heaven and earth, time and eternity. If everything that exists is, in some way, good, then even finite, temporal goods partake in God’s goodness. Temporal goods are still goods. 8 As Augus￾tine writes, “Whatever God has made is good. Some are great goods, some are small goods, but all are good. Some are celestial good things, some are earthly good things; some are spiritual goods, some are bodily goods; some are eternal goods, some are temporal goods. But 6 Standard accounts of Augustine in political theory share this em￾phasis on transcendence. Sophie Lunn-Rockliffe suggests that, for Augustine, “the truly important community is not this-worldly, but transcendent” and argues that Augustine’s primary critique against classical philosophers targeted their “inappropriately earthly focus” (2011, 150–1). 7 For discussion, see Gregory (2008, 41–4); Mathewes (2007, 74–94); Jenson (2006, 8–15); and Coles (1992, 17–8). 8 As Augustine writes (1998a, 12.4), “For, though earthly things were not intended to be coequal with heavenly things, it would still not be fitting for the universe to lack these things altogether, even though heavenly things are better.” 1039 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 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Michael Lamb they are all good,because the one who is good made is all-good,then everything that God creates,includ- them good"(1990,21.3).In City ofGod,Augustine even ing the material world,must be good,for God could rejects the claim that "the goods which [the earthly] not be responsible for creating anything evil (1998b. -00081v0000/L0LoL city desires are not goods:for,in its own human fash- 712.18-716.22:1998a,11.22,12.5-9).Even the nature ion,even that city is better when it possesses them than of the devil is,in one sense,good (1998a,19.13;1953 when it does not....These goods are goods,and they are 13.26).For Augustine,then,evil is not an independent without doubt gifts of God"(1998a,15.4). force that competes with goodness,but a deficiency or If Augustine's participationist ontology undermines negation of goodness,either a turning away from what critics'first assumption about the metaphysical and is good (privation)or the wrongful use of a good for thus moral status of temporal goods,it also challenges improper ends(perversion)(1998a.11.9.11.22.12.7-9 their second assumption about Augustine's either-or 19.13:Elshtain1998.76-85:athewes2001.75-81:Jen- account of love.If human beings participate in God's son 2006,15-32).The ontological and moral priority being and goodness,then loving God does not neces- of goodness over evil thus furnishes what Gregory de- sarily crowd out,or compete with,love of neighbor or scribes as a psychological"dialectic"between love and the world.In loving temporal goods properly,human sin.virtue and vice(2008.14-5.20-2.35-6).Since sin re beings also love God:the two loves are not mutually ex- flects the privation or perversion of love,love has onto- clusive (see Gregory 2008.44-5.221-2.322-50:Math- logical,moral,and psychological priority over sin:with- ewes2007,82-4,91-2;Jenson2006,28;Smith2005, out a movement of love for some good,there would be 201).In one sermon,Augustine even suggests that it is no sin.Yet,because love can become disordered,love is impossible to love the invisible God without loving the always threatened by sin,the human tendency to love visible neighbor:"if you do not love the brother whom a good insufficiently or perversely (Augustine 1998a, you see,how can you love God,whom you do not see?" 14.6-7:1997b,352A.6;Gregory2008.14-5,20-2,35-36: (2008,9.10).10 Indeed,for Augustine,properly loving Mathewes 2007,82-5).In this life,love risks becoming the neighbor simply is loving God:"Does he who loves deficient or excessive,and virtue remains threatened his brother also love God?It must be that he loves God: by temptations toward privation or perversion(1998a, it must be that he loves love itself....By loving love he 19.4;1953,19.37).As a result,one function of a virtue is loves God....If God is love,whoever loves love loves to help human beings resist these temptations toward God”(2008.9.10:cf.1990,21.2-3:1998a.11:28).In this vice(1998a,19.4). context,love of neighbor does not compete with love Augustine is especially concerned about the vice of of God but partly constitutes it.An either-or account pride,or perverse self-love,which breeds a lust for of love that neglects this continuity fails to register Au- domination that drives human beings to grasp tem- gustine's participationist ontology. poral goods for their own purposes (1998a,1.Preface On Augustine's account,the primary problem is not 1.30-31,12.6,12.8,14.13-14,15.5,19.12,19.15).Under with the metaphysical status of temporal goods or hu- the sway of pride,human beings assume they are self- man neighbors,but with human beings who tend to sufficient and self-sustaining sources of their own be- love them in an inordinate or disordered way(Gregory ing and goodness,putting themselves in the place of 2008,39,221,256-63:Mathewes2007,78.83:Bowlin God and seeking to place others under their power 2010,297).As Augustine says of the "miser"who loves (1998a,1.Preface,12.1,14.13-14;19.12:cf.Elshtain1998, S5.501g money,the "fault...lies not with the gold,but with the 16-8,49-51;Jenson 2006,25-8).Augustine attributes man;and this is true of every created thing:though it is the Fall to this prideful assumption of self-sufficiency, good,it can be loved well or ill;well when the proper which denies the ways in which human beings partic- order is observed,and ill when that order is disturbed" ipate in God's being and goodness (1998a,14.13-14) (1998a,15.22:cf12.8:1990,21.3)Thus,Augustine con- For Augustine,pride causes human beings to strive af- cludes,"a brief and true definition of virtue is'rightly ter more for themselves,to grasp at temporal goods ordered love'"(1998a,15.22).11 and dominate their neighbors for their own private pur- If virtue is "rightly ordered love,"it follows that vice poses rather than participate in a good that everyone is disordered love,a privation or perversion of good- can share in common (see 1998a,1.Preface,1.30-31, ness(1998a,12.34,12.6-9,14.6-719.13).12 Challeng- 12.1,15.5,19.12:Jenson2006,25-32:Gregory2008,42- ing the Manichean view of good and evil as compet- 4,329-31.343-7:C1air2016,60-1n48) ing forces in the world,Augustine argues that if God In light of Augustine's participationist ontology and concerns about pride and domination,Gregory argues 9"But"he adds,"if the higher goods are neglected..and those that the function of Augustine's"order of love"is moral other goods desired so much that they are thought to be the only as much as metaphysical:"His philosophical and theo- goods,or loved more than the goods which are believed to be higher logical energies are devoted more to how one is to love then misery will of necessity follow,and present misery be increased by it"(1998a,15.4).I address this point below. in an actively ordering way rather than to an abstract 10 For discussion,see Gregory(2008,44-5):cf.Mathewes(2007,81- metaphysical speculation on what one is to consider as 7) appropriate objects of love"(2008,221,cf.40-2).Math- ifFor Augustine,virtue and vice reflect the"quality"of a person's ewes agrees:the order of love "is more dispositional will:"For if the will is perverse,the emotions will be perverse:but than metaphysical:Augustine does not want us not to if it is righteous,the emotions will not only be blameless,but praise. love the world,but rather to change how we love it,as 2orniuiscussion se Mathewes (001 59-103 e64 a whole and in its component parts"(2007,89-90;see 5.75-81) also Williams 1989;Bowlin 2010,297-9).Rather than 1040

Michael Lamb they are all good, because the one who is good made them good” (1990, 21.3). In City of God,Augustine even rejects the claim that “the goods which [the earthly] city desires are not goods; for, in its own human fash￾ion, even that city is better when it possesses them than when it does not….These goods are goods, and they are without doubt gifts of God” (1998a, 15.4).9 If Augustine’s participationist ontology undermines critics’ first assumption about the metaphysical and thus moral status of temporal goods, it also challenges their second assumption about Augustine’s either-or account of love. If human beings participate in God’s being and goodness, then loving God does not neces￾sarily crowd out, or compete with, love of neighbor or the world. In loving temporal goods properly, human beings also love God; the two loves are not mutually ex￾clusive (see Gregory 2008, 44–5, 221–2, 322–50; Math￾ewes 2007, 82–4, 91–2; Jenson 2006, 28; Smith 2005, 201). In one sermon, Augustine even suggests that it is impossible to love the invisible God without loving the visible neighbor: “if you do not love the brother whom you see, how can you love God, whom you do not see?” (2008, 9.10).10 Indeed, for Augustine, properly loving the neighbor simply is loving God: “Does he who loves his brother also love God? It must be that he loves God; it must be that he loves love itself…. By loving love he loves God…. If God is love, whoever loves love loves God” (2008, 9.10; cf. 1990, 21.2–3; 1998a, 11:28). In this context, love of neighbor does not compete with love of God but partly constitutes it. An either-or account of love that neglects this continuity fails to register Au￾gustine’s participationist ontology. On Augustine’s account, the primary problem is not with the metaphysical status of temporal goods or hu￾man neighbors, but with human beings who tend to love them in an inordinate or disordered way (Gregory 2008, 39, 221, 256–63; Mathewes 2007, 78, 83; Bowlin 2010, 297). As Augustine says of the “miser” who loves money, the “fault … lies not with the gold, but with the man; and this is true of every created thing: though it is good, it can be loved well or ill; well when the proper order is observed, and ill when that order is disturbed” (1998a, 15.22; cf. 12.8; 1990, 21.3) Thus, Augustine con￾cludes, “a brief and true definition of virtue is ‘rightly ordered love’” (1998a, 15.22).11 If virtue is “rightly ordered love,” it follows that vice is disordered love, a privation or perversion of good￾ness (1998a, 12.3–4, 12.6–9, 14.6–7, 19.13).12 Challeng￾ing the Manichean view of good and evil as compet￾ing forces in the world, Augustine argues that if God 9 “But,” he adds, “if the higher goods are neglected … and those other goods desired so much that they are thought to be the only goods, or loved more than the goods which are believed to be higher, then misery will of necessity follow, and present misery be increased by it” (1998a, 15.4). I address this point below. 