《社会保障概论》课程教学资源（课后阅读资料）APSR_Volume112. Issue 4.Nov 2018_The_Power_of_the_Multitude_Answering_Epistemic_Challenges_to_Democracy

American Political Science Review (2018)112,4.891-904 doi:10.1017/S0003055418000527 American Political Science Association 2018 The Power of the Multitude:Answering Epistemic Challenges to Democracy SAMUEL BAGG McGill University ecent years have witnessed growing controversy over the "wisdom of the multitude."As epistemic critics drawing on vast empirical evidence have cast doubt on the political competence ofordinary citizens,epistemic democrats have offered a defense of democracy grounded largely in analogies and formal results.So far,I argue,the critics have been more convincing.Nevertheless,democracy can be defended on instrumental grounds,and this article demonstrates an alternative approach.Instead of implausibly upholding the epistemic reliability of average voters,I observe that competitive elections, universal suffrage,and discretionary state power disable certain potent mechanisms ofelite entrenchment. By reserving particular forms ofpower for the multitude ofordinary citizens,they make democratic states more resistant to dangerous forms of capture than non-democratic alternatives.My approach thus offers a robust defense of electoral democracy,yet cautions against expecting too much from it-motivating a thicker conception of democracy,writ large. POWER,NOT WISDOM:THE REALIST CASE dynamics of political power,critics routinely overstate FOR DEMOCRACY the attractiveness of non-democratic alternatives like meritocracy.Meanwhile,defenders of democracy often emocracy faces increasingly pressing chal- understate the challenges of voter ignorance,which lenges on“epistemic'”grounds(Bell2015; prevents them from articulating a robust,realistic ac- Brennan 2016;Caplan 2007;Somin 2013). count of democracy's instrumental value.Developing Though few dispute its superior track record in the a more compelling response to epistemic challenges twentieth century,even committed democrats worry requires that we turn our gaze from questions of & about the political ignorance,short-sightedness,and wisdom to questions of power.This article outlines irrationality of ordinary citizens (Achen and Bartels such an approach. 2016:Green 2009).Given these worries,indeed,many On the one hand,evidence of serious epistemic political philosophers assume that a purely "instru- deficits ought to chasten our expectations for electoral mental"defense of democracy is unstable,concluding that the value of political equality must be conceived in democracy-defined minimally as any system charac- terized by competitive elections,universal suffrage,and “non-instrumental'”or“intrinsic”terms(Griffin2O03: substantial discretionary state power.Nevertheless. 是 Kolodny 2014;Viehoff 2014).Such arguments are each of these three components is indispensable. hardly decisive,however (Arneson 2004;Wall 2007), As I demonstrate in what follows,non-democratic and in the face of rising enthusiasm for non-democratic institutional alternatives would grant incumbents and alternatives(Foa and Mounk 2016).others have wisely other elites too much latitude to entrench their own insisted on justifying democracy in instrumental terms power, presenting unacceptable dangers of "state In particular,recent years have witnessed growing in- capture"without generating significant or systematic terest in epistemic accounts of democracy (Estlund compensatory benefits.Though electoral democracy is 2008:Landemore 2012).which directly answer epis- hardly free of such pathologies,each of its three central temic challenges by defending the"wisdom of the mul- components does enhance resistance to particularly titude"(Waldron 1995). dangerous forms of entrenchment and capture-even This epistemic approach to evaluating rival regimes has a venerable history,dating all the way back to if ordinary people are as politically incompetent as critics claim.My approach thus provides a more Plato and Aristotle.Unfortunately,it is also deeply robust defense of basic democratic institutions than is misleading.In focusing on who has the appropriate available on other instrumental approaches,without skills and knowledge to govern rather than the complex implying any kind of complacency about them.It yields an appropriately enthusiastic appraisal of electoral Samuel Bagg is a Postdoctoral Fellow with the Research Group on democracy-as a justly celebrated achievement that is Constitutional Studies and the Department of Political Science at nonetheless profoundly insufficient-while encourag- McGill University,855 Sherbrooke St.West,Montreal,QC,Canada, H3A 2T7 (samuel.bagg@gmail.com). ing a thicker conception of democracy,writ large. For valuable feedback and discussion on the themes of this article, My account is not entirely unprecedented-indeed, I am very grateful to Arash Abizadeh,Aaron Ancell,Pablo Bera- it builds on recent efforts to establish realistic founda- mendi,Kevin Elliot,Michael Gillespie,Kelly Gordon,Ruth Grant tions for democratic theory (Green 2009,2016;Knight Jeffrey Green,Ewan Kingston,Jack Knight,Elizabeth Landesberg. and Johnson 2011;Medearis 2015;Przeworski 2010; Catherine Lu,Victor Muniz-Fraticelli,Wayne Norman,Will Roberts, Amit Ron,Christa Scholtz,Melissa Schwartzberg,Lucas Swaine, Rahman 2016;Shapiro 2003,2016)and responds more Daniel Weinstock,and Yves Winter,as well as Leigh Jenco and sev- generally to growing interest in "realist"alternatives eral anonymous reviewers at the APSR. to overly moralized or idealized ways of doing political Received:November 1.2017:revised:March 25.2018:accepted:July philosophy (Bagg 2016,2017;Galston 2010;Mantena 20,2018.First published online:September 6,2018. 2012;Williams 2005).Yet it is unique in engaging 891

American Political Science Review (2018) 112, 4, 891–904 doi:10.1017/S0003055418000527 © American Political Science Association 2018 The Power of the Multitude: Answering Epistemic Challenges to Democracy SAMUEL BAGG McGill University Recent years have witnessed growing controversy over the “wisdom of the multitude.” As epistemic critics drawing on vast empirical evidence have cast doubt on the political competence of ordinary citizens, epistemic democrats have offered a defense of democracy grounded largely in analogies and formal results. So far, I argue, the critics have been more convincing. Nevertheless, democracy can be defended on instrumental grounds, and this article demonstrates an alternative approach. Instead of implausibly upholding the epistemic reliability of average voters, I observe that competitive elections, universal suffrage, and discretionary state power disable certain potent mechanisms of elite entrenchment. By reserving particular forms of power for the multitude of ordinary citizens,they make democratic states more resistant to dangerous forms of capture than non-democratic alternatives. My approach thus offers a robust defense of electoral democracy, yet cautions against expecting too much from it—motivating a thicker conception of democracy, writ large. POWER, NOT WISDOM: THE REALIST CASE FOR DEMOCRACY Democracy faces increasingly pressing chal￾lenges on “epistemic” grounds (Bell 2015; Brennan 2016; Caplan 2007; Somin 2013). Though few dispute its superior track record in the twentieth century, even committed democrats worry about the political ignorance, short-sightedness, and irrationality of ordinary citizens (Achen and Bartels 2016; Green 2009). Given these worries, indeed, many political philosophers assume that a purely “instru￾mental” defense of democracy is unstable, concluding that the value of political equality must be conceived in “non-instrumental” or “intrinsic” terms (Griffin 2003; Kolodny 2014; Viehoff 2014). Such arguments are hardly decisive, however (Arneson 2004; Wall 2007), and in the face of rising enthusiasm for non-democratic alternatives (Foa and Mounk 2016), others have wisely insisted on justifying democracy in instrumental terms. In particular, recent years have witnessed growing in￾terest in epistemic accounts of democracy (Estlund 2008; Landemore 2012), which directly answer epis￾temic challenges by defending the “wisdom of the mul￾titude” (Waldron 1995). This epistemic approach to evaluating rival regimes has a venerable history, dating all the way back to Plato and Aristotle. Unfortunately, it is also deeply misleading. In focusing on who has the appropriate skills and knowledge to govern rather than the complex Samuel Bagg is a Postdoctoral Fellow with the Research Group on Constitutional Studies and the Department of Political Science at McGill University, 855 Sherbrooke St. West, Montréal, QC, Canada, H3A 2T7 (samuel.bagg@gmail.com). For valuable feedback and discussion on the themes of this article, I am very grateful to Arash Abizadeh, Aaron Ancell, Pablo Bera￾mendi, Kevin Elliot, Michael Gillespie, Kelly Gordon, Ruth Grant, Jeffrey Green, Ewan Kingston, Jack Knight, Elizabeth Landesberg, Catherine Lu, Victor Muñiz-Fraticelli,Wayne Norman,Will Roberts, Amit Ron, Christa Scholtz, Melissa Schwartzberg, Lucas Swaine, Daniel Weinstock, and Yves Winter, as well as Leigh Jenco and sev￾eral anonymous reviewers at the APSR. Received: November 1, 2017; revised: March 25, 2018; accepted: July 20, 2018. First published online: September 6, 2018. dynamics of political power, critics routinely overstate the attractiveness of non-democratic alternatives like meritocracy.Meanwhile, defenders of democracy often understate the challenges of voter ignorance, which prevents them from articulating a robust, realistic ac￾count of democracy’s instrumental value. Developing a more compelling response to epistemic challenges requires that we turn our gaze from questions of wisdom to questions of power. This article outlines such an approach. On the one hand, evidence of serious epistemic deficits ought to chasten our expectations for electoral democracy—defined minimally as any system charac￾terized by competitive elections, universal suffrage, and substantial discretionary state power. Nevertheless, each of these three components is indispensable. As I demonstrate in what follows, non-democratic institutional alternatives would grant incumbents and other elites too much latitude to entrench their own power, presenting unacceptable dangers of “state capture” without generating significant or systematic compensatory benefits. Though electoral democracy is hardly free of such pathologies, each of its three central components does enhance resistance to particularly dangerous forms of entrenchment and capture—even if ordinary people are as politically incompetent as critics claim. My approach thus provides a more robust defense of basic democratic institutions than is available on other instrumental approaches, without implying any kind of complacency about them. It yields an appropriately enthusiastic appraisal of electoral democracy—as a justly celebrated achievement that is nonetheless profoundly insufficient—while encourag￾ing a thicker conception of democracy, writ large. My account is not entirely unprecedented—indeed, it builds on recent efforts to establish realistic founda￾tions for democratic theory (Green 2009, 2016; Knight and Johnson 2011; Medearis 2015; Przeworski 2010; Rahman 2016; Shapiro 2003, 2016) and responds more generally to growing interest in “realist” alternatives to overly moralized or idealized ways of doing political philosophy (Bagg 2016, 2017; Galston 2010; Mantena 2012; Williams 2005). Yet it is unique in engaging 891 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000527

