《社会保障概论》课程教学资源（课后阅读资料）APSR_Volume112. Issue 4.Nov 2018_Exit_Voice_and_Public_Reason

American Political Science Review (2018)112.4.1120-1124 doi:10.1017/S0003055418000539 American Political Science Association 2018 Letter Exit,Voice,and Public Reason KEVIN VALLIER Bowling Green State University ublic reason liberals appeal to public deliberation to ensure that a legal order can be publicly justified to its citizens.I argue that this voice mechanism should be supplemented by exit mech- anisms.By allowing citizens to exit legal orders they believe cannot be publicly justified,citizens can pressure states to change their laws.This exit pressure is sometimes more effective than deliberation. I explore federalism as an exit mechanism that can help public deliberation establish a publicly justified polity. he theories of deliberative democracy and pub- Both mechanisms create incentives for institutional lic reason liberalism are tightly connected.Theo- change,and so both mechanisms can be used to align rists in both camps hold that political institutions the legal order with what is publicly justified for cit- are legitimate when they are based on the reason of the izens.But as Hirschman noted.voice and exit mech- public.Deliberative democrats specify this condition anisms can limit the effectiveness of the other in by claiming that legitimate institutions make decisions bringing about social change.Thus,voice and exit based on open,equal,democratic discussion among cit- mechanisms must be carefully balanced in establishing izens in the public square.Public reason liberals hold a publicly justified polity. that legitimate institutions are those that can be justi- Introducing exit into public reason greatly alters how fied to multiple reasonable points of view,that is,to the public reason liberals should understand their view as 4号元 public as a whole.Many theorists regard the two the- well as how they should address institutional problems. oretical traditions as roughly equivalent because they They have focused exclusively on how to use deliber- equate public deliberation with the idea of public justi- ation to establish a publicly justified polity.If exit can fication;the idea of public justification in public reason also yield public justification,normative and social sci- liberalism is understood as a series of public,deliber- entific inquiry within public reason liberalism should ative acts aimed at justifying certain laws and public shift dramatically,with balanced investment in explor- policies. ing the promise of voice and exit.Even the modest But public justification and public deliberation are thesis that exit can be an effective supplement to voice distinct ideas.Public justification is a social state where is highly consequential for the dominant branch of lib- each person has sufficient moral reason to endorse the eral political theory.A second contribution of this essay 是 political power and legal order to which she is subject: is to situate public reason views within the turn to exit public deliberation is simply one method of reaching in political theory found in contemporary republican that social state.Once we grasp the distinction between (Taylor 2017)and classical liberal (Somin 2016)theo- the justification relation and the social processes by rizing;many political theories should pay more atten- which this relation is established,we can see that social tion to exit. processes other than deliberation may play an impor- I explore exit through political decentralization,es- tant role in achieving public justification. pecially federalist arrangements.By decentralizing le- In this paper,I distinguish between methods of gal authority to states or localities and allowing persons reaching public justification and argue that public rea- to move freely between them,citizens can find legal son liberals should appeal to social exit as a supplement regimes closer to what they have most reason to ac- to democratic deliberation.As Albert O.Hirschman cept.2 This self-sorting process not only moves people (1969)taught us long ago,social change can occur to legal orders they prefer,but pressures smaller polit- through voice,where persons openly express con- ical bodies to alter their laws to attract citizens,such as cerns and demand institutional change,or through exit, changing tax rates or eligibility for social services. where persons leave institutions that they dislike or dis- I'll sketch these ideas in five further sections in the agree with. hopes of pointing toward avenues for further research. eys Kevin Vallier is an Associate Professor of Philosophy.Bowling Green State University,Shatzel 310,Bowling Green,Ohio,43403 (kevinvallier@gmail.com) I am grateful to Christie Hartley,Brian Kogelmann,Andrew Lis. ter,Ilya Somin.Robert Talisse.and for comments and conversations about this piece and the issues it addresses.I am also grateful to a For instance,we can now see the benefits of employing models of reading group with my graduate students,especially for comments exit behavior to determine what can be publicly justified,such as the from Ryan Fischbeck,Ian Irwin,and Colin Manning.Several anony- Tiebout (1956)sorting model,which predicts the policy implications of movement between localities. mous referees provided me with extensive,helpful comments. 士 I apply public justification to individual laws,with Quong(2011 Received:January 23.2018:revised:May 11,2018:accepted:July 20. 273-87)and Gaus (2011,490-7),though this assumption is not neces- 2018.First published online:August 23,2018. sary to vindicate my thesis. 1120

American Political Science Review (2018) 112, 4, 1120–1124 doi:10.1017/S0003055418000539 © American Political Science Association 2018 Letter Exit, Voice, and Public Reason KEVIN VALLIER Bowling Green State University Public reason liberals appeal to public deliberation to ensure that a legal order can be publicly justified to its citizens. I argue that this voice mechanism should be supplemented by exit mech￾anisms. By allowing citizens to exit legal orders they believe cannot be publicly justified, citizens can pressure states to change their laws. This exit pressure is sometimes more effective than deliberation. I explore federalism as an exit mechanism that can help public deliberation establish a publicly justified polity. The theories of deliberative democracy and pub￾lic reason liberalism are tightly connected. Theo￾rists in both camps hold that political institutions are legitimate when they are based on the reason of the public. Deliberative democrats specify this condition by claiming that legitimate institutions make decisions based on open, equal, democratic discussion among cit￾izens in the public square. Public reason liberals hold that legitimate institutions are those that can be justi￾fied to multiple reasonable points of view, that is, to the public as a whole. Many theorists regard the two the￾oretical traditions as roughly equivalent because they equate public deliberation with the idea of public justi￾fication; the idea of public justification in public reason liberalism is understood as a series of public, deliber￾ative acts aimed at justifying certain