10 For discussion, see Gregory (2008, 44–5); cf. Mathewes (2007, 81– 7). 11 For Augustine, virtue and vice reflect the “quality” of a person’s will: “For if the will is perverse, the emotions will be perverse; but if it is righteous, the emotions will not only be blameless, but praise￾worthy” (1998a, 14.6). 12 For an insightful discussion, see Mathewes (2001, 59–103, esp. 64– 5, 75–81). is all-good, then everything that God creates, includ￾ing the material world, must be good, for God could not be responsible for creating anything evil (1998b, 7.12.18–7.16.22; 1998a, 11.22, 12.5–9). Even the nature of the devil is, in one sense, good (1998a, 19.13; 1953, 13.26). For Augustine, then, evil is not an independent force that competes with goodness, but a deficiency or negation of goodness, either a turning away from what is good (privation) or the wrongful use of a good for improper ends (perversion) (1998a, 11.9, 11.22, 12.7–9, 19.13; Elshtain 1998, 76–85;Mathewes 2001, 75–81; Jen￾son 2006, 15–32). The ontological and moral priority of goodness over evil thus furnishes what Gregory de￾scribes as a psychological “dialectic” between love and sin, virtue and vice (2008, 14–5, 20–2, 35–6). Since sin re￾flects the privation or perversion of love, love has onto￾logical,moral, and psychological priority over sin: with￾out a movement of love for some good, there would be no sin.Yet, because love can become disordered,love is always threatened by sin, the human tendency to love a good insufficiently or perversely (Augustine 1998a, 14. 6–7; 1997b, 352A.6; Gregory 2008, 14–5, 20–2, 35–36; Mathewes 2007, 82–5). In this life, love risks becoming deficient or excessive, and virtue remains threatened by temptations toward privation or perversion (1998a, 19.4; 1953, 19.37). As a result, one function of a virtue is to help human beings resist these temptations toward vice (1998a, 19.4). Augustine is especially concerned about the vice of pride, or perverse self-love, which breeds a lust for domination that drives human beings to grasp tem￾poral goods for their own purposes (1998a, 1.Preface, 1.30–31, 12.6, 12.8, 14.13–14, 15.5, 19.12, 19.15). Under the sway of pride, human beings assume they are self￾sufficient and self-sustaining sources of their own be￾ing and goodness, putting themselves in the place of God and seeking to place others under their power (1998a, 1.Preface, 12.1, 14.13–14; 19.12; cf. Elshtain 1998, 16–8, 49–51; Jenson 2006, 25–8). Augustine attributes the Fall to this prideful assumption of self-sufficiency, which denies the ways in which human beings partic￾ipate in God’s being and goodness (1998a, 14.13–14). For Augustine, pride causes human beings to strive af￾ter more for themselves, to grasp at temporal goods and dominate their neighbors for their own private pur￾poses rather than participate in a good that everyone can share in common (see 1998a, 1. Preface, 1.30–31, 12.1, 15.5, 19.12; Jenson 2006, 25–32; Gregory 2008, 42– 4, 329–31, 343–7; Clair 2016, 60–1n48). In light of Augustine’s participationist ontology and concerns about pride and domination, Gregory argues that the function of Augustine’s “order of love”is moral as much as metaphysical: “His philosophical and theo￾logical energies are devoted more to how one is to love in an actively ordering way rather than to an abstract metaphysical speculation on what one is to consider as appropriate objects of love” (2008, 221, cf. 40–2).Math￾ewes agrees: the order of love “is more dispositional than metaphysical: Augustine does not want us not to love the world, but rather to change how we love it, as a whole and in its component parts” (2007, 89–90; see also Williams 1989; Bowlin 2010, 297–9). Rather than 1040 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000345

Between Presumption and Despair providing a moral doctrine that simply identifies the of referring to proximate and ultimate objects (cf.von metaphysical nature of love's objects,Augustine sup- Heyking 2001,224-5,232;Mittleman 2009,155).To use plies a moral and spiritual practice intended to chas- a good is to relate to it as a proximate object,to will ten the pride that leads us to love temporal goods in it for the sake of something else,as a part of attaining perverse or inordinate ways.As Augustine preaches,"I what can be enjoyed.In most cases,to enjoy a good is to am not saying that you should have no loves;I simply rest in a good obtained,or to seek a good as a distant or want your loves to be properly ordered"(2001,Sermon ultimate end.the terminus of one's desire and pursuit 335C.13:cf1990.34.2) (1991b.9.9.13,10.11.17:O'Connor1983,55-9).While This focus on moral psychology helps to disrupt crit- many influential interpreters map this use/enjoyment ics'third assumption that Augustine's injunction to distinction onto an instrumentalist interpretation of “use"temporal goods to“enjoy”God instrumentalizes “means”and“ends”(Arendt1996,32-4.3740:Chad- the neighbor and deserts the world.Rather,the order wick 1986,64:Marrou 1957,79).a more accurate ac- of love has the opposite aim:it seeks to prevent idolatry count renders the proximate/ultimate object distinc- and chasten the lust for domination,functioning as a tion in terms of parts and wholes-proximate goods regulative ideal that checks tendencies to harm,domi- that participate or take part in the ultimate unity of nate,and possess others (Williams 1989.140:Mathewes the whole (see Augustine 1998a,11.31,19.13.19.16:cf. 2007,78-93:Gregory2008,41-4,329-31,343-7:Bowlin Elshtain 1998,35;von Heyking 2001,194-5;Mathewes 2010,297-9;Stewart-.Kroeker2014,205,218-21;2017 2007,89-90).On this account,to "use"a neighbor or 239-44).As Rowan Williams writes,"The language of temporal goods is not to treat them as mere means, uti is designed to warn against an attitude towards any but to recognize them as part of creation,parts whose finite person or object that terminates their meaning in being and goodness depend on God and thus cannot their capacity to satisfy my desire,that treats them as be merely ordered to one's own selfish ends.This in- the end of desire,conceiving my meaning in terms of terpretation discourages instrumentalizing and domi- them and theirs in terms of me"(1989.140).By enjoin nating relations with the neighbor and the world and 4号元 ing us to love neighbors“in God”orto“use”rather thereby authorizes a more positive view of temporal than"enjoy"them,Gregory affirms,Augustine's order goods than critics tend to suggest. of love"aims to morally protect the neighbor from the Ultimately,by recognizing Augustine's participation- self's prideful distortion that the neighbor exists only ist ontology,identifying temporal goods as proper ob- in terms of one's own ends,or that the neighbor is a jects of love,and casting“use”and“enjoyment'”in threat to the self's relation to this infinite God"(2008 terms of proximate and ultimate ends,this alterna- 42:cf.221,329-31,346-7).In this way,loving others "in tive account challenges critics who dismiss Augustinian God"or "for God's sake"encourages prideful human love as either instrumentalizing or otherworldly.Au- beings to recognize that temporal goods are not theirs gustine allows love for human neighbors and temporal to abuse,dominate,or possess goods as long as that love is properly ordered.And if This conception of“use”and“enjoyment'”fits with Augustinian love is not as otherworldly as critics as- the more capacious sense of the terms in Augustine's sume,Augustinian hope need not be either.Augus- original Latin,which do not bear the weight of Kan- tine's explicit order of love provides a model for recon- tian interpretations.3 Citing Augustine's definition of structing his implicit order of hope. use and enjoyment in various texts,William Riordan O'Connor argues that "according to Augustine's own definition to use merely means to take up something 8 THE ORDER OF HOPE into the power of the will,that is,to apply the will to something,consciously to allow the will to become en- For Augustine,hope,like all virtues and affections,de- gaged with it.This in itself does not dictate an instru- pends on the movement of love.Indeed,"hope can- mental attitude"(1983.57:cf.Gregory 2008.342).This not exist without love"(1999a,2.8)."[Y]ou can't even reading fits with Augustine's own suggestions that God hope for anything you don't love.Love,you see,kindles “uses”human beings,and that a relation of“use"is hope,hope shines through love"(1994,359A.4).This the bond of love that joins the members of the Trinity claim coheres with Augustine's view that all virtues (1997a,1.31.34-132.35:1991b,6.10.11:O'Connor1983 and affections find their unity in love (1998a,14.7 14.9. 54,58).In these contexts,"use"is not exclusively in- 15.22;Bowlin 2010).In particular,hope is a kind of love strumental or exploitative,but describes a relation to for a future good that is desirable and possible to attain. 四 goods pursued for the sake of something else,as con but not yet present or possessed (1999a,2.8).Hope is a stitutive parts of a larger whole (O'Connor 1983,57-8). kind of love for objects cast under this description. To quote Oliver O'Donovan,“use”and“enjoyment'" Importantly,as in the case of love,Augustine explic- name not“something we do,”but“a relation in which itly includes temporal goods among hope's proper ob- we stand"(2002.16). jects.In the Enchiridion,for example,he appeals to Given this alternative account and the modern in- the Lord's Prayer to identify "what we should hope fluence of Kantian renderings,it is perhaps best to re- for"(1999a,1.3,30.114-6).The first three petitions- cast Augustine's use/enjoyment distinction as his way Hallowed be your name,your kingdom come,your will be done,on earth as it is in heaven-identify hopes 13 The following discussion is indebted to Gregory(2008.335-50) for“eternal gifts”that“will endure perfectly and im- For a complementary reading,see von Heyking(2001,201-4). mortally in our spirit and body"(1999a,30.115,citing 1041