Samuel Bagg directly with both epistemic critiques and non- ability of electoral democracies to overcome systemic democratic alternatives.Moreover,it integrates a pathologies such as bourgeois ideology, patriarchy number of disparate insights within a comprehensive white supremacy,and settler colonialism (Coulthard theoretical framework,oriented around a novel ideal 2014:Davis 2012:Gramsci 1971:Malcolm X 1964). of resisting state capture. Democrats typically rely on one of two strategies In short,I claim,the value of competitive elections, for defending competitive elections with universal suf- universal suffrage,and discretionary state power is not frage.First,many emphasize their intrinsic value,main- to bestow ultimate authority upon the demos as the taining that everyone deserves a say over decisions that wisest possible sovereign.Instead,the value of each bind them.Others prefer to stress the instrumental ben- of these crucial democratic institutions is best under- efits of democratic institutions.observing that modern op//s stood in terms of the power it denies to various elites democratic governments have most reliably promoted and which is thereby retained by various groups of peace and prosperity (Sen 1999).Both of these com- ordinary citizens.The most promising paradigm for mon accounts,however,fail to adequately address re- answering epistemic challenges to democracy,I con- cent epistemic critiques. clude,will emphasize the power,not the wisdom,of the As Brennan and Bell readily admit,for one,high- multitude. lighting the extent of voter ignorance will rarely sway those who take the intrinsic value of democracy as a foundational normative premise.Yet this premise is THE EPISTEMIC FRAME:EVALUATING THE neither self-evident nor universally shared.If ceding a WISDOM OF THE MULTITUDE largely symbolic form of political equality like univer- sal suffrage would really yield dramatic improvements Epistemic Critiques of Democracy in social,economic,and environmental outcomes,this tradeoff would understandably appeal to many ob- With fascism and communism as its most salient op- servers around the world.This hardly constitutes a 4号元 ponents,electoral democracy came to enjoy near- thorough rebuttal of arguments for democracy's intrin- universal support in the twentieth century-at least sic value,of course,but given that these arguments are among Western cultural elites.Even as scholars accu both reasonably contestable in theory and widely dis- mulated staggering evidence of the political ignorance puted in practice,democrats would be unwise to ignore of ordinary voters (Campbell et al.1960;Zaller 1992). the domain of instrumental value altogether.2 In what most nonetheless embraced Winston Churchill's view follows,therefore,I set aside intrinsic concerns of democracy as the"worst form of government,except Similarly,epistemic critics happily acknowledge for all the others that have been tried." electoral democracy's relative instrumental success- Recently.however,some have begun to venture especially in the twentieth century (Bell 2015,7;Bren- more full-throated criticisms.Jason Brennan argues,for nan 2016,8,195).Yet it hardly constitutes a guarantee instance,that if people have a right to competent gov- of peace,prosperity,and liberal rights(Levitsky and ernment,we should not leave decisions in the hands of Way 2010);much less a thorough "democratization" the "ignorant,irrational,misinformed nationalists"of of social and economic life (Crouch 2004;Tilly 2007). typical electorates(2016,23).He then outlines a num- Meanwhile,democracies have also done awful things- 15.501 ber of potential alternatives to one-person-one-vote, especially to noncitizens(Bell 2015,46-47).Isn't it pos- including restricted suffrage and plural or weighted sible,critics ask,that some alternative might perform voting.Given democracy's serious and demonstrable even better? flaws,he argues,we have a responsibility to give such Ultimately,I argue,the answer is no:no epistocratic alternatives a try.Daniel A.Bell(2015)raises similar political institutions offer reliable substantive advan- concerns from a rather different perspective,defend- tages over electoral democracy,all things considered. ing a quasi-Confucian political meritocracy modeled Especially given pervasive findings of voter ignorance, on contemporary Singapore and China,which elimi- however,epistemic critics are right to be dissatisfied nates competitive elections altogether.Such proposals with the reasoning offered by prevailing accounts. to allocate political power on the basis of knowledge Despite an almost axiomatic faith in democracy or merit,rather than giving it freely to everyone,are democratic theorists still lack a compelling instru- sometimes called epistocracies(Estlund 2008). mental explanation of why competitive elections and Epistemic skepticism of popular rule has an un- universal suffrage should not be abandoned in favor of flattering history,and it is often dismissed as obso- alternative institutions that would maintain attractive lete.Yet electoral democracy faces troubling practi- features of liberal government while filtering out cal challenges in the twenty-first century (Dresden the ignorance,irrationality,and bigotry of ordinary and Howard 2016),and serious normative worries have come from diverse intellectual quarters.Liber- tarians lament widespread ignorance about economic Indeed,the percentage of people globally who believe democracy L policy (Caplan 2007),for instance,and egalitarians is "essential"has declined dramatically in recent years (Foa and suspect popular commitment to fundamental rights Mounk 2016). (Dworkin 1996).Environmentalists bemoan the im- 2 For more comprehensive arguments against intrinsic accounts of pact of short-sighted democratic choices on natural democracy-whose intuitive plausibility often relies on implicit in. strumental assumptions-see Arneson(1993.2004).Wall(2007).and systems (Humphrey 2007),while radicals doubt the Brennan(2016). 892

Samuel Bagg directly with both epistemic critiques and non￾democratic alternatives. Moreover, it integrates a number of disparate insights within a comprehensive theoretical framework, oriented around a novel ideal of resisting state capture. In short, I claim, the value of competitive elections, universal suffrage, and discretionary state power is not to bestow ultimate authority upon the demos as the wisest possible sovereign. Instead, the value of each of these crucial democratic institutions is best under￾stood in terms of the power it denies to various elites, and which is thereby retained by various groups of ordinary citizens. The most promising paradigm for answering epistemic challenges to democracy, I con￾clude, will emphasize the power, not the wisdom, of the multitude. THE EPISTEMIC FRAME: EVALUATING THE WISDOM OF THE MULTITUDE Epistemic Critiques of Democracy With fascism and communism as its most salient op￾ponents, electoral democracy came to enjoy near￾universal support in the twentieth century—at least among Western cultural elites. Even as scholars accu￾mulated staggering evidence of the political ignorance of ordinary voters (Campbell et al. 1960; Zaller 1992), most nonetheless embraced Winston Churchill’s view of democracy as the “worst form of government, except for all the others that have been tried.” Recently, however, some have begun to venture more full-throated criticisms. Jason Brennan argues, for instance, that if people have a right to competent gov￾ernment, we should not leave decisions in the hands of the “ignorant, irrational, misinformed nationalists” of typical electorates (2016, 23). He then outlines a num￾ber of potential alternatives to one-person-one-vote, including restricted suffrage and plural or weighted voting. Given democracy’s serious and demonstrable flaws, he argues, we have a responsibility to give such alternatives a try. Daniel A. Bell (2015) raises similar concerns from a rather different perspective, defend￾ing a quasi-Confucian political meritocracy modeled on contemporary Singapore and China, which elimi￾nates competitive elections altogether. Such proposals to allocate political power on the basis of knowledge or merit, rather than giving it freely to everyone, are sometimes called epistocracies (Estlund 2008). Epistemic skepticism of popular rule has an un￾flattering history, and it is often dismissed as obso￾lete. Yet electoral democracy faces troubling practi￾cal challenges in the twenty-first century (Dresden and Howard 2016), and serious normative worries have come from diverse intellectual quarters. Liber￾tarians lament widespread ignorance about economic policy (Caplan 2007), for instance, and egalitarians suspect popular commitment to fundamental rights (Dworkin 1996). Environmentalists bemoan the im￾pact of short-sighted democratic choices on natural systems (Humphrey 2007), while radicals doubt the ability of electoral democracies to overcome systemic pathologies such as bourgeois ideology, patriarchy, white supremacy, and settler colonialism (Coulthard 2014; Davis 2012; Gramsci 1971; Malcolm X 1964). Democrats typically rely on one of two strategies for defending competitive elections with universal suf￾frage. First, many emphasize their intrinsic value, main￾taining that everyone deserves a say over decisions that bind them.Others prefer to stress the instrumental ben￾efits of democratic institutions, observing that modern democratic governments have most reliably promoted peace and prosperity (Sen 1999). Both of these com￾mon accounts, however, fail to adequately address re￾cent epistemic critiques. As Brennan and Bell readily admit, for one, high￾lighting the extent of voter ignorance will rarely sway those who take the intrinsic value of democracy as a foundational normative premise. Yet this premise is neither self-evident nor universally shared.1 If ceding a largely symbolic form of political equality like univer￾sal suffrage would really yield dramatic improvements in social, economic, and environmental outcomes, this tradeoff would understandably appeal to many ob￾servers around the world. This hardly constitutes a thorough rebuttal of arguments for democracy’s intrin￾sic value, of course, but given that these arguments are both reasonably contestable in theory and widely dis￾puted in practice, democrats would be unwise to ignore the domain of instrumental value altogether.2 In what follows, therefore, I set aside intrinsic concerns. Similarly, epistemic critics happily acknowledge electoral democracy’s relative instrumental success— especially in the twentieth century (Bell 2015, 7; Bren￾nan 2016, 8, 195). Yet it hardly constitutes a guarantee of peace, prosperity, and liberal rights (Levitsky and Way 2010); much less a thorough “democratization” of social and economic life (Crouch 2004; Tilly 2007). Meanwhile, democracies have also done awful things— especially to noncitizens (Bell 2015, 46–47). Isn’t it pos￾sible, critics ask, that some alternative might perform even better? Ultimately, I argue, the answer is no: no epistocratic political institutions offer reliable substantive advan￾tages over electoral democracy, all things considered. Especially given pervasive findings of voter ignorance, however, epistemic critics are right to be dissatisfied with the reasoning offered by prevailing accounts. Despite an almost axiomatic faith in democracy, democratic theorists still lack a compelling instru￾mental explanation of why competitive elections and universal suffrage should not be abandoned in favor of alternative institutions that would maintain attractive features of liberal government while filtering out the ignorance, irrationality, and bigotry of ordinary 1 Indeed, the percentage of people globally who believe democracy is “essential” has declined dramatically in recent years (Foa and Mounk 2016). 2 For more comprehensive arguments against intrinsic accounts of democracy—whose intuitive plausibility often relies on implicit in￾strumental assumptions—see Arneson (1993, 2004),Wall (2007), and Brennan (2016). 892 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000527

The Power of the Multitude citizens.3 As a result,existing instrumental accounts instrumentalist approaches,then,epistemic accounts remain perpetually vulnerable to challenges from stake out a far more robust commitment to demo- novel forms of non-democracy,like those proposed cratic procedures.The connection between democ- by Brennan and Bell,which are said to transcend the racy and superior outcomes is not just a historical limitations of earlier forms. accident,but a deep and abiding principle of social Such challenges can be understood as versions of organization the perennial "benevolent dictator"objection-that Content neutrality is key here.Most instrumental- is,that if rule by an intelligent and well-intentioned ist accounts emphasize the connection between demo- monarch or aristocratic elite could achieve better re cratic procedures and specific substantive outcomes- sults than rule by the people,instrumentalists should that is,maintaining liberal rights or avoiding famine prefer it to democracy.Many democrats are troubled and war-which inevitably invites "benevolent dicta- by this objection,which has often spurred the develop- tor” objections.On epistemic accounts,by contrast, ment of intrinsic accounts of democracy's value (Beitz democracy is more like the scientific method:we can 1989,98:Christiano1996,16-7,56;Kolodny2014,202) trust it to reach political truths,in the long run,with- If instrumentalism yields only a contingent,defeasible out knowing those truths in advance (Gaus 2011).As commitment to democratic institutions,they conclude Sean Ingham summarizes,epistemic democrats aim to democrats had better rely on the intrinsic value of po show that"democratic institutions have a tendency to litical equality and self-government.Meanwhile,many produce reasonable outcomes [...without presuppos- instrumentalists embrace the hypothetical prospect of ing any narrow,controversial view of what the out- attractive alternatives to democracy.Until recently, comes of democratic procedures should be,much as a however,few have taken this prospect seriously. good justification of a particular scientific research de- We no longer have this luxury.Given the urgent sign does not presuppose the hypothesis that the re- practical and philosophical challenges facing electoral search aims to test"(Ingham 2013,136).Rather than democracy,we cannot be content that it is less awful establishing their empirical propensity to produce par- 4号元 than the other systems we have tried.We must also ticular results,therefore,epistemic democrats empha- explain to challengers like Brennan and Bell-and, size structural features of democratic procedures;turn- more importantly,to reformers and revolutionaries ing to abstract arguments,analogical reasoning,and- around the world-why we should refrain from trying most centrally-formal proofs of collective compe- anything else. tence (Schwartzberg 2015). The simplest and most prevalent of these proofs- Epistemic Defenses of Democracy once called the "jewel in the crown of epistemic democrats"(List and Goodin 2001.283)-is the Con- That is why the "epistemic"account of democracy dorcet Jury Theorem (CJT).This theorem shows gaining popularity among political philosophers ap- roughly,that if many people independently make a bi- pears so promising (Anderson 2007;Bohman 2006: nary decision that has a correct answer,and each has Estlund 2008:Landemore 2012:Misak 2008:Ober a greater-than-random chance of being correct,a ma- 2008).Unlike many intrinsic accounts,epistemic views jority vote is extremely likely to deliver the correct acknowledge that the quality of the outcomes pro- answer.Following its rediscovery in the late twentieth duced by democratic procedures is central to their century,early epistemic democrats eagerly applied the justification.Unlike their instrumentalist rivals,how- theorem to democratic politics (Estlund 1994:Grof- ever,epistemic accounts promise a coherent expla- man and Feld 1988). nation of why we should expect democratic proce- In the years since this initial enthusiasm,however, dures to produce better outcomes than non-democratic the theorem's relevance for democratic theory has re- alternatives:only democratic procedures,they claim, peatedly been challenged (Anderson 2008:Christiano can harness the collective wisdom of the people.As 1996.33-4:Dietrich 2008:Gaus 1997),and even many a whole.that is.the demos possesses greater wisdom former advocates have now conceded its limited use- than the wisest philosopher-king or council of experts, fulness (Estlund 2008,223-36).The requirement that and so democracy-a system in which the demos is individual decisions be independent of one another sovereign-will outperform even the most benevo- for instance,is incompatible with the deliberation and lent of monarchies or aristocracies.Compared to other communication that many epistemic democrats under- stand as crucial to the superior performance of demo- 四 cratic procedures.In assuming a discrete number of 3 Defenders of instrumentalism have typically been more concerned choices,moreover,the CJT also ignores problems of with debunking intrinsic views than explaining democracy's real in- agenda control (Fuerstein 2008).Perhaps the most strumental value (e.g.,Arneson 2004;Wall 2007).Minimalist ac. counts articulated by political scientists like Przeworski (1999.2010) devastating objection to the CJT's practical relevance, and Achen and Bartels(2016.316-9)offer more-and they inform however,is simply that it proves too much(Ingham my own(more comprehensive)account-yet they remain remark- 2013).If we suppose the theorem does apply to ac- ably unpopular(if not entirely unknown)in political philosophy tual democratic elections,we must implausibly con- 4 In response.democrats since Mill have hypothesized that political clude that they almost never deliver the "incorrect"re- participation has intrinsic benefits for people.Yet as Brennan(2016. 54-73)shows,empirical research on this subject is not encouraging sult.Without this supposition,meanwhile,the theorem As Bell (2015,168-78)emphasizes,moreover,local democratic par- provides existing institutions with no defense against ticipation is perfectly consistent with meritocracy "at the top." epistemic critiques. 893