laws and public policies. But public justification and public deliberation are distinct ideas. Public justification is a social state where each person has sufficient moral reason to endorse the political power and legal order to which she is subject; public deliberation is simply one method of reaching that social state.Once we grasp the distinction between the justification relation and the social processes by which this relation is established, we can see that social processes other than deliberation may play an impor￾tant role in achieving public justification. In this paper, I distinguish between methods of reaching public justification and argue that public rea￾son liberals should appeal to social exit as a supplement to democratic deliberation. As Albert O. Hirschman (1969) taught us long ago, social change can occur through voice, where persons openly express con￾cerns and demand institutional change, or through exit, where persons leave institutions that they dislike or dis￾agree with. Kevin Vallier is an Associate Professor of Philosophy, Bowling Green State University, Shatzel 310, Bowling Green, Ohio, 43403 (kevinvallier@gmail.com). I am grateful to Christie Hartley, Brian Kogelmann, Andrew Lis￾ter, Ilya Somin, Robert Talisse, and for comments and conversations about this piece and the issues it addresses. I am also grateful to a reading group with my graduate students, especially for comments from Ryan Fischbeck, Ian Irwin, and Colin Manning. Several anony￾mous referees provided me with extensive, helpful comments. Received: January 23, 2018; revised: May 11, 2018; accepted: July 20, 2018. First published online: August 23, 2018. Both mechanisms create incentives for institutional change, and so both mechanisms can be used to align the legal order with what is publicly justified for cit￾izens. But as Hirschman noted, voice and exit mech￾anisms can limit the effectiveness of the other in bringing about social change. Thus, voice and exit mechanisms must be carefully balanced in establishing a publicly justified polity. Introducing exit into public reason greatly alters how public reason liberals should understand their view as well as how they should address institutional problems. They have focused exclusively on how to use deliber￾ation to establish a publicly justified polity. If exit can also yield public justification, normative and social sci￾entific inquiry within public reason liberalism should shift dramatically, with balanced investment in explor￾ing the promise of voice and exit.1 Even the modest thesis that exit can be an effective supplement to voice is highly consequential for the dominant branch of lib￾eral political theory.A second contribution of this essay is to situate public reason views within the turn to exit in political theory found in contemporary republican (Taylor 2017) and classical liberal (Somin 2016) theo￾rizing; many political theories should pay more atten￾tion to exit. I explore exit through political decentralization, es￾pecially federalist arrangements. By decentralizing le￾gal authority to states or localities and allowing persons to move freely between them, citizens can find legal regimes closer to what they have most reason to ac￾cept.2 This self-sorting process not only moves people to legal orders they prefer, but pressures smaller polit￾ical bodies to alter their laws to attract citizens, such as changing tax rates or eligibility for social services. I’ll sketch these ideas in five further sections in the hopes of pointing toward avenues for further research. 1 For instance, we can now see the benefits of employing models of exit behavior to determine what can be publicly justified, such as the Tiebout (1956) sorting model, which predicts the policy implications of movement between localities. 2 I apply public justification to individual laws, with Quong (2011, 273-87) and Gaus (2011, 490-7), though this assumption is not neces￾sary to vindicate my thesis. 1120 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:56:49, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000539

Exit.Voice.and Public Reason PUBLIC JUSTIFICATION AND PUBLIC that can bridge this space are seldom provided in the DELIBERATION literature.So it is unclear the extent to which delib- erative principles can,by themselves,establish public As noted,public reason liberals say that political power justification.Fortunately,exit can help. must be subject to a multilateral justification to be le- gitimate.Political power must be acceptable to mul- tiple reasonable points of view in a society suffused VOICE AND EXIT with incompatible views about what the good and jus- tice require (Rawls 2005,136).Thus,a political order Hirschman identified exit and voice as two approaches is only legitimate when its coercive governmental ap- to organizational reform.Organization members who op//s paratus is endorsed by the reason of each member of wish to change the decisions and structure of their or- the public.Public reason liberals have many internal ganization can exercise power either by leaving the or- disagreements,but most think public reason implies ganization or by communicating concerns and propos- principles of justification and principles of deliberation ing improvements.Consumers exercise exit when they Principles of justification specify when political power stop buying a company's product;they exercise voice is justified for each member of the public,whereas prin- when they complain to the producer.Employees ex- ciples of deliberation require citizens to engage in the ercise exit when they quit and find another job;they deliberative act of attempting to justify their preferred exercise voice when they appeal to a union to generate principles to one another(395).But the relationship better working conditions.Citizens exercise exit when between justification and deliberation has often gone they emigrate;they exercise voice when they vote. unexplored. Exit and voice have different advantages.Voice com- As I understand the idea of public reason,it is fore- municates more information and gives constituents on- vc士 most a justificatory principle;it determines when po- going political power.Exit can often be more effec- litical coercion is justified for each person.This means tive,however,given that the organization member is that deliberative principles can be grounded in justi- no longer present and so no longer subject to the or- ficatory principles in three steps:(i)establish an ap- ganization's flaws.Further,losing a member is often propriate conception of public justification,(ii)demar. a greater cost to an organization than addressing her cate the set of justificatory reasons-the reasons that complaints.Voice and exit also impact one another's can justify coercion-and (iii)argue that a deliberative effectiveness.Voice can forestall exit by giving the or- practice will ensure that genuine justificatory reasons ganization member more ways to express her dissat- largely determine the shape of the law.Only successful isfaction.Exit can discourage voice by removing the arguments for each step can connect justification and voice of those who exit,as well as discouraging