Between Presumption and Despair providing a moral doctrine that simply identifies the metaphysical nature of love’s objects, Augustine sup￾plies a moral and spiritual practice intended to chas￾ten the pride that leads us to love temporal goods in perverse or inordinate ways. As Augustine preaches, “I am not saying that you should have no loves; I simply want your loves to be properly ordered” (2001, Sermon 335C.13; cf. 1990, 34.2). This focus on moral psychology helps to disrupt crit￾ics’ third assumption that Augustine’s injunction to “use” temporal goods to “enjoy” God instrumentalizes the neighbor and deserts the world. Rather, the order of love has the opposite aim:it seeks to prevent idolatry and chasten the lust for domination, functioning as a regulative ideal that checks tendencies to harm, domi￾nate, and possess others (Williams 1989, 140;Mathewes 2007, 78–93; Gregory 2008, 41–4, 329–31, 343–7; Bowlin 2010, 297–9; Stewart-Kroeker 2014, 205, 218–21; 2017, 239–44). As Rowan Williams writes, “The language of uti is designed to warn against an attitude towards any finite person or object that terminates their meaning in their capacity to satisfy my desire, that treats them as the end of desire, conceiving my meaning in terms of them and theirs in terms of me” (1989, 140). By enjoin￾ing us to love neighbors “in God” or to “use” rather than “enjoy” them, Gregory affirms, Augustine’s order of love “aims to morally protect the neighbor from the self’s prideful distortion that the neighbor exists only in terms of one’s own ends, or that the neighbor is a threat to the self’s relation to this infinite God” (2008, 42; cf. 221, 329–31, 346–7). In this way, loving others “in God” or “for God’s sake” encourages prideful human beings to recognize that temporal goods are not theirs to abuse, dominate, or possess. This conception of “use” and “enjoyment” fits with the more capacious sense of the terms in Augustine’s original Latin, which do not bear the weight of Kan￾tian interpretations.13 Citing Augustine’s definition of use and enjoyment in various texts, William Riordan O’Connor argues that “according to Augustine’s own definition to use merely means to take up something into the power of the will, that is, to apply the will to something, consciously to allow the will to become en￾gaged with it. This in itself does not dictate an instru￾mental attitude” (1983, 57; cf. Gregory 2008, 342). This reading fits with Augustine’s own suggestions that God “uses” human beings, and that a relation of “use” is the bond of love that joins the members of the Trinity (1997a, 1.31.34–1.32.35; 1991b, 6.10.11; O’Connor 1983, 54, 58). In these contexts, “use” is not exclusively in￾strumental or exploitative, but describes a relation to goods pursued for the sake of something else, as con￾stitutive parts of a larger whole (O’Connor 1983, 57–8). To quote Oliver O’Donovan, “use” and “enjoyment” name not “something we do,” but “a relation in which we stand” (2002, 16). Given this alternative account and the modern in￾fluence of Kantian renderings, it is perhaps best to re￾cast Augustine’s use/enjoyment distinction as his way 13 The following discussion is indebted to Gregory (2008, 335–50). For a complementary reading, see von Heyking (2001, 201–4). of referring to proximate and ultimate objects (cf. von Heyking 2001, 224–5, 232;Mittleman 2009, 155). To use a good is to relate to it as a proximate object, to will it for the sake of something else, as a part of attaining what can be enjoyed. In most cases, to enjoy a good is to rest in a good obtained, or to seek a good as a distant or ultimate end, the terminus of one’s desire and pursuit (1991b, 9.9.13, 10.11.17; O’Connor 1983, 55–9). While many influential interpreters map this use/enjoyment distinction onto an instrumentalist interpretation of “means” and “ends” (Arendt 1996, 32–4, 37, 40; Chad￾wick 1986, 64; Marrou 1957, 79), a more accurate ac￾count renders the proximate/ultimate object distinc￾tion in terms of parts and wholes—proximate goods that participate or take part in the ultimate unity of the whole (see Augustine 1998a, 11.31, 19.13, 19.16; cf. Elshtain 1998, 35; von Heyking 2001, 194–5; Mathewes 2007, 89–90). On this account, to “use” a neighbor or temporal goods is not to treat them as mere means, but to recognize them as part of creation, parts whose being and goodness depend on God and thus cannot be merely ordered to one’s own selfish ends. This in￾terpretation discourages instrumentalizing and domi￾nating relations with the neighbor and the world and thereby authorizes a more positive view of temporal goods than critics tend to suggest. Ultimately, by recognizing Augustine’s participation￾ist ontology, identifying temporal goods as proper ob￾jects of love, and casting “use” and “enjoyment” in terms of proximate and ultimate ends, this alterna￾tive account challenges critics who dismiss Augustinian love as either instrumentalizing or otherworldly. Au￾gustine allows love for human neighbors and temporal goods as long as that love is properly ordered. And if Augustinian love is not as otherworldly as critics as￾sume, Augustinian hope need not be either. Augus￾tine’s explicit order of love provides a model for recon￾structing his implicit order of hope. THE ORDER OF HOPE For Augustine, hope, like all virtues and affections, de￾pends on the movement of love. Indeed, “hope can￾not exist without love” (1999a, 2.8). “[Y]ou can’t even hope for anything you don’t love.Love, you see, kindles hope, hope shines through love” (1994, 359A.4). This claim coheres with Augustine’s view that all virtues and affections find their unity in love (1998a, 14.7, 14.9, 15.22; Bowlin 2010). In particular, hope is a kind of love for a future good that is desirable and possible to attain, but not yet present or possessed (1999a, 2.8). Hope is a kind of love for objects cast under this description. Importantly, as in the case of love, Augustine explic￾itly includes temporal goods among hope’s proper ob￾jects. In the Enchiridion, for example, he appeals to the Lord’s Prayer to identify “what we should hope for” (1999a, 1.3, 30.114–6). The first three petitions— Hallowed be your name, your kingdom come, your will be done, on earth as it is in heaven—identify hopes for “eternal gifts” that “will endure perfectly and im￾mortally in our spirit and body” (1999a, 30.115, citing 1041 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000345

Michael Lamb Matthew 6:9-10).While these eternal goods are the count of these things themselves but on account of an- ultimate objects of hope,Augustine identifies tempo- other good that comes from them,"namely,the tempo- ral goods as proper,if proximate,objects of hope in ral well-being of the community (2003,130.6.12).But, the last four petitions of the Lord's Prayer-Give us he insists,these temporal goods must only be proxi- this day our daily bread,and forgive us our debts as we mate objects to be used rather than ultimate ends to also forgive our debtors,and do not bring us to the time be enjoyed.This admonition again reflects his concerns of trial,but deliver us from the evil one (1999a,30.115 about pride and domination:if honors and positions of citing Matthew 6:11-13).Since these petitions iden- power are"desired on account of an empty pride over tify goods that are "necessary for acquiring the eter- their superiority and on account of the superfluous or nal gifts"and "concern our needs in the present life," even harmful pomp of vanity,it is not proper"(2003, they do not necessarily conflict or compete with eternal 130.6.12).But "if they desire for themselves and for goods(1999a,30.115).Hoping for these goods can be a theirs a sufficient amount of necessary things and do proximate part of realizing the ultimate end.14 not desire any more,they do not desire improperly' Augustine advances a similar claim in a sermon on (2003,130.6.12).While Augustine suggests that human Psalm 129,where he explicitly acknowledges the per- beings ought to"prefer eternal to temporal things"and missibility of hoping for temporal goods:"Am I con- love them"on account of"'God,he still permits hoping demning hope for worldly advantages,if God is be- for temporal goods for the sake of health or friendship sought to grant them?No,but there is another kind as long as this hope does not become disordered or per- of hope proper to Israel.It is not Israel's true calling verse(2003.130.5.11-130.714.130.12.22-130.13.24:see to hope for riches or bodily health or an abundance of also Studer 1990,211). earthly assets,as though such things were its supreme Augustine's emphasis on hoping for such temporal good"(2004,129.11,emphasis added).This final caveat goods in "proper fashion"highlights a crucial feature of is significant:it implies that Augustine allows us to hope his account.If hope is to be virtuous,it,like love,must for certain temporal goods as long we do not hope for be properly ordered (1998a,14.6-9,15.22).Strikingly, 4号元 them as our supreme good,as long as we do not rest in Augustine applies the same distinctions to hope that them,either making them idols or dominating them as he uses to explicate his order of love. if they are ours to possess. In Sermon 157,for example,he invokes the distinc- In places,Augustine even suggests we can hope for tion between using and enjoying in the context of hope some temporal goods for their own sake.In Letter rather than love.He praises those who are "hoping 130 to Proba,as in the Enchiridion,Augustine iden- for eternal things which we cannot see"and admon- tifies proper objects of desire by appealing to the ishes those who are"hooked on temporal things that Lord's Prayer and describes "health"and "friendship" can be seen"(1992b.1575).Yet he acknowledges that as temporal goods properly sought"for their own sake" those who hope for eternal goods should not abandon (propter se)(2003,130.12.22-130.13.24,130.6.13).15He hope for temporal goods:"We too make use of them argues further that human beings may desire "a suf- according to the needs of our journey;but we don't set ficient amount of necessary goods...sought not for our heart's joy on them,in case when they collapse we their own sake but for the sake of [health and friend- should be buried in the ruins.You see,we make use of ship],when they are sought in proper fashion"(2003 this world as though we were not using it,in order to 130.6.13).6 Among these goods,he includes"temporal reach the one who made this world,and remain in him well-being"and even"honors and positions of power" enjoying his eternity"(1992b,1575,emphasis added). (2003,130.6.12).