The Power of the Multitude citizens.3 As a result, existing instrumental accounts remain perpetually vulnerable to challenges from novel forms of non-democracy, like those proposed by Brennan and Bell, which are said to transcend the limitations of earlier forms. Such challenges can be understood as versions of the perennial “benevolent dictator” objection—that is, that if rule by an intelligent and well-intentioned monarch or aristocratic elite could achieve better re￾sults than rule by the people, instrumentalists should prefer it to democracy.4 Many democrats are troubled by this objection, which has often spurred the develop￾ment of intrinsic accounts of democracy’s value (Beitz 1989, 98; Christiano 1996, 16–7, 56; Kolodny 2014, 202). If instrumentalism yields only a contingent, defeasible commitment to democratic institutions, they conclude, democrats had better rely on the intrinsic value of po￾litical equality and self-government. Meanwhile, many instrumentalists embrace the hypothetical prospect of attractive alternatives to democracy. Until recently, however, few have taken this prospect seriously. We no longer have this luxury. Given the urgent practical and philosophical challenges facing electoral democracy, we cannot be content that it is less awful than the other systems we have tried. We must also explain to challengers like Brennan and Bell—and, more importantly, to reformers and revolutionaries around the world—why we should refrain from trying anything else. Epistemic Defenses of Democracy That is why the “epistemic” account of democracy gaining popularity among political philosophers ap￾pears so promising (Anderson 2007; Bohman 2006; Estlund 2008; Landemore 2012; Misak 2008; Ober 2008). Unlike many intrinsic accounts, epistemic views acknowledge that the quality of the outcomes pro￾duced by democratic procedures is central to their justification. Unlike their instrumentalist rivals, how￾ever, epistemic accounts promise a coherent expla￾nation of why we should expect democratic proce￾dures to produce better outcomes than non-democratic alternatives: only democratic procedures, they claim, can harness the collective wisdom of the people. As a whole, that is, the demos possesses greater wisdom than the wisest philosopher-king or council of experts, and so democracy—a system in which the demos is sovereign—will outperform even the most benevo￾lent of monarchies or aristocracies. Compared to other 3 Defenders of instrumentalism have typically been more concerned with debunking intrinsic views than explaining democracy’s real in￾strumental value (e.g., Arneson 2004; Wall 2007). Minimalist ac￾counts articulated by political scientists like Przeworski (1999, 2010) and Achen and Bartels (2016, 316–9) offer more—and they inform my own (more comprehensive) account—yet they remain remark￾ably unpopular (if not entirely unknown) in political philosophy. 4 In response, democrats since Mill have hypothesized that political participation has intrinsic benefits for people. Yet as Brennan (2016, 54–73) shows, empirical research on this subject is not encouraging. As Bell (2015, 168–78) emphasizes, moreover, local democratic par￾ticipation is perfectly consistent with meritocracy “at the top.” instrumentalist approaches, then, epistemic accounts stake out a far more robust commitment to demo￾cratic procedures. The connection between democ￾racy and superior outcomes is not just a historical accident, but a deep and abiding principle of social organization. Content neutrality is key here. Most instrumental￾ist accounts emphasize the connection between demo￾cratic procedures and specific substantive outcomes— that is, maintaining liberal rights or avoiding famine and war—which inevitably invites “benevolent dicta￾tor” objections. On epistemic accounts, by contrast, democracy is more like the scientific method: we can trust it to reach political truths, in the long run, with￾out knowing those truths in advance (Gaus 2011). As Sean Ingham summarizes, epistemic democrats aim to show that “democratic institutions have a tendency to produce reasonable outcomes […] without presuppos￾ing any narrow, controversial view of what the out￾comes of democratic procedures should be, much as a good justification of a particular scientific research de￾sign does not presuppose the hypothesis that the re￾search aims to test” (Ingham 2013, 136). Rather than establishing their empirical propensity to produce par￾ticular results, therefore, epistemic democrats empha￾size structural features of democratic procedures; turn￾ing to abstract arguments, analogical reasoning, and— most centrally—formal proofs of collective compe￾tence (Schwartzberg 2015). The simplest and most prevalent of these proofs— once called the “jewel in the crown of epistemic democrats” (List and Goodin 2001, 283)—is the Con￾dorcet Jury Theorem (CJT). This theorem shows, roughly, that if many people independently make a bi￾nary decision that has a correct answer, and each has a greater-than-random chance of being correct, a ma￾jority vote is extremely likely to deliver the correct answer. Following its rediscovery in the late twentieth century, early epistemic democrats eagerly applied the theorem to democratic politics (Estlund 1994; Grof￾man and Feld 1988). In the years since this initial enthusiasm, however, the theorem’s relevance for democratic theory has re￾peatedly been challenged (Anderson 2008; Christiano 1996, 33–4; Dietrich 2008; Gaus 1997), and even many former advocates have now conceded its limited use￾fulness (Estlund 2008, 223–36). The requirement that individual decisions be independent of one another, for instance, is incompatible with the deliberation and communication that many epistemic democrats under￾stand as crucial to the superior performance of demo￾cratic procedures. In assuming a discrete number of choices, moreover, the CJT also ignores problems of agenda control (Fuerstein 2008). Perhaps the most devastating objection to the CJT’s practical relevance, however, is simply that it proves too much (Ingham 2013). If we suppose the theorem does apply to ac￾tual democratic elections, we must implausibly con￾clude that they almost never deliver the “incorrect” re￾sult. Without this supposition, meanwhile, the theorem provides existing institutions with no defense against epistemic critiques. 893 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000527

Samuel Bagg As a result,contemporary epistemic democrats have epistocratic ruling class could be chosen that would be typically looked elsewhere for proof of collective com- "justifiable in terms acceptable to all qualified points petence.Perhaps most prominently,Helene Lande- of view"(Estlund 2008.41).As Landemore (2012.52) more has recently championed a theorem known as laments,his account thus resorts once again to intrinsic Diversity Trumps Ability (Landemore 2012;Lande- concerns,relying on epistemic considerations only to more and Elster 2012).According to simulations run show that democracy outperforms random selection of by Hong and Page (2004),a randomly selected group outcomes.Though the formal proofs she favors are un- of problem-solvers will often outperform a group of convincing,therefore,she is right to insist that a robust the best individual problem-solvers,due to the bene- fully instrumental defense of democracy is possible. ficial effects of cognitive diversity.Since this theorem Given the serious practical dangers of according po- allows for deliberation.unlike the CJT-and further- litical power on the basis of epistemic merit,I argue,we more does not assume a discrete number of choices- can readily meet epistemic critics of democracy on their it is understandably attractive to epistemic democrats own instrumentalist turf.To do so,however,we must looking for a more realistic alternative. reject the"epistemic frame"long preferred by democ- Unfortunately,however,its validity also depends on racy's critics,which proposes to compare democracy highly restrictive conditions that cannot be assumed and epistocracy in terms of the wisdom of those sup- to hold in real political circumstances(Brennan 2016. posed to have ultimate sovereignty-that is,the demos 180-94;Thompson 2014;Van Hees 2007).Perhaps and the knowers,respectively.Given that all regimes most importantly,it assumes cognitive diversity without are in reality composed of complex,pluralistic power value diversity,and once the latter is introduced,the structures,the notion of "ultimate"sovereignty only theorem fails to show what Landemore claims(Ancell obfuscates(see Pettit 2013,12-5,220-9).As I elaborate 2017).Moreover,she does not sufficiently address the below,democracy and epistocracy are not diametrically possibility that epistocratic institutions could easily co- opposed:in fact,successful democracies rely on certain opt this virtue.Indeed,Bell's model for a modernized epistocratic institutions,while the proposals of Bren- Confucian political meritocracy foregrounds diversity nan and Bell avowedly include democratic elements. in the selection criteria for leaders as well as active con- Instead of evaluating the wisdom of the "sovereign"in sultation of diverse bodies of citizens-in both cases each regime,therefore,I urge sustained attention to the building on existing Chinese Communist Party prac- incentives and opportunities facing those whose power tices (Bell 2015,190). is,in relative terms.most concentrated. There are,of course,a range of other analogies and formal results that have been used to demonstrate the epistemic competence of democratic procedures,many of which rely on the value of cognitive,intellectual,or BEYOND THE EPISTEMIC FRAME: perspectival diversity.We may safely set them aside, DEFENDING THE POWER OF THE MULTITUDE however,given the objection just raised.After all,any epistemic advantages thought to be unique to demo- My core argument proceeds in three parts.defend- cratic institutions could conceivably be co-opted by a ing three central components of electoral democracy sufficiently well-designed epistocracy.Even if the mul- through an engagement with alternatives presented by 。101g titude possesses some special wisdom that no team three contemporary epistemic critics.I begin with the of experts could match,that is,competitive elections two epistocratic proposals discussed above,defending with universal suffrage are not obviously the most ef- political competition against Bell's centralized politi- ficient way of harnessing it,and could conceivably be cal meritocracy,and universal suffrage against Bren- improved upon by clever experts. nan's franchise qualifications.In both cases,I admit that Extant epistemic approaches,it seems,have failed epistrocratic institutions could conceivably produce su- to deliver on their promise to provide an instrumental perior substantive outcomes,yet maintain that they defense of electoral democracy that is robust to are not worth the serious risks they entail.In practice challenges from epistocracy and other "benevolent epistocratic mechanisms would be susceptible to espe- dictator"objections.As the longtime epistemic demo- cially dangerous forms of "capture"by rulers seeking crat David Estlund admits in his recent work,it is no to entrench their power,while their purported advan- use denying that "there are subsets of citizens that are tages are very unlikely to materialize.Despite the many wiser than the group as a whole"(Estlund 2008,40). deficits of competitive elections with universal suffrage The problem with epistocracy,rather,lies with deciding therefore-including their own vulnerabilities to en- which subset to empower.Yet Estlund squanders this trenchment and capture-we have decisive reasons not insight,in my view,by interpreting the problem in to experiment with epistocratic alternatives the terms of public justification,arguing that no I then consider the possibility of mitigating the per- nicious effects of political ignorance by limiting the state's discretionary power,as might seem to be im- 5 This logic is central,for instance.to Waldron's(1995)reading of plied by my concern with state capture.Indeed,I argue, Aristotle-who memorably analogizes democracy to a banquet with constraining and decentralizing political power can many contributors-as well as Estlund's parable of the blind men and the elephant,whereby the men succeed in correctly identifying help to resist certain forms of entrenchment and cap- the animal only by pooling their individual sense data(2008,233-6). ture,but it also enables others,and thus cannot repre- See also Bohman(2006). sent a general solution.In particular,limiting the state's 894