those deliberation.This insight is easily missed.Again,some who would expend the effort to use voice to improve public reason liberals think public justification imme- their organization.If persons can cheaply exit institu- diately entails or is to be identified with deliberative tions,the relative costs of using voice increase;more- behavior(Cohen 1989,21). over,watching others exit may lead deliberators to be- Assuming deliberative principles can be justified, come despondent and inactive. they usually take the form of doctrines of restraint, Exit and voice mechanisms are both relevant for de- since these principles morally require citizens to re- termining the content of the law.Citizens can use voice strain themselves from offering and acting upon cer- to change the law.or they can respond to laws they dis tain kinds of reasons in political life.Restraint typi- like by leaving or no longer participating in their politi- cally requires that the reasons we offer and act upon cal institutions.Public reason liberals have overlooked in politics be shared,shareable,or accessible reasons the fact that exit can move the law into closer alignment (Vallier 2018).John Rawls(2005,450)argues that citi- with what is publicly justified.If laws are justified for zens only reason publicly when they deliberate "within each reasonable point of view,we can expect some de- a framework of what he or she sincerely regards as the gree of satisfaction and stability from the citizenry;but most reasonable political conception of justice."Amy unjustified laws are often seen as immoral,unjust,and Gutmann and Dennis Thompson(1996,55)argue that. illegitimate,and so will create dissatisfaction.Dissatis- in a deliberative democracy,citizens are duty-bound faction can be expressed and ameliorated by exit.Polit- to only use reasons that "can be shared by fellow citi- ical officials who want to keep their citizens around will zens who are similarly motivated."Micah Schwartzman change the law to meet citizens'needs,at least when of- 四 (2011,378)argues that justifications are public only ficials must compete with the officials of other polities when they are"based on reasons drawn from a family or provinces. of shared moral and political values." That said,citizens are sometimes mistaken about Gerald Gaus (2011.41)and I (Vallier 2014)allow what they have reason to do and sometimes fail to unshared and inaccessible reasons into the set of justi- act on the reasons they have.Consequently,exit mech- ficatory reasons.We also reject deliberative principles anisms may conform a polity's laws to what citizens while retaining justificatory principles,so some pub- want,not what is justified for them.This means we must lic reason liberals,at least the "convergence"theorists, eventually establish a correlation between citizens'jus- stress the deliberation-justification distinction. tificatory reasons and the reasons they act upon. Justificatory and deliberative principles are sepa- Establishing the correlation would require consider- rated by considerable logical space;and the arguments able empirical work that I lack the ability to conduct. 1121

Exit, Voice, and Public Reason PUBLIC JUSTIFICATION AND PUBLIC DELIBERATION As noted, public reason liberals say that political power must be subject to a multilateral justification to be le￾gitimate. Political power must be acceptable to mul￾tiple reasonable points of view in a society suffused with incompatible views about what the good and jus￾tice require (Rawls 2005, 136). Thus, a political order is only legitimate when its coercive governmental ap￾paratus is endorsed by the reason of each member of the public. Public reason liberals have many internal disagreements, but most think public reason implies principles of justification and principles of deliberation. Principles of justification specify when political power is justified for each member of the public, whereas prin￾ciples of deliberation require citizens to engage in the deliberative act of attempting to justify their preferred principles to one another (395). But the relationship between justification and deliberation has often gone unexplored. As I understand the idea of public reason, it is fore￾most a justificatory principle; it determines when po￾litical coercion is justified for each person. This means that deliberative principles can be grounded in justi￾ficatory principles in three steps: (i) establish an ap￾propriate conception of public justification, (ii) demar￾cate the set of justificatory reasons—the reasons that can justify coercion—and (iii) argue that a deliberative practice will ensure that genuine justificatory reasons largely determine the shape of the law. Only successful arguments for each step can connect justification and deliberation. This insight is easily missed. Again, some public reason liberals think public justification imme￾diately entails or is to be identified with deliberative behavior (Cohen 1989, 21). Assuming deliberative principles can be justified, they usually take the form of doctrines of restraint, since these principles morally require citizens to re￾strain themselves from offering and acting upon cer￾tain kinds of reasons in political life. Restraint typi￾cally requires that the reasons we offer and act upon in politics be shared, shareable, or accessible reasons (Vallier 2018). John Rawls (2005, 450) argues that citi￾zens only reason publicly when they deliberate “within a framework of what he or she sincerely regards as the most reasonable political conception of justice.” Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson (1996, 55) argue that, in a deliberative democracy, citizens are duty-bound to only use reasons that “can be shared by fellow citi￾zens who are similarly motivated.”Micah Schwartzman (2011, 378) argues that justifications are public only when they are “based on reasons drawn from a family of shared moral and political values.” Gerald Gaus (2011, 41) and I (Vallier 2014) allow unshared and inaccessible reasons into the set of justi￾ficatory reasons. We also reject deliberative principles while retaining justificatory principles, so some pub￾lic reason liberals, at least the “convergence” theorists, stress the deliberation-justification distinction. Justificatory and deliberative principles are sepa￾rated by considerable logical space; and the arguments that can bridge this space are seldom provided in the literature. So it is unclear the extent to which delib￾erative principles can, by themselves, establish public justification. Fortunately, exit can help. VOICE AND EXIT Hirschman identified exit and voice as two approaches to organizational reform. Organization members who wish to change the decisions and structure of their or￾ganization can exercise power either by leaving the or￾ganization or by communicating concerns and propos￾ing improvements. Consumers exercise exit when they stop buying a company’s product; they exercise voice when they complain to the producer. Employees ex￾ercise exit when they quit and find another job; they exercise voice when they appeal to a union to generate better working conditions. Citizens exercise exit when they