“Yes,”Augustine affirms,“it is proper Here,Augustine employs the use/enjoyment distinc- to will these things if it is their responsibility to pro- tion to chasten listeners against hoping for proximate vide for those who live subject to them,not on ac- temporal goods as their supreme good or ultimate end. In other sermons,Augustine identifies rightly or- 14 Alan Mittleman is one of the few interpreters to note the permis- dered hope by identifying corresponding forms of sibility of Augustinian hope for temporal goods:"Despite his dis- disorder-namely,the vices of presumption and de- paragement of the misplaced,worldly hopes of paganism,Augus- spair.In Sermon 87,for example,Augustine identifies tine does not deride worldly hope altogether.Just as he reconstructs 'two evils'”that“kill souls'":“despair"(desperatio)and virtue within a Christian mode as the practice of love,he validates "perverse hope"(peruersa spes)(1991a,8710).17 De- hope for those worldly goods necessary for a Christian life,that is,for spair is the privation of hope.Desperatio means liter- the life of the City of God as it steadfastly endures within the earthly city.Ultimate hopes coexist with proximate hopes.Just as the rabbis ally to be "without hope,"which Augustine considers read a domesticated eschatology out of the petitionary prayers of a great evil since it causes us to withdraw from the the liturgy,so,too,Augustine finds the Lord's Prayer to be a concise good rather than"stretch"toward it in hope (see 1992a, expression of legitimate hope"(2009,155: see also Studer 1990.211. 105.7;2004,129.10).When we despair,our hope be- 217). 15 For an illuminating discussion of Letter 130,see Clair(2016,52- comes deficient,and we lose the capacity to seek our 65). objects of hope or patiently endure the difficulties and 16 Augustine makes a similar claim in The Excellence of Marriage delays associated with attaining a future good (1992b, (1999b,9.9):"Undoubtedly we should take note that God gives us some benefits that are to be sought after for their own sake,such as wisdom,health and friendship,and others are necessary for the sake i7 I translate peruersa as“"perverse"rather than“wrongheaded,”as of something else,such as learning,food,drink,marriage,and sleep Hill does.In Sermon 352A.7(1997b),Augustine also describes"per- ing together."He goes on to emphasize the importance of proper verse hope”(spem peruersam)and“unbelieving despair”(infidelem “use”(1999b,9.9). desperationem)as the two vices related to hope. 1042

Michael Lamb Matthew 6: 9–10). While these eternal goods are the ultimate objects of hope, Augustine identifies tempo￾ral goods as proper, if proximate, objects of hope in the last four petitions of the Lord’s Prayer—Give us this day our daily bread, and forgive us our debts as we also forgive our debtors, and do not bring us to the time of trial, but deliver us from the evil one (1999a, 30.115, citing Matthew 6: 11–13). Since these petitions iden￾tify goods that are “necessary for acquiring the eter￾nal gifts” and “concern our needs in the present life,” they do not necessarily conflict or compete with eternal goods (1999a, 30.115). Hoping for these goods can be a proximate part of realizing the ultimate end.14 Augustine advances a similar claim in a sermon on Psalm 129, where he explicitly acknowledges the per￾missibility of hoping for temporal goods: “Am I con￾demning hope for worldly advantages, if God is be￾sought to grant them? No, but there is another kind of hope proper to Israel. It is not Israel’s true calling to hope for riches or bodily health or an abundance of earthly assets, as though such things were its supreme good” (2004, 129.11, emphasis added). This final caveat is significant:it implies that Augustine allows us to hope for certain temporal goods as long we do not hope for them as our supreme good, as long as we do not rest in them, either making them idols or dominating them as if they are ours to possess. In places, Augustine even suggests we can hope for some temporal goods for their own sake. In Letter 130 to Proba, as in the Enchiridion, Augustine iden￾tifies proper objects of desire by appealing to the Lord’s Prayer and describes “health” and “friendship” as temporal goods properly sought “for their own sake” (propter se) (2003, 130.12.22–130.13.24, 130.6.13).15 He argues further that human beings may desire “a suf￾ficient amount of necessary goods ...sought not for their own sake but for the sake of [health and friend￾ship], when they are sought in proper fashion” (2003, 130.6.13).16 Among these goods, he includes “temporal well-being” and even “honors and positions of power” (2003, 130.6.12). “Yes,” Augustine affirms, “it is proper to will these things if it is their responsibility to pro￾vide for those who live subject to them, not on ac- 14 Alan Mittleman is one of the few interpreters to note the permis￾sibility of Augustinian hope for temporal goods: “Despite his dis￾paragement of the misplaced, worldly hopes of paganism, Augus￾tine does not deride worldly hope altogether. Just as he reconstructs virtue within a Christian mode as the practice of love, he validates hope for those worldly goods necessary for a Christian life, that is, for the life of the City of God as it steadfastly endures within the earthly city. Ultimate hopes coexist with proximate hopes. Just as the rabbis read a domesticated eschatology out of the petitionary prayers of the liturgy, so, too, Augustine finds the Lord’s Prayer to be a concise expression of legitimate hope” (2009, 155; see also Studer 1990, 211, 217). 15 For an illuminating discussion of Letter 130, see Clair (2016, 52– 65). 16 Augustine makes a similar claim in The Excellence of Marriage (1999b, 9.9): “Undoubtedly we should take note that God gives us some benefits that are to be sought after for their own sake, such as wisdom, health and friendship, and others are necessary for the sake of something else, such as learning, food, drink, marriage, and sleep￾ing together.” He goes on to emphasize the importance of proper “use” (1999b, 9.9). count of these things themselves but on account of an￾other good that comes from them,” namely, the tempo￾ral well-being of the community (2003, 130.6.12). But, he insists, these temporal goods must only be proxi￾mate objects to be used rather than ultimate ends to be enjoyed. This admonition again reflects his concerns about pride and domination: if honors and positions of power are “desired on account of an empty pride over their superiority and on account of the superfluous or even harmful pomp of vanity, it is not proper” (2003, 130.6.12). But “if they desire for themselves and for theirs a sufficient amount of necessary things and do not desire any more, they do not desire improperly” (2003, 130.6.12). While Augustine suggests that human beings ought to “prefer eternal to temporal things” and love them “on account of” God, he still permits hoping for temporal goods for the sake of health or friendship, as long as this hope does not become disordered or per￾verse (2003, 130.5.11-130.7.14, 130.12.22–130.13.24; see also Studer 1990, 211). Augustine’s emphasis on hoping for such temporal goods in “proper fashion” highlights a crucial feature of his account. If hope is to be virtuous, it, like love, must be properly ordered (1998a, 14.6–9, 15.22). Strikingly, Augustine applies the same distinctions to hope that he uses to explicate his order of love. In Sermon 157, for example, he invokes the distinc￾tion between using and enjoying in the context of hope rather than love. He praises those who are “hoping for eternal things which we cannot see” and admon￾ishes those who are “hooked on temporal things that can be seen” (1992b, 157.5). Yet he acknowledges that those who hope for eternal goods should not abandon hope for temporal goods: “We too make use of them according to the needs of our journey; but we don’t set our heart’s joy on them, in case when they collapse we should be buried in the ruins. You see, we make use of this world as though we were not using it, in order to reach the one who made this world, and remain in him, enjoying his eternity” (1992b, 157.5, emphasis added). Here, Augustine employs the use/enjoyment distinc￾tion to chasten listeners against hoping for proximate, temporal goods as their supreme good or ultimate end. In other sermons, Augustine identifies rightly or￾dered hope by identifying corresponding forms of disorder—namely, the vices of presumption and de￾spair. In Sermon 87, for example, Augustine identifies “two evils” that “kill souls”: “despair” (desperatio) and “perverse hope” (peruersa spes) (1991a, 87.10).17 De￾spair is the privation of hope. Desperatio means liter￾ally to be “without hope,” which Augustine considers a great evil since it causes us to withdraw from the good rather than “stretch” toward it in hope (see 1992a, 105.7; 2004, 129.10). When we despair, our hope be￾comes deficient, and we lose the capacity to seek our objects of hope or patiently endure the difficulties and delays associated with attaining a future good (1992b, 17 I translate peruersa as “perverse” rather than “wrongheaded,” as Hill does. In Sermon 352A.7 (1997b), Augustine also describes “per￾verse hope” (spem peruersam) and “unbelieving despair” (infidelem desperationem) as the two vices related to hope. 1042 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000345