Samuel Bagg As a result, contemporary epistemic democrats have typically looked elsewhere for proof of collective com￾petence. Perhaps most prominently, Hélène Lande￾more has recently championed a theorem known as Diversity Trumps Ability (Landemore 2012; Lande￾more and Elster 2012). According to simulations run by Hong and Page (2004), a randomly selected group of problem-solvers will often outperform a group of the best individual problem-solvers, due to the bene￾ficial effects of cognitive diversity. Since this theorem allows for deliberation, unlike the CJT—and further￾more does not assume a discrete number of choices— it is understandably attractive to epistemic democrats looking for a more realistic alternative. Unfortunately, however, its validity also depends on highly restrictive conditions that cannot be assumed to hold in real political circumstances (Brennan 2016, 180–94; Thompson 2014; Van Hees 2007). Perhaps most importantly,it assumes cognitive diversity without value diversity, and once the latter is introduced, the theorem fails to show what Landemore claims (Ancell 2017). Moreover, she does not sufficiently address the possibility that epistocratic institutions could easily co￾opt this virtue. Indeed, Bell’s model for a modernized Confucian political meritocracy foregrounds diversity in the selection criteria for leaders as well as active con￾sultation of diverse bodies of citizens—in both cases building on existing Chinese Communist Party prac￾tices (Bell 2015, 190). There are, of course, a range of other analogies and formal results that have been used to demonstrate the epistemic competence of democratic procedures, many of which rely on the value of cognitive, intellectual, or perspectival diversity.5 We may safely set them aside, however, given the objection just raised. After all, any epistemic advantages thought to be unique to demo￾cratic institutions could conceivably be co-opted by a sufficiently well-designed epistocracy. Even if the mul￾titude possesses some special wisdom that no team of experts could match, that is, competitive elections with universal suffrage are not obviously the most ef￾ficient way of harnessing it, and could conceivably be improved upon by clever experts. Extant epistemic approaches, it seems, have failed to deliver on their promise to provide an instrumental defense of electoral democracy that is robust to challenges from epistocracy and other “benevolent dictator” objections. As the longtime epistemic demo￾crat David Estlund admits in his recent work, it is no use denying that “there are subsets of citizens that are wiser than the group as a whole” (Estlund 2008, 40). The problem with epistocracy, rather, lies with deciding which subset to empower. Yet Estlund squanders this insight, in my view, by interpreting the problem in the terms of public justification, arguing that no 5 This logic is central, for instance, to Waldron’s (1995) reading of Aristotle—who memorably analogizes democracy to a banquet with many contributors—as well as Estlund’s parable of the blind men and the elephant, whereby the men succeed in correctly identifying the animal only by pooling their individual sense data (2008, 233–6). See also Bohman (2006). epistocratic ruling class could be chosen that would be “justifiable in terms acceptable to all qualified points of view” (Estlund 2008, 41). As Landemore (2012, 52) laments, his account thus resorts once again to intrinsic concerns, relying on epistemic considerations only to show that democracy outperforms random selection of outcomes. Though the formal proofs she favors are un￾convincing, therefore, she is right to insist that a robust, fully instrumental defense of democracy is possible. Given the serious practical dangers of according po￾litical power on the basis of epistemic merit, I argue, we can readily meet epistemic critics of democracy on their own instrumentalist turf. To do so, however, we must reject the “epistemic frame” long preferred by democ￾racy’s critics, which proposes to compare democracy and epistocracy in terms of the wisdom of those sup￾posed to have ultimate sovereignty—that is, the demos and the knowers, respectively. Given that all regimes are in reality composed of complex, pluralistic power structures, the notion of “ultimate” sovereignty only obfuscates (see Pettit 2013, 12–5, 220–9).As I elaborate below, democracy and epistocracy are not diametrically opposed: in fact, successful democracies rely on certain epistocratic institutions, while the proposals of Bren￾nan and Bell avowedly include democratic elements. Instead of evaluating the wisdom of the “sovereign” in each regime, therefore, I urge sustained attention to the incentives and opportunities facing those whose power is, in relative terms, most concentrated. BEYOND THE EPISTEMIC FRAME: DEFENDING THE POWER OF THE MULTITUDE My core argument proceeds in three parts, defend￾ing three central components of electoral democracy through an engagement with alternatives presented by three contemporary epistemic critics. I begin with the two epistocratic proposals discussed above, defending political competition against Bell’s centralized politi￾cal meritocracy, and universal suffrage against Bren￾nan’s franchise qualifications. In both cases, I admit that epistrocratic institutions could conceivably produce su￾perior substantive outcomes, yet maintain that they are not worth the serious risks they entail. In practice, epistocratic mechanisms would be susceptible to espe￾cially dangerous forms of “capture” by rulers seeking to entrench their power, while their purported advan￾tages are very unlikely to materialize.Despite the many deficits of competitive elections with universal suffrage, therefore—including their own vulnerabilities to en￾trenchment and capture—we have decisive reasons not to experiment with epistocratic alternatives. I then consider the possibility of mitigating the per￾nicious effects of political ignorance by limiting the state’s discretionary power, as might seem to be im￾plied by my concern with state capture. Indeed, I argue, constraining and decentralizing political power can help to resist certain forms of entrenchment and cap￾ture, but it also enables others, and thus cannot repre￾sent a general solution. In particular,limiting the state’s 894 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 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The Power of the Multitude ability to counteract social and economic inequalities his book's title (i.e.,The China Model),Bell does not facilitates growing stratification and concentration of claim that the contemporary Chinese government ful- private power,which almost inevitably feeds back into fills the meritocratic ideal,nor even that it outperforms the political process.In the long run,that is,certain existing electoral democracies(19).Instead.the version limits on discretionary power will turn out to be self- of political meritocracy he proposes as a "model"will undermining,allowing the growth of powerful enti have eliminated the political repression and corrup- ties or factions that may rival and eventually capture tion characterizing the current regime by implement- the state apparatus.Rather than simply minimizing the ing independent checks on centralized power(116,124 state's discretionary power,I conclude,we must bal- 150),a freer press (134,174),intraparty competition ance "defensive"strategies of constraint and decen- (138),more democratic participation in local affairs tralization with equally necessary "offensive"projects. (169,189-91),improved Confucian moral education which use state power to curtail and redistribute this (124),greater economic equality (132),and diversi- dangerously concentrated private power. fied methods of meritocratic selection (130.135.193- To supporters of each of these proposals,my conclu- 4),among other reforms.Top-level leaders in Bell's sions will likely seem hasty,and there is certainly more imagined political meritocracy,in other words,would to say in each case.My primary aim in article,how- be prevented from abusing their power by a number ever.is not to convince committed epistocrats-indeed of norms and institutions that many will recognize as I expect most readers already share my practical com- liberal.Citing precedents from East Asian history and mitment to electoral democracy.As noted above,my philosophy,however,Bell rightly observes that many of goal is of a higher order:I aim to sketch an integrated these devices are not exclusively Western or liberal in theoretical paradigm for explaining and defending that origin.Notably,this includes meritocracy itself,which commitment amid growing doubts about its intellec- has origins in both Western and Confucian traditions as tual foundations and mounting challenges to its prac- a mechanism for constraining the power of the nobility tical supremacy.The account of electoral democracy and other privileged elites(65-6). present is more compelling than the alternatives,I Bell's emphasis on independent checks on central- suggest,because it responds to epistemic critiques and ized power is not surprising.The evils of unconstrained "benevolent dictator"objections without relying on in- authoritarian rule-or,more classically,tyranny-have trinsic concerns,Churchillian complacency,or the du- long been obvious to all serious observers.As the bious analogies and formal results employed by epis- power of modern centralized states has continued temic democrats. to expand,moreover,effective constraints have only As should be clear,the concept of "state capture" become more important (El Amine 2016).Even if is central to this account,though its role is perhaps unconstrained rulers are initially benevolent,the unconventional.Rather than explaining why certain political institutions they create can be used by less outcomes are undesirable,the term functions in my ar- benevolent successors (or usurpers)in tremendously gument to highlight similarities between different out- harmful ways.Meanwhile,opposition leaders have comes that are antecedently accepted as bad:namely, no feasible non-violent path to power and are thus that all involve the use of state power by a particu- more likely to engage in violent resistance;inducing lar faction to achieve its partial ends at the expense coercive repression and/or civil war (Przeworski of other groups.Applying such a normatively laden 1999).Finally,the absence of independent constraints concept to particular cases will inevitably generate dis- associated with "extractive"institutions and re- agreement,of course,but there are plenty of uncontro- duced long-run economic growth (Acemoglu and versial cases-ranging from slavery and tyranny to reg- Robinson 2012;Fukuyama 2014;North, Wallis ulatory capture-and my argument proceeds largely and Weingast 2009). from these cases.Indeed,I prefer to see state capture Like most historical advocates of rule by the few. as a family resemblance concept,rather than as a set therefore,contemporary epistocrats happily concede of necessary and sufficient conditions.Regardless,the that rule by unconstrained,extractive elites is worse concept anchors my defense of all three components of than rule by the many.They insist,however,that electoral democracy,and thus provides a genuine,com- non-democracies are not necessarily tyrannical in this orehensive alternative to the prevailing intrinsic and way.As Bell points out,for instance,the leaders of instrumental theories that I set aside or rejected above contemporary China and Singapore are already con- Instead of purporting to achieve an intrinsically valu- strained by a range of norms and institutions,and his re- eys able form of collective self-rule or an instrumentally forms would constrain them further.Moreover,effec- valuable form of collective wisdom,electoral democ tive constraints predated competitive elections in most racy emerges in the following sections as a limited yet early liberal states,while implementing elections with- indispensable tool for resisting particularly dangerous out supporting reforms in certain contemporary non- forms of state capture. democracies could be counterproductive.As a result,I readily concede that elections need not always be our Political Meritocracy and the Necessity of first practical priority. Competition for Power What I maintain,however,is that no large-scale, long-term political vision is plausible without open We may begin with Bell's (2015)arguments for po political competition.Within democracies,suspend- litical meritocracy.Despite what many assume from ing elections may be necessary when the electoral 895

The Power of the Multitude ability to counteract social and economic inequalities facilitates growing stratification and concentration of private power, which almost inevitably feeds back into the political process. In the long run, that is, certain limits on discretionary power will turn out to be self￾undermining, allowing the growth of powerful enti￾ties or factions that may rival and eventually capture the state apparatus. Rather than simply minimizing the state’s discretionary power, I conclude, we must bal￾ance “defensive” strategies of constraint and decen￾tralization with equally necessary “offensive” projects, which use state power to curtail and redistribute this dangerously concentrated private power. To supporters of each of these proposals, my conclu￾sions will likely seem hasty, and there is certainly more to say in each case. My primary aim in article, how￾ever,is not to convince committed epistocrats—indeed, I expect most readers already share my practical com￾mitment to electoral democracy. As noted above, my goal is of a higher order: I aim to sketch an integrated theoretical paradigm for explaining and defending that commitment amid growing doubts about its intellec￾tual foundations and mounting challenges to its prac￾tical supremacy. The account of electoral democracy I present is more compelling than the alternatives, I suggest, because it responds to epistemic critiques and “benevolent dictator” objections without relying on in￾trinsic concerns, Churchillian complacency, or the du￾bious analogies and formal results employed by epis￾temic democrats. As should be clear, the concept of “state capture” is central to this account, though its role is perhaps unconventional. Rather than explaining why certain outcomes are undesirable, the term functions in my ar￾gument to highlight similarities between different out￾comes that are antecedently accepted as bad: namely, that all involve the use of state power by a particu￾lar faction to achieve its partial ends at the expense of other groups. Applying such a normatively laden concept to particular cases will inevitably generate dis￾agreement, of course, but there are plenty of uncontro￾versial cases—ranging from slavery and tyranny to reg￾ulatory capture—and my argument proceeds largely from these cases. Indeed, I prefer to see state capture as a family resemblance concept, rather than as a set of necessary and sufficient conditions. Regardless, the concept anchors my defense of all three components of electoral democracy, and thus provides a genuine, com￾prehensive alternative to the prevailing intrinsic and instrumental theories that I set aside or rejected above. Instead of purporting to achieve an intrinsically valu￾able form of collective self-rule or an instrumentally valuable form of collective wisdom, electoral democ￾racy emerges in the following sections as a limited yet indispensable tool for resisting particularly dangerous forms of state capture. Political Meritocracy and the Necessity of Competition for Power We may begin with Bell’s (2015) arguments for po￾litical meritocracy. Despite what many assume from his book’s title (i.e., The China Model), Bell does not claim that the contemporary Chinese government ful￾fills the meritocratic ideal, nor even that it outperforms existing electoral democracies (19). Instead, the version of political meritocracy he proposes as a “model” will have eliminated the political repression and corrup￾tion characterizing the current regime by implement￾ing independent checks on centralized power (116, 124, 150), a freer press (134, 174), intraparty competition (138), more democratic participation in local affairs (169, 189–91), improved Confucian moral education (124), greater economic equality (132), and diversi￾fied methods of meritocratic selection (130, 135, 193– 4), among other reforms. Top-level leaders in Bell’s imagined political meritocracy, in other words, would be prevented from abusing their power by a number of norms and institutions that many will recognize as liberal. Citing precedents from East Asian history and philosophy, however, Bell rightly observes that many of these devices are not exclusively Western or liberal in origin. Notably, this includes meritocracy itself, which has origins in both Western and Confucian traditions as a mechanism for constraining the power of the nobility and other privileged elites (65–6). Bell’s emphasis on independent checks on central￾ized power is not surprising. The evils of unconstrained authoritarian rule—or, more classically, tyranny—have long been obvious to all serious observers. As the power of modern centralized states has continued to expand, moreover, effective constraints have only become more important (El Amine 2016). Even if unconstrained rulers are initially benevolent, the political institutions they create can be used by less benevolent successors (or usurpers) in tremendously harmful ways. Meanwhile, opposition leaders have no feasible non-violent path to power and are thus more likely to engage in violent resistance; inducing coercive repression and/or civil war (Przeworski 1999). Finally, the absence of independent constraints is associated with “extractive” institutions and re￾duced long-run economic growth (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Fukuyama 2014; North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009). Like most historical advocates of rule by the few, therefore, contemporary epistocrats happily concede that rule by unconstrained, extractive elites is worse than rule by the many. They insist, however, that non-democracies are not necessarily tyrannical in this way. As Bell points out, for instance, the leaders of contemporary China and Singapore are already con￾strained by a range of norms and institutions, and his re￾forms would constrain them further. Moreover, effec￾tive constraints predated competitive elections in most early liberal states, while implementing elections with￾out supporting reforms in certain contemporary non￾democracies could be counterproductive. As a result, I readily concede that elections need not always be our first practical priority. What I maintain, however, is that no large-scale, long-term political vision is plausible without open political competition. Within democracies, suspend￾ing elections may be necessary when the electoral 895 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000527