emigrate; they exercise voice when they vote. Exit and voice have different advantages. Voice com￾municates more information and gives constituents on￾going political power. Exit can often be more effec￾tive, however, given that the organization member is no longer present and so no longer subject to the or￾ganization’s flaws. Further, losing a member is often a greater cost to an organization than addressing her complaints. Voice and exit also impact one another’s effectiveness. Voice can forestall exit by giving the or￾ganization member more ways to express her dissat￾isfaction. Exit can discourage voice by removing the voice of those who exit, as well as discouraging those who would expend the effort to use voice to improve their organization. If persons can cheaply exit institu￾tions, the relative costs of using voice increase; more￾over, watching others exit may lead deliberators to be￾come despondent and inactive. Exit and voice mechanisms are both relevant for de￾termining the content of the law. Citizens can use voice to change the law, or they can respond to laws they dis￾like by leaving or no longer participating in their politi￾cal institutions. Public reason liberals have overlooked the fact that exit can move the law into closer alignment with what is publicly justified. If laws are justified for each reasonable point of view, we can expect some de￾gree of satisfaction and stability from the citizenry; but unjustified laws are often seen as immoral, unjust, and illegitimate, and so will create dissatisfaction. Dissatis￾faction can be expressed and ameliorated by exit. Polit￾ical officials who want to keep their citizens around will change the law to meet citizens’ needs, at least when of￾ficials must compete with the officials of other polities or provinces. That said, citizens are sometimes mistaken about what they have reason to do and sometimes fail to act on the reasons they have. Consequently, exit mech￾anisms may conform a polity’s laws to what citizens want, not what is justified for them.This means we must eventually establish a correlation between citizens’ jus￾tificatory reasons and the reasons they act upon. Establishing the correlation would require consider￾able empirical work that I lack the ability to conduct. 1121 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:56:49, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000539

Kevin Vallier But consider three points.First,this paper advances the ing of federalism,which affirms "divided powers be- thesis that exit mechanisms can supplement voice.Vin- tween member units and common institutions."In a dicating my thesis therefore only requires that exit can federalist model,sovereignty "is non-centralized,of- improve the justifiability of the laws to which citizens ten constitutionally,between at least two levels so that are subject,and this in turn only requires that citizens units at each level have final authority and can be self- tend to act on the justificatory reasons they have.The governing in some issue area."As Ronald Watts(1998. assumption that citizens tend to act on the reasons they 120)notes,decentralized political orders are"the genus have is prima facie plausible,and is taken for granted of political organization that is marked by the combi- by deliberative democrats.Second,we should not sin- nation of shared rule and self-rule,"that is,the national gle out exit mechanisms for failing to match citizens' with the local. exit choices with their justificatory reasons when voice There are several types of political decentralization. mechanisms raise the same concern.After all,citizens such as unions,confederations,leagues,and hybrids;a can voice irrational and vicious opinions,offering bad federation involves a "territorial division of power be- deliberative inputs.And political officials can fail to tween constituent units-sometimes called'provinces' provide justifiable laws even in response to good de- 'cantons,possibly 'cities,or confusingly 'states'-and liberative inputs.Thus,public deliberation faces a sim- a common government"(Follesdal 2014).Federative ilar concern as social exit.Third,we don't need to de- constitutions typically specify the relevant arrange- cide between voice and exit;a publicly justified polity ments and the authorities of both levels are usually di- should appeal to a mix of the two.While finding the rectly elected (Watts 1998,121).In contrast,confedera- optimal mix is difficult,there is no reason to think that tions tend to have a weaker center,as they might allow we should drop exit and use voice alone.We should be member units to legally exit,only exercise authority able to find cases where exit is an effective supplement. delegated by member units,or subject the institutional Deliberativists often argue that deliberation can center to vetoes. change pre-reflective preferences to produce more Here I will focus on reasons to have federations as consensus and more reasoned political decisions an alternative to highly centralized states.We can fur- (Bohman and Rehg 1998,ix-xvii).Thus,deliberation ther specify federalism as allowing small,local units helps to generate more publicly justified policies by to have consequentially unique policies and that peo- changing people's real views and bringing them in line ple and goods can use low cost transportation to move with which reasons truly apply to them.Moreover,po- between them.Taxation and spending are also linked litical decisions will become more sensitive to these at each governance level,a kind of fiscal federalism reasons uncovered by further deliberation.A delibera- ○ates1999). tivist might object,therefore,that exit is not a transfor- Several considerations favor federal arrangements: mative process because exiters keep their pre-reflective (1)better protections for unpopular ethnic,regional, preferences and find institutions that suit those pre- or political groups,(ii)accommodations for minority reflective preferences. groups whose political dissatisfaction would otherwise In one way,pre-reflective sorting is not a problem for lead to violent separation,and (iii)encouragement for exit mechanisms,since a major motivation for empha- citizens with similar policy preferences to cluster,pro- sizing deliberation is to ensure that a diverse public can viding more policy satisfaction(Follesdal 2014,3.2). 