Between Presumption and Despair 1574;1998a,19.4).Augustine often ascribes this vice In another sermon,Augustine describes temptations to those with a false self-estimation.distorted vision toward presumption and despair as "two siren voices or deficient faith (1991a.8710:1997b,352A.6-8).The each opposed to the other,but both dangerous,which despairing fail to see themselves and the world rightly lure people to destruction"(1997b,352A.6).The fact which causes them to withdraw from future goods that that Augustine uses maritime metaphors to describe are actually within reach.The despairing either sink each of these vices as a"whirlpool"(uoraginem)is sig- into a slothful lethargy where they have no motivation nificant,especially in Hippo,a Roman port city where to act rightly,or they recklessly pursue other vices,be- many in his audience were merchants or sailors familiar lieving that the certainty of eternal punishment licenses with the dangers of the sea (1991a,8710-11).19 Vices, at least some form of "temporal enjoyment"(1991a, like whirlpools,are self-consuming,warping a person's 8710;1997b,352A.6-9).Either way,the despairing en- character and creating bonds of habit that are hard to ter a"deep and dizzy whirlpool"where they"turn their alter or escape.Moreover,if virtues aid the ascent to backs"on God and fall"into various sins and vicious wisdom,vices,like whirlpools,cause human beings to forms of behavior"(1991a.8710). curve in on themselves,plunging them into a downward If despair constitutes the vice of deficiency,pre- spiral and pulling them farther away from God and sumption constitutes the vice of excess,the perver- the Good.20 For Augustine,"the right sort of hope"- sion of hope.Those who escape despair,Augustine "good hope"-avoids the whirlpools of both presump- preaches,must "be careful they don't tumble into an- tion and despair(1991a,8710).21 other whirlpool,and find that having been unable to Most often,Augustine discusses hope,presumption, die from despair,they now die from perverse hope," and despair in relation to eternal goods (1991a.8710- which is "equally pernicious"(1991a,8711;cf.1997b, 11:1992a,105.7-8:1997b,352A.6-9:2000,31(2)),but 352A.6).By "perverse hope,"Augustine means a kind since he commends hope for temporal goods,his order of presumption,which characterizes those who "hope of hope can be extended to include proximate objects in the wrong way,"hoping"too much"for certain goods By applying the same distinctions to both hope and 4号元 that are not possible or appropriate,or"too much"in love,Augustine implies that hope for temporal goods God's assistance to achieve them without any effort on can be permissible as long as that hope is properly or- their own part(1997b,352A.7-9).In one sermon,for dered and avoids the vices of presumption and despair & example,he notes that hope can become perverse if it The question is whether Augustine believes distinctly is a "hope for something unworthy,even if you hope political goods can be among hope's proper objects. for it from God"(2000,31(2).6).The implication is that "unworthy"objects are not genuine goods:they can- not be ordered or referred to God.Elsewhere,Augus- HOPE FOR THE COMMONWEALTH tine suggests that hope can also become perverse or In City of God,Augustine famously rejects Cicero's “false”(spem falsam)if it suggests or assumes“more definition of a commonwealth(res publica)as the prop- than the facts warranted"(1997a,3.30.43).Here pre- erty of a people "united in fellowship by common sumption entails an excessive epistemic confidence in agreement as to what is right and by a community of the possibility of realizing a certain good,which af- interest'”(1998a,2.21:19.21:cf.Cicero1999.1.39).In fects one's motivation to pursue it.Thus,presumption. its place,Augustine offers a "more practicable defini- like despair,can entail apathy or recklessness:the pre- tion"that recognizes a"commonwealth"even if a "peo- sumptuous either assume they have already attained ple"has not achieved true justice (1998a,2.21,19.24). 8 their object of hope and thus do not need to do any- For Augustine,a commonwealth is the property of an thing more to achieve it,or they rush headlong into "assembled multitude of rational creatures bound to- its pursuit without a proper estimation of the risks and gether by a common agreement as to the objects of difficulties involved (2000,31(2).1:1991a.8711:1997b their love”(1998a,19.24).“In this case,”he concludes, 352A.7-9).For Augustine,perverse hope is as danger- "if we are to discover the character of any people,we ous as despair (1991a,8710-11). have only to examine what it loves...no matter what That the virtue of hope is surrounded by vices on the objects of its loves may be"(1998a,19.24). both sides reflects Augustine's dialectic of love and sin Importantly,Augustine does not cast these common where virtue will always be accompanied by tempta- objects of love simply as ultimate,otherworldly ends tions toward vice.The "human mind,"Augustine ar- Rather,he includes proximate,this-worldly goods,the gues,"dithers between opposite dangers,wavering be- good things appropriate to this life"(1998a,19.13). 四 tween confession of its weakness and rash presump- tion,and for the most part it is tossed between these two and battered on either side,and whichever way it is driven there is a ruinous fall awaiting"(2000,31(2).1).18 sumptuous person still has a hope of salvation.whereas the despair- ing person has abandoned this hope,deeming salvation impossible. 19That Augustine identifies vices as"whirlpools"also fits with his pilgrimage motif:vices,like whirlpools,are obstacles on one's journey 1 Here.Augustine is actually describing two kinds of presumption to the heavenly city.For more on Augustine's pilgrimage motif,see that of someone who confesses weakness but believes God will offer Stewart-Kroeker (2017). salvation no matter what,and the "rash presumption"of another who 20 Jenson(2006.6-46)identifies Augustine as a source of the idea of assumes that she can achieve salvation by her own efforts.What dis- tinguishes the "presumption"of one who confesses weakness from On the role of prudence in ordering hope and avoiding presump- the "despair"of another who professes weakness is that the pre- tion and despair,see Lamb (forthcoming). 1043

Between Presumption and Despair 157.4; 1998a, 19.4). Augustine often ascribes this vice to those with a false self-estimation, distorted vision, or deficient faith (1991a, 87.10; 1997b, 352A.6–8). The despairing fail to see themselves and the world rightly, which causes them to withdraw from future goods that are actually within reach. The despairing either sink into a slothful lethargy where they have no motivation to act rightly, or they recklessly pursue other vices, be￾lieving that the certainty of eternal punishment licenses at least some form of “temporal enjoyment” (1991a, 87.10; 1997b, 352A.6–9). Either way, the despairing en￾ter a “deep and dizzy whirlpool” where they “turn their backs” on God and fall “into various sins and vicious forms of behavior” (1991a, 87.10). If despair constitutes the vice of deficiency, pre￾sumption constitutes the vice of excess, the perver￾sion of hope. Those who escape despair, Augustine preaches, must “be careful they don’t tumble into an￾other whirlpool, and find that having been unable to die from despair, they now die from perverse hope,” which is “equally pernicious” (1991a, 87.11; cf. 1997b, 352A.6). By “perverse hope,” Augustine means a kind of presumption, which characterizes those who “hope in the wrong way,” hoping “too much” for certain goods that are not possible or appropriate, or “too much” in God’s assistance to achieve them without any effort on their own part (1997b, 352A.7–9). In one sermon, for example, he notes that hope can become perverse if it is a “hope for something unworthy, even if you hope for it from God” (2000, 31(2).6). The implication is that “unworthy” objects are not genuine goods: they can￾not be ordered or referred to God. Elsewhere, Augus￾tine suggests that hope can also become perverse or “false” (spem falsam) if it suggests or assumes “more than the facts warranted” (1997a, 3.30.43). Here pre￾sumption entails an excessive epistemic confidence in the possibility of realizing a certain good, which af￾fects one’s motivation to pursue it. Thus, presumption, like despair, can entail apathy or recklessness: the pre￾sumptuous either assume they have already attained their object of hope and thus do not need to do any￾thing more to achieve it, or they rush headlong into its pursuit without a proper estimation of the risks and difficulties involved (2000, 31(2).1; 1991a, 87.11; 1997b, 352A.7–9). For Augustine, perverse hope is as danger￾ous as despair (1991a, 87.10–11). That the virtue of hope is surrounded by vices on both sides reflects Augustine’s dialectic of love and sin, where virtue will always be accompanied by tempta￾tions toward vice. The “human mind,” Augustine ar￾gues, “dithers between opposite dangers, wavering be￾tween confession of its weakness and rash presump￾tion, and for the most