Samuel Bagg framework itself faces an existential threat.but this worski 1991,2005;Shapiro 2016,49-50).7 Attempts to measure must always be temporary (Kirshner 2014). exceed these limits may then be foiled by indepen- Meanwhile.non-democracies should generally strive to dent power centers within the state-perhaps through achieve stable electoral institutions as quickly as realis- conflict between executive and legislative branches tically possible.This is not because elections are intrin- as Madison famously envisioned,or perhaps through sically valuable,nor because they always yield superior other mechanisms like judicial and bureaucratic inde- outcomes.Instead,the primary reason political meri- pendence,federalism,and institutionalized protections tocracy does not present an attractive alternative to for opposition parties.As Levinson and Pildes(2006) electoral democracy is that it is far more likely to lead insist,the key principle is"separation of parties"-the to unconstrained authoritarianism or tyranny.Though distribution of state power among different factions- constraints on centralized power can also be eroded in rather than the separation of powers as such(which a system with electoral competition,the magnitude of is perfectly compatible with unified partisan con- this risk is much greater under political meritocracy- trol).Second and more generally,then,rival parties even given highly advantageous conditions-than it is will be able to coordinate opposition to incumbent under any ordinary consolidated democracy.The key entrenchment-at the limit including armed rebellion. difference is that meritocratic leaders have much more Indeed,the organizational strength of opposition par- effective tools for entrenching their power. ties is one of the key conditions for achieving and con- In any political system,many things influence solidating democracy (Levitsky and Way 2010,68-70). whether incumbents and their factional allies retain Finally,these incentives will be supplemented by 元 power.In both meritocracies and democracies,for in- some degree of genuinely principled commitment to stance,the approval of a broad class of economic liberal democracy and the rule of law-especially and cultural elites is an important contributing factor. among those with strong professional socialization In both systems,similarly,massive popular discontent such as lawyers and journalists.This commitment will bodes poorly for incumbents.In any political meritoc- bolster the existing motivation of opposition officials racy,however,the incumbents themselves-as those to frustrate incumbent entrenchment,for instance,as atop the centralized meritocratic hierarchy-have far well as any existing preferences for stable equilib- greater capacity to affect the outcome.Given the sig- rium among the incumbents'allies.Indeed,mecha nificant discretion afforded by the unavoidably am- nisms grounded solely in political incentives would un- biguous standard of political "merit,"incumbents can doubtedly be less reliable in the absence of genuine gradually shift the balance of power in their favor,ap- principled commitments,and their significance should pointing cadres at every level who will support their not be discounted.At the same time,polarization reli- factional interests,and replacing those who will not.6 ably weakens their motivational force relative to imme- Compared with elected democratic politicians,there diate substantive concerns(Svolik,n.d.).Perhaps even fore,they have far more latitude in shaping the struc more troublingly,it can be difficult to disentangle prin- tural conditions supporting their own political power, cipled from expedient motives in the first place(Bagg and (consequently)much greater capacity to entrench 2018a,2018b:Lodge and Taber 2013).Given these vul- their rule nerabilities,it would be unwise to rely entirely on the Of course.democratic incumbents also use their con- production of principled commitments through educa- 。101g trol over the state apparatus to increase their chances tion and socialization to maintain the integrity of noto- of retaining power-reliably employing techniques riously fragile constraints on centralized power. such as gerrymandering,for instance,where available. That,however,is precisely what Bell's political mer- They may also attempt to capture independent agen- itocracy would do.Even if the independent power cen- cies by appointing factional allies or undermine the ters he proposes were initially effective,their continued economic and organizational foundations of opposi- independence would not be supported by electoral un- tion parties (see Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018,72-96).Yet certainty and organized opposition,and could be rel- there are at least three crucial factors restraining such atively easily co-opted by top-level leaders disposed efforts at entrenchment:the uncertainty of electoral to do so.As Bell himself concedes (2015.123-4).the outcomes,the organizational strength of the opposi- stability of constraints on power in a meritocracy ulti- tion,and independent commitment to the institutional mately relies on the forbearance of those at the top of framework of liberal democracy. the centralized hierarchy,which he proposes to secure First,incumbents know that despite their efforts through improved Confucian moral education 四 to stack the deck,their opponents may yet come to As I have emphasized,I do not deny the efficacy power and retaliate.Given sufficient uncertainty about of such principled commitments.Yet,as Madison fa- the results of subsequent elections,an equilibrium in mously insisted,"enlightened statesmen"should not be which all incumbents respect certain limits to such self- relied upon to sustain crucial constraints on power in serving strategies is beneficial for all parties (Prze- My argument thus reinforces the utility of regime classification schemes based on electoral competitiveness (e.g.,Levitsky and Way 6 There is evidence that this is precisely what Xi Jinping did,for 2010,5-16),whereby full democracies are characterized by an even instance,with his "anti-corruption"campaign (Hualing 2015;Yuen playing field and significant electoral uncertainty,non-democracies 2014)-setting the stage for his recent move (in February 2018)to by a lack of meaningful competition,and hybrid regimes by a skewed do away with term limits and further consolidate his power. field that nevertheless retains some uncertainty. 896

Samuel Bagg framework itself faces an existential threat, but this measure must always be temporary (Kirshner 2014). Meanwhile, non-democracies should generally strive to achieve stable electoral institutions as quickly as realis￾tically possible. This is not because elections are intrin￾sically valuable, nor because they always yield superior outcomes. Instead, the primary reason political meri￾tocracy does not present an attractive alternative to electoral democracy is that it is far more likely to lead to unconstrained authoritarianism or tyranny. Though constraints on centralized power can also be eroded in a system with electoral competition, the magnitude of this risk is much greater under political meritocracy— even given highly advantageous conditions—than it is under any ordinary consolidated democracy. The key difference is that meritocratic leaders have much more effective tools for entrenching their power. In any political system, many things influence whether incumbents and their factional allies retain power. In both meritocracies and democracies, for in￾stance, the approval of a broad class of economic and cultural elites is an important contributing factor. In both systems, similarly, massive popular discontent bodes poorly for incumbents. In any political meritoc￾racy, however, the incumbents themselves—as those atop the centralized meritocratic hierarchy—have far greater capacity to affect the outcome. Given the sig￾nificant discretion afforded by the unavoidably am￾biguous standard of political “merit,” incumbents can gradually shift the balance of power in their favor, ap￾pointing cadres at every level who will support their factional interests, and replacing those who will not.6 Compared with elected democratic politicians, there￾fore, they have far more latitude in shaping the struc￾tural conditions supporting their own political power, and (consequently) much greater capacity to entrench their rule. Of course, democratic incumbents also use their con￾trol over the state apparatus to increase their chances of retaining power—reliably employing techniques such as gerrymandering, for instance, where available. They may also attempt to capture independent agen￾cies by appointing factional allies or undermine the economic and organizational foundations of opposi￾tion parties (see Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018, 72–96). Yet there are at least three crucial factors restraining such efforts at entrenchment: the uncertainty of electoral outcomes, the organizational strength of the opposi￾tion, and independent commitment to the institutional framework of liberal democracy. First, incumbents know that despite their efforts to stack the deck, their opponents may yet come to power and retaliate. Given sufficient uncertainty about the results of subsequent elections, an equilibrium in which all incumbents respect certain limits to such self￾serving strategies is beneficial for all parties (Prze- 6 There is evidence that this is precisely what Xi Jinping did, for instance, with his “anti-corruption” campaign (Hualing 2015; Yuen 2014)—setting the stage for his recent move (in February 2018) to do away with term limits and further consolidate his power. worski 1991, 2005; Shapiro 2016, 49–50).7 Attempts to exceed these limits may then be foiled by indepen￾dent power centers within the state—perhaps through conflict between executive and legislative branches, as Madison famously envisioned, or perhaps through other mechanisms like judicial and bureaucratic inde￾pendence, federalism, and institutionalized protections for opposition parties. As Levinson and Pildes (2006) insist, the key principle is “separation of parties”—the distribution of state power among different factions— rather than the separation of powers as such (which is perfectly compatible with unified partisan con￾trol). Second and more generally, then, rival parties will be able to coordinate opposition to incumbent entrenchment—at the limit including armed rebellion. Indeed, the organizational strength of opposition par￾ties is one of the key conditions for achieving and con￾solidating democracy (Levitsky and Way 2010, 68–70). Finally, these incentives will be supplemented by some degree of genuinely principled commitment to liberal democracy and the rule of law—especially among those with strong professional socialization such as lawyers and journalists. This commitment will bolster the existing motivation of opposition officials to frustrate incumbent entrenchment, for instance, as well as any existing preferences for stable equilib￾rium among the incumbents’ allies. Indeed, mecha￾nisms grounded solely in political incentives would un￾doubtedly be less reliable in the absence of genuine principled commitments, and their significance should not be discounted. At the same time, polarization reli￾ably weakens their motivational force relative to imme￾diate substantive concerns (Svolik, n.d.). Perhaps even more troublingly, it can be difficult to disentangle prin￾cipled from expedient motives in the first place (Bagg 2018a, 2018b; Lodge and Taber 2013). Given these vul￾nerabilities, it would be unwise to rely entirely on the production of principled commitments through educa￾tion and socialization to maintain the integrity of noto￾riously fragile constraints on centralized power. That, however, is precisely what Bell’s political mer￾itocracy would do. Even if the independent power cen￾ters he proposes were initially effective, their continued independence would not be supported by electoral un￾certainty and organized opposition, and could be rel￾atively easily co-opted by top-level leaders disposed to do so. As Bell himself concedes (2015, 123–4), the stability of constraints on power in a meritocracy ulti￾mately relies on the forbearance of those at the top of the centralized hierarchy, which he proposes to secure through improved Confucian moral education. As I have emphasized, I do not deny the efficacy of such principled commitments. Yet, as Madison fa￾mously insisted, “enlightened statesmen” should not be relied upon to sustain crucial constraints on power in 7 My argument thus reinforces the utility of regime classification schemes based on electoral competitiveness (e.g., Levitsky and Way 2010, 5–16), whereby full democracies are characterized by an even playing field and significant electoral uncertainty, non-democracies by a lack of meaningful competition, and hybrid regimes by a skewed field that nevertheless retains some uncertainty. 896 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000527