5795.801g reach a certain degree of consensus on political issues Finally,(iv).federations encourage rational reflec- to ensure that the resulting policies track the reason of tion in deciding which laws should apply to each per- the public.But if exit is available as well as voice,there son.Deliberative norms will encourage citizens to be is less need to resolve many disputes by consensus reflective about which policies to support within a sin- since people can form new sub-publics with high gle polity.However,citizens seldom have a causally degrees of consensus.such as federative units.This significant impact on policy outcomes,and so their in- weakens the need to transform preferences.And if centive to deliberate well is weakened.Citizens may be preference transformation is necessary,exit processes rationally ignorant (Downs 1957)of political knowl- often involve processes of reflection that can be trans- edge required for effective political decision-making formative as a person weighs various considerations and deliberation.Exit deliberation should function in deciding whether to exit one legal regime and enter rather differently.Each person decides whether to exit another. and her exit choice will have a considerable causal im pact on which laws affect her.She therefore has an incentive to deliberate more carefully about relocat- EXIT,DECENTRALIZATION,AND ing than voting.After all,most people deliberate more FEDERATIONS about which house to buy than which politician to sup- port.Exit can therefore increase the degree to which I will now illustrate my thesis by exploring federalism legal policy formation is based on good reasoning since as an attractive exit mechanism. the law will sometimes be responsive to the exit choices Federalism is a kind of political decentralization.We of citizens.Now,again,these two types of delibera- can understand decentralization as involving the ver- tion are different.Voice-deliberation occurs with oth- tical division of the powers of government between ers,whereas exit-deliberation usually occurs within a federal,state,and local levels.Decentralization is there- single mind or small group.Yet exit-deliberation can fore similar to Andreas Follesdal's(2014)understand- still conform the law to what is justified for each person, 1122

Kevin Vallier But consider three points. First, this paper advances the thesis that exit mechanisms can supplement voice. Vin￾dicating my thesis therefore only requires that exit can improve the justifiability of the laws to which citizens are subject, and this in turn only requires that citizens tend to act on the justificatory reasons they have. The assumption that citizens tend to act on the reasons they have is prima facie plausible, and is taken for granted by deliberative democrats. Second, we should not sin￾gle out exit mechanisms for failing to match citizens’ exit choices with their justificatory reasons when voice mechanisms raise the same concern. After all, citizens can voice irrational and vicious opinions, offering bad deliberative inputs. And political officials can fail to provide justifiable laws even in response to good de￾liberative inputs. Thus, public deliberation faces a sim￾ilar concern as social exit. Third, we don’t need to de￾cide between voice and exit; a publicly justified polity should appeal to a mix of the two. While finding the optimal mix is difficult, there is no reason to think that we should drop exit and use voice alone. We should be able to find cases where exit is an effective supplement. Deliberativists often argue that deliberation can change pre-reflective preferences to produce more consensus and more reasoned political decisions (Bohman and Rehg 1998, ix-xvii). Thus, deliberation helps to generate more publicly justified policies by changing people’s real views and bringing them in line with which reasons truly apply to them. Moreover, po￾litical decisions will become more sensitive to these reasons uncovered by further deliberation. A delibera￾tivist might object, therefore, that exit is not a transfor￾mative process because exiters keep their pre-reflective preferences and find institutions that suit those pre￾reflective preferences. In one way, pre-reflective sorting is not a problem for exit mechanisms, since a major motivation for empha￾sizing deliberation is to ensure that a diverse public can reach a certain degree of consensus on political issues to ensure that the resulting policies track the reason of the public. But if exit is available as well as voice, there is less need to resolve many disputes by consensus since people can form new sub-publics with high degrees of consensus, such as federative units. This weakens the need to transform preferences. And if preference transformation is necessary, exit processes often involve processes of reflection that can be trans￾formative as a person weighs various considerations in deciding whether to exit one legal regime and enter another. EXIT, DECENTRALIZATION, AND FEDERATIONS I will now illustrate my thesis by exploring federalism as an attractive exit mechanism. Federalism is a kind of political decentralization.We can understand decentralization as involving the ver￾tical division of the powers of government between federal, state, and local levels.Decentralization is there￾fore similar to Andreas Føllesdal’s (2014) understand￾ing of federalism, which affirms “divided powers be￾tween member units and common institutions.” In a federalist model, sovereignty “is non-centralized, of￾ten constitutionally, between at least two levels so that units at each level have final authority and can be self￾governing in some issue area.” As Ronald Watts (1998, 120) notes, decentralized political orders are “the genus of political organization that is marked by the combi￾nation of shared rule and self-rule,” that is, the national with the local. There are several types of political decentralization, such as unions, confederations, leagues, and hybrids; a federation involves a “territorial division of power be￾tween constituent units—sometimes called ‘provinces’, ‘cantons’, possibly ‘cities’, or confusingly ‘states’—and a common government” (Føllesdal 2014). Federative constitutions typically specify the relevant arrange￾ments and the authorities of both levels are usually di￾rectly elected (Watts 1998, 121). In contrast, confedera￾tions tend to have a weaker center, as they might allow member units to legally exit, only exercise authority delegated by member units, or subject the institutional center to vetoes. Here I will focus on reasons to have federations as an alternative to highly centralized states. We can fur￾ther specify federalism as allowing small, local units to have consequentially unique policies and that peo￾ple and goods can use low cost transportation to move between them. Taxation and spending are also linked at each governance level, a kind of fiscal federalism (Oates 1999). Several considerations favor federal arrangements: (i) better protections for unpopular ethnic, regional, or political groups, (ii) accommodations for minority groups whose political dissatisfaction would otherwise lead to violent separation, and (iii) encouragement for citizens with similar policy preferences to cluster, pro￾viding more policy satisfaction (Føllesdal 2014, 3.2). Finally, (iv), federations encourage rational reflec￾tion in deciding which laws should apply to each per￾son. Deliberative norms will encourage citizens to be reflective about which policies to support within a sin￾gle polity. However, citizens seldom have a causally significant impact on policy outcomes, and so their in￾centive to deliberate well is weakened. Citizens may be rationally ignorant (Downs 1957) of political knowl￾edge required for effective political decision-making and deliberation. Exit deliberation should function rather differently. Each person decides whether to exit and her exit choice will have a considerable causal im￾pact on which laws affect her. She therefore has an incentive to deliberate more carefully about relocat￾ing than voting. After all, most people deliberate more about which house to buy than which politician to sup￾port. Exit can therefore increase the degree to which legal policy formation is based on good reasoning since the law will sometimes be responsive to the exit choices of citizens. Now, again, these two types of delibera￾tion are different. Voice-deliberation occurs with oth￾ers, whereas exit-deliberation usually occurs within a single mind or small group. Yet exit-deliberation can still conform the law to what is justified for each person, 1122 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:56:49, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000539