part it is tossed between these two and battered on either side, and whichever way it is driven there is a ruinous fall awaiting” (2000, 31(2).1).18 18 Here, Augustine is actually describing two kinds of presumption, that of someone who confesses weakness but believes God will offer salvation no matter what, and the “rash presumption” of another who assumes that she can achieve salvation by her own efforts. What dis￾tinguishes the “presumption” of one who confesses weakness from the “despair” of another who professes weakness is that the pre￾In another sermon, Augustine describes temptations toward presumption and despair as “two siren voices, each opposed to the other, but both dangerous, which lure people to destruction” (1997b, 352A.6). The fact that Augustine uses maritime metaphors to describe each of these vices as a “whirlpool” (uoraginem) is sig￾nificant, especially in Hippo, a Roman port city where many in his audience were merchants or sailors familiar with the dangers of the sea (1991a, 87.10–11).19 Vices, like whirlpools, are self-consuming, warping a person’s character and creating bonds of habit that are hard to alter or escape. Moreover, if virtues aid the ascent to wisdom, vices, like whirlpools, cause human beings to curve in on themselves, plunging them into a downward spiral and pulling them farther away from God and the Good.20 For Augustine, “the right sort of hope”— “good hope”—avoids the whirlpools of both presump￾tion and despair (1991a, 87.10).21 Most often, Augustine discusses hope, presumption, and despair in relation to eternal goods (1991a, 87.10– 11; 1992a, 105.7–8; 1997b, 352A.6–9; 2000, 31(2)), but since he commends hope for temporal goods, his order of hope can be extended to include proximate objects. By applying the same distinctions to both hope and love, Augustine implies that hope for temporal goods can be permissible as long as that hope is properly or￾dered and avoids the vices of presumption and despair. The question is whether Augustine believes distinctly political goods can be among hope’s proper objects. HOPE FOR THE COMMONWEALTH In City of God, Augustine famously rejects Cicero’s definition of a commonwealth (res publica) as the prop￾erty of a people “united in fellowship by common agreement as to what is right and by a community of interest” (1998a, 2.21; 19.21; cf. Cicero 1999, 1.39). In its place, Augustine offers a “more practicable defini￾tion” that recognizes a “commonwealth” even if a “peo￾ple” has not achieved true justice (1998a, 2.21, 19.24). For Augustine, a commonwealth is the property of an “assembled multitude of rational creatures bound to￾gether by a common agreement as to the objects of their love” (1998a, 19.24). “In this case,” he concludes, “if we are to discover the character of any people, we have only to examine what it loves … no matter what the objects of its loves may be” (1998a, 19.24). Importantly, Augustine does not cast these common objects of love simply as ultimate, otherworldly ends. Rather, he includes proximate, this-worldly goods, the “good things appropriate to this life” (1998a, 19.13). sumptuous person still has a hope of salvation, whereas the despair￾ing person has abandoned this hope, deeming salvation impossible. 19 That Augustine identifies vices as “whirlpools” also fits with his pilgrimage motif: vices,like whirlpools, are obstacles on one’s journey to the heavenly city. For more on Augustine’s pilgrimage motif, see Stewart-Kroeker (2017). 20 Jenson (2006, 6–46) identifies Augustine as a source of the idea of sin as being “curved in on oneself” (incurvatus in se). 21 On the role of prudence in ordering hope and avoiding presump￾tion and despair, see Lamb (forthcoming). 1043 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000345

Michael Lamb Among the most important is "temporal peace,in pro- citizens in the commonwealth (cf.Johnson 2007.166- portion to the short span of a mortal life,consisting in 70). bodily health and soundness,and the society of one's Critics,however.may wonder whether this civic own kind:and all things necessary for the preserva- peace counts as an object of hope at all.After all. tion and recovery of this peace"(1998a,19.13).These most Augustinian realists interpret temporal "peace" goods are similar to the health,friendship,and "tem- in a negative,minimalist way,identifying peace sim- poral well-being"that Augustine identifies in Letter ply as the mere absence of violence.For example, 130 to Proba.In both texts.Augustine considers these Robert Markus argues that,for Augustine,the pur- goods proper as long as citizens observe right"order" pose of politics consists solely in protecting "a lowly and“use”(1998a.19.13:2003.130.6.12-130.714). form of 'peace':the public order and security which For Augustine,the supreme good is not temporal human sin has made unstable in society"(1970.174) peace but eternal peace,which consists in "a perfectly “The greater goods,”Markus argues,are“beyond the ordered and perfectly harmonious fellowship in the en- scope of politics"(1970,174).Herbert Deane shares joyment of God,and of one another in God"(1998a this tragic vision of politics as a modus vivendi whose 19.13;cf.19.11,19.20).Although eternal peace is "our remedial function is negative rather than positive:"the Final Good,"temporal peace remains a genuine good: state,for Augustine,is an external order;the peace that "For peace is so great a good that,even in the sphere it maintains is external peace-the absence,or at least of earthly and mortal affairs,we hear no word more the diminution.of overt violence....It does not seek thankfully,and nothing is desired with greater long- to make men truly good or virtuous.Rather,it is in- ing:in short,it is not possible to find anything bet- terested in their outward actions,and it attempts,with ter"(1998a,19.11).Augustine's emphasis on tempo- some success,to restrain its citizens from performing ral peace reflects his view of human beings as inher- certain kinds of harmful and criminal acts"(1963.117: ently social beings who desire peace with their fellows: cf.133-4.138-43).For these Augustinian realists,the "just as there is no one who does not wish to be joyful, primary purpose of politics is not to promote good so there is no one who does not wish to have peace but to prevent evil,not to foster internal virtue but to (1998a,19.12)."Civic peace"(concordiam ciuium)- restrain external violence.Since this view has autho- the peace of the city or commonwealth-constitutes rized influential accounts of Augustinian pessimism,it one species of this temporal peace (1998a,19.16).It is worth considering whether the mere absence of vio- consists in "peaceful association"among fellows,"an lence provides an object of hope sufficient to motivate ordered concord,with respect to command and obedi- positive political action. ence,of the citizens"(1998a,19.12-13). Augustine certainly believes that civic peace re- Crucially,although Augustine distinguishes the quires remedies and restraints.Indeed,when he ex- heavenly'”and“earthly'”cities by their loves and plains what constitutes the "well-ordered concord"of hopes (1998a,14.28,15.21,19.1),he describes civic 'peace among men,"he identifies a duty not to harm peace as a common good that citizens of both cities as the first principle (1998a,19.14).Yet,following Ci- can share,even if they "use"it as a proximate object cero (1991,1.31),2 he also specifies more positive re- for different ultimate ends: sponsibilities of justice and civic friendship alongside these negative duties:"the order of this concord is,first. both kinds of men and both kinds of household make com- that a man should harm no one,and,second,that he mon use of those things which are necessary to this mortal should do good to all,so far as he can"(1998a.19.14) life;but each has its own very different end in using them This second,more positive form of concord challenges So also,the earthly city,which does not live by faith,desires those who cast politics simply as a negative remedy for an earthly peace,and it establishes an ordered concord of constraining the effects of sin.Augustine's common- civic obedience and rule in order to secure a kind of co- wealth,like Cicero's,is not simply a set of minimal gov- operation of men's wills for the sake of attaining the things ernment structures,coercive laws,or political institu- which belong to this mortal life.But the Heavenly City-or tions,but also a set of ordered relationships,a kind of rather,that part of it which is a pilgrim in this condition of concord or civic friendship among those who belong to mortality,and which lives by faith-must of necessity make use of this peace also,until this mortal state,for which such the populus (see 1998a,19.3,19.13-14;Elshtain 1998. peace is necessary,shall have passed away.Thus,it lives like 38-9 von Heyking2001,77-89:2004,182-4).Indeed, a captive and a pilgrim,even though it has already received Augustine suggests that the pursuit of common goods the promise of redemption,and the gift of the Spirit as a requires "peaceful association among citizens:the kind of pledge of it.But,for as long as it does so,it does "society of one's own kind"remains a necessary not hesitate to obey the laws of the earthly city,whereby precondition for temporal peace(1998a,19.12-13).The the things necessary for the support of this mortal life are administered (1998a,19.17). 22 In On Duties,Cicero identifies two fundamental duties of justice: "first that one should harm no one:and secondly that one serve the Thus,Augustine concludes,"since this mortal condition common advantage"(1991,1.31:cf.1.20).In particular,he suggests is common to both cities,a harmony concordia is pre that citizens have a duty "to contribute to the common stock the served between them with respect to the things which things that benefit everyone together,and,by the exchange of dutiful belong to this condition"(1998a,19.17).Here,Augus- services,by giving and receiving expertise and effort and means,to 士 bind fast the fellowship of men with each other"(1991,1.22:cf.1.28) tine identifies a distinctly political good-civic peace In appropriating a twofold formula similar to Cicero's,Augustine ad- or concord-as a common object of hope for diverse vocates a more positive form of concord. 1044