The Power of the Multitude perpetuity.s Without reinforcement from strong inde- features that cannot be replicated by a centralized po- pendent incentives-such as those provided by institu- litical meritocracy.10 tionalized uncertainty and the separation of parties- Despite these vastly more favorable conditions,of principled commitment to maintaining independent course,even science is hardly a perfect meritocracv. power centers will eventually succumb to the siren song From its origins to the present,systematic biases of political expediency.Institutions that foster legiti- and exclusions have profoundly affected its character mate opposition and open competition for power thus (Longino 2013;Marks 2009).In other realms where it render the capture of the state by tyrannical,extractive is often invoked,meanwhile,the ideal of meritocracy is elites less likely than institutions that effectively allow even further from realization,and is often simply used incumbents to select their own replacements. to legitimize unjust inequalities(McNamee and Miller In my view,the severity of this danger is more than 2013).These challenges do not render the concept of enough reason to abandon the idea of political meritoc meritocracy incoherent or inherently reactionary-on racy.It is also worth noting,however,that the increased the contrary,meritocracy is a necessary feature of any risk of tyrannical rule is not offset by great prospective modern political system,including electoral democ- rewards.Even when incumbents do not actively consol- racy.Yet no meritocracy is immune to bias,capture,or idate power,they will still be subject to more mundane corruption (Fricker 2009;Medina 2012),and given the forms of capture and corruption,undermining meri- intense strains they must bear,such defects will be es- tocracy's claim to possess significant advantages over pecially significant in political meritocracies democracy. Acknowledging the extensive corruption of China's Consider the strict conditions enabling the progress existing political structure,Bell often draws on the of natural science-perhaps the most obviously suc- success of political meritocracy in Singapore and cessful meritocracy in existence.Especially within Kuh- Hong Kong to demonstrate that these flaws might nian"normal science,"standards of merit are relatively be remedied (2015,31-3,113,117).According to uncontroversial.Where disagreement exists,it is usu many other scholars of the region,however,the 4号 ally resolved methodically within structures of open opposite trend is more likely.Political meritocracy competition,which are themselves supported by a de- in Singapore and Hong Kong is already decaying. centralized disciplinary structure.Finally,few scientific they observe-and will continue to do so,absent questions have significant consequences for the distri- democratization-while China's is unlikely to become bution of social power,meaning that scientific institu- less corrupt (Hui 2015,2016;Tan 2008).Ironically, tions are rarely targeted for capture by outside inter- they conclude.meritocracies function best under ests. democratic political conditions. In politics,by contrast,the distributive stakes are far That said,we need not deny that political meri- higher.Political meritocracies are thus,predictably,the tocracies can govern well-perhaps even outperform- target of intense competition for capture among fac- ing electoral democracies in certain cases.Rather,my 是 tions seeking to advance their interests.Given the in- claim here is that political meritocracies are unlikely evitable limits to open competition under a central- to enjoy either systematic or substantial advantages ized hierarchy,these factions are forced to displace the over comparably situated electoral democracies in the weight of their political disagreements onto the def- long run-especially those that successfully integrate inition and application of meritocratic standards.Yet healthy meritocratic institutions at other levels.Given these standards are far more ambiguous than those this,the increased risk of authoritarian consolidation of science-thanks partly to wider disagreement on easily counts as a decisive argument against political the ultimate ends to be served (Jenco 2016)-and meritocracy. consequently less capable of withstanding such strain. Though scientific meritocracies have enabled remark- able progress through the methodical resolution of dis- Franchise Qualifications and the Necessity agreements,therefore,this is only in virtue of several of Universal Suffrage We turn next to the franchise qualifications proposed by Brennan (2016,204-30;see also Caplan 2007 8 See Andrew Nathan(2016,155).who contests Bell's"perfected" 197-8).He acknowledges the injustice of historical conception of human nature,and(citing Madison)expresses doubt restrictions grounded on morally irrelevant factors that "any political system can be induced to operate on the basis of such as race,sex,or possession of property.Given eys moral virtue alone."Lynette Ong (2016)voices similar concerns. the epistemic flaws of democracy,however,he asks: 9I make no distinctions here between democratic institu. why not conditionalize suffrage upon morally relevant tional frameworks-for example,parliamentarism versus presidentialism-but three observations epistemic qualifications?Prospective drivers must are relevant. 名 First,a variety of competitive systems could conceivably generate the sort pass a driving test,and prospective doctors must of incentives which sustain independent checks.Second,the strength attend medical school.Why not issue voting licenses of these incentives should be a primary consideration in choosing in a similar way,through competence testing or between systems.Third,this is likely quite context-dependent educational requirements? making it difficult to draw general conclusions.That is why,despite clear affinities with Ian Shapiro's(2003,2016)approach,I do not share his confidence in pure majoritarianism,which seems to depend on overly optimistic assumptions about retrospective accountability 10 For a more detailed discussion of this analogy.see Bagg(2018b. (see Achen and Bartels 2016,discussed below). 269-73). 897

The Power of the Multitude perpetuity.8 Without reinforcement from strong inde￾pendent incentives—such as those provided by institu￾tionalized uncertainty and the separation of parties— principled commitment to maintaining independent power centers will eventually succumb to the siren song of political expediency. Institutions that foster legiti￾mate opposition and open competition for power thus render the capture of the state by tyrannical, extractive elites less likely than institutions that effectively allow incumbents to select their own replacements.9 In my view, the severity of this danger is more than enough reason to abandon the idea of political meritoc￾racy. It is also worth noting, however, that the increased risk of tyrannical rule is not offset by great prospective rewards. Even when incumbents do not actively consol￾idate power, they will still be subject to more mundane forms of capture and corruption, undermining meri￾tocracy’s claim to possess significant advantages over democracy. Consider the strict conditions enabling the progress of natural science—perhaps the most obviously suc￾cessful meritocracy in existence.Especially within Kuh￾nian “normal science,” standards of merit are relatively uncontroversial. Where disagreement exists, it is usu￾ally resolved methodically within structures of open competition, which are themselves supported by a de￾centralized disciplinary structure. Finally, few scientific questions have significant consequences for the distri￾bution of social power, meaning that scientific institu￾tions are rarely targeted for capture by outside inter￾ests. In politics, by contrast, the distributive stakes are far higher. Political meritocracies are thus, predictably, the target of intense competition for capture among fac￾tions seeking to advance their interests. Given the in￾evitable limits to open competition under a central￾ized hierarchy, these factions are forced to displace the weight of their political disagreements onto the def￾inition and application of meritocratic standards. Yet these standards are far more ambiguous than those of science—thanks partly to wider disagreement on the ultimate ends to be served (Jenco 2016)—and consequently less capable of withstanding such strain. Though scientific meritocracies have enabled remark￾able progress through the methodical resolution of dis￾agreements, therefore, this is only in virtue of several 8 See Andrew Nathan (2016, 155), who contests Bell’s “perfected” conception of human nature, and (citing Madison) expresses doubt that “any political system can be induced to operate on the basis of moral virtue alone.” Lynette Ong (2016) voices similar concerns. 9 I make no distinctions here between democratic institu￾tional frameworks—for example, parliamentarism versus presidentialism—but three observations are relevant. First, a variety of competitive systems could conceivably generate the sort of incentives which sustain independent checks. Second, the strength of these incentives should be a primary consideration in choosing between systems. Third, this is likely quite context-dependent, making it difficult to draw general conclusions. That is why, despite clear affinities with Ian Shapiro’s (2003, 2016) approach, I do not share his confidence in pure majoritarianism, which seems to depend on overly optimistic assumptions about retrospective accountability (see Achen and Bartels 2016, discussed below). features that cannot be replicated by a centralized po￾litical meritocracy.10 Despite these vastly more favorable conditions, of course, even science is hardly a perfect meritocracy. From its origins to the present, systematic biases and exclusions have profoundly affected its character (Longino 2013; Marks 2009). In other realms where it is often invoked, meanwhile, the ideal of meritocracy is even further from realization, and is often simply used to legitimize unjust inequalities (McNamee and Miller 2013). These challenges do not render the concept of meritocracy incoherent or inherently reactionary—on the contrary, meritocracy is a necessary feature of any modern political system, including electoral democ￾racy. Yet no meritocracy is immune to bias, capture, or corruption (Fricker 2009; Medina 2012), and given the intense strains they must bear, such defects will be es￾pecially significant in political meritocracies. Acknowledging the extensive corruption of China’s existing political structure, Bell often draws on the success of political meritocracy in Singapore and Hong Kong to demonstrate that these flaws might be remedied (2015, 31–3, 113, 117). According to many other scholars of the region, however, the opposite trend is more likely. Political meritocracy in Singapore and Hong Kong is already decaying, they observe—and will continue to do so, absent democratization—while China’s is unlikely to become less corrupt (Hui 2015, 2016; Tan 2008). Ironically, they conclude, meritocracies function best under democratic political conditions. That said, we need not deny that political meri￾tocracies can govern well—perhaps even outperform￾ing electoral democracies in certain cases. Rather, my claim here is that political meritocracies are unlikely to enjoy either systematic or substantial advantages over comparably situated electoral democracies in the long run—especially those that successfully integrate healthy meritocratic institutions at other levels. Given this, the increased risk of authoritarian consolidation easily counts as a decisive argument against political meritocracy. Franchise Qualifications and the Necessity of Universal Suffrage We turn next to the franchise qualifications proposed by Brennan (2016, 204–30; see also Caplan 2007, 197–8). He acknowledges the injustice of historical restrictions grounded on morally irrelevant factors such as race, sex, or possession of property. Given the epistemic flaws of democracy, however, he asks: why not conditionalize suffrage upon morally relevant epistemic qualifications? Prospective drivers must pass a driving test, and prospective doctors must attend medical school. Why not issue voting licenses in a similar way, through competence testing or educational requirements? 10 For a more detailed discussion of this analogy, see Bagg (2018b, 269–73). 897 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000527

Samuel Bagg As above,my response to these suggestions is race to "teach to the test"could hardly be expected to thoroughly pragmatic.While conceding the conceptual yield substantial benefits in vote quality-indeed,given possibility of unobjectionable epistemic qualifications, the massive expenditures required,the most significant I highlight the practical risks of giving political leaders consequence would be to intensify parties'dependence the power to design them.Though not quite as upon concentrated wealth. dangerous as the ability to appoint successors directly, Brennan concedes that his proposals could have the ability to implement epistemic qualifications would drawbacks,including the potential for manipulation also enable incumbents to entrench their rule-and (2016.222-30).However.he asserts that they also the hypothesized benefits here are even less likely promise vastly superior outcomes.Caricaturing any un- to materialize.Thus,Brennan's epistocracy ought to willingness to experiment with epistocracy as a species op//s remain off the table as well. of Burkean conservatism.he insists that we cannot Of course,democracies already enable incumbents know in advance whether such tradeoffs will be worth- to manipulate the pool of eligible voters in various while.I disagree.As I have already argued,we know ways.Some restrictions,like those concerning age and enough about politicians to predict that some would citizenship,are likely inevitable.Others,however- use these tools to entrench their power.Perhaps more including voter identification requirements,felon dis- importantly,we also know enough about voters to enfranchisement.and the gerrymandering of single- predict that disenfranchising those with low political member districts-are routinely used to entrench the knowledge would not substantially improve the epis- power of incumbents by tilting the electoral odds in temic quality of electoral results.Thus,even if in- their favor (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018,183-6,208-11). cumbents(or independent bodies)imposed perfectly Such policies are typically justified on other grounds, benign epistemic qualifications,the benefits Brennan and some may be valuable on balance,yet in each projects would be very unlikely to materialize. case,this feature gives us reason to be suspicious (Is- Consider that voters in modern democracies do sacharoff and Pildes 1998:Shapiro 2016.86-8).By com not choose directly between different policies.Instead parison,then,Brennan's proposals would grant politi- they choose between parties or candidates.There is cians far greater leeway in choosing their own voters. thus substantial distance between a voter's overall level and should be regarded as far more dangerous. of political knowledge and the quality of her vote Consider the possibility of conditionalizing suffrage choice.Yet Brennan makes very little effort to demon- on educational attainment.Brennan himself speculates strate that higher political knowledge scores would be (2016,223)that in the US,Democrats would favor associated with greater likelihood of voting for the very low or very high qualifications,while Republi- "correct"party or candidate.12 Instead,he relies on an cans would prefer a mid-range qualification,such as intuitive sense that political knowledge must raise vote a high school diploma.Yet he fails to recognize what quality.13 a dramatic effect this could have:for either party,im- Perhaps,on the margin,it does.As Brennan himself plementing a properly targeted policy would instantly insists throughout his book,however,our intuitive un- translate a small temporary majority into a massive and derstanding of voting behavior cannot be trusted.In durable electoral advantage.Where traditional gerry- particular,it seems,rational assessment of the argu- mandering faces natural limits,moreover-imposed by ments for competing policies-which political knowl- 。101g the need to distribute a fixed voting population among edge tests purport to measure-plays a small role (at geographically contiguous districts-"epistemic"ger- best)in vote choice.As extensive research on"mo- rymandering could continuously compound incumbent tivated reasoning"has demonstrated,better informa- advantages through ever-more-targeted tests,recur- tion rarely changes our mind,it simply gives us better sively altering the voting population itself.Even if their tools for defending our intuitions(Lodge and Taber immediate effects were not so extreme,finally,such 2013).Meanwhile,education primarily alters our policy policies would still give incumbents strong incentives preferences indirectly,by changing our social context to manipulate educational attainment patterns for par- and identity.Where they exist,then,correlations be- tisan ends. tween political knowledge and vote choice are largely Implementing a competence test presents no solu- explained by unrelated,non-rational factors-centrally tion,as incumbents would have similarly strong incen including the set of identity groups to which we be- tives (and even greater leeway)to manipulate its con- long(Achen and Bartels 2016).By far the most signifi- tent.Once established,moreover,parties would likely cant consequence of disenfranchising those individuals scramble to prepare their supporters,much as they al- with low epistemic qualifications,therefore,would be ready conduct voter registration drives and get-out- the-vote campaigns in places without automatic reg- istration and mandatory voting.The resulting arms 2 We need not assume that political questions have objectively cor- rect answers to accept that elections present citizens with options that 11 The fact that literacy tests in the US South did not generate a similar arms race reflects their peculiarly pernicious,openly partisan a smattering of broadly libertarian preferences that he presumably nature.Since white voting rights were generally"grandfathered"in, considers correct(2016,33-4).While these studies control for certain only blacks were subject in practice to the tests,which were designed demographic variables,however,other potential confounds remain to be nearly impossible.Meanwhile,those who managed to pass were (e.g.,group identities elided by crude demographic controls).More often prevented from voting by other means.Under such conditions importantly,they do not establish that having such"superior"policy mass mobilization by Republicans would have been futile. preferences actually enhances vote choice. 898