Exit,Voice,and Public Reason perhaps more so than public deliberation.based on the (3)Hirschman (1969,43)argued,"The presence of differing incentives for rational reflection for voice and the exit alternative can therefore tend to atrophy the exit. development of the art of voice."So one danger of ap- Federal structures should therefore prove critical for pealing to exit is that exit will make voice less effective. matching the legal order to what is publicly justified.In Institutions will have fewer incentives to change if their many cases,there is simply too much diversity at the most articulate and committed citizens exit the polity. national level to solve political problems,or to hope Institutions will rot as their quality degrades.However that deliberation will yield agreement.Effective solu- we must balance the benefits of developed voice with tions to these pressing issues might be unjustifiable at the potential benefits of developed exit.The fact that the national level.but could be solved at lower levels of exit mechanisms may decrease the art and exercise government,where there is less diversity and disagree- of voice is a cost,but if exit mechanisms more than ment.This is because states and provinces often have compensate for this cost,then expanding exit is still more unified political cultures and so can be expected worthwhile.And exit might surprise us by encourag- to come to consensus,or something near enough,when ing majorities to listen to exiting minorities,as well as a national government cannot.Federations thereby inspiring emigres to participate in deliberation given become appropriate when a political decision is nec- their greater satisfaction with their new political unit. essary but where no solution can be justified at the (4)Competition between political units may create a national level.Second.as noted.federations can incen race to the bottom,with polities changing laws and poli- tivize good deliberation and reasoned decision-making cies in ways that make the laws and policies less justi- since people will sometimes make more rational exit- fied for their members,especially those who lack the re- decisions than voice-decisions sources to leave their political orders.These issues also arise in economic competition between nation-states (Dietsch 2015).A race to the bottom is a real risk.but OBJECTIONS TO FEDERATIVE it has to be weighed against the hope of a race to the 4号 DECENTRALIZATION top.Exit can trigger a reduction in justified policies,but I will now address six objections to using federations in it can also trigger an increase in justified policies. public reason. The race to the bottom might beat the race to the top & (1)In the United States,the language of states' because richer and more influential citizens are more rights has often served to legitimize the mistreatment able to exercise exit,and so polities will offer policies of black Americans,so American federalism might be that favor these citizens over poorer,less influential a bad idea.Of course,historical injustices against black citizens.But.first.rich and influential citizens don't al- Americans will not demonstrate the inadequacy of fed- ways or even usually vote purely in their self-interest. eralism in states without this legacy.But,even in Amer- Many favor egalitarian and progressive policies,and ica,worries about discrimination at more local levels their sense of justice will still operate in a world with only provide reason to avoid decentralization on racial more exit than we currently have.Second,the poor can policy and related issues,perhaps such as higher educa- still exit,even if exit is sometimes expensive,and states tion,health care,pensions,real estate,civil rights,and can adopt policies that reduce exit costs for the poor, so on.Unconnected issues can still have a federalist say by providing moving incentives to poor citizens of solution. other polities,like health-insurance portability or re- (2)Federations raise a minority-within-a-minority location vouchers.So polities may often feel competi- problem.3 Were the US federal government to hand tion to become more social democratic rather than less. 平 decisions down to Texas.liberal cities like Austin would Third,the overwhelming majority of global migrants find policy less to their liking,and Illinois outside of are from the poorest and most vulnerable groups,and Chicago might find public policy skews further left so have a strong incentive to use exit rights,whereas than they find acceptable.Federation-style decentral- wealthier people face a weaker incentive to take the ization can therefore undermine public justification if costly step of exiting their political institutions.Fourth, it produces regimes that establish public justification even our exit-limited democracy must grapple with po- for a smaller proportion of persons than the proportion litically powerful citizens misusing their influence,so found in the larger governing body.We can sometimes the difference between exit-friendly democracy and address the minority-within-a-minority problem with exit-limited democracy is only a matter of degree. further decentralization.Work on polycentric legal (5)Citizens might only exit (i)if local units have arrangements (Jacobs 1992:Ostrom 1990)shows that distinct policies,(ii)some policies better match what decentralized social institutions can often produce effi- is publicly justified for them,and(ii)citizens can de- cient solutions to social problems.4 Local groups some- termine whether (i)and (ii)hold.Conditions (i)-(iii) times provide creative,novel solutions to these prob- are hard to meet,perhaps limiting the attraction of exit. ems as well. But federalist policy markets should yield preemptive policy changes so long as the marginal emigre is pre- pared to exit.Local units may respond by advertising 3 Thomas Christiano(2010,288-99)addresses a similar minority- and offering new policies and helping citizens relocate, within-a-minority problem much as firms respond to the marginal buyer.Also,sim- 4 Brian Kogelmann (2017)links public reason to polycentric ar- ilar difficulties hamper deliberation,but this is a reason rangements. to encourage voice,not limit it.The same goes for exit. 1123