Michael Lamb Among the most important is “temporal peace, in pro￾portion to the short span of a mortal life, consisting in bodily health and soundness, and the society of one’s own kind; and all things necessary for the preserva￾tion and recovery of this peace” (1998a, 19.13). These goods are similar to the health, friendship, and “tem￾poral well-being” that Augustine identifies in Letter 130 to Proba. In both texts, Augustine considers these goods proper as long as citizens observe right “order” and “use” (1998a, 19.13; 2003, 130.6.12–130.7.14). For Augustine, the supreme good is not temporal peace but eternal peace, which consists in “a perfectly ordered and perfectly harmonious fellowship in the en￾joyment of God, and of one another in God” (1998a, 19.13; cf. 19.11, 19.20). Although eternal peace is “our Final Good,” temporal peace remains a genuine good: “For peace is so great a good that, even in the sphere of earthly and mortal affairs, we hear no word more thankfully, and nothing is desired with greater long￾ing: in short, it is not possible to find anything bet￾ter” (1998a, 19.11). Augustine’s emphasis on tempo￾ral peace reflects his view of human beings as inher￾ently social beings who desire peace with their fellows: “just as there is no one who does not wish to be joyful, so there is no one who does not wish to have peace” (1998a, 19.12). “Civic peace” (concordiam ciuium)— the peace of the city or commonwealth—constitutes one species of this temporal peace (1998a, 19.16). It consists in “peaceful association” among fellows, “an ordered concord, with respect to command and obedi￾ence, of the citizens” (1998a, 19.12–13). Crucially, although Augustine distinguishes the “heavenly” and “earthly” cities by their loves and hopes (1998a, 14.28, 15.21, 19.1), he describes civic peace as a common good that citizens of both cities can share, even if they “use” it as a proximate object for different ultimate ends: both kinds of men and both kinds of household make com￾mon use of those things which are necessary to this mortal life; but each has its own very different end in using them. So also, the earthly city, which does not live by faith, desires an earthly peace, and it establishes an ordered concord of civic obedience and rule in order to secure a kind of co￾operation of men’s wills for the sake of attaining the things which belong to this mortal life.But the Heavenly City – or, rather, that part of it which is a pilgrim in this condition of mortality, and which lives by faith – must of necessity make use of this peace also, until this mortal state, for which such peace is necessary, shall have passed away.Thus,it lives like a captive and a pilgrim, even though it has already received the promise of redemption, and the gift of the Spirit as a kind of pledge of it. But, for as long as it does so, it does not hesitate to obey the laws of the earthly city, whereby the things necessary for the support of this mortal life are administered (1998a, 19.17). Thus,Augustine concludes, “since this mortal condition is common to both cities, a harmony [concordia] is pre￾served between them with respect to the things which belong to this condition” (1998a, 19.17). Here, Augus￾tine identifies a distinctly political good—civic peace or concord—as a common object of hope for diverse citizens in the commonwealth (cf. Johnson 2007, 166– 70). Critics, however, may wonder whether this civic peace counts as an object of hope at all. After all, most Augustinian realists interpret temporal “peace” in a negative, minimalist way, identifying peace sim￾ply as the mere absence of violence. For example, Robert Markus argues that, for Augustine, the pur￾pose of politics consists solely in protecting “a lowly form of ‘peace’: the public order and security which human sin has made unstable in society” (1970, 174). “The greater goods,” Markus argues, are “beyond the scope of politics” (1970, 174). Herbert Deane shares this tragic vision of politics as a modus vivendi whose remedial function is negative rather than positive: “the state, for Augustine, is an external order; the peace that it maintains is external peace—the absence, or at least the diminution, of overt violence…. It does not seek to make men truly good or virtuous. Rather, it is in￾terested in their outward actions, and it attempts, with some success, to restrain its citizens from performing certain kinds of harmful and criminal acts” (1963, 117; cf. 133–4, 138–43). For these Augustinian realists, the primary purpose of politics is not to promote good but to prevent evil, not to foster internal virtue but to restrain external violence. Since this view has autho￾rized influential accounts of Augustinian pessimism, it is worth considering whether the mere absence of vio￾lence provides an object of hope sufficient to motivate positive political action. Augustine certainly believes that civic peace re￾quires remedies and restraints. Indeed, when he ex￾plains what constitutes the “well-ordered concord” of “peace among men,” he identifies a duty not to harm as the first principle (1998a, 19.14). Yet, following Ci￾cero (1991, 1.31),22 he also specifies more positive re￾sponsibilities of justice and civic friendship alongside these negative duties: “the order of this concord is, first, that a man should harm no one, and, second, that he should do good to all, so far as he can” (1998a, 19.14). This second, more positive form of concord challenges those who cast politics simply as a negative remedy for constraining the effects of sin. Augustine’s common￾wealth, like Cicero’s, is not simply a set of minimal gov￾ernment structures, coercive laws, or political institu￾tions, but also a set of ordered relationships, a kind of concord or civic friendship among those who belong to the populus (see 1998a, 19.3, 19.13–14; Elshtain 1998, 38–9; von Heyking 2001, 77–89; 2004, 182–4). Indeed, Augustine suggests that the pursuit of common goods requires “peaceful association” among citizens: the “society of one’s own kind” remains a necessary precondition for temporal peace (1998a, 19.12–13).The 22 In On Duties, Cicero identifies two fundamental duties of justice: “first that one should harm no one; and secondly that one serve the common advantage” (1991, 1.31; cf. 1.20). In particular, he suggests that citizens have a duty “to contribute to the common stock the things that benefit everyone together, and, by the exchange of dutiful services, by giving and receiving expertise and effort and means, to bind fast the fellowship of men with each other” (1991, 1.22; cf. 1.28). In appropriating a twofold formula similar to Cicero’s, Augustine ad￾vocates a more positive form of concord. 1044 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000345

Between Presumption and Despair "city's life is inevitably a social one"(1998a.19.17: ascending order.suggesting that each participates in cf.19.5) the larger whole (1998a,19.13).He makes this part- Augustine's emphasis on sociality in the common- whole structure explicit in 19.16,where he describes wealth is even more evident in his original Latin.His how "domestic peace has reference to civic peace": definition of a "people"-coetus multitudinis rationalis "A man's household,then,ought to be the beginning, rerum quas diligit concordi communione sociatus-is or a little part,of the city;and every beginning has usually translated as "an assembled multitude of ra- reference to some end proper to itself,and every part tional creatures bound together by a common agree- has reference to the integrity of the whole of which ment as to the objects of their love,"which can sug- it is a part."Indeed,even the "peace of the unjust" gest a kind of rational consensus of citizens (1998a. ultimately participates in the peace of the heavenly 19.24).But as John von Hevking notes,Augustine's in city:"Even that which is perverse...must of necessity vocation of coming together (coetus)in concord (con- be in,or derived from,or associated with,and to that cordi)has social and affective connotations that are extent at peace with,some part of the order of things often downplayed in modern accounts of Augustine's political thought(2001,85-8;cf.2004,182-4).The dif. Ouheu mot at (9sa.92) ference is especially clear when contrasting Augustine's In the current age,Augustine holds that civic peace definition with Cicero's:in place of a people joined remains proximate and imperfect,but the properly by common agreement on justice and law (iuris con- ordered friendships that constitute the peace of the sensu)and the sharing of interests or benefits (utilitas just are genuine goods,friendships that participate communione sociatus).Augustine emphasizes agree in friendship with God.Indeed,given the part-whole ment and harmony (concordi communione sociatus) structure of human society,civic peace need not be a around common objects of love (rerum quas diligit) "lowly form of 'peace""(Markus 1970,174),but can While many interpreters assume that "common ob- constitute a more positive form of civic friendship that jects of love"refers to something closer to "common participates,even if imperfectly,in friendship with God. 4r元 interests"(e.g.,Klosko 2012,233,247),the modern If civic peace is a proper object of Augustinian hope, language of interests can also suggest"rational"or this hope,however,must also be rightly ordered to "economic"interests that do not necessarily map onto avoid the vices of presumption and despair.Peace,after the affective and social complexity of Augustine's ac- all,is a fragile and "uncertain good":"If...there is no count..