Samuel Bagg As above, my response to these suggestions is thoroughly pragmatic. While conceding the conceptual possibility of unobjectionable epistemic qualifications, I highlight the practical risks of giving political leaders the power to design them. Though not quite as dangerous as the ability to appoint successors directly, the ability to implement epistemic qualifications would also enable incumbents to entrench their rule—and the hypothesized benefits here are even less likely to materialize. Thus, Brennan’s epistocracy ought to remain off the table as well. Of course, democracies already enable incumbents to manipulate the pool of eligible voters in various ways. Some restrictions, like those concerning age and citizenship, are likely inevitable. Others, however— including voter identification requirements, felon dis￾enfranchisement, and the gerrymandering of single￾member districts—are routinely used to entrench the power of incumbents by tilting the electoral odds in their favor (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018, 183–6, 208–11). Such policies are typically justified on other grounds, and some may be valuable on balance, yet in each case, this feature gives us reason to be suspicious (Is￾sacharoff and Pildes 1998; Shapiro 2016, 86–8). By com￾parison, then, Brennan’s proposals would grant politi￾cians far greater leeway in choosing their own voters, and should be regarded as far more dangerous. Consider the possibility of conditionalizing suffrage on educational attainment. Brennan himself speculates (2016, 223) that in the US, Democrats would favor very low or very high qualifications, while Republi￾cans would prefer a mid-range qualification, such as a high school diploma. Yet he fails to recognize what a dramatic effect this could have: for either party, im￾plementing a properly targeted policy would instantly translate a small temporary majority into a massive and durable electoral advantage. Where traditional gerry￾mandering faces natural limits, moreover—imposed by the need to distribute a fixed voting population among geographically contiguous districts—“epistemic” ger￾rymandering could continuously compound incumbent advantages through ever-more-targeted tests, recur￾sively altering the voting population itself. Even if their immediate effects were not so extreme, finally, such policies would still give incumbents strong incentives to manipulate educational attainment patterns for par￾tisan ends. Implementing a competence test presents no solu￾tion, as incumbents would have similarly strong incen￾tives (and even greater leeway) to manipulate its con￾tent. Once established, moreover, parties would likely scramble to prepare their supporters, much as they al￾ready conduct voter registration drives and get-out￾the-vote campaigns in places without automatic reg￾istration and mandatory voting.11 The resulting arms 11 The fact that literacy tests in the US South did not generate a similar arms race reflects their peculiarly pernicious, openly partisan nature. Since white voting rights were generally “grandfathered” in, only blacks were subject in practice to the tests, which were designed to be nearly impossible.Meanwhile, those who managed to pass were often prevented from voting by other means. Under such conditions, mass mobilization by Republicans would have been futile. race to “teach to the test” could hardly be expected to yield substantial benefits in vote quality—indeed, given the massive expenditures required, the most significant consequence would be to intensify parties’ dependence upon concentrated wealth. Brennan concedes that his proposals could have drawbacks, including the potential for manipulation (2016, 222–30). However, he asserts that they also promise vastly superior outcomes. Caricaturing any un￾willingness to experiment with epistocracy as a species of Burkean conservatism, he insists that we cannot know in advance whether such tradeoffs will be worth￾while. I disagree. As I have already argued, we know enough about politicians to predict that some would use these tools to entrench their power. Perhaps more importantly, we also know enough about voters to predict that disenfranchising those with low political knowledge would not substantially improve the epis￾temic quality of electoral results. Thus, even if in￾cumbents (or independent bodies) imposed perfectly benign epistemic qualifications, the benefits Brennan projects would be very unlikely to materialize. Consider that voters in modern democracies do not choose directly between different policies. Instead, they choose between parties or candidates. There is thus substantial distance between a voter’s overall level of political knowledge and the quality of her vote choice. Yet Brennan makes very little effort to demon￾strate that higher political knowledge scores would be associated with greater likelihood of voting for the “correct” party or candidate.12 Instead, he relies on an intuitive sense that political knowledge must raise vote quality.13 Perhaps, on the margin, it does. As Brennan himself insists throughout his book, however, our intuitive un￾derstanding of voting behavior cannot be trusted. In particular, it seems, rational assessment of the argu￾ments for competing policies—which political knowl￾edge tests purport to measure—plays a small role (at best) in vote choice. As extensive research on “mo￾tivated reasoning” has demonstrated, better informa￾tion rarely changes our mind, it simply gives us better tools for defending our intuitions (Lodge and Taber 2013).Meanwhile, education primarily alters our policy preferences indirectly, by changing our social context and identity. Where they exist, then, correlations be￾tween political knowledge and vote choice are largely explained by unrelated, non-rational factors—centrally including the set of identity groups to which we be￾long (Achen and Bartels 2016). By far the most signifi￾cant consequence of disenfranchising those individuals with low epistemic qualifications, therefore, would be 12 We need not assume that political questions have objectively cor￾rect answers to accept that elections present citizens with options that are, in some sense, better than others. 13 Brennan does cite two studies correlating high information with a smattering of broadly libertarian preferences that he presumably considers correct (2016, 33–4).While these studies control for certain demographic variables, however, other potential confounds remain (e.g., group identities elided by crude demographic controls). More importantly, they do not establish that having such “superior” policy preferences actually enhances vote choice. 898 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000527

The Power of the Multitude to disenfranchise the (already disempowered)groups ance from victory into defeat,politicians carefully man- to which they disproportionately belong. age their reputations,aiming to satisfy a range of in- Brennan glibly dismisses this"demographic objec- terest groups without upsetting others too profoundly tion."He announces repeatedly,for instance,that by (Oppenheimer and Edwards 2012,206-18).Even if his“objective,.”“morally relevant'”standards,black the franchise does not meaningfully empower indi- women are the least "competent"voters in the US. viduals,therefore,it does give non-negligible leverage and that his proposals would therefore disenfranchise to groups. them in large numbers (2016,33,132-3,148,227-8). That said,we may grant that enfranchisement of- Rather than taking this opportunity to reexamine his ten brings surprisingly few benefits.For instance, epistemological premises,however.he assures readers nineteenth-century socialists and reactionaries both as- of his excellent implicit bias scores,and asserts that sumed working class suffrage would yield far more ex- disadvantaged citizens cannot vote in ways that pro- tensive redistribution than it did.We may also grant mote their interests "unless they have tremendous so- that most voters are sociotropic,meaning that their cial scientific knowledge"(227).14 Remedying their dis- votes are directed at a common good,rather than their advantages thus requires disenfranchising them-and own self-interest.Yet even Brennan acknowledges that thereby entrusting their interests to better-informed there is clearly some connection between enfranchise- voters.I5 ment and group interests,observing for instance that Such claims are,quite frankly,preposterous,and "if we deprive all black people of the right to vote one may be tempted simply to ignore them.In my [...this will help facilitate people of other races in view,however,it is worth showing why they are not exploiting,dominating,and oppressing blacks"(2016, supported by the empirical evidence Brennan cites, 97-8).Nothing could be more obvious,of course,but since this research does challenge many common as- given Brennan's assumptions,it cries out for explana- sumptions about democracy,and it should not be dis- tion:Why might this be?Alas,it seems,not everyone missed along with Brennan's conclusions.It is well votes sociotropically-and even when we do,our views 4r元 established,for instance,that most voters know too of the “common good”are inevitably biased(Bagg little about policy to make meaningful choices be- 2018b) tween parties on that basis-meaning that there is In sum,empirical research in public opinion and no "bedrock"of public opinion to which representa- political psychology does not dispute that groups- tives might faithfully respond (Disch 2011).Accord- even those with below-average political knowledge- ing to Achen and Bartels(2016),moreover,the min- can use the electoral system to advance their inter- imalistic model favored by many political scientists- ests. What the research does throw into question is retrospective accountability-is also typically oversold the rational grounding such processes are often sup- (146-76).At best,it seems,voters hold representatives posed to have.If"most citizens support a party not be- accountable for a fairly narrow set of outcomes(Healy cause they have carefully calculated that its policy posi- and Malhotra 2013):at worst,for nothing at all-or for tions are closest to their own.but rather because 'their outcomes representatives cannot control.This research kind'of person belongs to that party"-as Achen and thus warrants serious attention,if not a thorough re- Bartels(2016,307)summarize-members of disadvan- thinking of democratic theory (e.g.,Green 2009).Yet taged groups may not always vote in ways that promote even the most resolutely skeptical accounts do not re- their interests.This is concerning,if unsurprising.Yet motely imply that low-knowledge voters would be bet- it hardly implies that their voting behavior is entirely ter off disenfranchised. insensitive to their interests-much less that their in- For one,democratic realists like Achen and Bar- terests will be more reliably protected by others.Vot- tels readily admit some correspondence between pub- ers driven by identity rather than policy will effectively lic opinion and policy outcomes.So long as they must promote their interests as long as the identities they fear electoral defeat,incumbents will adhere to"vague find salient lead them to support parties and candidates limits of permissiveness"set by public opinion,and whose policies promote their interests. though electoral punishment of specific misdeeds is To be sure,this is not always the case.But neither is rare,it does occur in extreme cases (Achen and Bar- it particularly implausible-voters do not choose their tels 2016,318-9).Uncertain about what will tip the bal- identities at random-and it seems especially likely when groups suffer collective disadvantages that ren- 14 One might suggest that a more relevant measure of epistemic der that identity affiliation salient.In such cases,ordi- 四 merit is one's likelihood of voting for a know-nothing authoritarian nary group members will often follow the recommen- populist-implying that black women were the most competent de- dations of respected leaders,many of whom would pass mographic group in the 2016 US Presidential election-but I will not pursue that argument here. any epistemic qualification Brennan could propose. Because this compliance is largely driven by identity On most of Brennan's proposals,this would entail entrusting the interests of the poor,women.and African Americans in the United rather than informed and independent consideration States to rich white men.To preempt the obvious objections,he pro of the issues,of course,leaders have latitude to extract poses that worries about fairness could be resolved by giving extra rents and engage in various deceptions.Voter igno- weight to the votes of those demographic minorities who do qualify rance does have real costs.Barring exceptional circum- to vote.Even if we grant (implausibly)that this solves the problem stances,however-such as a sinister conspiracy among /:sany however,it does so only by exacerbating another:clearly,entrusting electoral outcomes to complex algorithms only widens the opportu- group leaders-it need not render their votes counter- nity (and incentive)for manipulation. productive,as Brennan suggests.Perhaps working-class 899