Exit, Voice, and Public Reason perhaps more so than public deliberation, based on the differing incentives for rational reflection for voice and exit. Federal structures should therefore prove critical for matching the legal order to what is publicly justified. In many cases, there is simply too much diversity at the national level to solve political problems, or to hope that deliberation will yield agreement. Effective solu￾tions to these pressing issues might be unjustifiable at the national level, but could be solved at lower levels of government, where there is less diversity and disagree￾ment. This is because states and provinces often have more unified political cultures and so can be expected to come to consensus, or something near enough, when a national government cannot. Federations thereby become appropriate when a political decision is nec￾essary but where no solution can be justified at the national level. Second, as noted, federations can incen￾tivize good deliberation and reasoned decision-making since people will sometimes make more rational exit￾decisions than voice-decisions. OBJECTIONS TO FEDERATIVE DECENTRALIZATION I will now address six objections to using federations in public reason. (1) In the United States, the language of states’ rights has often served to legitimize the mistreatment of black Americans, so American federalism might be a bad idea. Of course, historical injustices against black Americans will not demonstrate the inadequacy of fed￾eralism in states without this legacy. But, even in Amer￾ica, worries about discrimination at more local levels only provide reason to avoid decentralization on racial policy and related issues, perhaps such as higher educa￾tion, health care, pensions, real estate, civil rights, and so on. Unconnected issues can still have a federalist solution. (2) Federations raise a minority-within-a-minority problem.3 Were the US federal government to hand decisions down to Texas,liberal cities like Austin would find policy less to their liking, and Illinois outside of Chicago might find public policy skews further left than they find acceptable. Federation-style decentral￾ization can therefore undermine public justification if it produces regimes that establish public justification for a smaller proportion of persons than the proportion found in the larger governing body. We can sometimes address the minority-within-a-minority problem with further decentralization. Work on polycentric legal arrangements (Jacobs 1992; Ostrom 1990) shows that decentralized social institutions can often produce effi￾cient solutions to social problems.4 Local groups some￾times provide creative, novel solutions to these prob￾lems as well. 3 Thomas Christiano (2010, 288-99) addresses a similar minority￾within-a-minority problem. 4 Brian Kogelmann (2017) links public reason to polycentric ar￾rangements. (3) Hirschman (1969, 43) argued, “The presence of the exit alternative can therefore tend to atrophy the development of the art of voice.” So one danger of ap￾pealing to exit is that exit will make voice less effective. Institutions will have fewer incentives to change if their most articulate and committed citizens exit the polity. Institutions will rot as their quality degrades. However, we must balance the benefits of developed voice with the potential benefits of developed exit. The fact that exit mechanisms may decrease the art and exercise of voice is a cost, but if exit mechanisms more than compensate for this cost, then expanding exit is still worthwhile. And exit might surprise us by encourag￾ing majorities to listen to exiting minorities, as well as inspiring émigrés to participate in deliberation given their greater satisfaction with their new political unit. (4) Competition between political units may create a race to the bottom,with polities changing laws and poli￾cies in ways that make the laws and policies less justi￾fied for their members, especially those who lack the re￾sources to leave their political orders. These issues also arise in economic competition between nation-states (Dietsch 2015). A race to the bottom is a real risk, but it has to be weighed against the hope of a race to the top. Exit can trigger a reduction in justified policies, but it can also trigger an increase in justified policies. The race to the bottom might beat the race to the top because richer and more influential citizens are more able to exercise exit, and so polities will offer policies that favor these citizens over poorer, less influential citizens. But, first, rich and influential citizens don’t al￾ways or even usually vote purely in their self-interest. Many favor egalitarian and progressive policies, and their sense of justice will still operate in a world with more exit than we currently have. Second, the poor can still exit, even if exit is sometimes expensive, and states can adopt policies that reduce exit costs for the poor, say by providing moving incentives to poor citizens of other polities, like health-insurance portability or re￾location vouchers. So polities may often feel competi￾tion to become more social democratic rather than less. Third, the overwhelming majority of global migrants are from the poorest and most vulnerable groups, and so have a strong incentive to use exit rights, whereas wealthier people face a weaker incentive to take the costly step of exiting their political institutions. Fourth, even our exit-limited democracy must grapple with po￾litically powerful citizens misusing their influence, so the difference between exit-friendly democracy and exit-limited democracy is only a matter of degree. (5) Citizens might only exit (i) if local units have distinct policies, (ii) some policies better match what is publicly justified for them, and (iii) citizens can de￾termine whether (i) and (ii) hold. Conditions (i)–(iii) are hard to meet, perhaps limiting the attraction of exit. But federalist policy markets should yield preemptive policy changes so long as the marginal émigré is pre￾pared to exit. Local units may respond by advertising and offering new policies and helping citizens relocate, much as firms respond to the marginal buyer.Also, sim￾ilar difficulties hamper deliberation, but this is a reason to encourage voice, not limit it. The same goes for exit. 1123 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:56:49, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000539