“Values'”or“common goods'”are better analo- security even in the home from the common evils which gies since they capture the ways in which these objects befall the human race,what of the city?The larger the engage our affections along with our reason.Augus- city,the more is its forum filled with civil law-suits and tine's conception of the commonwealth carves out a criminal trials.Even when the city is at peace and free political role for virtues and affections -such as love from actual sedition and civil war,it is never free from and hope-that are sometimes elided in contempo- the danger of such disturbance or,more often,blood- rary political theories that emphasize epistemic justifi- shed"(1998a,19.5;cf.15.4).Augustine's vivid account cation and abstract rationality (for discussion,see Gre of social and political evils chastens citizens from find- g0y2008,23,38,66-74,99-107,149-75,241-56.366-7: ing rest in an imperfect commonwealth,either making Hordern 2012). an idol of politics or presuming that earthly politics is That many critics downplay the associational and the supreme source of happiness(1998a,15.4,19.5-8). affective aspects of Augustine's thought may reflect This is one of the core insights of Augustine's politica their implicit metaphysical dualism and"futurist"es- thought:Augustine's diagnosis of political and social chatology,their view that heaven and earth are en- evils punctures any illusions that politics can escape tirely distinct and that the eschaton is deferred indefi- the effects of self-interest or the temptations toward nitely to some"absolute future"beyond temporal his- vice that exist on all sides.But Augustine's warnings tory(Billings2004:135-6;Arendt1996,18-9,2644) against presumption do not thereby license pessimism If one assumes a strict separation between the earthly or despair.As Kristen Deede Johnson argues,Augus- and heavenly or the temporal and eternal,the relative tine's political vision "lies somewhere in between the peace of the saeculum can seem detached from par two extremes of completely abandoning the earthly ticipation in the City of God.But if one recognizes city and looking to the earthly city to achieve utopian Augustine's participationist ontology,temporal or civic like harmony and peace"(Johnson 2007,169;cf.176-9). peace is no longer simply an absence of violence,but Luke Bretherton agrees:"For Augustine,politics in the a kind of participation in the peace of the Heavenly saeculum is about enabling a limited peace that is on City.23 the one hand shorn of messianic pretensions but on the Augustine suggests as much in City of God.When other not given over to demonic despair"(Bretherton, he identifies the various forms of peace-the peace of 2010.83:see also Mathewes 2007.214-60:Avramenko the body,irrational and rational souls,the household 2007,810). the city,and the heavenly city-he identifies them in 24 Citing this passage,Klosko recognizes that earthly peace "par- 23 While John Milbank rejects a futurist eschatology and affirms Au- takes to some extent of the heavenly peace,"but he does not draw gustine's participationist ontology (2006,394,429-34).in his most the same implications for his understanding of Augustine's com- rhetorically excessive moments,he tends to limit any "real"and"gen- monwealth.Instead,he follows Deane in seeing the purposes of the uine"peace to the church(2006,394-5). 'state”as primarily“negative”"(Klosko2012,246-9). 1045

Between Presumption and Despair “city’s life is inevitably a social one” (1998a, 19.17; cf. 19.5). Augustine’s emphasis on sociality in the common￾wealth is even more evident in his original Latin. His definition of a “people”—coetus multitudinis rationalis rerum quas diligit concordi communione sociatus—is usually translated as “an assembled multitude of ra￾tional creatures bound together by a common agree￾ment as to the objects of their love,” which can sug￾gest a kind of rational consensus of citizens (1998a, 19.24). But as John von Heyking notes, Augustine’s in￾vocation of coming together (coetus) in concord (con￾cordi) has social and affective connotations that are often downplayed in modern accounts of Augustine’s political thought (2001, 85–8; cf. 2004, 182–4). The dif￾ference is especially clear when contrasting Augustine’s definition with Cicero’s: in place of a people joined by common agreement on justice and law (iuris con￾sensu) and the sharing of interests or benefits (utilitas communione sociatus), Augustine emphasizes agree￾ment and harmony (concordi communione sociatus) around common objects of love (rerum quas diligit). While many interpreters assume that “common ob￾jects of love” refers to something closer to “common interests” (e.g., Klosko 2012, 233, 247), the modern language of interests can also suggest “rational” or “economic” interests that do not necessarily map onto the affective and social complexity of Augustine’s ac￾count. “Values” or “common goods” are better analo￾gies since they capture the ways in which these objects engage our affections along with our reason. Augus￾tine’s conception of the commonwealth carves out a political role for virtues and affections—such as love and hope—that are sometimes elided in contempo￾rary political theories that emphasize epistemic justifi￾cation and abstract rationality (for discussion, see Gre￾gory 2008, 23, 38, 66–74, 99–107, 149–75, 241–56, 366–7; Hordern 2012). That many critics downplay the associational and affective aspects of Augustine’s thought may reflect their implicit metaphysical dualism and “futurist” es￾chatology, their view that heaven and earth are en￾tirely distinct and that the eschaton is deferred indefi￾nitely to some “absolute future” beyond temporal his￾tory (Billings 2004: 135–6; Arendt 1996, 18–9, 26–44). If one assumes a strict separation between the earthly and heavenly or the temporal and eternal, the relative peace of the saeculum can seem detached from par￾ticipation in the City of God. But if one recognizes Augustine’s participationist ontology, temporal or civic peace is no longer simply an absence of violence, but a kind of participation in the peace of the Heavenly City.23 Augustine suggests as much in City of God. When he identifies the various forms of peace—the peace of the body, irrational and rational souls, the household, the city, and the heavenly city—he identifies them in 23 While John Milbank rejects a futurist eschatology and affirms Au￾gustine’s participationist ontology (2006, 394, 429–34), in his most rhetorically excessive moments, he tends to limit any “real” and “gen￾uine” peace to the church (2006, 394–5). ascending order, suggesting that each participates in the larger whole (1998a, 19.13). He makes this part￾whole structure explicit in 19.16, where he describes how “domestic peace has reference to civic peace”: “A man’s household, then, ought to be the beginning, or a little part, of the city; and every beginning has reference to some end proper to itself, and every part has reference to the integrity of the whole of which it is a part.” Indeed, even the “peace of the unjust” ultimately participates in the peace of the heavenly city: “Even that which is perverse … must of necessity be in, or derived from, or associated with, and to that extent at peace with, some part of the order of things among which it has its being or of which it consists. Otherwise, it would not exist at all” (1998a, 19.12).24 In the current age, Augustine holds that civic peace remains proximate and imperfect, but the properly ordered friendships that constitute the peace of the just are genuine goods, friendships that participate in friendship with God. Indeed, given the part-whole structure of human society, civic peace need not be a “lowly form of ‘peace’” (Markus 1970, 174), but can constitute a more positive form of civic friendship that participates, even if imperfectly,in friendship with God. If civic peace is a proper object of Augustinian hope, this hope, however, must also be rightly ordered to avoid the vices of presumption and despair. Peace, after all, is a fragile and “uncertain good”: “If . . . there is no security even in the home from the common evils which befall the human race, what of the city? The larger the city, the more is its forum filled with civil law-suits and criminal trials. Even when the city is at peace and free from actual sedition and civil war, it is never free from the danger of such disturbance or, more often, blood￾shed” (1998a, 19.5; cf. 15.4). Augustine’s vivid account of social and political evils chastens citizens from find￾ing rest in an imperfect commonwealth, either making an idol of politics or presuming that earthly politics is the supreme source of happiness (1998a, 15.4, 19.5–8). This is one of the core insights of Augustine’s political thought: Augustine’s diagnosis of political and social evils punctures any illusions that politics can escape the effects of self-interest or the temptations toward vice that exist on all sides. But Augustine’s warnings against presumption do not thereby license pessimism or despair. As Kristen Deede Johnson argues, Augus￾tine’s political vision “lies somewhere in between the two extremes of completely abandoning the earthly city and looking to the earthly city to achieve utopian￾like harmony and peace” (Johnson 2007, 169; cf. 176–9). Luke Bretherton agrees: “For Augustine, politics in the saeculum is about enabling a limited peace that is on the one hand shorn of messianic pretensions but on the other not given over to demonic despair” (Bretherton, 2010, 83; see also Mathewes 2007, 214–60; Avramenko 2007, 810). 24 Citing this passage, Klosko recognizes that earthly peace “par￾takes to some extent of the heavenly peace,” but he does not draw the same implications for his understanding of Augustine’s com￾monwealth. Instead, he follows Deane in seeing the purposes of the “state” as primarily “negative” (Klosko 2012, 246–9). 1045 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000345