The Power of the Multitude to disenfranchise the (already disempowered) groups to which they disproportionately belong. Brennan glibly dismisses this “demographic objec￾tion.” He announces repeatedly, for instance, that by his “objective,” “morally relevant” standards, black women are the least “competent” voters in the US, and that his proposals would therefore disenfranchise them in large numbers (2016, 33, 132–3, 148, 227–8). Rather than taking this opportunity to reexamine his epistemological premises, however, he assures readers of his excellent implicit bias scores, and asserts that disadvantaged citizens cannot vote in ways that pro￾mote their interests “unless they have tremendous so￾cial scientific knowledge” (227).14 Remedying their dis￾advantages thus requires disenfranchising them—and thereby entrusting their interests to better-informed voters.15 Such claims are, quite frankly, preposterous, and one may be tempted simply to ignore them. In my view, however, it is worth showing why they are not supported by the empirical evidence Brennan cites, since this research does challenge many common as￾sumptions about democracy, and it should not be dis￾missed along with Brennan’s conclusions. It is well established, for instance, that most voters know too little about policy to make meaningful choices be￾tween parties on that basis—meaning that there is no “bedrock” of public opinion to which representa￾tives might faithfully respond (Disch 2011). Accord￾ing to Achen and Bartels (2016), moreover, the min￾imalistic model favored by many political scientists— retrospective accountability—is also typically oversold (146–76). At best, it seems, voters hold representatives accountable for a fairly narrow set of outcomes (Healy and Malhotra 2013); at worst, for nothing at all—or for outcomes representatives cannot control.This research thus warrants serious attention, if not a thorough re￾thinking of democratic theory (e.g., Green 2009). Yet even the most resolutely skeptical accounts do not re￾motely imply that low-knowledge voters would be bet￾ter off disenfranchised. For one, democratic realists like Achen and Bar￾tels readily admit some correspondence between pub￾lic opinion and policy outcomes. So long as they must fear electoral defeat, incumbents will adhere to “vague limits of permissiveness” set by public opinion, and though electoral punishment of specific misdeeds is rare, it does occur in extreme cases (Achen and Bar￾tels 2016, 318–9). Uncertain about what will tip the bal- 14 One might suggest that a more relevant measure of epistemic merit is one’s likelihood of voting for a know-nothing authoritarian populist—implying that black women were the most competent de￾mographic group in the 2016 US Presidential election—but I will not pursue that argument here. 15 On most of Brennan’s proposals, this would entail entrusting the interests of the poor, women, and African Americans in the United States to rich white men. To preempt the obvious objections, he pro￾poses that worries about fairness could be resolved by giving extra weight to the votes of those demographic minorities who do qualify to vote. Even if we grant (implausibly) that this solves the problem, however, it does so only by exacerbating another: clearly, entrusting electoral outcomes to complex algorithms only widens the opportu￾nity (and incentive) for manipulation. ance from victory into defeat, politicians carefully man￾age their reputations, aiming to satisfy a range of in￾terest groups without upsetting others too profoundly (Oppenheimer and Edwards 2012, 206–18). Even if the franchise does not meaningfully empower indi￾viduals, therefore, it does give non-negligible leverage to groups. That said, we may grant that enfranchisement of￾ten brings surprisingly few benefits. For instance, nineteenth-century socialists and reactionaries both as￾sumed working class suffrage would yield far more ex￾tensive redistribution than it did. We may also grant that most voters are sociotropic, meaning that their votes are directed at a common good, rather than their own self-interest. Yet even Brennan acknowledges that there is clearly some connection between enfranchise￾ment and group interests, observing for instance that “if we deprive all black people of the right to vote […] this will help facilitate people of other races in exploiting, dominating, and oppressing blacks” (2016, 97–8). Nothing could be more obvious, of course, but given Brennan’s assumptions, it cries out for explana￾tion: Why might this be? Alas, it seems, not everyone votes sociotropically—and even when we do, our views of the “common good” are inevitably biased (Bagg 2018b). In sum, empirical research in public opinion and political psychology does not dispute that groups— even those with below-average political knowledge— can use the electoral system to advance their inter￾ests. What the research does throw into question is the rational grounding such processes are often sup￾posed to have. If “most citizens support a party not be￾cause they have carefully calculated that its policy posi￾tions are closest to their own, but rather because ‘their kind’ of person belongs to that party”—as Achen and Bartels (2016, 307) summarize—members of disadvan￾taged groups may not always vote in ways that promote their interests. This is concerning, if unsurprising. Yet it hardly implies that their voting behavior is entirely insensitive to their interests—much less that their in￾terests will be more reliably protected by others. Vot￾ers driven by identity rather than policy will effectively promote their interests as long as the identities they find salient lead them to support parties and candidates whose policies promote their interests. To be sure, this is not always the case. But neither is it particularly implausible—voters do not choose their identities at random—and it seems especially likely when groups suffer collective disadvantages that ren￾der that identity affiliation salient. In such cases, ordi￾nary group members will often follow the recommen￾dations of respected leaders,many of whom would pass any epistemic qualification Brennan could propose. Because this compliance is largely driven by identity rather than informed and independent consideration of the issues, of course, leaders have latitude to extract rents and engage in various deceptions. Voter igno￾rance does have real costs. Barring exceptional circum￾stances, however—such as a sinister conspiracy among group leaders—it need not render their votes counter￾productive, as Brennan suggests. Perhaps working-class 899 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000527

Samuel Bagg voters could have done better than the social demo- cieties and.within this context.rules or structures pro- cratic parties of the early twentieth century-just as hibiting centralized redistribution between groups will contemporary African Americans could do much bet- predictably facilitate the entrenchment of elite power. ter than the Democrats-but it is idle to pretend that Accordingly.such limits can be considered mechanisms such allegiances have no basis whatsoever in genuine of state capture protection of group interests. Advocates of limited government may object to We may admit,then,that members of disadvantaged this description.Even if elites benefit disproportion- groups often vote in suboptimal ways-just like every- ately from state protection of property,they do not one else.As we have seen,however,it is highly unlikely have arbitrary control over state action.Given a sit- that instituting epistemic conditions on the franchise uation of highly asymmetrical social power,indeed. would reliably and significantly improve average vote it might seem that increasing the state's centralized quality.It is far more likely that they would be used power would only give elites more powerful tools with to entrench the power of incumbents-potentially so which to dominate others.We should not brush this effectively as to endanger the competitiveness of elec- concern aside,given that discretionary state power has tions.Restricting the political rights of low-knowledge often been used in precisely this way(e.g.,Somin 2015). disadvantaged groups,therefore,would bring risks for Nevertheless,historical experience also provides evi- those groups (and for the polity as a whole)that are dence of opposing tendencies. far out of proportion to any hypothesized benefits.In In the infamous Lochner era between 1897 and 1937 sofar as Brennan's epistocratic proposals are intended for instance,the US Supreme Court repeatedly over- for the real world,we must resoundingly reject them. turned redistributive legislation favored by wide ma- jorities.Interestingly,some justices saw themselves as defending the "general"interest-namely,economic Limited Government and the Necessity of growth-against labor's attempts to capture the state 4号 Robust Discretionary Power in service of its"partial"interests(Rahman 2016,64) In hindsight,however,it is far more plausible to under- We turn,finally,to the idea of limited government- stand these conservative justices as agents of state cap- that is,constraining and decentralizing political power ture,defending the partial interests of industrial capi- through mechanisms like federalism,local governance. talists at the expense of nearly everyone else.For one, and judicial review,while encouraging greater reliance growth inevitably creates winners and losers,and can- on competitive markets and interjurisdictional foot- not be understood as a"neutral"policy that is always voting.As Ilya Somin argues,this could "reduce the in the "general"interest.Meanwhile,labor's eventual problem of public ignorance by reducing the number victories did not demonstrably slow growth,and in of issues to be decided by government to a level that fact seemed to facilitate widely shared prosperity.Of voters would find more manageable"(2013,141;see course,"state capture"is no more self-interpreting than also Caplan 2007,192-7).Indeed,something like this any other normatively laden concept,and as I have ac- solution may appear as the logical extension of my ar- knowledged,there will always be disagreement about gument:if epistocracy is dangerous because it enables how to apply it in practice.Nevertheless,it is broadly state actors to accumulate excessive centralized power. accepted that Lochner-era jurisprudence protected the 1.101g perhaps the solution is to place tighter constraints on interests of a small economic elite at the expense of a those actors. vast majority (Sunstein 1987). As I demonstrate,however,the problems of en- Nor is it the only example of US elites em- trenchment and capture are not so easily resolved. ploying techniques of "limited government"-that is, While certain limits on discretionary state power are constraining and decentralizing political power-to en- advisable,others would actually facilitate the entrench- trench their dominance.Southerners have long ap- ment of various elites,and ultimately the capture of pealed to federalism in defending the institutions of the state itself.Thus,I argue that resisting state cap- white supremacy,for instance,while metropolitan elites ture requires a delicate balance between "defensive" routinely use the principle of local governance to strategies that limit the state's discretionary power,and thwart the efforts of disadvantaged groups to claim a "offensive"strategies that use this discretionary power greater share of regional resources (Anderson 2010 to target the potential perpetrators of capture-that is, Hayward 2013).Here too,of course,opponents of re- the possessors of concentrated private power. distribution by centralized federal or municipal author- Consider first that even a"minimal"state-one con- ities may claim that it represents a pernicious form stitutionally limited,perhaps,to defining and enforc- of state capture-and here too,their claims are thor- ing property rights-would still play a crucial role in oughly implausible.Though the federal government the distribution of power,and would hardly be neutral coercively imposed the Civil Rights Act upon states,for between differently situated actors.Such a state would instance,few today would dispute that it was the state- enable privileged elites to perpetuate their social and level Jim Crow laws overturned by the Act which more economic advantages quite effectively,while coercively clearly embodied the use of coercive centralized power preventing any redistributive efforts-legal or extra- by a privileged class to perpetuate its (perceived)inter- legal-undertaken by coalitions of the disempowered. ests at the expense of others. More generally,state protection of private property is The point of these examples is not to show that lim- fundamental to the social order in nearly all modern so- its on discretionary power are always mechanisms of 900

Samuel Bagg voters could have done better than the social demo￾cratic parties of the early twentieth century—just as contemporary African Americans could do much bet￾ter than the Democrats—but it is idle to pretend that such allegiances have no basis whatsoever in genuine protection of group interests. We may admit, then, that members of disadvantaged groups often vote in suboptimal ways—just like every￾one else. As we have seen, however, it is highly unlikely that instituting epistemic conditions on the franchise would reliably and significantly improve average vote quality. It is far more likely that they would be used to entrench the power of incumbents—potentially so effectively as to endanger the competitiveness of elec￾tions. Restricting the political rights of low-knowledge disadvantaged groups, therefore, would bring risks for those groups (and for the polity as a whole) that are far out of proportion to any hypothesized benefits. In￾sofar as Brennan’s epistocratic proposals are intended for the real world, we must resoundingly reject them. Limited Government and the Necessity of Robust Discretionary Power We turn, finally, to the idea of limited government— that is, constraining and decentralizing political power through mechanisms like federalism, local governance, and judicial review, while encouraging greater reliance on competitive markets and interjurisdictional foot￾voting. As Ilya Somin argues, this could “reduce the problem of public ignorance by reducing the number of issues to be decided by government to a level that voters would find more manageable” (2013, 141; see also Caplan 2007, 192–7). Indeed, something like this solution may appear as the logical extension of my ar￾gument: if epistocracy is dangerous because it enables state actors to accumulate excessive centralized power, perhaps the solution is to place tighter constraints on those actors. As I demonstrate, however, the problems of en￾trenchment and capture are not so easily resolved. While certain limits on discretionary state power are advisable, others would actually facilitate the entrench￾ment of various elites, and ultimately the capture of the state itself. Thus, I argue that resisting state cap￾ture requires a delicate balance between “defensive” strategies that limit the state’s discretionary power, and “offensive” strategies that use this discretionary power to target the potential perpetrators of capture—that is, the possessors of concentrated private power. Consider first that even a “minimal” state—one con￾stitutionally limited, perhaps, to defining and enforc￾ing property rights—would still play a crucial role in the distribution of power, and would hardly be neutral between differently situated actors. Such a state would enable privileged elites to perpetuate their social and economic advantages quite effectively, while coercively preventing any redistributive efforts—legal or extra￾legal—undertaken by coalitions of the disempowered. More generally, state protection of private property is fundamental to the social order in nearly all modern so￾cieties and, within this context, rules or structures pro￾hibiting centralized redistribution between groups will predictably facilitate the entrenchment of elite power. Accordingly, such limits can be considered mechanisms of state capture. Advocates of limited government may object to this description. Even if elites benefit disproportion￾ately from state protection of property, they do not have arbitrary control over state action. Given a sit￾uation of highly asymmetrical social power, indeed, it might seem that increasing the state’s centralized power would only give elites more powerful tools with which to dominate others. We should not brush this concern aside, given that discretionary state power has often been used in precisely this way (e.g., Somin 2015). Nevertheless, historical experience also provides evi￾dence of opposing tendencies. In the infamous Lochner era between 1897 and 1937, for instance, the US Supreme Court repeatedly over￾turned redistributive legislation favored by wide ma￾jorities. Interestingly, some justices saw themselves as defending the “general” interest—namely, economic growth—against labor’s attempts to capture the state in service of its “partial” interests (Rahman 2016, 64). In hindsight, however, it is far more plausible to under￾stand these conservative justices as agents of state cap￾ture, defending the partial interests of industrial capi￾talists at the expense of nearly everyone else. For one, growth inevitably creates winners and losers, and can￾not be understood as a “neutral” policy that is always in the “general” interest. Meanwhile, labor’s eventual victories did not demonstrably slow growth, and in fact seemed to facilitate widely shared prosperity. Of course, “state capture”is no more self-interpreting than any other normatively laden concept, and as I have ac￾knowledged, there will always be disagreement about how to apply it in practice. Nevertheless, it is broadly accepted that Lochner-era jurisprudence protected the interests of a small economic elite at the expense of a vast majority (Sunstein 1987). Nor is it the only example of US elites em￾ploying techniques of “limited government”—that is, constraining and decentralizing political power—to en￾trench their dominance. Southerners have long ap￾pealed to federalism in defending the institutions of white supremacy, for instance,while metropolitan elites routinely use the principle of local governance to thwart the efforts of disadvantaged groups to claim a greater share of regional resources (Anderson 2010; Hayward 2013). Here too, of course, opponents of re￾distribution by centralized federal or municipal author￾ities may claim that it represents a pernicious form of state capture—and here too, their claims are thor￾oughly implausible. Though the federal government coercively imposed the Civil Rights Act upon states, for instance, few today would dispute that it was the state￾level Jim Crow laws overturned by the Act which more clearly embodied the use of coercive centralized power by a privileged class to perpetuate its (perceived) inter￾ests at the expense of others. The point of these examples is not to show that lim￾its on discretionary power are always mechanisms of 900 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000527