Kevin Vallier (6)Exit mechanisms may vary in their capacity to Cohen,Joshua.1989."Deliberation and Democratic Legiti- satisfy different conceptions of justificatory reasons. macy."In The Good Polity:Normative Analysis of the State, One could argue,for instance,that exit will encourage a eds. Alan Hamlin and Philip Pettit.Oxford:Blackwell,17- person to find laws that conform to her private,conver- 34. Dietsch,Peter.2015.Catching Capital:The Ethics of Tax Competition. gent reasons,but not to the reasons she shares with oth- New York:Oxford University Press. ers.Citizens are,after all,more likely to make personal Downs,Anthony.1957.An Economic Theory of Democracy.New decisions about where to live based on private factors. York:Harper. including comprehensive reasons,whereas in demo- Follesdal,Andreas.2014.Federalism.Stanford Encyclopedia of Phi- losophy.Accessed on August 1.2018.http://plato.stanford.edu cratic deliberation they may be more likely to express entries/federalism. themselves in terms of shared reasons.So exit could be Gaus,Gerald.2011.The Order of Public Reason.New York:Cam- friendly to convergence approaches to public justifica- bridge University Press. tion,but hostile to the dominant consensus approaches. Gutmann,Amy.and Dennis Thompson.1996.Democracy and Dis- Even so,the consensus model might also be bolstered agreement.Cambridge,MA:Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. by exit.If people self-sort into polities where others Hirschman,Albert.1969.Exit,Voice,and Loyalty.Cambridge,MA share their values,the polity will have more shared rea- Harvard University Press. sons,and so using shared reasons in politics will be eas- Jacobs,Jane.1992.The Death and Life of Great American Cities.New York:Random House. ier and less burdensome.That means consensus politics Kogelmann,Brian.2017."Justice,Diversity,and the Well-Ordered may actually be improved,since each federal unit will Society."Philosophical Ouarterly 67,663-84. track the consensus standard more closely for their cit- Oates,Wallace.1999.An Essay on Fiscal Federalism.Journal of Eco- izens,even if there is more variation between federal nomic Literature 37,1120-49. units.For this reason,I do not think the case for exit Ostrom,Elinor.1990.Governing the Commons:The Evolution of In- stitutions for Collective Action.Cambridge:Cambridge University mechanisms depends on adopting a particular concep- Press. tion of justificatory reasons. Quong.Jonathan.2011.Liberalism without Perfection.New York Oxford University Press. Rawls,John.2005.Political Liberalism.2nd ed.New York:Columbia CONCLUSION University Press. Schwartzman,M.2011."The Sincerity of Public Reason."Journal of Exit mechanisms like federalism can supplement voice Political Philosophy 19,375-98. in creating a publicly justified legal order and so de- Somin,Ilya.2016.Democracy and Political Ignorance:Why Smaller serve the enthusiasm that public reason liberals place Government Is Smarter(2nd edition).Palo Alto:Stanford Univer- sity Press. in public deliberation.We should eagerly explore mul- Taylor,Robert.2017.Exit Left:Markets and Mobility in Republican tiple methods of establishing a publicly justified polity. Thought.New York:Oxford University Press. Tiebout.,Charles.1956."A Pure Theory of Legal Expenditures."Jour- nal of Political Economy 64,416-24. REFERENCES Vallier,Kevin.2014.Liberal Politics and Public Faith:Beyond Sepa- ration.New York.Routledge. Vallier,Kevin.2018.Public Justification.Stanford Encyclopedia of Bohman,James,and William Rehg,eds.1998.Deliberative Democ- Philosophy.Accessed on August 1,2018.http://plato.stanford.edu/ racy:Essays on Reason and Politics.New York:MIT Press. entries/justification-public/. Christiano,Thomas.2010.The Constitution of Equality:Democratic Watts,Ronald.1998."Federalism,Federal Political Systems,and Fed- Authority and Its Limits.New York:Oxford University Press. erations."Annual Review of Political Science 1,117-37 1124

Kevin Vallier (6) Exit mechanisms may vary in their capacity to satisfy different conceptions of justificatory reasons. One could argue, for instance, that exit will encourage a person to find laws that conform to her private, conver￾gent reasons, but not to the reasons she shares with oth￾ers. Citizens are, after all, more likely to make personal decisions about where to live based on private factors, including comprehensive reasons, whereas in demo￾cratic deliberation they may be more likely to express themselves in terms of shared reasons. So exit could be friendly to convergence approaches to public justifica￾tion, but hostile to the dominant consensus approaches. Even so, the consensus model might also be bolstered by exit. If people self-sort into polities where others share their values, the polity will have more shared rea￾sons, and so using shared reasons in politics will be eas￾ier and less burdensome.That means consensus politics may actually be improved, since each federal unit will track the consensus standard more closely for their cit￾izens, even if there is more variation between federal units. For this reason, I do not think the case for exit mechanisms depends on adopting a particular concep￾tion of justificatory reasons. CONCLUSION Exit mechanisms like federalism can supplement voice in creating a publicly justified legal order and so de￾serve the enthusiasm that public reason liberals place in public deliberation. We should eagerly explore mul￾tiple methods of establishing a publicly justified polity. REFERENCES Bohman, James, and William Rehg, eds. 1998. Deliberative Democ￾racy: Essays on Reason and Politics. New York: MIT Press. Christiano, Thomas. 2010. The Constitution of Equality: Democratic Authority and Its Limits. New York: Oxford University Press. Cohen, Joshua. 1989. “Deliberation and Democratic Legiti￾macy.” In The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State, eds. Alan Hamlin and Philip Pettit. Oxford: Blackwell, 17– 34. Dietsch,Peter. 2015.Catching Capital:The Ethics of Tax Competition. New York: Oxford University Press. Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper. Føllesdal, Andreas. 2014. Federalism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Phi￾losophy. Accessed on August 1, 2018. http://plato.stanford.edu/ entries/federalism. Gaus, Gerald. 2011. The Order of Public Reason. New York: Cam￾bridge University Press. Gutmann, Amy, and Dennis Thompson. 1996. Democracy and Dis￾agreement. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Hirschman, Albert. 1969. Exit, Voice, and Loyalty. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Jacobs, Jane. 1992.The Death and Life of Great American Cities. New York: Random House. Kogelmann, Brian. 2017. “Justice, Diversity, and the Well-Ordered Society.” Philosophical Quarterly 67, 663–84. Oates,Wallace. 1999. An Essay on Fiscal Federalism. Journal of Eco￾nomic Literature 37, 1120–49. Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of In￾stitutions for Collective Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Quong, Jonathan. 2011. Liberalism without Perfection. New York: Oxford University Press. Rawls, John. 2005. Political Liberalism. 2nd ed. New York: Columbia University Press. Schwartzman, M. 2011. “The Sincerity of Public Reason.” Journal of Political Philosophy 19, 375–98. Somin, Ilya. 2016. Democracy and Political Ignorance: Why Smaller Government Is Smarter (2nd edition). Palo Alto: Stanford Univer￾sity Press. Taylor, Robert. 2017. Exit Left: Markets and Mobility in Republican Thought. New York: Oxford University Press. Tiebout, Charles. 1956. “A Pure Theory of Legal Expenditures.”Jour￾nal of Political Economy 64, 416–24. Vallier, Kevin. 2014. Liberal Politics and Public Faith: Beyond Sepa￾ration. New York. Routledge. Vallier, Kevin. 2018. Public Justification. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Accessed on August 1, 2018. http://plato.stanford.edu/ entries/justification-public/. Watts, Ronald. 1998. “Federalism, Federal Political Systems, and Fed￾erations.” Annual Review of Political Science 1, 117–37. 1124 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:56:49, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000539